

**THE  
CAMBRIDGE  
MODERN HISTORY**



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,

C. F. CLAY, MANAGER.

London: FETTER LANE, E.C.

Edinburgh: 100, PRINCES STREET.



Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.

Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS.

Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.

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THE  
CAMBRIDGE  
MODERN HISTORY

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VOLUME XI  
THE GROWTH OF NATIONALITIES

CAMBRIDGE  
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS  
1909

Cambridge :

PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

## PREFACE.

THE quarter of a century which, roughly speaking, is covered by this volume is remarkable as being an epoch of violent international and civic disturbance, interposed between two generations of almost unbroken peace—the period 1815–45, and that from 1871 to the present day. It is also, from the point of view of Universal History, the most important period since the Congress of Vienna. Indeed, the changes made in the map of Europe between 1859 and 1871 were in some respects greater and more permanent than the final results of the warfare which ended in that great pacification. The effects produced by the French Revolution and the reign of the first Napoleon in the domain of political ideas—especially in regard to notions of self-government and the spirit of nationality—were indeed immense and enduring. But the alterations which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars made in the distribution of power and in international relations were too sweeping to last. They called forth a hostile reaction as overwhelming as the impulse which produced them; and the balance of power which resulted from the Congress of Vienna differed in no essential respects from that which existed before 1789.

The following generation saw some notable changes in political conditions—the overthrow of Legitimism in France; the separation of Holland and Belgium; the liberation of Greece from the Turk, and other reductions of Ottoman power. But, thirty years after the Congress, its work still remained almost intact. The revolutionary and nationalist efforts in Poland and Italy had failed; the unitary movement in Germany had made little progress except in the Zollverein, the political effect of which was as yet hardly perceived; reform and reaction were still at grips in the Iberian peninsula; the obstinate conservatism of Metternich continued to dominate Europe.

But with the Revolution of February a new stage in European development begins. The next four years (1848–52) were a period of

violent oscillation—not so much in international relations as in the domestic affairs of France, Italy, and central Europe. Already, for some years previously, the mutterings of the coming storm could be perceived by those who had ears to hear; but there was no apparent reason to suppose that the new efforts of political reformers and ardent nationalists would be more successful than those which had preceded them. Nor indeed were they, so far as superficial appearances went. The outbreak of 1848 was far more violent and more widespread than the movements of 1820 and 1830; but, though for some time the revolutionary element seemed to be gaining the upper hand, the tide ultimately turned and the reaction everywhere prevailed. The Austrian monarchy, after a severe struggle, not only reestablished itself in its own dominions but recovered its hold upon northern Italy. In Bohemia the rising spirit of Slav nationality led to a futile revolt; elsewhere in the Austrian dominions it served as a set-off against the Magyar; and, with the aid of Russia, the insurrection in Hungary was put down. Thus strengthened and encouraged, Francis Joseph had little difficulty in regaining the hegemony of Germany, and reducing Prussia at Olmütz to her former secondary position. In France the Republic collapsed, more from its inherent weakness and the mistakes of its leaders, than from any active opposition; and another Napoleon advanced, by rapid stages, from Presidency to Empire. This was the most notable change produced by the Revolution of February; but two others had consequences ultimately as important. In Germany Prussia, in Italy Piedmont, had stood forth as the champions of national unity; and each had adopted a constitutional form of government. In their nationalist efforts both countries failed—Piedmont heroically, Prussia not without humiliation; but each remained the centre of nationalist hopes. These events, combined with the aims and character of Napoleon III, the circumstances of his accession, and the appearance, in Italy and Prussia, of two of the greatest statesmen of modern times, determined the course of European development during the next eighteen years (1852–70).

This period (that of the Second Empire) falls into two divisions, marked respectively by the rise and dominance, the decay and fall, of Napoleon's power. Anxious to allay the fears excited by his name, he began by proclaiming the pacific intentions of the Empire. But he could not forget that military distinction was expected from a Napoleon, or disregard the conviction of Frenchmen that France ought to be the

arbiter of Europe. He therefore grasped the opportunity of self-assertion afforded by the state of Turkey and the question of the Holy Places, and, departing from the policy of Louis-Philippe, made war, in conjunction with Great Britain, on Russia in defence of the Turk. The internal dissensions and the vacillating policy of the British Ministry had left the initiative in the preliminary negotiations to Napoleon; and he retained it throughout the armed conflict which ended, to the dearly-bought advantage of the Allies, in the Treaty of Paris. That the Peace of 1856 was not more unfavourable to Russia was due to Napoleon's desire to leave the way open for a complete reconciliation with the defeated Power. -

With a reputation considerably enhanced both at home and abroad by this success, his throne apparently established, and the succession secured by the birth of a son, Napoleon now set about carrying into effect a policy which he conceived to be a heritage from his uncle and at the same time worthy of France—namely, the championship of oppressed nationalities. The most flagrant example of a nationality oppressed, and that which most nearly concerned France, was to be found in Italy. Hence the understanding with Sardinia, foreshadowed at the Conference of Paris, which led to the war of 1859. The Peace of Villafranca left the work of emancipation incomplete and Napoleon's promises only half fulfilled. When the Emperor retired, the work of liberating Italy was taken up by a stronger and more determined spirit, that of Cavour, whose vigorous and astute policy had, ever since the dark days of Novara, prepared his country for the coming struggle. The union of Italy was brought about by a skilful mixture of audacity and caution, of war and diplomacy, of action and reserve; and Cavour lived to see his work accomplished, save that at his death the Austrians were still in Venice, and a French garrison in Rome. Napoleon's scheme of liberating an oppressed nationality had prospered far beyond his original intention or desire; and the annexation of Savoy and Nice hardly compensated for the closing of the door to French ambitions in the peninsula.

Cavour had used Napoleon in order to carry out his schemes for the union of Italy. Meanwhile, in the north, another great statesman was watching events and forming his plans for still more momentous action. In the year after Cavour's death, Bismarck was called to power in Prussia. His first task was to forge the military weapon without which his policy of "blood and iron" could not hope to succeed. Abroad he recognised

the supreme importance to Prussia of a good understanding with her eastern neighbour; and the Polish insurrection of 1863 gave him the opportunity of cementing the friendship with Russia for which Prussia's attitude in the Crimean War had paved the way. But Bismarck's originality showed itself most momentously in the policy which he adopted towards Austria. In the debate between the parties of "Great" and "Little" Germany, Bismarck ruled the former decisively out of court. No longer obsequious to the traditions of the Holy Roman Empire, Prussia was to revive those of Frederick the Great and to strike boldly for the headship of Germany.

The revival in 1863 of the Schleswig-Holstein question, which had played an important part in the German movement of 1848, gave Bismarck the opportunity of putting this policy into execution, and of testing the capacities of his new army in the field. The duchies once taken from Denmark, it was not difficult to pick a quarrel with Austria over their tenure. Austria, attacked on two sides, was victorious at Custoza, but her crushing defeat at Königgrätz decided the German question against her; and Prussia, strengthened by annexations in northern Germany, became the unquestioned head of a new confederation. As for Italy, though defeated, she had her reward in Venetia.

It was France—it has been well said—rather than Austria, that was beaten at Königgrätz; and Napoleon was not slow in perceiving that the result was one which menaced the power and even the security of France. He had vainly intervened in regard to Poland in 1863—an action which only served to alienate Russia. His refusal to interfere in the question of the duchies in the following year offended England without conciliating Germany. Meanwhile difficulties, at home and abroad, gathered round the Second Empire. In the Legislative Body an opposition, hardly perceptible at first, was gradually growing in numbers and influence. The ill-advised and unfortunate expedition to Mexico was draining his resources and undermining his influence. To the Emperor, then, it seemed increasingly necessary that France should obtain some compensation for the growth of her neighbours in territory and power. The compensation which he specially coveted lay on the left bank of the Rhine, or in Belgium. When the Seven Weeks' War broke out, Napoleon looked to a prolonged struggle which would enable him to intervene between the exhausted combatants at his own price. But he was not prepared for action, and his hopes were dashed by the

rapid conclusion of peace. Subsequently he opened secret negotiations with Prussia, but Bismarck bluntly repelled the suggestions to which he had formerly appeared to listen, and made use of them to bring the States of southern Germany into a close military alliance with Prussia.

From this moment a conflict between France and Germany became practically inevitable. To the majority of Napoleon's advisers it appeared essential that the consummation of German unity should at all costs be prevented. Bismarck looked to a war with France as the only way to its accomplishment. The conflict appeared likely to break out over the question of Luxemburg (1867); but Bismarck was not ready, nor did he regard the matter as one likely to enlist the ardent sympathy of the whole German nation. He accordingly accepted a compromise and awaited a better occasion. Meanwhile in France, the system of government was rapidly passing, under the increasing pressure of the parliamentary opposition, from an autocracy into a constitutional monarchy, without, however, any gain of popularity for the Emperor, whose concessions appeared due rather to weakness than generosity. The disastrous failure of his plans in Mexico diminished his resources, and dealt a heavy blow to his reputation.

Dreading a single-handed collision with Prussia, he sought to strengthen himself by alliances. His natural allies were Austria and Italy. With the object of winning over Victor Emmanuel, Napoleon made the Convention of September, and removed his troops from Rome. But Garibaldi was not to be restrained; and Mentana forged anew the fatal link which bound Napoleon to the Vatican. So long as French troops held the gates of Rome, there could be no alliance between France and Italy. Austria lent a more willing ear; and overtures made with the utmost secrecy at Vienna seemed to promise a hopeful result. Time however was needed for Austria to prepare; and time was not to be allowed.

Secret as the negotiations were, Bismarck was awake to the fact that a league against him was in contemplation, and he resolved to anticipate it. The Revolution in Spain and the difficulty of finding anyone to fill the vacant but precarious Spanish throne, gave him the opportunity of fastening a quarrel on France, which would appear to put that country in the wrong, and would give him that whole-hearted support in Germany which was requisite for a successful war. The last phase in the



episode of the Hohenzollern candidature was so managed as to produce this twofold result; and the war for which Bismarck had so long been preparing burst on an astonished Europe. A series of overwhelming victories hurled the Empire to the ground; the heroic resistance of France was, with more difficulty, overcome; and Paris itself fell into the invaders' hands. Already German unity—the great result at which Bismarck had aimed—had sprung from the triumph of combined Germanic effort; and the new Empire was proclaimed amid the painted victories of the *Roi Soleil*. In Paris the horrors of the Commune followed, like the fire after the earthquake, on the disasters of the war; and, when the Commune fell, royalist intrigues threatened and embarrassed the French Government. It was only slowly and with difficulty that the Third Republic established itself, and the maimed and shattered State recovered domestic repose. But the hegemony of Europe—if indeed Napoleon III had ever really possessed it—had definitively passed across the Rhine.

Directly connected with that nationalistic policy which is so striking a feature of the central story of this volume are the awakenings and developments of national spirit or enthusiasm in the life and literature of Italy, Germany, and Hungary, and also among the Slavonic races—Čechs, Poles, and Russians—to which attention is drawn in the following narrative. Much else of interest and importance—notably the Mutiny in India, the steady advance of British colonies towards self-government, the rapid progress of British trade, the awakening of Japan and the revolution in that country which substituted a highly organised modern State for a loose congeries of feudal principalities—is also to be told. The great contemporary events in America, the Civil War and the victory of the Northern States over slavery and the forces of disruption, have already been narrated in another volume.

It remains only for the Editors to acknowledge their debts to the distinguished scholars who have aided them in this portion of their enterprise. Sir Alfred Lyall, acting as the literary executor of the late Sir Spencer Walpole, gave final revision to Chapters XI and XII. The Bibliographies to these chapters were compiled by Professor J. H. Clapham (now Assistant Tutor of King's College) to whom we are also indebted for valuable suggestions and criticisms with regard to these and other chapters in the present volume. In connexion with the same two chapters valuable information was given as to the Income Tax and Succession

Duty by Mr T. A. Prest, of Somerset House. To Mr R. W. Seton-Watson, who kindly read through Chapter XV, 1 and Chapter XXII, 4, we owe some valuable suggestions upon these sections. The latter section had the additional benefit of revision by Professor Askenazy, of Lemberg University. We are much indebted to Mr Ignatius Knaster for his services in connexion with this section. Dr Zsolt Beöthy, Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Budapest, gave valuable assistance in Chapter XV, 3, and allowed some quotations from his own works to appear therein. Dr Eugen Horváth, Professor in the Gyöngyös Gymnasium, Hungary, rendered assistance, especially in the Bibliographies to Chapters III, VI, VII, XV. To Professors H. Delbrück, of Berlin, and F. Meinecke, of Freiburg, the Editors owe special thanks for their counsel as to several of the chapters on recent German history.

In Chapter XXVII, 1, Mr E. A. Benians, Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge, offered valuable suggestions. The Right Honourable Sir Charles Tupper revised the whole of Chapter XXVII, 2, and inserted in it some new information derived from his own vast experience in Canadian politics. Chapter XXVII, 3 was carefully revised by Mr F. H. Keeling, Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge; and the accompanying Bibliography was in large part composed by him and by Mr T. A. Boosé, Librarian of the Colonial Institute. It may be well to state that, though the lamented death of Professor Masi occurred before this volume was published, Chapters IV, XIV, and XIX had received the benefit of his final revision. The Index to this volume has been compiled by Mr H. G. Aldis, of Peterhouse and the University Library, who has also given other assistance.

Finally, we desire to state that, in consequence of the illness of one of our number, his editorial duties with regard to the present volume were, from an early stage in the progress of its chapters through the Press, undertaken by Mr H. W. V. Temperley, Fellow of Peterhouse. He has discharged the task which thus devolved upon him with conspicuous ability and devotion, and we desire to assure him of our cordial gratitude.

A. W. W.  
G. W. P.  
S. L.



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## CHAPTER I.

### GREAT BRITAIN AND FREE TRADE.

(1841-52.)

John Wilson Croker said that in July, 1841, for "the first time in our history that he remembered the people had chosen the first minister for the Sovereign." His testimony is not a proof; but without doubt the majority of over eighty with which Peel came to power was in a special sense his own. The nation that had learnt to distrust the Whigs trusted him. In boroughs and counties, in the City and in Yorkshire, at Dublin and in Northumberland, strong candidates went down before his supporters. There was hard work for him to do, and his fitness for the trust was to be severely tested.

It was the census year. The returns showed no appreciable slackening in the growth of the population. The full truth about the "state of England question" was being steadily told to the rulers of England through their own commissioners and committees, by the Press and in fiction, by the voice of agitation and the noise of riot. Of the textile factories something had long been known. In February, 1841, Nassau Senior and his colleagues signed the report describing the long-drawn tragedy of the hand-loom weavers. Next year appeared the record of the darker tragedy of the women and children in the coal and iron mines, followed in 1843 by the longer, less notorious, but equally pitiful story of child-labour in all branches of manufacture. That same year a commissioner sent down to South Staffordshire to find out why there had been tumultuous strikes at the collieries reported, among other things, that fifty-seven per cent. of deaths among the miners were due to accidents in the pits. Special Poor Law Commissioners brought to light the presence of children of all ages and both sexes in the nomadic agricultural gangs that facilitated the quick and economic working of the great farms of East Anglia and the fen country. Edwin Chadwick wrote unspeakable things about urban burials. In 1844 and 1845 reports on the state and health of the populous districts told how the many mill-dams on the Aire acted "as a series of catch-pits for the sewage of 120,000 persons," and how "in one part of Manchester the wants of upwards of 7000 people" were "supplied by thirty-three necessaries only."



From the harvest of 1838 to that of 1842 the price of wheat was higher than it had been for any equally long period since 1820. Owing to a combination of causes, foreign trade was absolutely stagnant. In most industries work was intermittent, and in hardly any were wages rising; while in such declining crafts as hand-loom weaving and frame-work knitting their fall was conspicuous. The Whig beginnings of factory legislation were but little less unpopular among those whom they were meant to help than the Whig poor law. Gaunt, new, workhouses—*Bastilles* they called them in the north—were full. In 1842 a heap of 150,000 tons of stone broken by paupers was to be seen at Leeds; at Paisley—not a large town—for many months 8—9000 souls were supported by charity. Chartists had preached a general strike for the Charter, and rioting seemed endemic. A single letter from the Home Secretary to the Queen (1842) reports “vigorous measures” at Preston; “no lives lost” at Blackburn; “peace preserved” at Manchester; house-burnings in the Potteries; an attack by the mob on Huddersfield, and “some disturbance” at Warwick. No wonder the experience of his first year of office was burnt into Peel’s widened and liberalised mind, or that, even with his working-day of fifteen or sixteen hours, what he did in the way of domestic legislation was so small compared with what he had to leave undone.

The Cabinet was strong in experience and promise, in administrative capacity and in debate. Peel chose it almost without assistance. Wellington offered to lead the Lords without office, thus giving Peel, as he said, “a ready answer to all else who could not receive” places. Graham, Peel’s most trusted adviser and administrator and closest personal friend within the Cabinet, took the post of danger at the Home Office. The Admiralty and the Under-Secretaryship of the Board of Trade went to young men, Sidney Herbert and Gladstone. Stanley’s eminent but erratic talent and brilliant powers of debate were in a sense wasted as War and Colonial Secretary, at a time when, as Peel told Gladstone, “the chief importance would attach to questions of finance.” Goulburn, at the Exchequer, was only Peel’s occasional mouthpiece. In the Lords, High Toryism was represented, among others, by Lyndhurst and Buckingham, Conservatism of Peel’s stamp by the Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen. Aberdeen had no Under-Secretary in the Commons, a fact which a rejected candidate for that post traced to Peel’s desire to face Palmerston himself. Perhaps he was right; for Sir Robert habitually kept his hand on the reins of all the offices.

A readjustment of the Corn Laws was only one aspect of the work of economical reform to which Peel rightly believed himself called; but the deathbed conversion of the Whigs, the state of the nation, the fears of the landowners, the activity and popularity of the Anti-Corn Law League, and the presence of Cobden in Parliament gave the corn question the first place in public interest. Nearly a hundred members of the Commons were ready to vote for repeal, and there was bitter

complaint at Westminster and in the country that no policy was indicated in the autumn of 1841. But a policy was maturing. Peel and Graham agreed with the League so far as to be resolved to quicken the purchasing power of the masses by lightening the taxes on their food. They sympathised with commercial freedom, but were not as yet prepared to throw the corn trade entirely open—for reasons both of principle and of party. Peel was convinced that Britain could never again dispense with foreign grain, save perhaps in years of exceptionally abundant harvest. The not ignoble dream of a self-sufficing land was for him finally dissolved. But knowing his followers, his “inferior animals” as Cobden called them, he would not suggest so drastic a change as he might himself have welcomed. He proposed merely a not very serious modification of those sliding duties on corn that he had helped to establish in 1828. Even this offended many of his party, the more so as it did not stand alone. Buckingham left the Cabinet; and the League denounced Peel savagely for insulting a starving people with a paltry concession.

The Corn Bill was not the chief financial event of 1842. Whig finance had produced a series of deficits and lowered the national credit. Before taking office, Peel had decided that he must employ the sound method of reducing duties to increase revenue—Pitt’s method and Huskisson’s—and that, to meet any resulting deficiency and prevent more deficits, the unpopular Income Tax must be temporarily revived. It was not a novel scheme. Peel was no inventor. A revived property tax had been approved in the Cabinet during Goderich’s short ministry; it had been favoured but feared by Althorp; its combination with a revised tariff had been explained by Sir Henry Parnell in 1830; and a belated attempt to raise revenue by lowering duties had been made by Baring in 1841, in consequence of the great report of Hume’s Import Duties Committee in 1840. To Peel belongs the credit of the thing done—done amid the gloomy doubts of friends and the angry criticism of adversaries. With the tariff he only made a beginning in 1842. Most of the export duties were abolished. Moderate import duties replaced prohibitions, notably in the cases of cattle, meat, and other foodstuffs. The duties on raw materials were reduced, and so were most of the duties on partly manufactured or finished articles. Incidentally, this curtailed protection of manufactures was meant to justify the reduction of the food taxes.

In 1843 and 1844 the tariff policy of 1842 was pushed somewhat further. Canadian wheat was admitted at 1s. instead of 5s. a quarter; and the last restrictions on the export of machinery were abolished in 1843. The great advance however was in 1845. By that time home and foreign trade had revived; there had been three satisfactory harvests; deficits had ceased; and Peel could act boldly. Hundreds of petty unremunerative duties disappeared; so did the export duties (except that on coal), and nearly all the raw material duties. To render these reductions safe, the Income Tax was renewed for three more years.

Meanwhile, the exceptional treatment of corn became more conspicuously anomalous, to the Minister as well as to the nation. Already in 1842 he was discussing the next move with Graham. Graham held that it must be the last—the move to “an open trade.” He thought it might safely be taken after two or three more sessions.

In 1844, £250,000,000 of consols were reduced from  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cents. In 1845 the lucrative excise on glass was abandoned; and there were some other financial reforms in these three decisive years. Wholesale lowering of import duties involved a reduction in the amount of the preferences given to colonial produce; but the preferential principle was retained—in the case of Canadian corn it was extended.

As events demonstrated the soundness of his financial policy, Peel's sympathy with the economic doctrines of his Manchester critics increased. But he was not the man to put all measures of government to the test of general principles, and he never made *laissez faire* his watchword. No continuous thread of principle can be traced through the internal economic legislation of 1842–5. One watches the able, concrete, unimaginative minds of the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary dealing with a series of separate problems, leaning no doubt towards *laissez faire*, but with no prejudice against state control; while around them the convictions and passions of landowners and millowners and merchants influence their decisions on railway bills, factory bills, and bank bills.

When Peel had last been in office, during 1835, there was only one railway line that regularly carried passengers, the Liverpool and Manchester. In the late thirties and early forties successive sections of railway were opened along the great trunk routes of communication. By the end of 1843 nearly 2000 miles of line were available; and five years later the open mileage was 5007. Peel's Ministry did not deal very successfully with this new and powerful social force. A small party in the country favoured state ownership; others wished the State to decide authoritatively where, when, and how lines should be built. Some control over existing lines was secured by the Act of 1844, that created the parliamentary train and gave the State the eventual right to purchase all the lines in the country. But, during the “railway mania” of 1845, an attempt made by Dalhousie, Gladstone's successor at the Board of Trade, to introduce some order and method into the reckless business of railway projection was frustrated by Peel's resolve to leave the final decision entirely to the Private Bill Committees of the House of Commons, which pursued no sort of consistent policy. Yet, in spite of injudicious and dishonest enterprises and vast waste of capital, the rapid construction of the railway network put new life into commerce and manufactures, gave much well-paid employment, and so helped to keep food prices higher than they had been ten years earlier.

Graham's Factory Act of 1844 for the first time regulated the working hours of women and created the half-time system for children.

It was bitterly attacked, on one side by the ten hours' party, on the other by the Manchester men. Next year print-works were brought under the factory law, the first non-textile works to be so treated. In 1842-3 Ashley had succeeded in passing the more revolutionary Act, which forbade child or female labour underground and laid the foundation of mine inspection, thanks to general disgust at the facts revealed in 1842. An attempt to associate important educational provisions with Graham's Bill failed because the Nonconformists resented the privileged position assigned to the Church. In all these measures the Government was pushed forward, somewhat against its will, by the philanthropists of both parties and by those Tories who were glad to attack the interests and deride the humanitarian professions of the free-traders.

The Bank Acts of 1844-5, Peel's handiwork, also raised bitter passions and controversies. They established the existing system of note issue for the United Kingdom, the regulation of the English notes being arranged so as to concentrate issue at the Bank of England. In Threadneedle Street issuing and general banking were to be kept apart. The Issue Department was to work automatically; it might issue £14,000,000 of notes against securities; beyond that point it must keep gold against every note created. Peel refused to make issue a government function, alleging that, in times of political stress, government notes are more likely to be distrusted and discredited than those of a strong private corporation. Besides regulating the Bank of England, he limited the issues of all other establishments, and stopped the creation of fresh issuing banks; for in every commercial crisis since 1760 the failure of innumerable small banks and the discredit of their notes had done untold harm.

Two of the great events in the religious history of the nineteenth century fell within the first four years of Peel's ministry—the Tractarian crisis and the disruption of the Scottish Church. The former, at this time, was a movement on the religious plane, the latter, a movement about the line where the planes of religion and politics intersect. Though travelling in very different orbits, Tractarian and Free Churchman had this in common—each demanded great zeal of his Church and claimed for it high spiritual prerogatives. For many years the party that called itself Catholic, that the world called Tractarian or Puseyite, had been forming opinion in Oxford. Now, its members were beginning, though half consciously at first, to draw discordant conclusions from common premisses. But already in 1841, when Newman's tract on the Articles roused the academic rulers of Oxford and the episcopal Bench, their premisses—as the *Times* said—had “sunk deep into the heart of the Church of England”; and, although the attacks of their enemies, the mismanagement of their ecclesiastical superiors, and the nature of their own principles drove some of the leaders from that Church in the years

that followed, those who remained continued to influence it profoundly, and by their zeal and devotion increased its vitality, extended its influence, emphasised those aspects of doctrine and ritual that it shares with episcopal communions, ancient and modern, and strengthened the barriers that separate it from the non-episcopal Churches. Once, in these years, the Oxford leaders had to face directly the eternal problem of the bounds of spiritual and temporal power, when their anger was roused by the cooperation of the Primate and the Crown with the royal head of the non-episcopal Prussian Church in establishing a Protestant Bishopric at Jerusalem; but the problem was not so forced upon them as it was upon Scottish churchmen in 1843.

In Scotland, as in England, the apathy and latitudinarianism of the eighteenth century had long been declining. By 1833—Newman's date for the beginning of the Oxford movement—the party of orthodoxy, action and reform, led by Chalmers, had secured a majority in the General Assembly. Between 1835 and 1841 over 200 churches were built for the growing population; sects that had seceded in the days of apathy and Deism were received back into communion; discipline was more strictly enforced, candidates for ordination more severely tested. The ministers of the new churches and of all chapels of ease, as well as the Secession ministers, were given a full share in the work of the presbyteries and the Assembly. In 1834 the Assembly passed the so-called Veto Act, which led directly to the Disruption. It declared that a majority of communicant heads of households could veto the appointment of a minister by a lay patron. Behind this notable decision stood nearly three centuries of theological and political controversy. The Scottish Church had regarded its first alliance with the State as a union of equals; and this view, it was held, the Revolution Settlement (1690) had sanctioned. Since 1711, when the British Parliament had revived the rights of patrons, the Assembly had repeatedly protested against this alleged breach of the Act of Union. Not that patrons had absolute rights; they could only require the presbytery of the district in which the vacant parish lay to take a duly qualified candidate "on his trials." The presbytery might subsequently reject him without appeal as morally or doctrinally unfit. Under the Veto Act a candidate distasteful to the majority of the congregation became *ipso facto* unfit. The object was to make the old practice of a "call" from the people a necessary step in every appointment. The formal document known as a call had always been in use; now it was to become a living reality.

All this was done with the advice of the highest legal opinion in Scotland; and for four years it worked well. Then came a series of decisions in the Scotch Courts and the House of Lords adverse to the legality of the veto, coupled with general assertions by the judges of the supremacy of the civil over the ecclesiastical power in all such matters, which set Scotland on fire. Aberdeen tried to make peace by Act of

Parliament; but his Bill was condemned by the Church and abandoned. By the end of 1841, the Courts had given damages against a presbytery for refusing to obey the law; and the Assembly had suspended a presbytery for obeying the Courts. Soon the Courts were to declare the privileges granted by the Assembly to Chapel and Secession ministers illegal; and the mere question of patronage was merged in the greater question of the spiritual rights of the Church. There were many schemes of conciliation; but on two points Peel and Graham stood fast. The Church Courts must cease to defy the law: in no case would they consent—as Graham put it—to transfer the right of patronage to “a variable and irresponsible multitude,” for they feared ecclesiastical as much as political democracy. Rather than share the privileges of establishment on these terms, half the clergy of Scotland, after recording in the Claim of Right of 1842 their conviction that the Courts and not the Church had violated the Constitution, left the Assembly, their churches, and their manse in May, 1843, to found the Free Church. In the first year 500 churches were built; and the extent and vitality of the secession amazed statesmen who hardly understood the sources of its strength.

When the Tories carried Dublin in 1841, the defeated candidate was O’Connell. At that moment his fortunes and those of Repeal seemed gloomy. Until 1840 his alliance with the Whigs had checked his agitation, though in 1839 he founded a society significantly named the Precursors. Anticipating the return of the Tories to power, he called the Repeal Association into life in April, 1840; but at first its life was feeble. He had founded so many associations; he had so often used threats of Repeal to extort concessions from Government; he had so long cooperated with the Whigs and had made terms with them about the tithe; relations of his had taken office under the Crown—these and other circumstances prevented rapid success. Only twelve Repealers went to Westminster in 1841, instead of the forty of 1832. But in November O’Connell was chosen Lord Mayor of Dublin, under the Whig Municipal Reform Act; and forty-seven of his sixty colleagues were Repealers. No Roman Catholic had ever sat on the City Council before. During his year of office active agitation was suspended; but his position and conduct revived his popularity, and preparations were made for a great movement in 1843.

A new force had arisen to aid, and later to thwart, O’Connell. On October 15, 1842, appeared the first number of the *Nation*, the organ of a band of young men of both religions who were filled with a spirit of nationalism which was more literary, and therefore deeper and better founded, more fervid and more intemperate than that of O’Connell’s personal following. Led by Thomas Davis, John Blake Dillon and Charles Gavan Duffy, “Young Ireland” laboured to weld together Catholic and Protestant and to revive among the people knowledge of its literature,

its heroes, and its wrongs. Their dream was first to waken the imagination of Ireland and then to win her independence—if all other means failed, with the sword. Their passion, their praise of rebellion, their impatience of the calculated methods of political agitation, their criticisms of O'Connell's absolute control of the funds of the Repeal Association, their faith in things to which he was hostile or indifferent—such as the revival of the Irish language—made them from the first rather unwelcome allies; but for a time outward signs of dissension were few.

The old Liberator—he was now sixty-seven—proclaimed in January, 1843, that the new year was to be the year of Repeal. Next month his campaign opened with a great debate on Repeal in the Dublin Corporation. Forthwith important recruits joined the Association; the people's contribution to the cause, the Repeal Rent, rose from £150 to £700 a week; and the O'Connell Tribute, collected twice yearly at all the chapels in the land, that year exceeded £20,000. The Association was admirably organised. Every parish had its Repeal Wardens, who directed operations and collected the Rent; in Repeal reading-rooms men read the *Nation* and the *Freeman's Journal*; for a time Repeal Arbitration Courts settled quarrels and checked agrarian crime. In March began the great open-air meetings. O'Connell and his organisers were tireless; and the wonderful, but too short-lived, success of Father Mathew's temperance movement enabled them, all through the summer, to collect and disperse hundreds of thousands of hearers in perfect order and peace.

Until May the Government remained passive. Then Peel proposed to revive in a modified form an Arms Act of 1835. He was, however, pressing conciliatory measures on De Grey, the Viceroys, and he disapproved of the high-handed action of the Irish executive in removing from the Commission of the Peace O'Connell and thirty-three other Repealers. This step and the subsequent despatch of troops to Ireland drove the Repeal Rent up to £2200, made avowed Repealers of O'Hagan (the future Chancellor) and Smith O'Brien, and brought a note of violence into O'Connell's speeches, which hitherto had been studiously constitutional. Remembering 1829, he tried to frighten Peel into concessions. He knew that it was hopeless to think of force; and when Peel, with both parties behind him in defence of the Union, stood firm, and when a great meeting at Clontarf was prohibited the day before it was to have been held, he submitted. Young Ireland wanted him to face the 60th Rifles, with ball in their pouches, and the guns of the warships that lay off shore at Clontarf. Possibly that was what the Government also wanted. This was in October. Within a few days O'Connell and an odd selection of his supporters were arrested. Early next year he was convicted of seditious conspiracy, before a well-packed jury, and was wildly cheered by the Whigs when he came to Parliament between the conviction and the sentence. In September, 1844, the

decision was reversed in the Lords by Denman's vote, and O'Connell left his easy confinement on a triumphal car. But his health was failing. In his absence Smith O'Brien had led the Association with success. On his return, his growing weakness, his dallyings with federalism in the shape of a subordinate Legislature at Dublin, and his steadfast resolve to avoid bloodshed at all costs, further shook the allegiance of his supporters. The Repeal Rent, the barometer of the cause, fell to a few hundreds a week.

Meanwhile Peel looked for measures of conciliation. The Union and the Established Church he would not touch. The land he hardly dared to touch. He sent over the Devon Commission to study the land law—its report is a monument to the defects of that law—and commissioned Stanley to introduce in the Lords a modest measure for increasing security of tenure and giving some compensation to improving tenants in the future; but he let the Bill be strangled in committee by Irish landlords whom, in his private letters, he called "shabby fellows." A measure for extending the county franchise was also abandoned. But he legalised the endowment of the Roman Church with land; he increased the grant to Maynooth, which lost him Gladstone; and he established the Queen's Colleges, the "godless colleges," for the joint education of Catholic and Protestant. Graham wanted to see Dublin University thrown open to the Catholics, though he would have left Trinity College untouched. All these measures were honestly welcomed by Young Ireland. The last two were bitterly denounced by nearly every religious party in Britain, and by O'Connell and most of the Roman Catholic Bishops in Ireland.

In June, 1845, Villiers introduced his annual motion for the immediate repeal of the Corn Laws. The inevitable criticisms of Peel and Graham were based mainly on one word—"forthwith." Everyone realised the direction in which they were moving; and the loyalty of the country party was strained to breaking point. Two months later came rumours of a widespread failure of the potato crop; but until late in September official reports from Ireland were favourable. The Ministers had often been told that one bad harvest would overturn their law of 1842. Peel had at last learnt that wages do not vary with the price of corn; and he believed that an attempt to maintain the laws in face of some imminent danger would harm the landowners more than any other class. He intended to confess his changed opinions to his party and to discuss with them a fresh corn policy in 1846. But, by the end of October, 1845, a short harvest and a failure of the potato crop throughout Europe were certain; how great a failure, was not yet known. So Peel told his Cabinet that grants to buy food for Ireland would probably be necessary, and that, if made, they must in his opinion be accompanied by the suspension or modification of the Corn Laws. He reminded them that Russia, Belgium, and Holland had suspended their corn duties, and



that several countries had prohibited the export of foodstuffs. They talked, disagreed, and separated. On November 6 he suggested tentatively that the ports should be opened by Order in Council; that Parliament should be summoned to grant an indemnity; and that the Corn Law should be revised after Christmas—a nominal duty being laid on maize and colonial corn, and some sort of sliding scale being retained for other grains. The existing scale was working badly, owing to a defective method of calculating the average prices which regulated the duties. Only Aberdeen, Graham and Herbert supported him. As a precautionary measure, he ordered the house of Baring to buy secretly £100,000 worth of maize in America; but he rejected a proposal, pressed on him from Ireland, for stopping the export of the fine Irish oat-crop of 1845. On November 15 Professors Lindley and Lyon Playfair, who had been sent to Ireland to make enquiries, reported that half the potato crop was lost or rotten, and that a quarter of what remained was wanted for seed. Now more than half the population of Ireland lived on potatoes. The Anti-Corn Law League had seized its chance and was working harder than ever. On the 22nd Lord John Russell in an open letter from Edinburgh declared himself on its side, and the crisis came.

Peel, though delayed by the divisions in his Cabinet, was determined to act. He was at this time disposed to suspend the laws himself and leave to the Whigs the "review of the whole question of agricultural protection" which must follow suspension. But he held that the Government which suspended the laws ought also to put before Parliament some policy to be adopted after suspension, and to carry it out, if Parliament approved. For this purpose he suggested, on December 2, a system of annually dwindling duties, based on a sliding scale, to lead to perfect freedom. His colleagues, except Stanley and Buccleuch, agreed; but many agreed reluctantly, some urging him to resign. He did resign, and the Queen sent for Russell. Russell and his party were by no means eager for office. Many leading Whigs were not converts to repeal; they were in a minority in Parliament; and some could not bring themselves to trust Peel's promises of support. Lord John himself trusted Peel, but did not trust Peel's control of his followers' votes. Eventually (December 18) he agreed to form a ministry, but threw up the task next day because Grey objected to Palmerston's taking the Foreign Office.

Peel therefore came back, with the full support of the Queen, with all his Cabinet but Stanley, with Gladstone also and Ellenborough. Wellington preferred even repeal to a ministry of "Cobden and Co.," and undertook to discipline the Lords. Peel felt stronger than ever, and decided to propose a measure involving ultimate repeal forthwith. Suspension, pending the decision of Parliament, was abandoned; why, is not quite clear. Possibly Peel hoped to carry his Bill so rapidly as to render it superfluous. He proposed that all corn duties, except a shilling, should disappear in 1849. When wheat was under 48s., there

was to be a 10s. duty; when it was 53s. or upwards, a 4s. duty. These rates were to fall annually. At existing prices this meant a 4s. duty. The budget, which followed this announcement, abolished the duties on all live animals and nearly every kind of meat, and reduced those on cheese, butter, and other foods. And, in order to demonstrate that Corn Law repeal was only part of a general policy, many duties on manufactures were abolished and others greatly reduced.

Parliament met in January, 1846, and Peel soon perceived that the hope that he had entertained of carrying his party with him was false. For years he had been accumulating unpopularity. He could not charm and manage the ordinary party man. At times, believing that people "liked being governed," he had stubbornly forced his followers to register his own opinions. His leadership was not based on affection, but on the belief that he was the ablest embodiment of Conservative principles. Those principles he had now, men said, betrayed—for the second time. The five months from January to June, 1846, were filled with a long series of bitter personal attacks on the Minister by the landed gentry, led by Lord George Bentinck, inspired by Disraeli, who, having sought office under Peel, had since begged favours at Peel's hands and whose faith in Protection was at least doubtful. In the Lords Stanley conducted the attack with more moderation.

To the last, Ireland was Peel's undoing. As the darkness of the coming famine deepened and food was seen leaving the ports, as there was little hope in the now disunited Repeal Association and the land grievances remained untouched, agrarian crime broke out once more. Corn Law repeal, introduced apparently as a palliative of Irish distress, was discussed for the most part from an English standpoint and at interminable length. Smith O'Brien said in the House that it was actually opposed to Ireland's permanent interests, seeing that she ordinarily sent grain to the protected English market. Meanwhile she waited—the existing law not suspended—with £100,000 worth of maize to be sold at cost price to guardians of the poor and relief associations. This was followed by a grant for extraordinary public works. The maize flour, which proved an incalculable boon, began to be utilised in the south-west in March; though at first the unfamiliar stuff, "Peel's brimstone," pleased no one. By that time its purveyor was asking Parliament for a new, and stern, coercion act. It passed the Lords; but in the Commons a combination of Whigs and Protectionists threw it out, some for love of Ireland, more for hatred of Peel. That was on June 26, the night that the Corn and Customs Bills passed the Lords. Three days later Peel resigned, and Lord John Russell reigned in his stead.

Famine was tightening its grip on Ireland. July and August, the "meal months," when the old potatoes were exhausted and the new were not available, were always a time of semi-starvation. The potatoes of 1845 lasted longer than had been expected; for the crop was heavy, the

disease sporadic, and an early frost checked it. But by the beginning of June some districts had been without potatoes for weeks. Only the government meal depots kept down prices. Money to buy food came from employment on the public works—roads, for the most part, and harbours. In August 97,000 men were employed on them. Already it was known that the potato blight would be far more destructive than that of 1845; the oat and barley crops were deficient, the wheat crop a bare average. Famine was also beginning among the potato-fed crofters of the Highlands and the Isles; but the activity of most of the Scotch landlords, the experience that Government had gained in Ireland, and the well-organised charity of the rich and unstricken southern and eastern counties limited its evil consequences.

Charity gave generous aid for Ireland also; and Government had hoped to abstain from again coming into the food-markets as a buyer, for fear of discouraging private trade. But such abstinence proved impossible. The winter of 1846-7 saw the climax of the tragedy. Government was now giving money freely. All who could—there were but too many impotent—thronged the works to get “the Queen’s pay.” Over 700,000 received it in March, 1847; and effectual control over the numbers or the work done had been lost. Ordinary agricultural operations had nearly ceased. The new workhouses were overcrowded, though the people hated them. Father Mathew wrote bitterly of how women “were forcibly deprived of their hair and clothed in the garb of guilty convicts.” In March and April the deaths in the workhouses alone exceeded 2500 a week. Starving Irish poured into England and died in thousands of famine fever. They crowded into emigrant ships, many dying on board or on arriving at their destinations. As one of these ships left Dublin, in June, 1847, it met the vessel that carried O’Connell’s body; and there rose from its deck the wail of the peasants for their dead leader and their lost home.

In January, 1847, Peel’s Corn Law and the Navigation Laws were suspended, and the policy of relief works was condemned. Relief was henceforward to take the form of cooked rations and to be administered mainly through the Poor Law organisation. Hitherto outdoor relief had been prohibited in Ireland. From March to June the people were successfully drafted from the works. By August more than 3,000,000 were receiving the rations, and the workhouse mortality had been reduced by one-half. The corn harvests of 1847 were satisfactory; food prices fell, and the potato disease was nearly exhausted. But so few potatoes had been planted that the winter of 1847-8 was again a time of great, though lessened, distress. So was the year 1849. While the wreckage of famine was being cleared away and relief for bankrupt landlords and bankrupt Poor Law Unions was being arranged, the peasants emigrated steadily. The next census showed that the population had fallen from about 8,300,000 to less than 6,600,000 between 1845 and 1851.

Political troubles and the continued failure of Parliament to deal satisfactorily with the land question had contributed to the emigration. The Whigs gave some Irishmen places and got some support from O'Connell while he lived; but there was no effective revival of the discriminating administration of 1835-9. The support given by the O'Connellites merely embittered the relations between that party and Young Ireland. In July, 1846, the final disruption came; the young men left the Association because they refused to pledge themselves never to use force to secure Repeal. Davis was dead; but more impatient and violent men carried on his work—Mitchel, a dreamy, passionate lawyer of thirty, and Meagher, a stormy orator of twenty-two. Smith O'Brien, disgusted with the irresolution of the O'Connellite rump, also sided with the seceders. Soon there were O'Connellite and O'Brienite faction fights. All this was in the height of the famine, when passions were easily roused. Moreover an untimely revival of an old agrarian trouble disposed hungry men to welcome violent counsels. Since about 1820, "clearances" had been in progress. As the old leases to middlemen fell in, many landowners, finding their estates overcrowded with cotters, cleared them and consolidated the holdings. The thing in itself was good; the manner of doing it could not have been worse. And this procedure was renewed, sometimes most wantonly, when famine distress gave legal warrant for evicting tenants who could not pay their rent. There were also evictions to relieve landlords of liability under the Poor Law. The year 1847 was filled, in certain counties, with the worst type of agrarian outrage. Under the advice of Lord Clarendon, their Viceroy, the Government passed a Coercion Act in the autumn. Russell sincerely desired to approach the land question; but he was not strong enough, nor were the times favourable. A compensation for improvements Bill and a suggested Bill to control evictions went into limbo in 1848.

The political ferment of 1848 filled the overwrought minds of the Irish leaders with dreams of a republic baptised in blood. Mitchel's paper, the *United Irishman*, talked incessantly of pikes, barricades, bullet-making and vitriol. Revolutionary clubs sprang into life. Meagher and O'Brien went to Paris to establish connexions with the successful republicans of France; but they were judiciously discouraged by Lamartine. The Government was at work, creating the crime of treason-felony and clearing for action. O'Brien and Meagher were tried for sedition, but escaped because each jury contained one Roman Catholic. A more judiciously constituted jury sent Mitchel to penal servitude for treason-felony. Later in the year Habeas Corpus was suspended; over a hundred nationalists were imprisoned by warrant; O'Brien, Dillon, and Meagher, foolish enough to surround themselves with a useless little body of armed men, were taken and transported.

All that Russell passed in the way of reforming legislation for Ireland was an extension of the franchise and Peel's favourite scheme for

facilitating the sale of encumbered estates. This was intended to introduce the British practices of land tenure. What it did was to complicate further the specifically Irish problems which its sponsors, even with the reports of the Devon Commission before them, persistently ignored.

The Russell ministry was lacking in constructive statesmanship and unsuccessfully, though ably, led. None of Peel's friends, the Ministers of 1846, would join, though they usually supported, the Government. The men who had done most to destroy the Corn Law were not even asked to join. There was a strong—a headstrong—man for the Foreign Office, for Grey withdrew his objection to Palmerston. Lord Grey himself did well at the Colonial Office. Others filled their posts creditably. But there was no one fit to continue Peel's special work. At the Exchequer, Lord John's attempt to play Peel to Sir Charles Wood's Goulburn was decidedly unsuccessful. Lord John once admitted that he had no head for figures, and unfortunately the times required skilful finance. The worst of the railway speculation was over in June, 1846; but the steady, and for a time unremunerative, absorption of capital in railway-building produced serious difficulties. Harvest failure in 1846 disorganised the produce markets, and caused an abnormal drain of gold from the United Kingdom to pay for the imported food. The slackening of purchasing power among the masses that comes with dear food depressed many branches of manufacture. Cotton, as well as grain, ran short. While the prices of food and cotton rose, those of most other staples fell. All through the spring of 1847, the money-market was disturbed; and in May wheat fetched 115s. a quarter. An unexpectedly good harvest proved ruinous to dealers who had strained their credit to buy at such famine prices. In August, when wheat was at 64s., corn firms began to fail, then East India merchants, joint-stock banks, iron firms, cotton firms, and of course stock-brokers. Every weak spot in the trade of the country was probed. In October the new Bank Act had to be suspended, the Bank being empowered to exceed its legal note issue against securities, in order to ease the panic demand for money; and political troubles in 1848 prolonged the slow convalescence of trade.

National expenditure was meanwhile driven up by an alarm of war with France in 1847. Hence deficits and financial expedients. In 1848 Peel's Income Tax was to expire. But, instead of abandoning, Wood and Russell proposed to raise it. There was vigorous opposition to this, and eventually they gave way. In 1851 and 1852 the Commons renewed it for one year only. But nevertheless the tax got established, as it were by accident. Some other sides of Whig finance showed more foresight. The obnoxious Brick Tax was abolished; the Stamp Duties were consolidated and reduced; an Inhabited House Duty took the place of the insanitary Window Tax; the last export duty—that on coal—disappeared; the duty on coffee came down to 3d. a pound; and the huge differential duties on foreign timber and foreign sugar were lowered.

These last were old occasions of controversy, much involved with party manœuvres and the fates of Governments. Until 1842 the duties had been almost prohibitive and even those on colonial timber and sugar had been high. An attempt to reduce the tax on foreign sugar was the immediate cause of Melbourne's fall. In 1844, Peel had forced on Parliament a reduction on non-slave-grown foreign sugars; but the supply of these proved inadequate. So in 1846, after Peel's fall, the "free labour" principle, which was half philanthropic half a concession to the West Indies, was dropped, and a scheme for the gradual equalisation of all the duties substituted for it. Depression in the sugar colonies and the stubborn will of Bentinck, fighting each step towards free trade, wrung from the Government in 1848 an extension of the preferential period until 1854. In the case of timber, Wood endorsed a policy traced out by Peel. Peel had found the duties on foreign timber at 55s., and on colonial at 10s. 6d. a load; Wood left them at 7s. 6d. and 1s. respectively. These partial abandonments of the preferential principle were simply the outcome of a desire to relieve consumers. In the American colonies they were most unpopular.

Closely connected with them was the fall of the old Navigation Code. A long series of reciprocity treaties had stretched it greatly since Huskisson's time. Direct trade with the treaty countries was practically open. In 1838 a very important concession affecting indirect trade had been made to Austria, by which her ships might carry freely between England and Danubian ports not on Austrian territory. Similar privileges had since been granted to the States of the Prussian *Zollverein* and to other countries. The Colonies were by this time allowed to trade direct with most foreign countries, the East Indies with any friendly Power. By special agreement, United States ships might even trade between the United Kingdom and India. But no foreign ship could carry between England and the Colonies, or from colony to colony. Goods could not even be sent from the Colonies in an "illegal" ship to be warehoused although not consumed here; yet they could be so sent from foreign countries. No Asian, African, or American produce could, as a general rule, be brought from any European port—Javan sugar or coffee from Rotterdam or cotton from Havre. Two years of controversy and committee reports preceded the final repealing Act of 1849. Opinions were very evenly balanced. The mercantile and manufacturing interests wanted complete freedom. Statesmen felt that the Code was in opposition to the general trend of commercial legislation, and were much influenced by the facts that most of our commercial treaties were running out, and that foreign Powers were disinclined to renew them on the old terms. Some colonists who were losing fiscal preferences wished to be left free to ship their goods in what bottoms they pleased. The seaboard Colonies of North America, on the other hand, bitterly resented the proposal to allow the Yankees to share their profitable carrying

trade with Britain and the West Indies. In England the shipping interest was almost unanimous against repeal; so was the old school of naval officers. But it was carried nevertheless; though proxies and the Bishops' votes were needed to pass it in the Lords.

Besides opening the colonial trade, the Whigs greatly extended colonial self-government. They did so, to some extent, under pressure; they borrowed ideas and received abundant criticism from such veteran colonial reformers as Gibbon Wakefield and Molesworth; and they often offended the Colonies by the manner of their gifts. Yet, when all is said, theirs was a great achievement. New South Wales had been granted a measure of home rule in 1842. Under Russell and Grey, Victoria was created, and Constitutions given to all the Australian Colonies. These were short lived, just because of their most important feature—they were alterable on the initiative of the Colonies themselves. Grey also drafted a Constitution for New Zealand. Shortly after he left office, it was revised and applied with Wakefield's assistance. In 1846 colonial legislatures had for the first time been authorised to remove differential duties favouring British goods. This permission, coupled with self-government, was to give them a control of tariffs and trade such as Lord Durham had never contemplated. In England there was much indifference to all these things. Very many observers thought that self-government would develop into independence. But, as a class, the leading statesmen of the forties neither desired, nor even habitually anticipated, the dissolution of the imperial bond.

Between Aberdeen's tenure of the Foreign Office and Palmerston's the contrast is complete—Aberdeen reticent, not popular, pacific, considerate, in full sympathy with the Crown and trusted by his chief; Palmerston always in the public eye, reckless, masterful, distrusted by the Court—by all Courts—and enjoying a popularity that encouraged him to disregard the leader whom he half expected in time to oust. Aberdeen's chief works were the establishment of a good understanding with France and the settlement of accumulated difficulties with the United States. Thiers and Palmerston had brought France and England to the very brink of war in 1840. Press writers and professional diplomatists on both sides were full of suspicions and jealousies. Aberdeen and Guizot, who were personal friends, laboured incessantly to remove causes of offence. But the work was heavy, and many Englishmen besides Palmerston thought that concessions were too habitually on Aberdeen's side. With all their labour war came near in 1844, through once famous squabbles over Tahiti and Morocco, which are elsewhere described. Though immediate danger was over, Peel was preparing to revive the militia ballot and strengthen the navy in 1845. Aberdeen, who disagreed with these warlike preparations, had spoken of resignation just before, in September, Irish affairs pushed all else aside.

At that moment the western horizon also was dark, for the second time since 1841 Old disputes about the Canadian boundaries, the abuse of the right of search by our slaver-hunting cruisers, and other matters, were settled by the Ashburton Treaty of 1842, both sides making concessions. But the Oregon boundary dispute remained and produced a dangerous inflammation in 1845. Once more Aberdeen acted with pacific dignity; and Peel was able to announce that his proposals had been accepted intact, on the very day on which the Government was dissolved.

Then came Palmerston, full of contempt for his predecessor; and the foreign offices abroad grew uneasy. "Palmerston," said Rothschild of Paris in December, 1845, "has this drawback—he makes the funds fall all over Europe without giving us notice." He did so now, though part of the blame lay with Guizot. Louis-Philippe had long been anxious to marry the young Queen Isabella of Spain to some Bourbon prince and her sister to his son the Duc de Montpensier. Aberdeen had acquiesced in principle; and the French Government had promised both him and Queen Victoria not to press the Montpensier match until Isabella was married and a mother, stipulating however to Aberdeen that, if a marriage for either princess outside the House of Bourbon became imminent, they should be free of their pledge. Immediately on entering office, Palmerston, advised by Bulwer, our ambassador at Madrid, set himself definitely against Montpensier, and privately pressed the claims of another candidate to the hand of the Queen's sister. Bresson, the French ambassador, had been intriguing in the opposite sense. Learning of Palmerston's intentions, Guizot took up Bresson's plan and arranged the two marriages to suit his master in August, 1846. In England the Court, the public, and the Press were furious; and, until the fall of Louis-Philippe in 1848, the Government was busy with plans for expenditure on the services and the revival of the militia.

While Europe was labouring in revolution, Palmerston's self-confident activity was incessant, generous, and indiscreet. It won him the good opinion of the nation, and finally lost him his office. Wherever absolutism grew arrogant, there Palmerston's agents took the side of freedom; in and out of season he instructed Governments in their constitutional duties. When Metternich tried to unite the Powers against the nationalist movement that he foresaw in Italy, Palmerston resisted him and sent Lord Minto to Italy to proclaim England's sympathy with reform. When the storm broke, he consistently supported the anti-Austrian party, telling Minto that "Italy ought to unite in a confederacy," and that "now was the time to strike." He rejoiced in Austria's temporary downfall, and, when Radetzky turned the tide, he worked hard in the Italian cause. He gave Spain lessons in the art of government, which led the Spaniards to give Bulwer his passports. In 1849 he tried vainly to avert Russian intervention in Hungary, and



ordered our Minister at Vienna to express disgust at Austrian atrocities "openly and decidedly." He supported the Sultan when the two Courts tried to force him to give up Kossuth and other political refugees. He allowed English arms to be sent to the rebel Sicilians. And, in extorting compensation from Greece over the notorious Don Pacifico incident, he was at least as anxious to school King Otho, who had absolutist leanings, as to win a diplomatic triumph for England and himself.

This Pacifico affair led to a formal parliamentary attack on Palmerston in June, 1850. He had already irritated Lord John and the Court by his habit of acting entirely on his own responsibility and his indifference to foreign susceptibilities. The Queen had censured him severely; the Prime Minister had made him apologise to the King of the Two Sicilies, and meant to remove him from the Foreign Office at the end of 1850. But he beat off the parliamentary attack with distinction, and Russell could hardly dismiss the man whose peroration, with its demand that no British subject should ever in vain say *Civis Romanus sum*, had stirred the whole people. Yet soon afterwards the Queen sent him a memorandum with definite rules for his relations with the Crown. Finally Russell removed him from office in December, 1851, because of fresh indiscretion and insubordination—not this time in a popular cause. He had expressed approval of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* of December 2, and had repeated his expressions, after the Queen and Russell had censured them, in a despatch that he submitted to neither.

The relations of the State with the Churches raised as great storms under Russell's Government as under Peel's. But the storm centre had moved south. Scotland was recovering from the shock of the Disruption. The Free Church grew strong and efficient. The Established Church also prospered, and the State conceded to it some of the privileges, though not the principles, for which the Disruption leaders had fought. In England Russell's hatred of the "Puseyites" was a beginning of trouble. They disliked his episcopal nominations; and one of these—that of the latitudinarian Dr Hampden—raised a tumult of protest. Indignation rose higher when the Privy Council overrode the refusal of Phillpotts, Bishop of Exeter, to institute to a crown living a clergyman named Gorham, who held Calvinistic views on baptism. This was an intrusion into the spiritual sphere by a lay tribunal far more decisive than those which had broken up the Scottish Church. But, as the English Church had no corporate voice, repudiation of the Establishment was impossible, even had it been widely advocated—which it was not; for the English and Scottish views of the bounds of temporal authority differed. Many clergymen who held high views of Church prerogative seceded to Rome; but these were individual acts. The revival of Convocation in November, 1852, was the outward sign of the desire that corporate action should henceforth be possible. Two years earlier,

Pius IX's creation of Roman bishoprics in England produced a widespread and fanatical outcry against Romanism and "Puseyism," in which Russell joined. It led him to place on the statute book that monument of intolerance and bad statesmanship, the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which in its final form forbade Roman Catholic Bishops to make use of those territorial titles which they have ever since employed.

Some contemporaries believed that Peel's decision in 1845 saved his country from revolution three years later. This at least is certain—it helped to convince the labouring classes that Parliament was not altogether indifferent to their needs, and strengthened the hands of all who were working for peaceful reform. After 1842 militant Chartism steadily lost its hold on the best of the working-men. The Chartist leaders were always quarrelling. Feargus O'Connor's Chartist Co-operative Land Society of 1845, which spent some £100,000 in an ill-considered attempt to bring the people back to the land, strained the resources and the loyalty of his followers. For some, faith in the political and even in the economic principles of the Anti-Corn Law Leaguers supplanted faith in the Charter. They learnt to cooperate with middle class Radicals for attainable political ends. Others threw themselves into the new cooperative store movement, with its tangible advantages, or into bolder and less successful essays in cooperative production. The Trade Unions drew apart from organised Chartism as the years passed. They were becoming businesslike and opportunist, more interested in the improvement of their own organisation than in the bolder schemes of the Chartists, such as Bronterre O'Brien's proposals for land nationalisation. Some of the great existing Unions date from these years, as for example, the Amalgamated Engineers. Only the high prices and slack work of 1847 and the revolutionary contagion of 1848 gave the party of violence among the Chartists a momentary ascendancy. Even then their power was more apparent than real, and they proved miserably inefficient revolutionaries. The great demonstration of April 10, 1848, which was to have overawed Parliament, was an utter failure; and the subsequent riots in the north were unimportant. Next year O'Connor, who was responsible for the fiasco, found just fifteen members of Parliament willing to vote with him for the Charter. As a distinct movement, Chartism was dead; most of its principles, but not its exaggerated class-feeling, found a home in the left wing of the new Liberal party.

The repeal of the Corn Laws by no means stood alone. There were many signs of a drawing together of "the two nations," and some signs of an increasing faith in legislation as an engine of economic reform. In 1847 and 1850 the Ten Hours Acts met one of the chief grievances of the factory population, a grievance upon which Chartist orators had laid great stress. Private enterprise was making a humble beginning of housing reform. The first Act dealing with it—the Lodging House

Act—was passed in 1851. From 1847 to 1850 urban sanitation and burial abuses were at last seriously taken in hand, though too late to prevent a recurrence of cholera in 1849. The State added a little to its small contribution towards the cost of national education; and the connexion between the absence of universal schooling and the existence of child labour was rendered clear by the factory inspectors. The Mechanics' Institutes had made some partial provision for adult education. In 1845 this was supplemented by the permission given to town councils to create museums; in 1850 the permission was extended to free libraries.

By that time urban wages were showing an upward movement in all but the dying crafts; though rural wages still continued at, or even below, the level of 1841. But the cost of living had declined, and, on the land, better cottages and more allotments were to be found. Railways and steam navigation and free trade had stimulated every branch of industry; and, although the glorification of Britain's industrial strength in the Great Exhibition of 1851 did not mark the beginning of an age of contentment and peace, it coincided with a marked increase not only in wealth but in well-being. Moreover the immense emigration of the past decade, from Britain as well as Ireland, had checked the gloomy fears of Malthusians and eased the labour market. Some 337,000 emigrants had left the United Kingdom in the three bad years 1840–2; 221,000 in 1842–5; and 130,000 in 1846. From 1847 to 1852 the number was never in any one year less than 248,000; and in 1852—after the great gold discoveries—it rose to 368,000. Many of the emigrants, British as well as Irish, carried bitter memories with them. The more capable and daring went; the more listless and timid remained. Thus the movement had its drawbacks, yet on the whole it was good.

Throughout the Russell Administration all the lines of party division were blurred. Peel had broken up the Tories and helped to break up the Whigs. Russell had not converted the whole Whig party to free trade. Many influential men would have preferred a protectionist to a Peelite alliance. Melbourne was a protectionist to the last. The manufacturing free-traders preferred Peel to the Whigs; and Cobden once begged him to lead a new middle class free trade party. Cobden and his friends owned no Whig allegiance and voted as they pleased; so did the Peelites. After Bentinck's death in 1848, the protectionist Tories came under the control of Disraeli, who took in hand the task of weaning them from their extreme opinions, and more than once tried to secure the cooperation of some of Peel's friends. For neither he nor Stanley ever thought mere dogmatic Protection an adequate foundation for a great political party.

Peel died suddenly and prematurely in July, 1850. He had been the greatest political power in the country, and had often saved the Government when in difficulties. But, in losing him, Russell also lost a possible

\* rival. Had Palmerston fallen a year earlier, some at least of the Peelites might have joined Russell. As it was, they held aloof. The revival of the question of parliamentary reform and the "Papal aggression" of September, 1850, further complicated matters. Reform was popular among Russell's more liberal adherents; and, after various parliamentary mishaps, he was beaten, in a nearly empty House, on a motion for extending the county franchise in February, 1851. During the debates he made a declaration in favour of some extension.

Russell resigned. Stanley was sent for, but refused office. Russell then tried, as so often before, to secure some Peelite assistance; but the Peelites unanimously condemned his anti-papal policy. Aberdeen was sent for and declined. Then Stanley tried to enlist Gladstone and others. He too failed. So Russell came back, no stronger than before. Towards the end of the year, when he was discussing Reform with his Cabinet, the rise of Louis Napoleon lost him Palmerston and threw the country into a war fever. On February 16, 1852, Palmerston cheerfully defeated the Government on an amendment to the little Militia Bill, with which they had hoped—and failed—to satisfy the public.

Stanley, now Lord Derby, the inevitable successor, held office until the general election in July by the courtesy of the Peelites. There was little legislation except a Militia Bill and a provisional budget, in introducing which Disraeli—now Chancellor of the Exchequer—praised Peel's finance and did not mention corn. Derby's short ministry is chiefly interesting through its influence on the rearrangement of parties. Had he repudiated Protection and been cautious abroad, he might have rallied Aberdeen, Gladstone, and Herbert. But there was no repudiation; and Malmesbury, his Foreign Secretary, seemed to them over-friendly with Napoleon. He had some hope of enlisting Palmerston; but Palmerston was thinking of the leadership. Graham was returning to his old Whig allegiance, with some able men at his back. Gladstone and the rest still dreamt of a purged Conservative party. That someone must join Derby, if he was not to fall, was clear; but no one joined.

There was a simple issue at the election—did the nation approve the commercial policy that Peel had begun and Russell had continued? Ministers had made it clear that they would stand by the decision of the electorate; but they were less clear as to what they wished that decision to be. Disraeli, like Peel before him, was preparing for a change of front and, in private, "had no great fear" of the Protectionists. The elections were numerically indecisive, against Protection decisive enough. When Palmerston proposed in place of a triumphant free trade motion of Villiers' a gentler amendment, so drafted (by Graham) as to save the face of the Protectionists, it was carried by 468 to 63. But acceptance of the free trade principle could not save the Government. It fell on December 17, on a budget amendment—when through the night Gladstone struggled with Disraeli.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE FALL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN FRANCE.

(1840-8.)

THE crisis of 1840 had nearly laid in ruins the July Monarchy, yet it was destined to live for another eight years, with such apparent stability, that it seemed unshakeable on the very eve of its downfall. The ability of Guizot who, during this period, bore the burden of power, is manifestly insufficient to explain so striking a phenomenon. It will be as well, therefore, to attempt a survey of the underlying causes which were sapping the *régime* of July in 1840, and also of those, possibly no less interesting, which kept it standing until the day when a shock, slight in itself, caused it first to tremble, and ultimately to collapse. Such an examination, moreover, will prepare the way for a clearer understanding of the different phases of the Republic of 1848 in its final metamorphosis into a Napoleonic Empire.

The crisis of 1840 produced certain elements which endangered the Government of Louis-Philippe, none of which, singly, was capable of seriously imperilling it, but of which the cumulative effect was great. An apparently trifling accident revealed the hidden weakness of the whole body politic; in a moment the movement assumed alarming proportions; and after three days, it proved fatal to the existing *régime* on February 24, 1848.

The least grave of these dangers would seem to have been the complete change in mental attitude of a large portion of the middle class at finding, or, at any rate, believing that the *régime* of 1830 had proved false to all its promises. The upholders of this *régime* had allowed the nation to believe, had indeed themselves believed, that the semi-revolution which had replaced Charles X. by Louis-Philippe would provide safeguards alike for vested interests and for the national honour. Instead of this, the new *régime* appeared to the *bourgeoisie* to have done nothing of the kind. Even if property were safe, the national honour seemed compromised; and the supporters of the *régime* were thus divided into two parties. On the one hand was a body of middle class

citizens, hitherto probably as much saturated with scepticism and Voltairianism as the rest of their class, but whose behaviour now clearly showed a revival of religious belief. They sent their children to the Congregationist Schools, which subsisted side by side with the State University—then dominated by the philosophy of Victor Cousin—they devoured eagerly the violent pamphlets by which the clergy were attempting to destroy this particular philosophy as well as the University monopoly. They cheered Lacordaire on his public assumption of the Dominican habit; they encouraged the Jesuits to reappear with heads held high despite the law; and, finally, they fostered the growth of innumerable congregations all over the country. In these and similar ways this section of the *bourgeoisie* showed its detachment from a *régime* which recognised in religion (since it preached resignation) a necessity for the populace, but which aimed at binding its ministers within the limits of the Concordat. But even in the remaining portion of the middle class, among whom still predominated a personal indifference towards religion, or at any rate a hatred of the Jesuits and of Ultramontanism, there came about a peculiar transformation, which, following upon an almost feverish interest in things political, and especially in foreign affairs, showed itself in a kind of apathy, an indifference as profound as it was incredible, amounting even to an openly expressed contempt for all such questions. Though still greatly attached to the *régime* in whose stability they were personally interested, this section of the *bourgeoisie* seemed to think that, with a Government of such approved caution in face of a Europe indulgent so long as it was not provoked, there was nothing for them to do but to take advantage of the situation to increase their individual wealth and to make up, by the enjoyment of material pleasures, for the loss of the luxury of national pride. All desire for “glory” was henceforth incompatible with the maintenance of their own particular privilege. Hence questions relating to lucrative enterprises, Stock Exchange speculation, and the like, formed practically their sole preoccupation after 1840. The opportunities for personal enrichment were naturally numerous, owing to the introduction of novel inventions, new industrial processes, steam engines, railways, and the like. It was a misfortune that, speaking generally, the national morality was but little regarded, and that scandals soon broke out in connexion with concessions and bribery whereby the reputations of two ex-Ministers were dragged in the mire. Even Guizot and Thiers, the leaders of the two rival political parties, though their personal integrity was above reproach, were splashed with the same mud.

How strange an effect must all this have had upon those to whom the *régime* had brought nothing but misfortune—those who not only possessed no direct voice in the government of affairs but, by the very conditions of their social existence, saw themselves condemned to a life of complete inaction in perpetuity! What had become of those theoretic rights

which had been reserved to them—equality with regard to employment, with regard to honours—of that Marshal's *bâton* which the Revolution or, according to the popular notion, Napoleon had placed in their knapsacks? With a Government so pacific in intention, would actual opportunities ever offer themselves? Seeking consolation through the imagination, they were forced to fall back upon reminiscences of their grandfathers, distorted by the action of time and centring round the Napoleonic legend. The contrast afforded by the commonplaceness of their own time, by the work of authors and artists such as Victor Hugo, Béranger the song-writer, the painters Charlet and Raffet (whose works were extensively reproduced by lithography)—and even by the views of the political leaders themselves, such as Thiers, who at the Château of Versailles took first rank among the “Napoleonisers”—all helped to reproduce this legend in letters of fire. Not only Napoleon himself was deified, but those humble grenadiers, those “*groggnards*”—whom his eagle eye had singled out from the crowd—were raised with him to the very pinnacle of greatness.

In very truth this Napoleonic cult, to which the Government sacrificed—as if in the hope of winning pardon for its own timidities abroad—seemed harmless enough for the moment. No imperial claimant assumed a menacing character—not even Louis Napoleon, whose somewhat foolish attempts in 1836–40 were almost unknown to the nation at large. Moreover, since the cult found its most ardent worshippers in the provinces, which—being inaccessible to the influence of the Press—seemed politically unimportant, the Government was perhaps justified in its attitude of reassurance. But Ministers should have paid greater attention to the disillusionments and disappointments of the working-classes, whose political discontent was beginning to be intensified by an added social discontent. It is, in fact, from this period that we may date the first infiltrations of Socialism among the workers. True, this Socialism presented at first no very dangerous appearance, consisting as it did of schemes for the radical reorganisation of society, which were either too theoretical or too purely *doctrinaire* to appeal readily to the great mass of the people. Moreover, there was too much contradiction among its exponents themselves. Proudhon preached Individualism, Cabot and Pierre Leroux Communism, Louis Blanc a mitigated and temporary system of socialistic workshops. Of all this the people in general grasped very little, inclining rather more to Louis Blanc's theory of the “right to work”—which was to receive its first practical application in 1848—than to Proudhon's maxim “property is theft.” Socialism was in fact only making itself known through the medium of vague, general articles in a certain section of the Republican Press which, after 1840, devoted itself in particular to the “amelioration of the working-man's lot.” For example, such a paper as *Le Journal du Peuple* was remodelled in 1841, and, becoming *La Réforme* in 1843, underwent a transformation

- still more profound under the editorship of Flocon and Ribeyrolles, who were assisted by Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc.

Nevertheless the Socialist propaganda was still too limited in extent, too vague, and, in certain directions, even too lacking in seriousness, to appear anything but an exceedingly remote danger. Far more serious in reality was the attitude of the middle classes after 1840, for upon them depended the whole stability of the "system." We know how it was established—this system which claimed to have raised up the Sovereignty of Reason upon the ruins of two chimeras: upon "Divine Right" and the "Sovereignty of the People," which were embodied in the legitimate Monarchy and the Republic respectively. It was done by making tax-payers (who paid 500 francs in taxes) eligible for election as Parliamentary Deputies, by making those who paid 200 francs eligible as voters, and by allowing the rest no political rights whatever. To the lower middle classes, however, who appeared to be deprived of political importance by the smallness of their pecuniary resources, the Government had conceded both a favour and a right. After the Revolution of 1830, which they had themselves brought about, they were held worthy to fulfil the functions of police, in the interests of Liberalism and for the maintenance of order, as well as to assist the army in the work of national defence. The National Guard had thus become a fundamental institution of the Monarchy—an institution whose practical importance was all the greater from the fact that they could use their muskets against whom they pleased. The National Guard was perfectly aware of its position and of the importance of its rôle. As a matter of fact, its opinions were divided like its functions—half military and half police—or its recruitment—half from the populace and half from the middle classes—or its interests—half conservative and half revolutionary. It possessed, in fact, but empty honours, and the burdens, without the joys, of power. It may be that it urged the Government less insistently to stir up warlike passions than to avoid all possibilities of diplomatic humiliations; it may even be that it found less fault with the grounds of a pacific policy than with the manner in which that policy displayed itself to the world. But this did not in its eyes diminish the guilt of the Government, responsible as it was, alike for its outward behaviour and its underlying intentions.

Middle class discontent proceeded promptly to show itself in the acquittal of persons accused of political offences, and in hostile cries uttered by the National Guard during reviews held by the King, a circumstance which eventually obliged him to suspend these inspections and parades. Yet these facts were not regarded by the Government as of any special significance, and rightly so. For the middle classes, while judging the Government severely, might be trusted not to imagine or desire its overthrow. So great was their horror, both of the excesses of 1793 and of those of the *ancien régime*, that, even at



the beginning of the "February Days," the National Guard had no thought of this kind. Its purely passive rôle was then to paralyse the army, a rôle which was however equivalent to leaving the field clear to the enemies of the régime both secret and avowed.

But from the year 1840, to be precise, the suspicions aroused in the breasts of these former partisans of reaction and revolution showed a tendency to disappear. The two parties, influenced by the same crisis which so profoundly modified the whole spirit of France, simultaneously underwent an evolution which rendered both practically unrecognisable. The class which continued openly to attack the Government was so far changed that it no longer endeavoured to spread its propaganda beyond a clearly defined portion of the nation, whose necessities became practically its sole preoccupation. This was the case with the Legitimists, who were condemned henceforward to restrict their recruiting-fields to the nobility and their dependents. It was also the case with those Republicans who, struck by the importance which social questions were assuming among the working-classes, subordinated to them all other problems. But the other faction of each of the two main parties adopted a wholly different line of conduct. While pretending to accept the existing form of government or perhaps in despair of changing it, the middle class Republicans, on the one hand, and the Catholic Legitimists, on the other, adopted tactics quite different from those which the Red Republicans and ultra-reactionaries had hitherto employed. The Republican organ-in-chief, *Le National*, formerly in the hands of Armand Carrel, allowed Marrast, who had returned from exile in 1840, to bring over its supporters—Garnier-Pagès junior, Arago, Carnot, Pagnerre, Goudchaux, Marie, and others—to an entirely new standpoint. This new departure consisted in transferring their opposition to legal ground, and in making electoral reform the first point in their programme. It was not that ultimate hopes were to be abandoned: they were to be postponed to a more propitious moment—or rather, the country was gradually to be led in the direction in which at present it declined to go. The Catholics, on their side, both Bishops and laity, henceforward appear to have exclusively occupied themselves with the cause of religion; and, feeling that they had gained nothing by the association of their cause with that of the Legitimists, they came to an important decision. They, too, were willing to accept the existing form of government, only demanding in return one thing, liberty with regard to secondary education—a reform to which the Government had pledged itself on its accession to power but which it had only partially fulfilled. This question had been left unsettled after primary education had been arranged upon lines allowing both freedom and reform to various denominations. If only the University monopoly were destroyed, the clergy and the congregations could, by securing control over the education of the sons of that middle class which held the reins of power, eventually

dominate the Government. The Bishops were gradually won over to this plan—their conversion being, curiously enough, due to a layman, a former friend of Lamennais and a staunch friend of Lacordaire, the Comte de Montalembert, who became proprietor of the great Catholic newspaper, *L'Univers*, in 1840, with the object of achieving this end. The suspicions harboured by one section of the upper, as well as of the lower, middle class towards a party hitherto deeply pledged to reaction gradually diminished and showed signs of disappearing altogether. At the same time, the distrust felt by the remaining section of those same classes in regard to the Liberal doctrines of progress began to subside, or at any rate gradually to lose its intensity, when they saw these same doctrines expounded with the literary and political moderation shown by *Le National*—so decisively contrasted with the habitual violence and crudity of *La Réforme*, in its daily accusations of treason against the “Gentleman’s Newspaper.” As a matter of fact the two Republican organs both aimed at the downfall of the Monarchy—though they differed with regard to means and opportunities. These underground workings, these tactics which the future was to make clear, the men of the Left Centre, including even Thiers himself, failed to comprehend, still thinking that they could ally themselves with the one section while repudiating the other. Guizot, also, was deceived as to the Catholic designs, to the extent of making compromising promises to Montalembert and his friends without paying sufficient attention to their strange collaborators, such as Louis Veuillot, whom Montalembert made editor of *L'Univers* in 1843—a man filled to overflowing with poisonous hatred towards the Monarchy of July.

Yet not even here must we look for the actual cause of that Monarchy’s fall. There had been no time for the propaganda of the middle class Republicans, nor for that of the Catholic laity, to produce their full effect before 1848. It was in fact to another and more internal malady that the *régime* was destined to succumb. Its fatal weakness, after 1840, lay in the fact that it was condemned to go on existing, or rather acting without any real incentive to action; and thus, by the medium of barren debates, of numberless internal dissensions, of rancorous and irreconcilable disputes between its leaders, all the contradictions and weaknesses inherent in the system were exposed to the public gaze. The *régime* had in fact no further *raison d’être*—there was no longer anything to compel France to preserve either the Monarchy or the Monarch, useful as both had undoubtedly been to her in ridding her of the horrors of a foreign invasion. On the sole condition that France respected the treaties of 1815, it was easy to see that Europe would leave her free to repress her unruly elements as she pleased; yet it was at this precise juncture that the Government laid itself open to the charge of refusing all demands for reform, and, what was perhaps still more unexpected, declined to make any change in her foreign policy.

This surprising policy was due neither to the senility of Louis-Philippe nor to the inexplicable obstinacy of Guizot, but to the exigencies arising from the nature and origin of the system itself.

The nature of the tyranny exercised by circumstance over the rulers of France was well illustrated in the questions of electoral reform and the lowering of the franchise. By the confession that one of its lines of policy might conceivably be changed, a *régime* proclaiming itself as one of "pure reason" admitted that this particular line of policy had a purely arbitrary foundation, and could be altered without serious consequences. Directly the possibility of the arbitrary principle having a place in the system of government was allowed, that system was doomed. If, for instance, it was held sufficient to-day to lower the property qualification to 100 francs, to-morrow, under the pretext that in a country like France the title of "proprietor" was of extraordinarily wide application, it would be possible to demand universal suffrage, with its inevitable corollary in the sovereignty of numbers. Even economic reforms became impossible, as was clearly seen when, in 1842, the Government was obliged to abandon the idea of a Franco-Belgian *Zollverein*—an abandonment due as much to the protests of the great manufacturers, the actual pillars of the *régime*, as to those of Europe.

Ultimately, the same compulsion of circumstance also manifested itself in foreign policy. Ever since 1830 France had had it drilled into her that in her capacity of a *parvenue* among the nations—a *parvenue*, it is true, who in no way blushed at her title, but who, at the same time, did not care to run the risks involved in the overthrow of "Society"—she must absolutely find someone to act as sponsor for her in the European drawing-room. And was not this sponsor ready to her hand in the shape of England who, according to a fallacious analogy common at the time, had passed through her own "Revolution of 1830" in 1688? Thus, even after the practically complete agreement reached with regard to the settlement of the Belgian Kingdom (1833), which is described elsewhere, the *entente cordiale* still remained the Government's main preoccupation and support. At the same time, in the face of a hostile Europe, England had become the model to imitate and not to surpass. No one took the trouble to observe that this presumably unchanging model was herself passing through a profound process of evolution, until the fact that she refused to play the part allotted to her in 1840 had forced itself upon the public attention. Moreover, the crisis revealed Europe as something quite different from the entity with which, until then, France had supposed herself to have been dealing. French policy, both home and foreign, was seen to have been based on a miscalculation. Not only was it clearly impossible to count any longer upon England as sponsor to the Liberal Monarchy of France in the "society" of Europe, but the Government of July could no longer put itself forward as a happy mean,

as a reasonable compromise between the just aspirations of the French people and the hostile passions of Europe. In external as in internal policy the *bourgeois* Monarchy had, in fact, lost its *raison d'être*.

But no one renounces existence of his own free will; therefore, the problem presenting itself after the crisis of 1840 was how to create anew by mere force of affirmation, or even of sincere conviction, the same European surroundings in which France had dwelt from 1815 to 1840,—the same bogey of a Grand Alliance, the same danger from another Waterloo. On this head all the overt partisans of the *régime* were in close accord; but it was impossible for them not to diverge as to the possibility of ignoring the crisis itself, and particularly the diplomatic insult inflicted upon France by England in 1840. The same fact was interpreted in different ways. The fall of the Whigs—so-called Liberals—and the triumph of the Tories—so-called Conservatives—in 1841, justified in Guizot's eyes the rehabilitation of the *entente cordiale*; in those of Thiers, it condemned it. How greatly England herself was misunderstood it is unnecessary to state. But what is worth noting is that it was on this very question of the *entente cordiale*, and not upon questions of internal policy (in regard to which Thiers and Guizot were to remain in agreement for five years longer), that a double evolution took place in Government circles. To begin with, the coalition formed in 1839 between the two Centres and the Dynastic Left against the proceedings of the King and especially against his foreign policy, was broken up. While, on the one side, the alliance between Guizot's Left Centre and the Dynastic Left became closer and more complete, on the other the Right Centre and Louis-Philippe were making mutual concessions, and concluding a bargain whereby each gained an equal advantage. The King obtained approval of his foreign policy from Thiers and the Right Centre by convincing them that it alone could save the *régime* from a return to the *levée en masse* and from democratic reforms, if not from something worse. In return the King accepted the Right Centre's parliamentary doctrines and respect for forms—a respect, however, more apparent than real, as the corruptions practised by Guizot were soon to demonstrate.

It should be noted that this schism between the two Centres was fraught with the gravest consequences for the fate of the Monarchy. It is true that at the present day one can hardly help smiling at the spectacle of two parties and two leaders—both equally devoted to the *juste milieu*—browbeating one another with accusations of "Revolution" and "Counter-Revolution." But this impression tends to disappear when one realises that between these two men and these two parties there lay not only bitter grudges and conflicting ambitions, but also, under the mask of common interests, two opposite philosophic and social conceptions of life. Starting from two different points of view, the one envisaging the rights of the individual rather in his relation to society and the other occupying just the contrary standpoint, they had no clear

perception of their initial divergence, so long as it was merely a question of building up and consolidating the existing system of government. But, directly it became a question of defending it, this divergence became manifest, each turned his arms against the other, and in their mutual destructive antagonism they threatened to overthrow the two essential pillars upon which the Monarchy rested. Neither could do anything singly; each party was unable, either to maintain itself in power, or to conduct an effective opposition. Their forces were practically equal, their fate depended upon a party other than their own—a party more genuinely central than themselves—which combined all the contradictions inherent in them both and united them in the oddest wedlock. This was that *centre législatif* which aimed at reconciling the two antagonists, which rejected Thiers on account of his bellicose policy, but imposed that same policy upon Guizot; which accepted the *entente cordiale* in defiance of the one, but compelled the other to use it as an instrument for annoying England. This was that middle party which, dominated by motives in themselves irreconcilable, desired peace because it suited its material interests, but designed for such peace an aspect of victory, in order not to put the finishing touch to popular exasperation. It was because this Centre was, for both Guizot and Thiers, a source of support as vital as it was intangible that both turned elsewhere for reinforcements. The one looked more and more to the Right, almost to the camp of the Legitimists, the other more and more to the Left, almost to that of the Republicans, each hoping to retain control of the middle class, and the whole resulting, in 1848, in the spectacle of a discontented National Guard surrendering to the enemies of the *régime*.

The history of the eight years after 1840 may be divided, under this aspect, into four periods: the first ending with the death of the Duke of Orleans and the passing of the Regency Act; the second with the conclusion of the *entente cordiale*; the third with its rupture; the fourth with the Revolution of February.

During the first period we find Thiers declaring, *à propos* of the Straits Convention, that Guizot had brought the *régime* into being solely for the purpose of diminishing French territory; Guizot retorted that Thiers had laid France open to the possibility of humiliation. But, while these mutual recriminations did an injury to the Monarchy of which neither antagonist dreamed, each had as yet only coquetted with those false friends, those new men, who were to be their undoing. While Guizot turned a blind eye upon the reestablishment of the Dominicans at Nancy, Thiers supported—half-heartedly it is true—a timid proposal of Odilon Barrot's for electoral reform, by which those who served on juries were to be added to the electoral roll.

But the issue was not joined, as might have been at first supposed, on the right of searching vessels suspected of carrying slaves. In 1831 and 1833 England and France had granted each other the reciprocal

right of search, stipulating that the number of cruisers employed by one Power for the purpose should not be more than half as much again as the number employed by the other. A limit was thus placed on the right of search which the more numerous British vessels might exercise. This arrangement was to lapse, when the right of search was extended to the flags of other nations. In 1842 Guizot presented to Parliament a new Convention, signed on December 20, 1841, by Lord Aberdeen, following upon long antecedent *pourparlers*—a convention now not restricted to France and England, but including Austria, Prussia and Russia. As at least one of these was not properly a maritime Power, the clause limiting the number of cruisers exercising the right of search had to be abolished. Thus disappeared a precaution which France had thought it her duty to take, to prevent an unlimited exercise of the right of search by the British Fleet. In Parliament the Centre itself, or rather the public opinion of French ports—such as it was—pointed out how prejudicial such a convention might be both to French commerce and to the independence of the fleet, and it was by the mouth of a deputy, who passed for a Ministerialist, that this view found most vigorous expression. Surprised and not less disappointed at the attitude of the majority—that majority which only a few days before had approved his desire to revise the policy of a good understanding with Europe, while at the same time condemning Thiers' attitude in the Straits question—Guizot promised not to ratify this convention without further consideration, though, at his own request and even supplication, other continental Powers had acceded to it. From these concessions, however, Thiers gained no triumph, since the Chamber showed no signs of a withdrawal of its confidence from the Ministry, though compelling it to alter its policy in the face of the whole of Europe. Before the end of the session Guizot had been forced by the majority in Parliament to give way completely, and to promise absolutely that he would not ratify the right of search—a necessity which he had hoped to be able to avoid.

Nevertheless, it was to satisfy the greed, the money-grubbing spirit, of this irremovable Centre, as well as in the hope of distracting public attention that Guizot, on February 7, 1842, held out as a bait his vast railway scheme, conceived—as even the *Journal des Débats* admitted—“to give free play to the Genius of Peace in its conflict with the Genius of War.” In very truth it ended by linking up Paris with such outlying points as Lille, Strassburg, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes and Cherbourg, and not only called forth all the sources of wealth contained in the soil, but concentrated them in the capital, and thus gave a giant impetus to the march of social and political reforms. Paying wholly insufficient attention to the disappointments and the scandals attendant on the handing over to private enterprise of such railways as were already constructed, Guizot contented himself with putting at the disposal of the State the land acquired, and left the construction of the

permanent way and the actual working of the railways in the hands of the great companies. If, by so doing, he thought to snatch from his rival an unique opportunity for winning over the majority, and at the same time to silence popular discontent, all the world now knows the depth of his miscalculation.

Neither Thiers nor Guizot had in fact so far any cause for self-congratulation, and the elections of 1842—owing to the apathy of the electorate—produced no radical change in the composition of the Chamber. Then came catastrophe, in the shape of the accident which cost the Duke of Orleans his life (July 13, 1842), and in a moment eyes were opened to the essential weakness of the “system.” All had been foreseen in this “Reign of Reason”—all but one thing: the Crown falling into the hands of a child. This event would not perhaps have been a serious matter before the crisis of 1840—the real catastrophe of the *régime*—but it became so after this. The whole problem of the July Monarchy was centred in a coffin. Either the Chamber alone ought to proclaim itself the constituent power and recognise its own right to elect the Regent where it liked—even to designate the young prince’s mother, if it chose to abrogate the Salic law; or this same Chamber ought merely to regard itself as called upon to settle a disputed point of law as a judicial tribunal. By its decision—either that the Salic law had been swept away, or that it had been preserved by the Revolution of 1830, together with the other laws of the *ancien régime*—a fundamental point which had remained in doubt for the last twelve years would find solution. And thereby, too, would be cleared away the uncertainty lying at the very foundation of the *régime*—the question as to whether the charter, and with it the constitutional system, dated from 1814 or from 1830. Was it a compromise between the rights of the King and the equal rights of the people? Was it imposed upon the former by the latter; and, in that case, was it capable of revocation and revision? Men’s minds were so shaken by the recent catastrophe that the problem seemed neither so simple, nor so complex, as in our statement of it. Alphonse de Lamartine, already moving on towards the Republic, pronounced in favour of the principles of 1830, on the pretext that those of 1814 would involve a return to the most obnoxious traditions of the *ancien régime*: a decision which sufficed to bring Odilon Barrot back to his earlier convictions. Thiers and Guizot, much against their own wishes, were compelled to unite by the necessity of defending this particular uncertainty—to which indeed the *régime* owed its birth. Happily for them personal factors decided the matter for the Deputies of the Centre or *Ventre*. The Duc de Nemours—not much of a Liberal and rather unpopular—seemed to them a safeguard against any leanings to the “Left” on the part of the *régime*; and they preferred him to the Duchess of Orleans, who was too popular, and therefore too much inclined towards those Liberal concessions, which were obnoxious in the

- eyes of these middle class property owners. Thus the Regency Bill of 1842 became law. The Act tacitly maintained the Salic and other laws of the *ancien régime*, and, by its ambiguity, gave equal satisfaction to both Thiers and Guizot.

Nevertheless, this law which should have brought them together did not long contribute to that end. Thiers, who had been forced to do violence to his own opinions in order to move in unity with his rival, and seeing him thereby firmly anchored to the buoy of power, grew weary of the struggle and, following the now stereotyped course of action, retired to his "beloved studies." He set to work upon his *History of the Consulate*, so as to contrast that period so fertile in its reforms and glorious in its victories with one of emptiness, selfishness and shame, during which, to use Lamartine's phrase, "*la France s'ennuyait*." This retirement of Thiers was naturally not without its effect upon Guizot, who was in no wise disturbed by the insignificant opposition of Molé, and was satisfied at having disarmed his most redoubtable adversary. In his somewhat precipitate elation he forgot all the humiliation inflicted upon him by the Centre, when he tried to enter into closer relations with England. He undoubtedly undertook to denounce diplomatically the treaties of 1831 and 1833; but he promised himself the accomplishment of something much better, *i.e.* the revival of the *entente cordiale*. Ever since 1842, despite contrary winds and tides, he had been working with this end in view, and had made to England an offer which she had coldly rejected—of concluding with her a bargain on the question of the Spanish marriages; a subject more fully discussed in the chapter on Spain. England, it was suggested, should abandon the candidature of Leopold Prince of Coburg to the hand of Isabella, and France that of the son of Louis-Philippe. There was no conceivable chance of England's accepting such a proposal so long as Espartero, who was all too much under English influence, continued to support the Regency in Madrid. But in April, 1843, he was overthrown, and in September Queen Victoria landed at Eu, with Aberdeen and the Prince Consort, and, as described elsewhere, accepted Guizot's proposals. This is not the place for us to ask what advantage England derived from this arrangement. To Guizot the matter was simple. He reestablished the *entente cordiale*, wiping out, at the same stroke, all remaining traces of the affront of 1840; at the same time, he achieved a success of personal vanity and a particular satisfaction for his majority in the preservation, as a possibility, of the eventual marriage of the Duc de Montpensier to the Queen's sister. In what he was later to call his "archaic simplicity" he conceived it to be of supreme importance to France, that no Prince of nominally English blood (as a matter of fact Prince Leopold was nearly related to the family of Louis-Philippe) should reign, or even parade upon the steps of a throne, on the far side of the Pyrenees. He did not perceive the inherent contradiction between seeking an alliance with



“perfidious Albion,” and offering her as its basis a measure of precaution against her odious designs. However this may be, the landing at Eu, and the announcement of the new *entente cordiale* resounded suddenly through France like a flourish of trumpets.

If Guizot had paid more attention to the national temper, he could hardly have failed to note that, at this precise juncture, the enemies of the *régime* were completing their metamorphosis, and finally adopting those weapons to which his downfall was to be largely due. On the one hand, Montalembert was busy winning over the bishops to his tactics, and collaborating with Veuillot; on the other, *Le National*—more occupied with the question of national defence than of riots or revolution—was as eager to congratulate the Government on having fortified Paris, as to scold the Republicans of *La Réforme* for neglecting their most vital duties to their country.

Meanwhile an occasion, afforded by an outburst of public opinion which the actions of the Ministry had provoked, brought into almost savage relief the lack of internal harmony between the Right Centre and the Left, and the fundamental antagonism between their social philosophies. Guizot had not only offended one large portion of the nation by his foreign policy; he had estranged a further portion by his toleration of the unauthorised Congregations, and by the appeals and offers made to the Catholics. He had begged this suspected party to assist him in fighting the anarchical elements which were everywhere revealing themselves, as much in the political lassitude of the electors as in the outward quiet of the people—quiet which, considering the national temperament, was ominous. This was undoubtedly another imprudence, but a wellnigh unavoidable one, which had its immediate consequence in concentrating popular attention upon those religious passions whose existence the populace, if left to itself, might have forgotten. Even men sincerely attached to the Ministry—colleagues of Guizot such as Villemain, and the editors of the *Journal des Débats*, the leading ministerial organ—began declaring that they saw everywhere the finger of the Jesuits. Liberals, or rather Republicans, such as Quinet and Michelet in their lectures at the *Collège de France*, caught the alarm and spread it broadcast. In truth the dissensions, both in the Chamber and in the Press, revealed a great confusion of ideas. In each party men’s minds were so divided on the subject of the Jesuits, or rather on that of educational liberty, which was so closely linked with it, that nothing of immediate gravity to the Government could for the moment arise; its seriousness was only to become manifest with time and when men’s ideas had grown clearer.

Thus the struggle between the two enemies began afresh, more ardently than before, and without any greater promise of victory to the one than to the other. Thiers had nothing but sarcasm for the *entente cordiale*; but he could not induce the Centre to repudiate it. All he could persuade that

a body to do was to restrict the range of the *entente*, to force Guizot into making a kind of *amende honorable*, and soon afterwards to try to compel him to extract from England measures unpalatable alike to that country and its Queen. Yet Guizot could hardly have paid less for the *entente* than by his refusal to annex Tahiti, and by insisting on the literal carrying out of the orders given to Admiral Dupetit-Thouars. The Admiral—instructed to occupy the Marquesas Isles—had taken upon himself to sign a treaty (September 9, 1842) with Pomare, Queen of Tahiti. This treaty, concluded in the absence of the Queen's English adviser, the missionary Consul Pritchard, placed Tahiti in the position of a protected State. In November, 1843, Dupetit-Thouars returned to find that Pritchard had inspired the Queen with sentiments adverse to France. Accordingly he annexed the island and eventually expelled Pritchard (March, 1844). The news of his action had produced violent excitement in both England and France, and each nation demanded satisfaction for the insults offered to her national pride. But the "Tahiti stupidities," as Louis-Philippe called them, were not worth a war with England, and Guizot was therefore reluctantly induced by the English Government to disavow the Admiral and his annexation projects, and to make a sort of reparation for the injury to Pritchard.

And, as to French relations with Morocco, the Ministry was surely right a thousand times over, in resting content with a victory on the Isly, and a bombardment of Tangier and Mogador, and in not wishing to add the immense difficulties of a struggle with Moroccan fanaticism to those France was already encountering in the resistance of the Algerians. The arrest of French progress in Morocco pleased England, and induced her to concede an official recognition of French definite establishment at Algiers. No doubt the future was to show the mistake France made in dealing with Morocco as if it were a duly constituted Empire; but this error was not apparent at the time or to the Opposition. On the contrary, all these arrangements were attacked by Thiers and his friends as involving injury to the national honour; and, unfortunately for the *régime*, Guizot could not defend himself by revealing the secret aim of his policy, the crowning success he looked for as the result of his alliance with England. He therefore tried to strengthen his majority by certain concessions to the Right, more apparent than real. He authorised Villemain, in February, 1844, to bring in a Bill which was headed by the words "Liberty of Education," but which, since it proceeded to do away with that same "liberty" in practice, evoked a fresh outcry from bishops and laity alike. Even the Centre would not allow him to profit by this cleverly engineered move in the direction of the Right, but retorted by handing over to Thiers the report drawn up in defence of the University monopoly—not as justifiable in itself, but as taking into account "the period and the country."

Thus in the struggle at the beginning of 1845 neither Thiers nor

Guizot had gained the upper hand. By this time both had grown weary of the narrow and obstinate dictation of the Centre, and each in his own fashion began to seek for some means of escape therefrom. The Treaty of May 29, 1845, between England and France suppressed the unlimited right of search and replaced it by organising a joint Franco-English squadron for the purpose in question. Thus Guizot finally got rid of that question to which, as to a kind of clog, the Centre had bound him, and proceeded to make advances to the party of reaction, which, if not more sincere, were at least more marked than before. Comte de Salvandy was appointed Minister of Public Instruction in the place of Villemain, and reprimands were addressed to Michelet and Quinet for their lectures on the Jesuits. Thiers, on his side, used similar tactics, and violently interpellated the Government on its illegal and culpable toleration towards those religious Orders (*i.e.* the Jesuits) which the old Monarchy had expelled. Finding that the Centre did not really oppose it, and that the secret necessities of the *régime* demanded it, he even proceeded to attack his rival on the subject of the *entente cordiale*, and to seek allies in England itself. Since Guizot had come to an understanding with the English Tories, Thiers must needs cultivate relations with the Whigs; and with this view he entered, towards the end of 1844, into a correspondence with Palmerston, and went over to England in 1845, in order to get into closer touch with him.

At this juncture, while the veiled enemies of the July Monarchy—both Republicans and Catholics—were growing impatient, underground movements were making themselves felt in Europe, most of all in Germany and in Italy. In England the return of the Whigs to power seemed certain; and, since the fall of the Aberdeen Cabinet seemed imminent, Thiers followed up his foreign alliance with Palmerston with an alliance at home. On December 25, 1845, he signed a formal treaty with Odilon Barrot, and through Barrot with the moderate Republicans, now called Parliamentary Radicals. In the event of Guizot's fall, Thiers undertook to make room for Barrot and his friends in the Ministry, and also to support a proposal of electoral reform backed by *Le National*, which lowered the franchise to 100 francs, while at the same time giving voting rights to certain professions, in such a way as to double the electoral strength of the nation. At the same time—and this was a matter of graver import, and only explicable by his anger with Louis-Philippe—Thiers undertook not only to tackle the subject of parliamentary corruption, but also to discuss the question of the "personal power" of a King, who had "betrayed the parliamentary system."

In face of these combined attacks Guizot did not remain inactive. He countered Thiers' alliance with the Radicals by his own alliance with the Catholics, to whom this time he was forced to offer a genuine *quid pro quo*. He allowed Salvandy to supersede the Royal Council of Public Instruction (wherein Cousin reigned supreme) in favour of a Council drawn

\* from different classes of the population, two-thirds of the members of which were to be renewed annually. To the Catholics and to the Pope, who had assisted in ridding him more or less effectually of the troublesome Jesuit problem, he made what was tantamount to a solemn promise to grant liberty of education. Finally, he took his own precautions with regard to foreign affairs, that is to say, he planned a certain diplomatic victory over England. In order not to lose the unique advantage which he had counted upon deriving from the *entente cordiale* before Palmerston's return to power, he hurried on the project of the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier with the Infanta Louisa-Fernanda, and endeavoured to make it simultaneous with that of Queen Isabella with Don Francis of Asis, the Duke of Cadiz. This project was well under way at the end of 1845, though, in a second meeting between Queen Victoria and Louis-Philippe at Eu in 1845, renewed disclaimers had been made by Guizot. All his plans, as well as those of Thiers, were suspended in consequence of the somewhat unexpected patching-up of the English Tory Ministry for a further six months (December, 1845—June, 1846), during which period it was clearly necessary for Guizot, as the Minister in power, and Thiers as his rival in Opposition, to set about postponing the performance of the promises made to their allies at home. Thiers obtained a respite from Odilon Barrot, and delayed the introduction of his proposed electoral reform. Guizot felt himself justified in not immediately bringing the question of educational liberty before the Chamber. The Ministers were "forced to await the result of the new elections and their effect upon parliamentary majorities both in England and France," and so forth. Nevertheless, the parliamentary session held on its way, unaffected by any such reasoning; and the only subjects of discussion were "corruption" and the "personal power." Thus Thiers and Guizot, with one eye on the future and the other upon those home allies likely to be useful in the coming electoral campaign, carried their inconsistency to the point of stripping the customary veil from the personality and practice of the King. The former accused him, in so many words, of reviving the spirit and methods of Charles X, and, in order to frighten him, pointed to the possibility of new barricades—thus reawakening in the country a memory which it would have been far better to let sleep. Guizot, on the other hand, supported the King in his refusal to surrender any of the royal prerogatives, asserting that he regarded them as "sheet-anchors in the storms which the country might yet be called upon to face." Such language, though apparently a defence of the monarch, really justified all hostile criticism, and invited France to lay the responsibility for every misfortune upon the Sovereign alone.

In July, 1846, the dissolution of the Chamber was announced. Beneath the activity of the parties in opposition and especially of their most hostile portion, a change was perceptible, too slight to

bring about an alteration in the parliamentary balance, but enough to prove that there was something wrong with the frail mechanism which for sixteen years had triturated the fortunes both of the nation and the throne. The *personnel* of two sections of the Centre had suffered change, and one of them finally consented to follow Guizot on the question of educational liberty, while still stipulating that it should be denied to the interdicted religious Orders. The other accepted the principle of the advisability of reform—even of electoral reform, provided that it was carried out under the auspices, not of Thiers, but of Guizot. But this was by no means the most threatening storm-signal of this new time. At this precise moment everything outside France was undergoing a process of transformation. It was not only manifest in England, which had just seen the triumphant return to power of Palmerston and the Whigs (June, 1846)—a return so desired by Thiers, so dreaded by Guizot. In Switzerland the capture of the Federal Council by the Radicals was complete, and official Europe was much alarmed by this ominous demonstration of the power of democracy. Germany also was profoundly agitated when the Schleswig-Holstein question entered upon an acute phase; while a similar wave of nationalist sentiment was sweeping over Italy, shaken to its foundations by the election of Pio Nono. All nationalities, especially those suffering or believing themselves to be suffering from oppression, stirred simultaneously as at a preconcerted signal—the people of Austria, the Danes, even the Poles whose national heart had seemed almost to have ceased beating. Everything in Europe, as in France, was in a state of ferment and restlessness.

As is inevitable at such times, dissension was everywhere. French Republicans and French Catholics were as hopelessly divided as to the end to be attained, as in regard to the means to be employed. Foreign nations, even the great mass of the French people themselves, hardly knew what they wanted, and only a little more clearly what they did not want. To Thiers and Guizot, seeking inspiration from events in England (which they were really as incapable of interpreting as of understanding Europe, or even France itself, at this moment of transition), the time seemed to have come when, in the interests of the Monarchy of the *juste milieu*, their trump-card must be played. Guizot, for his part, did not hesitate to break up the foreign *entente* to which he had hitherto devoted his efforts, in order to conceal from Thiers and Palmerston its main object, viz. the marriage of Isabella to Francis of Assis and the simultaneous union (since Maria Christina insisted upon it) of the Infanta to the Duc de Montpensier. On October 10, 1846, it was announced to the world that, in direct defiance of previous French pledges, these marriages would immediately take place. England and Palmerston were furious, since, as it was believed that Isabella would never have a child by her husband, the Duc de Montpensier might

one day sit on the throne of Spain. But for this remote prospect England cared less than for the immediate insult to her national pride involved in Guizot's breach of faith. The immediate effect was the severing of the *entente cordiale*, and the isolation of France in Europe.

Henceforward events followed one another so quickly that, at home as well as abroad, all was confusion. Palmerston, enraged at being tricked by Guizot in the affair of the Spanish marriages, tried to persuade Metternich that the presence of the Duc de Montpensier in Madrid would reestablish that union between France and Spain which had existed under Louis XIV and Philip V. When this hope flickered out, he busied himself, regardless of the cost, in setting France against Austria, or Austria against France *à propos* of events in Switzerland and Italy. In every conceivable way, and by every conceivable means, he tried to wreck the France of Guizot and Louis-Philippe, even that of Thiers, by supplying weapons to their opponents. Metternich, who had taken advantage of the sudden coldness between France and England to annex Cracow, and, having just drawn upon himself an academic though indignant protest from Guizot, was not ashamed to disavow his whole past policy. He was now ready to seek the help of that very France whose susceptibilities he had trampled under foot, so that, aided by France's King and by Guizot, he might the better fight revolution—and this time it was revolution indeed.

Finally, in France itself, there was a most interesting change of front on the part of both Republicans and Catholics. The Catholics, disgusted at seeing the Chamber reject once more the proposal for liberty of education (May, 1847), in spite of Guizot's efforts, seemed disposed to listen to the overtures of the Republicans. For they not unnaturally thought that it could scarcely be more difficult to induce an electorate, based upon universal suffrage, to give them what they wanted, than it had proved to persuade one composed of small property-owners. The moderate Republicans, such as Marrast, Marie, Carnot, willing but a short while before to submit to Thiers' evasions, now decided, in proportion as they realised his "hypocrisy" and his imperious need of their assistance, to impose harder conditions upon him. Suddenly, in the midst of all this the whole reputation for probity upon which this French middle class Government prided itself, which reputation Guizot's *morgue* had largely helped to preserve, collapsed completely beneath the crushing weight of a number of notorious scandals. Teste, a former colleague of Guizot, was convicted of having sold to Cubières, a former colleague of Thiers, a salt-mine concession for a considerable amount of hard cash. At the same time by way of violent contrast, men bankrupt in reputation were being whitewashed, thanks to the talents of enthusiastic advocates. These bankrupts were the men of the Terror and their advocates, men like Louis Blanc, Jules Michelet and Alphonse de Lamartine. The impassioned albeit

inaccurate *Histoire des Girondins* by Lamartine brought his publishers a success which was celebrated at Maçon in July, 1847, by a colossal banquet to 6000 guests. In the face of such calamities to the *régime* it was inevitable that Thiers and Guizot should yield some ground to their allies, in the hope of recapturing it later on if they could.

Guizot was now forced to hasten the reconquest of Montalembert by proclaiming aloud from the tribune that "for all the moral diseases of society religious faith and liberty are the sovereign remedies." He asked from the Catholics only "a little patience" and he would give them their educational liberty. Thiers, for his part, half of his own free will and half from necessity, allowed his friends to sit side by side with Odilon Barrot and the Republicans at a whole campaign of banquets, designed to bring pressure to bear first upon public opinion and subsequently on the Government, with the view of precipitating electoral reform. Thiers, who hoped, though the expectation was a vain one, to conciliate Louis-Philippe, took no personal part in these banquets, the object of which, in his view, was to strengthen and steady the institutions of July. Unfortunately for Thiers, Barrot was from the outset in a position to dictate his own terms to him. Barrot himself was soon forced to yield to the moderate Republicans, who in their turn were soon to give way before those of the advanced section. Starting with the omission of the royal toast, and then with that of the bald toast to the July Institutions, these banquets, originated in Paris with a view to the enlargement of a too restricted suffrage, were destined to pass by imperceptible degrees, as at Lille and Rouen, to the glorification of manhood suffrage by Ledru-Rollin. Nor was Guizot more fortunate in his alliances, though the theatre of his mortifications lay outside France. What advantage was it to him to be hand and glove with the Catholics, and to have risked checkmate against Palmerston in Switzerland, if the Church of Rome, which he had served so well there, was to elude him in Italy? Pope Pius IX paid no attention to him, and, at the very moment when the banquets were producing their greatest effect in France, gave rein in the Italian Peninsula to an immense movement towards freedom and unity, which was destined to shake all the monarchies of Europe to their foundations.

Everything should have warned Thiers and Guizot of their imprudence; but their positions, and the element of infatuation in their characters, ill-fitted them to understand what was going on in the hearts of nations. Their excuse must be sought in the confusion of ideas then prevalent everywhere, alike among the masses and among those who aspired to lead them—whether they were Catholics and Republicans as in France, or national patriots as in Germany and Italy. So great, for example, was the political indecision of the French people, powerless, for lack of a man to reestablish the one form of government which seemed at the moment to be suited to it, viz. the Empire, that neither

\* Catholics nor Republicans could look forward to a lasting or even a possible victory. And this explains how it was that Thiers and Guizot, in spite of all their compromises with the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right, failed to take alarm, but continued to devote themselves unremittingly to their favourite idea—the taming of a rebellious majority.

At the beginning of 1848, Guizot, still believing in the possibility of isolating his rival from the Monarchical Centre for good and all, proposed to the Chamber that his Government should denounce those “blind or hostile passions” which did not even recoil before the criminal idea of altering, in some degree, those institutions which had governed France so long without shock and without disturbance. Thiers had already defined his attitude at the end of 1847 in a discourse which was indeed a masterpiece of contradictions (not all of them intended). Extremely bold in parts, so as to make a powerful impression on the Centre, it was also extremely timid in others, since he still had to maintain his character of a possible Minister, acceptable alike to the King and to Metternich. If he spoke, now of the painful necessity of respecting the treaties of 1815, now of the opposite necessity of recognising the movements towards unity of the Italian peoples, it was with the deliberate design of inviting the Centre to choose between him, Thiers, who prided himself upon his leanings towards Revolution, and Guizot, whom he accused of reverting to the *ancien régime*. Vain efforts on the part of both! The Centre repulsed Thiers and, for the moment, condescended to approve of Guizot’s foreign policy, and even to censure those “blind or hostile passions” which desired reforms. Yet immediately afterwards, by its mouthpiece, Desmousseaux de Givré, it was reproaching the Minister with having accomplished “nothing! nothing! nothing!” And then these same deputies, as though afflicted with *amnésie*, proceeded to demand the belated introduction of “wise and moderate reforms.” What was this but incoherence *in excelsis*—absurdity reigning fatally supreme in a kingdom which prided itself upon being the Realm of Reason?

Moreover in January–February, 1848, while nothing in the state of things abroad justified Louis-Philippe and Guizot in arguing the existence of a dangerous social upheaval, neither was there anything to justify them in their threats of a counter-revolution. Austria and Metternich, bowing before accomplished facts, had seen constitutional governments erected at Naples, Florence and Turin, and a Liberal in the Chair of Saint Peter. The hour was approaching when the Monarchy of the *juste milieu* would have once and for all to reveal its true policy to a nation whose sentiments had profoundly changed since 1830.

Should the Monarchy fail thus to declare itself, it remained to be seen what incident would cause, and what would be the manner of, its downfall. A doubtful point of law had presided over its origin, and was now to preside over its end. The Opposition—Dynastic as well as Republican—decided to hold a great banquet in Paris, to answer



the censure passed by Guizot upon its "blind or hostile passions." But Hébert, the Minister of Justice, interpreting a legal enactment in heroic fashion, claimed the right to prohibit this banquet—a gage of defiance which the Opposition took up by simply asserting that the banquet would take place. Both sides proceeded to take up their positions. On the one side should have been the troops and also—it was thought—the National Guard; on the other the insurrectionary forces. But then, all of a sudden, both parties took fright. The Government had only a limited confidence in the National Guard and preferred not to put its loyalty to the test; the deputies ranged round Thiers did not feel sure enough of their Republican allies; Barrot himself had not sufficient confidence in the support of the populace.

A sort of tacit understanding was arranged between the Ministry and the Opposition, an incongruous compromise which threatened to reduce the conflict to the proportions of a farce. The banquet was to be announced for February 22, and the demonstrators were to be present, but without any display of military force and in obedience to a simple police order; they were then to disperse; after which the legal aspect of the question could be thrashed out in the Courts. Everything was admirably foreseen—except the numbers and the organisation of the demonstrating procession. *Le National* proceeded on its own responsibility to draw up the plan of a grandiose procession, wherein the various corporations, societies, groups, even the National Guard itself, should march in their appointed order. Could it be that the possibility of such a procession exceeding the limits, allowed by the Government, was also not wholly unforeseen? The Ministry threatened to rescind its pledge, and to mobilise both the troops and the National Guard. The Opposition, becoming alarmed, decided during the night of February 21–22, 1848, that *Le National* and *La Réforme* should countermand the procession in their issues of the next morning, and peace seemed to reign once more. Accordingly, the morning of the 22nd duly arrived without any military precautions having been decided upon by the Government, just as no programme of action had been drawn up by the leaders of the heterogeneous Opposition—Left Centre, Left Dynastic, middle class Republicans, Socialist Republicans. But, on that same morning, the mass of the people of Paris, who did not read the newspapers and were unwarned of the change of programme—urged on simply by curiosity and without any instigation from recognised leaders—took a decisive step. Hardly knowing what they wanted, but desiring to express their invincible dislike towards Guizot, the King and even Thiers himself—in fact towards all the beneficiaries of that *régime* which had exploited the credulity of the masses for eighteen years—the citizens thronged into the streets in unexpected numbers.

## CHAPTER III.

LIBERALISM AND NATIONALITY IN GERMANY  
AND AUSTRIA.

(1840-8.)

IN Germany and Austria the years 1840-7 are of special interest as the period in which the revolutionary storms of 1848-9 were preparing. An antiquated political condition was evidently hastening towards dissolution. It was obvious that an absolutist and bureaucratic system of government could not quench the fire of Liberal and national ideas, which continued to blaze forth with ever growing strength and intensity; nor could it help towards that minimum of agreement between rulers and ruled which is essential for the maintenance of stability in our complicated modern States. To attain to its full vigour, a State needs the support and approval of those national influences which contribute the most to its economic, social, and intellectual life. At that time these were to be found in the middle classes, among men of education and the more progressive citizens. But in this very class the opposition was strongly represented; and it was now spreading downward to the lower grades of the population, whose traditional devotion had hitherto been the main support of the ruling Houses in Germany and Austria.

Still the strength and significance of these opposing tendencies must not be gauged only by the elemental power with which they forced a way in 1848; we must estimate them from a more comprehensive standpoint. Though they overthrew the old Government *régime*, they did not destroy all the foundations on which it rested. It was no such easy matter to set aside the institutions built up by centuries of labour. The bureaucracy and the military system in particular, the two main supports of absolute monarchy, were so securely constituted that they survived the shock of the Revolution. Moreover the antagonistic tendencies of the middle and lower classes were still very far from undermining the remnant of loyalty to the dynasty. When, therefore, the national and Liberal demands at last compelled recognition from the Governments, important remnants of the old political *régime* were able, not only to survive, but also to attain to fresh and vigorous life. These facts must be kept in mind in noting the symptoms which characterise the overthrow of the old forces and the rise of the new ideas.

We may begin with Austria, that Power which still held the actual hegemony in Germany. The system of government which prevailed after 1815 and is elsewhere described underwent no essential change during this period. But it could be maintained only in a form which hastened its internal decay. The Emperor Ferdinand, who succeeded to the throne in 1835, was good-natured and inoffensive, but mentally and physically insignificant. The real task of government was therefore undertaken, not by a regularly constituted regency, but through the further development of an existing organ of central government, composed of a small number of dignitaries, and known as the State Conference (*Staatskonferenz*). As representative of the Emperor, the Archduke Louis became President of this body in 1836, and in his absence Prince Metternich took his place; the other regular members were the Archduke Francis Charles, and Count Kolowrat, who had charge of the finance department. Other members who could be summoned, when required, were the heads of the separate sections of the State Council (*Staatsrat*), and the Presidents of the so-called *Hofstellen* (Court offices), who were really the highest administrative authorities of the State. Even under the Emperor Francis I there had been a marked want of cooperation between these three bodies—the State Conference, the State Council, and the Court offices; and it now proved impossible to establish the missing connexion. The heads of sections of the State Council and the Presidents of the Court offices, who were only summoned now and then and for a special purpose to the meetings of the State Conference, remained in their former isolation.

On the other hand of the two officials permanently attached to the State Conference, Metternich was already so overburdened with foreign affairs, and Kolowrat with the finances, that they had but little leisure for other state matters. Nor was it long before a bitter personal rivalry broke out between the two. As in addition to this, Archduke Louis, partly from indolence partly from fear, opposed every innovation, it is not surprising that in the heart of the State a somnolent condition set in, and that mere routine and listless habit prevailed even more generally than before. In the forties the State Conference met less and less often. Metternich was not unaware of the weakness of the administrative organisation; but he contented himself with his own peculiar domain, that of German and foreign policy, and with promulgating those maxims which helped even beyond the borders of Austria to maintain the condition of stagnation, so indispensable to the preservation of the existing Government.

Thus the system of political separation and the suppression of all political desires and tendencies of a Liberal character, remained in force; but the power necessary to maintain its full severity gradually declined. Though newspapers and pamphlets published in the country were still subject to strict censorship, there was no difficulty in introducing into

Austria the Liberal literature of foreign countries, so long as care was taken to avoid any aggressive provocation of the police. All this literature was eagerly consumed by the educated classes: while the young scholars and students steeped themselves in Radical ideas. Even the teachers in the universities, though nominally subject to the severest restrictions in regard to their teaching, could allow themselves considerable latitude, so long as they avoided touching on the dogmas of the Catholic Church. Under the shadow of a patriarchal police *régime* new life was sprouting upward in almost all directions; and even these tentative movements showed how serious were the problems that a modernised Austria would have to face, and what a disintegrating effect the idea of nationality must exercise upon its polity.

It is important to distinguish carefully two political movements: first, that which aimed mainly at Liberal and constitutional measures without affecting the essential character of the Austrian institutions; and, next, that which combined the Liberal demand for weakening the central State with the National claim for the emancipation of the individual nationality. The movement in the German lands took, as might be expected, the former course in different parts, but it differed much in intensity. In the Alpine districts it was least developed; in Lower Austria and the capital Vienna the greatest activity was shown. It was indeed a noteworthy circumstance that the Assembly of Estates in Lower Austria began to evince some political zeal. During the last century the separate national assemblies, with the exception of the Hungarian Parliament which is treated elsewhere, had entirely lost their political significance. They might have their say in the revision of tariffs, and might even bring forward modest requests and representations, but in all other respects they were mere harmless shadows of their former selves. And practically they only represented the nobility. But now the Assembly of Estates in Lower Austria was beginning to seek support from the well-to-do and cultivated citizens of Vienna, in the hope of thus increasing its importance. Its representations to the Government grew in boldness, and though it expressed the one-sided interests of the landed gentry with a certain *naïveté*, it also sent in complaints about general abuses, pressing for a more effectual parliamentary representation of the cities, and for various modern reforms in legislation and taxation. In this way the old Estates acquired a new significance.

The same thing happened in Bohemia. Here, too, the Diet was essentially representative of the land-owning nobility; but the memory of the old days, when the Estates had taken their share in the Government, was being awakened. They recalled the "renovated Constitution" established by the Emperor Ferdinand II in 1627, which had originally aimed at diminishing the power of the Assembly and increasing that of the King. Now that absolutism had made such advances, this Constitution had come to be regarded as a source of rights and as a

documentary proof of their existence, and as such was once more brought to light. As a matter of form the Diet still voted the taxes, though this procedure was always treated by the Government as an empty formality. But since the beginning of the forties the Bohemian Diet had claimed the right to consider and, if need be, to refuse the proposals of the Government with regard to taxation. This claim resulted in animated discussions and disputes with the Government, notably during 1847. A very slight increase of taxation was required for the maintenance of the municipal criminal courts (*Stadtkriminalgerichte*) in Bohemia. The Government proposed to raise this by an increased land tax, to be levied in Bohemia alone; but the Parliament insisted that the expenses should be included in the general budget of the State, and vetoed the increased taxation. At that time the Government was still strong enough to disregard the protest of the Parliament and levy the tax in the form it preferred. The Bohemian Estates too must have felt that the basis of their old Constitution no longer sufficed to bring the fight with the Government and the bureaucracy to a successful issue. They too, like the corresponding class in Lower Austria, were trying to get into touch with the interests of the middle class. But they could draw upon an even stronger force by invoking the spirit of Čech nationality. At that time the Čechs were devoting energy and enthusiasm to the study of their language, literature, and history, and were zealously cultivating the Pan-Slavonic idea of the interconnexion of all Slav peoples. Partly under the influence of romanticism, but still more with a view to establishing the independence and originality of Čech civilisation, zealous students like Palacký and Schafarik studied the ancient history of the Čechs and Slavs.

Events in Galicia at that time proved that the interconnexion between the Slav peoples had not attained to that ideal intimacy which the Čechs desired. The Polish revolutionary party, completely defeated in Russian Poland, had set its hopes on fresh risings in Galicia and the Prussian province of Posen; and the little State of Cracow, established as a neutralised free republic in 1815 and as the last survival of Polish autonomy, now became a centre of agitation and conspiracy. The neighbouring Powers, the original accomplices in the partition of Poland—Russia, Austria and Prussia—had already, in the secret agreement of 1835, resolved to abolish the troublesome little republic and to incorporate it with Austria. In fact they had actually sent troops into the territory of Cracow, to suppress the agitation there in 1836. Ten years later the flames of revolution were rekindled at Cracow with greater force. Under the leadership of Mieroslawski, the Poles determined to declare their independence on February 14, 1846, in Posen and Galicia simultaneously. The conspiracy in Posen was discovered before it broke out and was easily suppressed; but in Cracow and Galicia there was fighting in real earnest. Cracow itself was subdued early in March by the Austrian Colonel Benedek—the unfortunate commander-in-chief of 1866—who rallied to

his side a number of peasants from Poland, especially from the Ruthenian district of Galicia, by allowing them to give full rein to their fierce hatred of their Polish landlords, whose country estates fell a prey to fire and plunder. Thus, with the silent connivance of the Austrian authorities, who felt themselves powerless to check the movement, one revolution was quelled by means of another. But the days of the free-state of Cracow were numbered. The European compact of 1815 was arbitrarily set aside, and in November, 1846, the two other Eastern Powers looked quietly on while Austria absorbed Cracow.

The struggle between the Ruthenian and Polish nationalities in Galicia was a prelude to that which Austria was to witness on a far larger scale in 1848, when the race hatred of the different nationalities broke out in full fury. Still in Galicia the political situation was comparatively simple, for the Polish magnates were struggling for emancipation, while the Ruthenian nationality naturally sought for support by attaching itself to the Austrian Government. In Hungary matters were far more complicated and difficult. Here the Magyars were trying to extend their dominion over the Croats, who, for their part, desired to bring the Slovenes and Serbs in Hungary and Dalmatia under their banner. In deciding which to favour of the two nationalities, the Government found itself between Scylla and Charybdis. The Magyars were a very important political factor, on account of their greater autonomy, which they exercised in Parliament by a right of taxation by no means merely formal. Moreover they formed the only nationality within the Austrian borders destitute of any kindred branch beyond those borders with which to combine. Their policy and fortunes are treated in another chapter.

Prussia, the second of the great German Powers, unlike Austria, had no such subversive tendencies to contend against. The Polish troubles of 1846 affected only the outer circle of the Prussian kingdom, and were easily suppressed. Still, Prussia too had to be prepared for the contingencies of a general revolution, which would certainly bring with it a fresh outbreak in Poland, and might endanger the Rhine provinces, her most westerly possession, which was as yet but imperfectly incorporated in the common State. Far more comprehensive and deep-seated were the difficulties involved in Prussia's internal condition and in the general character of her relation to the Germanic Body, even in the years that preceded the outbreak of the Revolution. The accession of Frederick William IV on June 7, 1840, is one of the most important landmarks in the Prussian and German history of the nineteenth century. It brought Prussia back again into the German movement, and restored her to the position of a living and active member of the whole German National life. The *Zollverein* had already woven close bonds round Prussia and the rest of Germany; and the feeling of unity promoted by the Wars of Liberation had nowhere quite died out. But complaints were general about the weakening of this sentiment in Prussia, for she

was returning to her former unyielding self-sufficiency, and, except with regard to the Zollverein, she had made herself unpleasantly conspicuous as an ally of Metternich. Political life too manifested itself far more quietly and peaceably in Prussia, particularly in her old provinces, than in the turbulent south and west of Germany. This was in large measure due to the loyalty and veneration with which in his later years King Frederick William III had been regarded, notwithstanding his narrow-minded and even oppressive *régime*. A shadow had seemed to rest on Prussia; but everything was changed with the accession of a new ruler. The monarch, the Government, and the people of Prussia once more step out into the clear daylight of German national history.

This change was due to the peculiar character of the new King, to the vigorous internal life of the people and the State, and to the impetus given by Prussia's political position in Germany and by the movements in other parts of Europe. The King's peculiarity consisted less in recognising and utilising the strongest and most fruitful tendencies of his time, than in setting the whole in stronger motion. He had enough sympathy with the new movement to feel drawn towards many of its demands, and to give the impression of a man who might play the part of leader to his age and his people. It was an impression, and nothing more; for it soon became evident that an impassable gulf lay between his desires and those of the majority of his contemporaries. Still the King, who in contrast with his taciturn father, was a brilliant and eloquent speaker, was inspired in his utterances by so much enthusiasm, such deep personal feeling, and so peculiar an insight into life and politics, that he actually stirred up and roused the very persons opposed to him in principle.

Greater political freedom and stronger national unity were the chief desires both of his contemporaries and of himself, but his meaning was different from theirs. The only thing he had in common with them was his opposition to bureaucratic absolutism on the one hand, and on the other to the treaties of 1815 and the subsequent settlement of Germany, which did not suffice to satisfy the national wishes. The substitute he proposed for the former was, however, not the Constitutional State, which his contemporaries desired, but the rule of the Estates, which would revive the rights and prestige of the nobles and corporations, and reflect the mystic glories of a divinely consecrated and patriarchal monarchy. In place of the sober and grudging Act of Confederation, he dreamed of a revived Holy Roman Empire, in which he, the heir of Frederick the Great, would voluntarily submit himself to Austria, as the wearer of the crown of Charlemagne. This idea, which he confided in 1840 to his intimate friend Colonel Joseph von Radowitz, proves in itself that his policy was not primarily concerned with the domain of reality. Though he was proud of his Prussian Crown and wished to see Prussia occupy a distinguished and prominent place in Europe, and himself play the part of a leader, a "duke" of the German forces, he was at least as much attracted

by the poetic splendour as by the actual power of the position. He was in fact a true romanticist, in the matter as well as the mode of his thought, and many of his ideas may be found in the pages of Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and Görres. His romantic feeling shows itself in his passionate love for the German nation, but also in his readiness to subordinate the individual interests of the separate States and nations to the idea of a universal community of European Christianity. It was shown in his desire to revive the Holy Roman Empire, which was to form the nucleus of a European league of peace, and in his growing enthusiasm for the idea of a new "Holy Alliance," and of a mutual combination against breach of the peace, revolution and violent change.

But, in spite of his fierce hatred of the French Revolution and all its consequences, he was too clever and large-minded to take pleasure in the detestable policy of repression and the persecution of popular leaders which had prevailed during the last decades. His reign began with a breath of freedom, by the restoration to his professorship at Bonn of the cruelly persecuted Ernst Moritz Arndt and the grant of an amnesty to the imprisoned demagogues; while of the seven Göttingen professors, who (as related in a previous volume) had been recently subjected to unfair treatment, the brothers Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm received appointments at the Berlin Academy, and Dahlmann was called to a chair at Bonn (1842). In the beginning of 1841 he even reinstated Boyen as War Minister, which office he had been compelled to resign at the time of the Carlsbad decrees in 1819 on account of his Liberal tendencies. This did not mean that the King shared Boyen's Liberal views, but that he honoured in him the faithful patriot, who had fought side by side with Scharnhorst during the War of Liberation. Of course Boyen with his Liberal tendencies found himself in a position of much isolation in the King's Council (1847), and, even in his own domain of army administration, found it difficult to defend the popular and Liberal side of the military organisation, the *Landwehr*, against the aristocratic military spirit of the Prussian officers.

At any rate, Frederick William IV contrived to connect all these measures with the period which appealed most strongly to his own ideals, that of the War of Liberation. And the actual moment of his accession recalled these traditions and coincided with a striking development of national consciousness, aroused by the position of the various Powers and the fear lest France, checked in her other ambitions, should seek to compensate herself by conquering the left bank of the Rhine. It was at this time that Niklas Becker's famous song of the Rhine, *Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein*, and Max Schneckenburger's song, *Die Wacht am Rhein*, were written. The King himself was full of great schemes in case of war resulting in the victory of the German arms; such as the reconquest of Elsass and Lothringen, the establishment of a Burgundian kingdom under an Austrian Archduke,



the inclusion of Holland and Switzerland in the German Union. In November, 1840, he sent Radowitz and General von Grolman, one of the ablest leaders of 1813, to Vienna, to draw up plans of campaign and to discuss the reform of the wretched military constitution of the German Confederation. But neither Austria nor the secondary States were disposed to undertake an effectual reform of the military organisation, which must inevitably increase Prussian influence. Consequently, when the fear of war had passed by, the result achieved was but small. An inspection of the contingents of the Union was introduced, and it was agreed to take in hand the long postponed erection of fortifications in southern Germany at Ulm and Rastatt.

Still, the national hopes, once reawakened in the German peoples, were never again completely lost. From this time forward till the Revolution of 1848 they swelled into an ever rising stream. Few persons had any consistent and clear conception of the form which a national united Germany should take, but the desire to achieve it was a very vivid reality. In this period of transition literary and philosophic were giving way to political and social interests, and even poetry and philosophy were transformed into weapons of attack. Bold young poets came forward with startling new songs touching on the events of the hour—Herwegh, Dingelstedt, Freiligrath, Prutz; and the Hegelian philosophy, which had formed the highest point of idealistic thought in Germany, had now to furnish the roads leading down again to reality. Thus the young Hegelians, with Arnold Ruge at their head, founded on Hegelian formulæ the demands for universal, political, social, and intellectual advance in accordance with Liberal and Radical ideas. There was constant and varied activity in the literature of the day, and a young generation was growing up with great demands, ready to criticise without mercy all existing institutions and full of optimistic illusions.

Its first and chief demand was "space in which a free spirit might find room to soar," *i.e.* abolition of the censorial restrictions on poetry and literature, which had been established both by the Confederation and by the separate States. Frederick William for his part was quite ready to modify the system of the censorship. In 1841-2 he made it much less stringent, exempting works of more than twenty sheets in length; and in 1842 he established a chief Court of censorship, in order to maintain a regular legal safeguard in this domain. But when he found that the writers were abusing the new freedom, the mild censorial *régime* soon came to an end; and the only result was mutual anger and recrimination between the Government and public opinion.

In religious matters the King pacified the quarrels with the Curia and the Prussian Catholics by considerable concessions. Though Archbishop Droste was not allowed to return to Cologne, Archbishop Dunin was reinstated in Posen (1840); and the dispute about mixed marriages was decided according to the views of the Church, while the "Catholic

Section," established in 1841 in the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship and composed of Catholic councillors, provided an effective organ within the Government for ultramontane ambitions. The King was blind to this danger, because his romantic views inspired him with deep respect for the ancient glory of the Roman Church, and drew him, despite his earnest Protestantism, towards the idea of the universal connexion between all faithful Christians. This made him tolerant towards all Christian denominations whose piety rested on firm dogma; but it also rendered him opposed and even intolerant towards all freer tendencies which sought to escape from dogmatic bondage. He suspected in them some revolutionary element; and, at that time, the camps in Germany were so divided that war was waged at the same time against political and ecclesiastical authorities. Indeed, the King's circle of friends included the men who found in the aristocratic and patriarchal polity that which God had appointed and consecrated, the really "Christian Germanic" State, and the complement of their political ideals in a pietistic orthodoxy.

This group included, besides the Catholic Radowitz, General Leopold von Gerlach, his brother the eminent lawyer Ludwig von Gerlach, the Cabinet Minister General von Thile, Count Anton Stolberg, Baron Senfft von Pilsach and others. These "Bible hussars," some of whom even regarded dancing as a sinful pursuit, were all men of high character and refinement, but were regarded by public opinion with contemptuous dislike; and the King's own rule soon confirmed the fears that had been felt as to this combination of politics and religion, and the aggressive encouragement of pietism. It was evident that an appearance of formal piety was now required of candidates for high state positions. Particular annoyance was caused in 1842 by the draft scheme for a new divorce law laid before the State Council by Ludwig von Gerlach, which aimed at modifying in a Puritanic sense the laxer customs of the national law. Public feeling ran so high that it became necessary to withdraw the essential clauses of this proposal, and the general feeling of mistrust was further strengthened by the administration of Eichhorn, the Minister of Public Worship. He had rendered important services to his country in connexion with the establishment of the Zollverein, and was thoroughly sincere and personally disinclined to the narrow form of orthodoxy; but his bureaucratic prejudices and the pressure exercised by the pietistic *entourage* of the King led him to interfere unduly in Church and School matters, and to subject to discipline teachers and clerics with any tendency to Liberal views. His measures were especially directed against the "Friends of Light" party in the Church led by Uhlich, Rupp, and Urslivenus, which had been trying ever since 1841 to free the clergy from the necessity of subscribing to the dogmatic articles of faith. The King agreed with Eichhorn that these undogmatic rationalists were entitled to toleration, but not to a place within the Protestant national Church. The majority were compelled to leave it, and form "Free

Congregations" which also helped to foster political radicalism. The civil power was used—so contemporaries could not but think—in order to suppress free intellectual movement within the Church.

And yet it was the King's ideal to restore liberty to the Protestant Church, and to hand over the power, which he exercised as *summus episcopus*, "into the right hands"; or, in other words, to create a revived apostolic ecclesiastical constitution, consisting of metropolitans, bishops, presbyters, pastors, laymen and eleemosynary deacons—a scheme which the King himself designated as a *Midsummer Night's Dream*. His real inner purpose was the weakening of the lay and bureaucratic influence in the Church. Eichhorn did in fact make an attempt at establishing the synods, and a Prussian general synod was actually convened at Berlin in 1846; but the King's fantastic views combined with the split between parties and tendencies in the Church to render any permanent settlement on the new basis impossible. Thus the King's ecclesiastical policy failed in its positive aims, though it secured the dominance of the orthodox and pietistic elements in the Prussian State. Nevertheless, it intensified ecclesiastical differences among the Protestants, embittered the minds of all broader thinkers, and helped in no slight degree to fan political discontent in the country.

The King's opponents, the "Friends of Light," also suffered from a certain ineffectiveness, for, like contemporaneous Catholic Reformers, they lacked positive religious force and creative leaders. When in 1844 Bishop Arnoldi of Trier exhibited the pretended seamless coat of Christ and encouraged pilgrimages to the sacred object, this caused so much annoyance even in Catholic circles, that "German Catholic" communities were founded under the leadership of a Silesian priest, Johannes Ronge. These however, after some faint flickerings of agitation, soon showed their inability to make any lasting impression on the masses of the Catholic people, and in 1859 they became incorporated with the "free communities" of the Protestant "friends of light."

The sympathetic excitement which all these religious and ecclesiastical struggles aroused among the lower as well as the more educated classes was really a symptom of political dissatisfaction, the desire to abolish the absolutistic bureaucratic tutelage and feudal aristocratic influence, as well as to secure real liberty and a free Constitution. At this time three Prussian provinces were hotbeds of political and social unrest—Silesia, East Prussia, and the Rhinelands. In 1844 Silesia experienced a local revolution in the disturbances caused by the distressed weavers, which had to be put down by force of arms; and Heinrich Simon, a lawyer of Breslau, at the same time won a wide acceptance for his severe attack on the new laws regulating the discipline of officials. In East Prussia the movement was more theoretical and doctrinal, for here the freer conditions of the age of Kant and reform had remained alive even among the aristocracy and led to a distinctly Liberal royalism.

Here Theodor von Schön, Stein's old colleague, had filled the post of Chief President till 1842 amid general satisfaction. In 1840 he had published, at first anonymously, his pamphlet *Woher und Wohin?* a pathetic plaint against the bureaucratic tutelage and an appeal for general Assembly of Estates of the Realm. He was seconded with even greater violence by Dr Johann Jacoby, whose pamphlet *Vier Fragen beantwortet von einem Ostpreussen* (Four questions answered by an East Prussian) involved him in a legal prosecution. Jacoby was a member of a group of young, for the most part Jewish, literary men and freethinkers, whose agitation originated at Königsberg, where it found support even among the peaceable merchant class.

In the Prussian Rhine Province the movement was even more closely connected with economic and social questions. Here were combined the strongest contrasts, in a historic stratification, whose oldest and lowest stratum originated in the time when the Rhine was the "Priest's lane of the Holy Roman Empire" and formed the Catholic element, which was already being transformed into modern Ultramontanism. Next came the democratic and levelling traditions and institutions of the French period. The *Code Napoléon*, the jury courts, the abolition of the economic and social contrasts between town and country, helped the mobile Rhinelander to feel himself superior to the inhabitants of the old provinces, and to grumble at the stiff Prussian officials, who administered his country according to antiquated principles. And it was just here, where the Prussian State found its severest critics, that a group of merchants with Liberal tendencies and a wide political outlook was formed, who knew how to value the blessing of a great and strong State, and desired a closer union and agreement between the Rhinelands and old Prussia, and a liberalising of the Prussian State as a whole. The leaders of this party were David Hansemann, a merchant of Aachen, Ludwig Canuphauseu of Cologne, Hermann von Beckerath of Krefeld, and the young Gustav Mevissen. And here, as in Königsberg, there was a light skirmishing corps of young Radical writers. The common organ of these various Liberal tendencies was the *Rheinische Zeitung*, which had but a short life (1842-3) and was soon suppressed on account of its daring language; but it has an historic interest because its editor, the young Karl Marx, at that time still occupied an intermediary position between the *bourgeoisie*, Hegelian philosophy, and Socialism.

At that time German socialism was still in the ideal and theoretical stage; but the conditions which were to cause its spread among the masses were even then preparing, for the capitalistic industries were expanding in the large and united economic domain created by the Zollverein. The Zollverein itself increased a little in extent by the accession of Luxemburg in 1842 and Brunswick in 1844; but the North Sea lands (Hanover, Oldenburg, and the Hanse towns) were unwilling to give up their free trade by sea, and preferred to remain outside it.

Even within the League there was often a violent clash of interests. The protectionists desired, especially in southern Germany and Saxony, to protect the home factories against English competition in wool, cotton, linen goods, and iron. They were opposed by the free-traders, who found support in Prussia both among the bureaucracy and those landowners who had not as yet been threatened by foreign competition. But these contests, in which the party in favour of protective tariffs achieved some victories in 1844 and 1846, were in themselves a token and proof of the increasing economic movement in Germany generally. During these years the first steamers went from Bremen to North America, aided by subsidies from Prussia, Bremen, and the United States. In 1841 Friedrich List developed views on a "national system of political economy," which went far beyond the ordinary arguments of the protectionists. In List's view the future of German nationality was connected with the claims of the national economic life, and the aim of his teaching was to establish the connexion between national and political power and economic prosperity. It was at this time that the first proposals, immature enough, were made in favour of German colonisation, suggested in part by the increase in emigration during these years. But, above all, the new means of locomotion provided by the railway were eagerly exploited by the enterprise of private capital. Joint-stock companies for railway construction sprang up everywhere; but the speculation fever, to which they gave rise, aroused the alarm and provoked the interference of the bureaucracy, and all manner of hindrances and restrictions were put in their way (especially by the Companies Law of 1844). Everyone who attempted any bold enterprise must be prepared to have his steps hampered by officialdom, which, no doubt with the very best intentions, and the desire to advance national prosperity as a whole, lacked the elasticity and understanding necessary to adapt itself to the requirements of a capitalistic system.

Thus the days of the purely bureaucratic system in Germany were numbered. Its last great achievement was the establishment of the Zollverein; but the effects of this very creation reached far beyond their original intention. The desire for parliamentary institutions in Prussia was reinforced by a fresh argument in the cumbrous economic methods of the bureaucracy. And now the State itself was compelled by the new economic requirements to satisfy the demand for a Constitution. The Government recognised the great advantage which the State would derive from constructing the railways itself, instead of leaving the task to private enterprise. One of the most necessary lines, partly required for military and strategic reasons, was a railway eastward from Berlin to Königsberg; and private enterprise, alarmed by the Companies Act of 1844, did not venture to undertake its construction. If the State were to undertake the task, it could not accomplish it without borrowing. But, according to the Order of January 17, 1820, a loan could not be

issued without the consent and guarantee of the Prussian Parliament; which, accordingly, gave the King a new and strong impulse for summoning it.

His ideals of government by Parliament were of a great and glorious assembly of the empire—something very different from a modern parliament on the French model, which was what the Liberals demanded. According to his Christian-Germanic doctrines there was a marked distinction between government by the Estates and government by representation. The latter in his view led down to the slippery path of popular sovereignty, which regarded the people as a single unity. He for his part believed in a system of historically developed separate Estates, whose representatives must only guard and represent their own rights and those of their fellow Estates. He was resolved never to grant to any assembly a formal control over the government, which was to be exercised by the will of majorities. Of course it was impossible to limit the powers of an assembly of Estates, so that its members should represent only their own rights and not deal also with the interests of the whole people. Still he made the attempt.

His plan, at any rate after 1830, was to unite in one great assembly all the members of the separate Diets, which had been established in each province since 1823, on a basis of class representation. But directly after his accession he was shown a testamentary draft of his father's, which enjoined on his successors not to make any change in the Constitution without consulting the chief members of the royal House, and, should the levy of a fresh loan become necessary, to fulfil the promise of 1820 by summoning a small Committee partly from the representatives of the Provincial Diets and partly from members of the State Council, who were appointed by Crown nomination. Although this draft was not legally binding, it hampered his action, and there were loud demands among the Liberals for the fulfilment of the promise to grant a Constitution, made on May 22, 1815. This demand had already been made by the East Prussian Diet, when it assembled to offer him allegiance in 1840, and had aroused in him a conflict of feelings. He determined to go forward slowly, one step at a time, always animated by the one resolve not to grant too many concessions to the exacting Liberals. In 1841 some additional rights were very sparingly doled out to the Provincial Diets. Their chief right was to be the privilege of electing Committees, which were to meet in Berlin and help to discuss legislation for the whole kingdom. This was almost the same as a central representation of the Prussian people; but at their first meeting in 1842 the King made it very clear that they were not to regard themselves as a mere popular assembly, "representing the varying wind of opinion and the teaching of the moment." Annoyed at this as well as at the ambiguous nature of their position, the Committees separated after achieving little of any importance.

Among the King's counsellors Boyen was at first the only one who worked for the Constitution with real and decisive conviction; afterwards, the same may be said of Bodelschwingh, especially after his appointment in 1845 to the Ministry of the Interior. The rest, no doubt, were also of opinion that something should be done to pacify the increasing discontent of the people; but they lacked real affection for the cause. A very dangerous opponent of constitutional rights was the Prince of Prussia, the King's brother, afterwards Emperor William I, who regarded his father's testamentary draft as the very last word to be spoken on this subject. In this view he was inspired not so much by obstinate absolutism as by anxiety lest the position of Prussia should be weakened by the effect that the institution of an assembly of this character might have upon Europe. On behalf of Austria Metternich also tried to stay the King's arm, and warned him against experiments with the Estates. But all this resistance, though it served to hinder him for a time, did not avail to turn him from his romantic scheme; and, as we have seen, he was also actuated by a very practical motive—the necessity laid on the Prussian State of establishing some sort of popular representation in order to obtain a freer hand in financial matters. The King therefore resumed the deliberations about this question in 1845, and would not rest satisfied until his favourite plans were realised. At last even the Prince of Prussia felt constrained, from motives of loyalty, to yield to his brother's wishes; but he declared solemnly: "A new Prussia will arise. The old Prussia goes to the grave with the publication of this law. May the new be as great and glorious in honour and fame, as the old has been."

On February 3, 1847, the Order summoning the Combined Diets was published. It was the King's own political action, an attempt conceived on a large scale but poorly executed, meant to achieve something different and better than the model Constitutions of ordinary Liberalism, something original sprung from Prussian soil and suited to her special needs. The King hoped that Liberalism would be put to shame and conquered by a deeper political insight. In reality it was a mongrel creation, in which absolutist ideas were mingled with the old theories of the representation of classes and privileges, and in which modern constitutional principles received very inadequate recognition. The result was a most inharmonious medley. Even the external arrangement was incomplete, though an attempt at creating Upper Chambers was made, by choosing out 72 of the most aristocratic members of the combined Provincial Diets to form a special House of Lords. But this plan was not even carried through consistently, as it was arranged that this special committee was to deliberate sometimes apart and at others together with the rest of the House. In accordance with the Constitution of 1820, these combined bodies were to have the decision as to the raising of new state loans; they were to possess the right of petition for

internal matters, and a deliberative voice with regard to projects of law, though it was left to the discretion of the Government whether or not these should be laid before the Prussian Parliament. The most important of its rights was therefore the voting of fresh taxes, while existing ones could not take place without their consent.

Even this concession was more than the orders and decrees of Hardenberg's time had undertaken to give to the future Prussian Parliament. But in one respect it obtained less than had been promised. The decree of 1820 had declared that the Parliament should receive an annual statement of the amount of the nation's debt, thus involving an annual meeting of the Estates. But this was just what the King, who feared the claims of the Parliament, did not mean to grant. He specially reserved the right in future to summon the Combined Diets only when any special occasion made it desirable, and devised an artificial means of satisfying the requirements of the 1820 order. A small standing deputation of eight members was to meet every year and examine the balance sheet relating to the state debts. Even state loans for military purposes were to be voted by this deputation and not by the Combined Parliament, though this arrangement cast an undeserved slur on the larger body. A still more artificial development of this parliamentary scheme was the retention of the Committees from the Provincial Diets created in 1842. These were to meet at regular intervals (once in four years) for the discussion of draft laws, though it rested with the Government to refer these at pleasure to the Combined Parliament, or, as before, to the separate Provincial Diets.

Such was the complicated scheme that the King now laid before his country. Yet, strangely enough, his aim had been to avoid the formalism and minuteness which he considered characteristic of Liberal Constitutions, and to substitute for it a living and personal understanding between the Prince and his people. There was a deep meaning in his words, when at the formal opening of Parliament in the White Hall of the castle of Berlin, on April 11, 1847, he addressed its members in a speech of fiery eloquence. "Never," said he, "will I allow a written document to come between God in Heaven and this land in the character of a second Providence, to govern us with its formalities and take the place of ancient loyalty." But the fantastic artist in him was misled by an illusion, which prevented him from realising that Constitutions, statutes, and settled rights are an absolute necessity of actual political life; and even he was obliged to limit his ideal picture by so many written agreements that, in the end, it was more artificial than the despised Constitutions of Western Europe.

This scheme, which was not meant to be a real Constitution, met with a decided opposition in the Combined Parliament, led by the Rhinelanders and East Prussians, who demanded full and absolute fulfilment of former promises, and above all regular sessions of the assembly.



They insisted that this could not be properly represented by the little standing committee of eight appointed to deal with the state debts. The King replied that he did not consider himself pledged to more than he had promised in his Charter of February 3, and would promise nothing except that the Combined Parliament should be summoned again in four years' time. Two financial Bills were now introduced in the assembly, of which one guaranteed the land-rent banks, to relieve the peasants of the burdens on their land, while a second, and even more important, measure guaranteed a state loan for the construction of the Eastern railway. But the East Prussian deputies, in spite of their special provincial interest in this particular measure, thought that even this Bill must be postponed until the political demand for the fulfilment of the promises of 1820 had been granted. Both proposals were accordingly rejected by a large majority. At the end of the session on June 25, 1847, Parliament was required by the King's word and the Charter of February 3 to elect the standing committees and financial deputation, the very bodies in fact which were to exercise the functions which the majority of the Parliament claimed the right to exercise themselves. The Opposition therefore regarded these elections as a step by which they would dispossess themselves of their rights. Of 499 members present only 284 took part in the elections without reservation, 157 with reservation, and 58 did not vote at all. Thus, though the committees were elected, the general result of the session was discontent and annoyance on all sides.

The whole Prussian people, as well as all non-Prussian Germany, was watching with the deepest interest this first attempt at combined and—in spite of the King's dislike to the term—parliamentary government in Prussia. Some may have doubted whether the Opposition had acted with political wisdom; but no one could doubt the great intellectual gifts of its leaders, or the honest political enthusiasm of their following. Throughout the land the names of the Opposition speakers, George von Vincke, the stiff-necked Westphalian, the Pomeranian Count von Schwerin, Beckerath the Rhinelander, Hansemann, and many others, were held in honour. In face of such ability Bodelschwingh, the King's Minister, had no easy task. But the hopes of the small and strictly Conservative minority were raised by the young Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen, remarkable already for his firm and proud bearing, the originality and condensed force of his speeches, and his dauntless courage. He represented the severest spirit of royalism and aristocracy, in face of a majority which though unquestionably loyal to the monarchy, and though in fact containing a large aristocratic element, was yet penetrated by the necessity for great constitutional concessions. But even the Rhinelanders, who formed the Extreme Left, were far removed from the conception of government by the people, and hoped to settle the Constitutional question by an "agreement" between Crown and Parliament.

Taken as a whole, the effect of the Combined Parliament on public opinion in Germany was to encourage all Liberal elements and also of

course the Radical parties, who regarded every moral victory achieved by Liberalism as a step towards their own future success. It happened that the years 1846 and 1847 brought bad harvests, high prices and great material distress throughout Germany. In the eastern provinces of Prussia the agrarian legislation of Hardenberg's time had relieved the more well-to-do peasant class of some of its former burdens by transforming them into proprietors, but had degraded the smaller peasants into day-labourers, and put their land into the possession of the landlords. In other German States too many of the burdens of the old landlord system still existed in greater or lesser degree. In the south-west, where the ownership of the land had long been undergoing subdivision, the small owners were great sufferers during this time of famine. Still it would be a mistake to seek in these material troubles, which did not check the economic development of Germany as a whole, the main causes of the Revolution of 1848. These are to be found in the growing desire among all classes of the nation for a freer political and social activity, and in the growth of the idea of nationality and of the longing for a powerful united Germany among the better educated classes. As the representatives of culture and intellectual ideals, they wished to rise above the bondage of absolutism and police government, above the particularism of fractional existence, into the higher and freer realms of German national life.

The increasing unrest of men's minds may also be traced in the political conditions of the secondary and small States. In the kingdom of Saxony, under Frederick Augustus II (1836-54) agriculture and industry had been greatly developed by the Zollverein, though the occurrence of some industrial crises had disposed the working classes to give ear to democratic, and sometimes even socialistic, doctrines. At the same time we may observe, especially in Saxony, where the "German Catholic" congregations were so numerous, the great influence exercised by intellectual tendencies. Leipzig especially, where Robert Blum, at that time box-office-keeper at a theatre, led the agitation, was a hotbed of freethought and democracy. The mistrust felt of a member of the Catholic dynasty, Prince John, who was unjustly suspected of Jesuit tendencies, gave rise to a street riot in Leipzig in August, 1845, which had to be put down by force of arms. Some symptoms of movement might even be observed in the most stagnant of the States bordering on Prussia, such as the grand duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Strelitz, which were linked together by a common aristocratic constitution. Though members of the burgher class could acquire manorial estates, which conferred on them a seat in the Diet, the essential rights of their position were kept from them by the nobility. A desire to obtain these was making itself strongly manifest; and this agitation, though springing originally from the old class system, was tinged in the years before 1848 with modern Liberal ideas and demands.

In Hanover the *coup d'état* of King Ernest Augustus in 1837 (mentioned in a previous volume) had aroused only passive annoyance in the calm and stolid population; but in the Diet, for all its reactionary transformation, occasional demands made themselves heard for a greater measure of political rights. Electoral Hesse was governed at that time by William II and his son Frederick William, who since 1831 had been joined with him as co-regent, both men of despotic views and repellent personality, whose private quarrels were a source of constant annoyance. When the Elector died in 1847, his successor would have arbitrarily repudiated the Constitution of 1831, had he not been restrained by the warnings of Prussia and Austria, who were anxious to avoid any new cause for provocation. The grand duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt (where Louis II reigned from 1830 to 1848) was spared these attacks on its Constitution of 1820. But here the greater political activity of the peoples in the south-west manifested itself, when in 1846 Heinrich von Gagern, the leader of the Hesse-Darmstadt Liberals, a man penetrated with German national ideals, returned to the Diet after ten years' abstinence from political activity.

Far more violent was the political movement in the grand duchy of Baden. Radowitz, then Prussian ambassador at Karlsruhe, aptly remarked that the German secondary States of the older type, such as Hanover, Saxony and Bavaria, were sharply distinguished in their political aspirations from those of the newer type, like Baden and Württemberg. In the former the internal constitutional struggle retarded the development of the national German ideas; in the latter the national and the abstract Liberal ideas held an equal balance. The dangerous proximity of France helped to foster the national German idea in these south-western districts, where, up to 1806, the remains of an old-fashioned patriotism had still lingered. At the same time democratic ideas, brought over by political fugitives from France and Switzerland, penetrated to Baden; and, in 1844, Radowitz expressed his opinion that the whole subversive party in Germany regarded Baden as the region where the chief blows were being struck. The Grand Duke Leopold (1830-52) at one time resorted to Liberal policy, at another to police repression; and this confusion caused distraction and disturbance in the minds of the people. Here, as in the Rhinelands, the purely political contrasts were complicated by the presence of a strong Ultramontane element, especially in southern Baden. A proposal brought before the Diet towards the end of 1845 by the deputy Zittel for equal toleration of all Christian denominations (framed for the benefit of the "German Catholics") aroused a violent counter-agitation on the part of the Roman Catholics. The Government hoped to draw its own advantage out of these disputes, and, in the expectation of breaking up the Liberal Opposition, dissolved the Diet in February, 1846. But the Liberals won a brilliant electoral victory, and at the end of 1846 the Grand Duke consented to appoint

a moderate Liberal Ministry under Bekk. This striking victory for the constitutional and parliamentary idea had another important effect; it marked the first separation in Germany between the Liberal and the Radical democratic parties, the former being led by Karl Mathy, Karl Theodor Welcker and Bassermann, the latter by Hecker, Struve and Itzstein. The former were prepared to abandon pure opposition and support the Government, the latter sought and found matter for fresh agitation among the lower classes of the town population in socialistic ideas and fanning the general hatred of the monarchy. We shall presently see that this parting of the ways in Baden prepared the events which marked the eve of the German Revolution.

In Württemberg, the able and energetic King William I grasped the reins more tightly in his hands, and consistently kept down the Liberal demands for freedom, which he had himself favoured early in the twenties, in the hope of thus strengthening the influence and popularity of the south-German States. But even here the Liberal Opposition in the Diet grew more active after 1845; and the famine years 1846-7 led in May, 1847, to street disturbances in the capital, Stuttgart.

In Bavaria, King Louis, with his idealistic tendencies and his love for art and architecture, had, ever since the close of the thirties, been entirely under the influence of the Ultramontane party, and had, after 1837, governed through the clerical Ministry of Abel. A painful impression was created by the sight of the Protestant soldiers of the Bavarian army, kneeling before the host at Catholic processions. But the annoyance of the Protestant population at this religious compulsion strengthened the Liberal Opposition, and the lust of power displayed by the Ultramontanes presently caused them to lose favour with the King. The actual circumstance which brought about the breach between the King and the Ultramontanes was an unfortunate one. In the autumn of 1846 he was drawn into an entanglement with the beautiful and fascinating Spanish dancer, Lola Montez, who played the part of a patroness of literature. The Ultramontanes were thus able to exclaim at the same time against the moral perversion of the old King and against the moral and political poison of Liberalism. The Abel Ministry protested against the King's proposal to create Lola Montez a countess, and their consequent resignation (February, 1847) inflicted a severe blow on his prestige. As the new Ministers also refused to be at the beck and call of the arrogant dancer, the so-called Lola Ministry had to be appointed in 1847 under Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein. Fighting went on in the streets of Munich between the Ultramontane and the "Lolamontane" students, while the common people threw mud and stones at the actress when she appeared in public. Thereupon the King closed the University (February 9, 1848), but the people of Munich were so unanimous in their attitude that he was at last forced to give way and send the objectionable Lola out of the country (February 11, 1848). These

scandalous proceedings, occurring in the midst of a fanatically Ultramontane though essentially loyal population, may have had no immediate revolutionary effect, but they certainly helped to weaken respect for the dynasties elsewhere in Germany and to prepare the ground in Munich for the events of March.

We may thus trace almost everywhere in Germany in the years before 1848, an increasing political unrest. At any rate in south-west Germany the scent of battle was in the air, and in the autumn of 1847 the various parties closed their ranks. On September 12, the Radicals of Baden assembled at Offenburg, under the leadership of Hecker and Struve, and the programme which they accepted may serve as a summary of the demands made by the advanced Left throughout Germany. These included the abolition of the reactionary federal laws (*Bundesgesetze*) of 1819 and 1832, which checked the utterance of political opinions, absolute religious toleration, Liberal laws regulating the right of assembly, and an oath of allegiance taken by the army to the constitution, for this, they hoped, would undermine the main support of the monarchy. They even proposed to substitute for the standing army a popular levy resembling a militia. The demand for popular representation in the Federal Diet (*Bundestag*) was to satisfy the democratic as well as the national tendency which even the Radicals shared. Other demands betray the influence of the socialist movement—a progressive income-tax, attempts to promote better relations between capital and labour, trial by jury, abolition of all privileges and finally substitution of government by the people for the rule of officials. The word Republic had not yet been uttered, but it was in the minds of the leaders, as was subsequently proved.

The National and moderate Liberal elements of Baden and western Germany generally founded an important organ in the summer of 1847, the *Deutsche Zeitung*, edited by the historian Gervinus at Heidelberg. It became the organ of that national and idealistic academic policy, which culminated in the hereditary empire party of 1848. They gave full recognition to the monarchical form of government and the separate German States, and they welcomed Prussia's Combined Parliament with hopeful sympathy, as the first step towards constitutional principles. They showed a general interest in the political future of Prussia, based on the hope of winning a national reform of the German Confederation with the help of a Liberal Prussia. What aspect this reformed State would bear, and what place Prussia and Austria would occupy in it, were questions that were either set aside or but vaguely discussed.

The Assembly of this party had its first experiences of the difficulties they would have to encounter, when they met at Heppenheim on October 10, 1847. Here were present among others Mathy, Bassermann, Heinrich von Gagern, Römer, the leader of the Würtemberg Liberals, and Hansemann from Rhenish Prussia. Some, like Bassermann,

thought the course of events would lead to a popular assembly representing the German people sitting side by side with a Federal Parliament consisting of representatives of the Governments. This was what the Radicals had demanded at Offenburg, and Welcker had been asking for ever since 1831. But where was the use of a national Parliament side by side with a Congress of Government representatives, if there was no unifying national Central Power beside and above them? Hansemann and Mathy therefore confined their efforts to the more modest and attainable plan of extending the Zollverein, and furnishing it with a Parliament of delegates from the Estates of the various States in the Confederation. This plan might have resulted in the foundation of a federal State under Prussian hegemony, within the frame of the old federal constitution. At the moment, however, the demand for a mere Zollverein Parliament did not attract the mass of the people, especially as Zollverein politics were just then complicated by the opposition between Free Trade and Protection. Eventually Hansemann and Mathy also recognised this fact, and during the next few months all the Liberals of southern and western Germany adopted the common watchword which the Radicals had already made their own—the demand for a national German Parliament to sit side by side, and legislate concurrently, with the Federal Diet already established as the organ of the German Confederation. On February 12, 1848, Bassermann brought forward a proposal in the Baden Chamber to work for this end; and the echo which his words found throughout Germany is another proof that the country was ready for the events of 1848.

Prussia itself had already entered on a path which led towards the views of the national party in southern and western Germany. Frederick William IV, as we know, had long been occupied with national dreams and fantasies, and desired at any rate to recall to life the German Federal Constitution, though on a conservative basis and with due regard to Austria's historic position and importance in Germany. He met with a check, however, in the backwardness of Austria, for her traditional system shrank from every radical change in Germany, especially from utilising the national idea. In the autumn of 1847 the King, by the advice of Radowitz, entered on a new policy. The failure of the Combined Parliament, and the rising flood of Nationalism and Liberalism suggested to him the idea of recovering his moral and political prestige by satisfying the national demand in a conservative and legitimate fashion. "The most powerful force of the present time, that of Nationality, has become the most dangerous weapon in the hands of the enemies of rightful order." Thus wrote Radowitz on November 20, 1847, in a memorial which the King adopted as his programme. According to this plan the enemy was to be hoist with his own petard, and the needs of the German nation as a whole, and of the Prussian State in particular, were to be satisfied at the same time. The King and Radowitz therefore proposed that the

Federal Diet of the Confederation, which had hitherto been so unfruitful of results, should take up new tasks in regard to the military organisation, legal protection, and material interests of the Confederation, and thereby inaugurate a comprehensive national legislation. But what was to be done if Austria, the natural opponent of an effective federal reform, should refuse her consent?

The actual consequence of an intensive federal reform must sooner or later transform the loose federation of States into a federal State. In the existing Confederation two great Powers, Austria and Prussia, had been able, though not harmoniously, to exist side by side; in a federal State this equality would become impossible. But Frederick William IV and Radowitz failed to realise this, though they were both inspired with ambition for Prussia, and hoped that a reform of the Confederation would raise her position in Germany and Europe. This desire to combine the incompatible, because it seemed such a beautiful dream, was characteristic of their romantic policy. "May God in Heaven save me from any attempt to drive Austria out of the Confederation," said the King in November, 1847; "Germany without Trieste, Tyrol, and that glorious Archduchy would be worse than a face without a nose." His friend Radowitz however was prepared, in case Austria and the Diet of the Confederation opposed the idea of reform, to go forward without her, and summon special associations of the States which desired reform, on the model of the Zollverein. But this was only to be a transition stage, and the restoration of the old community with Austria and all the German States was the final goal.

At the end of 1847 Radowitz went to Vienna to win Austria to the cause of federal reform. But events in Switzerland, as is elsewhere told, intervened, and took up, for the time being, the whole attention of the Prussian and Austrian Governments, and set the question of reform again in the background. The King however took it up again, even before the outbreak of the February revolution in Paris (1848). Two events occurred to give it an impetus: the news of the proposal introduced by Bassermann on February 12, into the Baden Diet, and the death of Christian VIII of Denmark on January 20, 1848. Radowitz, when consulted by the King, at once advised him to press forward German interests in the Schleswig-Holstein question, the origin and development of which is elsewhere described.

The Federal Parliament had already replied to the "open letter" of Christian VIII of Denmark, by a general reservation of rights (September 17, 1846). Now, they were called on to defend these rights, and with them the German nationality in Schleswig, at the very moment when the whole German Confederation was feeling the inspiration of fresh national life. While undertaking these great and difficult tasks, they were drawn into the current of a revolutionary movement, which might either carry them along to their goal or involve them in destruction.

## CHAPTER IV.

## ITALY IN REVOLUTION.

(1846-9.)

THE main revolutionary influences working in Italy just before the period 1846-9, were two: the one, the frankly Revolutionary doctrine of Mazzini; the other, that of Moderate Reform. Nothing is more indicative of the opposition between these policies, and at the same time of the fact that they had not then severed all connexion, than the agitation at Rimini in 1845, headed by Pietro Renzi. There we see an armed insurrection by the people, and side by side with it a Reform manifesto, issued by Luigi Carlo Farini of the Romagna and Giuseppe Montanelli of Tuscany, which renewed the demands for reforms first formulated by the Great Powers in their Memorandum of 1831. The authors hoped no doubt to gain the good-will of the Powers, or at least to involve them in some sort of moral complicity with the insurgents of the Romagna—a naive idea enough, as the event proved. The attempt indicates, however, a sense of the uselessness of previous efforts and sacrifices (as notably shown in the elsewhere described “Bandiera” incident, in 1844, the memory of which still burned in the hearts of all) and produced a consequent reaction of thought. A new policy was coming to the front, even among the most blinded of conspirators, which at last recognised that salvation must be looked for outside the narrowing influences of the *Sette* (Secret Societies): and Mazzini significantly repudiated any connexion with the agitation at Rimini in 1845.

The first and strongest impulse to political thought in the direction of Moderate Reform as against armed Revolution, was given by Vincenzo Gioberti's *Primato morale e civile degli Italiani* (1843); and following thereon came the works of Balbo, Torelli, Durando, Capponi, Galeotti, and d'Azeglio, which have been noticed elsewhere. In his *Primato* Gioberti said nothing at all about the Austrians, and very little—and that little with reserve—about the Jesuits, lest his book should be stopped in Lombardo-Venetia. To this the Liberals took no exception, seeing that hatred of the foreigner could be detected in every page, and that Gioberti's conclusions were a clear call to arms which was intended to stir, and did in fact stir, Italy to its very depths. But, if he thought to mollify either the Austrians or the Jesuits, he was soon



undeceived. Not only Austria, but even other Italian Governments, did their best to stop the circulation of the book, by seizing it and forbidding its sale; while the Jesuits were especially alarmed by the striking and unexpected impression it produced among the clergy. Thus it became a forbidden fruit which all wished to taste, even if they could not appreciate half of its metaphysical subtleties. So clearly was it understood that Italian independence was the principal thesis of Gioberti's book, in spite of its astute omissions and skilful silences, that the writers who continued the discussion, with Balbo at their head, all addressed themselves explicitly to that point.

The man who took the principal part in exposing the flagrant contradiction between the proposals of the Moderate Reformers and the reckless and disconnected attempts of armed Revolution, was Massimo d'Azeglio, then a student of painting in Rome. Travelling from that city by easy journeys through Umbria, the Marches, and Romagna, he collected a fund of observations, the substance of which, with his remarks thereon, he published in his celebrated work *I Casi di Romagna* (The Fortunes of Romagna). The literature of Reform stood to political events in the double relation of cause and effect; of those immediately following it was undoubtedly the direct cause, inasmuch as they were (in their earlier period, at least) mainly the work of the Moderate Reform party, to the formation of which literature had contributed so much. And in that literature there is probably no more widely known or popular work than *I Casi di Romagna*, with its friendly warnings to the party of conspiracy, and its terrible indictment of the methods of Papal government. Of course it went full in the teeth of the traditions of Italian literature; it was Federalist, and Neo-Guelf; it aimed at making an ally, instead of an enemy, of that very Temporal Power of the Popes, which from Machiavelli to Victor Alfieri had been considered the principal bar to the reconstruction of the Italian nation. The literature of political reform culminates in *I Casi di Romagna*. Before publishing it, d'Azeglio had communicated to King Charles Albert of Piedmont and Sardinia his impressions of the Romagna, and had informed him of the advice he had given to his Liberal friends, namely, to trust in Charles Albert as the only leader who possessed an Italian army strong enough to attempt anything useful and decisive. This secret conversation with Charles Albert is recorded by d'Azeglio in his *Ricordi* (Recollections). The King replied to him calmly but firmly: "Tell these gentlemen to keep still; there is nothing to be done at present; but they may rest assured that, when the opportunity occurs, my life, my sons' lives, my arms, treasure, and all, will be expended for the cause of Italy." Then he embraced and dismissed him. D'Azeglio had not expected any such positive declaration from a Prince of so uncertain and secretive a temperament, and left his presence with emotion. Shortly afterwards *I Casi di Romagna* was published (January, 1846).

But for a short time, and by a sort of happy accident, its leading ideas appeared to be practically accepted; though they never really succeeded in becoming popular, in spite of d'Azeglio's assertions to the contrary. Mazzinianism, on the other hand, the deadly enemy of the Moderate Reform programme, looking to the unification of Italy as its end and to open insurrection as its means, never ceased to justify its own existence to the popular mind. Nor did it cease to combat the exaggerations of the Federalists and Neo-Guelfs, and to deny their claim to be the completest and most logical exponents of a united Italy. But whatever may be said of the extraordinary variety of views which characterised the political literature of Italy at the end of 1846, there can be no doubt as to the effect that it produced, in forcing the question from the gloom and mystery of the conspirator's cellar into the open fields of publicity. Here Mazzini had set the example by his publication of *Giovine Italia* (Young Italy).

This series of publications, their profound effect on public opinion, the calibre of their authors, and the moderation of the opinions put forth in them, were a sufficient proof to Europe in general—and to Austria in particular (to whom all this ferment of ideas was an abiding menace)—that the Italian question had now permeated every class in society. It was now impossible to put this new form of militant patriotism on the same level as Mazzinian conspiracies, or to throw it contemptuously aside with the ordinary formula of the pundits of reaction, that it was an affair of madmen, or of scoundrels. It would have been absurd thus to describe men like Gioberti, Balbo, d'Azeglio, or Capponi.

In 1845 Gioberti had published his *Prolegomeni al Primato*, which, though intended as a preface to the second edition of the *Primato*, is in fact a separate work; impulsive and impressionable, Gioberti not only practically renounced his idea of making the Papacy the pivot of Italian regeneration, but went further. He broke his armistice with the Jesuits, and roundly denounced them as the moths fretting the garment of Catholicism; and, though he had previously favoured an agreement between all Italian rulers, he now laid the Neapolitan Bourbons under the ban of the civilised world. What was it that had produced in him this change, involving a suggestion of inconsistency?

It was caused by two facts: the one, the already mentioned execution of the brothers Bandiera in 1844; the other, the demeanour of the Jesuits in Switzerland, where, as is elsewhere described, they had shown themselves ready and willing to go even so far as civil war. And not in Switzerland only had they behaved thus, but also in Belgium, Italy, and France. In France, indeed, the struggle between the University of Paris and the Society of Jesus, between Liberals and Jesuits, reached such a pitch of bitterness and created so much popular excitement, that even the Conservative Minister, Guizot, had found it necessary to send a special envoy to Pope Gregory XVI to invite him to recall the Jesuits.

This envoy was Pellegrino Rossi, of Carrara, an Italian political exile naturalised in France, who had acquired a European reputation in science, literature, and statesmanship, and had risen by sheer genius to the highest offices, first in Switzerland, and later in France. By singular ability and tenacity Rossi succeeded in his difficult mission; he actually induced the General of the Jesuits, by his own act, to dissolve the French branch of the Society. As Minister of France, Pellegrino Rossi was present at the death of Gregory XVI and at the enthronement of the new Pope; and, while he never failed in his duty as the loyal interpreter of French policy, his heart was none the less that of a patriot and an Italian. On seeing Italy once more, after some thirty years of exile, "I cried," he says, "like a child"; and he subsequently sent forth his son with his blessing to Lombardy as a volunteer against the Austrians. The like spirit appears in his public and private correspondence with Guizot, and in private letters written by him from Rome, after the revolution which dethroned Louis-Philippe.

Thus, on the eve of 1846, the positions of the Italian Liberals and their adversaries had gradually come to be determined by the following facts: the victory of Rossi over the Jesuits (although this directly concerned France alone); the unexpected attack on the Jesuits in Gioberti's *Prolegomeni*, to which they had made haughty and unsparing replies; the indignation excited in Tuscany, even among Liberals, by certain Neo-Guelphic and pro-Papal tendencies of Gioberti and Balbo, to which Giusti had given expression; and, finally, the absolute irreconcilability between the Moderate Reformers and the Revolutionary Mazzinists. Owing to these facts, the field of controversy was widened, and the air of Italy became so charged with electricity that at any moment a spark might cause a conflagration. The most practical idea of the Moderate Reformers was that the petty tyrants of Italy, together with the Pope, and Austria, could be far more effectively combated by constantly stirring public opinion, and by insisting on wide and open public discussion of the state of Italy, than by secret conspiracies and mere local revolts. Next to the Press and to the vigorous controversy carried on in print, their best allies were the *Congressi degli Scienziati* (Scientific Congresses), which had met regularly from 1839 to 1847, and which united as into one family through community of thought and study all cultivated Italians, who had been hitherto isolated in their various cities. At first the Italian Princes (including even Ferdinand II of Naples) not only permitted these Congresses, but took some pride in patronising them; but, as the Congresses became more and more an opportunity for political propaganda and for the development of Liberalism, they took fright. Austria, ever watchful, was specially alarmed; the Austrian Minister in Tuscany, in reporting on the Congress held in Florence in 1841, flatly called the Grand Duke a traitor; and Marshal Radetzky, who had commanded the Austrian troops in Lombardo-Venetia since 1833,

could see nothing but the cloven hoof of the devil of revolution in this Arcadia of Congresses.

But even in Tuscany that period of "pacific beatitude," which is held to have lasted from 1824 to 1847, was no longer quite undisturbed. Pietro Renzi, the leader of the revolt at Rimini in 1845, had been allowed to slip into France, whence he had returned to Tuscany; the Papal Government demanded his extradition, which the Tuscan authorities granted after some hesitation. Just at this moment Massimo d'Azeglio was passing his *I Casi di Romagna* through the press; and thus it happens that, while in the text he praises the Grand Duke for his humanity to the refugees of Romagna, he inveighs against him in a note for the surrender of Renzi. Another trouble befel the Grand Duke at Pisa, when the Sisters of the Sacred Heart, an off-shoot of the Jesuit system, asked permission to open homes and schools. This was contrary to the traditional policy of the grand duchy; moreover, a petition against the establishment of such an outpost of the Jesuits in Pisa had been drawn up by Giuseppe Montanelli, and signed by hundreds of people of mark. The authorities did in fact refuse their sanction, but they expelled d'Azeglio from Florence as a sort of compensation for the striking success of his book; a piece of gratuitous discourtesy, which made a greater scandal than the extradition of Renzi.

In 1815, Ferdinand II of Naples, who, with all his proverbial indifference, was somewhat uneasy under the general storm of execration raised by the Bandiera executions, tried to figure as an enlightened ruler by graciously welcoming the *Congresso degli Scienziati*. The 1400 names on the list of that Congress show that the amateurs outnumbered the professionals, and that many attended for reasons very different from the mere love of science. The King had no objection to flattery from the Congress; but was none the less ready, on hearing of the agitation at Rimini, to lock up some of its leading political members; and it was only on a secret warning from the Minister, del Carretto, that these men secured safety by speedy flight. The Neapolitan Liberals on the whole favoured Mazzini's old methods of conspiracy and partial and local rebellion, although his *Giovine Italia* had no great circulation among them; the famous *Protesta del popolo delle due Sicilie* (Protest of the People of the Two Sicilies) by Settembrini, in 1847, was their first utterance in favour of Reform on the lines of the Rimini manifesto. It should be remembered that, bad as the condition of the Neapolitan provinces was, that of Sicily was even worse. The consequent jealousy between the two peoples was fostered by the incompetence of the authorities, and was afterwards productive of much evil to the cause of Italy as a whole.

The same condition of things existed in the smaller States; in Lucca, whose ruler was a madman; in Modena, under a petty tyrant; in Parma under the widow of Napoleon, dominated by a succession of

lovers and husbands who could at the best but rank as mere Austrian agents. Of course these rulers did not distinguish between Mazzinians and Reformers, between Revolution and Moderate Liberalism. Like Austria, they felt themselves equally threatened by both; and they trusted to Austrian aid against both, if necessary—with good reason, for Austria was the true sovereign of all Italy, outside the kingdom of Sardinia.

In Piedmont the case was different. On Charles Albert the writings on Reform, of Gioberti, Balbo, d'Azeglio and others, had produced a profound effect. He had always disliked Austria, and cherished the idea of expelling her from Italy by force of arms. The discovery of this secret by his new Foreign Secretary, Clemente Solaro della Margarita, in 1835, had caused him considerable annoyance. But others had discovered it also: Gioberti evidently refers to it in his *Primato*; Balbo, more explicitly, in his *Speranze d'Italia*; and even Niccolini, the tragic poet of Tuscany, openly called on Charles Albert to draw the sword. The revival of public confidence in the King, notwithstanding his conduct in the rebellion of 1821, and his indefensible severities in 1833, was marked; and the hopes of the Liberals once more centred in him. He did not at once lay aside the reserve and mystery he had adopted since his accession; but the effect was none the less visible, reviving the memories of his youth, and eliciting many expressions, spasmodic perhaps but none the less clear, which revealed his "secret," the fixed, deep-rooted purpose to which the rest of his life was to be devoted.

The state of affairs in Italy in 1846 may be thus summarised—Naples motionless under the tutelage of Austria (which, however, the King personally resented), and disturbed by a Liberal agitation, which he ferociously repressed; Lombardy and Venice, to all appearance submissive and contented, but with a Liberal ferment gradually alienating the higher classes from the Government and extending among the lower. In the Papal States deep-seated evils were openly denounced: in the duchies of Lucca, Parma, and Modena, there was an ever growing divergence between rulers and ruled. In Tuscany an administration was slowly losing its old repute owing to its new reactionary tendencies; it was menaced by a Liberal agitation, and by the intervention of a secret Press, which not only demanded Reform but threatened the person of the Grand Duke himself. Piedmont alone was sound; the people were devoted to the dynasty; and the King, who had at last taken up a position of decided resistance to the overbearing policy of Austria, was slowly but surely carrying out his internal reforms.

Such was the condition of Italy at the death of Gregory XVI, June 1, 1846. The least that could happen, it was said, was that the Papal State generally and the turbulent Romagna in particular would be turned upside down; that Austria would then intervene; and that she would be opposed by France, according to her already declared intention. In fact, the conflagration might extend to all Europe.

In view of possibilities, Metternich had ordered Radetzky, the Austrian Commander-in-chief in Italy, to be ready to reinforce the garrisons of Ferrara and to invade the Legations. France, on her side, warned Austria that her intervention would be followed by a French occupation of Civita Vecchia and Ancona. Metternich, thus aware of the possibility of Revolution in the Papal State, was ready to meet it; but he was not prepared for a Pope of the type desired by Gioberti in his *Primato*. He had directed Count Lützow, the Austrian Minister in Rome, who was an expert in Papal diplomacy, to manipulate the election of the new Pope in the Austrian interest. In short, he wanted a Pope with no appetite for novelties, and as devoted to Austria as had been Gregory XVI, who had never during his pontificate been guilty of any apostolic energy, except indeed against Russia; for the severity of his language to the Emperor Nicholas on his visit to Rome in 1845, on the subject of Catholic persecution in Poland, was long remembered.

Just at this time della Margarita, in the name of his Government, offered the Papal State the aid of Piedmontese troops, in case of disorder occurring on the death of the Pope and the election of his successor, thus anticipating the proposal, which some declared to be so novel and bold when Gioberti made it in 1849. Nothing could cause so much suspicion and irritation to Austria as the knowledge that the rulers of Italy were solving her internal problems on their own account, especially if this action took the shape of an intervention by Piedmont in the Papal States, at the request of the College of Cardinals. The offer of della Margarita had no result, and a serious danger was averted; for Piedmont might thus have found herself fighting on the same side as Austria, in the very probable event of a similar intervention by the latter. This might possibly have been agreeable to the personal opinions of della Margarita, but it would certainly have been repugnant to Charles Albert and his followers, and not less fatal to the future of an Italy which was to unite under the hegemony of Piedmont.

The fears of Metternich and of della Margarita were groundless. Upon the death of Gregory XVI, amid the indifference or execrations of all, including even his intimates, no serious disorder ensued. The party of Moderate Reform was then in the ascendant, and the idea of provoking Austrian intervention by unconsidered agitation was abominated by all. Action was confined to the presentation of petitions for Reform signed by great numbers of citizens of the highest repute, the most noteworthy of which was that from Bologna, drawn up by Marco Minghetti. A lengthy Conclave had been expected; but a new Pope was in fact elected in forty-eight hours.

Cardinal Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti, the new Pope, who assumed the name of Pius IX, belonged to a respected family of provincial nobility residing at Sinigaglia, in the Marches. Born in 1792, he received his early education at the College of the Scolopi at

Volterra, but left the College owing to epileptic fits. Some traces of this terrible infirmity always remained in a nervous excitability and unreasoning impetuosity, which explain many incidents of his later life. The stories of the extraordinary promise, as of the romantic love affairs of his youth, are merely the fables of admirers, or the slanders of enemies. He returned to Sinigaglia in 1809, where he remained till the restoration of Pius VII in 1814. This was the period to which are assigned his supposed irregularity of life and relations with the Freemasons and the *Carbonari*. There is no proof that he was in any actual political connexion with the Revolutionary party, or that he even diverged to any great extent from his family traditions, which were purely clerical.

The future Pope left Sinigaglia (1814) for Rome to seek his fortunes under the wing of an uncle, Monsignor Paolino Mastai; for a short time he mingled in the mob of worldly ecclesiastics of that capital; but the influence of his mother's sincere piety, and of his own excessive tendency to emotion, soon entirely changed the current of his life. After being refused admission to the Pope's "Noble Guard" on the score of his weak health, he obtained a small post in the Orphanage known as that of Tata Giovanni (1816); and, accepting this success as a sign from Heaven, he took Holy Orders. In 1817 he went on a half-religious, half-diplomatic mission to Chili; from which he did not return till 1825, when Leo XII nominated him to the Presidency of the Hospital of St Michael, promoting him two years later to the Archbishopric of Spoleto. There in 1831 he first came into contact with the Italian Revolution. General Sercognani, the leader of the revolutionary forces (in which the future Emperor of the French was serving) had retired to Spoleto, after having pushed forward as far as Otricoli; there he was persuaded by Mastai to throw down his arms and disband his troops.

In 1832 Mastai was translated to the see of Imola; and in 1840 was created a Cardinal, retaining his see. At Imola he witnessed a constant round of conspiracy, revolt, repression, Austrian intervention, imprisonments, banishments, sentences, and executions. He was unable to conceal his disgust, and, in consequence of his open protests, he had the honour of being classed at the Court of Rome with Abbé Grégoire, of Revolutionary fame. Mastai resented this, and hence perhaps a remark of his in a letter to his friend Monsignor Polidori, on the occasion of the meeting of the three Cardinal Legates of Bologna, Ferrara, and Ravenna, at a political congress in November, 1845: "God help us! for the meeting of the three Eminences certainly will not!" In these words there is a certain flavour of protest, as of an honest man in the midst of rogues, who seems to be losing heart and spirit at his own isolation and impotence for good in such an atmosphere of suspicion, distrust, and espionage.

At this period Mastai lived in close intimacy with Count Giuseppe Pasolini, an educated and thoughtful young Liberal, and his amiable wife, Antonietta Bassi, who resided near Imola. In this genial and sunny

Environment Mastai's cultivated temperament and aristocratic instincts found attraction and sympathy, while in the loyalty of the pair and the honesty of their intentions he felt a hitherto unknown confidence. They frequently discussed the logical and practical possibility of an agreement between religion and progress, between the Catholic faith and Liberal principles, and the incompatibility of the Italian aspirations with the methods practised by the Pope and by Austria. Thus Mastai was led to adopt, more or less, the ideas and principles of Moderate Reform, in opposition to retrograde absolutism, or Revolutionary Mazzinianism.

Probably Mastai had not given any special attention to these matters, or to the development of those ideas of conciliation which had formed part of the Liberal romanticism of 1830, and the revival of which was then unconsciously drawing the younger clergy into opposition to the obscurantists and the Jesuits. But at the bottom of his heart he certainly then sympathised with the movement, whose scope had been widened by the literature of Reform until it dealt with all the problems of Italian politics. It was on this idea of conciliation that Gioberti, Balbo, and the other writers on Reform had based all their schemes for the redemption of Italy. Thus the Pasolini easily led on Cardinal Mastai to political questions, and brought him at last to regret bitterly the conditions of the time and to look forward to a happier future, for which nothing, as he thought, was needed but a little leniency and a little Christianity on the part of the rulers. His friends introduced him to Gioberti's *Primato* and Balbo's *Speranze d' Italia*; d'Azeglio's *I Casi di Romagna* he had already obtained from another friend of the house. Thus by the study of the Liberal Reform doctrines, combined with the sight of the horrors perpetrated under his eyes in Romagna, the Pope of 1846 grew out of the Bishop of Imola.

On Mastai's departure to attend the Conclave in 1846, Count Pasolini expressed his hopes that he might have the opportunity, as Pope, of practising all the theories so often discussed; and the populace, seeing a dove flying round his carriage, affirmed that it was the Holy Ghost. Thus the foundation was being laid for the extraordinary legend of the liberty-loving Pope, which was destined later to mystify the world and to influence the mind of the Pope himself. The exact moment of his election was unpropitious to the ideas of Liberal Reform; there was a breath of reaction over all Europe, which would increase a thousandfold the difficulties of a Pope who wished to prove his good-will by actions. The *entente cordiale* between Louis-Philippe and England had been broken by the Spanish marriages, and the rupture had forced Louis-Philippe into the arms of Austria, whose policy was everywhere and always anti-Liberal.

The first actions of Pius IX were, under these circumstances, those of a man who did not know exactly where to begin. Luckily for him, he had the support and assistance of two excellent men: Canon Graziosi,



a learned and enlightened ecclesiastic, and Monsignor Corboli Bussi, a man described by Minghetti as of so ardent a disposition that he would nowadays be called a Catholic Socialist. They and Pellegrino Rossi were the inspirers of that great political act, the Amnesty of July 16, 1846. It proclaimed the pardon of all political offenders and suspects, and made Pius IX, historically speaking, the father of the political resurrection of Italy. The enthusiasm caused by the Amnesty in Rome, in the provinces, in Italy generally, indeed in the world at large, was indescribable. It was a spark falling upon a mass of inflammable stuff—a consideration which had not occurred to the Pope, when he yielded to the spontaneous dictates of his kindly nature. Among the people a yearning for change, for political and social reforms, had been growing since 1815, and had become irresistible since 1830. In Italy, where the need was greatest, Austria had been the mainstay of the reaction in its struggles with Liberal aspirations; and it was against Austria that any innovation, however small and insignificant, would naturally be held to be directed. But the Amnesty of Pius IX was neither small nor insignificant; in spite of the safeguards surrounding it, it was in substance a rehabilitation of patriotism. It made a virtue of what had before been a crime, at a moment when through all Europe Reaction and Liberalism were in a state of opposition, and even of open conflict. A main clue to subsequent Italian history is to be found in the fact that Pius IX, unlike Metternich, did not see that his Amnesty meant war with Austria, and the independence of Italy. The act was equivocal, and admitted of two constructions: and all that followed is, under ultimate analysis, only an exposure of this ambiguity, and of its elimination by the logic of facts. In this sense the Amnesty of Pius IX began the Italian Revolution.

The reforms of Pius IX after the Amnesty were slow to come, few, inadequate, and often inconsistent: the secularisation of the Government, the most urgent and the most desired of them, never got beyond the stage of a pious wish. The enthusiasm for the Pope however did not diminish; since a certain liberty existed for all except Jews. It lay indeed *de facto*, if not *de jure*, at the mercy of the rulers, but it was something which relieved the old wretched conditions, without creating new difficulties. Rossi judged the reforms of Pius IX very rightly, when he wrote to Guizot: "This is not an ideal administration, but one that is still only an idea." The Pope never acted except under the pressure of a popular demonstration; and so well did the people, and their tribune, Angelo Brunetti (dubbed Ciceruacchio), know this, that their demonstrations had become a permanent institution. Thus the Government was on a dangerous incline, which might lead to disaster on the first disagreement between people and sovereign. And yet, in the councils of reaction, Pius IX was already denounced as a Freemason and a *Carbonaro*, and the legitimacy of his election was denied—portents indicative of the

Dislike and alarm which his attitude inspired. Commenting on these events, Metternich said to the Marquis Sauli, Sardinian Minister in Vienna: "We were prepared for everything except for a Liberal Pope; now we have got one, there is no answering for anything."

Towards the close of 1846 the forecast of the great arbiter of European politics was beginning to be justified, and the ambiguity as to the meaning and purport of the Amnesty began to be apparent. Its effect was already assuming a more pronounced shape beyond the boundaries of the Papal State. Genoa was celebrating the centenary of the expulsion of the Austrians in 1746: in Milan there was solemn mourning over the death of Federigo Confalonieri, one of the martyrs of the Spielberg, who had expired in a village at the foot of St Gothard, on his return to Italy, whither he too had been attracted by the glimmer of the day-dawn on the dome of St Peter's. The Scientific Congress in 1846 assumed so political an aspect that it was actually called a National Convention. It was there that the proposal was made for the above-mentioned centenary *fête* at Genoa, in which the whole of Italy was invited to take part; beacon-fires were to illuminate the whole range of the Apennines. Emphasis was thus laid on the point to which Rome was still endeavouring to shut her eyes, the direct relation between Liberal Reform and the yearning for national independence; and della Margarita was not mistaken when, after a visit of enquiry to Rome, he wrote to King Charles Albert: "The Revolution wants no making; it is made already!"

In other Italian States, such as Tuscany, Lucca, Modena, and Parma, this attitude had engendered an ever growing popular enthusiasm, which was rather of a frankly national and anti-Austrian, than of a merely reforming, temper; it had deeply stirred Naples and Sicily, while in Piedmont every opportunity was taken for patriotic demonstrations, one of the most important of these being the Agricultural Congress at Montara, which served the same purpose for Piedmont as the Scientific Congresses had served for Italy. King Charles Albert, foreseeing that Austria would put every obstacle in the way of a reforming Pope, looked forward with pleasure to war on his behalf, as the prospect harmonised with his own political and religious principles. Meanwhile he continued to carry out reforms within his own kingdom; he dismissed della Margarita; he showed less severity towards the political exiles, who were now returning home, and towards the Press; he gave the portfolio of Education to Marquis Cesare Alfieri di Sostegno, a man of reputed progressive tendencies; whom some even declared to be in secret communication with Liberals from Lombardy.

For, even in Lombardy and Venetia, the districts under direct Austrian rule, the period of comparative contentment, or at least of resignation, was closing. The rural population was perhaps indifferent, but the urban middle class was thoroughly hostile to Austria, and the nobility and

clergy were gradually following their lead. The Liberal party was divided into Mazzinians, supporters of Charles Albert, and anti-Austrians pure and simple. The popular feeling was significantly shown in Milan on the occasion of the funeral of Federigo Confalonieri, and in Venetia by the protest against the official plans for the Venice-Milan railway. Among the signatories of this vigorous protest were Daniele Manin, Pietro Paleocapa, and Valentino Pasini, three of the leaders in the coming revolution. Meanwhile, the large circulation of the works of Gioberti and of other Reformers was giving the Government great uneasiness, as the question in Lombardo-Venetia was one not merely of Reform, but of Nationality. The popularity of these works could only mean the assertion of Nationality, and the expulsion of Austria. Every demonstration in favour of Pius IX, or of the system he was held to represent, meant further estrangement from Austria. These movements continued without interruption down to the meeting of the ninth and last Scientific Congress, held in Venice in 1847; when, in consequence of the inflammatory addresses then made, the two most prominent speakers, Daniele Manin and Nicolò Tommasèo, were arrested.

In Rome the slowness and inadequacy of the reforms were attributed to the secret influence of the Jesuits and the retrograde party, and prompted the cry first raised on March 10, 1847: "Long live Pius IX—alone!" On April 21, the Pope sanctioned the formation of an Advisory Council (*Consulta di Stato*). The idea of an autocracy, tempered by the advice of a Council, had been favoured by Gioberti in his *Primato*, but only as a step towards Constitutional government; unfortunately, to Pius IX it meant the furthest limit of his reform. But the tide was rising from day to day; and it had now become difficult to stem it. In spite of the opposition of the Secretary of State, Cardinal Gizzi, arms were placed in the hands of the citizens by the formation of a Civic Guard, whereupon he resigned. The first anniversary of the Amnesty was now at hand, and the people were preparing to give it due honour. Suddenly, the word was passed round that Austria was in secret accord with the Cardinals of the Opposition, the Jesuits, and some of the worst cut-throats of Gregory XVI's old police (who had been seen skulking about Rome), to foment disorders in Central Italy. Thus were to be created pretexts for intervention, and for giving a final blow to the whole Reform agitation, which Austria regarded as pure Revolution. On the rumour reaching Brunetti (Cicruacchio), the popular tribune promptly stopped all preparations for the festival, summoned his most faithful adherents, arrested the best known of the Opposition, made shift in some way to arm the Civic Guard, and insisted on the resignation and banishment of Monsignor Grassellini, Governor of Rome, and the institution of a judicial enquiry. In fact, as Gioberti said in his pamphlet on the subject, "if ancient Rome could boast of its Cicero, modern Rome might be equally proud of its Cicruacchio!"

Had he then really saved Rome from another Catilinarian conspiracy? Clerical historians deny it absolutely, some asserting that the pretended plot was a popular delusion and exaggeration; others that it was a mere excuse for attacking the reactionaries. Two facts, however, support the allegation: the reactionary movements that took place in no less than ten Italian towns at the same date, and the sudden occupation of a part of Ferrara by Austrian troops on July 17, 1847. This had been preceded by an offer of armed intervention, first made by Metternich to Monsignor Viale-Prela, papal Nuncio in Vienna, and later by the Austrian Minister, Count Lützow, to Cardinal Gizzi in Rome. Evidence of this offer exists in the correspondence of the two British representatives in Vienna and Florence with Lord Palmerston, and in that of Count Revel, Sardinian ambassador in London, with his own Government. After this offer was declined, Metternich tried to force intervention by provoking agitation in Central Italy. If the Pope asked for intervention, an end could be probably made of the whole movement on the pretext of restoring order; and, if the Pope could not be induced to summon the Austrians, then the invasion of Ferrara would so provoke the feelings of the nation as to make war inevitable. The "great" Roman plot therefore probably had a genuine existence, though it never got beyond the embryonic stage. At any rate, Metternich succeeded entirely in attaining his second object; for the Austrian occupation of Ferrara (July 17, 1847) hurried Italy prematurely into action. Together with the subsequent insurrection at Palermo, on January 12, 1848, which closes the period in which Reforms, and opens that in which Constitutions, were granted, the Ferrara occupation marks the beginning of actual warfare—in fact the opening of the Italian Revolution of 1848.

According to Radical and Republican historians, Pius IX was at this time in covert accord with Metternich; of this there is no proof, and the probabilities are against it. Metternich was obliged to admit the Pope's protests against the occupation of Ferrara; and, if the Pope had been privy to the occupation, Metternich would surely have blurted out the secret. Instead of doing so, he repeated his arbitrary action; for a second armed demonstration of the Austrians against Ferrara took place on August 17. Pius IX thereupon repeated his protests; and Austria, while reserving all questions of law, was forced to give up the town and confine herself to the occupation of the fortress of Ferrara, according to the terms of the treaties of 1815. So far indeed was Metternich from being in secret league with the Pope, that, in a private letter written at this time, he charges Pius with being a Freemason and a *Carbonaro*, who had succeeded, Heaven knew how, in becoming Pope.

Metternich's plans were thus ripening. Revolution and war were imminent; and he was ready to face both, for he possessed the superiority in force, and knew that the political situation in Europe would leave him a free hand. For France had broken with Great

Britain, and attached herself to Austria, through fear of isolation; she could not therefore carry her counsels of Reform in Italy so far as to offend her new ally. Great Britain, it is true, favoured Reform; for the rupture with France had in a measure forced her to accept the office of Defender of the Liberal faith, which France had inherited from the first Revolution. England had therefore encouraged the Pope and the other Italian Princes on the path of Reform, and had opened communications with the Papal Government, which were called semi-official to meet the religious scruples of Pius IX. Lord Minto had been sent on this mission; but he had given the Pope clearly to understand that, should the Reform movement degenerate into a provocation of Austria, England would not put out a finger to help. Prussia and Russia were naturally on the side of Austria, and delighted to see her preparing to put down the Revolution imminent in Italy. Metternich had a free hand, and every reason to act with all speed, and hence the Roman plot, and the surprise of Ferrara.

These two events, while increasing the popularity of Pius IX, accentuated the hostility felt towards Austria. On September 8, 1847, Mazzini wrote a singular appeal to the Pope recalling his letter to Charles Albert in 1831, in which he exhorted him to bring about not only the unity of Italy, but also a reform in the Church. In Florence a demand was made for the formation of a Civic Guard, which the Grand Duke refused under orders from Vienna; later, a disturbance at Leghorn, in which the tempestuous romance-writer Guerrazzi was involved, forced him to grant it. At Leghorn a further demand had been made for a Constitution; in fact, the first Liberal Ministry in Tuscany was then formed, under the Marquis Ridolfi. In Piedmont the impulse to more resolute action was again given in the Agricultural Congress. At the meeting at Casale in Montferrat Count Castagnetto, the King's private secretary, read a letter from his Majesty on the subject of the occupation of Ferrara, which was in fact a call to arms, and was welcomed as such with patriotic enthusiasm in Turin, Genoa, and throughout Piedmont. King Charles Albert indeed again fell back into the usual and characteristic state of indecision, which earned him at the time the name of King *Tentenna* (hesitating). He had undoubtedly determined on war; but he knew that the summoning of a Constitutional Assembly must be the prelude to it, and he feared this step would produce weakness and disorder. Hence with every disposition for war he still leaned for a moment towards peace. But henceforth the die was cast. Nothing could have better contributed to exasperate the popular feeling than the excesses recently committed by Austria in Lombardo-Venetia. Senseless as they were, Austria seemed unable to avoid them, any more than the Italian States could avoid being dragged, in spite of themselves, into the vortex of Liberal Reform, with its certain result of revolution and war.

The movement initiated by Pius IX had made itself felt throughout all Italy, and sometimes with singular results; nowhere more so than in the Two Sicilies, where the political disturbances of the past, notably those of 1820, had left their record of continual plots and insurrections in the habits and history of the people. In July, 1847, the miseries and corruptions of the Bourbon *régime* were laid bare to the world in Settembrini's terrible *Protesta del popolo delle due Sicilie*, by which Naples and Sicily seemed to signify their common intention of working in accord with the general movement of Italy. Indeed, in August, 1847, Messina and Reggio di Calabria did actually choose the same moment for rising; the combination promised well, but it was short-lived; and a repetition of the experiment by the Revolutionary committee of Naples, after the rising had been suppressed, was unsuccessful. A continuous series of popular demonstrations was then organised, on the model of those in Rome under Pius IX and in Florence under Leopold II, by which King Ferdinand II was to be frightened into Reform. The King appeared to be shaken; he was particularly affected by the protests of the Tuscan and Roman Press, and by an address from the Liberals of Rome and Piedmont, signed by Camillo di Cavour, Silvio Pellico, Carlo Alferi di Sostegno and Michelangelo Caetani di Sermoneta, which called upon him to follow the example of the other Italian rulers by granting Reform. All that came of it, however, was the dismissal of the worst of his Ministers in favour of some of rather better repute. The Sicilians at this time broke off entirely from the Revolutionists of Naples, and determined to act on their own account; oddly enough, they began by giving public notice that an insurrection would take place on January 12, 1848. "It would fall due," they said, "with the certainty of a promissory note."

Pius IX in the meantime protested vehemently, that he desired no war with Austria, and that the formation of an Advisory Council marked the limit of his internal reforms. It was in vain, for everyone believed that he would yield to persuasion, or to the compulsion of facts. Before the close of the year the Council was inaugurated with extravagant ceremony, in order to mark that, in the opinion of the public, it, and it only, was the Government; and publicity was demanded for its proceedings as if it had been a real Parliament. The new municipality of Rome, constituted on a wide electoral basis, was already demanding a Constitution; a great popular demonstration was held; and a new administrative programme was put forth, which included the expulsion of the Jesuits, against whom the feeling of execration was strong. The Pope was torn this way and that between the demands of the people, and the warnings of the retrograde party as to the possible danger to religion. On January 2 and 3, 1848, the Austrians crushed the disturbances in Milan and other Lombard towns by the slaughter of defenceless citizens. The indignation excited

throughout Italy was eloquently expressed by d'Azeglio's well-known pamphlet, *Lutti di Lombardia*; in Rome the obsequies of the victims were celebrated amid intense and universal emotion.

The rising in Palermo on January 12, 1848, closed the era of Reform, and ushered in that of Revolution. Beginning in Palermo on the 12th, it was completely successful by the 27th, after a desperate and singularly ferocious struggle; a practically unarmed populace not only routed the garrison, but drove a relieving force from Naples into ignominious flight. In twenty-four days the whole island was free, except the fortress of Messina, which the Sicilians, with strange weakness, never succeeded in mastering during the Revolution. The King then consented to treat, and offered some concessions through the mediation of the English and French Ministers. The Sicilians haughtily declined every concession; they proclaimed without further ado the *Costituzione del 1812* (Constitution of 1812), and appointed a provisional Government under Ruggero Settimo. On April 18 their two Houses of Parliament considered a resolution for the deposition of the Bourbon dynasty in Sicily.

The concessions, which the King of Naples was now offering to Sicily, he had already granted with a liberal hand to his mainland kingdom, under the stress of his disasters in Sicily and of the continuous demonstrations in Naples. On January 29 he issued an edict formulating the basis of a Constitution. He was the first of Italian rulers to make this concession, and appears to have intended to precipitate by this means the purely Reform movement, and above all to punish Pius IX for causing confusion by his schemes of Reform. The Pope would now be forced to follow suit, together with the other Italian Princes, even those most dependent on Austria. The result was curious. The concessions granted in Naples were so extravagantly large, that the country, passing suddenly from the most rigid restriction to the wildest licence, fell headlong into a state of continuous anarchy, with which the three Liberal ministries, which succeeded one another in the hundred days or so of the new Constitution, were never able to cope.

The King of Naples was right in supposing that his action would force the hands of Leopold of Tuscany and the Pope. But Charles Albert, after long hesitation, came to an independent decision. Feeling certain that the Austrian war now imminent could not be safely undertaken unless he could gain over the Liberal opinion so powerful in Piedmont, he published a manifesto announcing the bases of the Constitution (*Statuto*), and formed a new Ministry under Cesare Balbo. The Manifesto was dated February 8, but was not formally promulgated till March 5. On February 17, a *Statuto* was also published in Tuscany.

Pius IX, on the other hand, tried to resist the torrent, but in vain. He had on February 10 published the allocution, containing the celebrated words, "God bless Italy"; which he repeated next

day, in addressing the people from the balcony of the Quirinal, amid the wildest enthusiasm. On both occasions he also made it perfectly clear that he would have nothing to do with a Constitution, with the expulsion of the Jesuits, or with war against Austria. Unfortunately, nobody listened to anything but his "God bless Italy." The Pope was torn different ways, now carried away by the tempest of events, now again intoxicated by the popular enthusiasm. At last, on March 10, he sanctioned the formation of a Ministry composed almost entirely of laymen, among whom were Marco Minghetti, Count Giuseppe Pasolini, and Giuseppe Galletti; on March 14, 1848, he published a Constitution. The scheme had been concocted in great secrecy by a committee of clerics; and the Ministry, whose duty it would be to put it into force, knew nothing about it. The moment Pellegrino Rossi set eyes on this formless abortion, this confused network of powers and jurisdictions, all neutralising one another, he told the Pope, rather brutally, that it was simply "war between sovereign and people under legal forms." The criticism was profound and worthy of its author, but it passed unnoticed amid the torrent of applause which greeted the Constitution.

The Revolution which hurled Louis-Philippe from his throne in France (February 24, 1848) was received with no little exultation in Italy. Nobody drew an ominous lesson, for no one had observed that all four Italian Constitutions, including that granted by the Pope, were, after all, only more or less accurate copies of the French Constitution of 1830, which had just broken down under the shock of Revolution. The socialistic side of the French Revolution of 1848 had little or no counterpart in Italy; but its political influence powerfully encouraged the hopes and increased the audacity of the ultra-Radicals. Its effects were more immediately felt in Germany and in Austria; and, on March 13, 1848, Vienna itself, the "faithful city," rose. To Milan and Venice came one upon another, in quick succession, the announcements of the Revolution in Sicily, of the grant of a Constitution to four Italian States, of a Revolution and Republic in Paris, and finally, on March 17, 1848, of the Revolution in Vienna and the fall and flight of Metternich.

Upon this news the tempest burst; the people, who had been so long preparing for it, rose with a unanimity of patriotic feeling which surprised, not only Austria, but even the most sanguine of the revolutionists. In the face of imminent ruin, the Government of Lombardo-Venetia practically went to pieces. The Revolution of Milan began on the morning of March 18; and on the night of the 22nd Radetzky abandoned the city. There were five days of furious battle in the streets, in which numberless barricades were erected; against these were pitted from 18,000 to 20,000 troops, who, deafened by the constant clang of the bells, and prostrated by fatigue and hunger, finally lost all heart against the indomitable tenacity of their opponents. During the five glorious days (the *Cinque Giornate*) of conflict in Milan the Austrian army was faced, not merely



by the people, but by an entire nation. All classes were there, united in one single desire to free their country or die; and this resolve carried them to victory. Fearing an extension of the movement into the rural districts, uncertain as to what was happening in Vienna, and dreading that the Piedmontese might hasten to the assistance of Milan, Radetzky retreated to his strategic base, the Quadrilateral, a district between the mountains and the sea, bounded by the Adige with its fortresses of Verona and Legnago on one side, and by the Mincio with those of Mantua and Peschiera on the other.

On March 22 Venice rose. The news of the Revolution in Vienna, which had reached the city on the evening of the 17th, had produced no immediate explosion. The first use that the Venetians made of the excitement produced by the news from Vienna and the consequent panic-stricken paralysis of the civil and military authorities, was to rush to the prisons and set free Manin and Tommasèo, who dissuaded them from extreme measures. But, on March 18, public feeling had reached such a pitch that the Governor, intending merely to trim his sails to the new breeze of Liberalism and Revolution that was blowing from Vienna, allowed the enrolment of a body of citizens not exceeding 200 or so, as a sort of Civic Guard for the protection of order. On the 20th and 21st the numbers enlisted were far beyond this limit; and the more cautious sought to profit by the opportunity to put the country in some sort of order, on the lines of the concessions made at Vienna, the corrected report of which had been welcomed, on the evening of the 19th, with satisfaction and even by some demonstrations. This was enough to confirm the civil and military authorities in their mistaken idea that conciliation was still possible. Conciliation was exactly what Manin and others would not hear of. Their plan was simply to get possession of the Arsenal, and proclaim the Republic of Saint Mark. On the 22nd Manin, at the head of the populace and the Civic Guard, captured the Arsenal, the Commandant of which had been killed in a mutiny. Having but few troops that they could trust, Palfy, the Governor, and Zichy, the Military Commandant, were forced to treat with Manin, the real leader of the Revolution, who persuaded them to capitulate, and to evacuate the town and the surrounding forts. Once more was heard—and this time without a dissentient voice—the old historic shout, "*Viva San Marco!*" and the Republic was proclaimed!

Although the envoys of the Provisional Government of Milan, which had been formed during the *Cinque Giornate*, insistently urged on Charles Albert the need for his prompt intervention in Lombardy, it was not till March 22 that, on the advice of his Ministers, he finally decided on war. On the 25th 5000 men crossed the Ticino in the direction of Milan; but the King did not reach Pavia before the 29th, six days after Radetzky's retreat from Milan. The Marshal had thus time and leisure to reorganise his forces. The King had only 23,000 men under

his command; so that his inaction may be attributed, in some measure, to lack of preparation as well as to delay. But the main factors were his own temperament, self-sacrificing to the utmost, but incapable of taking swift decisions; the unforeseen suddenness of events; and, lastly, the fact that he was facing Austria alone, while she, though crippled by her internal conditions, was anything but isolated in Europe.

For Charles Albert the abstention or neutrality, counselled by England and France, was now impossible. All Piedmont was stirring. Volunteers were starting everywhere in small parties for the front. Camillo di Cavour, who was one day to be the statesman of the union of Italy, published in the *Risorgimento* his well-known article beginning "The hour of fate has struck for the Sardinian monarchy. One road only is open, that of immediate war." If Charles Albert had but so resolved! Even the few days' delay was both a military, and a political, blunder. The King's failure to intervene, until the triumph of the Milanese in the *Cinque Giornate* was complete, cast an uncertainty upon his and their respective rights and obligations, which was increased by the general but very erroneous impression among the insurgents that, henceforth, they no longer stood in need of armed help. The existing divisions between parties in Milan, from the Moderate to the ultra-Radical, grew wider; the higher and wealthier classes still clung to the idea of union with Piedmont, while many others, and these the noisiest, inclined to a Republic. The two parties were about equal in strength; and both were represented in the Provisional Government. It was determined, as a compromise, to leave the question of the new form of government to be decided at the close of the struggle. This was the worst possible solution, as it created a weak and confused condition at a very critical moment; and withal it was of absolutely no practical use, inasmuch as defeat would involve the return of Lombardy into the Austrian Empire, while success would mean the victory of monarchy under Charles Albert, who was after all the chief Power in Upper Italy. But the question was further complicated through the proclamation of the Republic of Saint Mark in Venice, which added one more to the existing subdivisions. There were Mazzinian Republicans in Milan; Manin and Tommasèo were pure Republicans of the federalist type in Venice; and both struggled to realise their own special programmes; while the King, who was risking his all for Italy, alone had a force competent to fight against Austria. However much he might favour a war for national independence, it would be too much to expect of him that he should fight, without any regard for the interests of his own dynasty, simply to create one Republic in Milan and another in Venice.

All this made but a gloomy prelude to the war; and the union of Parma and Modena with Piedmont, which took place at once and almost without opposition, was not an equivalent compensation. The war thus begun put the Grand Duke Leopold II in a grave difficulty. Tuscany

was burning to take part in it ; and the Grand Duke found it impossible either to resist or to divert the popular enthusiasm. On April 5, 1848, he accordingly declared war, and despatched into Lombardy 3000 regulars and the same number of volunteers. On April 17 they crossed the Po under the command of General Cesare de Laugier.

The political situation in Rome at this time was most singular. The people and the Administration breathed war, and war only ; the Sovereign opposed it. In defiance of him, however, troops and volunteers left Rome in large numbers between March 23 and 30, and traversed the whole length of the Papal States on their way to the Po, being as they passed joined by others amid general enthusiasm. War was not indeed yet formally declared, though operations had commenced ; the Austrian ambassador was still at his post in Rome ; and the Pope had forbidden the troops to cross the frontier. In his allocution of March 30, 1848, the Pope appeared still to look forward to some pacific solution, trusting to his favourite scheme of a *Lega degli Stati Italiani* (League of Italian States). His main dread was that of a schism in Germany, a spectre with which diplomatists, Cardinals, and Jesuits were always trying to terrify him ; and he wished therefore to throw off all responsibility for the war. But General Giovanni Durando, who commanded the Papal troops, forced his hand by a proclamation of April 5, 1848, written by d'Azeglio, which solemnly declared a crusade against the foreigner. The Pope was furious, and his Ministers would gladly have disowned Durando ; but they were reluctantly obliged to direct him to put himself at the disposal of Charles Albert. Volunteers were already crossing the frontier on their own account. Finally, on April 25, Durando crossed the Po, and took up a position between Ostiglia and Governolo, thus forming, with the Tuscan forces, the right wing of the army investing Mantua.

Durando did not stay there long ; Austria, with her usual tenacity, though torn by intestine revolution, had sent a new army under Nugent, by way of the Carnic Alps, to the aid of Radetzky, who was shut up in the Quadrilateral. This move obliged Manin to call for the help of Charles Albert, who thereupon, on April 30, 1848, ordered the Papal forces to prevent Nugent's junction with Radetzky. Unfortunately Nugent had already reached Udine on the 22nd. The provinces of Venetia, threatened by this move, all favoured union with Piedmont ; but Manin, when calling upon Charles Albert for assistance, had, like Milan, proposed to reserve the question of the form of government till the close of the war. This proposal simply created a new cause of disagreement in Venetia ; as a compromise it had been abandoned even in Lombardy ; it ran counter to the general opinion in the duchies of Parma, Lucca, and Modena, where the popular vote had been for union with Piedmont, and in Tuscany and the Papal State ; counter, lastly, to the essentially monarchical instincts of the Neapolitans, who were now

quarrelling with the Sicilians on this very question of separation. The net result of this dispute in any event was only so much loss of strength to the party of national independence in this hour of supreme need.

In the ever increasing anarchy of Naples, three Liberal ministries had followed one another: the third, presided over by Carlo Troia, favoured cooperation in the War of Independence. On March 29 200 volunteers had already been sent to the front, raised and commanded by the Princess Christina Belgioioso, a Milanese lady and a characteristic specimen of the age both in her faults and in her virtues. In April a fleet was despatched to the Adriatic, and was fired on by the Sicilians as it passed Messina—a shameful deed, but in connexion with which may perhaps be noted the fact that barely one hundred of the Italian volunteers, who fought in the War of Independence, came from Sicily. The 40,000 Neapolitan troops told off for service in Upper Italy dwindled down to barely 14,000, commanded by the old insurgent, General Guglielmo Pepe; and so slow were their movements (designedly, no doubt) that the heads of their columns did not reach Bologna before May 14.

Charles Albert now moved on the Quadrilateral, where Radetzky had taken refuge, passed through Pavia and Cremona, but avoided Milan, which he did not propose to enter unless victorious. Overcoming the feeble Austrian resistance offered on the Mincio, he took post on its left bank, so as to cover Lombardy in case of defeat, and to keep in touch with the Papal and Neapolitan forces, which were to march on the Lower Po. He thus stood between the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera; and the subsequent affairs were little more than reconnaissances against one or other of these fortresses. At last Radetzky, with a view to the reestablishment of his communications with Peschiera, attacked the heights of Pastrengo on April 20; he was beaten, but retired without molestation. On his side, Charles Albert, deceived by a false assurance that Verona would immediately rise on the advance of the Piedmontese troops, moved on May 6 to Santa Lucia, within sight of Verona. Being repulsed with serious loss, he was obliged to concentrate his attention on the siege of Peschiera.

No better fortune attended the volunteers of Lombardy. Few in number, without discipline, and badly led, they had first been directed to act on the Mincio on the left of the Piedmontese; they were then sent into Tyrol, to hinder the advance of reinforcements for Radetzky in Verona; thence they were recalled to Brescia partly for reorganisation, and partly from a fear that their presence in Tyrol might provoke the intervention of the Germanic Confederation. That the aid given by Lombardy was lacking both in quantity and quality was mainly owing to the unfortunate view held in Milan that the war had closed with the *Cinque Giornate*, and also by the paralysing uncertainty as to the eventual form of government, the decision on which had been suspended

chiefly by Mazzinian and Republican influence. The Provisional Government decided to remove this last obstacle at any cost, and at an Assembly of the People held on May 12 brought forward a resolution for union with Piedmont, which was ultimately carried in June. Venice subsequently followed this example, although the effect of Manin's greatest blunder produced more delay and greater difficulty. She had given little material aid to the war, believing that Durando's Papal troops, with the Neapolitan forces, were sufficient for their task; unfortunately, the latter had not yet crossed the Po. Meanwhile Nugent advanced towards the Tagliamento, annoyed but not seriously hindered by the attacks of the inhabitants and of the Venetian volunteers; on May 3 he reached Conegliano, on May 5 he occupied Belluno.

At this juncture Durando was at Treviso, having been ordered thither by Charles Albert on April 29; where he was joined on May 6 by General Ferrari, with the Papal volunteers. In the uncertainty as to Nugent's movements, the two generals should have remained in close touch; but they scattered their forces on useless lines of defence. Ferrari found Nugent on May 9 at Cornuda, and was driven back in complete disorder, thus leaving open the line of the Lower Piave. While Durando was hesitating whether to cover Treviso, or to defend the fords of the Brenta against the enemy, General Thurn, who had succeeded Nugent, advanced with all speed and attacked Vicenza; though repulsed by the inhabitants with the aid of Durando, who had now come up, he was able to make good his junction with Radetzky at San Bonifazio, near Verona, on May 22.

Notwithstanding the success of the Austrians in thus effecting their main purpose, the continued resistance of Vicenza had restored heart to Durando's mixed force of regulars and volunteers; and, if the Neapolitans, who had now reached a point between Bologna and Ferrara, had crossed the Po, joined Durando, and come into touch with the Piedmontese army, the result of the war might have been different. Radetzky would have thus been shut in between Mantua and Verona, with Peschiera on the verge of surrender, and his communications would have been threatened on the lines of Tyrol and of the Piave, where the revolt appeared to be extending. But Radetzky knew that the Neapolitans were not moving, and that he was faced by an army extended over more than thirty miles. He therefore decided to force the Piedmontese right, composed of the Tuscans, cross the Mincio, and take the Piedmontese in the rear. Accordingly, on May 29, he drove in the Tuscans as far as Curtatone and Montanara. But their fierce resistance delayed him long enough to enable the Piedmontese to cross to the right bank of the Mincio, and win the battle of Goito on May 30. On the same day came the news that Peschiera had fallen. This was the most glorious day of the war. But Radetzky made better use of his defeat than Charles Albert of his victory. The King halted, while Radetzky hurried on and captured Vicenza, in spite of a vigorous defence, on June 10.

On the 14th Treviso fell; on the 15th Padua, Rovigo a little later. Of all Venetia, Venice amid her lagoons alone remained free.

The want of discipline among the Papal volunteers and their dispersal after Cornuda were not due only to bad organisation, want of military spirit, and discord among their chiefs. A more powerful solvent existed in the Encyclical of April 29, 1848, in which Pius IX, in answer to a specific request for his views from his lay ministry, solemnly denounced the war, and alike, as man and as Pope, disclaimed from thenceforth all part in the cause of Italy. Its effect in Rome, in Italy and in Europe generally, was calamitous, and certainly went beyond the intentions of its author. A report immediately spread among the Papal regulars and volunteers who had fought at Cornuda, that the Pope's public repudiation of the war had deprived them of the benefit of the ordinary laws of warfare, and justified Austria in treating them as mere brigands, to whom no quarter was due; hence a general discouragement and disorganisation. The temporary success at Vicenza and the incorporation of what had been the Papal forces into the army of Charles Albert, at the instance of the Roman Ministry, somewhat revived their spirits; but the final capitulation of Vicenza in June precluded the majority of them from taking further part in the war, and the remainder took refuge in Venice, now the only place in Venetia where Austrian authority had not been restored.

The fifteenth of May—the day of the meeting of the Chambers in Naples—saw the beginning and the close of her Constitutional *régime*, and the end of her share in the War of Independence. On this fatal day folly spread from the Council Chamber to the street; and barricades were everywhere erected, because the King had vetoed a proposal which Settembrini himself described as worthy of a tap-room, viz. that Parliament should be opened without the tender of any oath of allegiance, and that the National Guard should garrison the forts of Naples. The Swiss regiments, ordered to patrol the streets in case of disorder, collided with the insurgents, and a conflict, beginning no one knew exactly how, resulted in a massacre. The populace then gave themselves up to the wildest excesses; the Chambers were prorogued, and then dissolved; on May 22 General Pepe, then at Bologna, was ordered to return to Naples with his troops; and Admiral de Cosa, who had already joined the Sardinian squadron before Trieste, was ordered to leave the Adriatic. Pepe and a few others declined to obey orders, crossed the Po, and entered Venice on June 13. The King did not immediately revoke the Constitution; but he made no further attempt to put it in force—which came to much the same thing. A curious legend treats this affair of May 15 as a mere act of provocation, concocted by the King and the Court *camarilla* in order to drown the new-born Constitution in blood, and to provide a pretext for the recall of the military forces ordered to the front against their own wishes.

But in truth, May 15 was only the outcome of the faults of all concerned; King, people, Liberals, Absolutists, secret societies, regular troops, National Guard, Court, and Deputies were all to blame, especially the last-named, whose reckless chatter, unreasonable suspicions, and pedantic disputes, together with their general violence, gave the King all the pretext he wanted; if, indeed, the inability to put down the rebellion in Sicily were not sufficient pretext in itself.

After the defection of Pius IX, the loss of Vicenza, the retreat of the Neapolitans, and the defeat of the Tuscans, Charles Albert found himself once more alone against Austria. Thus the idea of Federation, which had never taken any formal shape, became impossible. The revolution in Vienna, which had stimulated those of Milan and Venice, had no practical effect upon the issue. The negotiations, that took place in the course of the war, never so much as promised a hope of a favourable result. On June 13 Wessenberg, the Foreign Minister in Vienna, made a proposal to the Provisional Government in Milan which practically amounted to an offer to repurchase Lombardy, apart from Venetia, at a price; but, as the Union with Piedmont had then been formally declared, this proposal came to nothing. Later Baron Hummelauer went to London to obtain the mediation of England in a project for the creation of a large kingdom comprising Lombardo-Venetia, and the duchies of Parma, Lucca, and Modena, and united to Austria solely by the personal link of the Crown. England did not refuse her good offices, and indeed put forward a still larger proposal, which was provisionally accepted by Hummelauer; but, as it was not discussed at Vienna till the moment when Radetzky was preparing his second attack on Charles Albert, it had no result. The military party had, as usual, the last word in Vienna; and the kindly Emperor Ferdinand, who appeared to be in the way, was forced to abdicate (December 2, 1848) in favour of the present Emperor, Francis Joseph, who had gained his first military and political experience in the Italian campaign.

It is possible, indeed, that all these attempts at negotiation had no purpose but that of gaining time for the reinforcement of Radetzky. France took a languid part in the discussion; her object was to prevent the formation of a strong monarchy in Upper Italy, or in that event to obtain compensation by the cession of Nice and Savoy. Charles Albert at last determined to attack Mantua, with the view of forcing Radetzky out of Verona, whither he had returned with all speed immediately upon the capture of Vicenza. He marched on July 13; on the 18th, he occupied Governolo after a successful action; but his line, stretching from Governolo to Rivoli, now became too much extended, and was consequently weak at many points. Radetzky, who could now (July 22) dispose of 80,000 men, repeated the manœuvre of Goito; he thrust back the Piedmontese left towards Peschiera, and then turned upon their centre. On July 24 the Piedmontese troops, brought up from the trenches before Mantua, made

a flank attack ; but they were completely defeated at Custozza on the 25th, and driven across the Mincio. Charles Albert, instead of retreating by the line of the Po, tried to cover Milan, before which he was again defeated (August 4). On his entrance into the city the populace rose, incited by noisy demagogues, and besieged him in the Greppi Palace (August 5), whence he was rescued with some difficulty. On August 6 the remnant of the Piedmontese army repassed the Ticino, and Radetzky reentered Milan. On August 9, at Vigevano, an armistice was concluded, generally known as the Salasco armistice, from the name of the gallant soldier who had the ill-luck to sign it. Its conditions were most rigorous, restoring everything to the *status quo ante bellum*, with the exception of the city of Venice, which still maintained its resistance. After this disaster Charles Albert withdrew to Piedmont, and the whole situation throughout Italy was evidently changed.

The Austrians immediately marched on the Duchies ; part of their forces, under Welden, entered the Papal States, advancing on Bologna. On May 4 the lay or Minghetti Ministry had resigned, in consequence of the Encyclical of April 29. The weak and ephemeral Ministry of Mamiani (May 4—Aug. 6) was succeeded by one under Count Edoardo Fabbri, under whom the disintegration of the State proceeded yet faster. On September 16, 1848, Fabbri was succeeded by Count Pellegrino Rossi, the man whose illustrious life was to be the price of the last desperate effort to maintain the union between Pius IX and his people, between a Catholic Papacy and the cause of a free and independent Italy. With marvellous judgment and knowledge Rossi flung himself into the task of curbing the all-pervading anarchy, and of infusing fresh life into an administration which was already in dissolution. He met the hatred both of Clericals and demagogues in the open, concealed none of his proposals, never retreated, put his hand to everything, and promised reform everywhere ; and all this without in any way threatening liberty, while allowing a scurrilous Press to go unmuzzled, and even taking part publicly in their controversies. His appointment took place on September 16 ; and he at once summoned the Chambers for November 15.

The foreign policy of Rossi is summed up in his attitude towards the eternal question of Italian Federation. Of this Pius IX was the most consistent supporter ; next to him was the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who saw therein a means of reconciling his duties as an Austrian prince and as an Italian ruler ; then came Naples, to whom it meant the possible submission of Sicily and a counterpoise to the dreaded ambition of Piedmont. Piedmont, on the other hand, had opposed Federation. Where views were so diverse, the idea of Federation was not practicable ; that of union, which was then the monopoly of the Republicans, was not yet ripe. When Rossi took the question up, the war seemed almost decided. The great philosopher Antonio Rosmini had been sent to Rome on August 15, 1848, by the Piedmontese Ministry to discuss



*Federazione* (Federation). But the Ministry of Casati and Gioberti had given way, after the Salasco armistice, to that of Alfieri di Sostegno. Sostegno was unfavourable to Rosmini's project, which involved a complete federative organisation of Italy; and all that he asked was assistance in the war, which, it was supposed, might soon be resumed. To this resumption of war Rossi was hostile, as involving a Federation without Naples, which, from a military point of view, was the strongest of the States; especially as any assistance from the Papal State was, at the moment, impossible. Rossi now put forward a vague counter-proposal for a "League of Princes," with which Rosmini's scheme would not have been necessarily incompatible. But Rossi was too late; if the projected kingdom of Upper Italy, the dream of Charles Albert, was dead, any federal organisation was equally out of the question. Considering the events in Venice on August 11, 1848, and remembering that the union of Piedmont with the Duchies, Lombardy, and Venice was only legally completed on July 27, 1848, we may reckon that the life of the Kingdom of Upper Italy lasted only a fortnight. With its disappearance, the idea of Federation under any form vanished beyond hope of realisation.

On July 27 the Statutory Union of Venetia and Piedmont was declared, Venice at last consenting: on August 6 the Commissioners of Charles Albert formally took over Venice. But on the 11th, when the news of the Salasco armistice arrived, they were expelled from the city, and Manin, who had retired into private life after the vote in favour of the Union, was restored to the dictatorship by acclamation. The defeat of King Charles Albert and the Salasco armistice closed the career of the Moderate Monarchist party. Henceforward the idea of a United Democratic Italy everywhere held the field. In Tuscany the Ridolfi Ministry was forced on August 18 to retire in favour of one headed by Gino Capponi, which appears to have resembled the Carlo Troia Ministry in Naples in many points; especially as both Ministers were exposed on one side to sovereigns of doubtful faith, and to the street-demagogues on the other. Leghorn now rose in insurrection. Montanelli was sent thither to exercise his influence, which was great on account of his service in the war, and his imprisonment; he there proclaimed an *Assemblea Costituente* (Constituent Assembly) for Italy, a name which thenceforwards was the badge and rallying cry of the Revolution, signifying an Assembly with absolute power, much on the lines of the French Convention. On October 27 the Capponi Ministry was succeeded by the so-called Democratic Ministry under Montanelli and Guerrazzi.

To the torrent of demagogy, which had triumphed so easily in Tuscany, Rossi offered a firm resistance in Rome. The day of the opening of the Chambers was drawing near, and there were signs that the Democratic party were preparing on that day to strike a great blow. On what did Rossi rely for victory? The answer must be that he relied solely on himself. We may admire his courage; but it is clear that he

had misconceived the situation, and was suffering under an illusion, which, grand and even heroic as it was, could not but be fatal alike to him and to his cause. On the morning of November 15, 1848, he drove to the Palace of the Cancellaria for the purpose of opening Parliament; after leaving his carriage and ascending the first few steps of the staircase, he met his death at the hand of an assassin. On the day after the death of Rossi, a popular insurrection forced the Pope to call a Democratic Ministry under Monsignor Carlo Muzzarelli, of which Pietro Sterbini, one of the instigators of the murder, was a member. On November 25 the Pope fled from Rome and took refuge at Gaeta, whence he issued a Commission of Regency; but his Commissioners were unable to act, or even to meet. The Chambers replied by the appointment of a "Supreme Committee of State," which decided to proceed to the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage. This Assembly met on February 5, 1849, and on the 9th proclaimed a Republic.

That matters did not proceed to so great a length in Tuscany was due to the resistance of Guerrazzi, a man who belonged to a class of his own, both in politics and literature. Montanelli and he were at first to all appearance in favour with the Grand Duke, who had not expressed any objection even to a Constituent Assembly. But on January 30 the Grand Duke withdrew to Siena; and retired on February 7 to Porto San Stefano. On the following day Mazzini appeared in Florence, but did not find the conditions propitious. A Triumvirate, consisting of Guerrazzi, Montanelli, and Mazzoni, had proclaimed a Constituent Assembly for Tuscany, and the Grand Duke on February 21 followed the example of the Pope by taking refuge at Gaeta. A Republic was not actually proclaimed in Florence; but Guerrazzi had all the power in his hands, and was ultimately, on March 28, 1849, appointed Dictator.

The Neapolitan King required no urging towards reaction; at any rate he had ample excuse for it in the disorders of his capital, in the refusal of the Sicilians to negotiate, and in the insurrections on the mainland after May 15, 1848. Had the Sicilians given any material aid to these insurrections, the face of things might have been changed; but they failed to do so. The Neapolitan Parliament, after a precarious existence, was finally dissolved on March 13, 1849. The hour was now at hand for the Sicilians in their turn to pay the penalty of their many mistakes and of the insular selfishness which had led them to trust entirely to the protection of the English fleet in their waters, instead of arming in their own defence. On July 10, 1849, after reforming the Constitution of 1812 to such an extent that the monarchical power was well-nigh extinguished under safeguards and provisos, they offered the Crown to the Duke of Genoa, second son of Charles Albert; he, however, declined it.

After the Piedmontese defeats and the Salasco armistice, the Bourbon King deemed the moment ripe for resolute action in Sicily; and, late in August, he launched an army under General Carlo Filangieri against

the rebellious island. Messina was captured amid horrors sufficient to awaken the conscience of Europe; from pure humanity, the French and British admirals in Sicilian waters intervened with proposals for a pacific solution. On September 11 the Bourbon, alarmed by this action, accepted the armistice; but the only result was to encourage the Sicilians to further resistance and defiance. The last scheme of settlement, known as the Ultimatum of Gaeta, dated February 26, 1849, was rejected like the rest by the Sicilian Parliament on March 24. For all their brave words, the Sicilians made no serious provision for the war; their troops were few, badly armed, and ill-disciplined, and commanded by adventurers, such as the Pole Mieroslawski. Having declared the armistice at an end, Filangieri captured Taormina on April 2 and Catania on the 7th; other towns surrendered without fighting, and he entered Palermo on May 15. Such was the evil end of the Sicilian Revolution, which had hampered instead of aiding the war of national independence, and had had no small share in bringing about the final disasters.

From these disasters Piedmont was labouring hard to recover; the Ministry of Marquis Cesare Alfieri di Sostegno, who had unselfishly taken office on August 19, 1848, tried to stay the torrent of catastrophe by accepting the mediation of France and England. The two Powers suggested the renewal of negotiations on the basis of the old Hartig and Hummelauer proposals; but these had never been put forward quite seriously by Austria, and it was not likely that she would now accept them, when her arms were completely victorious, when Lombardy had been reoccupied, and when the only remaining resistance was that of Venice. Austria fenced over the point at first, and tried to make mischief between the mediating Powers and Piedmont; but at last she refused to consider the old bases of negotiation, suggesting for a new basis the grant of Liberal institutions in Lombardo-Venetia, similar to those already granted in the rest of the Austrian empire. A Congress at Brussels was proposed, but Austria found plenty of excuses for not taking part in it: and finally, after Wessenberg had been succeeded at the Foreign Office in Vienna by the more unyielding Prince Schwarzenberg, she declared her intention of taking her stand purely and simply on the treaties of 1815. The part taken by France in all these negotiations had been neither frank nor creditable; that of Great Britain, though fruitless, was at any rate more honourable. Palmerston in particular, in his despatch of November 11, 1848, to Vienna, went fully into the errors and iniquities of Austria in her Italian policy; he looked into the future with sureness of vision, even prophesying that the return of a Bonaparte to power in France might result in the enfranchisement of Italy from the Austrian yoke by French assistance.

The ill-success of the Anglo-French mediation increased the enmity and opposition to the Piedmontese Ministry, in spite of their efforts to reorganise and reinforce the army. Vienna had again risen in insur-

rection on October 6, 1848, thus giving renewed vigour to the Revolution in Hungary, which had now been in progress for some months. The Opposition in Piedmont naturally thought this an excellent opportunity for repudiating the Salasco armistice and renewing the war. Vincenzo Gioberti, whose support they had obtained, and who believed himself to be leading the Democratic party, though he was in fact only following their lead, publicly charged the Sostegno Ministry with having a concealed programme of peace at any price. Alfieri had now retired through ill-health, and had been succeeded by General Ettore Perrone, a man of the highest character, who afterwards died fighting heroically at Novara; that Ministry also resigned, on December 3, 1848. It was followed by Gioberti's Democratic Ministry (to give it the title then in fashion), which soon discovered that to make war at that moment would be equally difficult and absurd; it therefore tried to revive the idea of a Federal Union of States, and to that end proposed that Piedmont should intervene for the restoration of the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. It was late in the day for such a policy; the reaction had already begun, and there was every risk that Piedmont also would be involved. Gioberti was repudiated by his own colleagues, and resigned. The Anglo-French mediation having likewise failed, the only issue from the impossible situation seemed to be to take the chances of war; and, on March 12, 1849, notice was given of the termination of the armistice. The Piedmontese army took the field under the Polish General Chrzanowsky; on March 23 they were defeated at Novara. Radetzky's triumph was complete, the only powerful army now opposed to Austria was decisively beaten, and the war was at an end for Piedmont. Charles Albert, after in vain seeking death on the battle-field, abdicated in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, thus removing any obstacle to peace that might attach to his own person. He then went into voluntary exile at Oporto in Portugal, where he died on July 28, 1849, a martyr to the cause of Italian independence.

Thus the final catastrophe of the Revolutionary period was on all sides rapidly approaching. In Rome Terenzio Mamiani tried to stem the advance of the tide, which was daily more threatening since the murder of Rossi and the flight of Pius IX. His efforts bear some resemblances to those of Gioberti in Piedmont, but here also circumstances were too strong. There were two unacknowledged dictatorships, the one that of the demagogues, exercised through Sterbini, once a party to the assassination of Rossi, now a Minister; the other that of the Reaction wielded by Cardinal Antonelli, ruling for Pius IX, who was at Gaeta. On February 7, 1849, the Pope and Cardinals formally applied for the intervention of all the Catholic Powers, though, by excepting the King of Sardinia, they incidentally negatived Gioberti's plans for his intervention. On the other side, Giuseppe Mazzini, the Revolutionists, and the flower of the Italian volunteers all flocked to Rome; together

with Giuseppe Garibaldi, already famous for great deeds in America, and during the recent war in Upper Italy. On receiving the news of the disaster at Novara, the Republic had established a Triumvirate, consisting nominally of Mazzini, Saffi, and Armellini, but with the whole power in the hands of Mazzini, who wielded it with honesty and moderation.

France, Republican France, in whom Mazzini trusted so confidently, offered the Pope her intervention in Rome, on condition that she should act alone; and on April 25, 1849, a French force under Oudinot landed at Civita Vecchia on its way to Rome. The French, who had not expected any serious resistance in Rome, were soon undeceived. On April 30, 1849, Garibaldi repulsed them by sheer hard fighting; and he similarly drove back the Neapolitans on May 19. Oudinot concealed the extent of his defeat, and sent home for reinforcements. Thus between France and the Roman Republic there suddenly arose a question of military *amour propre* obscuring the political issues; and this just at the moment when the President of the French Republic, for the confirmation of his own power and for the eventual restoration of the Empire, needed the whole support both of the army and the Church. In order to gain time, the French sent Ferdinand de Lesseps to Rome to treat for peace with Mazzini and the Assembly; and on May 17 an armistice was concluded. Lesseps no doubt acted in good faith, as did Mazzini; and they came to terms. But, as soon as the reactionary intrigues between Gaeta and the French headquarters were ripe, and the reinforcements had arrived, the terms were repudiated. Without even giving notice of the close of the armistice, the French suddenly assaulted Rome. Garibaldi and his forces made a heroic stand; but, on June 30, they were obliged to abandon the defence, and a number retreated with Garibaldi before the French entered the city. The life of the ill-starred Roman Republic under Mazzini had been precarious and, politically speaking, it earned small praise; but, as the death-struggle of Italians against foreign perfidy and violence, its record is glorious and its memory is still green.

At the date of the fall of Rome the Austrians had already invaded Tuscany. Guerrazzi the Dictator had already charged Cesare de Laugier (who had fought at Curtatone and Montanara) with treason, because, as an officer of the Grand Duke, he had tried to aid in his restoration. Now, however, Guerrazzi himself followed that example; for, while trying to keep the anarchical demagoguery in bounds, he was also meditating the possible restoration of the Lorraine dynasty, with himself in the part of Monck. But the Moderates, who bore him no good will, and who still nursed some vain hopes of averting Austrian intervention, gave him no time to get the credit of such overtures. On April 11, 1849, in a burst of reaction, the Grand Duke was restored by a general vote, in which the municipality, the upper classes, and the peasants combined; and Guerrazzi was arrested, on the pretext of protecting him from the excited populace. The punishment of the city was bitter. On May 25,

after overcoming a slight resistance at Leghorn, the Austrians entered Florence. The Grand Duke gave it to be understood that the Austrian intervention was against his wishes; but General d'Aspre tore off the mask, by his proclamation dated Empoli, May 24, in which he declared that the Austrians had come at the specific request of the Grand Duke. Ten days of glorious struggle now took place at Brescia, the only one of the Lombard cities that had risen in support of Piedmont's desperate renewal of the war in March, 1849. The attempt was put down with extraordinary ferocity by the Austrian General Haynau, who earned the nickname of "General Hyena"; and Brescia's struggle may be looked upon as the epilogue of Charles Albert's War of Italian Independence.

Thus Venice alone was left. After the defeat of Novara the Venetian Assembly resolved on resistance to the last, on the motion of Daniele Manin, whose grandeur and truthfulness of character is unsurpassed among Italian patriots. He proposed by keeping a strong hand upon demagoguery to win the respect of all Europe, and by the moderation of his rule to throw into stronger light the lawlessness of Austria's appeals to force; with a lofty faith in international equity, he hoped ultimately to force England and France, as the Liberal Powers, to accord to Venice their moral and material support, and thus to compel Austria to accede to her demands. His right-hand-man was Valentino Pasini, a diplomatist who recalled the best type of the ambassadors of the Serene Republic; and whose admission to personal negotiation with Prince Schwarzenberg is sufficient proof of his diplomatic skill.

Venice did in fact resist to the last. On May 26, 1849, the Austrians captured the fort of Malghera. From July 30 the city endured a ceaseless direct bombardment. On August 4 starvation and cholera stared them in the face. Unwilling to abuse the unlimited confidence of his people, Daniele Manin called an Assembly: on August 6 he was given full power to deal with the situation. After he had received a final and unfavourable answer from Pasini, who was negotiating at Vienna, and had learnt the news of the Russian intervention for the suppression of the Revolution in Hungary, his last hope disappeared. On August 11 he began to treat for the surrender of the city. On the 14th, the first reply was received from the Austrian commander, offering only the hardest conditions. The cholera was making havoc in town and fleet; only a section of the city still remained uninjured by the ceaseless bombardment, and the rush of the population into that section was aggravating the epidemic. In a short time starvation cut short all discussion, and unconditional surrender became inevitable. On August 24 Manin resigned all power into the hands of the municipal authorities, who negotiated the surrender; and on August 27 he departed into exile. With the fall of Venice all was at an end. The Pope and the Italian Princes were restored; France occupied Rome; the Austrians were dominant throughout the north; on all sides reaction triumphed.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

(1848-52.)

ON January 27, 1848, Alexis de Tocqueville, speaking in Parliament, questioned the Ministers of Louis-Philippe: "Can you," he asked, "at this very moment count upon to-morrow? Have you the smallest idea of what a year, a month, even a day may bring forth?" Guizot and his colleagues with their majority behind them smiled at the warning, for, although a heated debate followed on Tocqueville's speech, there was nothing to show that it pointed to the fall of the Monarchy of July. For three years the Opposition under Thiers and Odilon Barrot had attacked, without weakening, the majority; and the Ministry resolved to deal once for all with their opponents by putting down the existing system of appealing to the nation outside Parliament, both in Paris and in the provinces, through the medium of meetings and banquets. Early in 1848 Count Duchâtel, the Minister of the Interior, with the approval of the King, "and to put an end to a dangerous and reckless agitation," prohibited a banquet, which was to have been given in the 12th *arrondissement* of Paris, and held troops in readiness to enforce the prohibition if necessary. His action, which became known to the Deputies at a moment when the Opposition was once more urging their grievances in the customary shape of an address to the Crown, stirred the anger of Guizot's opponents, but there was nothing to show that the outburst heralded a revolution. A disturbance there might be, but in the absence of organisation it could be of no consequence; it might even afford Ministers a favourable opportunity for reducing the Opposition to impotence and silence.

Events showed however how false were the calculations of Guizot and his friends and how true were Tocqueville's words. On February 22, 1848, the day fixed for the prohibited banquet, a considerable crowd of students, workmen, and shopkeepers—lookers-on and malcontents rather than rebels—assembled on the Place de la Madeleine in obedience to the summons of the Republican journals, *Le National* and *La Réforme*, for the purpose of protesting against the policy of Guizot. The gathering

had neither watchword nor leaders. Even the Opposition members had decided at the last moment to hold aloof; and the Republicans themselves—Louis Blanc and Ledru-Rollin—after issuing their appeal to the people began to dread the consequences. The result, however, of that one day was that an unarmed and excited mob compelled King Louis-Philippe, in spite of the 30,000 soldiers at his disposal, to dismiss the Guizot Ministry on February 23.

To all appearance nothing of much importance had happened on February 22; one or two scuffles on the boulevards and on the Place de la Concorde, a few barricades no sooner erected than pulled down, some customs barriers burnt in the suburbs—the disturbances seemed to be of far less moment than had been the case on previous occasions when the royal cause had triumphed. In point of fact, certain events, conclusive as evidence of what was going on, had, to the furtherance of the people's cause, created sudden confusion in the Councils of the monarchy. The dragoons who should have cleared the approaches to the *Corps Législatif* had on receiving their orders made it plain that they sympathised with the demonstrators, and the infantry on guard in the Avenue Marigny fell back as the demonstrators approached. From the very first the regular army under the half-hearted leadership of Sebastiani and Jacqueminot had declined to interfere; and, when—to supply its place—the Government, on the morning of February 23, appealed to the National Guard, the appeal was met by unmistakable signs not only of friendly neutrality but of active sympathy with the mob. The people, the army, and the National Guard, had as if by instinct come to a sudden understanding. The force upon which Guizot had counted for crushing the disturbance had disappeared, and the disturbance assumed the proportions of a revolution.

All this was the outcome of a gradual and obscure growth of ideas and sentiments which had for eight years been taking place in every class of the nation, and which had escaped the notice of statesmen too much engrossed in parliamentary struggles to watch the aspirations of the people. The subjects of debate in the Chambers at this juncture seemed to be mere questions of electoral reform: the lowering of the property qualification of deputies and electors, and certain measures framed to prevent the Ministry from creating a majority of paid functionaries. When however the people clamoured for "Reform" and for the dismissal of Guizot who was opposed to it, as fiercely as they had once denounced the "Ordinances" and Polignac, their passionate aspirations went far beyond the bounds of the wrangle between the Ministers and the Opposition. They called for the overthrow of a Government legally constituted perhaps, but unjust and dishonourable, set up for the benefit of a minority who, devoid of conscience and forgetful of their responsibilities, were enjoying the spoils of office and filling their pockets at the expense of the working classes at home and of the good name of the country



abroad. Frenchmen, whose minds had been stirred, in the Press, the pamphlets, the fiction, and the drama of the time, by the lessons drawn from the social evils around them, were angered at the combined resistance to their dream of internal progress and national greatness offered by the King, his Ministers, and Europe. From 1840 onwards, they looked upon the whole Government as one long conspiracy—the permanent betrayal of the country. The events of February 22 showed that there were many Frenchmen of this way of thinking among both the soldiers and the officers in the regular army, and that they were still more numerous in the National Guard.

The King at this juncture committed the grave blunder of imagining that, if he dismissed Guizot, he could with the help of his other Ministers ensure the continuance of the peaceful foreign policy which had been for eight years his chief aim and for which he held himself responsible as between France and Europe. Guizot bowed to the King's decision, and, pale and calm, announced it to the Chambers at three o'clock on February 23. The Deputies, less disposed to submit to a disgrace which they felt to be inevitable and imminent, expressed their indignation, and Molé made an attempt to rescue the doomed majority by a coalition with the Right Centre and Dufaure and Passy. Meanwhile, there happened one of those accidents which might have been foreseen—a collision on the Boulevard des Capucines between the mob who were emboldened by the fall of the Ministers and some troops under the orders of a loyalist officer. This incident was the signal for a general rising in the city; and, on the same evening, Molé abandoned the attempt to form a Ministry with the men who, during eight years, had shared the Government with Guizot. Thiers, for whom the King sent during the night, agreed to accept a position already so gravely compromised only on condition that the Chamber should be forthwith dismissed, and an Assembly called together resting on a wider franchise and more closely representative of the nation.

We should wonder at the repugnance of Louis-Philippe to comply with requirements so amply justified, if we did not call to mind the events of 1840, the dismissal by the King of his Minister because of the attempt of the latter to gratify the nation by an ambitious foreign policy, and, subsequently, that Minister's strenuous and successful struggle with Guizot, and his active participation in the revival of the Napoleonic legend. When, at the nation's bidding, the hour of revenge struck for Thiers, the old sovereign saw his system and his work swept away together with the Ministers and the Assembly that had helped him, no matter how, to maintain peace for eight years. The members of the royal family and the Court who were with the King on the night of February 23 noticed his dejection and his hesitation, the fatal inconsistency between his decisions and his acts. He stood almost alone, confronted by the whole of France; he was convinced that he was in the right and that the country

was in the wrong, and he saw that the only possibility of saving the Crown for himself and his children lay in the doubtful chances of a Civil War; his convictions urged him to employ force. The memories of the Revolution and the idea of a struggle with the nation at large held him back; he felt doubts as to his duty and his prospects of success; he was wearied out yet incapable of yielding. When he agreed to the demands of Thiers, he forced General Bugeaud upon him as Minister of War and thus coupled his concession with a defiance—surrendering and threatening simultaneously.

During the night which decided the fate of the monarchy, the revolutionaries had on their side found an organisation and leaders. The journalists and members of the democratic clubs, Louis Blanc, Félix Pyat, Goudchaux, Flocon, Bastide, Martin of Strassburg, Arago, Caussidière, who had previously shown much hesitation, were unable, after the conflict on the Boulevard des Capucines, to resist the appeal of the excited populace. At the offices of *La Réforme* and *Le National*, in the committees and at the meetings of the secret societies, they had decided, relying on the complicity of the army and the National Guard, to seize the opportunity which presented itself. More than 1500 barricades were forthwith thrown up, and at some of them in the redoubtable centre quarter was displayed the red flag, the symbol of the social revolution. The insurgents provided themselves with firearms by plundering the gunsmiths' shops and by seizing on the barracks and guard-rooms, while the manufacture of cartridges and bullets went on without intermission. Proclamations drawn up in haste and printed by Proudhon conveyed to the combatants the order for a general attack; and by sunrise on the following day, February 24, all the central districts of the capital, from the Bastille to the Rue St Honoré and from the Porte St Denis to the Panthéon, were in the possession of the insurgents. The proletariat of Paris, armed and already victorious, demanded, in the flush of combat, something more than a mere change in the political system: they demanded the inauguration of the promised era of justice, prosperity and glory. They were ready and resolved to force on a social revolution, throughout Europe if need were.

The appointment of General Bugeaud, moreover, and his military dispositions destroyed the effect which might have been produced by entrusting Thiers and Odilon Barrot with the formation of a Ministry of the Left and by the dismissal of the Assembly. The members of the secret societies by whom the orders of the day were now issued called to mind the massacres of the Rue Transnonain and the pitiless nature of the repressive measures taken against them by the Duc d'Isly. It was in vain that Odilon Barrot boldly traversed the boulevards and the streets, in the hope of inspiring confidence and so reestablishing order. To his appeals and his speeches the defenders of the barricades answered with cries of "Down with Bugeaud," "Down with Thiers," "Down with

Louis-Philippe." When Barrot returned to the Ministry he found there the Republican deputies, Pagnerre and Garnier-Pagès, who demanded the abdication of the King. Guizot and the Chamber had fallen, and now the monarchy of July was itself in jeopardy.

The monarchy had now nothing left to rely on but military force; and this resource was suddenly to fail. When he took over the command, Marshal Bugeaud had been startled by the state of the regular army; he found it demoralised and ill-supplied with provisions and military stores. He had however ordered General Bedeau with a force of 2000 men to clear the boulevards, General Sebastiani with a like force to make his way to and occupy the Hôtel de Ville, General Duhot to hold his ground at the Bastille and Colonel Brunet to join forces at the Panthéon with General Renault. In spite of the formal orders of the Commander-in-chief to act and act quickly, all his lieutenants, apprehensive of the disaffection of the National Guard and of a possible conflict with it, shrank from the task. Duhot evacuated the Place de la Bastille and retired to Vincennes; Sebastiani retired with unnecessary haste from the Hôtel de Ville, and Bedeau, after parleying on the boulevard with the chiefs of the citizen soldiery, halted his troops and advised the Marshal to hand over the city to the National Guard.

From the very beginning the action of Bugeaud was paralysed by the hesitation of his colleagues and the advice of courtiers and Ministers. He wasted the decisive morning of February 24 in attempts at conciliation. At 10 o'clock he ordered all regular troops to retreat to the Carrousel and entrusted the maintenance of order to the citizen forces. The retreat amounted to a capitulation, and the army accepted it in that sense.

When the forces of General Bedeau withdrew from the boulevards as far as the Rue de la Paix, they abandoned their guns and ammunition waggons to the insurgents who surrounded them; and they looked on while the rebels helped themselves to ammunition and delivered a series of successful attacks on police stations and guard-rooms. By 10 o'clock the only building in Paris outside the Carrousel and the Tuileries which was left to the Government was the Palais Royal; it was held by the Municipal Guard, but its position became more critical every hour. The supreme moment had arrived. If he was to regain the ground he had so rapidly lost, could the King in default of the army, whose inaction he had encouraged, count on the aid of that National Guard which in 1830 and since that time had helped him to stave off the republic? In order to satisfy himself as to this, Louis-Philippe reviewed the guard in the Court of the Tuileries; and he reentered his palace with the sad conviction that his citizen-soldiers would leave him to struggle unaided with the mob.

These three victories gained by the people in swift succession over the Ministers, the Assembly, and the King himself drove him to a

resolution which as he believed would save the monarchy and his dynasty from destruction; at 1 o'clock on February 24 Louis-Philippe abdicated in favour of his grandson, the Comte de Paris. This solution which, without doubt, he submitted to rather than approved, had been suggested an hour before by politicians who had hoped that by sacrificing the King they would escape a republic, and it was supported by the princes (by Montpensier especially, who with his brothers had for a long time objected to the pacific policy of their father). The plan had however been opposed by certain of his adherents more far-seeing than the others and by the Queen herself, who had shown great courage when the storm of the Revolution thundered at the gates of the Tuileries. It was in fact to the democracy of Paris that Louis-Philippe, deserted by his army and the National Guard, abandoned his Ministers, his family, and himself, on February 24, 1848.

For some hours two parliaments were sitting at Paris, two Assemblies debating the fate of France and discussing a future which three days before, they had not dreamed of and for which they were in no sense prepared. One of these Assemblies which sat in the Salle St Jacques at the Hôtel de Ville met spontaneously on the abdication of the King for the purpose of setting up a government in his place. The insurgents crowded thither during the afternoon and held a noisy sitting under the unacknowledged leadership of the advanced Republicans of *La Réforme*, Louis Blanc, the workman Albert, Martin of Strassburg and Flocon. The Assembly appointed as mayor of Paris Garnier-Pagès and, following the tradition of 1792, took steps to subject all France to the authority of the revolutionary commune in the shape of a provisional government—a Committee of Public Safety, which had been created with the view of imposing the Republic and social reforms upon the whole of Europe. The other was the legal Assembly of representatives, the only lawful authority left standing indeed, but derelict after the storm; the Conservative majority was bewildered by the ruin of the Ministry which had created it; the Liberal and Royalist minority was discouraged by the abdication of the King.

Louis-Philippe having abandoned the Tuileries, which were forthwith occupied by the insurgents, the deputies met at the *Corps Législatif*. Without a Ministry at their head to prescribe a definite programme, they had neither the belief in their cause nor the community of aim which were necessary to enable them to frame for themselves a policy capable of resuscitating the monarchy; they were without any guarantee that their deliberations or their persons would be protected against the attacks of the victorious revolutionaries. At this juncture the President Sauzet might have played a decisive part; he had neither the necessary qualities nor the inclination to do so.

On the one side were the Duchesse d'Orléans, her son the heir of Louis-Philippe, and her brother-in-law the Duc de Nemours, who had made

their way through the disturbed streets to invite the aid and authority of the Chamber, in bringing about the devolution of the Crown upon a minor and the creation of a Regency monarchical in form. On the other side were the Paris mob, which had surged from the street into the tribunes and the very precincts of the Chamber, with demands exactly contrary; it was between these opponents that the deputies were called upon to legislate—and, as they formed a collection of individuals rather than an organised body, they allowed their hands to be forced.

Lamartine, in secret agreement with the journalists of *Le National*, Marie, Marrast, and Crémieux, was preparing the way for the Republic by the creation of a Provisional Government on a plan devised in the office of that newspaper, and he was unwilling as yet to proclaim the fall of the House of Orleans or to propose the Republic prematurely. Dupin and Odilon Barrot, Royalists to the end, defended but feebly the cause of the Comte de Paris and of the Regency promised to the fallen King in exchange for his abdication. It was the conquerors of the Tuileries, students, Republican citizens, and Socialist workmen who in spite of the orders of General Gourgand invaded the defenceless Assembly, swept away the President, the Royalist deputies, the Regent and the boy King, and gave monarchy its death-blow. Dupont de l'Eure was chosen President on the spot; and the deputies who were exponents of the rights of the people declared the final deposition of the Orleans family and placed the Provisional Government in the hands of Lamartine, Arago, Ledru-Rollin, Dupont de l'Eure, Garnier-Pagès, Crémieux and Marie. They refrained from proclaiming the Republic.

There was a wide difference of origin, composition and aims between the gathering of the men of Paris who sat at the Hôtel de Ville and the Assembly of French deputies who at the *Corps Législatif* had voted for a Provisional Government. The one was actually the people in arms who had overturned the monarchy, swept away all other authority and sat in the direct exercise of their sovereign will; they were, however, the people of Paris and nothing more, working men and artisans eager to achieve social reforms and to revolutionise Europe. The other was a body of representatives chosen in part by the provinces, whose functions had been placed in suspense by the downfall of the parliamentary monarchy, politicians who were chiefly concerned in legalising their own position with the consent and by the help of the nation—more inclined to follow the opinion of the country than to move forward without its approbation, "*de cimenter un gouvernement solide*"; more desirous, finally, of order than of reform, of peace at home and abroad than of social changes or the advancement of theories.

If these two bodies with their divergent aims had continued to oppose each other as the people, the Ministers, and the Court had opposed each other for the last three days, the Revolution would not have come to an end on the evening of February 24. Lamartine,

however, and his colleagues in the Assembly had the courage and the sagacity, like Louis-Philippe in 1830, to demand the confirmation of their powers by the sovereign people at the Hôtel de Ville. On their arrival there the representatives of the people who mistrusted them hesitated to comply. The Ministers finally gained their object by proclaiming the Republic forthwith (subject to ratification by the people), and especially by admitting to power three Republicans, two of whom were socialists, as secretaries of the Provisional Government; the names of these men were added by the popular assembly to those of its friends Marrast, Louis Blanc, and Albert, the working man. "We have been appointed to the Chamber but not *by* the Chamber" was the phrase employed by Crémieux to describe this singular Constitution. It was the result of a bargain, of a compromise between the deputies and the people of Paris, brought about and concluded by mutual concessions; on the one side was the establishment of a democratic republic and the promise of a movement of social reform; on the other was the surrender of the sovereignty of the people following upon the surrender of the sovereignty of the King, into the hands of the Provisional Government.

Promises and mutual confidence formed the basis of that compromise which on a certain evening of 1848 for the second time founded the Republic at Paris. This fact explains the preponderating part in the settlement played by sentiments which found their highest expression in the eloquence of a poet—Lamartine. All classes of the nation, the provinces as well as the capital, shared during the first days of the new *régime* in one common dream of justice and benevolence. The rich, like the Rothschilds, subscribed for the wounded, and duchesses organised societies for the relief of the destitute. The poorer classes, although they had gained the upper hand, made no attempt to abuse their victory, abstaining from vengeance and plunder. Never was a revolution less blood-stained. The army which had avoided a conflict was invited to swear friendship with the triumphant mob; the clergy proclaimed the doctrine of Christian equality and fraternised with young and old beneath trees of liberty. The provinces made no complaint of changes about which they had not been consulted; they trusted Paris as Paris had trusted the Provisional Government. The political parties who might have cherished regrets or hopes became suddenly conscious of their own impotence, as they were swept away by a flood of enthusiasm.

These were the characteristics of a Revolution, the shortest and least violent that has ever taken place in France, but which carried with it a conviction of its irresistible force. These same qualities accounted too for the transitory nature of its results.

Once clothed with authority and made responsible for order, the Provisional Government hastened to organise the one with a view of ensuring the other. Since Guizot fell there had been no Ministry, and Lamartine at this juncture undertook Foreign Affairs, Ledru-Rollin the

Interior, Arago the Admiralty and provisionally the Ministry of War, it being necessary to recall General Cavaignac from Africa. Crémieux became Minister of Justice, and Marie of Public Works; Finance, Public Instruction and Trade were respectively entrusted to Michel Goudchaux, Carnot, and Bethmont. Their first care was for Paris; measures were necessary to provide for the removal of the barricades and for the subsistence of the populace, who had been plunged into poverty by the events of February and the enforced idleness which followed. The officers in command of the army agreed to serve under General Bedeau, who had been placed at their head; General Duvivier, who had assisted at the capture of the Tuileries, reorganised the National Guard, and functionaries of all sorts, when invited to transfer their services to the Republic, accepted the situation. The new Ministry then, without further delay, turned its attention to the provinces and appointed Commissioners who were to carry its orders into each department and report on the position of affairs. In many cases the men, thus hastily chosen, injured rather than benefited the cause of the Republic. It was not however the country districts which first gave the Government cause for anxiety; danger threatened from close at hand, from the people of Paris whom it had already been necessary to reckon with, who mistrusted the Government and even their own representatives, associated with it in an incongruous task.

It was to no purpose that on the very evening of February 24, the Government with a view to satisfying the popular eagerness for social reform had declared that the royal palace of the Tuileries should be turned into a national home for incapacitated working men, and that the civil list of Louis-Philippe should be employed in redeeming for destitute persons the goods which they had been compelled to pawn. On February 25 the revolutionaries, who had grown used to mob victories, marched to the Hôtel de Ville with arms in their hands and bearing the red flag, the emblem of their claims and the terror of the propertied classes. Lamartine calmed them by dint of fair words and concessions, and persuaded them to retain as the National Flag the tricolour with a red rosette on the staff. Next, under pressure from his colleagues, particularly Louis Blanc, he pledged the future by a decree which proclaimed the right of all citizens to employment, cost what it might, under the inspection of the State or of associations authorised by it. It was only by this concession, extorted by the menace of a dangerous conflict, that he succeeded on this particular day in persuading the mob to disperse and in procuring for his Ministry a further extension of credit. "We have three months of misery in the service of the Republic before us," said one of the popular orators to Lamartine on taking his leave; the promise implied was full of meaning, but it was never carried out. The Republic had restored to liberty the revolutionaries Blanqui, Barbès, Huber, and Martin Bernard, imprisoned under the Monarchy of

July. The return of these men to Paris, their presence there in the midst of their adherents, and the tale of the sufferings they had endured, created so much excitement in the clubs of the Friends of the Revolutionaries (*Amis du peuple de la Révolution*), which had just then been formed, that a fresh armed rising took place on February 28. The working men of Paris and their Socialist leaders demanded that as a practical sequel to the decree of February 25, a Ministry of Progress and Labour (*Ministère du progrès et du travail*) should be created, whose duty it should be, in conjunction with one of their own number, to create and equip a centre for the organisation of labour. The Ministers parried this new attack by consenting to the appointment of a commission of enquiry—one more promise—which was to sit at the Luxembourg under the presidency of two of their members, Louis Blanc and Albert. The Government had already on February 27 made a show of fulfilling its previous promises by opening yards for the engagement of the unemployed as navvies—the first beginning of national workshops. It had moreover in the place of the Municipal Guard, which had become odious to the Parisians, enrolled, as a paid body of police, men who had been driven by want to volunteer for the service. These measures, condemned as acts of weakness by the propertied classes, by no means satisfied the Socialist artisans. In vain the mutual assurances of confidence and good will exchanged in a moment of enthusiasm between the Provisional Government and the people were renewed again and again. No sooner were they given than fresh claims were advanced.

On March 16 there was a demonstration organised by the *bonnets à poil*, the grenadiers of the National Guard, belonging to the well-to-do quarters who were indignant at the recent disbandment of their smartest battalions; and this sufficed to rouse once more the poorer inhabitants of the *faubourgs* who were dissatisfied and restless. A hundred thousand men marched past the Hôtel de Ville and extorted a promise from the Government that the regular army should always be kept as far from Paris as possible. If on this occasion the Socialist leaders could have agreed amongst themselves to let loose the mob upon the Ministry, the social revolution so much desired by Blanqui and Barbès would have broken out and swept away Lamartine and his colleagues. Instead of this, there were divisions among the leaders of the working men; and Cabet, Raspail, and above all, Louis Blanc, managed to turn a dangerous riot into a peaceful demonstration, and so gained for a few days a greater hold than ever upon the Ministry. The Government survived this fresh crisis only through the intervention—the *treason* as it was called in the clubs—of Louis Blanc; but the important point was that it did survive the danger; and every week added, no matter with what difficulty, to its existence strengthened its position. Louis Blanc soon perceived this. He had hoped to have dominated the Ministry, which in the first instance had accepted his dictation with ill grace, but at the beginning of April, 1848,



Lamartine had managed to secure the all-important support of Ledru-Rollin, and within the Ministry, at all events, retained his supremacy. It was, however, only with the greatest difficulty that he had succeeded in securing for the country during these two months complete political liberty, liberty of the Press, the right of meeting—liberty in fact under every aspect, and in resisting at the same time the pressure of the social revolution.

His efforts had been equally great to maintain peaceful relations between the newly born Republic and the European Powers. With Europe on the one side already ripe for revolution at the moment of the outbreak in Paris, and on the other the Parisian democrats who were inclined to follow the traditions of the Convention and make war on kings on behalf of their subjects, the Government had a difficult part to play; a dread of the revival of the Terror inclined them to peace, while they were anxious after the fall of Guizot to emphasise their sympathies with liberty. A number of foreigners who had taken refuge at Paris—Belgians, Poles, Germans, Italians, and Irish—found advocates and champions in the victors of the Tuileries, and also in certain of the Ministers whose enthusiasm they had aroused. The circular despatch addressed by Lamartine on March 7 to the Powers was necessarily, like the Government itself, a compromise, an undertaking not to intervene in the affairs of Europe coupled with a veiled threat of intervention aimed at those sovereigns who should check the natural growth of liberty within their own dominions: “the maintenance of the treaties of 1815 is irreconcilable with natural rights.” “The circular is evidently a piece of patch-work put together by opposite parties in the Government. The one warlike and disturbing, the other peaceful and conciliatory. I should say that if you were to put the whole of it into a crucible and evaporate the gaseous parts and scum off the dross, you would find the rule to be peace and good fellowship with other Governments” (Palmerston to Clarendon, March 9, 1848). As a matter of fact, while the Revolution broke loose in Germany and Italy, the French Republic, which seemed to have prompted them, abstained under the guidance of Lamartine from any participation in the troubles at Berlin and Vienna. It even went so far as to discover and put a stop to the plottings of certain Frenchmen such as Delescluze with the “Risk Alls” (*Risquons Tout*) in Belgium and the *Lyonnais* in Savoy. This was hardly the Republic dreamed of by the revolutionaries of Paris, when on the evening of February 24 they proclaimed, as the consequence of their victory, a new era of liberty, and the brotherhood of all Europe. A dream, however, could be no safe guide for statesmen burdened with the destinies of France; and between them and the people of Paris there arose a fundamental antagonism—the conflict of the ideal with the practical, of enthusiasm with reason—which had its origin in the events at the Hôtel de Ville on February 24, and which day by day grew more acute.

In these circumstances, France was called upon to elect a Constituent Assembly. Such a national council had been demanded, and promised from the first by the Provisional Government. On February 26, accordingly, it gave notice that a plebiscite for the Republic would be held immediately; while, on March 5, it summoned the constituencies to prepare for the elections on April 9. By the provisions of a decree drafted in conformity with a pledge given by Ledru-Rollin, "the suffrage was to be direct and universal; all Frenchmen over twenty-one years of age were to have a vote; and all Frenchmen over twenty-five were to be eligible for election. Voting was to be secret, by *scrutin de liste* according to departments." This decree afterwards took its place as a law among the legal institutions of the country, and by it the French democracy, which, already in 1789, had acquired equality before the law, now obtained complete political equality also. The adoption of such a measure was a great event in the history of France, and in that of modern democracy; but, after fifty years of monarchical government and several centuries of political inexperience on the part of the nation, it was also a measure of which it was impossible to foretell the consequences. The results of such a step were specially mistrusted by the revolutionary leaders in Paris, Louis Blanc, Blanqui, and Albert, who would have preferred delaying the elections as their forerunners had done in 1793. They were perfectly at home in a revolutionary movement in Paris under their immediate control; but an appeal to the country would be a leap in the dark, a leap too, whatever the result, backed with all the sanction of the law. They protested therefore against the elections, and with redoubled vigour on March 17, when it became known that the Ministers, who were equally uneasy about the result of an appeal to the people, had decided to take roundabout steps to influence the choice of the electors. On March 8, Ledru-Rollin addressed a circular to his agents in the departments, in which he desired them to warn all under their rule against letting candidates spring surprises on them and to mistrust those *républicains du lendemain* who, while pretending to be the friends of the new *régime*, were trying to make the electors forget the really sincere Republicans of former days. Although Ledru-Rollin was one of the most advanced members of the Government, this advice caused him to be accused of exerting undue official pressure, and at the same time aroused the indignation of the club orators, who demanded that the elections should be put off. For the purpose of calming the agitators they were accordingly postponed till April 23, 1848.

The results of the contest, which were published on April 28 and 29, fully justified the forebodings of the Socialists, and, to a certain extent, those of the Ministers. Judged only in the light of the speeches of those elected, the returns, it is true, represented an almost unanimous devotion on the part of the country to the Republic and to social reform; but a glance at the personal character of the deputies produced a very

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different impression. In Paris itself, the Socialist leaders, Barbès, Leroux, and Raspail, together with all the Labour candidates, and the communists nominated by the commission at the Luxembourg, hardly obtained a fourth of the votes given to members of the Provisional Government; and the elections in the capital therefore supplied Lamartine and his colleagues with precisely that legal support of which they had hitherto felt the want in their campaign against violence and impatience. In the provinces, on the other hand, the election returns showed a very different state of affairs. Lamartine himself, it is true, was elected in ten departments; but out of the eight-hundred and forty deputies who composed the new Assembly, a dangerous minority of a hundred and thirty were declared Legitimists, and at least a hundred, who had sat as Royalists in the Assemblies of the preceding reign, could be counted side by side with the members of Lamartine's own party. Should these Royalists forget the crisis which had disunited them in 1830, and combine together against the Republic, their presence in the Assembly might easily become a peril to the new *régime*.

This double peril, consisting on the one hand of the discontent among the Socialist leaders, who were now deprived of their authority in Paris by the legalised power of the Assembly, and who on April 15, before the elections, had even attempted to excite another insurrection, and on the other hand of the large number of Royalists in the Assembly, who, though nominally Republicans, had by no means abandoned their former opinions, ought to have induced the Republican majority to form itself into a closely united party. That such a course was absolutely essential, if the party was to be successful in its endeavours to establish peace, and in its task of compelling the refractory and hot-headed sections of society to submit to the laws of a strong and organised Republic, was quite evident; but it was soon made clear that no such union would be attempted.

On May 8, in compliance with the law, the Provisional Government laid down its powers, and rendered its final account to the Constituent Assembly. As that body was incapable of exercising the executive power itself, it decided to establish an Executive Commission of five members, until after the Constitution had been voted. Lamartine advised the Moderate Republicans to permit some of the Democrats to hold office in this Commission, as they had formerly done in the Provisional Government; but all in vain. Moderates, such as Buchez, Marie, Pagnerre, Garnier-Pagès, and the men belonging to the committee at the Palais National—Marrast and Marie—strained every nerve to exclude Ledru-Rollin, whose propagandist tendencies and leanings towards Socialism had alarmed them. It would indeed have taken little to induce them to form an alliance with Orleanists like Odilon Barrot. On May 9, when the vote on the Commission was taken, Ledru-Rollin's exclusion, which would have provoked an immediate conflict, was only prevented by the most

strenuous exertions on the part of Lamartine, whose eloquent refusal to abandon his colleague cost him fifty votes and some of his popularity. On the following day, on the other hand, Louis Blanc called upon the Assembly and the Government to remember the people, and to nominate a Minister of Labour and Progress, thus further alarming the country at the projects of the revolutionary party.

From the very first, the Executive Government was caught between these tendencies to excess and reaction, and reduced to impotence. The two principal sections of the Republican party in the Assembly formed themselves into separate parties that were disunited and almost hostile to one another. Dupont de l'Eure presided over the Moderate Republicans at the Palais National; Ledru-Rollin and Flocon headed the Reform party, which went by the name of "the committee of the Rue des Pyramides"; and Berryer, a celebrated Legitimist lawyer, led the Royalists, who affected the name of "honest Republicans," and met in the Rue de Poitiers. The whole Assembly also, by the five great committees into which it at once organised itself, was conspiring to curtail still further the power of the Commissioners entrusted with the government of France.

The consequences of such conduct soon became visible. By May 11, the popular agitators believed that circumstances were ripe for an enterprise that would secure them the command of the streets. Their pretext was the foreign policy of the Government; for according to the Parisian democrats the business of a Republic was to make war on kings, and organise crusades for the assistance of enslaved or martyred nations. Their ideas, however, did not coincide with those of Lamartine, who insisted on maintaining a peaceful policy, and on observing strict neutrality in European quarrels. On May 13, accordingly, when the news of a Polish revolt, brutally suppressed by Prussian troops (May 5), became known in Paris, a long procession of workmen and students assembled in the Place de la Concorde, with shouts of "*Vive la Pologne.*" On May 15, this procession met again outside the doors of the *Corps Législatif*, in order that it might support a motion made by the deputy Wolowski in behalf of unhappy Poland. The Assembly itself was next invaded, and in a few moments became the prisoner of the people, who, by the mouths of Blanqui, Barbès, and Huber, proceeded to decree its dissolution, to establish a tax on the rich, and to declare war against the kings of Europe. Fortunately, the National Guards from the *bourgeois* quarters of the city and from the suburbs, who appeared upon the scene at the call and under the command of General Clément Thomas, arrived in time to set the deputies at liberty, to restore the independence of the Assembly, and to reestablish peace and order in the capital. The revolutionary leaders, Barbès and Blanqui, were now in their turn obliged to submit to the fate which they had designed for the members of the Assembly: the Provisional Government, for a moment master of the

Hôtel de Ville, was driven out, the revolt was brought to an end, and the conspirators were imprisoned at Vincennes.

This episode, however, had further consequences. Not only did it accentuate the split in the Republican majority, but the more advanced members of that party were now held responsible for an act of violence which they had never encouraged. An accusation was brought against Louis Blanc, who was roughly handled by the National Guards, and narrowly escaped being arrested; Caussidière, the chief commissioner of police, a friend of Ledru-Rollin's, was obliged to send in his resignation; while Ledru-Rollin himself was looked upon as the accomplice of the rioters. The members of the committee at the Palais National, Marrast, Sénart, Martin of Strassburg, and Pascal Duprat, who were delighted to have this opportunity of compromising their more advanced colleagues and of identifying them with the insurgents, intrigued busily against the Executive Commission, and even against Lamartine, in the hope of either obliging them to resign, or to give way before the reactionary campaign which was being meditated. To the detriment of the Republic they were unconsciously repeating the mistakes made by the Royalist majority of the two Centres when it overturned the throne of Louis-Philippe. By setting the two sections of their majority one against the other they were crippling their power, which could only become really strong through the union of their whole party.

This fact was clearly proved by the bye-elections on June 5, 1848. Almost all the candidates elected in Paris, and in some of the provinces, belonged to the parties hostile to the Executive Commission and to Lamartine's Republic. The Parisian Socialists who had suffered in the April elections now obtained their revenge through the success of Pierre Leroux, Proudhon, Charles Lagrange, and Caussidière. In four constituencies Royalists rejoiced over the election of Thiers, who had till now been excluded from the Constituent Assembly, but who now, in company with Changarnier, returned in triumph to public life. The event, however, charged with the most serious consequences for the future was the election of Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte in Paris and in three departments; for his success proved that a coalition had been effected between the discontented and the hopeful sections of society, and bore witness to an alliance among all those workmen, Conservatives, Liberals and patriots who were mutually disappointed with the home and foreign policy of the Republic. It showed that the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right, however mutually opposed, were ready to unite under a name recalling the glories of the past; while the other Republicans, under the guidance of Lamartine, were growing more and more divided.

On June 10, when the Government moved that a decree of banishment should be pronounced against Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the icy manner in which the Assembly received this proposal at once convinced Lamartine that his own power was at an end. Two-thirds of the

Assembly, consisting of the Socialists, the Royalists, and a large number of the Republicans, who were well pleased to do anything that damaged the Executive Commission, which they accused of weakness and of favouring the Revolutionists, voted that Louis Napoleon should be allowed to take his seat.

From this moment the Republic was without a Government, though it had never needed one more. Trade and business, which had already been injured by the February insurrection, were declining. The five per cent. *Rente*, which had been at par under the preceding *régimes*, now stood at only sixty-nine. Strikes and want of work had affected both workmen and employers. The collection of a supplementary tax of forty-five *centimes*, voted by the Assembly to supply the deficit, was causing trouble, and giving rise to riots in all parts of the country, at some of which cries of "*Vive l'Empereur*" were already to be heard. In the month of May also, those workmen in Paris whom the Republic had placed in the *Ateliers nationaux*, in order to secure the peace of society during a time of crisis, and in order to testify the new *régime's* sympathy for the labouring classes whom they hoped thus to preserve from the contagion of revolutionary doctrines, began to show an inclination to escape from Conservative influences, and to go over to Louis Blanc and the Socialists. More than 100,000 men whom the Government believed it had enrolled in the party of order now showed signs of preparing for a revolt; while their leader, Émile Thomas, allowing himself to be influenced by the mob and by its doctrines, proposed a plan for the organisation of labour according to the methods of Louis Blanc, which he had till now rejected.

When first this change of opinion among the workmen became noticeable, the Government resolved to meet it by prompt action. On May 26 it dismissed Émile Thomas, the head of the *Ateliers nationaux*, and forced him to leave Paris; while, in concert with Trélat, the Minister of Public Works, it endeavoured to find some means of putting an end to the workshops themselves, of sending the younger workmen into the army, and of either discharging the others, or obliging them to work again for private employers. But it suddenly appeared to have thought better of this design, and instead of discharging all the workmen simultaneously, began to talk of getting rid of them by slow degrees. The Government had realised that it was face to face with a serious insurrection.

This new insurrection was too good an opportunity for weakening and disuniting the Republicans to be missed by their adversaries. In the Assembly, on May 28, during a sitting of the Labour Committee, presided over by Corbon, a Socialist workman, the Democrats combined with economists like Wolowski, and with the Royalists, in an attempt to force the Government to consent to a decree for the reorganisation or disbanding of the national workshops. The speeches made by some of

the deputies on this occasion, even more than the actual words of the decree, were of a kind certain to provoke hostility between the *bourgeoisie* and the labouring classes. Both Socialists and Conservatives wished to excite a disturbance; "either organise labour or maintain order" was the general cry. Under their orders the Assembly required the Government, now in a dilemma between the extreme parties, to dismiss the provincial workmen who had crowded into the workshops, and to pay any men whom they continued to employ by the piece instead of by the day. In vain Trélat and the Commission tried to postpone the passing of this decree. On May 30, June 11 and June 19 the Right repeated their demands. In Paris, ever since May 30, the people had been preparing for resistance. George Sand pointed out to Tocqueville the state of affairs among the workmen, and told him of their organisation, numbers, arms, and bitter feeling. "Do not," she said, "drive the people into the street by irritating them." The Commission, with its usual prudence, endeavoured to repurchase the railways and to start the construction of lines on a large scale, for this measure would have at once enabled the State to provide work for the national workshops and to send the unemployed away from Paris. But the Assembly refused its consent to this project, and on June 21 the Government was obliged to publish a decree abolishing the *Ateliers nationaux*. The younger workmen were to be compelled to enter the army, the rest to be sent into the provinces to make embankments. On the same evening, however, the workmen, with cries of "*Vive Barbès*" and "*Vive Napoléon*," decided to make a demonstration in the Panthéon on the following day; and on June 23, barricades were erected in all the working-class districts. On that evening Lamartine, now resigned to a struggle which he saw was inevitable, and with which he perceived the Commission would be unable to cope, persuaded his colleagues to place unrestricted powers in the hands of the Minister for War, General Cavaignac. On June 24, accordingly, the Assembly, satisfied with having rendered powerless the Government which it had itself created on May 5, established a military dictatorship in the person of General Cavaignac for the purpose of putting down the insurrection; and at the same time requested the Executive Commission to resign.

This measure, which was proposed by Pascal Duprat with the consent of the Moderate Republicans and the men of the Committee at the Palais National, was apparently justified by the gravity of the approaching conflict. Indeed, the struggle which now broke out between the people and the Conservative Republicans, on June 23, 24, 25, and 26, was much longer and more sanguinary than the conflict with the monarchy in the preceding February. Both sides were ready to take the offensive; and General Cavaignac was much better prepared for resistance than Louis-Philippe had been. The populace had had both time and means to provide arms and ammunition; while the Minister for War, with the

assistance of Colonel Charras, had made all necessary preparations for overcoming the insurgents; and had arranged a plan of campaign which was now successfully carried into operation by the concerted action of Generals Lamoricière, Bedeau, Damesme and Duvivier. The compromise that had existed in Paris between the Republic and the labouring classes was now at an end. On the day when the Assembly denounced that precarious understanding the people rose *en masse*, without any incitement from conspirators, in the working-class districts round the Hôtel de Ville, in the Bastille quarter, in the Faubourg St Antoine, and in the neighbourhood of the Panthéon and the Place d'Italie. Veritable fortresses were set up by the insurgents, "with the regularity and skill of engineers," for the purpose of regaining the Hôtel de Ville from the *bourgeoisie*. The generals entrusted with the task of contending with the workmen for the possession of Paris, Cavaignac and especially Lamoricière, also resolved to concentrate their forces in the districts which they already controlled, and to secure from thence first the Hôtel de Ville and subsequently, one after another, the various strongholds of the insurrection. In the midst of this pitched battle, only a few deputies still endeavoured to carry messages of peace and conciliation to the barricades or the Assembly; but the people answered these well-meant efforts by firing at Lamartine, wounding Bixio, and killing Dornès. From the tribune, meanwhile, some of the deputies reviled Victor Considérant and Duclerc.

A terrible battle ensued. On June 24 the troops, assisted by the National Guard and the *Garde mobile*, succeeded in occupying the Hôtel de Ville and the central districts, while at the same time they drove the insurgents back into the *faubourgs*. On the 25th General Bréa was killed while trying to surprise the great barricade set up by the people near the *Barrière de l'Italie*, which was taken the same afternoon. On the same day all the northern districts were recovered from the insurgents. Finally, in the evening, after terrible bloodshed, the troops, which had now been reinforced by National Guards from all parts of France, succeeded in taking the Place de la Bastille, where the rebels had concentrated their forces. The Faubourg St Antoine was now the only quarter unsubdued; but the conquest of this working-class district was a very difficult enterprise, for its lofty houses and narrow streets were ill suited to military operations, while almost its entire population was fighting on the side of the workmen. The Archbishop of Paris (Mgr. Affre) bravely undertook a mission of pacification for the purpose of saving the army and people from another engagement that would inevitably lead to still worse bloodshed. He was struck down by a bullet, which was not, however, fired by an insurgent nor aimed at him, and it looked, at first, as if his life had not been sacrificed in vain, for the combatants now showed some inclination to lay down their arms. During the night conferences took place between Recurt, the Minister of the Interior, Adam, a Parisian official, and delegates from the Faubourg. The people required



a guarantee that a "social Republic would be established" as the price of their submission. Cavaignac, however, demanded unconditional surrender. At ten o'clock on June 26 he ordered an attack, which resulted in a complete victory. The Parisian workmen and army left 10,000 killed and wounded on the field of battle in this cruel struggle; while the number of officers, who fell during the insurrection, exceeded the number killed in any of the glorious victories of the First Empire.

This conflict left behind it a feeling of hatred between the Republic and the people that nothing could efface. For a long time, the *bourgeoisie* dreaded a repetition of the insurrection which it had found so much difficulty in suppressing at Marseilles, Rouen and Bordeaux. No mercy was shown to the vanquished; special commissions were instituted for the purpose of securing culprits, who might otherwise have escaped punishment; Courts martial were set up; and on June 27, a large number of prisoners was sentenced to transportation from France. The people were forced to submit to the will of their conquerors, but their hearts were filled with hatred. During the insurrection, which had thus extinguished the hopes of the populace, traces of an active Bonapartist propaganda were already noticeable, and that party now prepared to profit out of the misunderstandings produced by the civil strife—for the outbreak of which it was probably, in some degree, responsible.

The conclusion of the social insurrection was a personal triumph for General Cavaignac, who had been responsible for its suppression. But, by August, 1848, the Republicans were entirely and hopelessly divided. After his last attempt to compose the differences among his party, Ledru-Rollin determined, with Flocon and Félix Pyat, to form an alliance with the defeated Socialists. On September 12, he pleaded, as Louis Blanc had done, for the right to work; while on September 22, he celebrated the anniversary of the Revolution by a great banquet. Meanwhile Delescluze, the editor of the *République démocratique et sociale* attempted to renew the alliance between the associations of the workmen and the Democrats. But, as Proudhon had just asked the Assembly to confiscate a third of all private property, such a proceeding was exactly the one most calculated to drive the Conservative Republicans into further reaction. This section of the party now permitted its allies of the Right, de Falloux, Thiers and Montalembert, to take measures completely at variance with Republican principles; such as the abolition, after July 11, of the right to elect the mayors in Paris and the other large towns, decrees restricting the liberties of clubs and political associations, and a succession of repressive measures against the Press, which was obliged "in the interests of property and the family," to provide heavy securities and to submit to a tyrannical surveillance, while its spoliation and ruin were made a source of public profit. On July 15 the *Manuel républicain*, written by the philosopher Renouvier, was prohibited; and Carnot was obliged to retire from the Ministry because

he had defended a scheme for popular elementary education. From fear and necessity the Republicans agreed to these measures to the great joy of the Conservatives, partisans of Church and monarchy; who, on October 1, 1848, in the persons of Dufaure, Vivien, and Freslou, began to make their way into the Ministry itself.

Under these conditions the Republican Constitution was passed by the Assembly during September and October, 1848. Though its object was to put the coping stone on a *régime* for the advancement of justice, fraternity and peace, and, so to say, to inaugurate a new era, it was published all in a hurry, as the last act of a dream, that had been condemned before realisation by the dissensions among the Republicans. Armand Marrast introduced the report of the Committee in the Assembly; and, in explaining the new law, he remembered rather his studies and his philosophy than the rôle of statesman that he had played in the Republican party since February, 1848. He offered the Assembly a theoretical scheme of Republicanism and social policy, the vagueness of which was little in harmony with the real state of parties. Revolutions, according to him, were justified by an inevitable law of progress; and he defined a *régime* resting on universal suffrage as a reign of equality explained by fraternity, as the condition most favourable to all liberty, whether of speech, of the Press, or of association, and as a pledge and binding promise to the disinherited and the poor.

On September 3, 1848, the Assembly, after a few amendments, decided almost unanimously to prefix a preamble to the Constitution conceived in a similar spirit, thus showing that it intended to proceed on the lines of Marrast and his committee. Tocqueville, who was a member of that committee, has left an account in his memoirs of his colleague's deliberation and aims. The actual text of the Constitution was mainly drafted by a lawyer, Courmenin, but the other members of the committee containing journalists from all parties like Marrast, Vaulabelle, and Lamennais, Royalist statesmen like Dufaure and Barrot, and Moderate Republicans, differed so greatly in their opinions that they were only able to work together at all by evading real facts and fundamental questions. As Tocqueville observed, "the Committee thought it best to preserve a semblance of harmony by keeping to superficial matters; it applied broad principles to small details; and it organised the whole machinery of the Government without due consideration, because it was desirous of avoiding any enquiry into the relative force of the various wheels."

The Chamber, which was even more divided than its Committee, acted in the same manner. In the preamble to the Constitution it declared that by means of the Republic "it would walk with greater freedom in the paths of progress and civilisation; would assure a more equal distribution of social burdens and advantages...and would enable all citizens to attain a higher standard of morality, prosperity, and

enlightenment by the help of laws and institutions." It recognised that there were "rights and duties prior to, and superior to, actual laws"; but it did not enquire whether the actual laws which it was then passing were consistent with this vague and ill-defined code. It undertook "to respect foreign nationalities," at the very moment when it was preparing to send a French expedition against the Roman people. It talked about "free popular education" while dismissing Carnot, and abandoning his projects. It announced, after closing the national workshops, that "the State and the departments would establish public workshops for the benefit of the unemployed." The unanimous issue of a written programme that for the present was quite unpractical, made the Assembly appear anxious to offer some amends for the real refusal of all its parties to grant any social and democratic reforms.

The clauses of the Constitution gave rise to much more debate. The lengthiest discussion was occupied with the question whether the legislative power should be vested in one or two Chambers. On September 27, Lamartine and Dupin, who were in favour of a single Chamber, only obtained a majority of 40 over Duvergier de Hauranne and Odilon Barrot. Republicans, indeed, were beginning to fear that a dictator might possibly establish his supremacy by sowing dissensions between two Chambers; and they would therefore only consent to the institution of a Council of State, to be elected by the Assembly for the purpose of elaborating and discussing bills. If the whole Republican party had logically followed up this policy, it could have rejected the Committee's proposal to place the executive power in the hands of a President to be elected directly by the people by universal suffrage. The Committee's proposal would lead to the establishment of two rival powers, each with a similar origin, but neither with any means of legally controlling the other; and as any conflict between two such powers must inevitably result in a victory for the one commanding the army, the end could only be a dictatorship. A few Democrats like Jules Grévy and Flocon opposed the project; but Lamartine's fears of a dictatorship were not strong enough to keep him from adopting it and upholding it in a vigorous debate. Eventually, by a majority of 500, the Assembly agreed to the institution of a President, to be nominated by the people, independently of the Chamber, like the President of the United States. There was this difference, however, that the French President's Ministers, though chosen and appointed by himself, were to be responsible to the Assembly, and answerable with their chief to a high court of justice, whose members were to be selected each year from the Court of Cassation (October 7, 1848). With the exception of some debates on administrative decentralisation, which occupied October 18 and 19, without arriving at any conclusion, there was no part of this Constitution, as it finally became law on October 23, which engaged the attention of the Assembly so earnestly as this question concerning the election of the President.

Meanwhile, on September 17, 1848, the people had already declared for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte in five departments. Of these elections the most characteristic had been those in Paris, where two parties, the Moderate Republicans and the Social Democrats, had found themselves face to face. Fould and Raspail, the favourite candidates of these two parties, out of a total poll of 247,000, had hardly obtained together a greater number of votes than had been cast for the great Emperor's nephew alone. As the months passed away, the heir of Napoleon continued to improve his position with the electors. In former days he had not seemed destined to such good fortune, when his unsuccessful conspiracies against the July Monarchy had resulted in his imprisonment and exile. Since then, however, he had very prudently remained in England, allowing his friends to act for him; and their zeal and activity, noticeable alike in the Assembly, in the Press, and at popular centres and demonstrations, had advanced his cause, and gradually gained over the malcontents of all parties. The Socialists, enraged at the way they had been crushed after the June insurrection, now remembered how Louis Napoleon had written in their behalf at the end of the preceding reign. Others among the Democrats expected a vigorous foreign policy from a Napoleon, accompanied by a glorious Liberal propaganda, such as Monarchy and Republic had alike refused them. Finally, not a few Royalists underrated the influence of a man whom they believed to be of mediocre ability and unequal to the task of securing a triumph for his political and religious aspirations. The elections which took place on September 17 were an omen which Louis Napoleon perfectly understood. He at once came to take his seat in the Constituent Assembly, where he was unanimously received as the defender of order and the champion of democracy. While the Republicans were divided among themselves, and were becoming more and more undecided between the desires of the people on the one hand, and the reproaches of a Conservative *bourgeoisie* on the other, a union of extremists was being formed against them under the leadership of Louis Napoleon.

During the last month in which his Provisional Government held office, Cavaignac tried in vain to give some more definite pledges to the party of order. To this end he separated himself from the more moderate section of the Republican party, and made Dufaure, a Moderate Monarchist, Minister of the Interior, with the result that he was accused of being a traitor by the Republicans on November 29; but all to no purpose. In the last days of November, in order to please and reassure the Catholics, who were alarmed by the Roman insurrection, which had brought about the assassination of the Minister Rossi, and was on the point of driving the Pope from Rome, Cavaignac took the step of appointing a special ambassador, Corcelles, and also organised an armed expedition at Toulon for the purpose of assisting the Pope. But neither these tardy concessions, nor the Minister's efforts to win the

favour of the masses, who were summoned on December 10, 1848, to elect a President by universal suffrage, were able to prevent Frenchmen from declaring themselves for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte by an enormous majority. He was elected to hold office for four years, by more than five million votes, against one million and a half given to General Cavaignac. On December 20, the President of the Constituent Assembly administered the oath to the Prince President, as he was to be called for the future; an oath by which he undertook to remain faithful to the democratic Republic, and to perform all the duties required of him by the Constitution. "Memories of the Napoleonic legend, dreams of a glorious future, the fear of communism and of a clerical propaganda, had deceived the mind of the people, and in consequence the Republic obtained a master." The rule of the men of 1848 was over; and now the Moderates also had had their day, like the *Montagnards*, Radicals and Socialists who had been dismissed in the months of June and July.

A proof that this was the case was furnished without delay by the Government, which the new chief of the executive power selected on December 29. Constitutionally he should have chosen his Ministers from the groups possessing a majority in the Assembly; partly, that is to say, from the Moderate Republicans of the Left, and partly from the Conservatives or Republicans of the Right, the sometime Monarchists. He, however, did nothing of the kind. The Assembly indeed retained its Republican President, Armand Marrast, but every other Republican, however able, was driven from office. The names of Arago, Marie, Garnier-Pagès, and Recurt were hardly even considered; and still less notice was taken of Sénart, Bastide, Pagnerre, and Barthélemy St Hilaire, although they controlled four hundred out of the seven hundred votes in the Assembly. The Premiership was given to Odilon Barrot, a man never at heart a Republican, though he had overthrown the monarchy, as it were accidentally, while striving to overthrow Guizot, and who now consented to serve under the new *régime*, solely in order to gain power. Drouyn de Lhuys, a diplomatist who had made his fortune under Thiers, and had won a name for himself while opposing Guizot, was made Minister of Foreign Affairs; Tracy undertook the Navy; Hyppolite Passy became Minister of Finance, and Malleville, Minister of the Interior. All these men had been in the Government of Louis-Philippe. There were indeed only two blots on this Orleanist Cabinet: namely, Bixio, a Republican, who accepted office, in the hope of inducing the Government to help suffering Italy, and de Falloux, a Legitimist, who had been persuaded by his friends, and by the Abbé Dupanloup, to accept the portfolio of Education, in order that the supremacy of the Church might be established in that department. It was not long, however, before the resignation of Bixio and Malleville made way for Léon Faucher, an old opponent of Guizot's, who had worked for liberty with much ability under the July Monarchy, but who was now, at the risk of

sacrificing liberty, to devote all his former energy and talent to the defence of order against Socialism. Under these Ministers the Republicans were all ejected from office. Berger, a friend of Odilon Barrot, who had formerly been a member of the Dynastic Left, was made Prefect of the Seine; General Changarnier became Commander-in-chief in Paris, and was also given the command of the National Guard, although it was illegal for the same officer to hold both appointments. The Legion of Honour was placed in the hands of Marshal Molitor, a general of the Empire; and finally a rich pension, as it were, was found for Jerome Bonaparte, a brother of the great Napoleon, by his being solemnly installed at the Hôtel des Invalides (January, 1849).

What control, however, could an Assembly representing a mere fraction of the electorate, and frequently holding diverse opinions, hope to exercise henceforth over a man supported by five million electors? The powers wielded by the Constituent Assembly—never anything but provisional—were necessarily obsolete, now that the Constitution had become law; while the President's power had acquired an additional strength since it rested on a definite form of government founded upon the Constitution. Ministers, indeed, still humoured the Assembly at times, but they often made it feel the superior strength of the master whom they represented. Now and then the Republicans offered a feeble resistance, and tried to come to an understanding with the Democrats whom they had formerly opposed. But a common fate awaited both parties. The life of the Republican Assembly had been prolonged, in spite of its last endeavours to avert the threatened dictatorship, in spite of a reaction among the Royalist party, and in spite of its ill-founded claim to remain sitting until all laws fundamentally necessary to the Constitution had been passed. But now, on January 29, 1849, under the coercion of the troops quartered in Paris, mobilised for the purpose by Changarnier, the Assembly was compelled to vote its own dissolution and agreed, by a majority of five, to retire so soon as it had passed laws for regulating the Council of State and the responsibility of the Executive, an electoral law, and finally a Budget. The Republic did not, however, disappear abruptly, but still lingered on for several months after this decree.

Its adversaries, in the meantime, took care not to neglect the lesson to be drawn from the Republican dissensions which had been so helpful to their own manœuvres. Perceiving that the days of the Constituent Assembly were numbered, they took measures for securing the control of the Assembly that would succeed it. Their first care was to form a united party; for their ranks included Orleanists who dreamt, like Thiers, of restoring the deposed monarchy; men who, like Faucher, Barrot and Dufaure, had visions of a *bourgeois régime* with a strong Government; declared Bonapartists, like Lucien Murat and Lucien Bonaparte; Legitimists, like Falloux; and even a very few Republicans. Though the past of these men differed as widely as their views, whether

avowed or otherwise, a union was none the less swiftly effected between them by means of a Committee (*Union électorale*) which met in the Rue de Poitiers. The common ground on which all were ready to agree was undoubtedly a policy of "saving society" by supporting the Church of Rome, which was so admirably qualified, if only it was strong and independent, to teach resignation and respect for authority to a turbulent people. In order to further this policy, subscriptions were collected in Paris and in the provinces; newspapers were subsidised and circulated; while pamphlets advocating the cause of religion and hostile to communism were distributed in town and county. "Woe to church towers if the Socialists win," became the common watchword; and Montalembert, the eloquent leader of the Catholic party, placing himself at the head of the association, called upon Liberty to unite with the Church for the purpose of securing the safety of society.

It was Falloux, Montalembert's friend and accomplice in the Prince President's Government, who now, under the pretence of giving freedom of conscience, became responsible for a law which handed over the training of the mind to the Church and the religious Orders. He had barely established himself as Minister of Education, for the purpose of carrying out this scheme, before he hastened to summon a special Parliamentary Commission on Education, whose appointed task was "to secure the freedom of the schools set up by the Republican Constitution" (January 4, 1849). Very few University men were appointed by the Minister to this Commission, which was mainly composed of Catholics, such as Dupanloup, de Melun, and de Riancey, under the presidency of Thiers. Its first duty, in the opinion of Falloux, was to shelve the democratic scheme for a system of elementary education given and controlled by the State, in opposition to the private schools, which Carnot had proposed six months earlier in the Constituent Assembly. Secondly, though Thiers and Cousin opposed this, it was to withdraw from the State the monopoly of secondary schools in which the *bourgeoisie* were educated, and to sanction the establishment of Catholic schools, and of education by the religious Orders. At the very outset of these proceedings, however, the Catholics encountered a difficulty which had not been foreseen. Certain members of the Constituent Assembly, who had scruples about the work on which they were engaged, endeavoured to oppose Falloux by bringing forward an alternative scheme for popular instruction. On January 9, Jules Simon, in the name of the Education Commission, gave the Assembly an opportunity of frustrating the plan formed by Falloux, the friend of Dupanloup and Lacordaire. This move was, however, defeated, for although the Commission had been nominated by the Assembly, the Minister was strong enough to delay any examination of its proposals until the end of the session; and at the coming elections he expected to obtain a majority which would promote the influence of the Church with greater docility.

It was not only the position of the Church in France, however, but also her situation abroad, which is elsewhere described, that was arousing the attention and zeal of the Conservatives. Though Cavaignac had offered the Pope assistance, after his defeat in Rome by the Revolutionists, Pius IX had preferred to take refuge at Gaeta, under the protection of the King of Naples and of Austria; and thence he appealed for help to Europe, and the despotic Catholic Powers, rather than to France, where sympathy with schemes for a free Italy was believed to be current. In France, the Catholics desired to show their sympathy with the Holy See by restoring it unconditionally to its former position; while their chief Falloux had accepted office for the double purpose of establishing "religious liberty," and of ensuring "the safety of the Pope in Italy." Louis Veuillot, a man well qualified to give evidence on Catholic party history, relates how, previous to the election of Louis Napoleon, Montalembert had made Falloux promise to intervene in Rome on behalf of the Pope.

But in January, 1849, the Prince President and his Ministers, Odilon Barrot and Drouyn de Lhuys, found it no easy matter to fulfil this promise. By the terms of the Constitution, which they had sworn to uphold, they were forbidden to interfere in quarrels between a sovereign and his people, and they had therefore no right to intervene between Pius IX and his rebellious subjects. It was hardly possible for Louis Napoleon to forget, or to make others forget, that, in 1831, he had himself intrigued and fought in Rome for those liberties which Pius IX would not grant even now, when defeated and a fugitive. With the President's consent, Drouyn de Lhuys suggested that a Congress should be summoned for the purpose of supporting the Pope; only making the condition that it should not be held in the King of Naples' dominions, but in those of the King of Sardinia, who was at once a Catholic and a Liberal. But a fresh outbreak of hostilities, and the crushing defeat of Charles Albert at Novara, in March, 1849, soon obliged Louis Napoleon and his Ministers to abandon their temporising policy. The revolution in Rome grew more acute after the nomination of a Triumvirate, of which Mazzini was the violent and despotic leader. By the end of March, 1849, the Pope's exile seemed likely to prove a lengthy and serious matter. Meanwhile Falloux, in the name of the Catholics, who were growing impatient, continually pressed for some definite action on the part of France. At length Drouyn de Lhuys took the first step forward, and decided to send de Rayneval and d'Harcourt to the conference of Catholic States at Gaeta. Afterwards, however, when he saw that this conference seemed inclined to give Austria a mandate to intervene in Rome, he advised Louis Napoleon to take more decisive measures, and to despatch an army corps to Italy, capable at once of checking the Austrians on the Roman frontiers, and of striking a wholesome fear into the hearts of the rebel Republicans.



The traditional hatred of French Liberals for the Austria of Metternich and Schwarzenberg, and their desire to dispute the possession of Italy with that nation, made Drouyn de Lhuys hope that he would be able to justify this enterprise in the eyes of the Constituent Assembly, in spite of its being apparently directed against the Romans; and, on April 16, he did in fact succeed in carrying his measure. On the other hand, he believed that this seeming attack upon the rebels would give the President a good opportunity of satisfying and reassuring the minds of the Catholics. The execution of this very delicate enterprise was entrusted to General Oudinot; who, though he was to refrain from attacking the rebels, received instructions "to bring about the reestablishment of order," on a basis in conformity with the legitimate rights of the people, while at the same time forcing Rome into submission; and the Pope to accept a constitution. On August 29, 1849, the French troops disembarked at Civita Vecchia. They encountered no resistance on first landing, for the Romans were uncertain whether the new arrivals came to defend them against Austria and the Neapolitans or to restore the Papacy to power. At first, the Pope rejoiced at the coming of these troops; but his satisfaction was mitigated when the French Envoys tried to force him to promise that he would grant indulgences and liberty to his subjects. It soon became evident that the French Government had been mistaken in believing that the mere presence of its troops would intimidate Mazzini or induce the Pope to give way. The arrival of General Oudinot in Italy only served to excite hostilities between the rival parties by making both contend for the assistance of France.

A choice between these parties soon became inevitable, nor could the decision of the French Commander be much in doubt. In the situation in which he found himself—a situation without a practicable solution—his only advisers were the diplomatists, d'Harcourt, de Rayneval and Forbin Janson; men who, both from inclination and from the position which they occupied, would naturally give way to the influence of the Roman Catholic party. Forbin Janson indeed, on the word of a priest, Father Ventura, assured Oudinot that Mazzini's faction in Rome was in a minority, and that the majority of the people there were hoping for his intervention. On April 30, accordingly, on the strength of this information, he risked an attack upon the city, and was defeated outside the gates of Rome. Without any actual orders, in defiance indeed of the decrees and instructions of the Constituent Assembly, he had declared war against the Roman Republic and his attempt had been a failure.

On May 7, 1849, when this news became known in Paris, the indignation among the Republican party fully equalled the joy experienced by the circle in the Rue de Poitiers. A stormy sitting in the Assembly showed, for an instant, how strong the Republicans might have been if they had only been united. The Moderates too—irritated at being

dragged into a war against liberty—(although they had refused to fight for it), and indignant at the open violation of the Constitution, united their reproaches and their votes with those of the Radicals. In a motion proposed by Sénart, and carried by a majority of a hundred, Jules Favre and Ledru-Rollin both condemned the conduct of the Government. To appease this violent opposition, Drouyn de Lhuys offered to suspend hostilities against the Roman Republic; while on May 9, he hurriedly despatched Ferdinand de Lesseps to Italy, in the hope that the negotiations of a diplomatist of strong will and well-known Liberalism would be able to repair the mischief caused by Oudinot's unfortunate attack. But whatever chance of success such a mission might have in Rome itself, it was condemned in France before it started.

But what did the wishes of a dying Assembly matter to the Catholics or the Conservatives? Oudinot's abrupt attack upon the Pope's enemies was exactly what they wanted, and they were therefore certain to find excuses for it and to turn it to some good account. In the first place it was an excellent pledge to offer to the Catholic electors at the opening of the electoral campaign. The honour of the Church and of the French army required to be avenged; and Falloux had no difficulty in making the Prince President understand and acquiesce in the wishes of the Catholic party. The occurrence, indeed, supplied Louis Napoleon with an admirable opportunity of strengthening his own majority in the next Assembly. He now formed a closer alliance with the Conservatives for the purpose of ousting the Republicans; forbade his Minister to send reinforcements to General Oudinot; and caused Lesseps to convey the following message, which, on May 9, he also had published in the Presidential paper *La Patrie*, to that officer: "Our military honour is at stake, I will not suffer it to receive any injury." Copies of the letter containing these words were also distributed to every regiment "for the purpose of attaching the army more closely to the chief of the State." As the elections were imminent there can be no doubt that Louis Napoleon desired to increase his prestige by a show of zeal against the Roman insurgents. The furious indignation of the Republicans, who, on May 11, 1849, endeavoured to overthrow the Ministry, did not prevent Léon Faucher from sending to the *Préfets* (May 12) a list containing the names of those deputies who disapproved of the Roman expedition, in order that the electors might be urged not to vote for them. At the same time, emboldened by the knowledge that its desire to involve France in the defence of the Holy See was connived at by the Presidency, the *Union Libérale*, the organ of the association in the Rue de Poitiers, did not scruple to apply such terms as "Socialist" and "Insurgent" to even the most moderate Republicans, who were only desirous of maintaining French neutrality in the quarrel between the Pope and his subjects. "The honour of the country and of the army" was cleverly turned to account, and used for the advantage of the reactionary parties

by Louis Napoleon; and on May 18, 1849, this fortunate phrase secured a victory at the elections.

At these elections the Conservatives won eighteen seats out of twenty-eight in Paris, while five hundred out of the seven hundred candidates recommended by the association in the Rue de Poitiers were successful in the provinces. The unanimity among the Republican party, which the Roman question had seemed for a moment to promote in the Assembly, had not been extended to the country. Moderate men like Arago, Bastide, Lamartine, Marrast, Carnot, and Jules Favre, had refused to stand at the elections as members of the coalition that Ledru-Rollin, Madier de Montjau, and Greppo had endeavoured to form with the Socialists for the purpose of defending the Republic. In consequence, the Moderate Republicans were utterly crushed; and even the most popular man among them, Dupont de l'Eure, only obtained 40,000 votes out of 274,000. Their rôle was indeed over; and henceforth they disappeared among the Royalists who had succeeded in uniting themselves with the Church and Louis Napoleon, or among those Democrats whose alliance they had formerly refused. An event of particular significance was the defeat of such a man as Lamartine, whose name and prestige had secured a majority for his party in 1848.

Though the defeat of these men was highly agreeable to General Cavaignac's fortunate rival, and to the Conservative party, it did not, after all, mean the final extinction of the democratic Republic which they had desired to establish in France. In Paris, the Social Democrats had secured only 30,000 votes less than the Conservatives; while in the provinces, two hundred deputies, entirely devoted to Republican principles, had been returned to oppose the Conservatives in the new Assembly. When the Revolution had broken out in February, very few people had dreamed of realising Republican ideas; and the democratic *régime* which had then been established, as if by chance, had not been supported by any definitely constituted party. But a year later, in 1849, in spite of the sanguinary conflicts which were agitating France and Europe, such a party was being insensibly formed by a *rapprochement* between statesmen who recognised the power and the rights of the people, and a people who began to perceive the uselessness of rioting and violence. This new force had been organised by Ledru-Rollin by means of banquets and popular committees. The communistic theories also, whose advocacy of confiscation had formerly caused so much alarm, had now been replaced by a Socialistic propaganda encouraging the formation of friendly societies among the lower classes, and urging them to engage in solid undertakings for the advancement of the general prosperity. The May elections were a real triumph for Ledru-Rollin, who was elected in five departments by two million votes. The departments of the Est, Alsace, the Haute Saône, the Jura, the Saône et Loire, the Ain, the Rhône, the Isère, the Ardèche, and also several departments

of the Centre, such as the Loir et Cher, the Cher, the Nièvre, and the Creuse, all pronounced themselves in favour of a Social Democratic Republic. Even in the army, as its generals themselves admitted, the party which was still strong in the Assembly and in certain districts, could reckon upon a considerable number of adherents; while Tocqueville observes that the Democrats, who had believed their cause utterly lost, were as much intoxicated with joy when their successes became known as if they had gained a majority at the elections.

During the last days of the Constituent Assembly, these Democrats had already made furious attacks upon the Government and the Conservatives, who had leagued together for their destruction. On May 19, they had managed to reject a Bill brought forward by the Government for the purpose of legalising the position of General Changarnier. On May 22, Ledru-Rollin and Sarrans had demanded vigorous action in defence of the liberties of the people, that is to say, a complete reversal of the policy of the Roman expedition. Had not General Changarnier kept the troops then in Paris shut up in their barracks, they might even have succeeded in persuading the Assembly to declare itself *en permanence*, and in giving the signal for an armed resistance. The pretext, or motive, for such a proceeding on their part would have been the blow aimed by the President and his Ministers at the Constitution by their conduct in the Roman question. But on May 27, 1849, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly had parted the combatants.

At Rome, meanwhile, all through this crisis Lesseps was ceaselessly trying to make the Romans submit to the Pope by promises of liberty and a Constitution. But, between General Oudinot on the one hand, who would not abandon his intention of entering the city by force, and Mazzini and Garibaldi on the other, who were firmly resolved to prevent him, his task was by no means easy. On May 16, nevertheless, he succeeded in obtaining an armistice from the French General; and on May 18, he persuaded the Roman Assembly to appoint some plenipotentiaries with views more moderate than Mazzini's. But, on the following day, Mazzini and the violent party once more obtained the upper hand in Rome; while Oudinot insisted upon a renewal of hostilities, and became even more warlike after the arrival of General Vaillant from Paris, with orders to supersede him if he should give way. On May 24, however, after threatening the Romans with a definite rupture, a menace which was confirmed by an ultimatum delivered on May 29, Lesseps at length succeeded in signing a treaty with the Roman Republic, by which the city gates were to be opened to the French army, if it would promise to respect the rights of the nation.

On the very day on which Lesseps issued his ultimatum, he was curtly recalled by a telegram from Drouyn de Lhuys, as if he had ill-acquitted himself of his mission or failed in obedience. On June 1 an order was telegraphed to General Oudinot from Paris, contrary to his

expectations, to break off negotiations, to attack Rome, and to take it by storm. It was the effect of the pressure brought to bear at headquarters by d'Harcourt and de Rayneval, who advocated the immediate and unconditional restoration of the Pope, and by the German Jesuits, who were financially supporting this French crusade. It was the consequence of the wishes which they had conveyed to Paris through a determined Catholic, Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne. Lastly it was the welcome extended by the Ministry to the Catholic majority in the Legislative Assembly. The first sitting had been held on May 28; and already the Catholics were growing uneasy to find Odilon Barrot hesitating between them and the more moderate deputies of the Centre, such as Dufaure, Tocqueville, and Lanjuinais. It was to reassure them and quiet their apprehensions that the Prince President had sacrificed Rome and the convention signed by Lesseps. That diplomat returned in amazement to France, to be rewarded for his efforts by disavowal and censure for having failed to carry out his instructions; while General Oudinot began the siege of Rome on June 3, and on the 30th entered through the breach. A fortnight later, the Catholics saw the close of their cherished crusade: a solemn *Te Deum* was sung at St Peter's celebrating the victory of France over the Roman Republic, and the unconditional restoration of pontifical authority.

At the same time Falloux had hastened to lay on the table of the Legislative Assembly his Bill for liberty of instruction claimed by Catholics and religious communities for nearly twelve years (June 18). A week later a commission had already been appointed to investigate it; and, on July 3, 1849, the Catholic majority, rejoicing just then in the return of the Pope to Rome, asserted their determination to carry through with the utmost speed "this Roman campaign at home," as Montalembert called it. The Constitution, however, prescribed a preliminary enquiry by the Council of State, in the case of a law of such importance. But when it came to obtaining control of education in France and achieving their purposes, Falloux and the Catholic majority did not trouble themselves about constitutional forms, any more than they had done in their defence of the Pope.

The Catholic party had the power, and they meant to use or even abuse it. The fruitless attempt of Ledru-Rollin and Martin Bernard, on June 13, to stir the people of Paris to revolt furnished an excellent pretext to decimate the Democratic party by means of severe measures—arrests in Paris and in the provinces, prosecutions and a state of siege. Banquets were forbidden, mutual benefit societies dissolved, and Republican school-teachers suspended or arbitrarily dismissed. These excessive measures of repression were as ill-judged as the abortive rising of June 13; besides, they overshot the mark. It became evident that this so-called vindication of order was to culminate in the subjection of the nation to the Catholic party. This stimulated the

Republican propaganda: the prosecutions secured readers for such newspapers as *Le National*—whose editors, Duras and Jules Simon, were now disposed for an understanding with the Democrats—*Le Siècle*, *La République*, *L'Événement*, prime mover in which last was Victor Hugo, and especially *La Presse*, which Émile de Girardin suddenly brought round again to the party of liberty, as public opinion shifted. In the country districts *La Feuille du Village* disseminated information among the peasants. The municipal and departmental elections more than anything else indicated the progress of this propaganda. None were more characteristic than the ballots of July 14: nineteen Socialist and Democratic deputies had been shut out from the Assembly by the High Court entrusted with the trial of the culprits of June 13. To supply their places the *Union Libérale* of the Rue de Poitiers had produced a list, mainly of Royalists like Malleville, Delessert, Ferdinand Barrot and Ducos, and of Moderates such as Lanjuinais and Boinvilliers, who always rallied round a Bonaparte. This list passed by only a very small majority over the Republican list, which mustered nearly 100,000 votes. So the strength of the Republican Opposition was growing.

The contending parties then were the Catholic Conservatives and the Republican Democrats, two vast bodies each disputing as to the power or tenets of the other; and, between the two, the Prince President at that time began by degrees to make his weight felt and to sketch out his own independent policy. His election and his fate, prior to the development tending to divide Catholics and Republicans into opposite camps, had been determined by the movement which, on the strength of his name, had at the close of 1848 brought together the numerous adherents of Communism, and also the people who since the days of June bore a grudge against the Republican *bourgeoisie*. Louis Napoleon had no intention of being completely drawn over to the Right, nor of losing his influence with the masses, the peasantry, and the army by adopting a Catholic reactionary policy. Though he might propose to remain the guardian of order in the face of clubs, democratic Press, and mob, he did not wish to be the tool either of the Monarchy or of the Church. On the contrary the mode of operation best calculated to develop and assure his power in the country seemed to him that of striking the political mean. Between the rival parties, on various grounds so distracting for France, an intermediate party must be interposed for which preparations had long since been made, and which was destined when the time should be ripe to supersede both in his interests. The history of the Legislative Assembly thus became to all appearances that of a Catholic Republic contending with Liberal and popular Oppositions; in reality events were simply paving the way for a personal government.

From the outset, Louis Napoleon had clearly shown that he had no intention of joining the Monarchist and Catholic majority, since he had selected more Liberal Ministers such as Tocqueville, Lanjuinais, and

Dufaure, to the last of whom, on the model of Cavaignac, he had entrusted the Ministry of the Interior (June 2). After the capture of Rome the Ministry prorogued the Assembly from August 13 to September 30. People openly talked of a *coup d'état*, which was precisely what took place—save that the President's action was less serious than had been feared, though sufficiently so to furnish a lesson for the Catholics and a pledge for the Liberals. The opportunity was provided for him by the Roman question—the pivot on which the internal affairs of France just then turned. Louis Napoleon had restored the Pope by force: he wished it to be known that—as a former champion of the liberties of Rome—he would not suffer Pius IX. and Antonelli to set up an absolutist *régime* once more, although a sort of white terror (*terreur blanche*) had already begun on July 15 in Rome. He sent his aide-de-camp, Edgar Ney, to remonstrate with the Pope; and finally, on August 18, he published Ney's instructions, in the form of a letter compounded of expostulations and demands, which scandalised the Holy See. France, or rather her leader, dared to present a sort of ultimatum to the Holy See, embodying a total amnesty, lay administration, and Liberal institutions. Pius IX., who could not dispense with the French troops, dared not show his anger by a refusal. In a brief of September 12, *motu proprio*, he promised reforms, but without really granting them. Instead of discharging his debt he signed a bill for payment at a remote date. Napoleon was not baffled by this dilatory reply: he insisted on his Ministers demanding from the Holy See an amendment to the pontifical brief, namely the voting of supplies by an elective assembly; but he had reckoned on a Ministry more amenable to his orders than to the will of the majority in the Assembly which controlled the Ministers.

When the *Législative* met, on October 1, 1849, the Catholics did not seem inclined to approve or support the conditions imposed on the Holy See by the Prince President. "It would be an odious piece of inconsistency to force the will of a sovereign whose independence we were but now vindicating," exclaimed Montalembert with enthusiastic applause from the majority. Odilon Barrot and his colleagues, yielding to Falloux' influence and to fear, did not venture to question this. They declared, in agreement with Thiers, reporter to the commission, that after all the Pope's brief was satisfactory and in compliance with the President's letter. The Assembly approved by a large majority of the expeditionary corps remaining in Rome in the Pope's service unconditionally and even for the purpose of supporting a reactionary policy; and thus they virtually pronounced against Louis Napoleon.

The President resolved on a decisive step, namely, the dismissal of a Ministry which had not upheld his policy of opposing the pretensions of the Catholic party. As early as May 30, 1849, he had commissioned Odilon Barrot "to secure Ministers who would be devoted to his own

person." Barrot had shirked this task, preferring to retain his influence in the Parliament. Without consulting the Assembly, the President sent for General d'Hautpoul on October 31 and put him in office, giving him for coadjutors new men who were to be simply exponents of his own opinions and policy. These new Ministers were: Rouher for Justice, de Rayneval and then Ducos de La Hitte for Foreign Affairs, Ferdinand Barrot for the Interior, de Parieu for Public Instruction, Fould for Finance. The message which he bade them read contained one passage which was a programme in itself: "No sooner were the dangers of the mob safely past than the parties were seen to raise their standards afresh, renew their rivalry, and alarm the country by sowing seeds of unrest broadcast. In the midst of this confusion France looks to the guiding hand, the will, and the standard of him whom she elected on December 10. That victory of December 10 involved a whole system, for the name of Napoleon is a programme in itself alone. Let us then exalt authority without detriment to true liberty."

It was in point of fact a dictatorship, which began from October 31, 1849, under pretext of "exalting authority." The most vigorous participator in the undertaking, whose talent and zeal were absolutely devoted to the President, was the Auvergne lawyer Rouher, who sought to find means for the satisfaction of his ambition in the establishment of a *régime* of authority. As Keeper of the Seals he did not scruple, for the undoing of the Republicans, to make "red, rabid, anarchist" criminals of them. For this piece of policy he made use of the administration of justice. The *procureurs-généraux* were bidden to give information every month against the organisation of the Democratic party, its newspapers, its associations, its dealings both open and secret, and even against those holders of office in the other departments who were suspected of half-heartedness or complicity. The Minister of War was equally zealous in his use of the *gendarmerie*, circulating orders for them to watch "itinerant demagogues," and to give notice of all persons in authority and even school-teachers favourable to subversive doctrines. On December 13, 1849, the Minister of Public Instruction, Parieu, asked the Assembly while waiting for the voting of a law on education, that the school-teachers in each department might be set under the control and at the disposal of the prefects. It was clear that, by the prosecution of the Republicans as anarchists, the presidential authority further aimed at setting up for itself in the country an army of officials, who should be perfectly amenable to its designs and ready to fall in with them, whatever they might be.

On January 2, 1850, the Royalist and Catholic majority attempted an almost successful opposition to this plan. It was only by a majority of one vote that the Bill, putting the school-teachers under the control of the prefects, was passed. Royalists and Catholics retaliated by opposing the Education Bill, which the Government had been adroit enough to delay and refer to the Council of State on November 7, 1849. The



President perceived the threat; the Assembly itself was dismayed by its audacity. On the advice of Dupin and Molé they agreed to a compromise, and voted for Parieu’s Bill, on condition that the Government pledged themselves to support at no distant date that Bill dear to the Catholics, the Education Bill drawn up by Falloux. This Bill, which in the history of French education has retained the name of “Falloux’ Act,” was finally passed on March 15, 1850.

The fundamental yet evident principle of this enactment was to confirm in the primary schools and extend to secondary education the right of all citizens to give instruction, and further to charge the State with the burden of providing national education—transferred to it by Napoleon I, when he created the University and the *lycées*, and by Guizot in his Act dealing with the schools in 1833. But for the Catholics, who thus secured the right of competing with the state schools, the law meant something very different. Primary, communal and departmental schools, the *lycées*, and the masters in these schools, were placed under the influence of the Church. Four archbishops, elected by their colleagues, were put by the Church on the governing body of the University to inspect the programmes of lectures, to examine books, and to enquire into abuses. On the provincial academic Councils she placed two priests, one of them a bishop, to supervise the masters; and, lastly, she obtained for rural *curés* the right of inspection of schools themselves. At the same time the Act gave special facilities to those schools which the Catholic party proposed to found, availing itself of the liberty of competition for the religious communities, whose existence was not then, however, recognised in France. If it was a question of a primary school, the certificate of competency required from state masters or from independent professors was not required from members of the Church: if of a secondary school, where only state masters with degrees attesting considerable attainments were allowed to teach, no proof of learning was asked from the teachers in the case of Catholic schools. On granting their premises to free (*i.e.* Catholic) schools, the communes and departments were exempted from obedience to the law obliging them to provide education at their own expense. By means of such immunities Falloux’ Act, which proclaimed liberty as a natural right, was destined, above all else, to subject that very liberty to the influence and advancement of the Catholic clergy.

Louis Napoleon’s Government would have been satisfied with Parieu’s Act, passed on January 9, 1850, which, under pretext of protecting the school-teachers from Socialistic doctrines, placed them at the Government’s discretion. It acquiesced in Falloux’ Act because it had been committed to it from the outset and, by going back on its word, it would have provoked a conflict with the Catholics in the Assembly, to the advantage of the Democratic party. The passing of these two Acts in succession produced a temporary compromise between the Prince

President and the *Législative*, a provisional *entente* directed against their mutual enemies—Republicans, Liberals, Democrats, and Socialists. On March 15 this ill-assorted but useful compact seemed to them still more necessary, because the system of repression practised during the past year produced an effect on these enemies contrary to calculation. On March 10, five days before the passing of Falloux' Act, the people of Paris and of the departments were summoned to a ballot, in order to fill the thirty-one vacancies in the Assembly. The Republican list, with men like Carnot, Vidal and de Flotte, was carried by a majority of a thousand votes over the list from the Rue de Poitiers supported by Louis Napoleon. In the provinces, eighteen Republicans were elected out of twenty-eight. This popular revulsion to Republicanism was due to the final completion and cementing of the union between Moderates, Radicals, and Socialists which was effected once a dictatorship seemed imminent and a clerical reaction to be feared. Henceforth the time could be foreseen when, by an inverse process to that which came about in 1848, Republicans of all shades of opinion would unite and regain the ground which their divisions had cost them, while the *Union Libérale* dissolved into partisans and opponents of Louis Napoleon.

This was the second decisive move in the policy of the Prince President. As he had imposed his will on the Catholic majority on October 31, 1849, so, on March 16, 1850, he opposed it to the progress of the Republican minority, which threatened to become a majority just as formidable to his ambition. Under pretext of protecting society, which he declared to be in danger, he made Pierre Jules Baroche Minister of the Interior. Baroche had attracted attention as magistrate by the zeal with which he had successively opposed Guizot and, after December 10, 1848, the Republicans. The *personnel* of the Second Empire was made up of Rouher, Fould and shortly afterwards Morny. Moreover it was amusing to see Baroche, one of those who had organised Radical banquets for the extension of the property qualification for the franchise, making ready with the same zeal to "rectify universal suffrage." Baroche threw himself heart and soul into this task, prosecuting newspapers and clubs; but just then a fresh election became necessary in Paris as Vidal, one of the candidates of March 10, chose to sit for his constituency in Alsace. Things went in favour of Eugène Sue, the popular writer, on April 28, 1850, thus contributing to the superiority of the Republican party. Baroche at once took in hand a scheme for "rectifying universal suffrage," suggested to the Conservatives by their defeat in Paris on March 10, which he introduced in the Assembly on May 8, 1850. A committee, of which Léon Faucher was chosen reporter, decided in favour of this scheme on May 18. On May 31 the *Législative* did likewise, after stormy debates, in which Montalembert was accused by Victor Hugo of having abjured his whole past as a Liberal, and Thiers brought about his own recall to the people's confidence. There

was an end of the matter. Nearly three million citizens found that they were deprived of their political rights on the pretext that they had not resided three years in one place, and were consequently "vagabonds," or "anarchists" and "criminals," if they had taken part in a club or secret society, or if they had been convicted before a political tribunal. Shortly afterwards clubs and public meetings even for election purposes were forbidden, for the future, by the Act of June 9, 1850.

Following on these enactments a regular reign of terror and persecution was deliberately inaugurated against the Republican party throughout France. The Administration of Justice under Rouher co-operated with the Executive under Baroche. House to house distribution of books or pamphlets, meetings and banquets, in any form, were forbidden. The Republican representatives of the nation were reduced to receiving their constituents one at a time in *cafés* watched by the police. Any gathering of people who might talk politics was eyed with suspicion by *gendarmes*, magistrates, and prefects. The houses of Republicans were searched daily. The smallest societies where Republicans met were signalised and broken up as secret societies. The Republican newspapers were hunted down and overwhelmed with lawsuits and fines. Officials, postmen, surveyors of roads, and school-teachers were dismissed on the slightest suspicion. Mayors, officers of the National Guard, and municipal councillors suffered a like fate so soon as information had been given against them. The cry of "*Vive la République*" became an act of sedition, that of "*Vive Napoléon*" was commended and rewarded. Absurd as it may seem even the wearing of red in belts, ties, or caps became actionable.

These reactionary measures paralysed the Republican propaganda just when it was deprived of means of action in the Assembly. There was at that time some thought of a rising among many Democrats like Michel de Bourges and his friends the London exiles, Ledru-Rollin and others; but the more politic among them—Bernard, Lavergne, Grévy and Cavaignac—contented themselves with exercising the right of speaking in the Assembly. They denounced, at every opportunity, these glaring infringements of justice, hoping that an appeal to the country would before long give the nation a voice once more, and that justice would then be avenged. Patience being a virtue of the strong, the Democrats proved their strength by the practice of it. They desired their party to abstain from voting till 1852, in order to signify their intention and fixed determination to have no part in political institutions, which—for the time being—had no more than a superficial claim to legality. By their policy the Republicans gained this point, that, in face of their opponents who were taking advantage of power for their own ends, they remained the party of justice, of liberty as against absolutism, of established order as against the abettors of civil strife. Thus, despite persecution, they were nourished on something better than hopes. Soon the Royalists, in their turn, were struck in the person of Changarnier, who was deprived

of the command of the army of Paris. On January 9, 1851, Louis Napoleon formed a Ministry of action, in which were included Rouher, Baroche, Fould, and Saint-Arnaud, and Thiers was able to say to the Assembly: "The Empire is already in existence."

From 1851 onwards the whole question was not *whether* the Empire would come into being, but *how*, by legitimate means or by force. If it was to be accomplished legitimately, the Constitution would have to be modified, in particular Article 45 forbidding the reelection of the President after four years' tenure of office. At the instigation of the Prefects the *Conseils-généraux* had since August, 1850, expressed themselves in favour of the removal by the Assembly of this limit in the case of Louis Napoleon; some had even advocated a consulship for life. The President was, first of all, in favour of effecting this act of usurpation without violence, preferring to have the supreme power accorded to him rather than to seize it. After governing by an emergency Ministry, which he appointed on January 17, 1851, in place of his Ministry whose fall had been effected by the vote of the Assembly—after proving to the Assembly that he could dispense with it and was even then doing so—he offered the Royalists an opportunity of coming to an understanding with him. Those approached by him were, first of all, Odilon Barrot, Malleville and Tocqueville, subsequently Faucher and Buffet, all men who could never be expected to countenance violent measures. On April 10, 1851, they accepted his promise of loyal support from the presidency if they would faithfully endeavour to extort from the Assembly a vote approving the prolongation of his tenure of office. Such were Louis Napoleon's efforts to secure a peaceful revision of the Constitution.

The new Ministers, among whom were Rouher, Baroche and Magne, left no stone unturned in their attempts to reconcile public opinion and even to utilise it in breaking down parliamentary opposition. Up till May 28, 1851, the time when the proposals desired by the Assembly were to be brought forward, the opinion of the country appeared favourable, especially in those departments in which the Bonapartist party had first been built up. The intentions of parties in the Chamber continued uncertain: the Republican party took their stand from the first. They could not pronounce in favour of preparing the way for a dictatorship, were it never so legal a one. The Monarchist party, who formed a majority, were disposed towards this solution, since they shared Berryer's illusion that an entire revision would fully vindicate justice, and tend to bring about a restoration previously approved by such Orleanists as Molé. Uncompromising Orleanists like Thiers, who desired to overthrow Louis Napoleon and set aside the Comte de Chambord, allied with the Republicans to defeat absolutely the programme of the President and his Ministers. The partisans of Bonapartist power, already numerous in the Chamber, who constituted the party of the Elysée, were bestirring themselves on the other side and

to their joy discovered many politicians in the ranks of Legitimists and Orleanists, who were resigned to a prolongation of Louis Napoleon's authority in order to avoid a *coup d'état* and delay the irreparable. De Broglie came to terms with Léon Faucher on this point, and his influence was still great in Orleanist circles. Persigny, a friend of the Prince and a former Legitimist, tried to win Changarnier's concurrence on these grounds and by means of promises likely to appease his rancour.

In short, there was certainly a majority in favour of the legal solution, which the Prince President laid before the House. But, according to constitutional law, a majority for the revision was not sufficient. The votes in favour had to be three-quarters of the total number of voters, and out of about 710 entitled to register their opinion over 180 (more than a quarter) were obdurate Republicans. Perhaps it was in order to win adherents in the group thus entitled to decide between dictatorship and monarchy that Louis Napoleon went away to Lyons, and made a speech there on June 1, 1851, which was calculated to conciliate the Democrats. This produced no effect whatever: when on July 8 Tocqueville opened the debate on the revision with a favourable statement, Michel de Bourges and Victor Hugo declared that not a single Republican would vote for it. On July 19 the project of revision was thrown out by nearly 100 votes: "The Constitution will not be revised," said a deputy, "it can almost be said to have ceased to be." After voting, the Assembly decided to rise as usual on August 10 for a recess of two months and a half—an interval which, in 1849 and 1850, the President had turned to such good account for the furtherance of his fortunes.

And did Louis Napoleon use it, as has been said, for the preparation this time of those violent measures, which seemed the sole expedient for maintaining his power, now that the attempt at a legal solution had been foiled? It was observed that Saint-Arnaud, General Magnan, and Colonel Fleury were summoned to Paris. They were young officers from Africa, who were supposed to possess the energy and decision of youth needful for carrying out a *coup de main*. Maupas, Prefect of Haute Garonne and the Prince's confidant, and Count Morny, who was a member of the family, and devoid of all scruple, were now more frequent visitors at the Elysée; and between August 11 and September 9, in the retirement of Saint-Cloud, they considered with Carlier, Prefect of Police, the question of the right moment and conduct of a *coup d'état*. It seems for a time that the President demurred at making the final decision.

Tocqueville, who was his Minister, has said: "Louis Napoleon was very vacillating in his plans. He was often seen to alter his course, advance, pause and then retire, greatly to his own loss: for the nation had chosen him to dare all things, and what it expected of him was valour and not discretion. He had always been much addicted to pleasure. His passion for common amusements and his taste for comfort had increased with the facilities of power. He let his energy thus become

daily enfeebled and his ambition abate and die away." Up to the moment for attempting the final stroke the President hesitated between the desire to establish himself firmly in power without risking anything and the fear of losing that power if he risked nothing.

After contemplating the *coup d'état* for October, 1851, when he saw the Assembly on the point of resuming its sittings, he thought that he would make one last attempt on legal lines. He knew that it was only the stubborn opposition of the Republicans, which had in July baffled his desire to protract his authority, and he suddenly conceived of a device for appeasing them. He announced his intention of restoring the people to all their rights and of abrogating the electoral law of May 31, 1850, and he gave the grounds for his action in his message of November 4. "This restoration of universal suffrage affords one more chance of securing the revision." But from October 12 the opposition of the Ministry, which resigned in a body rather than accept this challenge to the Conservative Assembly, and the certain opposition of that Assembly, induced the President to anticipate it. On October 27 he summoned de Maupas to the Prefecture of Police for Paris in these terms: "Here I am on the edge of a ditch full of water; on the other side I see safety for the country. I need some men to help me across this ditch. Will you be one of them?" Maupas had accepted, and so above all had Saint-Arnaud, who was to replace General Randon in the War Department. Lamoricière had said of him: "When you see Saint-Arnaud a Minister, say: Here is the *coup d'état*." The other Ministers, except Giraud and Fortoul, were men of no weight and behind them lurked Morny awaiting the critical moment, when he would assume the management of the conspiracy at the Ministry of the Interior. The plot was carried on in perfect secrecy during November, 1851, whilst the Assembly, which was reduced to the defensive, attempted at the instigation of its Quaestors to guarantee its own inviolability and existence by a law, empowering the Assembly's President to claim the armed force and all authority. The Republicans had defeated this Quaestors' Bill by a majority of one hundred. The Royalists had set aside the Electoral Bill approved by the Republicans. Members seemed incapable of combining for decisive effort. Maupas, Persigny, Saint-Arnaud, Morny and Mocquard, bringing Louis Napoleon's final hesitations to an abrupt conclusion, laid their plans in profound secrecy during the last days of November.

First of all a decree was drawn up by Morny and mysteriously printed during the night of December 1-2, embodying a proclamation informing and advising the people of the dissolution of the Assembly and the restoration of universal suffrage, and convening the electors from December 14 to 21 for a *plébiscite* to decide about the revision of the Constitution. When the Parisians read these notices, they were confronted by the whole army of Paris called out in readiness to uphold

them. The people's representatives found the *Palais législatif* occupied since dawn by two regiments of the line. They soon heard too that at sunrise the most prominent men among them, Royalist as well as Republican generals, had been taken to the prison of Mazas under the pretext of their having conspired against the State: those so treated were Bedeau, Changarnier, Lamoricière, Cavaignac, Leflô, Colonel Charras; Thiers and Roger du Nord of the Orleanist leaders; and of the Republicans Cholat, Valentin, Greppo, Nadaud, Miot, Baune and Lagrange. Warrants had at the same time been issued against seventy Republicans, journalists or members of Democratic societies, who were to be arrested "in order to make the Republic more sure," as Louis Napoleon put it. In short, all the men, and the parties, who in July had opposed the revision of the Constitution, were rendered powerless under pretext of conspiracy, whether in the interests of crown or people. The manœuvre had been rapidly executed and promised to be successful.

Such representatives of the people, however, as were still at large, tried under Berryer's leadership to organise some form of legal opposition at the Mairie of the Tenth Arrondissement, in the quartier St Germain, where the Legitimist party reckoned its strongest adherents. Two hundred deputies of all parties met for a last sitting and proclaimed the fall of Louis Napoleon and the continuance of the Assembly, although they possessed no means of enforcing their decisions or the law of the land. At the orders of Maupas, General Forey cleared the hall and had these last supporters of legality conveyed between lines of soldiers to prison in some neighbouring barracks.

The Republican representatives had tried another expedient for resisting the establishment of a dictatorship. Carnot, de Flotte, Jules Favre, Victor Hugo, Michel de Bourges, Madier de Montjau, and Schoelcher formed themselves into a committee of opposition and decided on a popular rising for December 3 in the Faubourg St Antoine. A few barricades were raised there and also near the Halles. But the whole day passed off without any events of consequence. It was not till the evening, from seven o'clock till midnight, that a serious disturbance ensued on news arriving that Baudin had met his death on a barricade. Saint-Arnaud left things to take their course until the afternoon of the next day; then, when he had given his troops the needful time to rest and recuperate, he hurled his cavalry brigades on the boulevards against the artisan districts in the centre, drove the mob back, and overwhelmed it, so that in a few hours he was master of the situation. Blows had been dealt thick and fast, and no quarter given; without warning an unarmed crowd of pedestrians and onlookers had been fired on with grape-shot on the Boulevard Poissonnière, and then the company had passed on at once to complete its work of brutal repression.

Morny had installed himself too, in hot haste, as Minister of the Interior. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte might be master of the Assembly and of Paris, but France was not yet at his feet. Morny, who was

devoid of scruples and full of energy and devotion for his cause, was the very man for this hazardous post. It was vital that everything should be prepared so that, when the people were summoned in a fortnight's time to vote for the restoration of the Empire, they might not be overruled by the influence of Republican leaders, committees, and newspapers of which the progress, even in the rural districts, had been daily apparent during the past two years. Morny kindled the enthusiasm of his prefects and sub-prefects by despatches. In order to make ready for the great national *plébiscite*, he authorised them after December 4, 1851, to replace justices of the peace, mayors, and school-teachers, whose concurrence was not vouched for by an oath in writing. He ordered them to arrest instantly any person attempting to disturb the peace, and to suspend any newspaper that might damage their side by its polemics. On December 5 he requested the prefects to give information against sub-prefects not showing sufficient zeal in the performance of this task. On December 6 he forbade them for the future to let a single newspaper appear unless they had seen the proofs. "The Administration," he said, "needed all its moral force to accomplish its work of regeneration and salvation." On the 7th the Ministry had a list of the authors of disorder, and the leaders of the Socialist party drawn up in every part of France, and a decree of December 8 treated as convicts and criminals at common law "all these rascally members of secret societies and unrecognised political associations."

There was a twofold purpose in these terrorist measures: the framework and heads of the Republican organisation prepared in the departments, in view of the elections of 1852, must be speedily demolished before the ballot to which France was summoned; and, on the other hand, the friends of law and order, both Conservatives and Royalists, must be persuaded by reason of impending anarchy to rally on the day of the voting to the policy of the Elysée. The risings which took place in Democratic centres in the provinces at the news of the *Coup d'état* contributed towards this twofold object. The north made no move, and the east scarcely any beyond a few demonstrations rapidly quelled at Nancy and Strassburg. In the west it was the same thing. But at Montargis and at Bonny-sur-Loire there was fighting. In Allier the Democrats of Donjon seized the town of La Palisse. There was a riot at Poligny in the Jura, a bloody revolt in Nièvre where the Democrats got possession of Clamecy and summoned their friends from Yonne to help them. The troops got the better of them on December 8. In the south the Republicans of Lavardac and Villeneuve advanced under arms against Agen, and those of Gers against Auch, while those of Hérault, mustering hastily from the country, blockaded Béziers for three days. At Toulon there was quite a little army commanded by Duteil, which would perhaps have roused Provence to revolt if Marseilles had risen. For six days a provisional Government consisting of peasants actually



sat at Digne and governed the Basses-Alpes, formerly a Conservative district. These revolts, speedily quelled by the exertions of the prefects, generals and *gendarmes* incited by Morny, afforded evidence to the country of the grave danger—from which it had been preserved by the *Coup d'état*—and some justification for the brutal repression of this “abominable vandalism of this *jacquerie*,” and for the declaration of a state of siege in thirty-two departments, one-third of France. From that time it was a simple matter to implicate in proceedings against insurgents all Republicans whom it was desirable to banish immediately.

In Paris from December 4 the number of arrests amounted to 2100; and they continued during the following days. In Meurthe, between December 3 and 20, nearly 5000 of the “reds” were arrested. And of course the departments which had risen were most affected.

The time had now come when Morny, in view of the approaching verdict of France, could give his prefects the necessary instructions “for ensuring the free and sincere expression of the will of the nation.” Since they were delivered for the future from Republicans and party animosity (which would have perverted the real significance of the ballot) the Administration must not remain inactive and unmoved. It received orders to turn “its energies to winning the day for the political opinion which had prompted the *Coup d'état*, to circulating the President’s proclamations even in the remotest villages, to forming electoral committees composed of honest men, who would undertake to enlighten the minds of the public, from the chief towns to the smallest hamlets, to fortify their spirit, and to convey the wishes of the prefects to the electors.” This circular of December 10, 1851, after the terrorist measures leading up to it, was the essential preliminary to a ballot manipulated by an energetic and unscrupulous Ministry. It contained a sentence which was at once a programme and an avowal. “Liberty of conscience, but the resolute and consistent use of every allowable means of influence and persuasion, that is what I expect from you.”

Morny was not deceived in his expectation, and Louis Napoleon could congratulate himself on having called him in at the critical moment, when on December 21, 1851, France decided, by 7,500,000 votes against 640,000, to delegate to the Prince President the right of drawing up the Constitution. The nation abdicated its sovereignty, vesting all its rights in the person of the great Emperor’s nephew, remembering at the same time the fame which his House had won for France, and hoping for a strong and equally glorious Government. The people were weary of parliamentary struggles and the impotence of parties; they dreaded popular risings and longed for quiet and security. They were discouraged and helpless too, beneath a *régime* of administrative pressure and terrorism, which stifled every attempt at discussion and opposition. Louis Napoleon and his adherents celebrated this their first victory at Notre Dame on January 1, 1852, and by *Te Deums* in all the churches of France. And, while the President duly installed

himself at the Tuileries, there to revive the memories of Napoleon's Consulate, the eagles, symbolical of glory and power, appeared once more on the standards of France. There was very little room for doubt as to the form of Constitution which the Dictator was commissioned to draw up.

In order however to leave nothing to chance, he carried on with renewed severity that policy, of which the efficacy had been proved by the *plébiscite* of December 20. After December 31, 1851, Morny had the list sent in to him of persons arrested since the *Coup d'état*, so that he might deal them a final blow and complete the sentence in good earnest. These measures for the "public safety" attacked the representatives of the people first of all: by the decree of January 9 eighteen deputies, of whom six were Republicans, were exiled for a period, and sixty-six for life, all of whom belonged to the *Montagne*; the five most dangerous of these were to be transported to Guiana; but, through the influence of George Sand, three of the sentences were commuted to banishment, namely, those of Greppo, Marc Dufraisse and Richardet. Mathé made his escape. Miot was sent to Lambessa. The Conservative deputies had almost all been released: there was nothing to fear from them after the voting of December 20. After the Democratic leaders, it was the turn of their constituents in the provinces, "the revolutionary ringleaders"—as they were termed in the circular of January 11, 1852—the insurgents in the recent risings and all opponents of the Government who threatened the peace. Regular lists of suspects were drawn up by Commissaries of the War Department, *procureurs-généraux* and prefects. All compromising information was welcomed; and arrests immediately began and were continued throughout the month of January, 1852, to the number, it is estimated, of nearly one hundred thousand.

Then, when all Democrats possessed of any energy, conviction or influence had been securely caught in the net which the authorities had spread so widely and so rapidly, a special Court of Justice was constituted to deal finally with the victims. "The number of guilty persons and the fear of public strife," Morny confessed in his circular, "did not allow of acting otherwise." From January 18, 1852, it was decided that *Commissions mixtes*, consisting of prefects, *procureurs-généraux* and officers, should try the prisoners in districts declared to be in a state of siege—if trial it could be called when the sentence was pronounced on information from the Government, in private, and without witnesses or counsel. These commissions determined on penalties, in accordance with a special code compiled for their use, namely, trial before a Court martial; transportation to Cayenne or Algeria, temporary or for life; relegation to some place in the interior; trial before a Court for the trial of misdemeanours (*tribunal correctionnel*); subjection to supervision. Under these conditions sentence was given summarily and rapidly. The records of the proceedings, as also the grounds of conviction, have been preserved and suffice to prove how many people—innocent even

from a political point of view—were arrested, condemned and actually transported on the orders of officials anxious to show their zeal or even as a consequence of private animosities or unfounded suspicions. The official documents of the time give the number of persons sentenced as little short of 20,000—nearly 3000 to relegation to the interior, 10,000 to transportation to Algeria, and 6000 to supervision. But this total is incomplete: the numerous Republicans must not be forgotten who, to escape these stringent proceedings, underwent voluntary exile in Switzerland, Belgium, England, and even the New World, or who remained in France because they were unable to flee, but had to leave their homes and conceal themselves at the sacrifice of their occupations and of other interests. By February, 1852, this piece of work was completed to the satisfaction of its instigators—a work which we can only regard as cruel and fatal to justice and liberty. George Sand's words bear a melancholy testimony to the state of things: "When you go into the provinces and see how crushed is the spirit, you must bear in mind that all the force lay in a few men now in prison, dead, or banished."

In conclusion, the dictator could henceforth without risk give some semblance of legality to his power. On January 14, 1852, he promulgated the Constitution on his own authority, having entrusted the task of drawing it up to his faithful Ministers Troplong, Persigny, Flahaut and Rouher chiefly. He offered it to the French nation as the fortunate and rightful heritage of the First Consul, a return too long delayed, "the only Constitution adapted to the social and administrative institutions of modern France, and calculated to secure the requisite liberties and the maintenance of Napoleonic principles." He justified the institution of an untrammelled power, on the grounds of the pretended responsibility of the head of the State towards a people no longer possessed of newspapers, political liberty, or personal security. The fact is that he had grasped all the nation's powers; the Ministers no longer constituted a parliamentary cabinet, but were appointed by him and removable at his pleasure alone; they had become mere instruments under his direction. The Council of State, chosen by him, formulated laws, but in private. The Senate, whose duty it was to revise the laws and propose fresh ones, and to interpret the Constitution, seemed to have some legislative authority; but the selection of every one of its members rested with the President and their salary was left to his discretion. Since their sittings were not public, and as their sessions only lasted so long as their master chose, beginning and terminating at his orders, what independence or initiative was there actually left to the Senate? The Senators were appointed on January 26, 1852, the Councillors of State, Admirals and Marshals on the 25th. Every precaution, legal and otherwise, was taken so that the sovereign, having made the law in his own interests and without any other check, need not apprehend that one and only check, the *Corps législatif*, which he had allowed to stand as a sort of last tribute to legality.

And such a *Corps législatif*! An assembly of two hundred and fifty members who had to swear themselves in before him in order to take their seats, who were elected by a ballot of the *arrondissements* to pass laws and arrange taxation, but who were obliged to refuse the public any account of their deliberations. They had to pass the Government's Bills without possessing the right to modify them, and might not even bring forward a Bill themselves. They were not entitled to nominate their President, nor might they call in the Ministers to debate with them, nor ask questions. By the suppression of the right of address they were deprived of every expedient for obtaining a hearing with either the sovereign or the nation. In short, the annual voting of the budget was the sole power remaining to the representatives of the country. Louis Napoleon had however taken his precautions against this inadequate means of opposition: by the electoral decree of February 2, 1852, all categories of electors suspected of Republicanism were carefully debarred from the ballot (which, according to principle, was to be universal) and the right of determining the electoral divisions was conferred on the executive power. "You must understand," Morny wrote to the prefects on January 18, "how great an effect a more or less skilful adjustment of divisions will have on the election results." "It is a serious business," he added on January 20; "the Government will not hesitate to recommend candidates directly to the choice of the electors." And, while biding his time for absolutely forcing the vote of the electorate, the President on February 17 issued a decree relating to the Press, which entirely deprived the voters of political liberty, subjecting them to authorisation pure and simple, and to the suspension of the Government at his caprice, and even compelling them to insert officially communications of reports of the Ministers and their agents.

On March 29, 1852, the President, desirous of putting the Constitution into force, installed the bodies, thus elected at his will and according to his orders. On that occasion he solemnly declared: "The dictatorship, entrusted to me by the people, terminates to-day." But what had he done but force that dictatorship on the people, and continue it under the semblance of a Constitution? His Minister and coadjutor, de Maupas, described this *régime* more accurately when he termed it an absolute Government, which possessed no more than the name of Republic and of liberty. Even the name was soon lost. A fresh *plébiscite* was organised in a similar manner to those preceding it. The same measures of repression and intimidation were in the first instance adopted; there were appeals from the head of the State to Conservatives and to Catholics in the provinces, which the President visited in September of that year; there was proscription of Democrats, and suppression of the Press. On November 21 and 22, 1852, came the final restoration of the hereditary Empire in the person of Napoleon III.

## CHAPTER VI.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE REACTION IN GERMANY  
AND AUSTRIA. I.

(1848-9.)

It has been seen in an earlier chapter, how widespread had been the political unrest which in Germany preceded the outbreak of the Revolution of 1848. The leaders of the party of national reform had definitively adopted as an integral element of their programme of action the transformation of the decrepit Confederation into a federal State. The more radical political ideas, which during the last generation had found abundant utterance in the south-west, seemed about to coalesce with the desire for representative institutions that in 1847 had led to the summons of the Combined Prussian Diet. Were such a coalition to be actually brought about, it must overwhelm all attempts at resistance or evasion. It must stultify the wish of King Frederick William IV to force the growing national movement into the tortuous channel of his own semi-mystic designs; but it must also overwhelm the traditional attachment to territorial independence still strong in many of the minor States of the north. Its effect on Austria and the Austrian monarchy could not yet be definitively gauged; but the discontent which had accumulated here was partly due to racial and to economic causes of very long standing.

Still, the impulse to which the outbreak of both the German and the Austrian Revolution of 1848 was due, came, after all, from without and not from within; and Count Beust, who was generally aware from what quarter the wind blew, very properly scouts the notion that the earlier and more homogeneous of these two associated movements, unprecedented in the suddenness of its outbreak and unparalleled in the swiftness of its spread, was of purely native origin. The impotence of the chief continental Governments had for some time become manifest to the party of agitation spread over Europe. In 1846, the Polish Revolution had indeed been overthrown; but its fugitive germs had been scattered into many a region of future activity besides the hotbed of Paris. In 1847 had followed the overthrow of the Swiss *Sonderbund*, and the successful assertion of the principle of a direct appeal to a national numerical

majority. In October, 1847, Metternich diagnosed the condition of Austria by the remark that a mortal disease was upon the State which he had served for very nearly half a century; and the Italian troubles of the December and January ensuing went some way towards confirming his fears. When on February 22-4, 1848, the crash came at Paris, the tremendous significance of these events was at once recognised by German political opinion among all sorts and conditions of men. In his London exile Ferdinand Freiligrath, whose dreams were haunted by the figure of the Holy Republic of the German nation, exulted in "this proud epoch of the world's history." And, a few days later, King Frederick William IV of Prussia, mindful, perhaps, of Neuchâtel, appealed to Queen Victoria to join in a new quadruple alliance on behalf of the peace of the world.

The earliest actual insurrectionary disturbances in Germany which followed on the February outbreak of the Revolution in France were on a small scale. But the rapidity of their succession and the ubiquity of their recurrence were amazing; and, in the words of Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, "most astonishing of all was the total absence of any power of resistance on the part of the various Government authorities, and the helplessness with which one and all, high and low, allowed themselves to fall a prey, some to the most inept notions, and others to a paralysis of terror." The movement, starting in the south-west in the last day or two of February, was everywhere welcomed by a virtual consensus of the middle and more especially the professional classes, as well as by a large proportion of the Government officials of the several States. Addresses poured in from all quarters—the most notable being that to the Prussian Government drafted by the master-hand of Dahlmann and signed by nearly the whole professoriate of his University of Bonn; while the population of nearly every important town or princely "*Residenz*" assembled in more or less imposing numbers, to give voice to its demands. With the almost universal claims for freedom of the Press and the right of free assembly and petition was usually associated the demand for a national Parliament, through which the people at large should share in the government of a united Germany. Trial by jury, the arming of the people, the grant of a Constitution where it did not already exist, and the imposition on the State army of an oath of fidelity to it where it did, were other frequent demands; often the establishment of equality of rights between the several religious confessions was added, for the most part on behalf of the Jews; and before long the social grievances of the lower classes, whose political interests proper were few, made themselves heard. The workmen in the towns claimed a share in the profits of the manufacturers; and the peasants raised their perennial cry for the removal of feudal servitudes, and the abolition of the game laws. In the large majority of instances the fruit fell from the trembling tree at the first shock. The procedure was nearly everywhere the same—mass-meetings, with "storm-petitions"

to the sovereign when forthcoming or to a Diet when at hand. But, though there was a great deal of clamour, there was little actual violence and hardly any bloodshed. The Governments readily changed the chiefs of their most prominent ministerial departments and made profuse promises of reforms; and they were equally prompt in undertaking to use their best endeavours for a fundamental change in the system of the existing Germanic Confederation.

The Heppenheim meeting of October 10, 1847—the first of the kind whose proceedings were made public—had led to the concentration of Liberal effort, in the south-west at all events, upon the question of a German National Parliament. On the first news of the Paris disturbances, a motion on this subject was proposed in the Darmstadt Chamber on February 27, 1848, by Heinrich von Gagern. This ardent champion of parliamentary freedom and singularly high-minded man had from the first aimed at carrying a plan of constitutional reform by the support of a national representative body, elected by the people at large; and he now urged the Hesse-Darmstadt Government to take steps towards obtaining for Germany in the first instance a provisional head with a responsible Ministry for foreign and military affairs, and a National Parliament. A few days later, on March 5, a more or less self-constituted committee of fifty-three leading Liberals, chiefly though not entirely from this part of Germany, met at Heidelberg, and agreed to the appointment of a Committee of seven members, to arrange for the summoning of a preliminary Parliament (*Vorparlament*). On his return from this meeting, Heinrich von Gagern, who had in the interval been himself called to the head of the Hesse-Darmstadt Ministry, brought about an understanding with the Baden and Nassau Governments, by which his younger brother Max was commissioned to ask the cooperation of other German Governments in establishing a German Central Power, which should assume authority in conjunction with the proposed National Parliament (March). The success of the scheme was practically conditional on the readiness of the King of Prussia to assume the responsibility of a provisional German headship. Frederick William IV, however, had conceived a rival plan of a Congress of German Princes at Dresden. The gifted and high-minded Joseph Maria von Radowitz, who had long been deep in the King's counsels, and of whose veracity there is no doubt, was afterwards anxious to prove that his master had been ready to place himself at the head of the German movement. But both Radowitz and the King, whatever the strength of their intentions, had to submit to the superior force of events. As for the old Diet at Frankfort, though, even to itself, its days were known to be numbered, it rose after a fashion to the situation by a vague appeal to the German nation (March 1) and by allowing each Government to deal as it chose with its Press. Meanwhile, the *Vorparlament* scheme was steadily carried on; and on March 31 this assembly actually met at Frankfort.

The grand duchy of Baden was the natural starting-point for the revolutionary movement which, once set on foot, seemed to progress almost automatically from State to State, and town to town. The Grand Duke Leopold had, as far back as 1846, introduced a strong Liberal element into his Administration, which was thus in substantial agreement with the constitutional views cherished by the parliamentary majority. But before long a potent influence was exercised on the Opposition side by Friedrich Hecker, a talented advocate with a powerful demagogic vein, who soon shared the Radical leadership with Gustav Struve. Thus, while the Liberal majority followed the lead of those whose national aspirations had found expression in Bassermann's motion in the Chamber noticed above, Hecker's socialistic harangues on the one hand and the remnants of Baron von Blittersdorff's anti-Liberal influence upon the administration on the other, made the political state of Baden extremely inflammable; in addition to which the grand duchy was in this very winter of 1847-8 threatened by material distress consequent upon an industrial crisis. Thus, when on February 27 the Paris news reached Mannheim (the centre of radical feeling in the State) a popular meeting was at once held; and an attempt made on March 1 to terrorise the Diet at Carlsruhe was only defeated by the presence of mind of Karl Mathy. By his advice the Government met the popular demands half-way, conceding liberty of the Press and the formation of a National Guard. But, while in the chief towns of the grand duchy the movement was still under some control, in the rural districts the peasantry began to rise against the landowners, and in the neighbourhood of the Lake of Constance a Republic was proclaimed. Mathy's courageous behaviour among his electors at Constance helped to steady men's heads; on March 23 the Second Chamber rallied to the Constitution; and, pending the meeting of the National Parliament, the revolutionary movement was arrested.

On the same day as that on which the French news reached Mannheim, it had filled Mainz. The famous metropolis, connected by recent traditions with the memories of the First French Revolution, had since those turbulent days had to submit to the reactionary sway of the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, besides as a territorial fortress admitting a joint garrison of Austrians and Prussians—the latter much detested. In default of the immediate concession of the demands of a popular meeting held on March 4, a descent *en masse* upon Darmstadt had been intended, when on the following day it was announced that Grand Duke Ludwig II had adopted his son and namesake as his co-regent (a few months later, Ludwig III became Grand Duke by his father's death) and called to the conduct of his Government Heinrich von Gagern, who learnt his appointment on his return from Heidelberg (March 5). It failed however to put an end to the Mainz unrest; and in May a deplorable disturbance took place, accompanied by some loss of life.

In the Bavarian capital the scandals of the Lola Montez régime might



have been expected to have ended with the departure of their heroine and the reopening of the University, the centre of opposition to her sway (February 11). But her creature, Berks, was still acting Minister of the Interior; and after, to quell popular agitation, Prince Wrede had been on the point of ordering the troops to fire on the crowd, a serious conflict seemed inevitable (March 6). A royal proclamation, however, now appeared, promising the assembling of the Estates on March 16, for the discussion of the popular demands, including a National Parliament; "Bavaria's King," it was announced in his inimitable style, "takes pride in his Germanic manhood." On the same day the Munich garrison, headed by the King's younger son, Prince Luitpold, swore fidelity to the Bavarian Constitution. But Lola still hovered about the capital; and various ministerial changes ensued before on the 18th, rioting having recommenced, she was declared an alien and her most powerful agent, the head of the police, was dismissed. The Estates were awaiting the opening of their sittings and the capital was distracted between hopes and fears, when, late on March 20, two royal proclamations were affixed to the walls. In one of these, King Ludwig, while recording his faithful adherence to the Constitution and his conscientious stewardship of the public resources—"as though I had been the servant of a free commonwealth," announced his abdication; the other was signed by his son and successor Maximilian II, who declared his resolution to uphold lawful liberty in both Church and State. Some Liberal politicians were admitted into the Ministry; and the new era began.

Bavaria was almost the only German State where the Revolution of 1848 was accompanied by a change of sovereign. In Hesse-Cassel, where a law-abiding population had to suffer from the arbitrary will of a succession of Electors, the Revolution found Frederick William I in a conflict with his subjects which he had long carried on as co-regent with his father William II, and had recommenced with fresh vigour since he had himself succeeded as Elector in November, 1847. Foiled in his attempt to prevent the officers of his army from taking the oath to the Constitution, which with the aid of his Minister Scheffer he was persistently striving to undermine, he had at the close of the year appointed a Commission of revision, under whose care it would probably have bled to death, but for the effect of the news from France, which reached Cassel on February 29. After some hesitation, due to Scheffer's illness, the Elector gave way under the pressure of a number of deputations from Hanau and other places (March 6), and agreed to the dismissal of Scheffer, the appointment of some Liberal Ministers, and the convocation of the Estates. Further deputations resulted in a proclamation of freedom of the Press and other concessions, including that of full right of private religious worship to the *Deutschkatholiken*—seceders from the Church of Rome whose importance (with that of their apostle Ronge) was overrated at the time, but has since been perhaps

unduly disparaged. These concessions were not considered sufficient at Hanau, where on March 9 a popular meeting, swelled by many outsiders, determined upon a three days' ultimatum to the Elector. On March 11 the Elector, greatly perturbed, more especially in view of the relative popularity of the rival Hesse-Darmstadt line, gave way once more and proclaimed his acceptance of a purely constitutional system of government. His Ministry was now thoroughly transformed; but as it neither enjoyed the Elector's confidence nor satisfied the populace (a riot on April 9 led to the disbandment of the Elector's lifeguards), more troubles were certain to follow.

At Frankfort, under a still essentially oligarchical system of government, the Jews within the city, and outside it the inhabitants of the rural districts, desired a removal of the restrictions resting upon them. In accordance with the permission given by the Diet on March 3, the Senate at once proclaimed the liberty of the Press; and, when further demands were made, they were for the most part granted. But some, including the removal of Jewish disabilities, were refused; and democratic excesses led to conservative counter-demonstrations. Meanwhile, the Diet hoisted the national black-red-and-gold standard in front of its palace, as though determined to put a patriotic face on its collapse.

From Mannheim and Carlsruhe the revolutionary movement quickly passed on into Nassau, where it took a new turn. On March 2 a popular meeting was held at Wiesbaden into which had poured an enormous number of peasants—it was said 30,000—well provisioned as if for a campaign. The one demand near to their hearts was that the private domains of the Duke—one of the wealthiest of German Princes—should be declared the property of the State. When, after some delay, Duke Adolf appeared among his subjects and promised to grant all their demands, he became for the nonce almost as popular as the able leader of the movement, a lawyer named Hergenhahn. But it was not to be expected that the peasants' rising—for such it really was—would stop here. Not only did the peasants, when an amnesty had been proclaimed for all offences against the game and forest laws, interpret this as licensing a general destruction of game and a free appropriation of all forest timber; but they possessed themselves of all communal offices, and carried on the work of local government, except that the payment of rates and taxes, and of rent payable to public receivers, had come to an end. While the Ministry under Baron von Dungen passively looked on, and the old Chambers had been dissolved, the real authority everywhere belonged to the Committees of Safety newly formed round the Central Committee at Wiesbaden. When at last a Second Chamber, elected on a new basis, assembled, it consisted half of peasants, half of officials. Hergenhahn, now chief of the Ministry, was left without enduring support, and in June, 1849, his resignation was accepted by the Duke. Notwithstanding the violent resistance of the Radicals, the days of

reform were now ended, and by March, 1852, the revolutionary changes had been effectually "revised."

It has been noticed in an earlier chapter, how in Würtemberg the intelligent system of government carried out for many years under King William, more especially through his very capable Minister Johannes von Schleyer, a strict constitutionalist, had ceased to satisfy the popular demands. The material prosperity of the kingdom had at last begun to diminish; and the economic distress had been increased by the dearth of 1847. Thus the malcontent element in the population had been further increased; though the Government, at the opening of the Würtemberg Diet early in 1848, sought to ascribe this condition of things to the malign influence of immigrant revolutionary agitators. The arrival of the news from Paris accordingly led to disturbances, which were forcibly put down, and to the admission into the Ministry of Friedrich Römer, the actual originator of the Heidelberg meeting of March 5, and a thoroughly independent politician of high character. To the Ministry which included him and some other men of insight must be attributed the fact that Würtemberg, though its action in regard to national German affairs was much hampered by the determined particularism of its King, weathered the storm in the two critical years 1848 and 1849.

Passing from the south-west to the north, one would hardly have expected that the kingdom of Hanover should have been involved to any serious extent in the revolutionary movement. For here the despotic rule of King Ernest Augustus—personally, in spite of everything, not an unpopular sovereign—had been able to repress the resistance which it provoked in every quarter; and no Press deserving the name existed to be "freed." Yet a public demonstration on March 17 induced the King, three days later, to consent to the appointment of a new Ministry, presided over by Count Alexander Levin von Bennigsen, and including, as its most important member, the eminent historian and publicist Johann Karl Bertram Stüve, burgomaster of Osnabrück. The Hanoverian legislature hereupon settled down to a revision of the Constitution of the kingdom on the more Liberal lines of that approved in 1833; and the task was accomplished by September, 1849. On the other hand, the Government of Ernest Augustus, even more pertinaciously than that of William of Würtemberg, opposed all attempts to bring about a constitutional unity for Germany at large.

In Saxony, since the Leipzig tumults of August, 1845, and the consequent adoption of a repressive policy by the Government, disquiet and discontent had continued to pervade the population. At a time when in Prussia the Combined Diet was at last presenting the spectacle of a representative assembly worthy of the name, in the little neighbour kingdom the Radicals had every pretext for declaring its existing Diet "incompetent." Nowhere was the impotence of particularism more keenly felt than in Saxony, through which so much of the German

nation's activity and intelligence circulated. Immediately on the arrival of the news of the Paris Revolution an address, in which all the sections of Liberalism concurred, was sent to King Frederick Augustus from Leipzig (March 2); and, this having been unfavourably received, a second, demanding the dismissal of the Ministry, was despatched amidst great agitation. Falkenstein, the unpopular Minister of the Interior, hereupon resigned; and, after the abolition of the censorship had been announced and the summoning of a new Diet promised, the whole of the Könneritz Ministry followed his example (March 13). Three days later, by which time the success of the Revolution at Vienna was unmistakable, the new Saxon Ministry took office—with Braun, the leader of the Opposition in the Second Chamber of the Diet, as its President, and von der Pfordten (formerly professor at Leipzig) and Oberländer (a town councillor of Zwickau) as Ministers for Foreign and Home Affairs respectively. Under Oberländer's auspices a network of clubs, destined to exercise a notable influence upon the progress of the revolutionary movement in Germany, speedily overspread the kingdom. The most active and influential among these were the *Vaterlandsvereine*, which were, consciously or not, moving forward in the direction of a Republic. Their exemplar was the Leipzig club, where Robert Blum was long the protagonist—a copious orator and a master of both rapture and pathos, but often indefinite like the movement of which he assumed the direction, and self-consistent only in his abhorrence of government and Governments. In Saxony the progress of this kind of radicalism was surprisingly rapid, and took the new Liberal Government itself by surprise, so that the new electoral law promulgated by it resulted in Diets which altogether outstripped its policy. Thus, in February, 1849, the Braun Ministry finally resigned, and was reconstituted under Held; Baron von Beust, to oblige the King, taking the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With this Ministry, too, the Chamber was speedily at issue on the subject of the publication of the German Constitution, and in April it was dissolved by the King, who though a moderate and reasonably minded Prince, was strongly attached to his sovereign rights. Thus affairs moved on to the final conflict between King and people in May, 1849, to which it will be necessary to refer below.

In Ernestine Saxony, and in the small Thuringian States in general, where for the most part much good-will existed between the potentates and their "peoples," the news of the February Revolution produced a flood of petitions and addresses as elsewhere. Little hesitation was anywhere shown before conceding the popular demands; indeed, at Greiz, Prince Henry XX of Reuss granted them before they were made. In the capital of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, whose public debt exceeded half a million of dollars and which could not boast a single railway, Prince Günther affably declared that, even if fate were to force him to abdicate, he would still arrange so as to finish his days at home. In

other Thuringian towns the citizens joined with the military in putting down insurrectionary demonstrations, or performed this task themselves. The rising at Weimar was mainly inspired from the neighbouring University of Jena, a time-honoured centre of academical agitation; more violent was that at Altenburg, where, after Hanoverian and Prussian troops had restored order, Duke Joseph abdicated in favour of his son George. In general, the more or less vague agitation for liberty ran its course in this part of Germany before the schemes for unity had taken definite shape. Nothing came of proposals for a union with the kingdom of Saxony, or for the establishment of a kingdom of Thuringia; and it may be noticed that, when at Frankfort (in November, 1848) a scheme of mediatisation was debated, nine of the Thuringian deputies voted against it, and only four in its favour. The spirit of Karl August of Weimar survived among many of the Thuringian Princes, and the Coburgers were by no means isolated in their political breadth of view. Thus these petty sovereigns were popular among their subjects; and in the days of the Reaction they showed little desire to undo the reforms accomplished in 1848 and 1849.

In Lippe-Detmold and Waldeck, as well as in the southern principality of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, the petitions of the inhabitants were granted by the several Princes (March 9-10). The course of events in the Anhalt principalities, at that time still under three Governments, and more especially the history of the Bernburg revolution, are typical of an obstinate *Kleinstaaterei* by no means on the Thuringian pattern. The population of this petty State had long been misgoverned under an imbecile Duke by an extravagant *camarilla*, without a single non-official newspaper to open the eyes of the public; but now a responsible Ministry and constituent Diet were established. These soon quarrelled with one another; whereupon the Court left the country, and Duke Leopold IV of Dessau assumed his kinsman's responsibilities by granting the Bernburgers a Constitution and summoning a fresh Diet for its revision. During an election riot (February 18, 1849), some thirteen persons were shot down by the military, which was hereupon superseded by Prussian troops; and soon afterwards the reaction began. In Dessau and Köthen, where a joint Diet sat and a common Constitution was confirmed by the Duke of Dessau, Prussian influence and Prussian military interference, to the satisfaction of King Frederick William IV who as the cousin of the Duchess took a great interest in Anhalt affairs, in the course of 1849 and 1850 undid most of the progress effected.

In the Mecklenburg grand duchies, long regarded as the impregnable fastness of feudal institutions and ideas, the movement of the spring of 1848 seized upon both burghers and peasantry as rapidly as elsewhere. At Schwerin the Grand Duke Frederick Francis II was moved to promise liberty of the Press, and to summon (for April 26) an extraordinary Diet, which, for the first time in Mecklenburg history, secured the same measure

of electoral rights to all classes of the population. Towards the close of the year deputies from both the grand duchies met to draw up a common Constitution on a broadly democratic basis. But the combined efforts of the nobility of both duchies and of the Grand Duke George of Strelitz (Queen Louisa's brother) prevailed over the willingness of his Schwerin kinsman to recognise this Constitution; and, both duchies having concluded military conventions with Prussia, the old character of the Mecklenburg *régime* was to a large extent restored by 1851.

In Oldenburg, in answer to the usual popular demands and disturbances, Minister Beaulieu quietly withdrew (his subordinate Hannibal Fischer being driven out of Birkenfeld by main force); and Grand Duke Paul Frederick Augustus was found ready to lay before a Diet summoned for the purpose (September) a draft Constitution, which assigned half the income from the domains to the State. Disturbances broke out in the free city of Bremen at the same time as in Oldenburg; and after a protracted deliberation a Constitution was adopted in March, 1849, in which the civic body was reformed on a broadly popular basis, without the oligarchical Senate being, however, ousted from its possession of the real power. In Hamburg, the question of constitutional reform had to be committed to an assembly elected by a general vote. But its conclusions failed to satisfy either side, and serious disturbances ensued which necessitated the calling in of Prussian troops (August, 1849), and at a later date of Austrian; so that more than a decade passed before (in 1860) a constitutional settlement was effected. In the third of the Hanse Towns, Lübeck, a proposal to revise the existing Constitution by providing for a wider popular representation, was withstood by the Senate, and ultimately led to an occupation of the city by Mecklenburg troops (October, 1848); but the revised Constitution came into force (December) and was not again altered in a reactionary sense till 1851.

The movements in the minor German States noted above, whatever their special antecedents, were actually brought about by the outbreak of the Paris February Revolution; but none of them could have gone so far as it did but for the success of the risings which shook the foundations of the two great German Powers, Austria and Prussia. And of these, again, the Berlin insurrection beyond all doubt derived a powerful immediate impulse from the upheaval which had preceded it, though only by a few days, at Vienna.

The general political condition of the Austrian monarchy has been briefly described in a previous chapter. A long period of peace had weakened instead of strengthened the authority of a Government whose purpose it had been to maintain the existing system of the State without any actual change. The spirit of constitutional freedom could not fail to penetrate into an empire of whose population something like half had for centuries enjoyed the right of a share in their own legislation and taxation, though this right was not exercised under modern

constitutional forms, and though even in Hungary the executive was reserved to the Crown. It was impossible but that a desire for an effective system of representative Government and for the reforms which its establishment must bring with it should be cherished throughout the empire, though no opportunity was allowed for any expression of opinion on public affairs either by the Press or by public meetings. The Government was organised in Departments, often conducted with ability, and by officials of enlightened and even Liberal views, but out of touch with one another and subject to little control except in the last instance by the supreme authority of the State. This supreme authority was in the hands of an imbecile Emperor, guided by a State Conference consisting of four—Archduke Francis Charles, the heir to the throne, mentally little above the level of the reigning Emperor; Archduke Ludwig, the Emperor's youngest brother, a conservative of the narrowest type, in favour of whose claims those of his liberal-minded elders Archdukes Charles and John had been accordingly passed over by their father; and the two Chancellors Metternich and Kolowrat, who were hardly on speaking terms with each other. Count Franz Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, who was responsible for the control of home affairs, was wont to pose as a reformer in order to annoy his colleague. Metternich, in his turn, while quite awake to the expediency of internal changes, had long abandoned any effort to bring them gradually about, and confined his attention to maintaining the existing political system of Europe against all attempts to interfere with it. Thus he had at last settled down to the belief that the success which had so long attended his endeavours was destined to continue unbroken.

The year 1848 opened with no direct signs of troubles; though anxiety was caused by movements of troops and volunteers towards the Lombardo-Venetian frontier. Early in February there were disturbances at Padua; and, anti-Austrian demonstrations having followed at both Milan and Venice, martial law was proclaimed in Lombardo-Venetia (February 22). In Hungary and Transylvania the Conservative influence of the two Court Chancellors, Count George Apponyi and Baron Samuel Jósika, seemed for the time at least to have arrested the progress of Kossuth's agitation, to which the Moderate leaders of the Opposition gave only a half-hearted support. Galicia was quiet. In the German provinces of the monarchy there seemed nothing to cause alarm, except that the bad harvests of the last two years and the stagnation of business had led to disturbances among the unemployed, more especially in and about Vienna.

The news of the Paris Revolution, soon after it had reached Vienna, was followed by that of the popular movements in Baden and Würtemberg, and of the rising at Neuchâtel, which resulted in the expulsion of the Prussian officials and the establishment of a Provisional Government (March 1). The first symptoms of public excitement at Vienna

manifested themselves among the select body of political thinkers who met in the Politico-Juridical Club, and of whom Alexander Bach, a Vienna lawyer of great ability and courage, as well as of an ambition which soared above personal inconsistencies, was soon to come to the front; among the students of the University, who were to play so extremely prominent a part in the coming Revolution; and more especially on 'Change. During the whole of this period of Austrian history, financial interests came to the front with surprising rapidity; and it was, as we shall see, the doubts felt in the stability of the National Bank of Austria which as early as March 3 furnished Kossuth with the opportunity for insisting on the establishment of a separate Hungarian Ministry.

Metternich was by this time quite aware of the gravity of the general situation of the Empire. On March 4 Radowitz arrived at Vienna, where Metternich agreed to the King of Prussia's proposal of a conference of Princes on German affairs at Dresden, and endeavoured to gain over his visitor to the idea of a common action on the part of the Eastern Powers in view of the approaching European crisis. He was full of anxiety; but though rumours of his and Archduke Ludwig's resignation were already on foot, no question of any popular concessions seems to have been as yet entertained. On March 9 an address, upholding the principles of a self-dependent and centralised Austria, was drafted for presentation by the Lower Austrian Estates who were shortly to meet; and two days later another was passed in a popular meeting at Prague, on similar lines, but emphasising the fraternity and equality of rights existing between the German and Čech nationalities.

Thus prefaced, the Vienna insurrection proper began characteristically by a demonstration in the University on Sunday, March 12, in which a petition of the well-known type was carried by acclamation and entrusted to the care of two popular professors. Though it was graciously received by the Emperor, through the mediation of Kolowrat, a feverish agitation had now seized upon the capital; and the State Conference, following Metternich's advice, resolved to summon a meeting of delegates from the lawful Estates of the several provinces of the Empire to confer with a special Committee nominated by the Government. But such measures came too late. On the 13th the insurrection took more definite shape. Led by Adolf Fischhof, a young doctor of medicine, a popular deputation amidst great tumult gained admission to the Landhaus, where the Lower Austrian Estates were assembling, and whence they with difficulty made their way to the Hofburg. Before the heads of the State assembled there in council could arrive at any conclusion, a conflict had taken place in the Herrengasse between the troops and a densely packed crowd, and five lives had been lost. So great was the popular fury that Archduke Albrecht, the commander of the garrison, was persuaded to allow the civic guard to enter the Inner Town, where



it at once fraternised with the insurgents. Then, while in the suburbs fire was set to some manufactories, the mass of the population of the city surrounded the imperial residence, where the members of the State Conference and others were assembled under Archduke Ludwig, and whither University and civic deputations passed in, the populace itself in the evening invading parts of the palace. It was in circumstances so anarchical, in the midst of a hurly-burly of Archdukes, officials, and *demos*, that Metternich, whose resignation had been demanded by the civic deputation, was apprised of the expediency of bowing to the storm. After a personal appeal, to which Archduke Ludwig made no adequate response, the Chancellor declared his readiness to resign, and at once drew up and despatched to the Emperor a dignified letter. On the following day (March 14) he and his faithful Princess escaped with some difficulty to Feldsberg in the Marchfeld, and thence to Olmütz and Prague; nor were the later stages of his flight—to Dresden, and finally to London (which he did not reach till April 21)—devoid of danger or of suffering. His semi-official farewells to the Tsar and the King of Prussia were in keeping with the rest of his conduct: he had given way to a catastrophe which, though never, as he writes, a *docteur à symptômes*, he had long foreseen and which during nearly forty years he had done his best to avert. His constructive task was long over; and even at Court, in the circle of Archduchess Sophia, the consort of the heir to the throne, his persistence in the old methods had begun to arouse some impatience. The extraordinary coldness experienced by the fallen statesman was due partly to fear, partly to a mass of obloquy which to this day obscures his great services to the Peace of Europe.

While Kolowrat remained in place, and Metternich's own office was temporarily filled, the imperial manifesto issued on March 15 was put together, without ministerial advice, in a wrangle of Archdukes and other advisers round the sovereign. It promised a Constitution, abolished the censorship of the Press, established a National Guard, and announced a joint meeting of Estates, which would now have a new significance, for the coming July 3. It was rapturously received as the visible sign of the popular victory; and on the same day the Emperor was made to drive as if in token of his contentment through the capital, where all was exultation and confusion. On the 16th, though Prince Windischgrätz, to whom on the 14th Archduke Albrecht had made over his powers, had proclaimed martial law, and carried it out in some of the suburbs, he left the city to its own devices; and the mob used its liberty to enter the house of the unpopular burgomaster, Ritter von Czapka, who fled for his life. A Committee of 24 citizens was appointed to conduct the business of the city. Inasmuch as the obnoxious head of the police, Count Sedlnitzky, had been dismissed and the force itself been reduced to inaction, such order as was preserved depended upon the exertions of this Committee, and more especially upon those of the new National Guard and the

armed students of the University. On March 19 the Emperor's advisers at last summoned courage to issue an imperial edict directing all public authorities to maintain the existing laws and ordinances in so far as they had not been legally revoked; and on the following day the new Ministry, which had been several days in the making, was actually called into "power." Bach and Schmerling were astute enough to keep out of it; and its ultimate head was Baron von Pillersdorff, hitherto Kolowrat's second-in-command, whose brief memoir of his Ministry shows him to have been well-intentioned and honest almost to simplicity. "Six men," he writes, "were now united in a single cabinet, who had never before exchanged opinions or concerted a political system"; and five of them speedily resigned. Among these were Count Kolowrat, who remained President of the Ministry for little more than a fortnight, when he retired into private life; Count Ficquelmont, who at an advanced age had taken the direction of foreign affairs, for which he had long been designed in the event of Metternich leaving it vacant; and Baron von Kübeck, whose experience of Austrian finance was probably unsurpassed, but who withdrew even sooner than Kolowrat.

The movement, which had first broken out at Vienna, had communicated itself with the utmost speed to Linz, the chief town of Upper Austria; to Graz, the capital of Styria (where public feeling in the first instance directed itself against the Jesuits), though the demands of the Styrian Diet rapidly extended; to Salzburg, and to other important places in German Austria. Thence it passed with no less rapidity into the other parts of the monarchy; and from first to last the action of the new Government was complicated by a most varied series of deputations.

The address of the two Tables of the Hungarian Diet was brought to Vienna on the day on which the triumph of the Revolution had been formally acknowledged there (March 15) by the Palatine of Hungary, Archduke Stephen. The guidance of popular opinion, and the consequent control of the Diet, where the Magnates could not in the end hold out against the Lower Table, was rapidly passing out of the hands of the Moderate Constitutionalists, even out of those of Széchenyi, whose influence had been unrivalled, into those of Count Batthyány and Kossuth. The youthful Palatine, who had only in the previous year succeeded to his father's dignity, had allowed himself to be gained over by these leaders, the drift of whose action he hardly perceived, and had consented to support the demand for a responsible Hungarian Ministry appointed by the Palatine, which the Diet had adopted on March 14. He was followed to Vienna by a large deputation of members (including Kossuth), and on the 17th was informed that the King agreed to the demand of the Hungarian Diet. No sooner had Archduke Stephen returned to Pressburg, than he announced the nomination of Batthyány as President of the Ministry. Meanwhile, on March 15, an enthusiastic popular gathering at Budapest had forced the Council of the absent

Palatine to grant the demands of the "People's Charter," embodying the "Twelve Points" recently drawn up by Joseph Irányi, and including liberty of the Press and the establishment of a National Guard. At Vienna, the critical character of the concessions which the vehemence of the Hungarian nationalists and the impetuosity of the Palatine had brought to pass, was fully recognised; and it was sought to minimise them by attempting to reserve to the imperial Government the supreme military command and certain financial resources for the maintenance of army and diplomacy, as well as to pledge Hungary to the taking over of part of the public debt. But it was not a moment in which the Government was able to press anything, and the law which practically pronounced the autonomy of Hungary was finally approved at Vienna (April). A brief period followed in which, as will be seen, much was done in the way of legislative reform to justify the measure which Kossuth and Batthyány had carried over the heads of Crown and nobility, and of all the Conservative and Moderate elements in the political life of the kingdom.

At Agram also, May 15 was a day of popular excitement, and in a great public meeting an address, approved on the morrow by the magistrature of the city, was voted, which called upon the Emperor to restore the ancient rights of "constitutional Croatia." At Prague, a National Guard was formed, and, pending the reorganisation of both Diet and City Council, a general "Committee of St Wenceslas" took it upon itself to prepare a national address for presentation to the Crown. Finally, in Galicia, whither of course the Vienna views penetrated latest, a deputation of nobles and citizens obtained from the imperial Commissioner at Cracow, and from the Governor Count Francis Stadion at Lemberg, the release of political prisoners. But this most capable and courageous official and statesman refused to allow the arming of the population, and called out the entire garrison of the capital, in order to show that here at least the Government stood firm.

The cycle of these early revolutionary movements is completed by the course of events in Berlin. The Prussian like the Austrian Government had at first remained apparently passive spectators of the series of disturbances in the minor States; though at the beginning of March Frederick William IV is said to have had the intention of sending two army corps into the south-west. When, however, by March 15 the outbreak of the Revolution at Vienna and the flight of Metternich became known at Berlin, there was great joy in popular and some satisfaction even in official spheres; but the Government seemed wholly at a loss how to act, and the King, who cherished a romantic veneration for the historical greatness of the House of Austria, was in the depths of despair. Everything seemed giving way around him. In the Prussian monarchy, there were signs of strong popular sympathy with the

Revolution. In the west—both in Westphalia and in the Rhine Province, where there was so much inflammable material to receive the sparks blowing across the frontier—savage assaults were made upon the country-houses of wealthy noblemen; and a great deputation was on its way from Cologne to assure the King that immediate reforms were indispensable. In the east, there was a disturbance at Breslau on March 5; and at Königsberg in East Prussia a meeting was held on the following day, which commissioned Johann Jacoby, a Radical physician of great ability, and others to draft a petition demanding liberty of the Press and a National German Parliament. A riot followed on March 13, and wild rumours immediately arose that the Government intended to bring Russian troops across the frontier.

In Berlin itself March had opened with a succession of public meetings, and from the 13th onwards there was increasing friction with the military and the police. A considerable alien element—believed to have consisted chiefly of Rhinelanders and Poles—had found its way into the capital, where barricades were experimentally erected as early as March 15. On the following day the military had for the first time to give fire in order to clear the streets. March 17 seemed to pass quietly; but unfortunately the King's Ministry was at this very time awaiting its dismissal. The high-minded and able Minister of the Interior, Ernst von Bodelschwingh, who had advised the summoning of the Combined Diet in 1847, had been unable to persuade the King to go further; and, distrusting his own influence as a public man, he had on March 15 again asked leave to resign. As a last service, he drafted a patent accelerating, in view of the great events at Vienna, the meeting of the Combined Diet, and insisting on the necessity of a Constitution, with a representative assembly, for Germany at large. On the fatal morning of March 18, Frederick William IV signed this patent, and at the same time an ordinance abolishing the censorship in Prussia. At noon the Ministers gave in their resignation. Count Albert von Alvensleben-Erxleben, a wealthy Conservative nobleman who had rendered excellent service to the State, and who long held an almost unique position at Court as adviser in cases of extreme difficulty, had been sent for; but, moved by a rooted distrust of the King's methods of rule, he declined to serve, and suggested Count Adolf Heinrich von Arnim-Boitzenburg. He was sent for in his turn and granted a day's delay in which to make up his mind.

In the course of the morning the royal concessions became known through Berlin; and the Schlossplatz filled with all sorts of people—more especially proletariat and “immigrants.” Within the Palace the King was discussing ministerial arrangements, and, in the midst of a motley crowd, receiving first the Rhenish deputation, to which he poured out promises for both Prussia and Germany, and then a less vehement deputation from the Berlin magistracy, towards which he

adopted a regal tone. Outside, in the meantime, the aspect of the crowd grew dangerous, and part of it bore down in a menacing fashion upon the Palace. In the absence of General von Pfuel, who had just arrived in Berlin to take charge of the Guards, the command was by Alvensleben's advice assigned to General von Prittwitz, an officer of high courage but uncertain temper. He at once—it was now about 2 p.m.—proceeded to clear the Schlossplatz by slowly advancing a squadron of dragoons, with their sabres sheathed, and a company of infantry on each flank. Some friction inevitably followed, and a few sabres were drawn; then a couple of muskets accidentally went off. No one was hurt; but in a moment the crowd dispersed, crying "Murder! Treason!" With extraordinary speed, barricades rose up in several streets, and in a few hours Berlin was in a state of general insurrection.

Prittwitz, who had not more than 12,000 troops at his disposal, now began to carry out his plan of gradually securing the control of a limited area round the Palace; but he was terribly hampered by the indecision of the King, who could not be induced till nine o'clock to give an order for the troops to advance, and who by midnight was in a condition bordering upon dementia. The shock of finding his trust in his people vain, and his own visions of action rudely dissipated, had completely unhinged him; and when the Liberal leader, Georg von Vincke, pressed the King hard to "yield," his last power of resistance seemed to have vanished. It was in this state of mind that he composed his ill-starred proclamation "*An meine lieben Berliner*," in which he requested the people to quit the barricades, after which the troops should be withdrawn. This he sent for approval or correction to the ex-Minister Bodelschwingh, who at once conveyed it to the printers. Next morning (Sunday, March 19) the confusion in the King's apartments was renewed; in the midst of it he knelt down to prayers with the royal family, when he was further softened by an inopportune admonition to humility from the Court preacher. Deputation on deputation arrived urging the unhappy monarch to withdraw the troops, although, except very partially in one of the suburbs, the barricades had not yet been evacuated. At ten o'clock, the King was at last persuaded by Arnim, in spite of the opposition of Bodelschwingh and of vehement protestations from the Prince of Prussia, to issue an order that the troops facing the barricades should quietly remove from them. The order was communicated to some of the officers on duty with the troops, who during the last four-and-twenty hours had undergone much fatigue and worry, and were half-starved; and it had already been partially acted upon before it reached Prittwitz, who, after some hesitation, with an oath, gave the word for the withdrawal of the troops into their barracks. Before long, to the horror of the inmates of the Palace, its surroundings were left unprotected. Soon afterwards the King granted the popular demand for arms, which were supplied from the Zeughaus; and the triumph of the insurrection was complete.

Further humiliations, however, followed on this unforgettable day of shame. In the course of the day a long procession escorting a van laden with corpses of defenders of the barricades—it was afterwards reckoned that 216 insurgents had fallen in the fray as against 18 soldiers—passed the *façade* of the Palace; the few military still remaining to guard it were quickly hidden away, and the King and Queen appeared on the balcony to salute the procession. In the evening the capital was brilliantly illuminated; for it was known that a new Ministry had been appointed—all of them avowed Liberals, though of no extreme type. With Arnim-Boitzenburg, Count Schwerin, Alfred von Auerswald, Ludolf Camphausen (the leader of the Rhenish Opposition), Hansemann, Bornemann, and, as Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Arnim (late Minister at Paris) had taken office. During the night and on the following morning Prittwitz ordered the troops to quit all the barracks in Berlin, lest they should be surrounded there. For a moment the King thought of leaving Berlin with his departing troops, but is said to have been kept back by the (incorrect) observation of his new Chief Minister that no sovereign who had left his capital in such circumstances had ever returned thither. He remained, and it is said that a watch was kept over the threshold of his bedchamber by one or two faithful officers. But the fury of the populace turned against the Prince of Prussia, who was set down as a sworn reactionary—"unhappily," wrote Ludwig von Gerlach, "quite a mistake." On the evening of the 22nd he and the Princess escaped to Potsdam, where the officers of the troops sent out of Berlin were consuming their wrath; and thence they continued their flight to England.

Meanwhile, on the 21st, the dregs of the cup had been drunk by the unhappy King, who was in a sense the martyr of his own illusions. On that day appeared a second Proclamation, drafted by Arnim-Boitzenburg, and addressed "To my people and the German nation." In this document occurred the celebrated phrase that Prussia was henceforth merged in Germany (*Preussen geht in Deutschland auf*). More than this, escorted by his Minister-in-Chief and a police officer, King Frederick William IV, with the black-red-and-gold flag which he had declared himself to have adopted floating round his head, rode through the streets of his capital, addressing the students of the University on the way and otherwise spending himself in promises. He had not consented to this grotesque solemnity without reluctance, and afterwards spoke to the Queen of this day as the most terrible of his life. The part which he had played on this occasion, there can be no doubt, filled all factions and interests in the State with shame and disgust. Among the Liberals, whom it had quite failed to conciliate, the idea was mooted of bringing about his abdication, and of working for the accession of the Prince of Prussia's son, Prince Frederick, under the regency of his mother, who leaned to Liberalism. For a time, the King, remaining at Sanssouci, followed

Radowitz' advice of "effacing" himself as much as possible—not only for constitutional reasons, but because his spirit was utterly broken.

Yet, after all, the significance of Frederick William IV's semi-mystic proclamation was more enduring than that of his unlucky ride. Arnim's phrase of Prussia being merged in Germany implied that desire for the expansion of Prussia and her Constitution into Germany and a German Constitution which underlay the political aspirations of the brothers Gagern, of the historian Droysen, and of Baron Stockmar, one of the most practical politicians of his day. This idea was in essence that of the National State, to this day imperfectly realised, as preferable to the Federal State which, though destined to be reconstituted and reorganised, was already becoming a thing of the past. But neither was Frederick William IV the man to secure to Prussia the hegemony in Germany at the price of the sacrifice of her own individuality as a State, nor was an effort in this direction to remain within the power of his successors.

On March 22 the solemn funeral of the martyrs of the insurrection was held at Berlin, attended by nearly all the clergy of the capital, the King doffing his cap as the coffins passed the Palace, whereas he took no part in the military honours at the burial of the fallen soldiers two days later. On the 25th he paid a visit to Potsdam, where he enraged the officers, some of whom, it is said, had entered into a plot for his "liberation," by dwelling on his perfectly comfortable condition at Berlin. Abroad, as well as at home, his Government was treated with undisguised disrespect. In the latter half of March the proposed conference of Governments on German affairs was to have been held at Potsdam instead of Dresden; Austria, then in the throes of her Revolution, had assented; and Ministers had actually arrived from Saxony and from the south-west. But, on March 24, the new Austrian Government declared that without its assent no change could take place in the Constitution of the Confederation. Eager to conciliate national feeling and Liberal good-will, the Prussian Ministry, as we shall see, despatched troops to support the newly established Provisional Government of Schleswig-Holstein, and promised to satisfy the Poles by a division of the grand duchy of Posen. On the 29th the Ministry was reconstituted with a view to satisfying the more advanced Liberalism of the western provinces, Camphausen taking Arnim-Boitzenburg's place at its head, and Hansemann being transferred to the Financial Department; and on April 2 the Combined Diet met. So far there had been no serious attempt to interfere with the results achieved by the March Revolution; but it was about this time that efforts towards bringing about a reaction began on the part of the extreme Conservatives, among whom Ludwig von Gerlach was the leading spirit, and Hans von Kleist-Retzow and Otto von Bismarck soon became known as his most redoubtable followers.

The hope was now widespread, that a United Germany would at last be called into life, with a common Constitution based upon a

national representation. Yet it may be doubted whether even this long-cherished aspiration, and the impulse derived from the wonderful success of the French Revolution, would have sufficed to fill all Germany with a sense of the necessity of common national action, but for the direct appeal coming at this very time from a quarter to which the national sympathy could go out whole and undivided. The significance of the Schleswig-Holstein question and its history cannot be understood except in connexion with the long struggle for national unity, and with its successive phases of hopefulness and failure.

The draft Constitution for the Danish monarchy, which it was attempted to introduce immediately after the accession of King Frederick in January, 1848, and by which it was intended to unite with the Danish kingdom the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, hitherto only tied to it by a personal union, was never carried into execution. It was to have been submitted to an assembly of notables—26 from Denmark and 26 from the Duchies; but the project had to be given up within two months. Its chief consequence was the formation at Kiel of a Provisional Government for the Duchies under the Hereditary Prince Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein-Noer, which included, together with Count von Reventlow-Preetz and Wilhelm Beseler of Schleswig, both prominent as political leaders, two local citizens of repute. This representative Government took possession of the fortress of Rendsburg—the key to the command of both Duchies—and organised the insurrection against the Danish rule. At Copenhagen no exertion was spared, and by the beginning of April 14,000 men were in the field. On April 9, before Prince Frederick had joined his army, it was defeated at Bau near Flensburg by the Danes, who two days later occupied Schleswig. Beyond a doubt, if left to themselves, being in possession of the whole of Schleswig, as well as in command of the sea and the island of Alsens, they would have made short work of the ill-organised insurrection. But already the quarrel had become one of European significance; and Prussia could not avoid taking part in the conflict.

The instincts of both the Russian and the British Government were against helping Germany to become once more what a league of German towns had been in the distant past, a great Baltic Power. France had no such interest, but she was traditionally hostile to Germany and friendly to Denmark. Austria was at present incapable of intervening; but if Prussia intervened, she could not permanently hold aloof. This fact, and the eagerness with which the Schleswig-Holstein rising had been welcomed by the patriotic feeling common to all German Liberals, were patent to all parties in Prussia. To the extreme Conservatives any Prussian interference in the struggle seemed self-seeking and dishonest; the Liberal Government knew that nevertheless it must be ventured, unless all thought of a Prussian hegemony in Germany was to be postponed *sine die*.



Thus, already on March 24 the Prussian Government had recognised the autonomy of the Duchies, their indissoluble connexion with each other, and the descent of the sovereignty over them in the nearest male (*i.e.* Augustenburg) line. Soon afterwards two regiments of Guards were sent to Rendsburg, as if Prussia had been charged with the Federal execution. On April 4 the Diet at Frankfort, moved by several of the north-German Governments, resolved to invite the Prussian to charge itself with the task of negotiating a cessation of hostilities with Denmark on the basis of the restitution of the state of things before the issue of the obnoxious Constitution; and an agent, Major von Wildenbruch, was immediately sent from Berlin to Copenhagen. His instructions were carried out by him in so unskilful a fashion as to inspire the Danish Government with the conviction that it might play its own game. It rapidly broke off the negotiations; and, after the defeat of the Schleswig-Holsteiners (April 9) and their retreat upon the Eider, the Prussian troops crossed that river (April 30). They were soon followed by other Prussian and Hanoverian soldiery. The die had been cast; and the German people at last had its wish. On April 12 the Federal Diet acknowledged the Schleswig-Holstein Provisional Government; and a few days later General von Wrangel, a veteran cavalry officer whose reputation for dash dated from the days of Napoleon and whose manners were thought like Blücher's, took the command of the army, commissioned by the Germanic Confederation as well as by the King of Prussia.

Before this enterprise came to an inglorious end, the National Parliament at Frankfort had at last been called into life. A Committee of Seven, including Heinrich von Gagern, had, it will be remembered, been appointed at Heidelberg on March 5, 1848, to take the requisite steps for the meeting of a National Parliament, and to provide in the first instance for the convocation of a preliminary assembly (*Vorparlament*). The Diet of the old Confederation, having as early as March 8 come to the conclusion that a German Parliament was a necessity, in its turn appointed an advisory Committee of Seventeen to discuss the best method of reorganising the existing Confederation. Among the Seventeen, for the most part men of Liberal views, Dahlmann represented Prussia, and Schmerling Austria. They constituted themselves early in April under the presidency of Max von Gagern; and within a week, Dahlmann, with the aid of the eminent jurist Albrecht, drafted a German Constitution which was signed by all the Seventeen but the Bavarian, and on April 25 laid before the Diet. "Dahlmann's Constitution," a historical document of the highest significance, accepted the principle of a hereditary sovereign head of the Empire; it further proposed a two Chamber system, giving seats in the Upper Chamber, by the side of the reigning Princes, to 161 notables, to be chosen in part by the Governments, and in part by the Diets, of the several States. For the rest, while army, diplomacy and customs were to be Imperial concerns, there was left to

the particular States a measure of independence sufficient to satisfy the demands of historical tradition. As to the extent of the Empire, both East and West Prussia were to be included in it, together with part of Posen, but only the Cisleithanian dominions of the House of Austria.

This scheme was generally approved by the Prince of Prussia and by Baron von Usedom, the Prussian plenipotentiary at the Diet, as well as by Bunsen. It agreed in some respects with a draft Constitution sketched about this time by Prince Albert (Queen Victoria's consort), but differed from it in others. Frederick William IV, however, would have none of it—in correspondence with Dahlmann he had put forward a rival scheme of his own, with the Emperor of Austria as hereditary Roman Emperor, and the King of Prussia as German King, together with other half-historical, half-fantastic variations. Thus Dahlmann's first draft, though in many respects long subsequent labours of the Frankfort National Assembly failed to better it, fell stillborn.

On March 12 the Committee of Seven had begun to issue their invitations to the *Vorparlament*, addressing them in the first instance to the several Estates; but the outbreak of the Revolution in Vienna and Berlin accelerated their action, and already on March 31 the assembly met at Frankfort. Out of a total of 576 members, 141 came from Prussia, 72 from Baden, 84 from Hesse-Darmstadt, but only 2 from Austria. The *Vorparlament* was not particularly fortunate in its actual President, the eminent Heidelberg jurist Mittermaier, who, though possessed of political experience as well as insight, lacked those physical qualities which among the Vice-Presidents Robert Blum had in perfection. The "Wild Parliament," as this assembly was dubbed, revealed its hopeless commixture of heterogeneous ingredients at its first meeting, held in the midst of tumultuous excitement and rumours of imminent armed intervention. The Republican minority, led by the Badenese Hecker and Struve, brought forward their plan of a federal Constitution on the model of that of the United States; but, on the motion of the Badener Alexander von Soiron, it was resolved to leave the settlement of the future German Constitution "solely and wholly" to the National Assembly, as directly representing the nation. In accordance with a federal law promulgated by the Diet as early as March 30, the *Vorparlament* ordered the holding of direct elections for a single Chamber, without a check upon it; but the numerical basis was altered so as to apportion one deputy to a population of 50,000, instead of 70,000, souls. A Committee of Fifty (in which not a single Republican member was included) was appointed to watch the course of events till the actual meeting of the National Assembly. It should be added that the *Vorparlament*, while declaring in favour of the immediate admission of a united Schleswig-Holstein into the Germanic Confederation, acknowledged it as a sacred duty of the nation to cooperate in the restoration of Poland.

Before the first sitting of the National Assembly was held (May 18), the Republican party, vexed by their failure in the *Vorparlament* and infuriated by the courageous arrest of Fickler, one of the champions of Radicalism in Baden, by the Moderate Liberal leader Mathy, had organised an insurrectionary outbreak near the Lake of Constance; but some troops sent by the Diet quelled the attempt (April); nor was another, made by Struve in September, more successful. More serious for the time was the rising, also in April, which followed on the arrival at Posen of General Baron von Willisen, an officer of Liberal views, as commissary to superintend the partition of that province. But he could not satisfy either side; and, though 20,000 insurgents were here confronted by more than 30,000 Prussian troops, it was not till after the latter had suffered a reverse at Miloslav (April 30) that the insurgents were forced to conclude a convention at Bardo (May 5) and lay down their arms. Hereupon General von Pfuël, who had succeeded Willisen, without difficulty suppressed the insurrection. Two years later the detachment of Polish from German Posen was without resistance revoked.

Republican opposition, and the unwillingness of some of the Governments to obey the behest of the Diet, had delayed the elections to the National Assembly. Nevertheless, by May 13 the deputies had gathered at Frankfort in sufficient numbers for the Assembly to be opened with adequate solemnity in the Paulskirche. The elections had not been carried on everywhere at the same time or with the same ardour; while, for instance, in Austria proper there had been much enthusiasm, in Bohemia a large number of districts had flatly refused to have anything to do with a German Parliament. The number of its members, which at the opening had nearly reached 400, seems afterwards to have risen to about 550. The National Assembly, whatever its shortcomings, presented a fair reflexion of German middle class society, except that the landowners, and still more distinctly the merchants and manufacturers, were quite inadequately represented in it. On the other hand, the "professors," the men of solid academical learning, including many of the foremost historical and legal scholars of the age, formed a very important element in the Assembly, and took a leading part in its debates. In one sense at least no nation could be "unready" which was counselled by such men as Dahlmann, Droysen, Duncker, Gervinus, Waitz, Mohl, Welcker, Mittermaier, with Jakob Grimm, Ernst Moritz Arndt, Ludwig Uhland, and many other bearers of honoured names. Yet even these were outnumbered by about two to one by the judicial and administrative officials, and nearly equalled in numbers by the practising advocates. At the second meeting of the *Nationalversammlung* it chose as its President by 305 votes out of 393 Heinrich von Gagern, who was unmistakably marked out for the post not only by the part he had taken in the national movement, but by his commanding personality, loftiness of purpose and moral courage. His chief competitors for the

Chair had been Alexander von Soiron and the democratic orator Robert Blum.

At an early sitting of the Assembly (on May 24) a Committee of Thirty (in which of the Diet's advisory committee only Dahlmann and Max von Gagern were included) was appointed to draft a national Constitution for report to the House; but, as it had been recognised from the first that the most pressing question was the establishment of a supreme executive authority—a Central Power—another Committee, of fifteen, was named to consider it. This second Committee had come to the conclusion that the bolder plan of the hegemony of a single Government—which could only have been the Prussian—must be postponed, and that the best temporary expedient was a tripartite Directory consisting of representatives of Austria, Prussia and the smaller States respectively, when opinion began to veer round towards the provisional establishment of a single Head, in the time-honoured form of a *Reichsverweser* (Vicar of the Empire). Somewhat impulsively, Gagern identified himself with this idea, and with the suggestion that Archduke John of Austria should be selected for the office. The Archduke's personal popularity, due in part to his open dislike of Metternich's system of government, in part to his *bonhomie* of manner and speech, and in part to his marriage with a daughter of the people, had been skilfully fostered in the Austrian interest. The proposal of entrusting to him the control of the executive power of the new-born Empire chimed in with the medieval notions of the King of Prussia—but would it commend itself to the susceptibilities of the Prussian people, and to the sympathies of the other, especially the northern, German States? For the debate which was to settle the question of the Central Power not less than 160 speakers had put down their names; and, after it had lasted from June 19–24, it was only a bold stroke on the part of Gagern which decided the issue. Amidst tremendous applause he proposed that the Assembly itself should proceed to create the Central Power by the election of a *Reichsverweser*. This resolution which, while vindicating the sovereignty of the nation as directly represented by the Assembly, completely ignored the particular Governments, having been supported by both Radowitz and Vincke, was, notwithstanding Dahlmann's protest, carried without a division on June 27; and on the following day the Central Government in the person of an irresponsible *Reichsverweser* acting through a responsible Ministry was established. On the 29th Archduke John was elected to the office by 436 out of 548 votes. The unwillingness of the Conservatives to ignore the Governments, and the Radical prejudice against the election of a Prince, had alike proved unavailing; and the Prussian plenipotentiary Usedom had not ventured to make known the protest sent by his Government. An act of more than doubtful legality had been combined with a great political blunder.

At first all seemed to promise well. The recognition of the *Reichs-*

*verweser* by the Governments met with no difficulty; the new Prussian Ministry (Auerswald's) passed over the *lâches* of Usedom, and King Ernest of Hanover swallowed his ire. It was, however, noticed that the recognition of the new authority by the Prussian army was indefinitely delayed. On July 11 the Archduke held his joyous entry into Frankfort; and the Diet of the Confederation, by transferring its powers to the *Reichsverweser*, at the same time, as had been skilfully arranged by Schmerling, asserted and for the present put a stop to its functions. The Archduke now proceeded to the appointment of a *Reichsministerium*, and of ambassadors to the Great Powers. Schmerling took Home affairs, and Heckscher Justice, with the Prussian General von Peucker as Minister of War; early in August Prince Charles of Leiningen accepted the Presidency of the Ministry, but resigned it within a few weeks on account of the vote on the Malmoe Truce to be mentioned below; while Heckscher was transferred to Foreign Affairs, and three deputies of great ability, Duckwitz of Bremen, Beckerath (for whom Mathy had generously made way), and Robert von Mohl, became Ministers of Commerce, Finance and Justice respectively. The appointment of Stockmar (who sat for Coburg) as Minister of Foreign Affairs had been contemplated; but he declined, though declaring himself ready to accept the Presidency of the Ministry if Bunsen would take the Foreign portfolio. Within the National Assembly, the system of parties slowly proceeded to define itself more or less distinctly. They took their names in French fashion from the sections of the arena in the Paulskirche in which their members sat, and also from the hostleries and other places of public resort which they frequented. Thus the Extreme Right (the Party *Milani*) consisted of the Conservative ultras, who denied to the National Assembly any right of participation in the executive, and demanded for the Governments a share in the settlement of the Constitution of the Empire. The Right (the *Casino*) did not ignore the Governments, though acknowledging the unity of Germany as the paramount purpose of the Assembly; while the Right Centre (the *Landsberg* party) though likewise respecting the independence of the Governments, desired the control of the military forces to be in the hands of the Central Power. It was to this fraction that the majority of the Ministers belonged. Similarly, the Left shaded off from the Extreme Left (the *Donnersberg*) who hoisted the flag of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, to the Left proper (the *Teutsche Hof*) whose chief aim was popular sovereignty as represented by a permanent national parliament elected by universal adult suffrage, and to the more moderate politicians in the Left Centre (*Württembergischer Hof*), with the intermediate fractions of the *Augsburger Hof* and the *Westend Hall*.

The National Assembly now felt itself free to enter upon its proper task. It began its constitutional discussions with the protracted process of formulating the *Grundrechte*, or fundamental rights of German citizenship. The interpretation given to the term was so

wide<sup>1</sup>, and the determination to exhaust the subject before passing on to a discussion of the constitutional superstructure so profound, that the *Grundrechte* must in any case have occupied the House for a considerable time; but before the Assembly brought its labours upon them to a close, towards the end of 1848, much had happened to interrupt these labours and to impair the authority of the Assembly itself. Thus, though the *Grundrechte* were, on December 27, 1848, proclaimed as law by the *Reichsverweser*, and though on March 28, 1849, they were incorporated in the Constitution of the Empire, the larger States (Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover) neither proclaimed them as law, nor treated them as having the force of law without proclamation.

A most humiliating rebuff was in the first instance administered to the national aspirations by the stoppage of the Schleswig-Holstein War. Prussia, though she had intervened in this War in the name of the Germanic Confederation, lacked the will, as the Central Government lacked the means, to carry the conflict to a successful issue in the face of the ill-will of the non-German Great Powers, while Austria required every soldier she could spare for the struggle in Italy. Wrangel, after assuming the command, had by a couple of successful engagements soon made himself master of the whole of Schleswig, and entered Jutland, taking Fridericia (May 2). Jutland, however, he soon received orders to evacuate, in consequence no doubt of Russian warnings. Very soon, too, the Danes drove back the Prussians from their position at Düppel opposite Alsen; but they were in their turn pushed back by Wrangel across the Jutland boundary upon Hadersleben (June 28). Practically the War was now at a standstill: the Danish blockade of the German coasts pressed heavily upon German trade, and was felt as a national humiliation which gave rise to a widespread wish for a German fleet. Neither the King of Prussia nor the Conservative *camarilla* which from time to time influenced his action sympathised with the War. Thus negotiations had been opened in the previous month, countenanced by Russia, Great Britain (where Bunsen's appeal to public opinion had been counteracted by the visit to London of the Danish politician Orla Lehmann) and Sweden; and on August 26 a truce was concluded for a term of seven

<sup>1</sup> This will appear from the following brief summary of the *Grundrechte* as actually passed: "Every German is a citizen of the Empire. No German State shall in the administration of civil or penal law make any difference between its own subjects and those of any other State. Before the law there exists no distinction of classes. The rights of all citizens are equal; the duties of all are the same: every man is bound to serve the Empire in arms. Personal freedom is inviolable; and no man may be arrested except on a judicial warrant which gives the cause of his detention and is communicated to him within twenty-four hours after his arrest. All Germans have the right of freely expressing their opinions by word of mouth, in writing or in print; the right of free petition; the right of public meeting. Every German State is to possess a Constitution with a popular representation, and to this representative body the Ministers are to be responsible."

months between Denmark and Prussia at Malmoe. Prussia had no authority to conclude this truce; but the Danish Government, in refusing to deal directly with the agents of the Central Power, was able to plead that it had remained "uninformed" of the establishment of that authority.

The Malmoe Truce stipulated that the Provisional Government should cease, and that its authority should be transferred to a so-called "Conjoint Government," named partly by Prussia and partly by Denmark, with Count Karl Moltke, whose leanings were Danish, at its head. When, on September 4, Heckscher communicated the Truce to the National Assembly for confirmation by the Central Power, it was clear that an approval of the compact would involve an approval of the action of Prussia in concluding it. The Prussian Government was at once impeached by the eminent politician at the head of the Right Centre, who, more completely than any man in his party, was identified with the idea of the hegemony of Prussia in Germany. Dahlmann, a Schleswig-Holsteiner every inch of him (he sat for a Holstein division), had resolved at any cost to oppose the Truce. After a first failure he renewed his onslaught; and, when after the ratification of the Truce by Prussia (September 2) the Assembly had to choose between the humiliation of approval and civil war, his motion for the rejection of the agreement was carried by a majority of 17 votes (September 5). The nascent organisation of parties seemed suddenly broken up; the Ministers resigned; if there was to be a new Government, Dahlmann, it was said, must take office with Robert Blum. The former was actually sent for by the Archduke; but he soon saw that he was in an *impasse*—even old Arndt had gone over to the Moderates. The diplomacy of Franke (long the trusted agent of the House of Augustenburg) had to be called in; and by a majority of 21 the vote of the Assembly was reversed, and the Truce of Malmoe approved (September 16). The most far-sighted and the most single-minded of the politicians of the Frankfort Parliament had been under a delusion. Prussia's prestige had fallen low; but her hand could not be forced by appeals to public morality and national patriotism. Though the Prussian Government now took steps, if the Danish War should be renewed, to meet it well prepared, the Prussian intervention in the Duchies was after a second campaign to come to a still more ignominious close.

Meanwhile, the breakdown of the National Assembly in this matter had led to the most lamentable incident in its history. The Free Town of Frankfort had in this very month of September set up a Constituent Assembly of 120, to be freely elected by the whole body of the subjects of the State. The citizens had been largely stimulated in the direction of advanced democratic ideas by the deputies of the Left, who fraternised with them in their clubs, and enjoyed their applause from the galleries of the Paulskirche. The acceptance of the Malmoe Truce by the Assembly had fallen like sparks upon fuel. The members were mobbed

indiscriminately as they came forth after voting; the Westend Hall, as the club-house of a more Moderate portion of the Left, was devastated; and an attempt was made to seize the person of Heckscher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Here, as in other risings of the sort, an unknown alien element poured in by train to take part in the conduct of the insurrection. The next day passed in wild rioting; but on the 18th some 2400 Austrian and Prussian soldiers arrived in the city. Unskilfully handled, they failed to prevent something like an irruption into the Assembly's place of meeting, where however the authority of Gagern kept the peace. Round the Paulskirche, however, a network of small barricades was raised, and it was not till two in the afternoon that the troops (which had behaved with admirable self-control, several Prussian soldiers having been shot down where they stood) received orders to demolish these. Three hours later the troops were called off again, as it was hoped that the arrival of artillery from Darmstadt would soon put an end to the revolt. It was about this time that two deputies, Prince Felix Lichnowsky, a nobleman of popular sympathies well-known in the Palace at Berlin, and the Prussian General von Auerswald—as a politician conspicuous by his moderation—who had ridden forth to survey the state of affairs, were recognised by a suburban mob, dragged forth from a house into which they had retreated, and murdered with the most revolting brutality. By six o'clock the artillery had arrived, and there were now some 12,000 troops in the town; but some hours passed before the revolt was mastered. Next morning a state of siege was proclaimed, which was vigorously enforced; and the talk of removing the National Assembly to Nürnberg came to nothing. But the effect of the episode, enacted almost under the eyes of the National Parliament, was very notable; and though the murder of Auerswald and Lichnowsky was not to stand alone as a deed of popular frenzy (probably in this instance instigated by diabolical design), its effect upon public feeling beyond all doubt contributed to hasten the approach of the Reaction.

While, during the summer and autumn of 1848, the authority of the National Assembly was seriously impaired, the relations between the Governments of the two German Great Powers and the National Assembly also underwent important changes. At Vienna, the transformation of the old political system into a constitutional *régime* more or less corresponding to popular Liberal ideas and aspirations, had been accomplished without much trouble and with hardly any bloodshed. The light-hearted Viennese were immensely elated to find that citizens and students together had managed a great revolution so cleverly, and were ready to believe that capital and monarchy might without difficulty be tidied over into a new stage of their political life, while the Constitution of the Empire was in the making. The influence allowed to the students of the University was a specially significant illustration of the childlike hopefulness of the times. These spoilt children of the community, left



to their own devices by their professors (except when one or the other of these served as a popular figure-head on his own account), were treated by the population at large not only as directors and organisers of the political movement in progress, but as a kind of Court of Appeal on all the grievances and troubles of private as well as public life. Perhaps this peculiar feature of the Vienna insurrection may explain the idealistic character which it throughout retained, and which it certainly did not owe to the scurrilities which flowed from the emancipated Press. The troubled condition of Vienna was, at the same time, due in part to the privations suffered by its working classes; for, though the Government had done their best to bring these sufferings to public notice, they had not earned much gratitude for their pains; and, in the end, the workmen came to care for little beyond the satisfaction of their own claims in the way of employment, freedom from taxation, and the general improvement of their condition. In addition to this material for future disturbance, there was the proletariat proper, with the Polish and other alien agitators. The full tide of a Polish immigration from France and Belgium poured into Germany towards the end of March, 1848; and the resolute pursuit by the Poles of their own aim, while many others who took part in the Revolution had but a vague notion of what aim they were pursuing, no doubt contributed to their disproportionately large share in the actual conduct of the insurrection now near at hand.

With Lombardo-Venetia turned into a camping-ground; with Hungary demanding a measure of independence which it was impossible to deny to her; with Croatia and Slavonia asking for protection against the Magyars, of which it was impossible at present to hold out more than the vaguest promise; with Bohemia striving after an autonomy of which her later history had failed to obscure the proud traditions; and with the German provinces of the monarchy largely entering into the desires of the rest of Germany for a real national executive as well as a national legislature—the new Austrian Government had decided not to postpone till the meeting of the great Combined Diet the attempt to frame the new Constitution which was to cure all ills. Pillersdorff and his colleagues in the meantime allowed the free use—and none could well have been more free—of the civic rights of petition and public meeting. Prince Windischgrätz had, as early as March 18, proclaimed that order and tranquillity had been restored at Vienna; moreover, when the news came of the evacuation of Milan and Venice, a large number of volunteers were enlisted for Radetzky's army. But this patriotic phase proved quite transitory.

The unspent force of the Revolutionary current, and the impotence of Pillersdorff and his colleagues, were shown on the occasion of the publication of the new Press law (April 1). Though it offered a liberal instalment of concessions, the law aroused the most vehement opposition, and Pillersdorff consented to the appointment of a joint

committee of students and journalists to advise on amendments. In the German question the Government were more successful in keeping in touch with public feeling both in Vienna and in the German provinces generally—which was in general sympathy with the national movement, but desirous of maintaining the Austrian ascendancy in federal affairs. Schmerling, whom the Government had appointed its representative on the confidential Committee of Seventeen, completely fell in with the guarded policy of Count Ficquelmont, who as Minister of Foreign Affairs kept a cool head, and who in the beginning of April, on the resignation of Kolowrat, assumed the Presidency of the Ministry. The fear of a Prussian hegemony influenced the policy of Austria even in this period of stress; as early as April 21, the Ministry officially declined, though in courteous phrase, to submit unconditionally to any decree of the "Federal Assembly"; and at Frankfort, down to the end of Archduke John's tenure of office, Austrian statesmanship continued to hold back.

Yet in Austria itself the progress of Liberalism seemed unbroken. The Ministerial changes early in April were accompanied by the abolition of the State Conference, so long the supreme authority in the Austrian system of government; and immediately afterwards Archduke Ludwig withdrew from public affairs. The Emperor Ferdinand found it easier to govern through his responsible Ministers, now that no more intimate adviser was left to him; the Archduchess Sophia had not yet become a convert to the cause of the reaction, and as yet all talk of a Court *camarilla* was illusory. But worthy men though Pillersdorff and his fellow-Ministers undoubtedly were, the times in Austria were not such as to suit a monarchy without a monarch. The symptoms of trouble continued in Vienna; and after Windischgrätz had on April 30 been transferred to his old post of Commander-in-chief at Prague, there was now in the imperial capital no effective military authority, and no police authority at all.

Meanwhile, the Ministers continued their work of framing a Constitution, and already early in April submitted to a gathering of some thirty notables from the several parts of the monarchy a draft, based, as Pillersdorff afterwards frankly declared, on the Belgian Constitution, as having been drawn up "in circumstances similar to those existing in Austria." In these deliberations Alexander Bach's voice is said to have been generally decisive. Simultaneously discussions on the proposed Constitution took place in the several provincial Diets. In Bohemia, however, the national party insisted by petition on the establishment of a separate administration for this kingdom, with Moravia and Silesia; and from Galicia, where Count Francis Stadion and his lieutenants had with difficulty maintained the public peace, a petition came up for the resettlement of the province on a national basis. The Bohemians were referred to the coming general *Reichstag*, whose assembling was to crown the constitutional work, for the satisfaction of their main demand;

the Galicians were assured that the Emperor was ready to preserve their nationality. But the cardinal difficulty with which the Austrian Government had to deal was the condition of Hungary, and its relations to the adjoining lands. The Hungarian Ministry had, after a violent storm of popular indignation had broken down some recalcitrance at Vienna, more especially against the inclusion of Kossuth, been finally constituted under Count Lewis Batthyány. Among its members were the Conservative Prince Paul Esterházy, long known as Austrian ambassador in London (Foreign Affairs); Francis Deák and Baron Joseph Eötvös, both Constitutionalists of high character and consistent moderation (Justice and Public Instruction); Count Stephen Széchenyi, formerly the adored leader of the national party (Public Works), and Kossuth (Finance). The Administration was thus composed of members of all the national parties, including men who kept in view the historic traditions of Hungarian politics; and in the elaboration of the Constitution at Pressburg, the provisions as to the Palatine, the maintenance of the bicameral system, and the imposition of a property qualification on electors, reveal a moderating hand, although the far-sighted prudence of Deák was unable altogether to prevail against the driving power of Kossuth. Thus the all-important provision which transferred the control of army and fortresses from the Crown to the Hungarian Ministry was strongly disapproved by Deák. On the other hand, his moderating wisdom cordially cooperated with the enthusiasm of Kossuth, who had long insisted upon their necessity, in carrying through the Diet those March and April Laws, which completely—and, it must be asserted, beneficently—changed the very foundations of the social as well as the political system of the Hungarian nation. In the first place, the feudal servitudes and the tithes payable by the peasantry were abolished. In the second, taxation was extended to all classes. In the third, the right of electing to the Diet, which had hitherto belonged only to the nobility, who exercised it in the several counties of the kingdom (*Comitats*), was now extended to every Hungarian owning property worth the equivalent of £30. These were henceforth the *Grundrechte* of the Hungarian people; and the fact that the nobility had voluntarily relinquished their privileges bound the middle class as well as the peasantry to the national cause during the conflicts now at hand; while a class of small landowners had been created who were passionately attached to the new *régime*. The Diets, it may be added, were to be henceforth annual; and their future seat, with that of the Government, was to be at Pest. Provision was also made in these laws for establishment of liberty of the Press, and for the formation of a National Guard.

But the Hungarian question was by no means solved by a change in the relations between the Austrian monarchy and the Hungarian nation. Notwithstanding the breadth of their legislative enactments, Kossuth and his fellow-leaders of the national movement had long regarded as an

axiom the ascendancy of the Magyars, including that of the Magyar tongue. Before the Diet separated, it requested the King to take immediate steps for the convocation of the Transylvanian Diet, so as to effect without further delay a union between the two countries. The feeling of Magyar Klausenburg was entirely in favour of such a union; but the Saxons at Hermanstadt showed an anxious desire to secure guarantees for their rights. Still more doubtful seemed the future of Slavonia and Croatia. On April 8 a Serb deputation, which had arrived at Pressburg to congratulate the Diet, though well received in public, were told by Kossuth in his private house that, before there could be any question of an equal treatment of the Slavonian with the Magyar tongue, appeal would have to be made to the decision of the sword. His imprudent words left five millions of Slavs and two and a half millions of Roumans (Walachs)—not to speak of nearly a million and a half of Germans—assured that five millions of Magyars were resolved to uphold the ascendancy of their tongue systematically extended since 1839. Thus a strong impulse was added to the agitation which had for some time been carried on for the speedy holding of a Diet of the "South Slavonic nations"; by which they should secure to themselves an autonomy analogous to the Hungarians. At Vienna this agitation was tacitly approved; but present ills had to be reckoned with in the first instance, and on April 11 the Emperor-King Ferdinand closed, with a speech in Hungarian, the Diet which had gone far towards achieving the disruption of his monarchy.

As a matter of course, in this of all monarchies in the world, neither loyalty towards the throne nor the desire for a strong personal rule was extinct or confined to self-centred regions like Tyrol. Even where these feelings did not operate, but where historic traditions of autonomy or the feelings of race were strong, there was in most instances a desire to uphold the Austrian empire as such, while transforming it into a union of more or less independent political communities, under the personal headship of the Emperor. Except among the German democrats—and even with these it was not always strong—there was nowhere a desire that the Austrian monarchy should merge, either in whole or in part, in a united Germany. Among the six Austrian members of the watching committee of Fifty named by the Frankfort *Vorparlament*, the five who put in an attendance (they included Count Anton Auersperg, no less sincere as a politician than as a poet) showed themselves anxious above all to secure attention to the demands of the Slav nationality; the sixth, the eminent historian Palacký, the acknowledged leader of the old Čech party in Bohemia, refused to attend, on the plea that Bohemia properly formed no part of Germany, and that for Austria, including Bohemia, to "merge" in Germany would be political suicide. The effect of Palacký's very open letter was considerable in various parts of the monarchy; among the Slovenes in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola

associations were formed in favour of adhesion to Austria and against incorporation in the Germanic body—the real object being the formation of a kingdom of Slovenia as an independent part of the Austrian monarchy. With all these views and interests the makers of the new Austrian Constitution had to reckon, as well as with the desire to merge Austria in Germany, cherished by the Vienna students and advocated by one Doctor Schütte—till he was removed by government orders.

Yet, after submitting the Constitution to the notables assembled at Vienna for the purpose, under the presidency of Archduke Francis Charles, it was resolved, instead of discussing the new Constitution in a general Diet (as had been promised in the imperial manifesto of March 15), to promulgate it ready-made (*octroyer*)<sup>1</sup> on the authority of the sovereign. The Constitution was actually published amidst great rejoicing on April 25, to which day the celebration of the Emperor's birthday had been postponed, and communicated by Ficquelmont to the foreign Powers. It declared the union as a single indissoluble constitutional monarchy of the lands forming part of the imperial Austrian State, exclusive of Hungary and the other Transleithanian lands, and the Italian possessions. To all the citizens of the State thus defined it granted full rights of civil and religious liberty. A General Diet (*Reichstag*) was instituted, to consist of an Upper House of princes of the dynasty, and nominees of the landowners, and a Lower of 383 members, the system of election to be definitively determined by the *Reichstag*. The provincial Estates were to continue by its side, but without constituent powers. The Ministers were to be responsible to it; and a National Guard was to be formed, which, like all the officials of the Empire, was to swear fidelity to the Constitution as well as to the sovereign.

The Constitution had avowedly left the Hungarian difficulty unsolved; and just exception was taken to some of its provisions as well as its omissions. Bach, who perceived that it was regarded as unsatisfactory, lost no time in moving away from the Administration. Its most unpopular member was at this time its head, Ficquelmont, widely charged with having jobbed into the Ministry of War his relative, Count Baillet von Latour, who was a general of reputation as well as a zealous servant of the Crown. The aged President of the Ministry was shamefully mobbed in his own house, with the cooperation of the National Guard and the Students' Legion, and practically forced to resign (May 3). The populace was more and more coming to demean itself as master of the city, with the aid of an increasing influx of Poles. In Galicia a rising on April 25 had been completely suppressed by the following day, and the sittings of the popular council at Lemberg were closed by Stadion. At the same time he granted the peasantry the abolition of the *robot* (a servitude of labour which varied in different parts of the monarchy, but

<sup>1</sup> "*Concession et octroi*" were the terms used in Louis XVIII's grant of the *Charte* of 1814.

usually extended over rather more than a hundred days), and encouraged the Ruthenes to assert their racial counter-grievances at Vienna. The Polish movement, being thus at an end in Galicia, proceeded to make itself felt, after another fashion, in the Austrian capital. Yet it was not the Poles to whom the second and most dangerous outbreak of the Revolution at Vienna was directly due.

For the control of the populace the Government, which dared not make use of such troops as remained in Vienna, had chiefly to depend on the National Guard, which transacted business with the Ministers through an executive Committee. Out of this Committee and the University students was then formed a Central Political Committee, which had begun to interfere in government business when it was dissolved by Count Hoyos, who had quite recently resumed the governorship of the city (May 13). The result was vehement popular indignation; and on the evening of the 15th, a concourse of workmen and students moved upon the Hofburg, following the National Guard, which did not interfere with their proceedings. Here a self-commissioned deputation invaded a meeting of the Cabinet, and obtained from it the reinstatement of the Central Political Committee, and the promise of a revision in a democratic sense of the Constitution and the electoral law. Late at night the Emperor signed these concessions, which were made public on the following day, with an undertaking that the military should not be called out except on the demand of the National Guard. Pillersdorff and his colleagues now chivalrously offered either to go or to stay; but without eliciting any public response. On the 17th the unexpected—which is often the obvious—happened. The Emperor, with the whole imperial family, starting from Schönbrunn as if for a carriage drive, continued it to Innsbruck. Fear, pure and simple, had dictated this step. On the following morning the news of the flight spread through Vienna, and produced a state of feeling made up of popular exasperation against the *Camarilla* (now forming round the Archduchess Sophia), loyal regrets, and among the well-to-do apprehensions of a complete downfall of the public credit. The Ministry floundered into a decree—which afterwards had to be modified in order to avoid a national bankruptcy pure and simple—ordering that all payments in specified coins or in public bank-notes should be accepted at their nominal value.

Public feeling was beginning to recover from the effects of the departure of the Emperor, when the Ministry attempted a repressive measure which they were impotent to carry out. One of the chronic incentives to disturbance would, they thought, be removed by the dissolution of the Academic Legion, for which the closing of the University for the annual vacation on May 26 would furnish an admirable opportunity. The students resisted in spite of a display of National Guards and regulars; and a large body of unemployed workmen (who had been kept together by government orders to facilitate measures

for their maintenance) came to the aid of their University comrades. The end was that the Government withdrew part of the troops, and, when the erection of barricades immediately ensued, revoked the obnoxious order itself. They had thus practically abdicated their authority; and on the evening of the 26th a fresh Committee of one hundred members, consisting of citizens, students, and National Guards, was set up to preserve public order and to safeguard popular rights. This Committee of Safety, with Dr Fischhof as its ruling spirit, exercised what little public authority remained in the strange interregnum which followed. While the eyes of the Viennese were turned towards Prague, whence an army under Windischgrätz was quite prematurely rumoured to be approaching, the barricades were left standing in the streets, "defended" by workmen, and affording much pleasure—especially one decorated with a portrait of the Emperor—to the population. The Press had never been more shameless. Vienna was given up to the officials and the lower classes; according to one account, the aristocracy had taken its departure on the 18th, and after the 26th the *bourgeoisie* followed.

A more extraordinary condition of things has probably never existed in a State in which the regular machinery of government was still at work. Addresses and deputations were pouring in every day to the Emperor's Court at Innsbruck, where Wessenberg, who had courageously taken office as Minister for Foreign Affairs at the age of 74, was in attendance, and where the Vienna *corps diplomatique* gradually assembled. In Vienna the rest of the Ministry jogged on as best it could, the War Minister Latour taking no part in any business but that of his own department. The chief difficulty of the Ministry was, after all, the situation of the public finances. Every month the deficit increased, and by the end of June it was reckoned at 35 million florins. The credit of the State could not much longer be maintained, when the reserve of coin in the Bank stood to the amount of government paper in circulation in the ratio of 1 to 8. On June 25 Archduke John, at Pillersdorff's request and with the Emperor's consent, came to the rescue by assuming the regency; but this could only be a temporary expedient, since his election as *Reichsverweser*, narrated above, followed within four days. Thus, when the Committee of Safety indicated the expediency of a change of administration, and Archduke John did not say nay, the long-suffering Pillersdorff actually resigned, together with one or two of his colleagues (July 8). Baron Anton von Doblhoff-Dier hereupon undertook the formation of a Ministry which was to be unmistakably Liberal in colour, with Wessenberg as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Bach of Justice, Latour, however, retaining the Ministry of War.

The abnormal condition of things at Vienna necessarily reacted upon the other great centres of population in the monarchy. At Prague the Čech party determined to attempt another advance towards Bohemian independence. Windischgrätz, who was in command of the troops, and

several members of the nobility, openly renounced all obedience to the Vienna Ministry; and Count Leo Thun, now at the head of the Bohemian Administration, declared himself obliged to establish a responsible provisional Government, in which the Čechs were duly represented. The Vienna Government hereupon called upon him to resign his office. On the other hand, the negotiations in progress at the instigation of Eötvös between Frankfort and Pest, aimed at allowing Austria to be absorbed into the German Empire with her Slav as well as her German provinces, provided that Croatia and Slavonia were left to be incorporated in the Magyar kingdom. But this solution they dreaded more than anything, and were resolved upon averting, more especially since the Austrian Government had appointed Count Joseph Jellačić von Buzim *Banus* of Croatia. Jellačić, the son of a Croatian nobleman and landowner who had seen much service in the Napoleonic days, had himself as yet only risen to the rank of colonel in the Austrian army; but he had gained distinction in the fighting against the Turks on the Military Frontier, of which he continued to hold the command, so that he always had a supply of soldiery at his disposal, and he had acquired the confidence of the national party in Croatia. Under his government Croatian jealousy of Magyar ascendancy soon found means of making itself audible; whereupon the Austrian Government cautiously prohibited the proposed meeting of a Croatian Diet and called upon the Banus to give an account of his proceedings. But, interpreting the situation for himself, he warmly approved the suggested convocation of a general Slav Congress with a view to the formation of a great Slav confederation.

The Slav Congress actually opened at Prague in June, after the issue of two manifestos, the one appealing to the whole brotherhood of Slavs, the other protesting loyalty to the House of Austria. But its sole fruit was a third manifesto drawn up by Palacký, which in its final sentence demanded a general congress of nations. The Congress had thus soared into the sphere of dreams; but, though the denunciation of a great Slav conspiracy seems to have been pure invention, the gathering undoubtedly helped to excite the democratic aspirations of the masses. The ill-will excited among the younger Čech partisans by the return of Windischgrätz was heightened by his refusal to supply the Prague students, emulous of their Vienna brethren, with cannon and ammunition. On Whitsunday, June 13, an assault was made upon his palace by the excited populace, and, this having been dispersed by the soldiery, barricades were erected, and the revolt began in earnest. Though on the first day the insurgents were overpowered by the troops, Windischgrätz, whose methods were always slow, entered into negotiations; even after his wife had been shot dead at a window of his palace, he showed no vindictiveness in the terms offered by him; and on June 15, after an exchange of prisoners had been effected, he withdrew his troops from the city to the surrounding heights, and agreed to an armistice. But, on the 16th, some shots fired across



the Moldau furnished him with an excuse for renewing hostilities; and, after demanding an unconditional surrender, he began the bombardment of the city and continued it during the night. In the morning the insurgents gave way, and Windischgrätz was absolute master of Prague.

The Reaction had achieved its first victory and found a champion in whom it could put its trust; and, though the Austrian Revolution was by no means at an end, the turning-point in its course had been reached. As for the Čechs, they had missed their opportunity, and had no longer to be taken into account in the ultimate settlement. The Bohemian Diet summoned by Count Leo Thun never met, and his Slavophil hopes were at an end. On the other hand, the Croats and Southern Slavs in general, having to abandon the hope of Čech cooperation, became in the hands of the Austrian Government an interest to play off against the Hungarians, and indeed an instrument to employ against them. For the present, the service rendered by Windischgrätz to the cause of order and to the prestige of the army overshadowed all others; and he felt strong enough to raise the state of siege at Prague, while declaring his determination to maintain the tranquillity which he had reestablished.

The Reaction, which had thus triumphed at Prague and was looking forward to a speedy triumph at Vienna, hereupon spread to other parts of the monarchy where the Revolution had made a more or less rapid progress. The provincial Diets which met in the summer of 1848 almost invariably took as a starting-point for their discussions the burdens resting on the peasantry—the *robot* and the tithe—and were indeed pinned down to this subject by the peasant deputies admitted into the reformed assemblies. The results were neither uniform, nor everywhere satisfactory. In Tyrol, where there were no peasant servitudes, the old Estates were maintained, and a petition was voted against the liberty of religious worship allowed by the new Constitution to dissident confessions.

The General Diet (*Reichstag*), which was finally to settle this Constitution, was formally opened by Archduke John on July 22, by which time most of the members of the heterogeneous and polyglot assembly had reached Vienna. Of the total of 383 nearly one-fourth were peasants; on the other hand, the nobility were conspicuous by their absence, though there were a few Polish nobles from Galicia, where, curiously enough, Stadion had also found a seat. Thus, as at Frankfort, the great body of the deputies belonged to the middle class; but it was calculated that less than half of them spoke German as their mother-tongue. The Right in the Assembly consisted mainly of Čechs, led by Ladislav Rieger, and the incompetence of the President, Schmitt (a Viennese), left the conduct of business chiefly in the hands of the Čech Vice-President Strobach; the minority on the Left consisted of German democrats, and was largely controlled by the Vienna democratic organisations.

Though the Committee of Safety still remained in the exercise of its

abnormal functions, a vote of the *Reichstag*, urging upon the Emperor the necessity of his return, induced his advisers to bring him back to Schönbrunn on August 12. Already on July 31 the Assembly appointed a Committee to deliberate on a Constitution for the Empire, instead of merely revising the Pillersdorff instrument, which was thus relegated to limbo. During August the discussions turned chiefly on the removal of the burdens which had hitherto oppressed the peasantry in their relations to the owners of the land. The mover of the resolution for their removal, which was unanimously adopted in principle, Hans Kudlich, was himself a peasant's son. But on the question of compensation protracted debates arose, the Left objecting to any payment of the sort, while Bach roundly declared that by the grant of it the Government would stand or fall. Thus the *Reichstag* determined in favour of compensation by a vote of 174 to 144, and by a further vote resolved on the formation of provincial funds for defraying it. With some difficulty, Bach further persuaded the House (which as he pointed out possessed no legislative, but only constituent powers) to ask the imperial sanction for the new land law; although it would not concede to the Emperor the title "*von Gottes Gnaden*" (by the grace of God). Thus a great and enduring piece of work was actually accomplished by this otherwise ill-starred *Reichstag* (September 7).

Before its remaining labours were overwhelmed by the last effort of the Revolution at Vienna, the relations between Austria and Hungary, and those between both Governments and the South-Slavonian movement, had entered into a further phase. The new Banus of Croatia had at first seemed ready to adopt the entire "Illyrian" programme, according to which a Slav kingdom was to be included on equal terms with Germany, Austria and Hungary in a tripartite personal union. But it is doubtful whether Jellačić was really enamoured of the ideal of a South-Slavonic State. His chief wish appears to have been to preserve the authority of the Habsburg dynasty which his family had faithfully served in arms, while at the same time enabling Croatia to defy the Pest Government and thus secure the gratitude of the Emperor. Without therefore intending to bind his future action by its conclusions, he summoned the Croato-Slavonic Diet for which both provinces had been agitating, and which met on June 5 at Agram. The assembly was blessed by prelates of both the Greek and the Roman Church, and attended by sympathetic or quasi-suppliant representatives from the Čechs of Bohemia, the Slovaks of northern Hungary, the Slovenes of Styria. The Dalmatians, however, would not come; and between the Croats and the Serbs of Slavonia, whose proper centre was at Carlowitz, no prospective system of common administration, or of mutual consultation, could be settled. The only point as to which unanimity existed was precisely the line of action which Jellačić desired to ensure—the rejection of the authority of the Hungarian Ministry.

The frightened imperial Court ordered him to dissolve the Agram assembly; but, by way of reply, he betook himself to Innsbruck in person to explain his proceedings, preceded by a couple of deputations.

The Hungarian Diet in its turn had reassembled on July 2; but the Court at Innsbruck, where Prince Esterházy put in an appearance as the Foreign Minister of the King of Hungary, could not hope that history would repeat itself, and that the Magyars would once more come to the rescue of their distressed sovereign. He was followed by the President of the Ministry, Batthyány, who had the satisfaction of taking back with him to Pest three imperial manifestos (dated June 10), rejecting the claim to independence in respect of the Hungarian Crown asserted by the two main sections of the population of Transylvania, the Saxons and the Roumans; charging the Hungarian Government with the defence of Dalmatia and the Military Frontier—both of them Slav lands which it was desired at Agram to include in the great South-Slavonian or “Illyrian” kingdom; and suspending the Banus of Croatia from all his offices till he should have justified himself before his sovereign. It required some courage—and some knowledge of the *dessous des cartes*—to see through this attempt to pacify Hungary at any cost, while waiting for better times. But this courage—and, there seems reason to believe, this knowledge—Jellačić possessed; and when, after Batthyány’s departure from Innsbruck, the Banus arrived there, a change in the Imperial policy set in, which was promoted by the turn which events took in Hungary under the continuously growing ascendancy of the Radical party and its leader—it might be said, its dictator—Kossuth.

An anti-military tumult at Pest on May 10 had ended in the withdrawal of the commanding general, Baron Lederer; and several of the officers and soldiers involved in the affray had been subjected by the Government to the jurisdiction of an ordinary tribunal. The apprehensions of the army quartered in Hungary increased when the Ministry called out a National Guard of 10,000 men, with higher pay than the regulars, obviously in order to tempt over as many as possible of them into its ranks; and a vague hope arose that Jellačić was the destined leader of a reaction at Pest as well as at Vienna in which the army would again play the decisive part.

His astute proceedings continued to excite quite extraordinary interest in both friends and foes. Encouraged by a rising of the Serbs under George Stratimirović at Carlowitz, which the Hungarian General Hrabowsky had in vain endeavoured to suppress, the Croatian Diet assembled at Agram for an extraordinary sitting, and resolved to demand from the Emperor the restoration of the Banus, together with other more far-reaching concessions. It then voted to confer upon the Banus an unrestricted personal authority; whereupon he declared the Diet permanent, and then prorogued it with a “parental” benediction (July 9). In other words, he could now act as he thought best on his own

responsibility. A negotiation into which he hereupon entered at Vienna with the Palatine and Batthyány, broke down; but he proclaimed his failure at Agram as if it had been a success (August 6).

Whether or not Jellačić had intended this last negotiation to fail, it was predoomed to a breakdown. The action of Kossuth, which they were unable to resist or restrain, was beginning to create great alarm among his colleagues, of whom in truth Batthyány alone was under his spell. Kossuth, whose moods were at times those of a religious enthusiast rather than of a political reformer, had for a time, in a sort of retreat, been meditating a systematic breaking away from the Austrian rule. He began with a succession of financial measures culminating in a refusal of the compulsory redemption of the notes of the Vienna National Bank by the Hungarian exchequer, and in the emission of Hungarian paper-money to the amount of 12½ million florins, in lieu of a loan of its paper offered to the Hungarian exchequer by the Vienna Bank, in accordance with its privileges (May). Thus the interests of Austrian finance were united to those of the Austrian army in the desire to see an end of the Hungarian Constitution and Ministry. Kossuth, however, went forward undismayed, commending his proceedings to the capital and the country at large by "his journal" (*Kossúth Hírlapja*)—for he was not less fluent and effective as a writer than as a speaker. When, on July 5, the Diet was reopened, it was seen how great a change had been brought about in its relations to the country. The commanding influence had altogether passed from the Magnates to the Deputies; indeed, the Upper House was approaching extinction, as a large number of nobles were quitting the country. The war against the Croats was treated as a national necessity, and Kossuth's impassioned demand for 42,000 men and a credit of 2,000,000 florins was granted without a dissentient voice (July 11). On the other hand, though it was reluctantly agreed to defend Austrian interests in Italy, if reasonable regard were paid to the just national demands of the Italians, there was obviously a growing sympathy on the part of the Magyars with the Italian struggle for independence. While (notwithstanding the misgivings of Eötvös and Deák) the Hungarian democracy was thus under Kossuth's leadership drifting away from the maintenance of a foreign policy frankly in harmony with that of Austria, it showed itself ready to enter into relations of intimacy with the Frankfort Assembly and its Central Power; and Kossuth ruthlessly pointed out to his countrymen that the completion of the unity of Germany meant the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. The Austrian Government, on the other hand, still kept up a policy of conciliation towards Hungary; though its leading members, and more especially Bach, perceived the impossibility of maintaining a real union on the basis of the existing Hungarian Constitution. But the solution of the problem was soon taken out of the Government's hands.

The outbreak of the conflict between Austria and Hungary, which had no doubt been largely provoked by the dealings of the Hungarian Diet with the questions of army and finance, was decided by the change which came over the spirit of the Austrian Court and Government with the triumph of the Austrian arms in Italy. In June and July Magyar pride had suffered from the inability of the Hungarian Government to cope with a series of disturbances on the part of the Serbs of Slavonia, in the course of which General Bechtold, who had nearly 10,000 men at his disposal, was finally repulsed from the trenches of Szent Tomasch, commanding the Franzenskanal and the Lower Theiss. The Austrian Government, however, though an understanding existed between the War Minister Latour and Jellačić, could not yet make up its mind to take part openly with the latter and the Slav movement. Kossuth's budget, on which the debates of the Diet began on August 24, was conceived and constructed entirely as if framed for a perfectly independent State, managing its own army and foreign affairs. Yet the anticipated financial deficit was nearly four times the anticipated revenue, and could only be covered by a loan and the issue of paper-money (besides the doubling of the tax on absentees). The Austrian Government having, in accordance with the privilege of the National Bank of Vienna, prohibited the circulation in Austria of Hungarian one-florin bank-notes, Kossuth retorted by the prohibition of Austrian notes of the same value in Hungary; and other retaliatory measures followed. The relations between the two Governments were becoming strained to the breaking-point; and now a curious contest arose between them for the possession of the person of the Emperor-King. When, on July 24, a motion had been carried in the Hungarian Diet inviting the King to Pest, Doblhoff brought matters to a crisis by inducing the Austrian General Diet (July 29) to send a deputation to Innsbruck urging the Emperor's return to Vienna. The deputation had to listen to some indignant reproaches launched by the Archduchess Sophia against the misbehaviour of the capital; but for the moment the Ministry, and the wish to mark the Imperial displeasure with the proceedings in Hungary, prevailed, and the Court returned to Schönbrunn (August 12). Both the Ministry and the Court had been encouraged to this defiance of the Hungarian Government, to which they had hitherto seemed to yield step upon step, by the good news from Italy, where on July 25 Radetzky had gained the victory of Custoza and on August 6 triumphantly entered Milan.

On August 22 the first warning was given to the Hungarians by the withdrawal of the extraordinary powers of the Palatine; whereupon Batthyány and Deák immediately hastened to Vienna to arrest further action. But the *Camarilla*, which now determined the action of the Emperor—and of which the chief members were the Archduchess Sophia and the Adjutant-General Prince Lobkowitz, the friend of Windischgrätz, to whom were subsequently added Baron Kübeck, now out of office,

and Prince Felix Schwarzenberg not yet Minister—had resolved to strike home; and on September 4 an imperial rescript was issued, without previous consultation with Wessenberg, reinstating Jellačić in all his offices. The Hungarian Ministers, who knew that this meant war, were for the moment dumbfounded. Batthyány shook off all responsibility for the imperial rescript by resigning his post. The patriotic Széchenyi's mind was unhinged, and he attempted to take his own life. Kossuth alone, after a moment of discouragement, rose to the height of the situation, which he had done so much to bring about. Into his half-responsible, half-irresponsible, hands now fell the direction of the proceedings of the Diet, which accepted the programme of the Minister of the People—including the issue of an (apparently) unlimited number of Hungarian five-florin bank-notes, and the transfer of any officers and soldiers from the army into the newly created National Militia—the *Honveds*. All this was to be “without prejudice to the sanction of the King”—which sanction was immediately refused by an imperial rescript, dated September 15. Three days earlier Batthyány had been induced by the Palatine to undertake the formation of a new Ministry, to which Kossuth promised to give an independent support. Batthyány's self-sacrifice deserves recognition—for he well knew that the condition which he had attached to his consent—namely, that the Austrian Government should prevent Jellačić from an irruption into Hungary—could never be fulfilled. On September 17 came the news that the Banus had crossed the Drave; and the invasion of Hungary—an invasion countenanced by the Austrian Government, and jubilantly welcomed by a large majority of the Slavs, whether or not subjects of the Hungarian Crown—had begun. On the same day the *Reichstag* at Vienna, to which the Hungarian Diet had made a last appeal as from nation to nation, notwithstanding a notable demonstration of sympathy on the part of the German democrats, was induced by Bach to refuse to receive the Hungarian deputation. A few days later the Palatine, Archduke Stephen, resigned his dignity; though he was much blamed by the Court, his intentions had always been good, and he had no taste for Kossuth's project of proclaiming him King. The recognition of Batthyány's Ministry was, however, not directly refused at Vienna; and the relations between the two Governments remained for a time undetermined even after hostilities had actually begun. In other words Austria, as Bach had indicated, reserved to herself the right of supreme arbitration between Slav and Magyar—and of finally siding with the successful combatant. So late as September 22 the Imperial troops in Hungary were ordered to avoid any collision with the national levies.

The patriotic enthusiasm which in the hour of peril Kossuth had been able to infuse into Diet and nation had, for the moment at least, justified itself. Capital and country had been so far as possible placed in a state of defence. With a view to ensuring the fidelity of the people,

it was resolved to carry out in full the reforms decreed by the Diet in the preceding spring, more especially the removal of the peasant servitudes, for which the landowners were to be compensated by a state advance of 15 million florins. The national military force had been provided with arms, munition and gunnery instruction at the "national" expense. Most of the fortresses of the kingdom had been given up to the Government; Temesvar and Arad alone, among the more important places, remaining under imperial control. The key of the Danube fell into the hands of the Hungarians, when on September 28 Field-Marshal von Mertz left Komorn, of which the defences had been neglected, in the hands of his second in command, who soon hoisted the Hungarian flag. But though Jellačić' advance met with no support in Hungary, he continued to move forward, and the critical moment of a collision drew nearer and nearer.

A last attempt was now made by the Austrian Ministry, in consultation with some Hungarian noblemen at Vienna, to avert the imminent catastrophe. It was agreed, with the assent of Batthyány, who had been summoned to give advice, to form a Conservative Ministry in Hungary under the presidency of Baron Vay. But, as this would take time and Jellačić was gradually drawing nearer to Pest, it was resolved, again with Batthyány's approval, to send thither at once Field-Marshal von Lamberg, who was himself a Hungarian Magnate, and conciliatory in his sentiments, in the capacity of Commander-in-chief of all the troops beyond the Leitha; so that Jellačić would have been subordinated to him. Before Lamberg's arrival at Pest Kossuth had induced the Diet to appoint a parliamentary committee of six, of which he was himself one, to assist the Ministry in the conduct of affairs (September 22)—a far-reaching step; for out of this Committee grew that of the National Defence, which with Kossuth at its head accomplished the Hungarian Revolution. At a sitting of the Diet on the 27th Kossuth carried a further motion, disapproving the assumption by Lamberg of the command of the Hungarian army and forbidding any part of it to acknowledge him as its chief. On the 28th he arrived at Pest, and after a short interview with Hrabowsky, the General in command, was crossing the bridge to Buda in a hackney-coach, when he was fallen upon by an excited mob and brutally done to death. His mutilated body, which had been borne on scythes to the military hospital, was afterwards secretly interred by the Servite Fathers.

But for this foul act Jellačić would have found himself in a position of great difficulty, had he appeared at the head of his troops before Pest. But this was not to be. On September 29 he came upon the Hungarian forces under General Moga near Veldencze, and after an artillery engagement agreed to an armistice of three days' duration. The check thus imposed upon his advance, and his subsequent withdrawal towards the Croatian frontier, and then into Styria, raised the self-

confidence of the Hungarian people to a height which as a military event the engagement hardly warranted; but, little more than a week later (October 7), his reserve, which, 10,000 strong, had followed the retreat of his main army, was pressed so hard by the Hungarians under Perczel and Görgei that it was obliged to surrender.

On October 3 the Austrian Government at last issued an open declaration of war against the holders of power in Hungary. The manifesto was signed among others by General Récsey, an old Hungarian officer who had been named President of the Hungarian Ministry by the Austrian Government. At the same time the Diet was dissolved, and its last resolutions were declared invalid; a state of siege was proclaimed over the whole kingdom; and Jellačić was declared Commander-in-chief of all the troops in Hungary. But there could no longer be any question at Pest of going back. On October 7 two Austrian generals surrendered with their force to Görgei at Ozora, and a great number of soldiers immediately passed over to the national camp. At Vienna, Latour, though continuing in the *Reichstag* to deny that actual assistance had been given to Jellačić, was pushing forward all troops which could be spared to the Hungarian frontier; and it was his intention of using for this purpose even part of the diminished Vienna garrison of 8000 men, which gave rise to the final revolutionary outbreak in the Austrian capital.

While the *Reichstag* was, in half a dozen languages, debating the Constitution, and public attention seemed to be riveted by the progress of the conflict between the Magyars and Jellačić, the populace of the capital and its friends were still haunted by the vision of an approaching sudden revolutionary change. Agitators of all sorts were on the spot; and as the fear of a restoration of the old order of things began to be associated with military designs and Court influences, the sense of excitement and alarm continued, even after illness had for a time silenced the Radical agitator-in-chief, a language teacher named Tausenau. On August 21 and the four days following Vienna was terrified by a prolonged riot occasioned by an attempt of the Ministry to lower the state allowance made to unemployed women and children; and the Committee of Safety, unable to cope with the rioters, made an offer to dissolve itself. The offer was promptly accepted by the Ministry, which, chiefly no doubt at the instigation of Bach, was, in the words of a diplomatic observer, "adopting a more governmental attitude." This again excited the displeasure of the populace; and in a riot which began on September 11 and continued on the following day a ministerial building was sacked. On the 13th the students were astir; at the requisition of the National Guard the military were called out; and the *Reichstag* declared itself permanent—a vote which Bach's firmness induced the House to rescind. More exasperated than ever, the malcontents now formed a new Central Committee out of representatives of the chief



democratic clubs; and the sympathies of the masses were thus directly attracted both to the Hungarian cause and to the scheme of absorbing Cisleithanian Austria into the German Empire—or German Republic—of the future. Hungarian influence was of course actively at work to foster this disposition.

Thus Latour's attempt to detach part of the Vienna garrison for service in Hungary proved a calamitous experiment. On October 5 some difficulty was caused by the removal of an Italian battalion; on the morning of the 6th a battalion of grenadiers, chiefly composed of Viennese, was to have started for Pressburg, when a disturbance took place at the railway-station, and part of the battalion fraternised with the populace and students. Some Galician troops having been ordered by Major-General Bredy to intervene, he was shot dead; his guns were seized; and the mutinous grenadiers and their friends marched back in triumph into the city. Neither Ministry nor *Reichstag* knew how to act; the small garrison, scattered through different parts of Vienna, were confused by contradictory orders; and the mob increased hourly, in spite of some efforts of the loyal portion of the National Guard—a body which outnumbered the garrison by something like five to one—and with the connivance of its disloyal section and the students. The bells were ringing, and cannon discharging—and the mob had become a maddened monster, which needed its victim. This victim was sought and found in the Minister of War, Count Latour, who was forced to sign some paper, and then hunted out from an attic in which he had taken refuge, and murdered—his body being hung up on a lantern-post. Meanwhile, barricades were rising everywhere; and after a struggle of several hours the populace, early on the 7th, stormed the Zeughaus. Wessenberg and Bach (now also an object of popular hatred) made their escape; and the latter next day sought to ease Doblhoff's way by resigning his office. In the night a fraction or rump of the *Reichstag*, consisting mainly of members of the Left, held a sort of sitting in which they declared the *Reichstag* permanent; appointed a Council of the Commune (*Gemeinderath*) to provide for the public security in cooperation with the Government; and despatched an address to the Emperor which recommended an amnesty, to include the murderers of Latour, and demanded the withdrawal of the imperial manifesto of October 3. Thus closely was the outbreak at Vienna, though its immediate cause was to be sought in the agitation among the working classes, interwoven with the movement, now essentially democratic, of the Hungarian Revolution.

The Emperor received this address, before the night of October 6–7 was out, with his usual suavity, and gave a conciliatory answer in writing. On the morning of the 7th he quitted Schönbrunn, this time guarded by a numerous escort. His destination was unknown at Vienna; but on the 17th he took up his residence at Olmütz. Soon after his

departure another manifesto reached the Ministry at Vienna for publication, in which an appeal was made to all the peoples of the Empire for their support in the struggle with revolutionary anarchy. The Ministry, represented by the Finance Minister, Baron Philip von Krauss (whose conciliatory attitude towards the Revolution was quite understood at Olmütz), and the rump of the *Reichstag*, instead of associating themselves with this manifesto, maintained a kind of middle position. Meanwhile, the majority of the *Reichstag*—the Slav Right and the leaders of the Centre—with the approval of both the Conservative and the Moderate Liberal chiefs, Stadion, Wessenberg and Bach—declared its sittings transferred to Brünn. The Vienna rump had now become a mere local authority, by the side of the *Gemeinderath* and the perennial students' committee, in the midst of an anarchy which a contemporary could describe as *gemüthlich*—liable though it was to outbreaks of fury. While the unemployed proletariat was being armed with weapons from the Zeughaus, the remaining troops of the garrison were withdrawn into a suburb, and finally led out to join Jellačić's forces, which were now approaching Vienna. By October 9 his army, numbering between 30,000 and 40,000 men, reached Bruck on the Leitha, some four miles from Vienna; within a couple of days the heights round the city were covered with troops; and on the 13th Jellačić's headquarters were at Schönbrunn. Notwithstanding the rumours current in Vienna, no Hungarian army of deliverance had appeared. The *Reichstag* had not dared to call in Magyar aid; on the other hand the Hungarian Government—or in other words Kossuth, now President of the Committee for the Defence of the Country—awaited an appeal from the *Reichstag* before actually attempting the relief of Vienna. Twice—on October 17 and 20—Hungarian troops actually crossed the Leitha, and twice they returned.

It was not, however, Jellačić, to whom the chief honours of the recovery of the Imperial capital were to fall. On October 11 a proclamation was posted in the streets of Prague, announcing that Prince Windischgrätz was starting with his army for Vienna. It was issued on his own authority; but, unlike Jellačić in Hungary, Windischgrätz, who had for some time been in close communication with the Court, had not long to wait for its confirmation. On October 16 an Imperial manifesto invested him with the command of all troops in the service of the Emperor, except the Italian army under Radetzky. Slowly, according to his wont, Windischgrätz advanced, proclaiming from Graz on the 20th a state of siege in Vienna and its vicinity, and calling upon all authorities to submit to him within four-and-twenty hours. The troops ultimately gathered round the city were afterwards reckoned at 160,000 men—probably a much exaggerated total.

The resistance offered by Vienna, as has been well pointed out by the most recent historian of the Revolution in Austria, was far from contemptible, especially if it is compared with the quiet submission of

Berlin to Wrangel, and that of Pest to Haynau. Windischgrätz refused to enter into any negotiation with rebels; and the *Reichstag's* protest against his proceedings was futile. The moving power lay with the democratic clubs; and their nominee, Wenzel Messenhauser, an ex-officer and popular journalist and orator, had on October 6 been chosen Commander of the National Guard. He was a man of courage; but the actual organiser of the defence was Joseph Bem, who had served under Napoleon in Russia, covered himself with glory at Ostrolenka, in the Polish insurrection of 1830-1, and had taken part in the civil wars of Portugal. With ruthless energy he conducted the resistance of Vienna till its close on October 29, when he fled to Pressburg and offered his services to Kossuth.

The struggle now riveted the attention of Germany at large, as well as of the Austrian Empire. Though an attempt in the National Assembly at Frankfort to obtain a direct vote of sympathy with the Viennese broke down, and the two Commissioners, who at Schmerling's instigation were sent to make enquiries at Vienna, speedily quitted that city for the camp of Windischgrätz, the "United Left" soon deputed to the Austrian capital four of its members, among whom by far the most prominent was Robert Blum. His political position had of late been somewhat weakened by his attempts to repress the wild extravagances of the Extreme Left, while posing as the acknowledged leader of the entire democratic party; and, by nature an orator rather than a statesman, he may have gone to Vienna with vague hopes. But, according to the testimony of one of his companions (Julius Fröbel), the deputation speedily perceived the discord existing between the leaders of the insurrection, and on the day after their arrival resolved to return to Frankfort. This proving impossible, Blum threw himself with impetuous courage into the defensive action of the University students.

On October 24 Windischgrätz took up his quarters at Hetzendorf, near Schönbrunn. On the previous day he had issued his second proclamation to the Viennese, giving forty-eight hours' grace to the city, and ordering the dissolution of all armed bodies, inclusive of the Academic Legion, the closing of all clubs, and the removal of all aliens unprovided with a passport, and further demanding the surrender of certain hostages, as well as of Bem, the Hungarian Pulszky, and the murderers of Latour. The desperate suggestion of the *Gemeinderath* that he might at once take possession of the ill-defended city, Windischgrätz judiciously declined; and he refused to negotiate with either *Reichstag* or Ministry. On the 26th the bombardment of Vienna by the Emperor's generalissimo began; but it was not till the 28th that the main attack was opened, and that after considerable resistance, directed by Bem, the walls of the Inner Town were occupied. Hereupon, there was much talk of surrender; but on the 30th the revolutionary spirit flickered up once more. A proffer of intervention had now been made by Kossuth, but curtly refused by

Windischgrätz; and on the 30th the Hungarian forces under Moga once more crossed the Leitha, and came into collision at Schwechat with the greater part of the Imperial army under Jellačić. When the result of the battle, which was visible from the spire of St Stephen's at Vienna—the rapid defeat of the Hungarians—was ascertained, all further organised resistance on the part of the city was at an end. The proletariat was in occupation of streets and walls; and, early on the 31st, the *Gemeinderath* sued Windischgrätz for protection. That night Vienna was, after a short cannonade, entirely in the hands of the troops; and the black flag on St Stephen's gave way to the black-and-yellow colours.

On November 1 the arrests of persons concerned in the insurrection began; but no execution took place for more than a week; and it was reckoned that altogether not more than 104 cases of punishment occurred, and that in not more than twenty-four death was inflicted. Among those executed was Robert Blum, as to whose active participation in the rising there was no doubt, and who was shot on November 9. The remembrance of his eloquence and enthusiasm invested his death with a semblance of martyrdom, which long occupied the popular imagination. A protest against his execution was almost unanimously voted by the Frankfort Assembly, and even Schmerling had to show indignation. The pardon extended to Blum's associate, Julius Fröbel, was attributed to the fact that this well-known publicist had produced a pamphlet opposing the absorption of Austria in Germany. Another sufferer was the gallant Messenhauser, by whose execution a lesson was read to the Austrian *Reichstag*. For the rest, Vienna submitted to the Reaction without further protest—herein wiser than the enthusiasts who died without having abandoned hope; for the final overthrow of the Vienna Revolution ended the design of permanently transforming the Austrian monarchy into a group of national States, while merging German Austria in a united Germany.

The army had now once more become, and was conscious of having become, the chief power in the State. Radetzky tendered his congratulations to Windischgrätz, and the Tsar felicitated both commanders (November). The selection of a Government had no longer to be accommodated to the demands of a democracy to which Pillersdorff and his colleagues had been obliged to show deference. In place of the old Ministry, treated with cool disregard by Windischgrätz (whom Archduke John, for him rather bitterly, about this time compared to Wallenstein), a new Administration now took office, presided over by the Field-Marshal's brother-in-law, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg. He possessed considerable experience as a diplomatist (he had recently rendered admirable service to Radetzky in this capacity, after serving under him with credit in the field); but he knew little, and cared less, for modern constitutional life, and was a stranger to any theory of government, except that of a strong monarchy. His self-possession was due, partly

to aristocratic haughtiness, partly to a cynical coldness of nature; and his will was iron. With him were associated, as Home Minister, Count Francis Stadion, who combined with conservative instincts a sincere desire for reform; as Minister for Commerce, Bruck, the creator of the North German Lloyd; and, among the late Ministers, Krauss for Finance, and, after Windischgrätz had overcome his prejudice against him, the indispensable Bach for Justice. The really distinctive feature in the new Ministers' programme, and in their policy, was the insistence on the unity of the Austrian monarchy, even as against what would at a later date have been called Pangerman aspirations. The democratic party at Vienna and in the German parts of the monarchy in general had never been able entirely to shake off the desire for the preservation of this unity; and the political instincts of Schwarzenberg and Stadion met in the desire to renew it in a more enduring form.

On October 22 an imperial rescript summoned the *Reichstag* (many of whose members had already betaken themselves to Moravia) to meet at Kremsier, a small town not far from Olmütz, and formerly an archiepiscopal residence. Another opportunity seemed thus to be offered to the Čech party to control the situation; but before long a large portion of the Left of the Vienna Assembly put in an appearance; and on November 27 Schwarzenberg, no doubt speaking the views of Stadion, announced the intention of the Ministry to uphold unreservedly the "constitutional monarchy." As a matter of fact, the debates of the Kremsier *Reichstag*, mainly concerned with a series of *Grundrechte*, which, like those elaborated at Frankfort, were to form the basis of the ultimate Constitution of the Empire, attracted scant attention.

The utmost excitement, on the other hand, was caused by an event, foreseen though it had been, which the Ministry communicated to the Kremsier *Reichstag* on December 20. The Emperor Ferdinand—whose mental condition necessitated this step—had on December 2 abdicated the throne, with a kindly word of welcome to his successor. Archduke Francis Charles having, not without difficulty, been induced to forgo his rights, his and Archduchess Sophia's son, Archduke Francis, or as he was henceforth happily called, Francis Joseph, succeeded as Emperor. Though only eighteen years old, he was at once declared of age. His accession eased the situation; for he was unfettered by promises either Austrian or Hungarian. His title as King of Hungary was, indeed, disputed as not having been confirmed by the Diet of that kingdom; but for this he could afford to wait, if, as his first proclamation drafted by Alexander von Hübner, like most Imperial manifestos of this period, announced, his trust was, "with the assent of all his peoples, to unite them into a single political whole."

The aim of the Schwarzenberg Government, thus announced and re-announced, was the consolidation of a single centralised monarchy, whose Constitution would absorb that of Hungary and the lands hitherto held

to be dependent on the Crown of St Stephen. But was this aim compatible with the continuance of the Kremsier Diet, which presumed the duality of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy only partly represented in it? In the course of the constitutional discussions which this Diet had taken over from Vienna something like a fair compromise seemed to have been reached between the centralising and the purely federalist principles. Palacký, whose draft had proposed to divide the monarchy into eight distinct national groups, withdrew from the Constitutional Committee; and provision seemed to have been made for a reasonable distribution of functions between the central and the provincial authorities, and of the electoral power between the towns and the peasantry. But, though by March 2, 1849, the Committee had at last ended its labours (even so far as proposing a new national white-red-and-gold flag), and was about to submit them to the Diet, these hopes were doomed to disappointment. Though the Frankfort Assembly had affirmed the provision of the German Constitution by which no German land could be combined with a non-German in a single State, and though Hungary was fighting for the autonomy of which her own Constitution was the symbol, the Schwarzenberg Government on March 4 perpetrated its *coup d'état*. On that day it published by imperial authority a Constitution of the one and indivisible Austrian monarchy; the occupation of the Kremsier Diet, after its many months of labour, was gone, and on March 7 it was dissolved.

Far different, except in its close, had been the course of Prussian politics in the period ensuing on the Revolution of March, 1848. The dreary months of summer and autumn brought little comfort to King or people. King Frederick William IV's sensitive nature could not bring itself to accept the new conditions of rule. The Camphausen Ministry showed no lack of skill or earnestness in seeking to perform the difficult task of restraining democratic endeavours while at the same time recovering for Prussia the sympathies of German Liberalism; but they could not conciliate the confidence of the King, to whom the idea of ministerial responsibility was utterly repugnant. He was still worse pleased when at the end of June the Ministry was once more shifted "further left" under the presidency of Rudolf von Auerswald, Hanseemann becoming the leading Minister. Thus the King remained constantly accessible to the counsels of the Conservative *Camarilla* by which he was surrounded (Leopold von Gerlach, Adjutant-General von Rauch, Marshal of the Court von Massow, Edwin von Manteuffel, and Marcus Niebuhr); while at the same time lending an ear to the advice of those Liberal statesmen towards whom he cherished an unfailing personal confidence—Bunsen, Stockmar, and above all Radowitz, who may be said to have kept the King's conscience in this period of depression, down to November, 1850.

The chief questions with which at this time the Prussian Government had to deal were the settlement of the Prussian Constitution, and the

relations of Prussia to Germany as reorganised under the Constitution in course of elaboration by the National Assembly. To democratic opinion, and to those far-sighted political thinkers who, though from no democratic point of view, desired a fusion between the Prussian monarchy and the national German State of the future, nothing could be more unwelcome than that a Prussian Constitution should be called into life before the German; and beyond doubt a strong specifically Prussian feeling existed even in Liberal quarters. The Prussian Ministry could, however, hardly do otherwise than pursue its course; and after the second and last Combined Prussian Diet (*Vereinigter Landtag*) had closed (April 10), the Constituent Assembly on which that Diet had resolved met at Berlin on May 22, and sat till November. Between this Berlin "National Assembly" and the King there was little love lost, although he followed Stockmar's advice by abstaining from dissolving it; but the Conservative party took up no attitude of uncompromising resistance against its work—indeed, in one of the earliest numbers of the *Neue Preussische (Kreuz-) Zeitung*, the important organ of Conservative opinion in Church and State, of which Wagener was editor and Ludwig von Gerlach the most important contributor, it was argued that Prussia was *de jure* a hereditary constitutional monarchy. Before long, however, the Assembly fell more and more under the control of the Radicals; and, when in a riot on June 14 the mob plundered the Zeughaus, the Assembly, whose sittings were held close by, declared itself in need of no protection but that of the citizens of Berlin. On the other hand, in August a series of meetings was held at Berlin, under the presidency of Kleist-Retzow, "for the protection of property"—the so-called *Junkerparlament*, in which Conservatives of various shades of views, from Bismarck to Bethmann-Hollweg, took part. In September, the Assembly proceeded to such a height of democratic extravagance as to pass, against Ministers, a vote calling upon all officers in the army who refused to abstain from reactionary efforts to resign their commissions. The consequence was another ministerial crisis. The poor King was exposed to a series of refusals from leading Liberal statesmen, and from Alvensleben, who made it clear that his acceptance of office must be preceded by the King's abdication—an event which at this time seemed quite possible. Finally, a Ministry was patched up under General von Pfuell, on his return from suppressing disorder in Posen (September).

As the year went on, the spirit of unrest was still astir in various parts of Germany—there were tumults in Saxony; and in Baden Struve once more proclaimed the republic (September 21), but soon found himself in prison, while in Vienna the Revolution was still supreme. In Berlin the mob terrorised city and Assembly; and the King vacillated between submission to the will of the democracy (assenting for instance to the reform of the game laws, and thereby enraging Bismarck) and spasmodic recalcitrance (absolutely refusing to accept the abolition of

the formula "By the grace of God" as the preamble of his royal title). The Ministry could bear the strain no longer, and resigned; and on November 1 the King took his courage into his hands and appointed a new President of his Ministry who was prepared to risk a conflict with the Assembly. Count Brandenburg, the son of King Frederick William II and Countess Dönhoff, and a patriotic Prussian and a Hohenzollern every inch of him (he was a cavalry general and had recently restored order at Breslau), was not the man to shrink from necessary measures. But he lacked the official experience enabling him to avoid repressive processes which, aristocrat though he was, were repugnant to him. He was therefore soon provided with a colleague (and future successor) whose qualifications supplemented his own, and who had been trained both to pertinacity and to self-effacement in the school of the bureaucracy typified by him. Otto von Manteuffel's name is associated, more than that of any other man, with a period of Prussian history full of humiliations, but marked at the same time by a subconsciousness of the future for which the State was preparing itself and of which the glory was to fall to others. He suited the King, who liked those in his service to spare him the outspokenness which had hitherto been a tradition of Prussian official life.

On November 9—the anniversary, as Ludwig von Gerlach was fain to remind the Court circle at Sanssouci, of "*Brumaire*"—Count Brandenburg appeared in the Berlin National Assembly, and announced its transfer to Brandenburg. The Assembly replied by resolving to refuse the payment of the taxes already granted by it; but on the following day Wrangel at the head of his troops occupied the capital without encountering any resistance. So far the new composite Ministry (which still included several Liberal or Liberalising members, such as von der Heydt) had been successful; but they had formed a further design—that of introducing by the authority of the Crown a ready-made Constitution, which differed by the insertion of certain provisions for the maintenance of the royal authority from the "Waldeck Constitution" (as that elaborated by the Assembly was popularly called after the most extreme of the Radical leaders). The Government Constitution even accepted the principle of universal suffrage; nor was it till nearly six months later (May 30, 1849) that the three classes of electors, graded according to rate of taxation, were introduced, and secrecy of voting was abolished. It is not easy to understand the object of Brandenburg and his colleagues in persisting in their intention to impose (*octroyer*) this Constitution upon the country. The King at first refused to sign, and only gave way when convinced that nothing could be expected from the Assembly at Brandenburg, and encouraged by the example set by the Emperor of Austria on November 27. The Assembly itself, whose trump card of refusing the taxes had been played in vain, could not be induced to make up a *quorum* at Brandenburg. Probably it was the desire to prove



the Prussian State capable of determining its own course of action which induced the Ministry to undertake and carry through their experiment. On December 5 the Assembly was dissolved, and on the following day the new Constitution was promulgated.

The efforts of the Frankfort National Assembly itself for the settlement of the German Constitution and the permanent establishment of a Central Government could not but be affected by the political changes in Austria and Prussia, and by the bearing of their Governments and peoples towards the German problem. For—in spite of many taunts as to the political incompetence of the Frankfort Parliament and the nation whose aspirations it on the whole adequately represented—it was not this Parliament or the German nation which is to be held accountable in the last resort for the failure of the work of reorganisation. It has been seen that, after much time and trouble devoted to the discussion of the *Grundrechte*—the basis on which the edifice of the Constitution itself was to rest—there ensued the interruptions caused by the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and the September riots at Frankfort. It was well understood at Frankfort that, after the purely provisional step of entrusting the vicarious administration of the Central Power to Archduke John of Austria, it behoved the Assembly to lose no time in establishing that Central Power on a firm foundation. But though logic might in this instance have been sacrificed to necessity, and the discussion of the *Grundrechte* adjourned till their acceptance and that of the Constitution of which they were the substructure could be enforced, the relations of Austria and Prussia to the new Germany could in no case have been settled with speed. When on October 19 the National Assembly entered on its grand constitutional debates, beginning with a series of questions which involved the relations with the two Great Powers, its authority had, as has been seen, unfortunately been impaired both in the eyes of the nation at large, and as towards these Powers in particular.

The relations of Austria to a reorganised Germany had not admitted of other than speculative treatment so long as the former had itself been in a state of revolutionary unsettlement. The appointment of Archduke John as *Reichsverweser* had irritated the Prussian nation without really benefiting its rival, and had merely tided over the difficulty of securing a permanent Central Government to a united Germany. But there was a question antecedent to that of the satisfaction of such claims as Austria might still possess to the hegemony in Germany; and this was that of the actual territorial relations between them. Practically, this problem admitted of only three lines of solution. The first was to admit the entire Austrian monarchy into the German polity of the future; this was of course impossible, and more impossible than ever at a time when the conflict between the nationalities within that Empire had developed into open war. The second was to exclude (together with

Transleithanian) Cisleithanian Austria from the German Empire or Federal State, and thus to do away with the completeness of German union. This was the solution which seemed to Frederick William IV, as it has to many patriotic minds before and after him, an unpardonable sin against the national history and the national life. Even those, therefore, who, like Dahlmann and Droysen, were prepared to consent to this sacrifice, rather than renounce the design of creating a federal German State under feasible conditions, shrank from a naked presentment of this alternative; and in its place put forward what may be described as a third course. This was, to insert in the proposed second paragraph of the German Constitution the following declaration: "No part of the German Empire may form part of a State containing non-German territories." These words implied that if the German portion of the Austrian monarchy was to be included in the Germany of the future, that monarchy must be divided into two halves, held together by a personal union only. One of these halves must be organically united with the German Empire, acknowledging its laws and yielding allegiance to its Central Power, however that Power might be constituted. The other must stand aside. And to this proposal the Austrian Government must answer by a categorical *Aye* or *No*.

It was, however, clear that the Austrian Government was not at the time in a position to give a decisive reply to a question affecting the whole future of the monarchy; and, in any case, procrastination would have been in accordance with its instincts. On the other hand, neither the National Assembly nor Prussia, Austria's only real rival, had any sufficient reason for delay. Not only, however, would it have seemed abominable to Frederick William IV to allow any advantage to be taken of the difficulties of the Austrian Government; but even Prussian Liberalism of the old Opposition type, as represented by such a politician as Georg von Vincke, could not reconcile itself to such a course. To this feeling Gagern gave expression by moving an amendment to the proposal of Dahlmann and the Constitution Committee—to the effect that non-Austrian Germany should be constituted a federal State with which Austria should enter into a wider federation; so that there would be a Union within a Union. But the wider union would manifestly amount to little more than an international alliance; and the eminent poet and patriot Ludwig Uhland admirably described it as "the joining of fraternal hands stretched forth for a final farewell." Ultimately, a proposal to exclude all non-German lands from the Empire was adopted by a large majority (October 27); but the majority failed to carry the nation with it. For it was due to the support of the entire Left, which—the Vienna Revolution was then at its height—still indulged in the hope that German Austria was destined to form part of the German Republic. The declaration had, after all, to stand over.

When, after the removal of the Austrian *Reichstag* from Vienna,

Schwarzenberg at last found time to reply to the Frankfort Assembly, he informed the deputies who at Kremsier were labouring at the completion of the Austrian Constitution, that the maintenance of the unity of the Austrian monarchy—that unity with which the principle approved at Frankfort was at direct issue—was “a German as well as a European necessity.” The relations between the new Austria and the new Germany, he continued, could not be finally determined till each of them should have firmly established itself; up to that time, however, Austria would continue faithfully to meet her federal obligations. The answer of the Frankfort Assembly was to relieve Schmerling of his position at the head of the *Reichsministerium* by a vote of want of confidence; in other words, the Assembly refused to be any longer a party to the temporising policy which he had so skilfully carried on. His place was taken by Gagern (December 18), who in his turn was succeeded as President of the National Assembly by Eduard Simson, a Königsberg Professor of remarkable political, and especially parliamentary, ability. In answer to the enquiries of the Prussian Government Schwarzenberg was quite explicit. He demanded the admission into the Germanic body of the entire Austrian monarchy, centralised as a single State. The Frankfort Constitution should be thrown over altogether, together with the Assembly which had produced it; and the old Confederation should be restored, with a stronger executive than it had hitherto possessed (December 13). The Prussian reply favoured the conjoint consideration of the Frankfort draft Constitution by Assembly and Governments; while, as to the future relations of the Austrian monarchy with the Germanic body, it approved the plan of a wider federation between the two (December 19). A further exchange of views then took place as to a possible grouping of the smaller German States round the larger; the Austrian Government propounding a scheme which would have successfully sapped the principle of German unity as well as the design of Prussian ascendancy, and was therefore warmly welcomed by the Governments of the minor Kings; and Frederick William IV interposing with a memorandum (January 4, 1849) upholding that conception of Austria as the first and Prussia as the second German Power, from which he only swerved when his patience was too sorely tried by his ally.

Meanwhile Gagern demonstrated, on behalf of the German Central Government, that a united and centralised Austrian monarchy could not conceivably enter into the German Federal State as at present constituted, while the question of a wider union between them must be left to diplomatic negotiation (December 18). Thus the political separation of Austria from Germany had to all intents and purposes been officially proclaimed. Though not long afterwards (January 5, 1849) Gagern was authorised by the Assembly to enter into negotiations with Austria as to her relations with the German State, it was well-known that Schwarzenberg's diplomatic action entirely ignored the

German Parliament. It therefore behoved Prussia to explain to the other German States her own position and her desire that they as well as she should maintain a satisfactory understanding with the German Parliament. This was done in a circular despatch which further advocated a closer union between the non-Austrian States of Germany, and a wider union between these and Austria. King Frederick William IV was with great difficulty—mainly through Bunsen's exertions—prevailed upon to attach his signature to this missive; and with its despatch, on January 23, Prussia seemed to have at last entered into friendly relations with the National Parliament, and to have abandoned her preposterous attitude of deference to Austria. Unfortunately, even now he vacillated; but between the Austrian Government and the Frankfort Parliament the breach was no longer to be filled. From Schwarzenberg came a bland demand that the Austrian Constitution of March 4 should be recognised by the German Ministry, and the entire Austrian monarchy admitted into the Germanic Confederation, reorganised by means of a directory of seven members, presided over (this was the solitary concession) alternately by Austria and Prussia, with an Upper or States House of 70 members, of whom 38 were to come from the Austrian monarchy, and 30 from Austrian Germany. The resolute answer of the despised Frankfort Assembly to this proposal was the completion of the Constitution at which it had so long laboured and the choice of the King of Prussia as German Emperor (March 27 and 28).

On this last issue the attitude of the Prussian Government towards the action of the German National Assembly from first to last turned. The difficulties in the way of the consistent advocates of a Prussian hegemony over Germany, to take if possible the convincing form of a German Empire hereditary in the royal dynasty of Prussia, were many and various. There was the conscientious conviction of the King, that the Imperial dignity ought to be restored to the House of Austria, he being made German King, or, as he would have preferred, hereditary commander of the German armies; there was his still stronger conviction that, if the headship of the Empire were accepted by him at all, it must come through the choice of his fellow Prince; and there was, lastly, his private but passionate determination not to accept a "crown of shame" (*Schandkrone*) from the detested revolutionary Assembly at Frankfort. A less immediate difficulty, but one which seems to have impressed itself upon several eminent political thinkers of the time, was the bearing of the question of the Prussian hegemony of Germany upon the future of the Prussian State. Was it possible for Prussia either to secure this hegemony or to merge her own political existence in that of Germany, if she sought at the same time to develop her own constitutional life, with representative institutions of its own? Least of all could such a combination commend itself, if the Prussian Constitution, which was to coexist with the German, was one imposed by the Crown,

and lacking real guarantees of permanency. Such seem to have been the views of such men as Bassermann, Simson, Hergenhahn and Heinrich von Gagern, all of whom in November, 1848, visited Berlin. The last-named in particular, as the mouthpiece of the Frankfort *Casino* party, earnestly endeavoured to divert the King from the path along which Brandenburg and Manteuffel were leading him. For a moment, the King's imagination was fired by the "tempter"; and Gagern believed that his efforts had been successful. But it was not to be; Prussia was neither now nor later to be wholly "merged in Germany"; and, as has been seen, the Prussian Constitution was promulgated on December 6.

Thus, the Austrian Government, after repressing the Bohemian and Viennese insurrections, and making some progress, as it seemed, towards overcoming the Hungarian revolution, had announced as its German programme the reconstruction of the old Confederation. From Prussia, on the other hand, the great opportunity of establishing her hegemony over Germany seemed passing away for the reasons indicated above, and because of the jealousy of the smaller German royal Governments, and the unwillingness of the democrats at Frankfort, Berlin and elsewhere to support a scheme based on hereditary monarchy. Between these difficulties the German Constitution, which the National Assembly had laboured so arduously to perfect, could not but fall to the ground, and the whole national movement of which it was to have been the enduring symbol, collapse, together with the National Assembly itself, in the face of a triumphant Reaction. One more series of efforts was made before the end came; but when these had been frustrated, the story closes, though its epilogue will have to be briefly recounted in a subsequent chapter.

On March 12, 1849, Karl Welcker, an eminent member of the National Assembly who had hitherto upheld the retention of Austria in the Empire proposed, without previous consultation with his party, the adoption *en bloc* of the Constitution of the Empire as now before the Assembly and the offer of the hereditary dignity of Emperor to the King of Prussia. Had Welcker pressed his motion to an immediate division, it would probably have been adopted by a large majority; but he deprecated haste; and, when the motion came up from committee for decision, it was rejected by a small majority, which included the entire Left as well as all the opponents of the ascendancy of Prussia. Even patriotic Radicals, however, could not look with equanimity upon the downfall of the entire constitutional edifice which seemed imminent; and in the end the influence of Heinrich Simon and others gained over a sufficient number of the Left by the twofold concession of agreeing to the Imperial veto being made suspensory only, and voting in parliamentary elections secret. The bearing of this limitation of the Emperor's prerogative (which was subsequently even extended to his veto on constitutional changes) upon King Frederick William's

estimate of the value of the Crown subsequently proffered to him should not be overlooked. But the word had now been given that, *quocumque modo*, the Constitution and the election of the King of Prussia as Emperor were to be put through. On March 27, a majority of 27 resolved that the head of the German Government should be a reigning German Prince; and the hereditary character of the dignity was affirmed by the still more slender majority of 4. On the following day 290 votes were given in favour of the election of King Frederick William IV of Prussia, 248 deputies, including 200 Austrian members, not voting; and a deputation of 32 members, with President Simon at their head, was appointed to offer the Imperial Crown to the King in person. Before leaving Frankfort, the President, perhaps injudiciously, prevailed upon the *Reichsverweser* to retain his office for the present.

Since signing the important despatch of January 23, Frederick William IV had relapsed into his usual habit of political castle-building. Early in February he perplexed his Ministers by a four hours' exposition of the system of German policy favoured by him. On the one hand, he could not but be impressed by the fact that many of those around him—not only his brother the Prince of Prussia and Liberal Ministers and advisers, but even a member of the *Camarilla* such as Rauch—inclined to the acceptance of the Imperial Crown. But his hatred of the Revolution and all its works was ineradicable; and he told the veteran Arndt, who vehemently pressed him not to refuse it, that it was no Crown, but a necklet of slavery. Thus, in consultation with the *Camarilla*, an answer to the imminent offer was drafted, and to this, improved by Alvensleben and accepted by the Ministry, the King adhered, though not without moments of doubt. On April 3 the celebrated audience took place in which the Imperial Crown was actually offered and declined. Strictly speaking, the King neither accepted nor rejected it. The purport of his words, which were lacking neither in dignity nor in good sense, was that he could arrive at no decision without the free assent (*Einverständniss*) of the German Kings, Princes and Free Towns. Inasmuch as there was little or no doubt as to the assent of the petty sovereigns, it was the Kings only whose dissent was in question; but as this was equally certain, Frederick William IV's reply amounted to a postponement *sine die* of the proposal made to him. Whether or not he afterwards regretted his decision, in his comments to Bunsen and others he dwelt chiefly, and by no means without reason, on the dangers to which his acceptance would have exposed Prussia. To Beckerath, whom the Frankfort Ministry sent to Berlin to make one final attempt at overcoming his scruples, he used, not for the first time, the expression that "Frederick the Great would have been the man for the occasion—as for himself, he was not a great ruler." At least he loved peace, and was full of real, though probably exaggerated, fears for the security of the monarchy which he had inherited.

Not one of the four Kings—Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Würtemberg—ventured to affront the majority of their subjects by declaring against the resolutions of the National Parliament; and, on April 4, the plenipotentiaries of 28 German States signified their assent to them. Moreover, the affairs of Austria were again going badly in Hungary, and her resistance to any Prussian action could, for the time at least, have been only what Schwarzenberg might have called “symbolical.” But the risk which Prussia dared not run a year later existed in 1849; and the Tsar would no doubt have then raised as angry a protest against any decisive step taken or threatened by Prussia as he actually did in 1850. In any case, Frederick William IV had made up his mind not to run this risk, and to break with the Frankfort Parliament once and for ever. On April 11 the National Assembly had resolved by a vote of 276 against 159 to adhere immutably to the Constitution which had been read for the second time and approved by the House. A motion for its recognition was laid on the table of the Prussian Second Chamber; and on the 21st the King authorised a ministerial declaration that the Prussian Government refused its assent to the Frankfort Constitution. Camphausen immediately resigned as plenipotentiary at Frankfort; and at Berlin the Foreign Office was taken over by Count Henry von Arnim-Heinrichsdorf, from whom no opposition to the King’s vagaries was to be expected.

The action of the Frankfort Parliament was paralysed from this moment onwards. Austria had recalled her deputies so early as April 5. On May 4 the Parliament gallantly called upon the several German Governments to enforce the lawfully enacted Constitution, and announced at the same time that the first duly constituted German *Reichstag* would meet on August 15, up to which date a Regent of the Empire (no longer a Vicar) was to hold office. But even this course was only supported by a majority of two. On May 14 Prussia recalled her deputies, declaring her intention of carrying on, in conjunction with the Governments of the larger States, the constitutional work begun at Frankfort. On May 21 Saxony followed suit; and on the same date 65 deputies, headed by Dahlmann—the very core of the whole body—announced their withdrawal. Four days earlier, the *Reichsverweser*, by way of keeping up appearances to the last, had appointed a new Ministry—but it was an administration *pour rire*, including as Minister for Foreign Affairs one Jochmus, previously a Hamburg merchant’s clerk and a Turkish pasha. On May 25 the rump of the National Assembly determined by 71 to 64 votes to migrate to Stuttgart, where on June 6 it set up a Regency of the Empire, consisting of Heinrich Simon, the ultra-Radical Karl Vogt, and four other deputies, and on June 16 declared the *Reichsverweser* a usurper. On September 30 Austria and Prussia finally took over his functions, such as they were, still appertaining to the Central Power, and before the end of the year Archduke John finally made over his authority into their hands, quitting Frankfort on New Year’s Day, 1850.

So ended an attempt which had long become hopeless, to give validity to a Constitution nobly planned. This instrument, which would have realised for Germany the ideal of national unity in a federal form, has passed into the limbo of great designs frustrated by fate. The edifice had been constructed on the basis of personal liberty to be guaranteed throughout the Empire by the *Grundrechte* described above. Its several States were to retain their independence in so far as it was not limited by the Imperial Constitution, and their Governments all the rights of state sovereignty not expressly surrendered to the Imperial authority. There was no longer any loose confusion of Federal with Government power as had been the case with the old Confederation; the Imperial authority was to form the sole international representation of the German nation; to it were to belong exclusively the right of declaring war and of concluding peace; it was to have at its command, not a congeries of state contingents, but the entire armed force of Germany. The Empire was to constitute a single territory in all matters of commerce and customs. The Emperor was to be its head and its international representative. By his side was to stand the *Reichstag*—composed of two Houses: the Upper or *Staatenhaus*, with 192 members (40 from Prussia and 38 from Austria), half of them nominated by the several Governments, and half by the representative bodies of the several States; and the Lower or *Volkshaus*, composed of the deputies of the nation, directly elected by a simple majority in areas of 100,000 inhabitants; every male citizen over twenty-four years of age being entitled to a vote. To each of the two Houses was to belong the right of initiating laws and impeaching members of the Government; but the Lower House alone was to determine the Financial Budget, to be annually proposed to it and granted for one year in whole or in part, or rejected, by the representatives of the nation.

This was the gift which the Frankfort Assembly proposed to bestow upon the German nation; nor can the design be laughed to scorn, though its incomplete fulfilment was reserved for a later generation.



## CHAPTER VII.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE REACTION IN GERMANY  
AND AUSTRIA. II.

IN November and December, 1848, the prospects of the Hungarian Revolution had become very dark. The national pride had suffered from the defeat of the Hungarian army at Schwechat (October 30) and its consequent return into Hungarian territory; and the dream of an alliance between the Hungarian and the Viennese democracy was at an end with the fall of Vienna. Before long, the Hungarian Government would have to defend itself and its cause against a ring of armed forces closing in upon the turbulent Magyar capital to cooperate with the army that had subdued Vienna—from Galicia and Moravia in the north, and from Styria in the west. The anti-Magyar movement of the northern Slovaks had been quite recently put down; but in Transylvania in the east all sections were united against the Magyars, except their kinsmen the Széklers, and a savage Rouman rising played into the hands of the Austrian Government. All along the southern line, in Slavonia and in Croatia, soldiery was being raised where it was not already under arms, and the Hungarian Government were being taught too late their rashness in treating the claims of these populations with contemptuous ill-will. To a total of not far short of 150,000 armed men, of whom at least two-thirds were trained regular troops, the Magyars could as yet only oppose a force of 100,000—still to a large extent consisting of troops which had come over from the Austrian colours; the national levies of the *Honveds*, however, admitted of considerable further extension; the National Guards, on the other hand, could not be used in the field. The great want of the Hungarians was officers of experience; for though many officers had come over with their companies, they were for the most part younger men.

Windischgrätz, habitually slow in his movements, was on the present occasion probably anxious to wait till the change of Emperor should have been completed. The Hungarian Diet of course declared Francis Joseph's assumption of the succession in Hungary illegal, as having taken place without its own assent, and on December 15 Jellačić, with the advanced

guard of Windischgrätz' army, crossed the Leitha. Of the two routes leading directly to Pest the southern was covered by Moritz Perczel, a Hungarian political leader, who had formerly been an officer of Engineers. The northern was in charge of Arthur von Görgei, who, on Moga's withdrawal after Schwechat, had been appointed his successor. This able strategist and in many respects mysterious man (for, wherever the key to his character and conduct is to be found, it is certainly not in his own wordy memoirs) sprang from a German Protestant family in the Zips, and had, after some early military service, quitted the Austrian army and devoted himself to chemical research at Prague. In 1848 he returned to Hungary, where he at first took service in the National Guard and speedily came to the front, sharing in the success of Veldencze, and doing his part towards embittering the conflict by ordering the execution by military law of Count Zichy, for engaging in "treasonable" correspondence with Jellačić. Görgei, who had many enemies, and between whom and Kossuth there existed an ineradicable antipathy, was afterwards accused of having always remained a German and always a soldier. Though Kossuth is known to have spoken of him as "a very ambitious man," he was no politician; and, while certainly careful of his military reputation, not even animated by any consuming desire for warlike laurels. On critical occasions Görgei made his choice coldly, as if distracted by no thoughts either of himself or of the cause for which he had taken up arms.

At present he judged resistance impossible. Perczel, who had attempted it, had been easily driven off the field near Móor (December 30), and Görgei, notwithstanding the insistence of Kossuth, declined to risk a battle before Pest on the right side of the Danube. When on the morning of January 2, 1849, he reached the capital, which he lacked the means of defending, he found that National Defence Committee, Diet, and population were panic-struck, and that the members of the Committee, including Kossuth, had already taken, or were taking, their departure to Debreczen beyond the Theiss. With them they carried the most potent of the instruments of government at their disposal—the press which produced their bank-notes. By January 4 no Hungarian troops were left in the capital, which on the following day was occupied by the Imperial army without resistance. The confiscation of the property of all rebels in arms was at once proclaimed; and a number of important arrests were made, including that of Batthyány, who at the last, with Deák and others, had sought to intervene so as to obtain terms from Windischgrätz. All Austrian officers who had not abandoned the Hungarian service by November 26 were declared liable to be court-martialled, though many of them, being stationed in remote parts of the country, had been unable to choose their side.

Windischgrätz might now have thrown himself upon Görgei's army with a greatly superior force, still leaving enough troops at Pest to

mask the all-important fortress of Komorn in his rear. Moreover, Count Schlick, whose family had for many generations honourably served the House of Habsburg on Hungarian soil, and who was himself a cavalry general of renown, after crossing the Carpathians from Galicia and putting Pulszky to flight on January 4, completely routed the army of 17,000 men commanded by General Meszáros, the Minister of War. Hereupon, no other Hungarian force being at the time left fit for battle, Görgei's army at Waitzen (on the bend of the river north of Pest) had on January 6, at the instigation of its commander, declared its adhesion to the Constitution granted to Hungary by King Ferdinand, and at the same time its resolution to oppose all Republican manoeuvres. Whether or not influenced by this manifesto, Windischgrätz made no serious attempt to prevent Görgei from withdrawing into the *Bergstädte*—the mountainous country in the upper valley of the Gran—where he was for the time secure; and, after a demonstration against Perczel, he returned to Budapest. Thus, as the early weeks of 1849 passed away, the insurrection, instead of being crushed as had been announced at Vienna, was beginning to gather strength out of weakness.

For, in the interval, Kossuth and his colleagues had not despaired of their country, and had perceived what Windischgrätz had failed to realise in time, that in a country with so many centres of action only a large military force could assume the offensive with a fair prospect of success. To this end Kossuth instructed Görgei and the army of the Upper Danube to march from the north-west to the Upper Theiss, there to effect a junction with George Klapka (a high-spirited Magyar, who had also seen service in the Austrian army, and who had now succeeded Meszáros in his command) and support him against Schlick. Görgei, who chose to regard this movement as a retreat, was at the beginning of his march interviewed by an emissary from Windischgrätz, who proposed to him—prematurely—that he should bring over the “army of the Upper Danube.” Schlick's advance upon Debreczen was stopped by the junction of the two Hungarian armies, and he had to evacuate Upper Hungary with all possible speed. But he effected this with the loss of under a couple of hundred men (February 13); so that Görgei's campaign with the “army of the Upper Danube” was virtually a failure.

The discord between the Hungarian leaders hereupon rose to a serious height. The difficulties of the Committee of National Defence in choosing their generals had from the first been excessive. No superior officer who had come over from the Austrian service could make a stand against Görgei; and his relations with Kossuth and his colleagues had never been satisfactory. Thus the Committee turned their eyes to the Polish refugees. Bem had offered his services after the overthrow of the Vienna insurrection, but he was so much detested by the democratic party among the Poles themselves that his life was actually in danger and Kossuth sent him to form an army in Transylvania. Early

in January, 1849, another Polish veteran, who had served under Napoleon and had since actively promoted the Polish cause, appeared on the scene, in the person of Henry Dembinski, whom Count Teleki (the Hungarian agent at Paris) had assured that the Hungarian Government would grant autonomy to all the Slav populations under its control. This avowed Panslavist was now appointed Hungarian Commander-in-chief over the heads of Perczel (who at once resigned), Klapka and Görgei. The appointment was a grave error; for Dembinski's aims were, at all events as yet, not those of the movement which he served.

When at last (February 22) Dembinski assumed the offensive, he was just too late to anticipate Schlick's junction with Windischgrätz. The latter had attacked the Hungarian forces at Kápolna on the 26th; and, when on the following day the fight had become general, Schlick arrived at the right moment, and the Hungarians were driven back upon the Theiss. Though they had left 1200 dead on the field (against only 300 Austrians), the defeat was not a rout; but Dembinski proposed to carry his army to the eastern side of the Theiss in front of Debreczen, and (with the exception of Komorn) the whole of western Hungary was now again in Austrian hands. Thus the first offensive operation on a large scale had ended in failure, and pacific feeling began to increase in the country as well as discontent with Dembinski. Széchenyi was out of his mind; Batthyány in prison; and even in the rump Diet at Debreczen Kossuth had to face an uncertain majority. But he did not lose courage, being aware that the army was increasing in numbers and, thanks to Dembinski, improving in organisation. Though very few of the Magnates had stood firm, the very numerous smaller nobility, the lower middle classes, and the liberated peasantry had proved staunch. The bank-note press was busily at work, producing at a marvellous rate 30 and 15 *Kreuzer* notes, which Windischgrätz till the middle of March was obtuse enough to allow to circulate in the reconquered districts. Kossuth sought to terrorise his adversaries by appointing extraordinary tribunals for trying political offenders; and, finally, he resolved to appease the further growth of dissatisfaction in the army by the dismissal of Dembinski (March 5). But he could not make up his mind to create Görgei Commander-in-chief, till General Vetter, who had been appointed to the post, had fallen ill. Thereupon operations once more began on a large scale; and, to the amazement of Austria and Europe, the tide of the Hungarian Revolution was seen to have once more set in, and to be rising to its height.

Meanwhile, the prospects of the Revolution had benefited by successful operations in the dependent kingdoms. In Transylvania Bem, with only 10,000 ill-armed and ill-disciplined troops, had been able to confound the incompetent Austrian generals and to take Klausenburg (Kolozsvár) on Christmas Day, 1848. In January and early in February he suffered some reverses, but soon defiantly resumed his ubiquitous activity. And

now an ominous incident occurred. The Saxon towns of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt, trusting no longer to the protection of the Austrian arms, appealed for aid to the Russian General Lüders, who had recently suppressed a Boyar rising in Wallachia. He was instructed by his Government to decline any intervention, except in case of an explicit request from the Austrian military authorities. When hereupon Puchner actually asked for aid, 3000 Russians occupied Hermannstadt and 200 Kronstadt, nor were they driven out of the former by Bem till March 11. Puchner was himself forced to fly across the Wallachian frontier, being followed by all the remaining Austrian troops and the Russians from Kronstadt; so that virtually the whole of Transylvania was now in Bem's hands.

In the south-west, the Serbs and Croats, deeply disappointed by Jellačić's inability to enforce their claims on the Imperial Government, and in Slavonia hampered by quarrels among the native leaders, had finally come to place their chief reliance, as against the Magyars, upon the Austrian army, which, during the early months of 1849, asserted its domination as far as the Maros river. When, on March 17, Perczel resumed his command, his advance led to a series of atrocities on both sides—a conflict of racial hatreds, which must remain shrouded in some obscurity. A great part of Slavonia and, with Bem's aid, of the Banat, was subdued. Croatia the Hungarians made no attempt to master.

These successes were preliminary to that of the main army, now under the chief command of Görgei. Windischgrätz made up his mind that the real object of Görgei's advance was the relief of Komorn, which a considerable division of the main Austrian army had been besieging since March 19. But, when on April 5 Görgei drew near to the Austrian position between Gödöllő and Isaszeg, Windischgrätz, at the head of not more than 25,000 men, little more than half the Hungarian numbers, was, after an engagement on the 6th, obliged to retreat upon the capital. Görgei now marched upon Waitzen, and, after driving out Götz and defeating Wohlgemuth at Nagy Sarlo, on the 22nd entered Komorn. Thus, Windischgrätz had failed to act up to his correct conclusion. Wohlgemuth had to fall back in order to cover Vienna while Jellačić withdrew into his own special sphere of influence in the south; and the Austrian main army's evacuation of Pest and retreat south of the Danube upon Vienna was only a matter of time. However, an attempt made by Görgei on the 26th to cut off Schlick at Szony failed.

A few days before the actual relief of Komorn Windischgrätz had been recalled. Though a man of strong character (as well as of strong speech) he was not, in fact, a great general, and no politician at all, as his blindness about the "Kossuth notes" had shown. He had wholly underrated the strength of his adversaries, and proved no match for the unexpected movements of Görgei. His recall, on which his brother-in-law Schwarzenberg had insisted, was softened by his retaining the title

of Commander-in-chief; but the command of the Hungarian army was transferred to the Governor of Vienna, *Feldzeugmeister* von Welden.

The Hungarian victories, thus recognised by the Austrian Government, seemed for the moment likely to bring about an entire change in the political aspect of south-eastern Europe, by means of a democratic fraternisation between Magyars, Slavs, and Italians. At Debreczen Kossuth, never in prouder mood, unfolded to the Diet in a secret sitting his design of a perpetual rupture with the Austrian dynasty; and on April 14 both Houses confirmed his policy by declaring the regal rights over Hungary appertaining to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine to be forfeited for ever. The Commission appointed to draw up a Declaration of Independence issued a manifesto (which was dated March 19) appointing Kossuth, until a definitive form of government should have been established, "responsible Governor-President" of the State. The majority of the deputies still at Debreczen having signed a memorial in favour of the proclamation of a Republic, this step was actually taken and announced in the official newspaper on April 18. The Magyars now represented the cause of the Revolution pure and simple. Hungary and Italy—where the democratic party had also prevailed over the Moderates—were now whole-hearted allies in their struggle against Austria; and it was no doubt largely in consequence of the renewed vigour displayed by the Magyars in the campaigns of the early spring of 1849 that Charles Albert's last offensive effort was made, which ended in the rout of Novara (March 23). Towards the Slav nationalities Hungarian policy could now no longer remain repellent; already Kossuth had made one abortive attempt at conciliating the Roumans of western Transylvania; and a Hungarian army corps under Dembinski and Wysocki was placed on the Galician frontier to encourage a Polish rising.

Kossuth now appointed a Ministry of his own, by no means composed entirely, or even mainly, of politicians of advanced opinions; though the President of the Ministry, Szemere, by his declarations identified himself and his colleagues unconditionally with the principle of popular sovereignty. Görgei was appointed Minister of War, it being however understood that, while he retained the command in the field, General Damjanics, in whom he had the utmost confidence, would represent him in the administration. Unluckily, however, Damjanics was at this time incapacitated from further service by a dangerous accident; and Klapka, whom Görgei could ill spare in the field, represented him at Debreczen. In Klapka's opinion, the military resources of the country were insufficient to carry on the war for another six months; and this patriot of the purest water seems practically to have confirmed Görgei in his opinion that the only salvation for the cause lay in a military dictatorship. Thus Hungary entered into this new and fiercer stage of the struggle, with her Governor and her Commander-in-chief at odds as to the method of conducting it, if not as to its ultimate aim.

So matters stood when, after Görgei's victorious relief of Komorn, breathless expectation waited upon his next military step. The general supposition was that he would march upon Vienna. Such a course would no doubt have been consistent with the spirit of Kossuth's military policy, and would have been much applauded on both sides of the Leitha. Moreover, the time had not yet come (nor did it seem near at hand) when any considerable part of the Austrian forces in Italy could be used for the Hungarian War. For the Italian policy of the Austrian Government after Radetzky's victories continued to be aggressive rather than conciliatory; and the total numbers of the Austrian forces which could be used against the Hungarian Revolution cannot have even now exceeded by more than about 20,000 the total of 170,000 or 180,000 men whom the Hungarians could put in the field. But Görgei's prudence as a general (to say nothing of other reasons) opposed an immediate advance on Vienna; and Kossuth gave the formal order that the army should march, not on the Austrian capital, but on Budapest. On May 3, Görgei began to cannonade the fortress of Buda, still occupied by 5000 Austrians under General Hentzi. For six weeks this gallant band held out, even after a breach had been made in the walls, and, when on May 21 the place was at last taken by assault, the commander heroically fell at the head of his men. On June 6, Kossuth held his solemn entry into Pest, where he judiciously prorogued the Diet.

But already the conditions of the conflict, in which the recapture of Budapest marked the high-tide of Hungarian success, had changed. The Austrian Government had by its Italian policy left itself no choice but to call in foreign aid, if the Hungarian insurrection was to be speedily and completely overcome. If at Berlin—even within the *Camarilla*—it was whispered that Austria might be willing to pay for Prussian aid by the surrender of the hegemony in Germany, the suggestion never came to anything, and would have suited neither Frederick William IV's nor Schwarzenberg's sense of honour. No alternative remained besides the acceptance of the aid of the Tsar, though it was some time before the Austrian Minister's pride could reconcile itself to this course, on its being suggested to him by Windischgrätz. Apart from the fact that the Hungarian Government were desirous of provoking troubles in Poland, Nicholas I sincerely believed himself to be the appointed guardian of the cause of order, of the institution of monarchy, and of the conservative interests of society in general; and specially as protector of his young fellow-emperor on the Austrian throne. For the service which he was prepared to render he expected no reward but gratitude.

The circumstances of Russia's proffer of aid to Austria have no doubt been partially obscured by an intentional oblivion. Some indications of the Tsar's readiness to furnish assistance seem to have been given as early as May, 1848, on the occasion of the Emperor Ferdinand's first flight from Vienna. But it was not till March, 1849, so far as we know,

that the Austrian Government first requested the Russian to move troops to the frontier in support of its operations; and it has been seen how in the course of that month a Russian corps actually entered Transylvania, at the request of the Austrian commander there, and was driven out again by Bem. After the recall of Windischgrätz, the Austrian Government had itself requested the despatch of a Russian auxiliary force; but the Government of the Tsar made it clear that Russian aid must take the form of an army under the independent control of its own commander, and amounting to a force superior in numbers to any single Austrian army in the field. On May 1 the Russian decision to grant aid was officially announced at Vienna, and a few days later at St Petersburg. The persistent rumours of an intervention in the Hungarian interest by either or both of the Western Powers, came to nothing; and Palmerston's remonstrances against Austria's acceptance of Russian aid were angrily rejected by Schwarzenberg. From Sardinia nothing could be obtained but cooperation in the organisation of an Italian legion, and from the Porte nothing but sympathy, though that was genuine enough.

The net was being drawn in. Jellačić was once more advancing from Croatia with not far short of 40,000 troops; and, from the Austrian frontier on the right bank of the Danube, the main Austrian army was approaching under the command of *Feldzeugmeister* Baron von Haynau. The inherited ruthlessness of this able officer (he was a son of the first Elector of Hesse) had been abundantly experienced by the Lombard towns with the administration of which he had been entrusted by Radetzky. The virtually absolute judicial and military powers, conferred upon the new Austrian Commander-in-chief, as well as the character which he bore and consistently exhibited with the utmost frankness, left no doubt that, if ever conciliation had been part of the programme of his Government, it was now so no longer.

Kossuth and his colleagues had literally nothing on which to depend but the national enthusiasm; and to this they resolved to make a final appeal. On May 18 the Hungarian Government put forth its protest against the Russian intervention, and at the same time announced a plan of national defence conceived in the spirit of a Crusade or Holy War; and on the 27th followed a further proclamation, with Bishop Horváth's injunctions to the clergy to lead on the people, crucifix in hand, against the foe. But the effort was futile. Of the five million Magyars and two millions of German inhabitants, most of the Magnates and wealthier citizens had quitted the country, while no reliance was to be placed upon such Serbs or Roumans as had in one way or another found their way into the ranks of the *Honveds*. The numerical disproportion between the combatants was too great; arms were wanting, and could neither be imported from abroad, nor manufactured at home in sufficient quantities; above all, the supply of money dried up as the



depreciation of the paper currency continued, and even the tradesmen at Pest began to refuse the notes. Thus Kossuth's appeal was only partially successful; and, while he was straining every nerve to uphold the Republic, Görgei's endeavours to form a party favouring the restoration of the old monarchical Constitution obliged him to prorogue the Diet, inasmuch as he did not dare to take away the control of the army from his rival.

A respite was afforded by the difficulty of adjusting the Russian and Austrian plans of action. At an interview between the two Emperors, held at Warsaw on May 21, it was resolved to abandon the plan of a joint Austro-Russian attack, to prevent which Görgei was operating upon the Waag, when he was defeated by Wohlgemuth at Pered (June 20-1). While 80,000 Russians under Field-Marshal Paskiévich were now at last crossing the Carpathians, the operations in the west were, much to Haynau's satisfaction, left to him and his 60,000 Austrians. Advancing on Raab, he drove back the Hungarians, and on June 27 the young Emperor, Francis Joseph, entered the place at the head of his troops. By the middle of July, the Russians, who had advanced without resistance and, after taking Eperies and other places north of the Theiss, were moving towards the Danube, in order if possible to take in the rear Görgei, who stood near Komorn, and was thus in imminent danger of being caught between the two allied armies. It is impossible to recount here the shifts and changes which had distracted the counsels of the Hungarian military and civil authorities. Dembinski's plan of a southern concentration had been in turn approved, rejected, and again approved by Görgei, who in his turn had been deprived of the supreme command, and reappointed commander of the army of the Danube, while the Ministry of War had been again conferred upon Meszáros.

Meanwhile, Haynau was carrying on his advance with great spirit. He followed up the capture of Raab by an attack upon the Hungarians' fortified camp at Acs (July 3), in the course of which Görgei was wounded, but which led to no result. Görgei had now finally resolved to abandon his position at Komorn, and with it any attempt at protecting Budapest, and move upon the Theiss. Kossuth, with Szemere and the rest of the Government, hereupon took his departure from the capital to Szegedin, which he reached on July 12. Distracted by doubts, he put the best face possible upon the situation; assembled the Diet (in which the House of Magnates had dwindled to a single member), and allowed it to carry on the pretence of legislation, and vote *inter alia* the emancipation of the Jews. Certain measures designed to meet the grievances of the non-Magyar nationalities as to language and other matters were passed by a majority (July 28), just before the Diet was transferred to the fortress of Arad (which on July 1 had capitulated to the Magyars after a siege of four months). But no sittings were actually held here; for the end was already at hand. On July 18 the Austrians took possession of Buda, and on the following day the Emperor's colours

were hoisted at Pest, where, apart from special measures of oppression, the prohibition of Kossuth notes as legal tender brought immediate ruin upon many households. In the course of the month Jellačić's soldiery at Hegyes with difficulty extricated itself from the attack of a much larger Hungarian force (July 14), but he contrived to effect his junction with Haynau's army at Uj-Besce. On the 23rd a Hungarian force suffered a reverse at Mossorin, at the hands chiefly of the Serb levies under Kničanin; and even in Transylvania, notwithstanding the diversion which Bem attempted to create by an incursion into Moldavia, the gradual advance of the Austro-Russian forces continued.

Görgei had rightly foreseen how the dislocation of the Hungarian military power must end; and the events of the early part of August made this clearer still. Haynau, determined to strike hard to deprive the Russians of any ground for the pretence of having saved the Austrian rule in Hungary, pushed forward in the direction of Szegedin, where he hoped, at the junction of Theiss and Maros, and in a position threatening Arad, to crush the Hungarian army of the south, to the command of which, after the usual disputes, Dembinski had been appointed. On August 5 Haynau fell upon it at Szőreg (on the left side of the Theiss) and drove it back, though without obtaining a decisive victory. Thus a concentration of the Hungarian forces still in the field had become more indispensable than ever. For, after an extraordinarily successful guerilla campaign of several months, Bem had been routed by Lüders on July 31 at Segesvár (Schässburg), where the patriot poet Alexander Petőfi is believed to have fallen; and the army which Bem had raised in Transylvania, though it momentarily recovered itself, was completely broken up. Thus everything now depended on a junction being effected by Görgei with Dembinski's army before Haynau was able to accomplish its overthrow. But neither of the two Hungarian commanders acted so as to further this purpose. Dembinski, after his reverse at Szőreg, fell back as far south as Temesvar. Görgei, for whatever reasons, perpetrated, according to his own confession, an undesigned piece of strategical nonsense by stopping his march far to the north of Arad, on the river Hernád. He had successfully avoided coming into contact with the forces of Paskiévich; but on the very day (August 9) when he at last arrived at Arad, the Hungarian army of the south, with which his own was to unite, was hopelessly routed by Haynau. The Austrian commander had, after a successful fight at Szegedin, crossed the Theiss on August 5, and four days afterwards had the satisfaction of delivering the long-desired main attack at Temesvar. Just before the battle, the command had been transferred by Kossuth from Dembinski to Bem, who arrived barely in time to assume it. He retreated with the remnant of the army to Lugos, but he recognised the defeat as decisive, and neither he nor his troops, most of whom dispersed, thought of resuming the struggle.

At Arad, where Kossuth and the Ministry were assembled, and where Görgei was, according to his own account, preparing for immediate action, the relations between the Governor and the general entered into their last and most extraordinary phase. According to Görgei, on August 10, the day before that on which the news of the result of the battle of Temesvar reached Arad, he informed Kossuth that, in the event of an Austrian victory, he would surrender; Kossuth replying that, in the same event, he would take his own life. Before daybreak on the 11th Kossuth sent Görgei the news of the catastrophe; and Görgei, with the full intention of carrying out the surrender, asked Kossuth to abdicate, and thus to transfer the responsibility of the surrender to the head of both army and Government. In reply, Kossuth sent to Görgei a document with the proper Ministerial counter-signature, conferring upon him the supreme command and full powers for concluding peace—but with the Russians only. By Görgei's desire one of the Ministers, Csányi, thereupon called on Kossuth to point out that without his abdication this document was futile; and, in consequence, the act of abdication was signed on the afternoon of the 11th by Kossuth and his Ministers. This account, so far as the transactions on the 11th are concerned, is generally confirmed by the statement of one of the Ministers who actually took part in the proceedings (Sabbas Vucovics, the Minister of Justice). Two of the Ministers (Szemere and Count Casimir Batthyány), who afterwards took exception to the proceedings, were, however, absent from the meeting at which the resignations took place, together with a third (Duschek), of whom more below. But Görgei omits to say that Kossuth, in his letter of resignation, prescribed to him the preservation of the autonomy of Hungary as a separate nation—a condition not included in the original document sent to him. From this it was afterwards argued—not very forcibly—that, in consequence of Görgei's disregard of this condition, the powers conferred on him reverted to Kossuth. In his proclamation to the nation (of the same date) the ex-Governor, while declaring it useless to continue the war, certainly made Görgei responsible for the preservation of the national political life of Hungary. Görgei's own proclamation promised that he would do his best—by the sword, or by pacific means; but he bade the citizens in no case further resort to arms.

While Kossuth fled towards the Turkish frontier—which he crossed on August 17, after burying the crown of St Stephen and its jewels at Orsova—Görgei quite openly set about his remaining task. By the Austrian army, even more vehemently than by the Austrian Government, it was afterwards imputed to him as an unpardonable offence, that he surrendered to the Russians, and not to Haynau and the Austrians, whose victorious operations had actually determined the result: for it was the Austrian rule against which Hungary had risen, the House of Habsburg whose perpetual exclusion from the Hungarian

throne had been voted by the Diet, and the Austrian Emperor whose allegiance the officers and soldiers, enlisted by the Committee of National Defence, had forsworn. On the other hand, Görgei, and with him Kossuth and the Hungarian Ministry, who were at least equally responsible for the decision, had more reason for hope from the Russians. The desperate design which seems at some time—possibly as late as their council held at Arad on August 10—to have been entertained by Kossuth and his Ministers, of offering the Hungarian crown to a Russian Grand Duke, cannot be brought home to Görgei. But Russian overtures of some sort had reached him from a comparatively early date, whereas no communications of a similar sort had come from Haynau or any other Austrian authority. In return to intimations received late in July the Ministers Szemere and Count Casimir Batthyány engaged in an active correspondence, and Görgei sent General Baron Pöltenberg to the Russian General Count Rüdiger; but, on the very day on which Kossuth quitted Arad, a letter from Rüdiger reached Görgei informing him that all offers of “submission to his lawful sovereign” must go through the Austrian Commander-in-chief. Görgei, whose mind was made up, hereupon, with the approval of a council of war, sent a white flag to Rüdiger, stating that, being now in possession of the supreme authority, he was prepared for an absolute surrender provided always that it was made in the presence of Russian troops only; and he appealed to the generosity of the Tsar, more especially for the former Austrian officers in his army, excepting himself. He then, in the night of August 11, moved his whole army from Arad to Világos, where on the 12th he ordered the ex-Finance Minister, Duschek, to distribute all the coin and notes in the National Treasury to the soldiers, but allowed this worthy to carry over to the Austrians the uncoined gold. On the morning of the 13th, in face of Rüdiger’s corps, the Hungarian army, 23,000 men strong, with 11 generals and 1400 officers, laid down their arms. The number of guns abandoned was 129.

A small remnant of 5000 men, after a fight at Lugos (August 15), managed to cross the Turkish frontier in the course of the five days following. Besides Kossuth, some of his Ministers, with Generals Bem, Dembinski, Meszáros, Perczel and others had also found a refuge. The remaining smaller bodies of Hungarian troops in Hungary and Transylvania also surrendered to the Russians, together with the garrisons of Arad, Munkács and Peterwardein—probably more than 15,000 men in all. At Komorn Klapka held out with heroic spirit till October 5, when he capitulated under favourable conditions.

Nothing now remained but the payment of the penalty. In the first place, by order of the Tsar, “at whose feet,” according to Paskievich’s despatch to Francis Joseph, “Hungary lay,” Görgei’s army, with the troops that followed its example, was handed over to the Austrian Commander-in-chief, Haynau. But for the personal intervention of

the Tsar and Grand Duke Constantine there is no reason for supposing that Görgei himself would have met with exceptional treatment; most certainly, he had not sought for it. After being taken to Paskiévich's headquarters at Grosswardein, he was informed by Haynau that he was pardoned by the Emperor, and would for the present be interned at Klagenfurt in Carinthia. Here he was, as he believed, able, after some time had passed, to help in bringing about an act of grace for some of his fellow-officers; for he had some fine qualities as a soldier, though after Világos no patriot could breathe his name without a shudder.

Haynau rigorously carried out the orders received by him. In the first place, all privates and non-commissioned officers, and all officers who had not previously served under the Austrian colours, were allowed to go scatheless, though, as an administrative measure, 40,000 *Honveds* (officers and men) were at once enrolled in the imperial army, in which they were of course liable to serve. Next, the officers of the late Hungarian army who had formerly held Austrian commissions were brought up before the military tribunal at Arad, some 490 in number. Thirteen generals were condemned to death; but the sentence was not executed till the news of the fall of Komorn had been received at Arad, when, on October 6, four of them (including Kiss) were shot, and the remainder (including Aulich, Nagy Sandör, and Damjanics) hanged. No case among those of the "Arad martyrs" was harder than that of Prince Charles of Leiningen, Queen Victoria's cousin. Of the other officers in prison at Arad 231 were sentenced to death, but not executed; 386 underwent various terms of imprisonment. One of these was Joseph Bayer, Görgei's chief of the staff, whom Haynau is said to have termed the real leader of the insurrectionary army.

Besides those who were taken arms in hand, many others suffered for their participation in the Revolution. All Magnates and Deputies who had sat in the Diet since its dissolution had been ordered on October 3, 1848, and all members of the Revolutionary Government, or of the committees or tribunals set up by it, were proscribed (September 1, 1849); and to the list were subsequently added other names, including those of Prelates who had promoted the Holy War proclaimed by Kossuth and Bishop Horváth. The ex-Governor himself, Pulszky, Julius Andrassy, and seventy-three others, were hanged in effigy. Of those non-military offenders who actually underwent punishment, Hungarian accounts state that 114 suffered death, and 1765 varying periods of imprisonment. Among the former was Lewis Batthyány, whose object throughout had been a pacific solution. His self-sacrifice was understood on neither side; but no execution was more deeply resented in Hungary than his. A few days after his death the Minister Csányi, Perényi, who had presided over the Magnates at Debreczen, and other prominent politicians, were brought to the gallows.

That the tragic tale of these events repeatedly unfolded by Kossuth

before British and American audiences should have stirred them deeply, was only in the nature of things. On the other hand, we should not forget that, according to the official enquiry, of which the results were published in August, 1850, a total of 467 persons were put to death in Hungary proper by order of military tribunals instituted by the Hungarian Revolutionary Government; and that, quite apart from the soldiers who fell in battle, a much larger number of men, women and children were, beyond all reasonable doubt, sacrificed in Transylvania alone, to the racial hatred which the Magyar Government had helped to fan. At the same time, the severity of the measures capriciously carried out by Haynau, in some instances with a barbarity congenial to him, and the impunity, granted to many of the inhuman barbarities perpetrated by the Roumans in Transylvania, dishonoured the Austrian name; nor was the process altogether stopped after Schwarzenberg had informed his colleagues that both Haynau in Hungary and Baron Wohlgemuth in Transylvania had been ordered to put an end to it (October 26, 1849). Haynau, whose arbitrary method of rule gave offence at home, was actually recalled in July, 1850.

It may perhaps be added here that Kossuth, after entering the Turkish dominions, had been recognised and interned at Widdin. In the same fortress Meszáros, Perczel, Bem, Dembinski, and Guyon were lodged; Casimir Batthyány and others being quartered outside, while the fugitive soldiers, including those belonging to the late Polish and Italian legions, were encamped on the Danube near by. The extradition of the exiles was demanded by the Russian Government; but the Porte, in whose support both England and France made naval demonstrations, stood firm, and only the Polish refugees were expelled. Three of the generals, including Bem, thought it prudent to adopt the Mussulman faith. At a later date about 2000 private soldiers returned to Hungary, trusting in the Austrian assurance of pardon. Kossuth was himself transferred to Shumla, and finally, in March, 1851, to Kiutayeh in Asiatic Turkey, which he was not allowed to quit till the following August. His later career as an apostle of Revolution in Great Britain and America cannot occupy us here, or his intervention in the Italian War of 1859; he declined to take advantage of the General Amnesty proclaimed in 1867; and died at Turin in 1895.

The course of internal affairs in the Austrian monarchy on both sides of the Leitha up to the date of Schwarzenberg's death in April, 1852, will be noticed in a later chapter; for the close of his career marked no real break in the system of home government, of which the real direction gradually came into the hands of the supple and flexible, but tenaciously ambitious, Alexander Bach. The Court had returned to Vienna so early as May, 1849; and with it the old days seemed to have come back, while the military spirit, with which Schwarzenberg himself

was in thorough sympathy, was, owing to the self-consciousness of a doubly victorious army, more in the ascendant than it had been before the Revolution. Next to the army, the chief prop of the Reaction was the Church. The improvement in the administration of the country which marked these years was largely due to the reorganisation of its system by Bach, as were the revival and progress of industry and commerce to the far-reaching policy of Bruck. Nor should it be forgotten that, as has been already pointed out, the removal of the servitudes and other burdens by which the peasantry had for centuries been oppressed, including the abolition of patrimonial jurisdiction and police, were a benefit conferred by the Revolution upon the Austrian empire (with the exception of Galicia), not again to be undone. Thus, in this so-called period of Reaction, the social and economic advance made by Austria was, as will be shown elsewhere, at least as notable as was the specious success attending her German policy, of which immediately.

In the meantime, the era of constitutional reform seemed to have closed for the Austrian monarchy. The Constitution of March 4, 1849, now appeared to those who controlled the destinies of the State a piece of obsolete machinery. Perhaps Stadion might have saved it; but, so early as May, 1849, this upright and far-sighted statesman was forced into retirement by a mental collapse. The opportunist influence of Bach, who now became Minister of the Interior, was speedily signalised by negotiations with the Episcopate, of which the Concordat of 1855 was the ultimate outcome. In place of what Schwarzenberg openly called the "abortive Constitution," a vigorously centralised system of government now became the avowed end and aim of the Ministry. In Bohemia, even before the year 1849 was out, the indefatigable Palacký was once more to the front with a newly furbished-up plan for a federation of nationalities, and the enthusiasm for this ideal was by no means extinct among the Čechs; but their own day had not yet come, and the German element prevailed over the Čechish in the municipal politics of Prague. In Hungary, after Haynau's recall, Bach's system of centralisation and Germanisation was freely applied to all nationalities alike, to the great tribulation of the Conservative Magyar Magnates, led by Baron Jósika, to whom the Reaction had restored but little of what the Revolution had taken from them. When, in October, 1851, the government of the kingdom, now divided into five administrative districts, was taken over from Baron von Geringer by Archduke Albrecht, the reorganisation of the administrative system of government seemed to announce itself as permanent; and it was coupled with a commercial policy apparently to the advantage of manufacturing Austria rather than agricultural and pastoral Hungary. Only very slowly and very quietly the party of constitutional legality was building itself up under the guidance of Deák, who, after remaining quietly on his estate during the Revolution, had unostentatiously placed himself at his country's service after it had been "pacified."

In Transylvania, under Wohlgemuth, and afterwards (from April, 1851) under Prince Charles Schwarzenberg, the hopes of the Roumans were doomed to disappointment; no less complete was the disillusionment of the Slavonian Serbs; and hardly less that of their neighbours, the Croatians, whose Banus was loaded with rewards, while the country had gained nothing but a modest extension of territory (including three Hungarian counties, and Fiume), in return for the loss—during a decade—of its Diet, the visible symbol of its desire for national autonomy.

When, as we shall see, Schwarzenberg's diplomacy had prevailed over Prussia at Olmütz and Dresden, and the Austrian hegemony in Germany might be regarded as definitively restored, the time seemed to have arrived for putting an end to the Austrian Constitution. Very possibly, this step was recommended to Francis Joseph by his paternal friend the Tsar at Olmütz in May; but the advice was superfluous. Already in April, 1851, a preliminary step had been taken by instituting, under the presidency of the experienced Kübeck, a *Reichsrath*, or Council of State, which, though without power of control over the Ministry, was to be entitled to be consulted on all matters of legislation. Bach, who was already engaged in executing his masterly retreat from constitutional principles, was acquainted with the design by Schwarzenberg; together with only one other member of the Cabinet, the Finance Minister Krauss; but the latter, though a faithful servant of the Crown, dissented from the plan, and ultimately resigned his office. On August 20 the final decision was taken; on the 22nd the National Guard was dissolved; on September 19 the civil servants of the Crown were relieved (as the army had been several months earlier) from the obligation of swearing fidelity to the Constitution; and on December 31, 1851, an imperial patent abolishing it was issued. The Austrian *coup d'état* was not bloodstained, like that which had by a few weeks preceded it in France; but it openly attested the Emperor's and his advisers' want of confidence in one and all of the peoples of the Empire, whom by a stroke of the pen it deprived of their representative rights. Yet it produced hardly a complaint; for the Constitution to which it put an end had not had time to become part of the life of the peoples. It was what lay behind the Constitution, but could be pressed forward more effectively without it than with it—the centralising tendency, in a word—that in the ensuing period provoked and heightened what power of self-assertion and opposition the nationalities still retained. Thus, while the economic condition of the several sections of the Austrian monarchy, with the aid of free land-tenure and the development of industrial progress and commercial intercourse, steadily advanced, neither could their political growth be again repressed as it had been before the Revolution; and, when they once more addressed themselves to the task of settling their own affairs, the troublous experiences of the Revolution age proved to have not been undergone in vain.



The collapse of the German National Parliament and of the Central Power established by it had left the settlement of the future conditions of Germany's political life to be determined by the two Great German Powers. Or rather, inasmuch as nobody—except now and again King Frederick William IV—any longer dreamt of a sincere cooperation for the purpose between them, this settlement must be ultimately determined by the stronger of the pair. How to shape their action in accordance with this necessity now became the main task of German statesmen during a period of some seventeen years. Until, however, in one way or another, the Hungarian Revolution should have been mastered, Schwarzenberg, to whom the national ideals of Germany were wholly antipathetic, could only maintain towards Prussia's belated schemes for the political reorganisation of Germany, an attitude of cold dissent.

These attempts on the part of Prussia were marked from the first by an uncertainty due to the very imperfect mutual understanding which existed on the subject between sovereign, ministry, and people. Moreover, each of these was hampered by the difficulty of reconciling the historic self-consciousness of the Prussian monarchy and its subjects with the German aspirations cherished both by the King and by the large majority of his subjects. On April 21, 1849, the Prussian Second Chamber, in spite of the uncompromising protest of the Prime Minister, Count Brandenburg, adopted the motion of Johann Karl Rodbertus, the celebrated economist, supported by the leader of the Liberal Opposition, Georg von Vincke, in favour of the recognition of the Frankfort Constitution of the German Empire—but by a majority of 16 votes only. A street disturbance followed at Berlin; but the King had made up his mind, as a matter of conscience, that the assent of the German Governments to the Constitution must be secured before it was definitively formulated. Thus, on April 28, he invited all these Governments to send plenipotentiaries to Berlin to discuss the terms of a Constitution for the German Empire. But, inasmuch as the Frankfort Constitution had been actually accepted by Würtemberg as well as by nearly all the petty States, and rejected, though on different grounds respectively, by Bavaria, Hanover and Saxony only (in which last instance it had been accepted by the Chambers, but not by the King), it was practically the Governments of these three kingdoms whom the Prussian desired to consult. Yet it was at this very time that the revolutionary element, acting through the democratic clubs overspreading the country like a network, once more sought to dominate the situation.

A beginning was made in the Rhenish Palatinate, whose population, far from loyally disposed towards its Bavarian rulers, on May 2 set up a provisional Government, and for several weeks maintained it in power. The movement, as a matter of course, spread to Baden (although the grand ducal Government had recognised the Frankfort Constitution), where it took the alarming form of a general military mutiny, compelling

the Grand Duke to fly into Elsass (May 13) and rapidly bringing the entire grand duchy, including the Federal fortress of Rastatt, under the control of the Republicans. A few days earlier, the Revolution had broken out in Saxony, where the Chambers had been dissolved (April 30), and the Ministry reconstituted on a more Conservative basis under Zschinsky and Beust. King Frederick Augustus II persisted in his refusal to recognise the German Constitution; and, inasmuch as the Chambers had also placed the whole of the Saxon troops at the disposal of the Central Power, he might well think that his sovereignty was at stake. At Leipzig a vote of "want of confidence" in the King was proposed; and, when disturbances had broken out in Dresden, he sought with the royal family the shelter of the fortress of the Königstein, higher up the Elbe. A provisional Government was hereupon formed by the popular leaders, and the "defence" of the capital organised under the direction of Michael Bakunin, a Russian fugitive. The few Saxon troops at hand were unable to suppress the insurrection; nor was it till after four days that, on May 7, three battalions of Prussian guards, by express orders of Frederick William IV, made their appearance at Dresden and, followed by other Prussian troops, took possession of the city. The violence of the Saxon "May Insurrection," occurring as it did in the midst of a gentle though excitable population, was surprising; and there was so much disagreement among the leaders that timely concession might have confined the movement within a narrow channel, and left less room for alien agencies. As a matter of fact, the rising was suppressed with a comparatively small loss of life (probably about 200 insurgents, and half as many Prussian or Saxon soldiers). Of the leaders some (including Tzschirner) escaped; but Bakunin was caught and sentenced to death—he was, however, afterwards delivered up to Austria, and by Austria to Russia. Several thousands of arrests took place; and it was long before capital and kingdom recovered from the demoralising effects of a few days' disturbance.

In Prussia itself, where the vote of the Chambers in support of the German Constitution had been immediately followed by their dissolution, there was much disquiet. Part of the *Landwehr* was called out; but in many districts, both east and west, the levies resisted the call. Düsseldorf and Elberfeld were for several days in the occupation of revolutionary bands; and at Breslau barricades were erected and lives lost. But, this time, the Government stood firm; by the end of May it had restored order at home, and was ready to furnish aid in answer to fresh applications from other States. It was about this time that the Government introduced a classification according to income into the Prussian electoral system. The democratic party abstained for a time from taking part in parliamentary elections; but the change was never revoked.

Meanwhile, the summons to the three Kings had gone forth; and, in a

proclamation to his people bearing date May 15, Frederick William IV had announced his intention of perfecting a German Constitution in consultation with his allies, and laying it before a parliament in which all the States whose Governments had taken part in the work should be represented. Prussia seemed at last anxious to satisfy the national claims and to assert her own right to the hegemony by satisfying them. Radowitz, who was now, and remained during some eighteen months further, the King's chief adviser, was a man of profound veracity and true highmindedness, besides being a true Liberal and a convinced supporter of the Prussian hegemony and the policy of excluding the Austrian monarchy from Germany proper. In spite, however, of the breadth of his statesmanship and the force of his eloquence, he was not much liked by the Liberals—chiefly no doubt because he was a devout Catholic, and in favour of a free Church in a free State, and partly also because, as Ludwig von Gerlach put it, he had no happy hand—being in fact better able to manage the King than to conciliate his own political opponents.

With a view, then, to carrying out the policy which Frederick William IV had accepted as far back as January 23, 1849, of a closer "Union" between Prussia and the purely German States, and a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance between this Union and the Austrian monarchy—a policy which Schwarzenberg had to all intents and purposes absolutely rejected—conferences were actually opened at Berlin on May 17. These conferences were attended by the plenipotentiaries of Prussia (Radowitz), Saxony (Beust and Behr), and Hanover (Stüve and Wangenheim). The Austrian ambassador attended only the opening sitting, and the Bavarian was left without instructions. On May 26, the three Governments accepted a draft of the German Constitution which had been prepared by Radowitz, and which, while maintaining the principles of a Prussian headship in the conduct of federal affairs, of a common administrative council, and of a popular representation, had been revised in a Conservative sense in several points, more especially as to the system of election for the representative assembly. The principles of the "*Dreikönigsbündniss*" were therefore essentially those on which the North German Confederation and the German Empire succeeding it, were afterwards established by Bismarck, at the time one of Radowitz' most violent opponents; but, in seeking to carry out these principles, Radowitz was unable to master the spirits of intrigue with which he had to deal. On the day after that on which the Saxon and Hanoverian plenipotentiaries had signed the draft Constitution and agreed to the publication of the terms of the Union, they signified that the entrance of their Governments into it was conditional on its being accepted by the other German Governments—apart from the Austrian—and by that of Bavaria in particular. The Prussian Government, as appears from Radowitz' own notes, does not appear to have regarded this reservation

as invalidating the Saxon and Hanoverian assent; and in the course of the summer the Union was joined by the two Hesses and several other minor States, while a meeting held at Gotha, on June 28, of nearly 150 members of the late Frankfort Assembly, including Heinrich von Gagern, Dahlmann, Mathy, Bassermann, Soiron and Beckerath, declared in its favour. But even the support of the *Gothaers*, as they were called by an only half-sympathetic public, failed to embolden the Prussian Government to rapid action. Nearly all the petty Governments had now joined the Union; and about this very time the most important of them was being laid under enduring obligations towards Prussia. By the middle of May the insurrection had overspread the whole of the grand duchy of Baden, and had swallowed up its entire military force, together with 3000 troops in the Bavarian Palatinate and some Würtembergers quartered in Freiburg. Some 22,000 or 23,000 regulars were now in the service of the insurrection, together with 14,000 or 15,000 National Guards; and, allowing for the spread of the revolutionary spirit through the contiguous States, a force of 100,000 men or more might have been very speedily on foot. Of course there was a want of officers as well as organisation; and, though a Provisional Government was set up on June 1, its head, Ludwig Brentano, whose actual moderation contrasted with the inflammatory tone of his former speeches, could not assert his authority over Sigel, a high-spirited young ex-officer, who commanded the soldiery. In the course of the month, however, came the beginning of the end. A Prussian force of about 20,000 men under General von Hirschfeld marched upon the Bavarian Palatinate, and on the right bank of the Rhine another of about 15,000 under General von Gröben, with a *Reichsarmee* under the former Minister of War, the Prussian General von Peucker, rather smaller in numbers, overran Baden—while Bavarian, Würtemberg, and Austrian troops stood in reserve. On June 13 the Prince of Prussia was placed at the head of the whole expeditionary force. Four days earlier the Polish General Mieroslawski had arrived at Carlsruhe to assume the supreme command of the insurrectionary army. In the circumstances, his plan of breaking up Hirschfeld's army after drawing it across the Rhine, could not end in success. Hirschfeld did not cross the Rhine till he had completely subdued the Bavarian Palatinate; and, though Mieroslawski gained a success at Waghäusel over General Hanneken, the Prussians, superior in numbers and discipline, routed the insurrectionary army in a series of engagements (June 25–30), and, by means of a rapid march by Peucker as far as Constance, effectively prevented any spread of the insurrection into Würtemberg. After Mieroslawski had thrown up the command, Sigel had only 6000 men under him, most of whom found their way into Switzerland. Rastatt alone held out till July 23, when the fortress surrendered unconditionally, and many of the garrison were put to death. The whole struggle—the most extensive military effort of the Revolution in Germany—had cost

the victors about 1000 dead and wounded; the losses of the vanquished cannot have been smaller. But the victory was complete, and helped considerably to raise the prestige of the Prussian arms.

Yet, under influences of which the chief was the King's unwillingness to take advantage of Austria's troubles, there was still hesitation at Berlin. Indeed, when in August, 1849, the *Reichsverweser*, Archduke John, had at last agreed to resign his office on condition of the Central Power being provisionally (up to May 1, 1850) held by Austria and Prussia in common, the Prussian Government consented to this temporary arrangement (September 30). But soon the situation became clearer. On October 5 the Administrative Council of the new Union met to discuss the proposal of Nassau that a day should be fixed for the meeting of the new National Assembly. Prussia's smaller confederates were ready to agree to this proposal; but Hanover and Saxony now (relying on a provision of the Federal Act of 1815) declared that the assent of Austria, Bavaria and Würtemberg was required to make such a measure legal. Unluckily Prussia herself had on more than one recent occasion appealed to the Federal Act, instead of treating it as extinct with the Confederation. But the vote for summoning the National Assembly was passed on October 19; and, though Austria protested, the elections actually took place on January 31, 1850, in the States which adhered to the Union.

But these no longer included Saxony and Hanover. On October 20, the day after that on which the Union had passed its resolute vote, all doubt was removed as to their real intentions, which to British diplomacy at all events had been no secret from the first. The two Kings, both of whom were under obligations to the King of Prussia—what the King of Saxony owed him has been seen—now announced their withdrawal from the Council of the Union, though they stated that they still remained members of the Union itself. In plain words, this meant their secession; they took no part in the elections to the Erfurt Parliament; and on February 23, 1850, Hanover openly seceded, and the Prussian envoy at the Court of King Ernest Augustus was recalled.

The breakdown of the "Three Kings' Alliance," in default of which the "Union" practically shrank to a league between Prussia and the petty States, encouraged Schwarzenberg, whose hands were now comparatively free, to press his own notions of federal reconstruction. For, while treating the Germanic Confederation as still in existence, he proposed changes in its scheme not less drastic than those which Radowitz had in view. Boldly assuming that it would include the whole of the Austrian monarchy, he proposed to substitute for the old Federal Council a directory of seven States (Austria, Prussia, the four lesser kingdoms, and the two Hesses counting as one). The scheme was commended to certain of the Governments (Hanover in particular) by the suggestion of pleasing territorial readjustments; and, having before the

end of 1849 been taken up by Bavaria, it was elaborated so promptly, that by February 27, 1850, the Governments of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony and Hanover (though the last did not actually sign) could lay it before those of Austria and Prussia. The scheme of the "*Vierkönigsbündniss*" differed from Schwarzenberg's chiefly by including a proposal for a "popular" assembly, to be elected by the Chambers of the several States, and to consist of 100 representatives each of Austria, Prussia, and the rest. Austria's presidency over the new directory was not mentioned either in Schwarzenberg's proposals, or in the Four Kings' Draft; but it was understood to be as much a matter of course as the inclusion of the whole Austrian monarchy in the reconstructed Confederation. The bearing of these schemes on the future commercial development of Germany cannot be discussed here; but it may be noted that at the Customs Conference held at Cassel, July—November, 1850, Austria succeeded in preventing an understanding between Prussia and the south-western States, and that in the following year the first step in Bruck's great plan of commercial policy was taken by the establishment of a Customs Union, referred to above, between Austria and Hungary.

Notwithstanding the defection of the two Kings and the stimulus which it supplied to the designs of Austria—notwithstanding, too, the renewed lukewarmness of King Frederick William IV towards the "Union" scheme and the exceptions taken to it by some of the Prussian Conservatives, such as their parliamentary protagonist Stahl, and Bismarck—Radowitz persisted. On March 20, 1850, the Erfurt Parliament opened; and, in spite of a virulent attack on the Prussian "*Sonderbund*" delivered a few days earlier by King William I of Würtemberg in a speech from the throne, the revised Constitution proposed in a very effective speech by Radowitz was approved by the Assembly, which was soon afterwards prorogued (April 29). But now Frederick William IV made it clear that he lacked the courage, and had lost the desire, to pit himself against Austria and the four royal Governments, with no support but that of the petty States. He invited the Princes of the Union to a personal conference at Berlin, and, having apprised his guests that he left them free to adhere to the Union, bade farewell to them in terms amounting to a suspension of it till happier times.

Schwarzenberg, with heightened self-confidence, now quite openly pursued his plan of reestablishing the old Confederation and its Diet, though declaring himself only desirous of gaining a starting-point for necessary reforms. On his invitation the plenipotentiaries of Austria and the four kingdoms, together with those of Electoral Hesse (to which Hesse-Darmstadt was added at the second meeting), Homburg and Liechtenstein, and those of Holstein and Limburg (Denmark and Holland), met at Frankfort on May 10, and on May 16 constituted themselves the *plenum* of the Diet. It was not, however, till September 2 that after a long and energetic diplomatic correspondence between

Radowitz and the Governments concerned, the activity of the old Confederation was practically revived by the reconstitution of its Select Council (*Engerer Rath*).

Though these manœuvres were resented by Frederick William IV, his desire to remain on friendly terms with the Emperor of Austria induced him to arrange a personal interview between them at Teplitz (September 8) and to receive acquiescently a letter from the Tsar urging him to adhere to the Austrian alliance. Something more was needed than even Schwarzenberg's overbearing action to carry the King so far as he actually proceeded on the lines of the policy of Radowitz. With regard to the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty the action of the two German Great Powers had come to be more or less in agreement. After the conclusion of the Truce of Malmoe (August 26, 1848) between Prussia and Denmark, bitterly resented at Frankfort and in Germany at large, negotiations for a definitive peace began in London, and were carried on during the remainder of the year. In October the Danes formulated a proposal—probably suggested by Russia, who never lost the possibilities of the succession out of view—that, *without prejudice to its connexion with the Danish Crown*, Schleswig should form an autonomous State, distinct alike from Denmark and from Holstein. Palmerston prevailed upon the Prussian and then upon the German Government (January, 1849) to accept this formula, omitting the clause italicised, though even so it was contradictory to the historic principle of the indissolubility of the union between the duchies; but Denmark declined to listen to the proposal so modified, and, confident in the support of three at least among the Great Powers, declared the truce at an end. On April 3, 1849, the War was reopened; and, though the Danish Government might count itself master of the sea, it was on this very day that at Eckernförde two Danish men-of-war, having all but run aground, were obliged to strike their flags; one of them afterwards blew up in sight of the troops commanded by Duke Ernest of Coburg-Gotha. On April 13 followed the capture of the Düppel redoubts (opposite Alsen) by Saxon and Bavarian troops; but after some further German successes the Danes worsted the Schleswig-Holsteiners under General von Bonin in their attack upon Fridericia. The issue of the War was not however to depend on the exertions of the contending military forces. On July 10, 1849, a truce for six months was, again under British mediation, concluded by the Prussian and Danish Governments at Berlin, which stipulated that Schleswig, after being evacuated by the German troops, should be for the time administered jointly by a Prussian, a Danish and a British Commissioner, the military occupation of the duchy being distributed between Swedes and Norwegians in the north, Germans in the south, and Danes on Alsen. At the same time peace preliminaries were signed, in which Prussia accepted the clause safeguarding the political union between Schleswig and the Danish Crown,

Denmark not insisting upon this union being declared indissoluble. Palmerston's diplomacy had succeeded in bringing to pass a settlement which was no settlement at all; as was shown even more distinctly by the terms of the "definitive" peace, concluded at Berlin on July 2, 1850. This peace, most inglorious for Prussia, was what is technically termed a "simple peace," *i.e.* it merely reserved to both the contracting Powers all the rights which they had possessed before the war; it made no mention whatever of Schleswig (except as to its evacuation); and it left the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein to call upon the Germanic Confederation to restore him to his rights in that duchy, or, in case of its refusing to intervene, to take steps on his own account. All the long preceding negotiations had been carried on under the eye of the Tsar, who resisted any proposal tending to the separation of Schleswig from Denmark or to the recognition of the Augustenburg succession in the duchies.

Thus the duchies were left to themselves. At first they were determined to carry on the struggle; for their army numbered 30,000 men—not far from the total of the military forces at the disposal of the Danes—and before the struggle was over, was increased by 12,000 or 13,000. In April it was placed under General von Willisen, who was once more doomed to disappoint expectations. He was defeated at Idstedt (July 25); and the loss of Friedrichstadt (September 7), which he in vain attempted to recover (September 29—October 4), was followed by his abandonment of the offensive, and then by his resignation of the command (December 7). Before this the fate of the duchies had been decided in the Olmütz Conferences, and the restored Germanic Confederation had declared its readiness to carry out the Peace of July 2, 1850. In these circumstances the Estates of the duchies, assembled at Kiel for the last time on January 11, 1851, resolved to renounce any further attempt at resistance, and the Provisional Government made over its authority to the Austro-Prussian Commission of Pacification. On January 28, 1852, Frederick VII of Denmark took possession of the duchies with a proclamation promising them special Constitutions with separate representative bodies, included in a common Constitution of the whole monarchy, to be submitted to the approval of their Estates. This proclamation, so far as words went, carried out and even expanded the undertakings into which the Danish Government had entered towards the German Great Powers (December 6, 1851), and was followed (on May 10, 1852) by an amnesty containing, however, numerous exceptions. Denmark's sincerity in forming these engagements was to be tested during the twelve years of continual grievances, political, financial and racial, which preceded the Dano-German War of 1864. The Common Constitution for the monarchy, drawn by the Finance Minister Sponneck and promulgated in 1854, was rejected by the Eider Dane party; and in its place a revised Constitution, which left the



representation of the duchies powerless in all matters common to the monarchy, was in 1855 forced upon them, and, so far as Holstein was concerned, upon the Germanic Confederation.

Finally, the question of the Danish Succession in 1852 likewise reached a settlement full of danger for the future. Already before the Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848-9 there had been a strong wish in Denmark proper to regulate the Succession in such a way as to preserve at all events the personal union between the kingdom and the duchies, although in the former the *Lex Regia* (1665) allowed succession in the female line, whereas in the latter only the male line of Christian I could succeed. Matters had now been simplified; the Constitution of 1848 had deprived the *Lex Regia* of its basis; the claims belonging to Prince Frederick of Hesse-Cassel, the nephew and nearest relative of King Frederick VII, (should his two sisters resign in the Prince's favour), would therefore be dropped by common consent; and of the *agnati*, the Augustenburgs and (with a single exception) the Glücksburgs were held to be out of court as having been in active sympathy with the rising against the Danish Crown. This view, which was favoured by the King, was strongly supported by the Tsar Nicholas; and, as in his capacity as head of all the three branches of the Gottorp line, which came next among the *agnati*, he declared in favour of the one eligible candidate of the Glücksburg line, Prince Christian, it was hoped that the Powers might agree upon the choice of this Prince, who was additionally acceptable as married to a niece of King Christian VIII.

In his interview with the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia at Warsaw in May, 1851, the Tsar obtained the assent of the former, and the conditional assent of the latter, to his Danish Succession scheme. But after this initial success the negotiation hung fire—partly owing to the dissatisfaction aroused in both the German Great Powers by the Danish proceedings in the duchies, partly in consequence of the negotiations with the head of the Augustenburgs, upon whose assent Prussia had made her own conditional, and in whose claims Queen Victoria took a strong interest. Moreover, both the Prussian Government and Queen Victoria were desirous that the claims of the Germanic Confederation to a voice in the matter should not be ignored. Thus it was not till Duke Christian of Augustenburg had (towards the end of April) declared his acceptance of the terms offered—he was to receive an annual payment in return for his acquiescence and the renunciation of his Schleswig estates—that the Conference of the Powers in London could settle its Protocol on the basis of an acknowledgment of the integrity of the Danish monarchy as a European necessity, and the consequent nomination of Prince Christian of Glücksburg and his descendants in the male line to the entire succession. The Protocol was actually signed on May 8, 1852, the final decision of Prussia in its favour having been possibly expedited by the recognition on the part of the

Powers of the King's rights in Neuchâtel. The ratifications were exchanged by each of the Powers concerned with Denmark only, so that they entered into no obligation with one another with regard to the settlement. It was promulgated as a law for the entire Danish monarchy on July 31, though not less unwelcome to the Danish nationalists than to the Germans in the duchies, and though the Holstein Estates disputed its validity as not having received their concurrence. A further flaw consisted in the fact that, though the Duke of Augustenburg had promised, for himself and his family, in no way to oppose the succession of Prince Christian of Glücksburg, he had not actually renounced his claims, and could not renounce those which would after his death or abdication accrue to his sons, both of whom were of age in 1852. Finally, the Germanic Confederation had not been consulted as to the Protocol; and, as Bunsen suggested at the time, this left the question open so far as that body was concerned. Such was the character of the instrument by which European diplomacy hoped successfully to ward off whatever future storms might arise in sea-girt Schleswig-Holstein<sup>1</sup>.

Meanwhile, another question had brought Austria and Prussia to the verge of an open conflict. The Austrian suggestion of a provisional administration to be carried on by both Governments, had after some hesitation been rejected at Berlin (May, 1850); and Prussia, with the remnant of the Union, stood opposed to her rival, with the beginnings of the restored Confederation, including at present some eleven out of thirty-five States. Schwarzenberg now changed his tone. He could not protest against the Prussian annexation of the two Hohenzollern principalities, which had been accomplished, with the consent of all concerned, in April.

<sup>1</sup> This may be the most convenient place for referring to an episode now half forgotten, but at the time productive of great bitterness and a deep sense of national humiliation. The course of the Schleswig-Holstein War in 1848 had created in Germany a desire, as widespread as it was legitimate, for a navy capable of protecting the northern coasts of the country. The subject, after being discussed by the Committee of Fifty at Frankfort and by a naval congress held at Hamburg in May, 1848, was in June taken up by the National Parliament and the *Reichsverweser's* Government. A small number of ships was equipped, partly by means of a *matricula* imposed upon the several States, from some of which the response was extremely slack, partly by voluntary contributions; but the enterprise, as Minister Duckwitz reported in April, 1849, was in an unpromising condition even before the National Government came to an end, though a small flotilla supported the last efforts of the Schleswig-Holstein army under Willisen. The restored Germanic Confederation, though acknowledging the ships to be its property, did nothing to keep them up; and after Hanover had made some attempt to that end, and Austria had proposed that they should be distributed in three divisions, the Diet in April, 1852, resolved to make an end of the fleet. Hannibal Fischer, a retired Oldenburg official of extremely reactionary antecedents, was appointed federal commissioner for the purpose, and incurred so much obloquy in the process that the completion of it had to be transferred to other hands. After dismissing the crews he had disposed of six steam brigs at forty, the sailing frigate *Deutschland* at fifteen, and twenty-seven gun-boats at four per cent. of their estimated value.

But he could dispute Prussia's right to conclude military conventions with Brunswick and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha for the incorporation of their federal contingents in the Prussian army, and seek to prevent an exchange of Baden and Prussian troops by preventing the transit of the former by way of the federal fortress of Mainz. Radowitz was full of wrath; but the King was still for peace, and the Tsar, intent upon the settlement of the Danish Succession, still sought to keep the peace between his Allies. Thus matters stood, when a constitutional quarrel arose in the very heart of Germany, which seemed precisely calculated to bring the political conflict between the two Great Powers to an issue: since on this occasion the territorial sovereign and his Minister, supported by Austria, stood opposed to the representatives of the people, to the civil and military servants of the State, and to the whole of the population, who were warm adherents of Prussia and her German policy. The Elector Frederick William of Hesse-Cassel had from his youth upwards been in the habit of suspecting all his servants and all his subjects; and his vindictive nature had made him the bitter foe of all who adhered to the public law of the land. He had indeed joined the Union of Princes brought about by Prussia, but only in the hope of thus obtaining some support against his territorial Diet, with which he was at odds about his Civil List. When his Ministers had demurred to his throwing up this engagement with Prussia, he had dismissed them and appointed a new administration under his and his father's former Minister, Hans Daniel Hassenpflug, who had since been in the Prussian service, but had quitted it under a cloud. The Elector's subjects regarded the appointment of this avowed reactionary as an open defiance of their rights and aspirations; and some of his colleagues were hated almost as much as he was himself. When the Hesse-Cassel Diet was at last convoked, it refused to vote the direct taxes unless a proper budget were laid before it, and was promptly dissolved (September 2). The machinery of government in the electorate speedily came to a deadlock; the Elector quitted his capital, and none of the state officials would obey the hated Minister when he attempted to carry on the Government. This was the celebrated "revolution in a dressing-gown"—for there was no demonstration of violence, but a passive resistance all round.

No grievance on the part of the Elector was likely to find consideration with the Erfurt Parliament; but the case was different with the restored old Confederation at Frankfort, where Schwarzenberg was master. After a fruitless struggle to obtain supplies, Hassenpflug accordingly appealed to the so-called Exceptional Law passed by the Diet in 1832, but revoked by it in March, 1848, and, after proclaiming martial law in the electorate, and being in return indicted by the Committee of the Estates on a charge of high treason, appeared with the Elector at Frankfort to present his case. The Diet at once took preliminary measures towards a Federal execution, which led to the

resignation of the large majority of the officers in the electoral army (September). On the other hand, the pride of the King of Prussia shrank from entering the old Confederation at such a moment in order to defeat the action of Austria at the Diet; and he had probably no desire to pose there as defender of the Hesse-Cassel Constitution. There accordingly remained only the alternative of meeting any action on the part of the Diet, which was still legally incompetent, by force. This was the course advocated by Radowitz, who was at this very time (September 29, 1850) appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. If he could persuade his master to stand firm, the destinies of Prussia and Germany seemed to lie in his hands.

But such was not to be the case, even though the eleventh hour seemed to have passed; for on October 11 at Bregenz the sovereigns of Austria, Bavaria, and Württemberg agreed on putting an army of 200,000 men into the field, and on both sides troops were moving towards the Hessian frontier. Meanwhile, King Frederick William IV was still hesitating; and on October 15 Count Brandenburg, still at the head of the Prussian Ministry, was sent to discuss the situation with the Tsar at Warsaw, whither he was speedily followed by Prince Schwarzenberg. From Brandenburg's reports it is clear that the Tsar, though mainly interested in settling the Danish Succession question, and generally desirous of promoting a good understanding between the German Great Powers, insisted on the continuance of the Germanic Confederation, which would of course be entitled to send troops into Hesse-Cassel on the requisition of the Elector. Brandenburg waived the proposal of a German popular representation, and agreed to the admission of the whole Austrian monarchy into the Confederation—in other words, to the abandonment of the policy of the Union.

But, on his return to Berlin (October 31), he found the capital and the country aflame with indignation at the insolence of the Confederation, the arrogance of Austria, the impudence of Bavaria (of whose troops the army of execution in Hesse was mainly to consist), and the audacious obstinacy of the Elector and Hassenpflug. King Frederick William's pride was touched; he was determined not to allow the Federal execution in Hesse, and on the arrival of news that 6000 Bavarian troops had occupied Hanau, Prussian troops were ordered to occupy both Fulda and Cassel. At a ministerial Council held at Berlin on November 1 and 2, under the presidency of the King, a proposal for mobilisation was advocated by Radowitz, but opposed by Brandenburg and Manteuffel—the Minister of War, Stockhausen, declaring that Prussia was not equal to a conflict with Austria and the German south, supported by Russia. The Prince of Prussia vigorously supported mobilisation; the King favoured it, but left the responsibility to his Ministers. A majority hereupon voted against the proposal; and, as the King acquiesced, his strangely voted resolution to act on strictly constitutional lines seemed to have decided

the issue in favour of peace. On the following morning Count Brandenburg, whose opinion had carried the day, fell ill, and on November 6 he died. When in his absence the Ministers had met under the presidency of Manteuffel, Radowitz and his supporters (Ladenberg and von der Heydt) announced their resignation; that of Radowitz was accepted by the King in an eloquent letter.

Meanwhile, popular opinion in Berlin and the country, wholly in the dark as to the ministerial discussions, awaited some vigorous action on the part of the Government. On November 2 General Count von der Gröben occupied Fulda, and General von Tietzen held his entry into Cassel, warmly welcomed by the inhabitants. The Austrians had massed 76,000 troops in Bohemia, whose numbers rumour of course exaggerated. On November 4 an Austrian despatch arrived demanding the withdrawal of the Prussian troops from the electorate, and an intimation from St Petersburg that the Tsar would regard a refusal of this demand as a *casus belli*. On the evening of November 5, Manteuffel, believing war to be now inevitable, whether the Prussian Government wished it or not, with some difficulty persuaded the King to issue, after all, orders for the mobilisation of the army, though accompanied by a declaration that the measure was defensive only. Much enthusiasm marked the carrying out of this measure, which was published on November 6, while diplomatic negotiations with Austria were still in progress.

Still, every effort was made on the Prussian side to avoid an actual collision. On November 8 the Prince of Thurn and Taxis at the head of the mainly Bavarian army of execution (which finally amounted to 25,000 men) approached von der Gröben's position at Fulda; and at Bronzell, near that city, a slight skirmish of outposts took place, which was immediately stopped by the officers after five Austrian riflemen—and it was said, one Prussian horse (*der Schimmel von Bronzell*)—had been wounded. Von der Gröben received immediate orders from Berlin to evacuate Fulda and take up a position near Hersfeld, where the military route (*Etappenstrasse*) open to Prussia by treaty led through the electorate. Fulda was hereupon occupied by the Federal troops, and the "execution" proceeded in due course as it had at Hanau.

And now it became gradually clear that, the mobilisation notwithstanding, the Prussian Government was about to give way. Radowitz' mission to England after his resignation had failed to exercise any favourable effect; and, though France was massing troops on her eastern frontier, a bargain with the President of the Republic, who had suddenly become apprehensive of the preponderance of the Austrian power, seemed to Frederick William out of the question. On November 9, the day on which the news of Bronzell had reached Berlin, the King approved a despatch in which his Government gave way as to the Union (it was practically dissolved on November 15), and with regard to the Federal occupation of Hesse-Cassel merely demanded a joint undertaking as to

its object and duration on the part of Austria and her allies, and the acceptance of the occupation of the Prussian military routes in the electorate by Prussian troops. Even to this last concession, evidently designed to save Prussia's honour, Schwarzenberg demurred; and once more a crisis seemed at hand. Orders had actually been given that on November 27 Thurn and Taxis should at any risk occupy Cassel, where von der Gröben still stood, and an ultimatum to this effect had on the 25th been sent to Manteuffel by the Austrian ambassador at Berlin. At the last moment, King Frederick William persuaded the Emperor Francis Joseph to approve a personal interview between Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel for the settlement of all questions at issue, and a temporary postponement of the order to the Federal troops.

On the evening of November 28 Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel met at Olmütz, and on the following day they agreed upon a "punctuation," of which the substance may be very briefly stated. As is remarked by Sybel, on whose masterly account of these transactions any attempt to put the substance of them into a small compass must base itself, Manteuffel, who had long opposed the Union and who detested the Hessian rebellion, besides being perfectly content to let the King of Denmark deal as he would with Holstein and the Succession, might well have asked Schwarzenberg, "What is there really in dispute between us?" Since it was certainly not Manteuffel's fault that Prussia had drifted into her present plight, and since his conviction that war at the present juncture would be disastrous to Prussia was soon shared even by spirits as fiery as Bismarck (although Bismarck like the Prince of Prussia objected to premature disarmament), the obloquy heaped on his head was unjust. It was Prussia, not her Minister, who was in a false position. She was proposing to negotiate on equal terms with Austria, though the attempt of Radowitz to make good, in at least some measure, his master's failure to accept for her the leadership of a reorganised Germany had broken down all along the line.

The dissolution of the Union was already a settled matter. Austria's counter-concession of free conferences between all the German Governments had already been offered at Warsaw. It was devoid of value, inasmuch as, with regard to the conclusions to be reached at these conferences, Schwarzenberg adhered to the conditions accepted by Prussia at Warsaw, including the continuance of the old Confederation; while he absolutely rejected the principle of a dual headship, shared by Austria and Prussia, in its Diet. The settlement in Holstein, to be made by an Austro-Prussian Commission, would present no difficulty. Finally, as to the burning Hessian question, it was settled at Olmütz that the Federal Execution should put an end to the opposition maintained against the Elector by his subjects, and then withdraw. A single Prussian battalion was, *honoris causâ*, to remain at Cassel, with another battalion demanded by the Elector, of course Austrian.

It was understood that no objection would be raised to a few Prussian troops covering the "military route." The final settlement of the constitutional trouble was to be left to an Austro-Prussian Commission, to be appointed by the above-mentioned free conferences. Finally, it was agreed that the King of Prussia should fix an early day (before the meeting of the conferences, which were to be held at Dresden) for the demobilisation of his army; Austria would hereupon stop all armaments, in reliance upon the same course being followed by all the Governments represented at the Diet.

In Prussia the feeling of humiliation was general; and the Second Chamber, which met on December 3, was so vehement in its denunciations of the agreement that the *Landtag* had to be prorogued for a month. But King Frederick William, who saw wrong in many things, saw right in perceiving that it was a gain for Prussia to have brought Austria to consent to the settlement of the affairs of Holstein and of Hesse-Cassel by the two Great Powers alone.

Meanwhile, the Dresden Conferences, which were to wind up the constitutional conflict, opened on December 23, 1850. Schwarzenberg was resolved not only to uphold the principle of the Austrian presidency in the Diet and in the executive council, but that this executive should be formed by Austria, Prussia and the four minor kingdoms, whose interests were thus identified with those of Austria. All the able diplomatists of the secondary States were there, ready to follow suit—including Baron von Beust, the chosen champion in after days of the Confederation which he was now helping to resuscitate—a loyal combatant in substance, though fond of the methods of his craft—and Baron von der Pfordten, who from a Saxon Liberal Professor had become a Bavarian reactionary. Hassenpflug and Baumbach, unabashed as ever, represented Electoral Hesse. With Schwarzenberg, who assumed the direction of the discussions as a matter of course, was Buol, with Manteuffel the shrewd Conservative Alvensleben, who usually found the right word at the right moment. The Russian Baron Schröder bore himself as one who had an undisputed right of entry behind the scenes.

In the discussions of the Commissions appointed by the Conference it seemed as if the Austrian programme would be carried without substantial resistance; in which case, though the composition of the proposed Federal executive was modified by allowing a representation of the petty States, Austria would still have commanded a working majority in a body of 11. The admission of the entire Austrian monarchy into the Confederation had also been accepted, though the proposal of a Customs Union between all the federated States was deferred; and the principle of a popular representation was rejected by Austria and her friends. But now the Prussian Government awoke to the fact that there was no prospect of the principle of parity between the two Great Powers in the Confederation being conceded, and, encouraged by a vote of 18 out of

35 Governments against the proposals of the Commissions so far as they had proceeded, Manteuffel announced that the admission of the whole Austrian monarchy into the Confederation (to which he cannot but have known that the Western Powers were strongly opposed) would be conditional upon the concession of parity in its presidency. If this were rejected, he proposed a return to the Confederation on its former lines.

The latter alternative was accepted by Schwarzenberg; and, when after a long holiday the members of the Conference reassembled, it simply resolved that the Federal Diet should be reestablished at Frankfort in the form settled by the Acts of 1815 and 1820, and then separated. On the same day (May 16, 1851) a secret alliance was signed between Austria and Prussia, which bound each Power to assist the other in case of an attack upon any of its possessions, whether or not within the Germanic Confederation. The history of the Dresden Conferences was thus by no means a mere repetition of the Olmütz surrender. But to Germany and Europe it seemed as if the overthrow of the policy of Prussia were completed by the restoration of the old Confederation, and in his exile Metternich rejoiced. Holstein submitted. The Elector of Hesse-Cassel returned to his capital before the year was out, and in March, 1852, the Diet declared the Hessian Constitution and Electoral Law invalid, so that in the following month Hassenpflug could recommence operations. But though the old Confederation and Austria's position in it had been propped up for another day, her relations with Prussia in German affairs had been fundamentally changed both by the political conflict between the two Powers and by its closing incident. As for Prussia, not without reluctance and not without ignominy, she had been brought to the conclusion that she must wait.



## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SWISS FEDERAL UNITY.

THE one region on the Continent to which the storms of 1848 brought immediate advantage was Switzerland, for to them it owes its transformation into a well-organised Federal State. Probably in no other part of Europe were such diverse elements in contact as in this land, where of old Celts, Rhaetians, Italians, Alamannians, Burgundians, and Lombards had striven for the mastery, and in which even now dwell four wholly distinct races—Germans, French, Italians, and Romansch. And to the variety of tongues must be added the diversity of religious creeds. The Zwinglians and Calvinists held Zurich, Bern, Basel, Schaffhausen, Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Geneva; while in primitive Switzerland, as well as in Luzern, Zug, Fribourg, and the Valais, the Roman Catholics were all-powerful. In the Protestant Cantons the people were busily engaged in trade and manufactures, taking also an active part in the intellectual movements of the day, while the Catholic Cantons were inhabited by a population which clung firmly to their ancient traditions, and was devoted mainly to pastoral and agricultural pursuits, though many also took service in foreign armies. Their intellectual development was almost exclusively under ecclesiastical influence.

Down to 1798 the political institutions of Switzerland were essentially medieval in character, and presented the most amazing contrasts. Side by side with the medieval *Landsgemeinden* (or assemblies in which every citizen had the right to appear in person) which continued to exist in several of the smaller Cantons, were the leagues, subject to the "*Referendum*," of the Grisons and of the Valais; and the civic aristocracies in Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Basel, Fribourg, Solothurn, Schaffhausen, not to mention the King of Prussia in Neuchâtel and the two spiritual rulers, the Abbot of St Gall and the Bishop of Basel. As regards the legal position of the various parts of the Confederation itself, these different States fell under one or other of three categories—the Cantons or *Orte*, which were full members, the "Associates" or *Zugewandte*, and the "Allies" or *Verbündete*, the two last being, so to speak, half-blood members. In addition there were the "Common Bailiwicks" (*Gemeine Vogteien*), which were ruled as subject lands by two or more of

the Cantons together. Within each Canton, too, the most violent contrast existed between the rulers and the subjects. In those which took their names from their capitals the town was really the sovereign, and looked upon the rural districts simply as subjects held by right of conquest or of purchase. Out of the citizens admitted to the franchise, especially in Bern, Luzern, Fribourg, and Solothurn, a small number of families had gradually come to monopolise all the offices of State, so that the "Patricians" excluded the "ordinary citizens" from any share in the government. Even the democratic Cantons, as well as the principal among the "Associates," possessed subjects of their own. Strictly speaking, the Confederation before 1798 did not form a real State, but was made up of a bundle of States, held together with difficulty by more or less close alliances. The Diet was not a real Parliament, but rather an assembly of envoys of various sovereign States, who could not go a step beyond their instructions, unless expressly empowered to do so by their respective Cantonal authorities. The majority of the Diet, too, could not bind the minority by any resolutions or decisions. Thus neither the Directory nor the Diet possessed any real political power.

Despite all its weaknesses and defects, the establishment of the "Helvetian Republic" (1798) ushered in a period of regeneration for Switzerland. The new system not only abolished at one blow a thousand antiquated formalities which had tightly fettered the Swiss people, but it destroyed the odious distinction between ruling burghers and subject peasants, and between "Cantons," "Associates," and "Subject Bailiwicks," establishing in their place the equality of all Swiss in their relations to the State, and a uniform Swiss citizenship. It introduced, for the first time, a single common suffrage throughout the whole land, and provided for the eligibility of all citizens to all offices, for the absolute separation of the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary, for complete freedom of residence and of trading within the Confederation, for the right of redemption of land taxes, for liberty of belief and of the Press. There was now a real common Parliament, a central Executive, a common judicial tribunal, a single coinage, a single postal service, and a single penal code. Torture was abolished; the rights of the State in relation to the Church were clearly defined; the extinction of monasteries was projected, and special attention bestowed on the improvement of all grades of education. In one word, this revolution, due to external pressure, for the first time set Switzerland in face of the problem of binding in a real State her various fragments, deeply divided as they were by language, customs, and religion—a problem which has ever since occupied the energies of her most energetic citizens.

The process of decomposition in the Helvetian Republic, which Bonaparte as First Consul intentionally promoted, led to the formation of the two great political parties, which, though under different names, remained in all essentials the same till 1874. One party, which looked

backwards and bore the name of "Federalists," clung to the ancient Confederation and the old state of things, seeking its leaders among the "Patricians" and its main support in the Catholic democracies of the forest Cantons. The other was the "Unitary" party, which maintained the Liberal ideas of 1789, the unity of the State and equality of all before the law, and relied for supporters on the great mass of "subjects" thus set free. The natural opposition between these two political parties seemed likely to lead to a Federal State, when Bonaparte intervened. By his "Act of Mediation" (1803), he turned the unitary Helvetian Republic back again into a loosely-joined Confederation of nineteen independent Cantons, with a Constitution which has been elsewhere sketched. Yet, though he sacrificed entirely the conception of Helvetian unity, he stoutly maintained the other great principle of the Revolution, the equality of all men before the law. He therefore did not permit the old plan of "Subject Lands" to be set up again. To the old thirteen Cantons he added six new, made up out of former "Associates" and "Subject Lands," viz. St Gall, the Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, and Vaud. Within the several Cantons the equality of burghers and country folk was established, at least in principle. The larger Cantons became representative democracies, although the suffrage was limited by the requirement of a property qualification, and some preference was shown to the old capitals. The ancient *Landsgemeinden* were set up again in the smaller Cantons, though the former "subjects" received the suffrage and the right of being elected to public offices. The League, which bound the several Cantons to each other, was in several respects a closer one than that of 1798. The power of making war and concluding treaties was entirely withdrawn from the Cantons. On some subjects at least the Diet was empowered to pass by a majority resolutions which should be generally binding. The great differences in size between the Cantons were recognised by giving the larger two votes apiece, the smaller having but one. Throughout Switzerland freedom of residence and freedom of trade were guaranteed.

The arrangements made by the "Act of Mediation" were readily accepted, as they were excellently adapted to the prevailing opinion of the Swiss people. The intrigues of the Bernese "Patricians" who (December, 1813) called in the Austrians in order to upset the "Act" and to restore the old Confederation, with "subject lands" as of old, nearly kindled civil war. Fortunately, the Tsar Alexander forced Metternich to put a stop to this reactionary policy, and induced the Great Powers, which desired the abolition of the "Act of Mediation," to recognise the nineteen Cantons which it had brought into being. In 1814, this number was raised to twenty-two by the admission of the Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva. Long and tedious negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the new "Federal Pact," which was solemnly confirmed by oath at Zurich (August 7, 1815). The Congress of Vienna arbitrated

on the matter of territorial changes and on the claims for compensation between the old and the new Cantons. It was made a condition that the result of this arbitration should be accepted by the Confederation; on this stipulation only would the Great Powers agree to the long desired declaration of the perpetual neutrality of the country.

In spite of the complete suppression of French influence after the occupation by the Allies, the further political development of the Confederation proceeded on the foundations laid by Napoleon. Yet the reactionary attempt of 1813-4 had a certain influence upon it. The "Federal Pact" of 1815, which remained the Constitution of Switzerland till 1848, still further weakened the authority of the Central Power. Thus, it permitted the Cantons to make alliances among themselves, subject to the condition that these should not be to the disadvantage of the Confederation as a whole—a permission which opened the way later to the *Sonderbund*. The equality of all citizens before the law was imperfectly guaranteed by the very elastic provision that the enjoyment of political rights should never be the "exclusive" privilege of any one class. The right of residence anywhere in Switzerland was no longer secured by the Confederation; of which omission certain Cantons took advantage to expel from their territories Swiss who belonged to other Cantons. No mention was made of liberty of belief in this Constitution any more than in that of 1803, while, at the special request of the papal Nuncio, the Swiss monasteries were placed under a Federal guarantee. In the Diet each Canton, great or small, was given but a single vote, so that the 12,000 inhabitants of Uri had in Federal matters precisely the same influence as the 200,000 inhabitants of Zurich, or the 300,000 of Bern. The Directory now shifted between three Cantons only (Zurich, Bern, and Luzern), the Governments of which acted in turn, for the space of two years, as the Central Federal Government.

One great advantage the Pact of 1815 certainly had over the Act of Mediation: in form at least it was the work of Switzerland itself, and was not guaranteed by the Great Powers, for the Swiss statesmen of the day took great care not to lay it before the Congress of Vienna for sanction. Thus Switzerland was responsible to itself only for this Constitution; and therefore the later attempts of the Great Powers to interfere in Swiss constitutional struggles rested on no legal ground. The new Constitution, too, afforded the opportunity of reorganising the Swiss army, a plan which Napoleon had intentionally thwarted. The Diet obtained the right of organising the Federal army, of seeing to its training and its equipment, and of appointing the General Staff as well as the colonels. A modest beginning was also made with the creation of a Federal exchequer, for the Cantons were bound to hand over the produce of certain customs duties with a view to the formation of a Federal war-chest, into which were subsequently paid the 3,000,000 francs that formed the Swiss share of the war compensation exacted from the French.

The reactionary movement of 1814 was much more marked in the Cantons than in the Confederation. In Bern, Luzern, Fribourg, and Solothurn the patricians drew the power again into their hands. In order to meet the requirements of the Federal Pact the Bernese patricians admitted into their Great Council or Legislature (composed of 200 life-members) 99 representatives of the rural districts, who were partly coopted by themselves and simply formed an appendage, without influence, to the aristocratic party. The same course was taken in Fribourg and in Solothurn. A more reasonable scheme was adopted in Luzern, where for every 50 patricians there were to be 50 representatives of the rural districts. In the other Cantons also, where the constitutions made under the Act of Mediation had not been violently overthrown, the systems of government were altered in an oligarchical sense in 1814. In Zurich, the town with its 10,000 inhabitants received 130 representatives, while all the rural districts together, with a population of 200,000, obtained only 82. In Basel, the city had 90 representatives for 15,000 inhabitants, as against the 60 representatives of the rural districts for 30,000. In Schwyz, the formerly subject "outward districts" had to be satisfied with one-third of the number of representatives; while the district of Schwyz, being the "old" country, though far less populous than the rest, obtained two-thirds of the members of the local *Landrath*.

In the new Cantons, where there was no town which had formerly been the ruler and might therefore claim privileges, an attempt was made to give the Constitutions an aristocratic tinge by raising the property qualification for the suffrage and by complicating the electoral system. Neuchâtel occupied a very singular position, for in 1814 it had returned to the King of Prussia, though he had consented to its incorporation into the Swiss Confederation as the twenty-first Canton. Its connexion with the King of Prussia was, however, purely personal. Except in the case of the Governor, no one could hold any state office in the Canton who was not a born citizen of Neuchâtel. The Estates possessed the power of legislation; but practically all power was in the hands of the aristocrats of Neuchâtel, from among whom were chosen the higher officials, in particular the Council of State, which acted as the Executive under the presidency of the Governor. The Confederation had expressly stipulated, when Neuchâtel was admitted as a Canton, that the instructions given to the Federal representatives of Neuchâtel, as well as the ratification and the execution of Federal measures, should be approved only by the Government residing in Neuchâtel, without the necessity of any further sanction or approbation, and that Neuchâtel should be bound to fulfil its Federal obligations like any other Canton.

The Act of Neutralisation of November 20, 1815, guaranteed to Switzerland the inviolability of her territory, and her "independence of any foreign influences." This stipulation did not, however, hinder the Great Powers, down to 1848, from claiming a far-reaching

right of guardianship over Switzerland; in particular of preventing it from giving asylum to political refugees. After the Congress of Verona ended (December, 1822), the semi-official newspapers of the neighbouring Powers threatened a military occupation. To avert this calamity, the Diet, by the "*Conclusum*" of July 14, 1823, surrendered for many years the traditional right of asylum. If the external aspect of Swiss affairs, during the period following upon the Restoration of 1814, was not very glorious, its internal aspect presented no very edifying spectacle. In some Cantons the methods of government and of administration of justice were those of the Middle Ages: for instance, in the year 1821 a criminal in Schwyz was tortured no less than 52 times. The Governments were so intent upon economical administration, that their achievements in the matter of education, public works, and the like, were mostly very modest. Newspapers and books were subject to a severe censorship. In some Cantons religious intolerance again prevailed, in others only a limited toleration. After their restoration in 1814, the Jesuits reappeared in the Catholic districts of Switzerland, first of all in the Valais, then in Fribourg (1818), where they put an end to the educational work of the highly meritorious Franciscan friar, Père Girard, because their fanaticism disapproved of this "Pestalozzi of Catholic Switzerland."

On the other hand, during the peaceful years from 1815 to 1830, Switzerland regained her strength after the terrible sufferings she had undergone during the period of the French Revolution. Manufactures and trade revived; the carriage-road over the St Gothard Pass, constructed by the Governments of Uri and Ticino, was a worthy rival to the great road built by Napoleon over the Simplon Pass; while from 1824 onwards steamers began to ply on the Swiss lakes. Swiss societies displayed great activity in the promotion of matters relating to public utility, art, and science. The more advanced Cantons sought to fill up the gaps in the Pact of 1815 by means of voluntary agreements ("Concordats"). Thus in 1819 twelve Cantons agreed to allow freedom of residence, and nineteen to adopt the same coinage; and in 1820 seventeen permitted mixed marriages. Capable officers, among whom William Henry Dufour of Geneva was especially prominent, worked hard to improve the army. In 1817 the Diet founded a Federal military organisation, and in 1818 it founded a military school in Thun; from 1820 onwards troops from different Cantons were for the first time brought together for the purpose of military manœuvres on a large scale.

With the commencement of the Greek struggle for liberty, of which John Gabriel Eynard of Geneva was one of the most ardent champions, Liberal and democratic ideas acquired new strength. Around the veterans of the days of the Helvetic Republic, such as La Harpe, Usteri, Zschokke, gathered a talented band of young men, who worked for a keener public spirit in the Cantons and a strong central authority in the Confederation,

while the country folk, discontented with the fashion in which their interests had been ignored, were prepared, at the first opportunity, to follow these Liberal leaders. In 1829 Zurich abolished the censorship, and Luzern separated the legislative power from the judicial; while in Ticino the Constitution was amended in a democratic sense, and thus an end was put to the power of a corrupt oligarchy (June 30, 1830).

In the July Revolution in Paris a few weeks later the Swiss Guards, as in 1792, bravely defended the lost cause of the Bourbons. The immediate result was the dismissal of all Swiss troops serving in France; and, as Holland had already disbanded the Swiss soldiers in her pay, this event really meant the end of the system of Swiss mercenary service in foreign armies. The one exception was seen in the kingdom of Naples, which retained her Swiss regiments till a later date. In Switzerland itself the mere example of the Paris Revolution gave a great impulse to the democratic movement. An immense impression was created by the numerous attended popular meetings, especially by the imposing assembly at Uster in the Canton of Zurich (November 22, 1830). These meetings demanded the recognition of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and the reform of the Cantonal Constitutions either by the Cantonal legislatures or by special parliamentary assemblies elected for that purpose by the people, the inhabitants of the towns and of the country districts being placed on the same legal footing. In the Cantons of Zurich, Luzern, Solothurn, St Gall, and Thurgau similar monster demonstrations sufficed to intimidate or coerce executives and legislatures. In Aargau, in Vaud, in Fribourg, and in Schaffhausen, armed but fortunately bloodless expeditions of the country folk against the capitals contributed to the success of the movement. In Bern the "Patricians" made a show of opposing it not only in their own territory, but, by virtue of their directorial power, in the entire Confederation also. However, on December 27, 1830, the Diet, under the lead of Zurich, refused to sanction any Federal intervention in the reform of Cantonal Constitutions. But, when disturbances broke out in the Bernese Jura, and a popular meeting held at Münsingen on January 10, 1831, fixed in a threatening mood a period within which a commission to consider the reform of the Cantonal Constitution should be summoned, the haughty Bernese "Patricians" decided to yield and to let matters take their natural course.

The new Cantonal Constitutions, framed in 1830-1, and submitted everywhere to a popular vote, except in Fribourg, made representative democracy the prevailing government in Switzerland. The people were considered sovereign, but exercised their rights only by the acceptance or rejection of the constitution, and by the direct or indirect choice of their representatives in the Legislatures (*Grosse Räte*). In St Gall alone had they the right of veto on resolutions passed by the Legislature. Property qualifications for the franchise disappeared

almost everywhere. The Cantonal Legislatures, elected for a limited period of years, passed laws, levied taxes, appointed the Executives and the Supreme Courts of Justice, superintended the whole administration, and decided the Cantonal vote in the Federal Diet. The new Constitutions guaranteed the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the publicity of official proceedings, freedom of belief, of the Press, of trade, of the right of petitioning, and protection against arbitrary arrest, and prohibited the extortion of confessions from accused persons and the like. Finally, the Cantonal Constitutions provided everywhere the possibility of constitutional amendment. In the Cantons thus "regenerated" a lively rivalry prevailed as to building up the State on the basis of Liberal principles, improving the administration and the courts of justice, freeing both trade and commerce from all shackles, constructing roads and other works of public utility, and particularly as to the education of the young, which was declared by the new Constitutions to be one of the first duties of the State. The system of primary education was thoroughly reconstructed, compulsory attendance was everywhere enforced, and seminaries for training teachers were founded. The institutions for higher education were also reformed; the middle schools were better organised; while the High Schools of Zurich and Bern were raised to the full rank of Universities in 1833-4.

Though in most Cantons these constitutional reforms were carried out without any great disturbance of the peace, they led in one case to prolonged strife and even to a regular civil war—in the Canton of Basel. Here the rulers of their own accord undertook the amendment of the Cantonal Constitution. This reform, however, did not satisfy the country folk, because the new Constitution assured, as before, to the city the majority in the legislature. The first armed rising of the malcontents was put down on January 13, 1831, by the Cantonal troops without much trouble; and the amended Constitution was declared to be in force. The institution of criminal proceedings against the leaders of the country folk kindled the flames of revolt afresh; and a second advance of the Cantonal troops succeeded ill (August 21). Even the occupation of the rural portion of the Canton by the Federal forces failed to restore peace to the distracted region, especially as the internal divisions of the Federal Diet prevented decisive measures. The Federal Diet being reluctant to resolve upon upholding unconditionally the Cantonal Constitution, so hateful to the Basel country folk, the Legislature of Basel on February 22, 1832, withdrew from forty-six recalcitrant communes the right of managing public affairs, thus handing them over to anarchy. But the only result of this measure was that on March 17, 1832, these communes formed themselves into a separate Canton, under the name of "Rural Basel" (*Basel-Land*). All the efforts of the Federal Diet to prevent this division of the Canton failed, owing to the obstinacy shown on both sides. Nothing remained, therefore, but to recognise



(September 14) this division, the right of reunion being reserved, and meanwhile half a vote in the Diet being attributed to each of the new half-Cantons. Disturbances of a similar kind threatened to cut the Canton of Schwyz into two halves. The "Outer Districts," after the refusal of "Old Schwyz" to recognise their political equality, met (April 15, 1832) in a *Landsgemeinde* at Einsiedeln, and proclaimed themselves an independent half-Canton under the name of "Outer Schwyz."

A third troublesome member of the Confederation was Neuchâtel. The stronger the feeling of Swiss nationality became, the more unnatural did its double position appear. Its ruling aristocrats considered loyalty to the King of Prussia their first duty and took their orders from Berlin, while on the other side the restless democratic watchmakers of the Jura sympathised warmly with Switzerland, and wished to belong to her entirely. Certain modifications of the Cantonal Constitution granted by the King of Prussia were insufficient to meet the wishes of the Republican party, which by a surprise obtained possession of the Castle of Neuchâtel (September 13, 1831). The Council of State appealed for help to the Federal Diet which, fearing foreign complications, despatched troops to Neuchâtel, and induced the Republicans to lay down their arms by promising an amnesty. But the amnesty was not strictly observed, so that the Republicans again rose in arms, though the Executive put down this revolt by its own efforts, without invoking another Federal intervention. Fourteen rebels were condemned to death by a court-martial, but their sentences were commuted by the clemency of the King to imprisonment for life. Other leaders were banished, put in chains, placed in the pillory, or flogged.

These troubles in Basel, Schwyz, and Neuchâtel caused a very great sensation throughout Switzerland. The Conservatives rejoiced that the flood of democracy had been stemmed in the city of Basel, in "Old Schwyz," and in Neuchâtel, and hoped for foreign intervention. The Liberals and Radicals, on the other hand, sympathised warmly with "Rural Basel," "Outer Schwyz," and the Republicans of Neuchâtel. Swarms of volunteers from other Cantons desired to aid the defeated parties, and were only held back with difficulty. In consequence of the refusal of the Conservative Cantons to grant the Federal guarantee to the Radical Cantonal Constitutions of 1831, seven of these, viz. Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Solothurn, St Gall, Aargau, and Thurgau, concluded (March 17, 1832) the so-called *Siebkonkordat* (Agreement of Seven), their object being to secure their new Constitutions against any violent overthrow. Soon this Liberal separate League was faced by a more dangerous Conservative League. On November 14, 1832, a conference held at Sarnen by Basel city, Neuchâtel, Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden declared that the recognition of the division of the Canton of Basel by the Diet was a violation of the Federal Pact, and refused to take part in any Diet to which representatives of Rural Basel and Outer Schwyz

should be admitted. On the occasion of an extraordinary Federal Diet summoned in March, 1833, by Zurich, then the Federal capital, with a view to the amendment of the Federal Pact, this "League of Sarnen" carried out its threat. A rival Diet met at Schwyz, and declared that the resolutions of the Federal Diet sitting in Zurich could not be recognised as binding. This declaration, however, was chiefly directed against the meditated amendment of the Pact of 1815.

The results of that Pact had not turned out favourable for Switzerland. The Diet and the ruling capital had too often shown themselves incapable of safeguarding the honour and the interests of the country, whether against the separatist feeling of the Cantons, or as regards foreign Powers. The Swiss Diet resembled the German in its cumbersome business arrangements, in being firmly tied to instructions, in its powerlessness to do anything really useful: it could pass absolutely no resolutions on subjects as to which twelve Cantonal Legislatures, or *Landsgemeinden*, had not come previously to an agreement. Above all, the Directory itself was merely a Cantonal Executive, which regarded Federal business as simply a crushing burden of extra work; which had to be got through somehow; and which, after two years, was gladly shifted on to some one else's shoulders. Quite apart from the fact that its powers were confined within the narrowest limits, there could be no question of any steadily pursued policy, of farsightedness, or of energetic action, so long as the Federal Executive migrated from one spot to another. Most of all did the lack of an active Federal Executive make itself felt in practical matters, in the lamentable confusion as to coinage, in the defects of the postal service, in the intricacies of the customs duties. These latter seemed to exist only to clog the channels of commerce within the country, and completely failed to attain their aim, when the question of protecting the economic interests of Switzerland against its foreign rivals arose. It was characteristic of the state of things in Switzerland that St Gall preferred to send its merchandise to Lyons through Strassburg, instead of by the direct route through Geneva; that goods destined for Milan and Genoa were, despite the tremendous extra journey of some 30 to 40 hours, sent over the Stelvio Pass rather than over the Swiss mountain passes; or, again, that it cost more to send a letter from Geneva to eastern Switzerland, than from Constantinople to Geneva. And how humiliating it was for a "free" Swiss that he could not freely select his residence within his small native land, because the narrow-mindedness of certain Cantons denied to him such a right!

While the system of the Restoration age was breaking down, newspapers and pamphlets (of which the most prominent was the *Zuruf*, written by the Luzern statesman, Kasimir Pfyffer) directed public attention to the second great object of the Liberals, the strengthening of the Federal Executive. The Canton of Thurgau formally proposed to the Diet in 1831 to undertake the amendment of the Federal Pact of 1815.

This proposal was accepted (July 17, 1832) in principle by 15½ votes out of 22. A committee, presided over by the Mayor of Luzern, Edward Pfyffer, was appointed by the Diet to make a first draft. This scheme centralised military instruction, the customs, the postal service, and the coinage, guaranteed freedom of residence anywhere in Switzerland; created a permanent Federal Executive of five members, to be fixed at Luzern; and provided also for a Federal Court of justice. The supreme authority in the Confederation was still to be the Diet, in which each Canton was to have the same right of vote. But the members of the Diet, though bound by their instructions as to the conclusion of alliances, the declaration of war, the making of peace, the amendment of the Federal Constitution, and some other matters, were to vote according to their individual opinions on all other subjects.

Although this draft carefully preserved the Federal basis of the Swiss Constitution, it encountered bitter opposition from the Catholics and the Conservatives. Not merely the members of the League of Sarnen, but also Zug, Appenzell, Ticino, and the Valais maintained that any alterations in the Federal Constitution must be accepted unanimously by all the twenty-two Cantons. Since this unanimity could never be attained, they thus practically denied to the Diet the right of altering the Pact. This division of opinion as to the amendment of the Pact was all the more dangerous because at the same time ideas were afloat as to foreign intervention. The reform of so many Cantonal Constitutions in a democratic sense had never been favoured by the Powers of eastern Europe, so that the decision to amend the Federal Pact inspired Metternich with the firm resolve to intervene against this project. He had to admit that the Treaties of 1815 in no sense guaranteed the Federal Pact. But this difficulty was overcome by the sophism that Switzerland would forfeit the advantages granted to her by the Congress of Vienna if she renounced her ancient character of a Confederation of sovereign States, and submitted herself to a central Executive. A memorandum from Vienna, June 5, 1832, recommended the Great Powers (together with Sardinia) to take steps in common against Switzerland. Prussia and Russia were quite ready to do so; but France and England thought that the very moderate draft of the Constitution elaborated by the committee did not afford any pretext for interference. Hence Metternich was obliged to take up a waiting attitude, contenting himself meanwhile with encouraging the resistance made by the League of Sarnen.

The Federal Diet, which met at Zurich in the spring of 1833, finally settled the text of the draft Constitution, by making further concessions to the party of Federalists. But, when even Liberal Cantons like Aargau and Vaud joined the Opposition, a bare majority of 12 votes out of 22 was all that could be hoped for. One member of that majority must necessarily be Luzern, whose consent seemed certain, since the draft assured it the honour of becoming the seat of the Federal Executive. The

Cantonal legislature had already almost unanimously accepted it (subject to its approval by a vote of the people) when the unexpected happened. The people of Luzern, influenced by the priests, rejected the proposal (July 7, 1833) by a majority of 11,000 to 7000, and thus put an end for a long time to any ideas of amending the Federal Pact.

This defeat of the Liberals encouraged the members of the League of Sarnen to make an attempt to force the revolted half-Cantons to return to their allegiance. On July 31, 1833, the Inner Schwyzers occupied the village of Kussnacht, which belonged to Outer Schwyz; and on August 3 the city of Basel made an attack upon Liestal, the capital of the half-Canton of Rural Basel. But the country folk offered so valiant a resistance at Pratteln that the city troops were compelled to retreat to Basel, with a loss of 63 killed. The Federal Diet, spurred on by the strong adverse public opinion as to this breach of the peace, acted with unusual energy, and occupied Schwyz and the city of Basel with 20,000 Federal troops. The rival or League of Sarnen Diet at Schwyz broke up in confusion on the advance of the Federal troops, which were only withdrawn when the relations between the two Cantons were finally settled. The two halves of Schwyz were now reunited into one single Canton, on the basis of absolute equality. A similar course was not possible in the case of Basel owing to the violent hatred excited between the city and the rural districts by the bloody encounters that had been waged between them. The separation of the two halves of this Canton was definitively sanctioned. As towards the Confederation, however, both halves formed but a single Canton, just as in the case of Unterwalden and Appenzell, so that, if they could not agree to vote in the same sense, their collective vote was not to be counted. The League of Sarnen was dissolved, as contrary to the Federal Pact, and its members compelled again to attend the Federal Diet. The most protracted resistance was offered by Neuchâtel, whose Prussian ruler was working for its separation from Switzerland. But, when the Diet ordered 6000 men to prepare for a march on the town, the Canton renounced its opposition. Hence the rent, which had threatened to break up the Confederation, was patched up for the time being, while the failure of constitutional reform put an end to the foreign intervention which Metternich had planned.

But the motley crowd of foreign refugees, who had sought shelter in friendly Switzerland after the failure of the revolutions in Poland, Germany, and Italy, afforded the Great Powers abundant excuse to make that little country feel their displeasure. Nevertheless, the Swiss displayed an ever increasing sensitiveness in the matter of their honour and independence. The complaints of the Great Powers were, at the same time, by no means always without foundation, for the invasion of Savoy by the Poles (prepared by Mazzini on Swiss soil in February, 1834) was certainly a grave violation of international law. But it was a glaring contradiction that, while the Great Powers urged imperfect police

measures against Switzerland as a crime, they denied her the sole means of maintaining order, viz. the privilege of creating a strong Federal Executive. The Government of the citizen King of the French rivalled Austria in its lordly contempt for the independence of Switzerland. Late in 1838 the French Government nearly brought about a war with Switzerland through requiring the expulsion of Louis Napoleon (who had been named an honorary citizen of Thurgau), the conflict being avoided only by his voluntary retirement to England.

Within the country party feelings were sharpened by religious disputes. In January, 1834, the Governments of Bern, Luzern, Solothurn, Rural Basel, St Gall, Aargau, and Thurgau concluded a Concordat at Baden, with the object of defending the rights of the State as regards the Church. But these "Articles of Baden," condemned by the Pope as "false, audacious, inclining towards heresy, and schismatic," were rejected in St Gall (1835) by the veto of the people. Even Bern, in face of the agitation fanned by France in the Roman Catholic districts of the Jura, did not venture to maintain them; the sole result was to exasperate the Roman Catholic inhabitants. In the Protestant Canton of Zurich the promotion of the Würtemberg professor, David Friedrich Strauss, the famous freethinking author of the *Life of Jesus*, to a theological chair in the University raised such indignation among the orthodox Protestant pastors and the country folk, that on September 6, 1839, thousands of armed peasants, under the leadership of Pastor Bernhard Hirzel, marched on the town. The Liberal Government promptly made room for one composed of Conservatives.

After this Zurich insurrection, it seemed as though the whole public life of Switzerland would fall into a state of utter lawlessness, and that the rule of the strongest would prevail. In Ticino the Radicals at once imitated the example of the Zurich Conservatives by violently overthrowing the clerical Government. On the other side an attempt made in Aargau by the Roman Catholics to turn out the Liberal Government ended in defeat (January 11, 1841), and resulted in the decision taken by the Cantonal Legislature, acting under the influence of Augustine Keller, headmaster of the Normal School, to suppress all the monasteries situated in the Canton because the disturbances had been instigated by them. This suppression of monasteries was, however, unconstitutional, as their maintenance had been guaranteed by the Pact of 1815. The Romanist Cantons therefore demanded the immediate reestablishment of the monasteries by the Diet, if necessary by force of arms. Bern threatened that it would back up the Aargau Liberals if arms were taken up in defence of the monasteries. This question as to the Aargau monasteries disturbed the minds of the Swiss for several years, till in 1843 the Canton in question found it best to reestablish the four nunneries, on learning which the majority of the Federal Diet decided that the matter was finally settled. This view was, however,

rejected by the Roman Catholic Cantons. Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg and the Valais protested against this violation of the Federal Pact by the majority of the Federal Diet. In a conference held by these six Cantons (the Valais not taking part) at Luzern (September 12-13, 1843), Siegwart-Müller, Mayor of the Canton, proposed, even at this early date, the separation of the Cantons which were "loyal to the Pact" from the rest, the establishment of a standing council of war, and preparations for an armed conflict. Though these proposals were not yet completely approved, yet they formed the basis of a Romanist "Separate League" (*Sonderbund*), which was joined (June, 1844) by the Valais after the Roman Catholics of that Canton had put down the Liberals by a regular civil war.

At the Diet of 1844 these seven Cantons renewed their demand for the reestablishment of all the Aargau monasteries. Aargau, however, parried this stroke by itself proposing the expulsion of the Jesuits, the recall of whom to Luzern was just then being proposed by the extreme Roman Catholics, under Siegwart and Leu. The monastery question was thus unexpectedly transformed into the Jesuit question; and the Roman Catholic Cantons had to exchange the offensive for the defensive. The Diet attempted to reconcile opposing parties by declaring, on the one hand, that the question of the monasteries was definitely settled, and on the other, by refusing the demand for the expulsion of the Jesuits. Hence the Luzern Legislature could now decide (October 24, 1844) to hand over the establishments for higher education to the Jesuits. The Luzern Liberals hereupon organised two armed risings with the assistance of armed volunteers from other Cantons. Their second attempt resulted in a bloody defeat (April 1, 1845) near Malters. Over 100 volunteers were killed; 1900 were seized, including Steiger, a former member of the Luzern Executive, who was condemned to death, but succeeded in saving himself by flight. Party hatred rose to such a height that Leu, the chief supporter of the recall of the Jesuits, was assassinated (July 20) by one of the volunteers.

Despite the miserable failure of these insurrections, the majority of the Swiss people became more and more convinced that the establishment of the followers of Loyola in one of the three Federal capitals was a national misfortune, and the storm of hatred continued to increase throughout Switzerland. In the Canton of Vaud, so early as February 14, 1845, the Conservative Government, which hesitated to demand the expulsion of the Jesuits in the Federal Diet, had been forced by a popular rising to make way for Radical successors. In Zurich the Conservatives lost the confidence of the people, by coquetting with the Roman Catholics: and the Liberals gained the victory at the election of the new Government. Ochsenbein, the leader of the volunteers who had attacked Luzern, with some friends of similar views, became a member of the Executive of the Canton of Bern (July, 1846), then Vice-President, and

was certain to be President of the Confederation, because on January 1, 1847, Bern became the Federal capital for two years.

On the other hand, the seven Roman Catholic Cantons formally concluded (December 11, 1845) a defensive Covenant, thus placing themselves in opposition to the rest of Switzerland, and forming an "armed Separate League" (*bewaffneter Sonderbund*) with a common council of war, presided over by Siegwart-Müller. In contrast to the Confederate States of North America of a later date, it aimed less at a complete separation from the Swiss Confederation than at obtaining the supremacy within it. It offered resistance to "unauthorised Federal resolutions"; it desired the reestablishment of the monasteries in Aargau, the maintenance of the Jesuits, and the abandonment of all Liberal ideas of amending the Federal Pact. These seven Cantons, which formed about a fifth of the Swiss population, claimed to be the sole qualified interpreters of the Pact of 1815, and to have the right of opposing by force of arms any resolution of the Federal authorities which might displease them; they even proposed, in case of need, to call for the intervention of foreign Powers. It was impossible for the Confederation to tolerate this "League within a League," which substituted force for law, and threatened treason towards the State. Even if the Pact of 1815 had not expressly forbidden the formation of separate Leagues of a nature prejudicial to the Confederation, the dissolution of the Sonderbund was an imperative necessity.

When, in June, 1846, the terms of the Sonderbund (hitherto kept secret) became public, the Federal capital, Zurich, solemnly protested against them, and proposed to the Federal Diet that met in July the dissolution of this Sonderbund. But this proposal was supported by ten votes only, a majority of twelve being necessary to pass a Federal resolution. Besides, the half-votes of Rural Basel and the Outer Rhodes of Appenzell were neutralised by the contrary votes of the city of Basel and the Inner Rhodes of Appenzell. An eleventh vote was gained on October 8, 1846, when the Genevese Radicals, under the leadership of the journalist James Fazy, drove out the Conservative Government by means of barricades and bullets, thus gaining the supremacy at the ensuing elections. Finally, in May, 1847, the twelfth vote was secured, when the Radicals obtained a small majority at the elections for a new Legislature in St Gall, which was nicknamed in consequence the "Canton of destiny." In July, 1847, the Federal Diet met at Bern, under the presidency of Ochsenbein, and now adopted decisive measures. On July 20 it decreed the dissolution of the Sonderbund by a majority of twelve votes (besides those of the two halves of Basel and of Appenzell), and on July 30 named a committee of seven members to consider further steps. On August 16 it decided by thirteen votes that the amendment of the Federal Pact should be taken in hand, and on September 3, by twelve votes (besides those of the half-Cantons named), it decreed the

expulsion of the Jesuits. The members of the Sonderbund had not the slightest idea of giving way, but mobilised their forces, threw up entrenchments, and looked for help from foreign Powers.

The events in Switzerland during the years 1844-7 had more than a merely local importance. They formed part of the mighty struggle of ideas that was going on all through Europe; they acted as a sort of prologue to the Revolution of 1848, and were therefore the object of the most attentive observation for peoples as well as for Cabinets. The Powers of the Continent, with singular unanimity, took the side of the Sonderbund, in which they saw incorporated the principles of Conservatism. Its chosen guardian, Metternich, had steadily urged since 1845 a common intervention of the Great Powers to "rescue" Switzerland, "which was in the throes of social dissolution." As in 1832, his excuse for this policy was derived from the wording of the Pact of 1815, which was based upon the unlimited sovereignty of the twenty-two Cantons, a principle to which the Radicals were continuously opposed. The fantastical Frederick William IV of Prussia was eager for intervention; he wrote to Bunsen (November, 1847) that there was for the Great Powers absolutely no question of right or wrong in Switzerland, but only whether the godless and unrighteous sect of Radicals should gain the dominion there by means of murder, blood, and tears, and should make out of the land a centre of infection for Germany, Italy, and France. On Russia Metternich could also count. In France Louis-Philippe and Guizot transferred their hatred of the Radical Opposition in France to the Swiss Liberals. The smaller Courts, such as that of Sardinia, followed the example of the more important. The Sonderbund received arms and money from Piedmont, France and Austrian Italy; it wished also to secure an Austrian general, and in 1846 Metternich actually sent Prince Frederick Schwarzenberg to Luzern. He had prepared a plan of operations, but was suddenly recalled; and, though he reappeared there after the outbreak of the war, he was not charged with the direction of hostilities.

The greater the danger for the Sonderbund seemed to be, the more busy was European diplomacy in working in its favour, though, luckily for Switzerland, combined action on the part of the Great Powers proved very hard to attain. Already at the end of 1846 Metternich had elaborated a programme, according to which, on the occasion of the transfer of the Federal capital to Bern, now "dominated by the bands of volunteers," all the accredited Ministers of the Great Powers should withdraw from the town, address identical protests from the Great Powers, and finally bring about an armed intervention. But Louis-Philippe and Guizot still shrank from such far-reaching measures in view of public opinion in France and of the effect of such steps on England. Guizot therefore made the sapient proposal that Austria should take the lead in the armed intervention, and that France should



later follow her example; in other words Austria was to incur the odium of intervention, and the French were to play the grateful rôle of coming in as the apparent protectors of Swiss independence. Metternich, however, would not hear of such a repetition of the *Anconade* of 1832. Though Prussia was prepared to join Austria and France under certain conditions, the difficulty of a union of the Great Powers was increased by the policy of England, on whose support both France and Prussia laid great stress. The British Cabinet was the only Government which possessed any sympathy with or understanding of the objects of the Swiss Liberals. The historian of Greece, George Grote, then staying in Switzerland, had—by his excellent letters on Swiss politics in the *Spectator*—placed Swiss matters in an entirely different light from that in which they were represented by the semi-official newspapers of Germany and France. Besides, Palmerston was rather glad of an opportunity to pay off France for the Spanish marriages and Austria for the annexation of Cracow. At heart he was averse from any intervention in Switzerland; hence, instead of merely standing aloof he did more, and that which was best for Switzerland. By apparently assenting to the wishes of the other Cabinets, he secured to himself the leadership of the proposed campaign against Switzerland with uncommon dexterity, and then checked the eagerness of its promoters, thus delaying its opening till it was too late.

While the five Great Powers discussed again and again the manner of their intervention and Austria stationed provisionally 10,000 troops on the Swiss frontier, the twelve Cantons which formed the majority of the Diet, without troubling themselves about the threats of the foreign envoys, took the requisite measures for maintaining the integrity of the Confederation. Federal representatives travelled through the seven Cantons to employ all means for bringing about a reconciliation, but their efforts met with no success. On October 21, 1847, the Federal Diet nominated the best qualified Swiss officer, William Henry Dufour of Geneva, commander-in-chief of the Federal forces, and placed at his disposition an army of some 100,000 men and 260 guns. In consequence of the zeal displayed by most of the twelve Cantons, the mobilisation of the troops was carried out with a celerity and a completeness which surprised the foreign Cabinets. Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) and Neuchâtel alone refused obedience to the summons of the Diet, the latter declaring itself to be neutral, though in reality, by the directions of Prussia, it was openly coquetting with the Sonderbund. The Sonderbund could dispose of 74 guns and 79,000 men, of which half were an ill-armed rabble, the chief command being entrusted to Ulrich von Salis-Soglio, a Conservative Protestant of the Grisons.

On October 29, the deputies of the Sonderbund Cantons quitted the Diet at Bern. On November 4, the Diet ordered the execution of its resolution for the suppression of the Sonderbund by armed force, and the campaign began. Dufour's simple and yet very effective plan was

to attack, one after the other, yet in each case with overwhelming force, the three isolated blocks into which the territories of the Sonderbund Cantons naturally fell—Fribourg, Luzern with the three Forest Cantons, and the Valais. Within a few days Fribourg was surrounded by 25,000 men, and capitulated on November 14, without making any real resistance. Next, Dufour, without letting himself be turned from his plans by attacks of the enemy on Aargau (November 12), and on Ticino (November 17), divided the centre and right wing of his army into five columns and advanced in a concentric circle on Luzern, in order to strike a mortal blow at the very heart of the Sonderbund. Even before the beginning of these operations Zug surrendered (November 21). The chief attack was directed by Dufour against the wooded hills between the Reuss and the Lake of Zug, which were strongly occupied by Salis-Soglio, as forming the natural defences of Luzern. On November 23 the divisions commanded by Gmür and Ziegler won this position after battles at Meyerskappel, Honau, and Gislikon, while Ochsenbein's division, by a fight near Schüpfheim, cleared the route through the Entlebuch. This one defeat sufficed to demoralise entirely the members of the Sonderbund. On the very evening of November 23 their council of war, the executive of Luzern, and the Jesuits fled to Uri. Next day the victors made their entry into Luzern. On November 25 Unterwalden laid down its arms, without offering any further resistance; on the 26th Schwyz also, on the 27th Uri; on the 29th the Valais; and received the Federal troops. The campaign of twenty-five days cost the Federal army 78 killed and 260 wounded, while the Sonderbund estimated their losses at a still smaller number. Thus the humane intention of Dufour to decide the war, as far as possible, by mere demonstrations proved completely successful.

Even considering the enormous difference in proportions, the rapid and comparatively bloodless Swiss War of Separation stands in the strongest contrast with the great Civil War in the United States, which lasted four years and cost the lives of half a million men. In Switzerland, not only the majority of the actual numbers that could be put in the field but also the advantages of good organisation and a capable generalship were on the side of the loyal Cantons. Above all, the members of the Sonderbund lacked any deep ideal or material interest capable of inciting them to a life and death struggle. The people of the Sonderbund Cantons realised beforehand that, notwithstanding the declamations of their spiritual and lay leaders, only their pride and not either their faith or freedom were in real danger, and their enthusiasm soon became chilled. Everywhere the Governments of the Sonderbund Cantons had to retire from office: in Fribourg, in Luzern, and in the Valais, the Liberals came into power. The defeated Cantons had to defray the expenses of the war, while Neuchâtel and the Inner Rhodes of Appenzell were fined for not fulfilling their Federal obligations. As order was restored in the Sonderbund Cantons and security given for the payment

of the war indemnity, the Federal troops were gradually withdrawn, so that the last detachments regained their homes by February, 1848. The assistance from foreign countries, for which the Sonderbund had formally appealed on November 15, 1847, was not forthcoming. Guizot indeed had laid before the Cabinets a new project, according to which the Great Powers were in concert to appear as mediators between the contending parties, and to impose their will on Switzerland. But Palmerston drew up a rival plan, a harmless and not binding offer of mediation which, in case of refusal by Switzerland, entailed no further consequences. On November 30, a day after the Sonderbund had ceased to exist, the French envoy presented the Note agreed on by the Great Powers. Austria, Russia, and Prussia followed suit; but England never took this step, inasmuch as the need for mediation had now entirely ceased to exist. The reply of the Diet on December 7 refused to admit the principle of foreign interference with the affairs of Switzerland, since her independence had been so formally recognised in 1815. Switzerland had now for the first time really reconquered her independence, thanks to the courage with which she had disregarded the threats of intervention uttered by the continental Powers. In spite of them, she had by her own might overcome the Sonderbund, and settled her own internal affairs according to her own opinions. Thus the Sonderbund war really meant the definitive liberation of Switzerland from the foreign yoke, that had lain on her so heavily ever since 1798, and her readmittance into the ranks of the genuinely independent States of Europe.

As the permanent result of this remarkable display of energy, it now only remained to carry out the scheme of amending the Federal Pact of 1815. Once more the continental Great Powers, which had decided to proceed without the support of England, attempted to block the way. Two special envoys from Austria and Prussia, Colloredo and Radowitz, appeared in Paris at Christmas, in order to come to an understanding with Guizot. It was suggested that the "twelve Cantons" should be required to evacuate the territory of the Sonderbund, to lay down their arms, and to give up all idea of amending the Pact of 1815 without the unanimous approval of all the Cantons; while a conference of the Great Powers, of the German Confederation, and of Sardinia, should assemble in Neuchâtel, to settle Swiss affairs. In case of the refusal of these demands on the part of the Diet, coercive measures were contemplated. A memorandum by Radowitz proposed that in such a case the envoys should be recalled, and the Swiss frontier be blockaded; while, should these measures fail, he proposed the occupation of Ticino by Austria, of Rural Basel by Prussia and the south-German States, of the Bernese Jura by France, and of Geneva by Sardinia.

In pursuance of these arrangements made in Paris the envoys of the three Powers assembled in Neuchâtel despatched to the Diet (January 18, 1848) a threatening collective Note; and on February 13, Russia

suspended her guarantee of Swiss neutrality and independence, in order to leave a free hand to the neighbouring Powers to carry out their intentions. The Diet, in a dignified answer (February 15), maintained its decided refusal to allow any interference with Swiss affairs from the outside. The February Revolution in Paris put a sudden end to all further projects. On the very spot where the representatives of European diplomacy had intended to meet in order to sit in judgment on Switzerland, in Neuchâtel itself, revolution broke out. In La Chaux de Fonds, Le Locle, and in the Val de Travers, Republican committees were formed as soon as the news of the events in Paris was received. The Neuchâtel Government begged for help from Bern, the Federal capital; but, instead of coming to the aid of the Neuchâtel aristocrats, the President Ochsenbein summoned the Neuchâtel Republicans to action in a note that contained but the two words, *En avant*. On March 1, 1848, the Republicans marched in arms against the capital, deposed the Council of State, formed a provisional Government, and proclaimed the Republic. A committee, appointed to draft a constitution, endowed the young Republic with a democratic form of government, which was accepted (April 30) by the people of Neuchâtel by 5800 to 4400 votes, and guaranteed by the Federal Diet. King Frederick William IV, threatened by the Revolution in Berlin itself, allowed matters to slide; but the Diet neglected to profit by the favourable moment to induce him to renounce all his rights over this Swiss Canton.

The European Revolution freed Switzerland from any fear of interference from without, and afforded her the leisure to amend the Pact of 1815. The reforms were drafted by a committee under the presidency of Ochsenbein, revised by the Diet, and accepted by 15½ Cantons (with a population of 1,900,000) as against 6½ Cantons (with a population of 290,000), and on September 12 the Diet declared that it had the force of law. This Constitution transformed the Swiss "League of States" into a Federal State which, especially as regards foreign Powers, now formed a compact whole. The Confederation was given the exclusive right of declaring war, concluding peace, making alliances and treaties with foreign Powers, and in general the control of all external affairs. Special treaties of a political character could no longer be concluded between the Cantons. The Confederation was entrusted with the organisation of the army, the training of the engineers, the artillery, and the cavalry, as well as with the superintendence of all higher military instruction. It also obtained the decision as to weights and measures, the coinage, the postal service, and the customs. It guaranteed the Cantonal Constitutions, in so far as to assure itself that they should continue to be of a Republican, purely representative, or democratic character, it established equality before the law, liberty of residence, liberty of belief for all Swiss citizens belonging to any of the Christian denominations, and the liberty of the Press and of public

meeting. It was authorised to establish a Federal University and a Federal Polytechnic School, and to contribute to the cost of works of public utility. The power of legislation was no longer to be vested in the old Diet, but in a Federal legislature, whose members were to vote freely, and without instructions. This legislature was framed after the pattern of that of the United States of America, having two Houses. The first was the Senate (*Ständerath* or *Conseil des États*), which represented the Cantons, each of which sent two members. The lower House was known as the National Council (*Nationalrath* or *Conseil National*), represented the Swiss people as a whole, and was composed of members elected in proportion to the population of each Canton. The moveable "Directory" was replaced by a permanent Federal Executive, composed of seven members elected for three years by the two Houses of the Federal Legislature sitting together. The chairman of this Federal Council, *Bundesrath* or *Conseil Fédéral*, was to be called the Federal President, *Bundespräsident*, or *Président de la Confédération*. A Federal Court of Justice was also set up. The Constitution could be amended at any time, by vote of the majority of the Cantons and of Swiss citizens.

On December 6 the new Federal Assembly met in Bern, which by a special law was constituted the permanent capital, and chose the first *Bundesrath* from among the distinguished men, who had been the real leaders of the twelve Cantons which formed the majority during the Sonderbund period. Such were Jonas Furrer (Zurich), who was the first Federal President, Ochsenbein (Bern), Druey (Vaud), and the like. Soon, many new institutions were called into being by the harmonious collaboration of the Federal Council and the Federal Legislature. In 1849 a postal service was created, and by the abolition of internal customs duties a heavy load was lifted off trade and commerce. In 1850 Switzerland was endowed with a single coinage, based on that of France, and in 1851 with a single set of weights and measures, as well as with the electric telegraph. In 1854 great undertakings in regard to roads and the straightening of rivers were begun, which were rendered possible by the financial support of the Confederation. In 1855 the Federal Polytechnic School in Zurich was opened. Formerly notorious as a centre of perpetual unrest, Switzerland now extorted even from its foes a great amount of respect owing to her regularised conditions and steady progress. In October, 1856, Bunsen, who had visited Switzerland again in 1854, wrote: "Throughout Switzerland I have found the country, owing to the strengthening of the central or Federal executive, in a state of unexampled progress and prosperity."

With regard to foreign Powers the position of Switzerland was also quite altered; for the new Federal authorities, with great tact, declined all suggestions that could affect the honour and the independence of the country, while, on the other hand, by their correct and consistent treatment of the refugee question, they took care that the neighbouring

States should not have any ground of complaint. Neuchâtel alone remained as a dark spot on the horizon. Frederick William IV, in his morbid yearning for his "beloved, loyal, little land in the Jura, which was now under the rule of godless men," but which had absolutely no value for Prussia though great importance for Switzerland, rejected the Federal proposals for annexation. In 1852, at the Conference of London, he obtained an express recognition of his rights to Neuchâtel, though at first he did not take any step to enforce them. In the autumn of 1856, however, Count Pourtalès-Steiger, with the connivance of the King, gave the signal to the Royalists to rise in arms. On September 3, they seized the Castle of Neuchâtel, before daybreak, and imprisoned the Council of State. But on the very next day the rebels were overpowered by the hastily mustered Republican troops, and thrown into prison to the number of 530. When, in consequence of this rising, the Federal Council ordered that judicial proceedings should be taken against the leaders of the revolt, the Prussian envoy in Switzerland demanded, with a reservation of all the rights of his master, that the proceedings should be stopped and the prisoners restored to liberty. But the Federal Council was determined to utilise this occasion to force the King, who could not leave his "loyal" subjects in the lurch, to renounce his rights over Neuchâtel, and therefore rejected this demand. The King then, "with a bleeding heart and tears in his eyes," addressed an autograph letter to Napoleon III. Flattered by this act of confidence, the Emperor, on November 26, addressed a Note to the Federal Council, in which he expressed his wish that the prisoners should be at once released unconditionally. At the same time, he offered his services for a happy solution of the whole question, since otherwise Switzerland would become involved in serious complications with Prussia. For Switzerland the matter was not merely one of honour, but mainly important in that it was not advisable to give up, before the right moment, the trump-card that the imprudence of her adversaries had placed in her hand. The Federal Council was aware, through the confidential communications of Napoleon, that the King of Prussia was willing to renounce his rights, in certain contingencies, but had also learned from hints from England that he intended to attach to this renunciation conditions, which would have afforded him a perpetual pretext to interfere in the affairs of the Confederation and of the Canton. The Federal Council therefore declined to accede to the wishes of Napoleon, at the risk of displeasing France and of going to war with Prussia.

As a matter of fact Prussia broke off diplomatic relations with Switzerland on December 18, and arranged to mobilise her troops on January 3, 1857, though she subsequently delayed till the 15th. Switzerland made preparations for war; all classes of the population displayed unanimous enthusiasm; and the Federal Council provisionally stationed 30,000 soldiers under Dufour, on the northern Swiss frontier.

But a war was not desired either by Napoleon, although he had encouraged Prussia to take military measures, or by the other Great Powers. Austria hindered the negotiations, by which Prussia sought to induce the south-German States to allow the passage of troops through their territories. Fresh offers of mediation made by Napoleon induced the Federal Council to despatch to Paris, at the end of December, 1856, Kern of Thurgau, who was a personal acquaintance of the Emperor. Napoleon made further confidential communications (even allowing Kern to read the autograph letters of the King of Prussia) to the Federal Council, which convinced the Swiss that their aim would be attained by setting free their prisoners, especially as England declared herself ready to act in concert with France in favour of Switzerland. Kern therefore agreed with Napoleon on a new Note (January 5, 1857), in which France formally bound herself, after the prisoners had been freed, to arrange a compromise to meet the wishes of Switzerland. The Federal Assembly therefore resolved (January 16) to abandon the judicial proceedings, with provision, however, that the liberated prisoners should be exiled from Switzerland till the matter was finally settled. A treaty was thereupon signed, on May 26, 1857, by which the complete independence of Neuchâtel from Prussia was established.

In 1860 Switzerland was less fortunate in obtaining a rectification of frontiers on the cession of Savoy to France, an event which made the position of Geneva very exposed. Napoleon III had spoken of a cession to Switzerland of northern Savoy, which was included in the Swiss neutrality, but declared it impossible after the popular vote as to the annexation. A party, headed by Stämpfli of the Federal Council, desired to make this refusal a *casus belli*; but the majority of the Federal authorities would not hear of so hazardous a proceeding, while an appeal to the signatories of the Treaties of Vienna had no success. Notwithstanding this failure, Switzerland continued to enjoy a high degree of esteem, as was shown in 1864 by her success in the movement which resulted in the signature of the Geneva Convention for the care of those wounded in war.

The land prospered greatly under the Federal Constitution of 1848 and for a long time no alteration in it was thought necessary, till at last the impulse towards amendment was given by outside events. An advantageous commercial treaty concluded in 1864 with France, which guaranteed French Jews full liberty of residence in Switzerland, led in 1866 to a slight change in the Federal Constitution, by which such a right, hitherto enjoyed only by Swiss citizens of one of the Christian denominations, was extended to Jews also. This raised the general question of reform; and the military lessons inculcated by the wars of 1866 and 1870 necessitated its serious consideration. The conviction grew that a Federal army composed of contingents from 25 Cantons, serving for different periods and variously trained, no longer answered the requirements of national defence. Besides, at a time when the

railway system was being rapidly extended, it was felt to be a great drawback that there should be as many legal Codes as there were Cantons and half-Cantons in Switzerland. Once more, there swept through the Cantons a powerful democratic movement, tending, by means of changes in the Cantonal Constitutions, to transform them from representative to pure democracies. Hence the left wing or democratic party broke away from the great Liberal party which had been in power both in the Confederation and in the Cantons since 1848. This new party inscribed on its banner the election of the executive by the people, the adoption of the "*Referendum*" as to laws and important financial measures passed by the Cantonal Legislatures, and the "*Initiative*" or right of a fixed number of citizens to propose Bills. At the same time it aimed at relieving the lower classes from some of their burdens, by piling them on the upper classes. A victory which this new democratic party won in the Canton of Zurich in 1867 over the Old Liberals proved decisive for all Switzerland. *Referendum* and Initiative now made a triumphal progress through all the Cantons, Fribourg alone clinging to a purely representative system.

This Reform movement in the Cantons had a reflex effect on the Confederation. Hence, while Democrats and Liberals often violently opposed each other in the Cantons, both united in Federal matters as against the Roman Catholics and the Conservatives in their demand for a thorough reform of the Federal Constitution, their motto being "One Code and One Army." The Federal Council, under the energetic influence of Emil Welti, was all the more ready to fall in with this demand because the occupation of the frontier by French troops in the winter of 1870-1 had laid bare deficiencies in the Swiss military system. Only the resolute action of the Federal general Herzog, and the utter demoralisation of Bourbaki's soldiers, as is told elsewhere, saved Switzerland from the disastrous consequences which the entry of 83,000 French troops on to Swiss soil might have entailed. On an invitation from the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly in 1871-2 thoroughly reformed the Federal Constitution. Without departing from the principles of that of 1848, the draft centralised in the hands of the Federal authorities military institutions as well as civil and penal law, and otherwise extended the powers of the Confederation. But, while this draft met with enthusiastic support from some, it encountered an equally strong resistance from others. The Liberals of French-speaking Switzerland, who feared that such a far-reaching centralisation would injure their special institutions and lead to everything being Teutonised, united with the Roman Catholics and the Conservatives. The proposed Constitution was rejected by 261,000 votes against 255,000, and by thirteen Cantons against nine (May 12, 1872).

The friends of reform now offered to the French-speaking Cantons (*Suisse Romande*) a compromise which for the moment gave up all idea



of complete unification in military and legal matters. The arming and the entire training of the soldiers was to belong to the Confederation; with regard to legal matters centralisation was to be limited to certain departments, such as the law of Contracts, including commercial and exchange law. But the Confederation was to have the right of legislation as to railways, banks, insurance companies, and factories, as well as to the straightening of rivers and as to the control of forests situated high up in the mountains. Freedom of belief was guaranteed to the widest extent; elementary education was to be compulsory, free, and solely under the control of the State. The *Kulturkampf*, which broke out in Switzerland in consequence of the Vatican Council, led to the deposition of Bishop Lachat of Basel in 1873. An attempt of the *curé* of Geneva, Gaspard Mermillod, aided by the papal Curia, but behind the back of the Genevese Government, to make Geneva the seat of a Roman Catholic Bishop, ended in the expulsion of Mermillod by the Federal Council from Switzerland (1873). These two events caused the acceptance of a series of amendments in the Federal Constitution, which strengthened the supremacy of the State over the Church. New episcopal sees could only be erected with the approval of the Confederation, new monasteries could not be founded at all; while a clause placing marriages under the protection of the Confederation led to obligatory civil weddings. As a counterpoise to the increased powers of the Federal authorities the Facultative *Referendum* was introduced. By it all Federal laws and resolutions passed by the Federal Assembly had, at the demand of 30,000 Swiss citizens, or of eight Cantons, to be laid before the people for their acceptance or rejection. In this form the amended Constitution was approved (April 19, 1874) by 340,000 votes to 198,000 and by 14½ Cantons to 7½. With the adoption of this reform the Swiss Confederation entered upon a new period of beneficent activity.

Since 1815 Switzerland has made great progress not only in respect of political institutions but also in economic matters. In Switzerland the soil fortunately belonged to the peasants, who displayed an extraordinary capacity for adapting themselves to those conditions of production which were so fundamentally altered in the nineteenth century. The peasant proprietors abandoned arable cultivation, which had ceased to be profitable, and devoted themselves to the breeding of cattle and the production of milk—industries which had attained great importance in the land. Instead of the medieval three-field arable and pasture land, which had still been in general use at the end of the eighteenth century, they adopted modern methods, artificial manure, agricultural machines, dairies and factories for cheese; while societies and companies sprang up and were backed by numerous institutions for the promotion of agricultural training, and for making experiments and researches, which the Confederation and the Cantons vied with each other in founding.

Swiss industries, too, long crippled by the "Continental System,"

began to revive after the fall of Napoleon I. The energy of Swiss traders enabled them to overcome the trade monopoly enjoyed by the neighbouring Powers, to which Switzerland could offer no resistance till 1848, and to create lucrative commercial relations with nations far away over the seas. The new Confederation of 1848, with its complete freedom of internal commerce, and its unified system of customs duties, dated from the period when England had become a Free Trade country, and when protective duties were being lowered on the Continent. All these circumstances helped to raise the trade and commerce of the Alpine land to a height of prosperity that had never been attained before. Surrounded by mighty neighbours, far distant from the sea, having no raw materials to export, and destitute of coal, Switzerland nevertheless became a real industrial country. The watchmaking trade of Geneva and of the Jura (whether belonging to Neuchâtel, to Vaud, or to Bern) became the foremost in the world. So early as 1856 it gave employment to about 40,000 persons, and manufactured annually about 1,100,000 watches, of which the value was about £2,000,000. In the matter of cotton-spinning mills worked by machinery, a system which Switzerland had adopted in the age of Napoleon, she was far ahead of all other continental nations. In the thirties there were also introduced into Switzerland weaving looms worked by machinery, which competed in the different branches of cotton manufacture with Great Britain. In the fifties and sixties the coloured prints of eastern Switzerland dominated the markets of India, China, and Japan. When the spinning and weaving industries declined, owing to growing foreign competition, a substitute was found in embroidery by machinery which—introduced into St Gall about 1830—gradually became by far the most important branch of the Swiss cotton-spinning trade. The silk-weaving industries of Zurich and Basel competed with those of Lyons and Krefeld, as did the straw-plaiting industries in Aargau and Fribourg with those of Tuscany. Closely connected with the adoption of machinery in the textile industries was the development of the machine-making industry, which, especially in Zurich and Winterthur, has won worldwide fame.

The means of communication were also vastly improved. Magnificent roads, generally constructed by the Cantons with financial help from the Confederation, rendered the lower portions of the Swiss Alps more accessible. In 1847 the first railway line in Switzerland was opened, from Zurich to Baden. After 1852 when the Federal legislature rejected the plan of construction of state railways proposed by its Council, various railway companies were formed, which in a short time built many lines in all parts of the country. Owing to lack of combination, however, this activity was open to serious drawbacks, so that the idea of nationalising the railways became more and more familiar, and was eventually realised in 1898. Plans for piercing the Alps by tunnels were soon devised, especially that under the St Gothard, which superseded all others.

because of its obvious advantages, and partly by reason of the energy of its principal supporter, Alfred Escher of Zurich. By a treaty signed by Switzerland and Italy on October 15, 1869, and joined by Germany on October 28, 1871, the three Powers bound themselves to finance this immense undertaking. So it became possible to construct right through central Switzerland a commercial international route of the highest importance.

The reverse side of the rapid development of trade and industry is shown especially by the rise of a numerous class of hired workmen, having no connexion with the land and very receptive of Socialist ideas which began to make their appearance about 1840, though for long this new class followed the lead of the Liberal and the Democratic parties. Democratic institutions and the keen sense of benevolence felt by the Swiss folk also helped to prevent a very acute enmity between the different classes. From 1815 onwards the industrial Cantons strove by means of legislation to check the abuses of industrialism. The most elaborate laws for the protection of workmen were those of the Canton of Glarus, which in many important points served as a model for the later Federal legislation on that subject. For example, Glarus, on August 10, 1864, was perhaps the first State on the Continent to introduce a twelve-hour working day, which it reduced to eleven hours in 1872.

The Switzerland of the nineteenth century, after she had produced in Pestalozzi the great educational reformer, attached great importance to the education of the people. Since the thirties the universal obligation of attending school became a reality. Even the most remote Alpine villages attempted to make the elements of education accessible to their children. A steadily increasing number of secondary schools of all kinds, the small but intellectually vigorous Cantonal universities, and the newly founded Federal Polytechnic School at Zurich made it possible for a Swiss to obtain at home an education adapted for all the scientific professions. The creation of a Federal University was repeatedly proposed, but the attempt always failed because those Cantons, which already possessed such institutions, were unwilling to sacrifice them to a central University. But the Polytechnic School in Zurich soon became one of the very best technical academies.

In the Natural Sciences a series of eminent savants fully maintained in the nineteenth century the fame that Switzerland had won in the eighteenth through Jacob, Johann, and Daniel Bernoulli, Leonhard Euler, Albrecht von Haller, Horace Bénédict de Saussure, and others. Such were Ignace Venetz, Jean de Charpentier, Louis Agassiz, the founders of the science of glaciers; the geologists Bernard Studer and Escher von der Linth; the botanists Auguste and Louis Pierre de Candolle, Oswald Heer, and Karl Wilhelm Nägeli; the zoologists Ludwig Rütimeyer and Karl Vogt; the mathematician Jakob Steiner, the astronomer Rudolf Wolf, and the physicists Jean Daniel Colladon and

Auguste Arthur de la Rive. The great "Dufour Map" of Switzerland (1832-64), and the still finer "Siegfried Atlas" (in course of publication since 1870) gave magnificent specimens of cartography to Switzerland. In History also she was well to the fore. The Genevese Simonde de Sismondi was prominent among the great French historians of the nineteenth century, Robert Glutz (Solothurn), with Louis Vulliemin and Charles Monnard (both of Vaud) wrote an excellent continuation of the celebrated history of Switzerland by Johannes von Müller; Eutychieus Kopp (Luzern) laid the corner-stone of the authentic history of the origins of the Confederation, and proved the stories of William Tell and of Arnold of Melchthal to be legendary; Ferdinand Keller (Zurich), by his discovery of the Lake Dwellings, threw an entirely new light on the history of Primitive Man in Europe; while in Jakob Burckhardt (Basel) Switzerland could boast of one of the principal historians of civilisation and of art.

As in the eighteenth century, Switzerland drew inspiration from the literary movements in Germany and France, and yet to a large extent went her own way. The originality and innate qualities which distinguish Swiss literature are particularly to be discerned in the characteristic fact, that even its most prominent representatives have wielded their pens, consciously or not, with the intention of exercising an educational influence over the Swiss people. This perfectly genuine trait is most strongly imprinted on the writings of the Bernese Jeremias Gotthelf (whose real name was Albert Bitzius), the first great realist in German literature, who in his tales painted, with the most merciless truthfulness and delightful force, the life of Bernese peasants. The finished poems of Gottfried Keller of Zurich, the first of all Swiss poets, are pervaded by the atmosphere of his native land, and breathe the patriotic love of country animating the generation which founded the Federal State of 1848. Another notable Zurich poet, Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, was far more cosmopolitan than Keller, both in the choice and the treatment of the subjects in his medieval novels and lyric poems. Similarly, the writers of the *Suisse Romande* preserved a healthy independence of Paris; as in the case of the charming humorist Rodolphe Töpffer, of the Liberal literary historian and thinker, Alexandre Vinet, of the poet Juste Olivier, and many more. Switzerland took also an honourable part in the evolution of the arts of the nineteenth century; it suffices to mention Arnold Böcklin of Basel, the most poetical of painters. But the narrow limit and small scale of human interest in Switzerland, and the lack of an artistic capital tended to drive its most talented artists abroad. However, the fact that the intellectual life of Switzerland is so much divided amongst different centres has had its good sides as well as its bad, and forms an interesting and instructive legacy of its political division.

## CHAPTER IX.

## RUSSIA AND THE LEVANT.

## (1) RUSSIA UNDER NICHOLAS I.

It is not certain that we are yet in a position to do justice to the reign, nor perhaps even to the character, of Nicholas I. We have not, it would seem, all the necessary documentary evidence, and we are too close to the period to be free from the bias of personal experience and a too vivid tradition. Writers who lived then, or who heard from the lips of that generation an account of those times, cannot escape from the appalling impression of the weight that lay on the whole of Russian intellectual life, and the moral and physical degradation of the vast majority of the population. There had been a reaction in the last days of Catharine and in the second half of the reign of Alexander; but the policy of repression was not carried through with the iron thoroughness and gigantic energy that characterised the whole thirty years of the reign of Nicholas. All freedom of thought was remorselessly repressed. The secret police, solemnly abolished under Alexander and publicly condemned as pernicious and demoralising by that monarch, were reestablished in 1826 under the name of the Third Section of the Private Chancery of the Emperor. The head of this section, the Chief of Police, was by right a member of the Committee of Ministers, had constant access to the Sovereign, and had the power of arresting, imprisoning, deporting, and making away with, anyone whom he pleased, without any restriction whatever. Intended no doubt not only to frustrate revolution, but also to act, in the absence of liberty and publicity, as a check on the arbitrary and corrupt action of public officials, this institution, with politics instead of religion as its sphere, rivalled, if it did not exceed, the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition.

But, hard and grievous as his system was, Nicholas was not himself a foe to enlightenment, as he understood it. Limited no doubt in intellect, limited still more in education, he regarded himself, and was regarded by his brother sovereigns, as the only bulwark against revolution in continental Europe. Yet he showed himself the patron of letters in Karamzin, the protector of indignant satire in Gogol, the pardoner of rebellious ribaldry in Pushkin. Again he was the organiser of charitable

effort in the shape of the institutions of the Dowager Empress Marie, the founder of a long list of educational institutions of a technical kind, and the giver of municipal self-government to St Petersburg. He had all the qualities and the defects of a martinet who had himself been brought up in the school of severe corporal punishment; but he was a straightforward, honourable gentleman, an affectionate husband and father, a loyal brother, a sincere friend, and a brave enemy. He had a kindly heart, and never wearied in his personal efforts to redress the grievances of his subjects; "the more tears you wipe away the more completely you effect my will," he said to Count Benckendorff, the chief of the Secret Police, when he asked for instructions. It was his misfortune to spend his life in valiantly trying to stem the tide of a European movement which he did not understand. His best excuse must lie in the excesses of the French Revolution, which still rang in the ears of the Continent; and those who know Russia, or who have read of the revolt of Pugacheff, can well imagine how far those excesses would most certainly have been transcended in St Petersburg or Moscow.

Strange to say, all the efforts of so determined an autocrat did not succeed in eradicating Liberal ideas from Russian society. The throne was, it is true, surrounded by a rising generation of obsequious courtiers and smart soldiers, given up to pleasure; but the middle class, if such a term can be applied to the slender body of men and women who constituted the intellect of the official and professional strata, remained hostile to the ruling *camarilla*; among them circulated a manuscript literature, against which the police were powerless, and which, if only by remote illusion and innuendo, kept alive the *esprit frondeur*. During the Crimean War, when it appeared that the army, for which everything had been sacrificed, was unable to maintain the glorious national tradition of 1812, when all the world saw that the bureaucracy was honeycombed by slowness, incapacity, peculation, even more deeply than contemporary satire had ever suggested, the antagonism to the existing order of things spread rapidly and became universal.

It is, however, a mistake to imagine that the reign was one of absolutely blind reaction. In the first place there was a definite addition to the national ideals. Hitherto there had been two Russian watchwords, autocracy and orthodoxy. To these was now added a third, that of nationality, a treasure to be jealously guarded against foreign influences, on the ground that Russia not only differed, but should differ from Western Europe, because in Russia alone was to be found a patriarchal national economy, consonant with the requirements of religion, of order, and of true political wisdom. In the second place, serious efforts at practical reform were not wanting on the part of the Tsar, who recognised clearly the two great evils under which the country laboured—first, the want of a definite system of law; and, secondly, the curse of serfdom, which not only undermined the self-respect of the people, but deprived

the upper classes, as such an institution always does, of those masculine qualities of initiative, energy, and self-reliance, without which no aristocracy can in the long run successfully lead the way either in peace or war.

The reign commenced with the appointment on December 26, 1826, of a Committee, under the presidency of Count Kochubei, to examine the papers left by Alexander I on the organisation and administration of the Empire. Although enquiries on this and other subjects often bore no other fruit than long reports, solid results were not wanting. Thanks to the unwearied energy of Speranski, the newly formed Second Section of the Private Chancery of the Emperor prepared, in 1832, a Code of Laws, which came into force in 1835. There had long been an abundance, if not a superfluity of laws in Russia; on the old Muscovite legislation Peter the Great and his successors had grafted enactments, which were imitated, or actually copied, from the Codes and customs of Western Europe. The *ukases* or decrees, in which these innovations were promulgated, were piled up one upon another, and were often ill-considered, ill-drawn, and contradictory. Each sovereign reversed the work of his predecessors, upsetting laws and institutions with such recklessness, that nothing seemed to the Russian mind so mobile or so variable as law and legal principles. Nicholas, like his predecessor Catharine, who had planned a similar undertaking in 1767, had the choice between the drafting of a homogeneous, reasoned body of law, like the *Code Napoléon*, and the collection and classification of existing laws. He chose the latter course; and in view of his intention of improving the conditions, and eventually securing the emancipation of the serfs, there is no doubt he was right. Speranski, accordingly, by his order, first made a collection of the laws of the Empire (*Sobranie Zakonoff*) in 45 quarto volumes, in which the enactments were arranged in chronological order, beginning with the *oulagenie* (statute) of the Tsar Alexis, and then condensed and coordinated them systematically in a digest, which is called the *Svod Zakonoff*.

This *Svod* is no doubt a mere compilation of laws, edicts, and ordinances, often belonging to different periods, and drafted from different points of view, without coherence and harmony; but it introduced a unity hitherto unthought of and, as compared with the preceding chaos, may well be called a model of lucidity and arrangement. There was, however, from the first, a considerable amount of repetition; and subsequent additions and amendments have not always improved matters. Since 1857 no complete edition has been issued. Voluminous as it is, the code is far from being a complete or precise collection of the laws of the Empire. There are separate laws relating to certain provinces, and to certain religious questions; and the special legislation relating to the Jews has become an inextricable labyrinth of severities.

But the law required other reforms besides those of being simplified and rendered accessible. It also required amendment; and Nicholas

commanded that a commencement should be made with the criminal and disciplinary legislation, with the result that in 1845, an ordinance was issued as to criminal and disciplinary punishments, which was preceded by the abolition of the knout, a reform decided on in principle under Alexander I. Procedure also demanded attention, for, alike in civil and in criminal matters, it was both secret and written—an inquisitorial system introduced from Western Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. The result of secrecy was of course to promote venality, to turn the advocates into mere traffickers in bribes, and to make judgment go by auction. Public indignation was not aroused, because the judges were, for the most part, too ill-paid to live on their salaries, and the just judge was therefore he who received from both sides, and decided the case on its merits. To neutralise the ignorance and corruption of the judges, the Government had increased the number of Courts of Appeal, and multiplied the formalities and written documents, with the result of making the cases last longer and cost more; the abuses remained untouched.

Reforms were also required in the civil branches of the administration, and when made, generally took the shape of introducing a military element. For instance, the branches relating to roads and communications, mining, engineering, surveying, forestry, and education, received a military organisation. The police were put upon a military footing, and a great deal of the business of the criminal courts was transferred to Courts martial.

In the army itself, on which the external safety and internal order of the Empire depended, too much attention was paid to mere drill and little or none to the armament, or the intelligence of the soldiery. The burden of providing both men and money lay most heavily on the lower classes. The regulations as to the enrolment of recruits for enforced military service (which the peasant dreaded more than any other form of punishment) were reformed by new regulations in 1832; but on the other hand the period of service was lengthened, and the best elements of the population were swallowed up almost by the armed forces of the Empire. Between 1825 and 1854, the *personnel* of the army and navy increased by 40 per cent., and absorbed on an average almost 40 per cent. of the budget. In this period the revenue increased from 110 to 260 million roubles, the expenditure from 115 to 313 million roubles. The principal means to meet the deficits were internal loans. The paper currency became so much depreciated, that when, in 1839, by a stroke involving the abolition of 427 million roubles of the public debt, the Finance Minister, Count Kankrin, fixed the legal rate of exchange, he made one silver rouble equal to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  paper roubles.

The greatest reform in finance was the substitution in 1843 of credit notes for the old assignats which were exchangeable for coin. From 1843 to 1856, as a result of this reform, the silver rouble was



both actually and nominally the unit of monetary value, and the only legal tender for which the holders of Credit Notes could claim to have them exchanged. During the Crimean War, however, the convertibility of paper-money into coin ceased, and was not again resumed, and the credit rouble became the actual monetary unit although the silver rouble remained the nominal one. In 1853 the national funded and non-funded debt including the excess of the note issues over the total bullion, was nearly £144,000,000 sterling. No real reforms were introduced in direct taxation, the arrears of which steadily increased. In 1831, there were 38 millions of roubles of arrears of direct taxation; in 1845, the arrears amounted to 71 millions, or 41 per cent. of the ordinary receipts of the budget. In direct taxation the chief reform was the reintroduction, in 1826, of the system of leasing the retail sale of spirits to private persons, whose interest it was to push the sale of drink by all means in their power; and a substantial increase in the revenue was the result, at the cost of the demoralisation and impoverishment of the population.

Of the Finance Ministers of this period, Count Kankrin (1821–44), Vronchenko (1844–52), and Brock (1852–8), the first, who has been called the Russian Colbert, was the most capable. Simple and economical in his own personal habits to the point of seeming miserly, he tried, and at first with success, to introduce the same economy into the finances of the State. He was resolutely hostile to the introduction of railways; and, with the exception of a short line from St Petersburg to Tsarskoye Selo (1834)—extended to Pavlovsk in 1836—the railway completed later between St Petersburg and Moscow (1851), and a line between Warsaw and the frontier (in all 632 miles), no attempts were made in this direction. The system of import duties from 1824 to 1850, which was high but not prohibitive, was successful in promoting Russian industry. Moscow, as Baron Haxthausen tells us, formerly a city of residence for noblemen, became in this period a town of manufacture and commerce. The average yearly value of exports from 1800 to 1824 was 64,122,000 roubles; that from 1824 to 1849 was 112,123,000 roubles. The average yearly value of imports from 1800 to 1824 was 112,329,000 roubles; that from 1824 to 1849 was 212,174,000.

The National Church was strenuously supported in her combat with dissent and other religions. In 1839, some 2,000,000 Uniates in Russia proper were forcibly united to the Orthodox Church. Heresy was stamped out, according to the official documents, but not in fact, for it was at this time that one of the most powerful and respectable sects, the Old Ritualists, received a great impulse by obtaining, what they had long wanted, a properly consecrated bishop, instead of being obliged to rely on runaway priests from the Orthodox Church. In 1844, permission was obtained from the Austrian Government to found a bishopric at Bielaya Krinitza, in Galicia, near the Russian frontier, and

in 1846, the Metropolitan of Bosnia passed over to the Old Ritualists, and accepted this diocese.

Early in the reign it was a matter of public policy to discourage the lower classes from undertaking the higher courses of education; yet, when the University of Vilna was closed, a new University was founded at Kieff (1832); classes in history and the Slavonic languages were instituted; and facilities (withdrawn after 1848) were given to young men to go abroad and study in order to qualify as professors. By the statute of 1835, a certain autonomy was left to the Universities in the shape of freedom to choose the rector and professors. The number of students at five Russian Universities, excluding Dorpat, rose from 2002 in 1836, to 3998 in 1848, but was reduced to 3018, in 1850. In the same year metaphysics and moral philosophy were withdrawn from the programme of the Universities, the latter on the ground that it was practically useless to young persons acquainted with the principles of Christianity.

The Censorship, which received a complete code of regulations in 1828, was pushed to a degree of severity hitherto unheard of, and became ridiculous by its persecution of the most harmless statements, which it construed into attacks on authority. The utterance of an unguarded word, the possession of a forbidden book, might at any time lead to exile in a distant government, or in Siberia itself, practically without either trial or appeal. In 1840, anatomical and physiological books were forbidden to include anything which might hurt the instinct of decency. In 1848, newspapers were forbidden publicly to commend inventions until they had been investigated according to the rules of science (it was not said by whom) and pronounced to be sound. In the same year a Committee was appointed to supervise the Censorship, and then another Committee was formed to supervise the first! Delations came in by thousands; everywhere there was distrust. The Censorship had no kind of system, and followed the inspiration of panic. In 1851 a Committee of musical experts was formed to investigate musical notes, on the ground that they might be used as a cypher, to conceal ill-intentioned compositions. The reading public was limited, fickle, and timid, so far as journals were concerned. In 1843 there were only 12,000 subscribers to all the chief Russian periodicals. In fact, the failure of Russian journalism may be ascribed as much to the indifference of the public, as to the virulence of the Censor.

Of the whole population of Russia, the serfs numbered in 1838 44 per cent., being most numerous in the neighbourhood of Moscow, and in the Black Earth zone, among the population of purest Russian descent. There had been unrest amongst them, ever since Peter III abolished the obligation of the nobility to serve in the army (1763). From that date the serfs had expected their emancipation to follow, as indeed, it should logically have done; since they had been originally

bound to the landowner to enable him to fulfil his military obligations to the State. This unrest was manifested by fewer outbreaks in the time of Alexander I than in previous reigns; but serious revolts recommenced under Nicholas in 1826, and continued all through his reign and after it, until emancipation took place, to which they contributed more than has been generally recognised. On an average there were 23 outbreaks a year from 1828 to 1854. Latterly the numbers concerned increased; and in 1843 there were 31 such outbreaks, more than 40,000 peasants of the imperial domains revolting in consequence of a report that they were to be handed over to private proprietors. In 1848 there were 64 outbreaks; and 10,000 peasants belonging to private proprietors revolted in the government of Kursk alone. Six Committees were successively appointed by Nicholas to consider the question of emancipation; but the practical results of his efforts in legislation for the benefit of the peasants were trifling. In 1827 the minimum of a peasant's share of land was fixed at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  *dessiatines* (about  $11\frac{1}{4}$  acres). In 1831, reforms were introduced into the government of the village communities, of which to a foreign observer the most striking was the vote by ballot. In 1833, a law forbade landowners to mortgage the serfs and separate them from the land they lived on; and also prohibited the sale of peasants by retail. In 1837, a Ministry of Domains was appointed, with the special object of ameliorating the lot of the peasants, and raising, by example, the standard of their treatment. Under the law of 1842, proprietors were allowed to transform their peasants into farmers, and 24,700 of these peasants were thus emancipated. By a law of 1841, it was forbidden to sell serfs, save to proprietors of land with peasants. When peasants were bought without land, it was necessary to indicate the property on which they were to be registered. The breaking up of families of peasants was again forbidden. In addition to this, certain slight restrictions were placed on the authority of the proprietor. A number of the worst of the proprietors were removed from the administration of their estates; and a few who were convicted of atrocious cruelty were exiled to Siberia. But no decisive or comprehensive measure of emancipation was attempted by Nicholas.

In the enquiries undertaken so far, it had become clear that the State could not consent to any project that would uproot the peasant from the soil and leave him free to wander at will, because such a plan would render the collection of the taxes impossible, and probably produce most serious agrarian troubles; next, that, if migration was to be restricted, the peasantry must be provided with land in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages, otherwise they would soon fall back into the power of the proprietors. Provision for such land could only be made by taking it from the proprietors—an inroad on the sacred rights of property for which Nicholas was not prepared. The peasants did not even obtain the right of making complaints, for fear of overthrowing the

authority of the landowners, whom Nicholas himself described as 50,000 most zealous and efficient hereditary police masters. Such rights and protection as were granted by the law were illusory, because for the most part unknown, and almost universally disregarded, so far as the serfs, who were members of the *Mir* or village community, were concerned. The domestic serfs, or *Dvorovyye*, who were practically domestic slaves under the absolute power and control of the masters, formed about 6 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. of the whole number belonging to the proprietors at the end of the reign of Nicholas; and their number was rapidly increasing. No doubt, in a very large number of instances where the landlord lived on his property, and took a pride in it, he treated his serfs well, and was a friend to them in time of trouble. But in the case of an absentee landlord or of an old soldier who introduced the brutal methods of the army into the management of his property, or worse still, in the case of speculators who bought properties for what they could make out of them, the lot of the serf was most miserable and degrading, alike to master and to man.

A power of resistance similar to that exhibited by the agricultural peasants was shown by another class of workers—also chiefly serfs—namely the factory hands, whose numbers increased from 210,568 in 1825, to 532,000 in 1847, falling to 481,000 in 1853, owing no doubt in part to the introduction of machinery, but still more to the revival of home industries. Industrial work in Russia was carried on at this time either in proprietary factories under state control or in factories owned by the nobles. Special privileges were granted to the factory owners and their families. They were freed from military and other services to the State, and were subject only to special Courts of justice. The sale of their produce was either secured by the State, as in the case of the manufacture of arms, ammunition, cloth, sail-cloth, and paper, or protected by heavy duties against the foreigner. In spite of the privileges granted to manufacturers, it became at an early date difficult to find persons to undertake the business; and foreigners were imported for this object. It was even more difficult to find sufficient workpeople. Peasants from the state and crown lands formed the first source of supply, and of these a certain number were generally allotted to each new factory, and bound to it in perpetuity. Till 1816, manufacturers were allowed to purchase peasants from the nobles, and to employ peasants who had run away from an estate; but after that date they were made responsible for the capitation tax in such cases. As the demand for labour increased, beggars, criminals, soldiers and their children, children from the orphanages, prisoners of war, and the wives of soldiers on service, were sent to the factories, and bound to them either for a time or in perpetuity. The manufacturers' rights over these were, however, restricted. They might not employ them in other than factory work, and were bound to keep them in employment, and maintain them

at all times. The State held itself in theory responsible for regulating wages, hours, and conditions of labour; and the workpeople had a right of appeal to the State.

The jurisdiction over state factories was transferred, in 1819, from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Finance, and, during the reign of Nicholas, was considered by that department purely from the point of view of the manufacturers. Under a law passed in 1840, allowing manufacturers to free the workmen, some 15,000 workmen were liberated, and were enrolled either among the merchants, or the citizens, or the domain peasantry. Compulsory labour was, in fact, not only undesirable in itself, but the workmen showed an energy and pertinacity in asserting their right to the redress of grievances which is not generally associated with the character of the Russian labourer. The principal cause of the strikes (which frequently occurred) was the wages; those of the freemen employed being twice as high as those of the serfs. Other complaints relate to long hours—16 hours a day for men, and for children of ten years, 15-17 hours a day in summer, and 14-16 in winter. Further, there were complaints of brutal treatment of every kind, including the punishment of being sent by the proprietor as recruits to the army instead of his own serfs, the punishment of flogging, in some cases until death ensued, and the punishment of banishment to Siberia. Sometimes, after a long struggle, the persistence of the workmen was rewarded by success, in the shape of freedom. In some of these contests, most of which took place in the neighbourhood of Moscow, the local authority, and in particular the enlightened Governor-General Prince Galitzin, took the side of the workmen, while the central authority at St Petersburg took the part of the capitalists.

Early in the century, it was recognised that serfdom was the great obstacle to Russia's industrial progress; and in 1811 the Ministry of the Interior was at work on a project for the formation of a free labouring class. In 1832, Prince Galitzin prepared a series of proposals to settle the relations between master and workmen, and in his report he states that the workmen rarely made complaints against just and honourable masters; but his proposals were successfully resisted by the employers in St Petersburg and Moscow. In 1835, the first Factory Act, with regulations as to the keeping of wages books, was passed, but remained a dead letter. In 1845, in consequence of the strikes near Moscow, another law was passed forbidding the night labour of children under twelve years; but, owing to there being no penalty for disobedience, this Act also remained ineffective. In the same year, an enactment against strikes was included in the Criminal Code. Even the workmen in the Siberian gold mines received the attention of the Ministry in 1838, though it is not certain whether the measures enacted were carried out. On the other hand, in 1847, as a result of complaints against the payment of wages in kind, bad food, fines, and deductions, Prince Scherbatoff, the Governor-

General of Moscow, prepared a scheme for a model labour contract, and for a workman's account book—proposals which fell through because of the panic induced by the revolutions which disturbed other countries in 1848.

The factories, which were owned by the nobles, were independent of the State in their origin, and rested on the power possessed by the nobles, which enabled them to use the labour of the peasants upon their estates for any purpose. Even in the days of purely domestic industries, they often sent the peasants to the towns to work at special trades, or employed them in the workshops attached to their own houses. When the advantages of manufactures on a large scale became apparent, the nobles erected factories like those founded by the State, and employed their own peasantry as workpeople: so much so, that a cloth factory could be found on every well-managed estate. At first, the peasants worked in the factories during the winter only, being occupied in agriculture during summer; but, as the need of more skilled work was felt, the factory hands were formed into a class distinct from the agricultural labourers, and worked in factories all the year round, being provided with board and lodging in large barracks, often far from their homes. These workers received no wages, only maintenance; but, though very cheap, the labour was unproductive. Attempts were made in the thirties by Prince Galitzin, the Governor-General of Moscow, to improve the position of the serfs in the nobles' factories; but he was not supported by the Government. The nobles' factories had the somewhat unexpected result of reviving the domestic industries carried on by the peasants; for the workpeople, who were employed in the factories during the winter, returned to their own homes for the summer, taking with them a knowledge of the simple processes which alone were used in the factories, and handing it on to the members of their families who remained at home. The very small prices asked by these peasants, who still considered their industrial as subsidiary to their agricultural work, enabled them to compete successfully with the factories in many cases. Some of these peasants rose by degrees into the position of wealthy manufacturers or merchants. The landlords found it to their advantage to encourage the enterprise of the serfs, since, as their earnings increased, they were able to increase the fixed yearly quit-rent (*obrok*) levied upon them, and in other ways to acquire part of their wealth;—for instance, by imposing fines on their marriage, or for allowing them to escape military service, or by exacting still larger sums for complete freedom.

The most remarkable development during this period was that of the cotton industry, which owed its prosperity to a great extent to the protective tariff. The amount of raw cotton imported rose from a yearly average of 70,000 *puds* (about 1191 tons) in 1821-5, to an average of 1,670,000 *puds* (28,414·45 tons) in 1851-5, while the cotton yarn imported rose from 120,000 *puds* (2041·75 tons) in 1812-5, to

590,000 *puds* (10,038·64 tons) in 1836–45, from which it declined to 120,000 *puds* in 1851–5, owing to the importation of machinery from England, and the establishment of weaving in Russia. The rise of the cotton industry was accompanied by a fall in the linen industry. This was due not merely to the fact that the cheaper routed the dearer product, but largely to the want of technical knowledge and skill—a want to which was to be attributed the slow progress of the iron industry, in spite of liberal state subsidies—as well as the fact that Russia lost some markets already gained abroad, for instance that of sail-cloth and iron. One of the chief reasons of the rise of the cotton industry was the employment of wage-earning free labour; in 1826, out of 47,021 employees in the cotton industry, only 247 were private serfs, and 2239 proprietary serfs, the rest were all freemen. The cotton factories were largely in the hands of peasants, in some cases still serfs, or merchants, or again foreigners, like the famous Knoop, whose activity began towards the end of the reign of Nicholas. With the development of free wage-earning factories commenced the fall of the old system. The proportion of the employees in the cotton industry, to those in all factories, was 7 per cent. in 1804, 21 per cent. in 1825, and 32 per cent. in 1836. The nobles' factories diminished, a fact which may to some extent explain their increasing indebtedness. On the eve of the emancipation the landed proprietors were indebted to the Government alone to the sum of 425 millions of roubles, and 69 per cent. of their serfs were mortgaged. Side by side with this, we find an increasing prosperity among the peasantry. The wages of free labour were rising at this period, owing to the rapid development of industry and the demand for labour, to the limitation of its supply caused by the existence of serfdom, and to the already explained method by which *krustari*, or home industries, competed successfully with the factories. From an economic standpoint, everything indicated the emancipation of the serfs to be a most pressing necessity, while, from that of public order and safety, the frequent outbreaks, both agrarian and industrial, showed that the old system could only be maintained with difficulty.

During this period of industrial development at home, Russia was at the same time seeking fresh outlets for her population and her trade to the south and east. In 1847 Nicholai Muravieff was appointed Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. In 1849 he built the fortress of Petropavlovsk on the eastern shore of Kamschatka, and fortified it so strongly that an attack made by the allied squadron during the Crimean War was repulsed with loss. In 1850 he established the port of Nicholaievsk at the mouth of the Amur. Next, being responsible for the victualling of certain Russian settlements in Chinese territory on the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Tartary, and needing for the purpose the waterways of the Amur, Muravieff boldly determined to seize the coveted province in the name of Russia. His first expedition into the Amur territory

was made in 1851-3. Other expeditions followed, and in 1858 he was able to lay the foundations of the town of Blagoveschensk, as well as of Harbarovsk, at the mouth of the Ussuri. In this same year he obtained from China the Treaty of Aigun, which surrendered to Russia all the country on the left bank of the Amur. Two years later, in 1860, Russia obtained from China the cession of the maritime province between the Ussuri and the sea. By Article II of the Treaty of Aigun, the rivers Amur, Sungari and Ussuri, were declared open to the navigation of Chinese and Russian vessels, to the exclusion of all other foreign countries.

The population of Siberia did not from the first conquest consist solely, or even chiefly, of either Asiatic aborigines or Russian exiles. An estimate of the Siberian population in 1622 showed that the country possessed 70,000 inhabitants, of whom only 7400 were exiles. Large numbers, in fact probably about 150,000, were exiled to Siberia between the years 1832 and 1852, suffering terrible privations on the march thither, and in the mines when they reached their destination. But the population was chiefly augmented by administrative emigration, under which whole families were moved with all their property, and also, in spite of the increased severities of the passport system, by voluntary emigrants who desired to escape the oppression of serfdom, and the harsh measures of the Government against religious sectaries, and above all to be released from the hated compulsion to military service. Indeed, so great was the desire of the Russian serfs to reach the freedom of Siberia, that many committed offences in Russia in order to be transported. Complete statistics are wanting, but from trustworthy records we gather that the number of emigrants to the government of Tomsk alone, during the eleven years 1852-63, was over eighteen thousand. In addition, there was the large official population of the military and civil officials for the service of the roads, the posts, stations, mines, and forts.

A large extension was also given to the Russian dominions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In Central Asia trouble began in 1829, owing to the plunder of a Russian caravan by the Khivans; and friction occurred between the western Kirghiz and the Cossack colonies, which were pushed forward to occupy fertile patches east of the Russian boundary. In 1834 Count Perovsky, the Governor-General of Orenburg, endeavoured to overawe the Kirghiz by the construction of a chain of forts on his southern boundary, beginning with Alexandrovsk on the Caspian. In 1839 hostilities commenced with an expedition of Perovsky against Khiva, which ended in a treaty of peace made in 1842, bringing the Amur Darya under Russian influence. In 1846 a footing was gained on the Sir Darya by the construction of Fort Kazalinsk. This led to war with the Khan of Khokand; and in 1853 Perovsky captured the Khokand stronghold, Ak Mechet, 280 miles inland from the Sea of Aral. In 1854 an expedition penetrated to Ili; and a fort was built at Verni, between the lakes of Baikal and Issik-Kul. The Treaty of Turkmanchay



with Persia in 1828 had secured to Russia the provinces of Erivan and Nakhichevan; while the Treaty of Adrianople with Turkey (1829) obtained for her the fortresses of Anapa, Achaltsik, and the Black Sea coast line, including Poti, so that the whole of the Caucasus was nominally converted into Russian territory. Nevertheless all through the reign of Nicholas the Lesghians and Cherkesses kept up a struggle for their freedom. The general advance and expansion of the Russian Empire during this period may be judged by the fact that it contained about 2,226,000 square miles in Europe, and about 4,452,000 in Asia; and in 1855 about 2,261,250 square miles in Europe, and 5,194,000 in Asia.

The reign of Nicholas, apart from the Crimean struggle which dominated its close, is full of the contrasts presented by every stage of Russian history, and offers problems of great difficulty and great interest to the historian. It seems at first sight a period of absolute darkness and despair; yet the greatest Russian writers, all of whom sprang from the ranks of the nobles, either first saw the light or flourished during this period. It seems at first sight a time of incredible misery for the lower orders, yet one great authority, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, expresses the view that the lot of a serf, before the emancipation and under the better class of proprietors, was undoubtedly more enviable than that of the majority of English agricultural labourers; while another, Baron Haxthausen who travelled in Russia at this time, records that wages were excessive, being in some cases twice as high as in Germany. It was certainly a time of industrial growth, and the commercial policy pursued promoted the development of that nurse of democracy, the cotton industry, and laid the foundation of future imperial unity. It was the golden age of home industries. The foreign policy pursued laid the foundations of future markets for Russian produce and outlets for Russian colonisation in Asia, and continued in Europe the national crusade to release the downtrodden Slavonic brethren from the yoke of the infidel, and to place the Cross instead of the Crescent on St Sophia. In fact, the germs of the future development of modern Russia are clearly to be discerned, no less than the promise of her mission in Asia and her destiny as head of the Slavonic races in Europe.

It is easy to condemn, as every lover of freedom must condemn, the maintenance of the institution of serfdom, and the barbarous lengths to which the policy of repression was carried. But it is only fair to remember that the keynote of the reign was given by the conspiracy of the Decabrists. It is at least open to doubt whether the iron system of Nicholas, in view of the unstable and corrupt instruments with which he had to work at a time of universal ferment and unrest, was not on the whole of more advantage, since it gave relative tranquillity to Russia, than any premature steps that could have been taken in the direction of those internal reforms which were now becoming plainly inevitable.

## (2) THE LEVANT.

By the settlement of the Egyptian question, which, after embittering his father's closing years, had during the first two years of his own reign almost defied the efforts of European diplomacy, the young Abd-ul-Mejid was left free to carry out his measures of reform. These had been accepted in principle by the late Sultan Mahmud, owing to the influence of their actual author and devoted partisan Reshid Pasha; but the official proclamation of them had been deferred until Abd-ul-Mejid's accession. Four months after that event, on November 3, 1839, in the presence of the foreign representatives, the great dignitaries of State, and the heads of the religious communities, the important Act known as the *tanzimât* (legislation) or *hatt-i-Sherîf* (imperial rescript) of Gulhané had been promulgated. This charter laid down formally the principle of the equality before the law of all classes of Ottoman subjects, guaranteed their lives, property, and honour; declared that legislation would at once be carried out to establish regular military service, the control of state expenditure, publicity in legal proceedings, freedom in commercial transactions, and the abolition of the confiscation of the property of criminals and of the disabilities heretofore attaching to their heirs. The new charter, which ended with a malediction on all such as should infringe its provisions, was proclaimed with equal solemnity throughout the provinces, but was followed by an immediate and universal reaction; and it must be admitted that, even when not actively hostile, prejudice and fanaticism, merely by their *vis inertiae*, proved too strong for the well-meant but somewhat premature legislation of the reforming Sultan and Minister. Indeed there have been few reigns in Turkey during which bloodshed and massacre in various parts of the Empire have been more frequent than that of Abd-ul-Mejid. But it would be grossly incorrect to deny that the *tanzimât*, and the other similar enactments by which it has been followed, have been productive of great and lasting benefit to the subject-races of Turkey, who, according to the testimony of a foreign eye-witness, in 1571 had been degraded to such a pitch of abasement that they dared not look a Turk in the face, and who were saved in 1644 only by the firmness and humanity of the Sheikh-ul-Islam from the general massacre ordered by Sultan Ibrahim. Life has come to be regarded as more sacred; property is outwardly respected and is not interfered with, at least without some show of legality; and, on the whole, the lot of the *raya* or peasant has become far more bearable in ordinary times and when no wave of fanaticism, real or factitious, passes over the land. One intolerable symptom of anti-Christian feeling was the tenacity with which the Turks insisted on imposing the death penalty on apostates from Islamism; and among Lord Stratford's highest achievements must be counted his success in inducing Turkey to abandon her uncompromising attitude on this head (March 21, 1844).

Though the settlement of the Egyptian question had pacified Turkey sufficiently to allow of the promulgation of the *tanzimât*, yet order was not thereby restored in Syria and Lebanon. The quarrels of the Druses and Maronites, heightened by the dissensions which followed on the exile of the Emir Beshir, Prince of the Druse Mountain (October, 1840), led to massacres by both parties. The overlapping of the different nationalities rendered a territorial arrangement of the question almost impracticable; and the matter was further complicated by the claim of France to protect the Maronites, as Roman Catholics. In 1845 it was found possible to draw up an organic statute for the Lebanon, which, while not giving complete satisfaction, secured a practically autonomous administration, under the Sultan's suzerainty, for each of the various classes of the population.

Meanwhile the educational, administrative, and judicial reforms which had been initiated in Mahmud's reign were actively carried forward. One important innovation was the institution of the Mixed Commercial Court at Constantinople; the presence in this tribunal of assessors of their own nationality afforded a much-needed security to foreign litigants. The British Government had instructed their ambassador to "impart stability to the Sultan's Government by promoting judicious and well-considered reforms." How energetically Lord Stratford laboured to carry out this instruction is evidenced by the archives of the Foreign Office and the statute-book of Turkey. But Reshid Pasha, the convinced advocate of reform, was unable to realise the hopes reposed in him; and his successors made no serious attempt to overcome the ingrained conservatism of Turkey. Notwithstanding the newly created ministries, codes, and tribunals, no long period was destined to elapse before the official belief in the regeneration of the Empire by spontaneous reform was exhausted; and, only a few years after the signature of the Treaty of Paris (1856), the most sanguine of Turkey's supporters had abandoned all faith in the protestations of the Porte as to its sincerity in such matters.

The settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier question was effected only after long and laborious discussion. Conflicting claims on the part of both States, which were embittered by the venom of sectarian differences, had nearly led to war in 1842; in the end, the mediation of Great Britain and Russia was invoked, commissioners of the two Powers proceeded to the debated points, and the Treaty of Erzeroum was concluded in October, 1847. But the frontier was never definitively demarcated; and to this day the question remains open and enters upon an acute stage from time to time.

The revolutionary movement of 1848, though extending to Moldo-Wallachia, had little effect on Turkey proper; but she came near a conflict with Russia and Austria over the question of the surrender of the Hungarian and Polish refugees, who had fled to Turkey after the

suppression of their respective insurrectionary movements. Thanks to the energetic action of Lord Stratford, who assumed in the cause of humanity a responsibility which few diplomatists have ever undertaken, and which in these days of rapid communications is scarcely likely again to fall on a foreign representative, the Porte held firm. Relying on his assurance of the support of England, it refused to give up the fugitives, in spite of the threats of the two imperial Cabinets. Prince Michael Radzivil was despatched with an ultimatum from the Tsar; but on September 17, 1849, thirteen days after his arrival, he withdrew without having attained his object; on the same day Russia and Austria broke off relations with Turkey. It was not until October 26 that Lord Stratford's natural anxiety as to whether his Government would endorse his resolute action was relieved by the arrival, after a memorable ride, of the Queen's messenger bearing the approval of the Cabinet. The two Powers hesitated to risk a conflict in which they would have found England, and probably France as well, on the side of Turkey. But Austria continued to demand the expulsion of the refugees, though most of them had decided to emigrate to America by 1851.

In 1850 the British ambassador was successful in obtaining the formal recognition of the native Protestants in Turkey as a distinct religious community, and the enactment of a law prohibiting the embarkation of negro slaves on Turkish vessels.

In 1852 the extension of Russian influence in Montenegro led to a conflict between Turkey and that principality, which the Porte had never recognised as independent. The Turks regarded as an infringement of their alleged suzerainty the charter whereby the young Prince Danilo, with the sanction of Russia, had divested himself of the episcopal character hitherto imposed on the rulers of the land, and had secured hereditary succession for his descendants. A powerful Turkish expedition under Omar Pasha was defeated by the Montenegrois with heavy loss on January 20, 1853; and the mediation of Austria and Russia brought about the cessation of hostilities.

On April 14, 1827, Capodistrias had been proclaimed by the National Assembly of Troezen President of the country for seven years; but Greece had been thrown into anarchy and confusion by his assassination on October 9, 1831. Civil war soon broke out between the partisans of the Commission of Three, appointed immediately after the murder of the President, and the Constitutional party; and it became necessary to call upon the French army of occupation in the Morea to garrison Nauplia, Patras, and, later, Argos. In the latter town an attack was made upon the French troops by Greek irregulars, who were however easily repulsed. Such was the internal condition of the country, when Prince Otho of Bavaria accepted the throne. The guaranteeing Powers had done their best to settle all the external relations of the new kingdom as satis-

factorily as possible, and to assure the material well-being of its young sovereign. By the treaty signed at Constantinople on July 21, 1832, the Sultan had consented to recognise the kingdom of Greece, and to evacuate those portions of it which were still in the occupation of his troops, on receipt of an indemnity of £400,000. The Powers guaranteed a Greek loan of £2,400,000 and obtained King Otho's formal admission into the ranks of European sovereigns. The King of Bavaria also undertook by the treaty of November 1, 1832, to supply a force of 3500 Bavarian soldiers, in substitution for the French army of occupation.

It was under these auspices that the young prince, aged 17, landed at Nauplia at the beginning of February, 1833. His person and demeanour favourably impressed his new subjects; and the poet Soutzo gave expression to the golden hopes, formed of the future of the country under his rule, in lines coupling the new sovereign's name with those of Lycurgus and Solon. A Council of Regency consisting of three Bavarians had been appointed by the King of Bavaria to act during his son's minority. The choice was unfortunate, and was directly responsible for the failure of the reign, for the Regents were ignorant of the country and had no special fitness for their task. Dissatisfaction was at once caused by the proclamation issued immediately after the King's arrival, which contained no mention of the Constitution promised to the Greeks in the announcement of King Otho's election made by the guaranteeing Powers. The Regency proceeded to organise the new administration on the basis of the practically absolute authority of the King, and of complete centralisation of the Government, on which even the municipal authorities were made dependent. Nor was greater wisdom shown in the important matter of taxation. The tithe system of the Turks was continued with all its abuses; the institution of a government monopoly of salt gave rise to general discontent, and an attempt to treat as state property all pasture lands was felt to be so outrageous an attack on the rights of private landowners that its abandonment was found necessary. But in drawing up their civil and criminal codes the Regents were more fortunate, and they endeavoured to settle satisfactorily the difficult question of the status of the Church of Greece. Since the revolution all relations with the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople had been broken off, and it was obviously out of the question that the authority of the *Phanar*, that is of the Patriarch and the Greek *camarilla*, which surrounded him at Constantinople and was under Turkish influence, should be reestablished. An episcopal council was convened at Nauplia, and, in accordance with its decisions, a decree was promulgated naming a Synod for Greece and declaring the Hellenic Church autocephalous and independent of the Phanar, August 4, 1833. But at a later date it was deemed advisable to remain in communion with the Patriarchate, and in 1850 the Oecumenical Patriarch consented to recognise the independence of the Hellenic Church and Synod.

On June 1, 1835, King Otho attained his majority and dispensed with the services of the Regents; and, on February 14, 1837, he married the Princess Amalia, daughter of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. Meanwhile the development of the country was neglected, and the proceeds of the guaranteed loan, instead of being devoted to the construction of roads, maritime communications and public works, melted away in useless extravagance. The result was that brigandage and disorder were prevalent throughout the country. The situation was further complicated by the intrigues of partisans of each of the three guaranteeing Powers, whose views were far from harmonious, and whose main object was to hinder each other from acquiring a preponderant influence in Greece. The irregular troops disbanded by the Regents gave great trouble, until the opportune occurrence of disturbances in Albania in 1833-4 afforded them congenial occupation on the further side of the frontier. Political insurrections were not wanting to add to the embarrassments of the Government; such as those in Messenia and Arcadia in 1834 and in Acarnania in 1836. Until 1843 the whole Government continued under Bavarian influence.

The insecurity and oppression, resulting from the incapacity and misgovernment of King Otho, had disgusted the three guaranteeing Powers as well as the people of the country, and had led to the cry for a Constitutional Government. The demand was supported by England and Russia, who pressed for measures calculated to introduce order into the embarrassed finances of the country; and platonic advice in the same sense was given also by France. But the warnings of the Powers were disregarded; and a revolution was required to induce King Otho to grant a Constitution. On September 14, 1843, the whole garrison surrounded the Palace; a deputation of the Council of State waited on the King to present the demands of the people, and Otho, obliged to choose between abdication and concession, adopted the latter alternative. The Bavarians were dismissed, and on November 20, 1843, a National Assembly was called together to draw up the Constitution. The task was completed on March 30, 1844, on which date the King gave his assent to the new Constitution. This charter, like most of those adopted in newly organised countries, was of a strongly Liberal nature. It declared the equality of all Greeks before the law, and assigned to universal suffrage the election of the members of the legislature. A senate, consisting of some fifty high officials, was also created. But little was done to remedy the shortcomings of the previous administration, or to establish local municipal self-government, so important for the country, of which moreover the bases already existed in the organisation which had been allowed to grow up under the Turkish rule.

It was too much to hope that complete respect for the Constitution would be shown by the Ministers appointed under its provisions. The first elections, held in 1844, at which Kolettes replaced Mavrocordatos

as Prime Minister, were conducted amidst the grossest illegalities on both sides, which were regularly repeated at subsequent elections. Military insubordination continued; trouble also arose with Turkey. The new Government had always been strongly in favour of the "great idea" of the restoration of Greece's former glories, *i.e.* of aggrandisement at the expense of Turkey. This "idea" seems ineradicable from the Greek mind, which is unable to realise the scantiness of the resources of the country or of its claims on the good-will of the Powers. It relies on memories of the past and on the enthusiasm of lovers of classical antiquity for the realisation of this visionary extension of Hellas, though during three-quarters of a century of independence the Greeks have failed to exhibit any marked ability in the art of government. The result was a tension in the relations between Greece and the Porte, ending, through an injudicious reproof addressed by the King to the Turkish Minister, in a complete rupture in 1847. The affair was settled through the intervention of the guaranteeing Powers; but the relations between the latter were far from cordial, and any measure supported by one of their number was likely to be opposed by the other two.

Partly through its aggressive attitude towards Turkey, the Government of King Otho had been growing gradually more and more estranged from England. The British Minister at Athens was subjected to petty slights worthier of the nursery than of the Court; and in 1850 Greece came to an open dispute with Great Britain, arising out of unsettled British claims. One cause of dispute was the question of the islets of Sapienza and Cervi; it was claimed that these formed part of the territory of the Ionian Islands; and the British Government, as exercising a protectorate over the Septinsular Republic, demanded the expulsion of the Hellenic authorities from the two islets named and the incorporation of the latter with the Ionian Islands. The British claims included the demand for an apology for an insult to a British naval officer, and indemnities for injury done to certain Ionian subjects, besides compensation due to George Finlay, the historian, for property belonging to him which had been arbitrarily seized and incorporated in the King's park at Athens. There was also the claim put forward by the notorious Don Pacifico, a Jew born in Gibraltar, and consequently a British subject, who resided at the Piraeus, where he had at one time occupied the post of Portuguese Consul. During one of those periodical attacks on the Jews not infrequent throughout the East and elsewhere at the Easter season, Don Pacifico's house was plundered on April 4, 1847; he thereupon presented to the Hellenic Government a heavy claim for compensation, which included £500 for the personal sufferings of himself and family, about £5000 for the value of his effects and furniture destroyed or pillaged by the assailants of his house, and upwards of £21,000 for the loss of documents in support of demands upon the Portuguese Government. His claim was endorsed by Her

Majesty's Government, and their action was vindicated in the House of Commons by Lord Palmerston in a speech, whose fervent patriotism distracted attention from the lack of care or precision in examining the details of the claim. The magnitude of the sum demanded was indeed the subject of much controversy and indeed ridicule, doubt being generally thrown on the existence of such valuable property in the house of one in the apparently humble circumstances of Don Pacifico.

The British Government, unable by peaceful means to induce the Hellenic Government to offer the desired apology or to satisfy the claims made, though the demand respecting Sapienza and Cervi was not included in these and was eventually abandoned, took the vigorous step of seizing the private property of Greek citizens, in addition to blockading the Greek ports. This action gave rise to great complaints on the part of other Powers, who alleged that their commercial and maritime interests were endangered, and whose intervention was enlisted by the more or less fraudulent transfer of Greek vessels to foreign flags. France and Russia, the other two guaranteeing Powers, were especially vehement in their objections to the course followed by England—which lost its novelty in later days, and gave rise to no international controversy when adopted by France in November, 1901, in order to enforce compliance by Turkey with the demands of French citizens. France offered her good offices, which after some demur were accepted. A French representative was sent to Athens to arrange matters; but his views did not agree with those of the British Minister, and on April 25, 1850, the blockade was resumed. Two days later the Government of King Otho accepted the British terms, and paid a sum of 180,000 drachmae (about £6400) in settlement of all claims, including 120,000 drachmae (about £4200) in respect of Don Pacifico's losses and personal sufferings. Meanwhile Lord Palmerston had arranged with Drouyn de Lhuys, the French ambassador in London, to accept in full settlement a sum larger than that agreed upon at Athens. The British Government determined to abide by the agreement arrived at in Greece, and some coolness ensued with France in consequence.

The question of the damage incurred by Don Pacifico through the destruction of the documents establishing his alleged claim against the Portuguese Government was referred to a mixed commission at Lisbon, composed of British, French, and Greek officials. On May 5, 1851, this commission decided that Don Pacifico was justified in claiming from Greece the sum, not of £21,000 but of £150 in respect of such documents as he might have lost and the expenses incurred by him during the investigation; and that sum was paid by the Hellenic Government to the British Minister at Athens on June 13, 1851.

By the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople, concluded on September 14, 1829, Russian ascendancy in the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia



seemed to be permanently assured; it is not without interest to note the steps by which this result had been reached. By the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (July 21, 1774) Russia acquired a vague and undefined right of intervention on behalf of the Principalities, confirmed in the Ainali Kavak Convention of March 10, 1779. By the *hatt-i-Sherif* of October, 1802, the Porte undertook not to dismiss the Hospodars without the concurrence of Russia. The Convention of Akkerman (October 7, 1826) laid down that the Princes were to be chosen from the Boyars; that they were to be appointed for seven years, and that they could be dismissed only for serious offences and with the consent of the Russian ambassador, which consent was necessary also in the event of their resignation. Further, the Princes were to give ear at all times to the representations of Russian Ministers or Consuls. The Treaty of Adrianople now secured them in their office for life, reaffirmed all the privileges and immunities conferred on the Principalities by previous treaties, and provided that Moldavia and Wallachia should be occupied by Russia until the payment by Turkey of the war indemnity, fixed at 10,000,000 ducats. Moreover, during the Russian occupation a *règlement organique* or Constitution was to be drawn up, in accordance with the wishes expressed by the legislative assemblies of the two provinces, and sanctioned by the Porte. This *règlement*, the work of a commission of Boyars under the presidency of Count Kisséleff, the Russian Administrator, was completed on July 29, 1829, and eventually received the Porte's confirmation, becoming law in Wallachia on July 1, 1831, and in Moldavia on January 1, 1832. While constitutional in character, it is strongly aristocratic in tone, and all the exclusive privileges of the Boyar class are therein maintained. Russia thereby assured the continuance of her influence, and acquired the sympathies of the Boyars, since, under this instrument, they formed the only section of the population which had any share in the administration of the provinces. The organic statute further provided that the election of the Hospodars should be carried out by an assembly of Boyars, in which, it was supposed, Russian influence would always be paramount.

But Russia, largely through the choice of tactless and overbearing agents, has the knack of converting friendly into hostile elements. The first Princes so appointed were, for Wallachia, Alexander Ghyka, 1834-42, and for Moldavia, Michael Stourdza, 1834-49. Difficulties in the working of the Constitution first arose in 1837, when the Russian representative at Bucharest called upon the Prince of Wallachia to cause the assembly to vote an additional article to the Constitution, providing that the *règlement* could not be modified in any way save with the assent of both Russia and Turkey. So strong was the opposition to the insertion of this strange clause in a charter of autonomy that the Russians induced the Porte to dissolve the assembly by firman. The Prince's position was thereby greatly weakened; Russian intrigues caused him to lose credit

with the nationalist party, and in 1842 he was deposed upon a petition from the assembly, after a joint enquiry held by Turkish and Russian Commissioners. His successor, George Bibesco, a *persona grata* at St Petersburg, was soon at variance with the assembly; recourse was again had to the Porte; and the Chamber, whose legislative period had still three years to run, was dissolved (1843). Freed till 1846 from the control of the assembly, Bibesco devoted himself to public works and financial and fiscal reform; in 1845 he succeeded, in spite of Austrian opposition, in inducing Turkey to allow the extension to Wallachia of the increase in import duties, raised from three to five per cent. in the rest of the Empire. Further, he abolished the customs between Moldavia and Wallachia, thus uniting the two Principalities in a *Zollverein*, which was to be the first step towards their complete union. In Moldavia Michael Stourdza maintained his position for fifteen years. Resisting the intrigues of the Boyars, supported as they were by Russia, he succeeded in effecting many useful and practical reforms; he founded schools, sought to improve the condition of the peasants, and relieved the Jews and Gipsies (many of the latter being slaves) of some of the disabilities to which they were subjected.

It was natural that the revolutionary and nationalistic movement of 1848 should spread to the Principalities. Since 1830 the desire for the union of the two countries had been growing in intensity, and the whole population was unionist, even in Moldavia, which would sacrifice her position if the union became an established fact, as the capital would clearly be Bucharest, the chief town of Wallachia. Russia had shown herself at first not unfavourable to the union, in the hope that a Russian prince might be called to the throne of the united Principalities. But the leaders of the movement, eager to include the whole Rouman-speaking race on either slope of the Carpathians, and chafing under the oppressive tutelage of their northern protector, aimed at complete emancipation from the Russian yoke as the next step after the shaking-off of the Greck incubus. The example set by the closely related Rouman population of Transylvania in resisting the Magyarisation, which was being forced on them, led to outbreaks in both Moldavia and Wallachia.

The first of these was limited to a street-riot at Jassy consequent on the presentation of a petition to the Prince demanding redress of certain abuses. Order was easily restored, a few only of the ringleaders being punished. But in Wallachia Prince Bibesco was compelled to accept a revolutionary Constitution and to form a Ministry from the members of the revolutionary Committee. Russia immediately formulated an official protest, and Bibesco abandoned office and left the country, June 14, 1848. The Turks were now urged by Russia to intervene and restore order by force of arms. Omar Pasha marched with 20,000 troops to Rustchuk, and a Turkish commissioner arrived at Bucharest, at whose demand the Provisional Government was dissolved and a lieutenancy

appointed, as provided by the organic *règlement*. Satisfied with this compliance, the commissioner withdrew, undertaking to lay before the Sultan the proposed modification of the Constitution. This did not suit Russia's plans; disturbances, perhaps the result of instigation, afforded her the desired opportunity; and the Principalities once more underwent the ordeal of a Russo-Turkish occupation.

On May 1, 1849, Turkey and Russia entered into the Convention of Balta Liman, which provided that the Hospodars of the Provinces should again be appointed for seven years, that the Assemblies should be replaced by divans nominated by the Princes, and that the joint occupation should continue until the complete pacification of the country, after which the armies were to be stationed near the frontiers, so as to be within hail if circumstances should require their return. The Princes were to be assisted in the work of reorganisation by Russian and Turkish commissioners. Michael Stourdza, who had retained his office throughout this troubled period, declined to accept the terms of the convention and abdicated. He was succeeded in Moldavia by Gregory Ghyka, while Barbe Stirbey became Prince of Wallachia. Prince Stirbey's first efforts were devoted to securing the evacuation of the country, and he attained this object in 1851. Among the most important reforms due to his reign must be included the settlement of the relations between peasants and landowners, greatly to the advantage of the former, and the extension of education and of the national language. The Russian occupation of the Principalities at the outbreak of the Crimean War soon made the position of the Hospodars impossible, and towards the end of October, 1853, they both withdrew to Vienna.

By the Treaty of Adrianople all the privileges enjoyed by Servia under former treaties were confirmed, and a year later, on November 30, 1830, Milosh Obrenovitch, who since the murder of Kara George had been the unopposed ruler of the country, was established, with the Sultan's formal recognition, as tributary Prince, with hereditary succession. Milosh cherished hopes, more than once revived later, of founding a Greater Servia which should comprise the whole Servian race; but his arbitrary and autocratic methods of government gave rise to much popular discontent. The Prince thereupon made an attempt to introduce Liberal government, and on February 15, 1835, promulgated a Constitution on Western lines. The nation, however, was not yet fit for such an experiment, which was soon abandoned, and the former autocratic system was resumed, with the result that the people again became seriously disaffected.

Under Russian persuasion, Prince Milosh on December 24, 1838, published a decree whereby he divested himself of much of his authority, in favour of a newly created legislative and administrative council

composed of seventeen irremovable senators. This body soon succeeded in getting into its hands the control of supreme power; and Milosh, having no support in the country, was obliged to abdicate in favour of his eldest son, Milan, on June 13, 1839. Prince Milan, however, died in the course of a month, when his younger brother Michael was elected by the Senate and confirmed by the Sultan. The new Prince, after freeing himself from the Regents imposed upon him by the Porte, was eager to effect widespreading reforms; but the expenditure requisite for these reforms necessitated increased taxation, which caused irritation and alienated the peasant supporters of the dynasty. In August, 1842, Prince Michael abdicated, and after a short regency Alexander Karageorgevitch, the son of the murdered Kara George, was called to the throne. Turkey agreed to sanction the choice, which, however, Russia consented to ratify only upon its confirmation at a second election held in deference to her wishes and on condition that the appointment should not be hereditary. Serbia now seemed to have entered on a new era of peace and progress, troubled only by temporary difficulties with Austria in 1848, due to the natural desire of the Servians to come to the aid of their oppressed kinsfolk, the Serbs of Slavonic Hungary.

## CHAPTER X.

NAPOLEON III AND THE PERIOD OF PERSONAL  
GOVERNMENT.

(1852-9.)

ON the evening of December 1, 1852, in a long procession of two hundred carriages flanked by torch-bearers, the members of the Senate proceeded in a body to Saint-Cloud, there to hail the Emperor in due form. The adherents of the older parties had been silenced; proscription and exile had crushed the "anarchists"; the decrees of the Presidency had given new life to the country's institutions; and the nation, by 7,839,000 "ayes," had once more reaffirmed its confidence in Louis Napoleon. Clothed with that absolute power which he demanded as essential to good government, the nephew of the "Great Emperor" was soon to be in a position to realise the dreams which had haunted his wanderings through the Old World and the New, and his hours of captivity in the fortress of Ham.

Napoleon was now forty-four years old; he was no longer the man of stone, "the eyeless sphinx," as Veuillot had called him in the years before 1850; and there were as yet none of the signs of that premature old age which marked the end of his reign. His pale complexion, dull glance, and phlegmatic bearing gave obvious indications of a melancholy and dreamy temperament, but his narrow forehead suggested that gentle and somewhat crafty obstinacy of which he was later to show himself capable. The bent of his mind had made him the slave of a tradition; his one object was to bring about, without much scruple as to the means, the restoration of his dynasty. Ultimately he went so far as to commend the *Coup d'état*; and in acting thus he did not perceive the irremediable mistake he had made. It cannot however be denied that genuine anxiety for the public good was mingled in his breast with selfish family ambitions. His letter to General Vaillant shows a full sense of the "personal responsibility attached to his position." Caesar had a conscience.

The adventures which he had passed through as *Carbonaro*, conspirator, and captive had shaped a remarkable character, which alternated between fits of reckless impulsiveness and moods of iron determination.

He knew how to keep his own counsel, how to brood over a design, and how to reveal it suddenly when he felt that his moment had come. His easy cordiality, his unaffected manner, his gratitude for past kindness, conciliated while it charmed; he had accomplices, it is true, but he had friends as well. But the choice of his associates, like the choice of his means, was to him a matter of small moment; all that he asked for in his adherents was that their interests should be bound up with his cause, and that their hopes should depend upon its success. He himself was still the conspirator, the man of small contrivances and petty intrigues, of *combinazioni* designed with the view of influencing his relations, his friends, and the men who surrounded him and in whose hands he felt himself to be. He was a man of half-resolves, and his powers of decision were fettered by the perpetual fear that he might compromise the future of his family. Even when he was seated on the throne, he was beset with the idea of combining all men, all parties, and all classes in one great secret society devoted to the welfare of his dynasty.

He believed, however, in his mission: that he was the man chosen by providence to realise at last the "Napoleonic ideas." He had himself expounded the ideals of the *Mémorial* and the *Légende Napoléonienne*, in various written treatises, *Political Reveries* (1832), *Les Idées Napoléoniennes* (1839), *Extinction of Pauperism* (1844). These ideals were the "reconstruction of French society, shattered by fifty years of revolution, and the reconciliation of order with liberty, of popular rights with the principle of authority." For Napoleon I, said his nephew, had found it impossible to realise his vast projects in ten years. His mission had been to complete the work of the Revolution and establish liberty in France. But the substructure must first be laid on solid foundations; liberty should crown the edifice. Its existence and position must be assured by a general recognition of the authority of government; and, to that end, government must appear as the "beneficent influence which moves the whole community." Napoleon I had attached the highest importance to manufactures, and had even in certain cases actually created them. Those who come after him, and with ample means and time at their disposal aim at realising his ideals, should do so by applying a stimulus to business, by helping and encouraging all classes alike: the manufacturers, by opening up new fields for industry, the peasants, by reviving the cultivation of the land through the aid of agricultural settlements, and the artisans, by providing work in abundance and so increasing their power of purchase. Thus work will be found for the unemployed, a demand created for every product, and poverty will disappear. "The triumph of Christianity abolished slavery; the triumph of the French Revolution abolished serfdom; the triumph of democracy will abolish pauperism," and the foundations of liberty will be laid.

The "Napoleonic" conceptions of foreign policy may be summed up in the phrase "a European Confederation." No more peace without

honour, as under Louis-Philippe; no more universal war, as under the Republic; but the "loyal offer of an alliance with France, to every government willing to combine with her in the defence of those interests which are common to all." But what were these "interests common to all" which were to serve as a bond between France and other governments? The defence of liberty and of national autonomy—these came first, for Louis Napoleon could never forget that he had been the pupil and friend of German philologists and Italian historians and an aggressive champion of liberalism. Within the lines of the Napoleonic legend, as it had grown up during thirty years, the Emperor had conceived a vast and vague combination of socialism and universal peace. His hope was that, by rallying all classes to his side, he would ensure at once the realisation of his dream and a glorious future for his dynasty.

In spite, however, of two triumphant *plébiscites*, the new Emperor could not be blind to the fact that opposition, though reduced to silence, still existed. After the *Coup d'état* and the "mixed commissions," he found himself in the hands of the "Men of Order" and forced to take action against the "Reds." Before he could begin to realise his ideals, to develop his vast projects, he was compelled, in the phrase then current, "to restore order." Hence the curious political system which governed France for eight years—a system of mingled severity and favours, under which all classes, solely in the interest of the supreme authority, were alternately harassed and caressed.

The proclamation of the Empire on December 2, 1852, was no more than the logical result of the policy pursued by the Prince President since 1849. Its reestablishment was not, constitutionally speaking, a revolution; it meant merely that certain readjustments gave a finish to the institutions which had been accorded to France under the Constitution of January 14, 1852. The *senatusconsultum* of November 2, 1852, ratified by the *plébiscite* of November 21 and 22, and promulgated by the decree of December 2, declared the Empire reestablished. On December 25, a second *senatusconsultum*, purporting only to "interpret and modify" the Constitution of 1852, defined the new *régime*. The Constitution of January 14 had already given to the Chief of the State, who was declared to be "responsible to the nation," the "free and unfettered authority" on which he had insisted. He commanded the forces by land and sea; he could make peace and war; justice was administered in his name; and he possessed the prerogative of pardon. He alone could initiate laws; he promulgated them and issued the decrees and regulations necessary to carry them into effect; in short, he had already absorbed the whole power of the executive and had laid his grasp on the judiciary and the legislature. The *senatusconsultum* of December 25 defined still more clearly the absolute nature of his power. From this time forward it was the Emperor by his personal authority, and not the Legislative Body, who could conclude treaties of

commerce; it was he who ordered or authorised all works of public utility. It was he who determined the relations between the Senate and the Legislative Body and defined the functions of those bodies (decree of December 31, 1852); finally, while the budget of every Ministry was voted by the Legislative Body, the subdivision under various headings of the sum granted to each Ministry was settled by imperial decree. Thus the Emperor was, so far as possible, supreme in the State; in theory he was still responsible to the people who had placed the power in his hands, but this responsibility had no real existence. As the Government alone could summon the nation to a *plébiscite*, the nation was dependent for the exercise of its rights on the good pleasure of the Government, while the very wording of the *plébiscite* excluded anything like a free expression of opinion.

It was through his Ministers, through his Prefects, by means of a great network of centralised administration, that the Emperor governed. Under the Constitution of 1852, the Ministers "no longer formed a responsible council, constantly checking, by their solidarity, the special impulses emanating from the Chief of the State, and reflecting merely the policy of the Chambers"—a policy subject to constant modification. They became nothing more than "respected and influential aids to the imperial intelligence"; they swore fidelity to the Emperor; they were excluded from the Legislative Body; each one worked by himself in his own special department. The will of the sovereign was thus present everywhere, but, as it was impossible for the Emperor to look into details, there was a want of cohesion and general supervision, and, though vast projects were carried out, every-day details were neglected.

The Ministers were ten in number. The Minister of State, created by a decree of January 22, 1852, was the medium of all communications with the chief bodies of the State, the Chamber, the Senate, and the like; he was in addition entrusted with all matters not expressly assigned to the other Ministries, and on December 14, 1852, was given charge of the imperial household. Besides him, there were the Ministers of Justice, the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, the Navy and the Colonies, Public Instruction and Worship, Public Works, and finally the Minister of Police, who had charge also of the Press. Several times in each week the Ministers attended the Emperor, made their reports, expressed their views, and received his orders.

Through the medium of these officials the Emperor conveyed his will to the various departments of State and to those responsible for local administration. The Prefect was the representative of the Government and enjoyed in his department all the authority of the sovereign. A decree of March 25, 1852, gave him the power to legislate in certain matters and the nomination to certain offices; and by the law of June 14, 1854, the appointment of teachers in the primary schools was taken from the Rector and given to the Prefect. He had full control of all local



bodies in his department; he appointed the members of the Academic Council (decree of March 9, 1852), and the members of the Chamber of Agriculture (decree of March 20, 1852). The prefectoral system has been regarded as an attempt at decentralisation; it was at most but an attempt to localise the central power. Decentralisation involves a transfer of certain elements from the central authority to local bodies, while in this case each Prefect, as the devoted agent of the Chief of the State, became a sort of miniature Emperor. He, too, administered despotically with his Council of State (the Council of the Prefecture) and his legislative body (the General Council); and he, too, imitated the methods of his sovereign in his treatment of everything, from important public works to the balls which he gave at the Prefecture.

Far from bestowing any independence on departmental and municipal authorities, the Emperor placed them under a supervision which grew stricter day by day. In the communes the authority still rested with the Mayor; but, by Article 57 of the Constitution of 1852, the Mayors, and, by a law of May 5, 1855, even deputy-Mayors, were appointed by the Executive and might be chosen from outside the municipal council. (Under the Republic only the Mayors of communes with more than 6000 inhabitants were nominated by the Government.) It is true that there existed in each commune, except at Paris (after July 3, 1848) and at Lyons (after March 2, 1854), an elective municipal council renewed every five years, with power to vote the municipal budget. Its sittings, however, were not held in public, and it was liable to be suspended by the Prefect, or to be dissolved by the Emperor and replaced by a commission. Its power was almost *nil*; even the municipal *employés*, the rural constables, the collectors of town dues, and the like, were appointed by the Prefect. Thus the Government created a host of adherents on which it could rely. It was through these zealous agents, these officials in their various grades—Ministers, Prefects, Mayors, and Deputies—that the imperial will penetrated to the extremities of the country and permeated provincial life.

Certain readjustments of detail were all that was necessary to place the machine of administration under the exclusive power of the Emperor. Revolutionaries like Blanqui were right in their belief, that he who in France holds the central power holds all. If Napoleon had been able to strike a successful blow, it was because he had on his side the army, upon which, after all, his power was based. Still, on the occasion of the first *plébiscite* 37,359 soldiers had voted “no” against 303,290 who had voted “aye.” They all indeed obeyed the orders of the Emperor; but he was not satisfied with mere obedience, he asked for affection. The law of April 28, 1855, enabled him to form an army devoted to himself; for, while under the law of 1832 a conscript who wished to avoid service might send in his place a relation or a “paid substitute,” the law of 1855 forbade substitution except between persons within the

sixth degree of relationship (*i.e.* second cousins); and, from that time forward, conscripts might avoid service by contributing certain sums to a fund (*Caisse de dotation de l'armée*) from which payments were made to old soldiers willing to reengage, the choice of the substitute being thus kept in the hands of the Government. An immoral traffic was suppressed, and the conscript was no longer held responsible for the desertion of his substitute; the chief gain however lay in the raising of an army largely composed of professional soldiers and entirely devoted to the Government. On March 20, 1858, all substitution except between brothers was forbidden. The substitution fund grew to be more than sufficient to provide the bounties and extra pay for the reengaged men; and in 1858, 12,000,000 francs were taken from it to meet a Treasury deficit.

The army, having placed the Emperor on the throne, guarded his dynasty against any possible rising, while the police, on their part, enabled him to keep a watchful eye on citizens at large. On January 22, 1852, as we have already seen, the police had been entrusted to a special Minister, who was also made responsible for the control of the Press and for the Public Safety, and was given the command of the National Guard, the *Gendarmerie*, and the like. Everyone agreed that de Maupas, the new Minister of Police, did his work well; but his unpopularity gave cause for apprehension, and his office was suppressed by decree on June 21, 1853. The police were placed once more under the Minister of the Interior, while the appointment of Commissaries of Police (1852-5), wherever their services were required in the departments, the great towns, and on the lines of railway, enabled the Government to keep a watch on all "dangerous individuals." When, in 1858, Orsini's attempt on the Emperor led to the passing of a special measure of Public Safety which empowered the Government to imprison, exile, or deport without a trial, any suspected person, nothing remained but to give the word to this ready-made army of officials. The liberty of citizens was placed at the arbitrary disposal of the Government; if men talked politics, they ran the risk of arrest; and there were spies everywhere, even in drawing-rooms.

The police kept the Press under strict supervision. It had not been thought well to suppress the political newspapers nor to insist on their being submitted for perusal before publication; but the security they were required to give was doubled (it amounted in Paris to 50,000 francs). The stamp duty was also doubled, and it was made necessary by a decree of February 17, 1852, to obtain the permission of the Government before founding a journal. The Minister of the Interior had power to appoint and to discharge the editor-in-chief on the nomination of the owners; no change could be made in the staff of the paper without the Minister's consent. Under the same decree, Press offences, instead of being tried before a jury, were sent to the police Court, where they were

summarily and severely dealt with. Finally, the Minister might intervene directly and without legal process by means of warnings, suspensions, and suppression. If an article was displeasing to the Government, the editor received a warning from the Prefect; after two warnings, the Minister by his own act could inflict suspension; and, if the newspaper was considered to menace public security, the Chief of the State could suppress it by a decree published in the *Bulletin des Lois*. The publication of reports of press trials, and of the sittings of the Legislative Body, and even of news which was disagreeable to the Government, was forbidden, while, on the other hand, it was made obligatory to insert official communications; and the Government was thus enabled to interfere in the actual composition of the journal. During the sixteen months that he was Minister, de Maupas launched no fewer than ninety-one press warnings. Many newspapers were suspended; but the authorities permitted the existence, under supervision, of at least one journal for each shade of opinion. The *Constitutionnel*, the *Patrie*, and the *Pays* represented the Government; the *Journal des Débats* defended Orleanism; the *Gazette de France* and the *Union* legitimist views; the *Univers* was the organ of the Catholics; and there even survived a republican journal, the *Siècle*, but its republicanism was of that antiquated nationalist and “interventionist” type which had in times past done such good service to the Bonapartist cause. While he allowed them the semblance of freedom, the Emperor exercised over the Press and over public opinion a sway as absolute as that which he exercised over the various Departments of State. His system was carried to perfection; no individual, no transaction escaped the watchful eye of the supreme authority.

Having grasped the substance of power, the Emperor, like his uncle, next bethought himself of adding the splendours of a Court. In the days of the Presidency those who frequented the Elysée had addressed him indifferently as “Prince,” “Citizen,” or “President”; but from this time forward, although he proclaimed himself a national sovereign, the monarchical forms and ceremonies prevailed. Napoleon III took up his abode at the Tuileries, and, in imitation of the *senatusconsultum* of 28 Floréal of the year XII, which itself had followed the lines of the monarchical constitution of 1791, the *senatusconsultum* of December 12, 1852, fixed the civil list of the Emperor for the whole of his reign at 25,000,000 francs.

By the *senatusconsultum* of November 7, 1852, the imperial dignity was made hereditary in the direct and legitimate descendants of the Emperor; in default of male children, he might adopt the children and legitimate issue (in the male line) of the brothers of Napoleon I. All his relations, who could not marry without the Emperor’s permission, received an annual sum of 1,500,000 francs, which was apportioned among them by the *senatusconsultum* of December 12, 1852.

As a matter of fact, the only members of the imperial family at this time were Jerome, the younger brother of Napoleon I and ex-King of Westphalia (1784-1860), who was too old to count in the succession, and his two children—Princess Matilde born in 1820 and Prince Napoleon (1822-91). As a deputy under the Republic, the latter had sat with "the Mountain," and had made a show of resistance to the *Coup d'état*, but soon succumbed to the proffered favours of the Emperor. He was a man of original and ready intelligence, with just and well-defined ideas; but he was wanting in tact and moderation. An anti-clerical and a democrat, the advocate of a policy which embraced the amelioration of the working classes at home and active interference abroad, he soon gathered round him at the Palais Royal the most advanced of the Liberals, men who had a leaning to Republican views. Napoleon III had no fondness for him; he mistrusted him as the possible leader of an opposition, and he looked forward to replacing him by an heir in the direct line.

The Emperor was soon busied with projects of marriage. The Courts of Europe, which had agreed with very ill grace and under pressure from England to recognise the Empire at the beginning of 1853, were not disposed to bestow upon him a royal princess. He took an unexpected step and made a love match with Eugénie de Montijo, Countess de Téba, the daughter of a grandee of Spain and a beautiful woman of twenty-six (January 30, 1853). He declared, somewhat late in the day, that he had not aimed at the ennobling of his family by a royal alliance, but that he took his stand on the position he had won for himself. These professions flattered the sentiments of the middle classes, while the aristocracy stood aloof. The Empress was beautiful and charming; her manner was simple and dignified; but she lacked depth and fixity of purpose. Impulsive and ignorant, she was incapable of grasping questions of State, and even her numerous charities never rendered her popular. Brought up under Ultramontane influence, she straightway became the opponent of Prince Napoleon and the Liberals, and placed herself at the head of the clerical faction at the Tuileries. Throughout his reign the Emperor hesitated between these two parties; and on many occasions his policy was guided more by the requirements of a coterie than by the general interests of the country.

There still existed at the Emperor's side a Chamber chosen directly from the nation by universal suffrage, and there were in addition the great bodies of State—the Senate and the Council—apparently competent in all respects to discuss and defend the general interests of the country. As a matter of fact the Chambers, whether elective or not, had become the mere agents of personal government. Political representation existed only in form; and a series of regulations adroitly combined had practically crushed out political life. The Constitution of January 14, 1852, had retained a Chamber elected by universal

suffrage. All citizens were voters; and, to facilitate the exercise of the franchise, the vote by communes had been substituted for the votes by cantons, and one-member constituencies (*scrutin uninominal*) for constituencies represented by several members (*scrutin de liste*). But the Government superintended all elections; it brought forward an official candidate, whose address was printed at the public expense, whom the Prefects openly and officially supported by spoken and printed addresses; they "enlightened the voters"—as the phrase was—as to his merits and shortcomings. A vote given to the official candidate was a vote given to the Emperor; and each election became almost a repetition of the *plébiscite*. "Universal suffrage, left without guidance to contend with local passions, might become a real danger," said Baroche in 1859. During the actual contest the Opposition candidates met with difficulties at every turn; political meetings were vetoed on the ground that they threatened the liberty of the electors; and the Prefect, whose permission had to be obtained before documents of any sort could be posted up, was disposed to refuse it to a formidable opponent. Finally, the free distribution of voting-papers was forbidden, the Court of Appeal having decided that a voting-paper was—like a book—subject to the laws affecting itinerant trading, and that any person supplying a voting-paper must do so from a fixed place of business.

When the polling-day arrived, it was the mayor who presided over the proceedings; and the mayors, as we have seen, were appointed by the Government. The voting lasted two days, and in the country places the mayor took possession of the voting-urn at the end of the first day; in the towns the working men, acquainted with official methods, took care not to vote till the second day. In certain villages, where the peasants were not in the habit of voting, the mayor manufactured the electoral results; and, needless to add, these results were not unfavourable to the Government. As the electoral districts were defined, not by statute, but by a simple order issued afresh every five years in the form most favourable to the interests of the Government, the official candidate might nearly always make sure of obtaining a majority; and the arbitrary grouping of urban with rural districts made it easy to overwhelm the Republican artisan in a flood of loyalist countryfolk.

A Chamber thus elected was, of necessity, composed of supporters of the Government; but, had it been composed of opponents, it would, by the provisions of the Constitution itself, have been reduced to impotence. It did not elect its own president; it was the Emperor who appointed to that responsible position one of the most zealous and most trusted of his friends. He appointed in the first instance Billault and afterwards the Duc de Morny, the Minister of the *Coup d'état*. Morny, by a judicious mixture of humour with solid argument, of haughtiness with conciliation, was most successful in checking the fervid eloquence of manufacturers and farmers and in keeping them within the limits of

commonplace discussion. The Chamber, moreover, remained in session for only three months in each year; in passing the budget, the Chamber could only vote a lump sum to each ministerial department; and the vote could be practically nullified by subsequent transfers of funds. As for legislation, the Chamber possessed no initiative; nor had it power even to move an amendment to a Bill brought in by the Government.

The principal part in the work of legislation was played by the "Council of State," defined, in the preamble to the Constitution, as a "body of practical men who could dispense with oratorical display." Its President, who was appointed by the Emperor, held the rank of a Minister; he attended Ministerial Councils and was the factotum of the Government. He represented it in the Senate and the Chamber on all questions of general policy. He supported in the Chamber the Bills elaborated, at the instance of the Ministers, by the Council of State, first in some one of its six sections and finally in a full sitting. The Council of State moreover framed subsidiary decrees and exercised jurisdiction in contentious matters. It was the supreme administrative tribunal; and it alone, by means of the inspectors of the Prefecture who were chosen from within it, exercised some sort of control over the Executive.

There was finally a third body, the Senate, which had a voice in legislation and the right of initiative and was competent to propose measures to the Government. But the Senate was above all the embodiment of constituent power. The chief constituent authority, indeed, although exercised only on occasions, lay with the people, from whom in theory all sovereignty proceeded, while the Senate exercised a constituent authority which was secondary but permanent. The Senate was the "depository of the fundamental pact." By its *consulta* it interpreted and modified the Constitution and annulled such enactments as were not in accordance with it; it exercised its powers, however, solely in the interests of the Emperor, composed as it was of Marshals, Admirals, and Cardinals, Senators *ex officio*, in virtue of the rank which they owed to the Emperor, and of 150 other members, likewise appointed by the Emperor, whose fidelity he secured by the provision of an annual allowance.

Thus in their very essence, the legislative bodies of the Empire in no sense represented the will of the country; they were mere agencies which served the Emperor as a channel of legislation. The text of the Constitution declared formally: "The Emperor governs *by means of* the Ministers, the Council of State, the Senate and the Legislative Body."

As a Government resting on force is never really durable, Napoleon III aimed at winning the attachment of the country at large. Having already obtained control of the whole administration, he next took steps to gain over the great corporations, such as the Church and the Universities, which, while more or less subject to the Government, remained outside his immediate supervision. From the beginning of his reign Napoleon had had the clergy and the "Christian community" on

his side; not that he was personally religious, but because his studied imitation of Napoleon I, "the restorer of altars," and the Church as a support of social conservatism, constrained him to value an alliance with the Catholics. The Catholics on their side understood the immense impulse which would be given by the open support of the State to the policy which they had followed since 1830; and Veuillot, Montalembert, and Dupanloup hastened to give their adherence to a Government founded on the *Coup d'état*. The clergy received innumerable marks of favour; crosses which had been destroyed were replaced; the Government was represented officially at festivals of the Church; Catholic missions were developed; the laws affecting the recognition of convents of nuns were simplified; and grants were made to the churches and to religious bodies connected with charity or education. The Empire was indeed, what Veuillot termed it, a "heaven-sent blessing"; and it is easy to understand why, in Persigny's words, "the men in black had grown so amiable."

The Catholics, however, were by no means unanimous. While Veuillot, and the country clergy who read the *Univers*, aimed at developing through the increased influence of the religious Orders the advantages gained in 1850, Montalembert, Dupanloup, and the Liberal Catholics looked rather to the formation of a Catholic party within the Empire, with authority enough to carry certain legislative reforms such as the abolition of the Organic Articles and the granting of full powers in matters of education. After having, on December 12, 1851, advised all Catholics to accept the new Government, "that the country might be saved from ruin," Montalembert broke with Napoleon and projected a Liberal opposition. In 1852, addressing the Legislative Body, he demanded a Government, representative and parliamentary in the true sense of the words; he reminded Catholics that it was under such a Government alone that they had obtained any real benefit, and advised them to adopt a more dignified and reserved attitude in their dealings with the Empire. He explained these views in his book, *Des intérêts Catholiques au XIX<sup>e</sup> Siècle* (1852), and he assisted in the revival of the *Correspondant* (1855); but he failed to rally the Catholics to his side. He was defeated at the elections of 1857, and in 1858 he was convicted of a press offence.

Montalembert enjoyed the esteem of the *doctrinaire* Liberals and his colleagues of the Academy; but it was with Veuillot and the *Univers*, with the thorough-going adherents of Napoleon III, that the Ultramontane Catholics threw in their lot. Veuillot indeed even ventured to lecture the Bishops in sympathy with Montalembert; and in 1854 he made a violent attack on Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, one of the keenest advocates of the freedom of instruction. Napoleon III had his wish; he had compelled the Church of Rome, like the Army and the Magistracy, to bow to his authority; and this without submission to the possible exactions of an intermediary.

Without obtaining those benefits in the shape of fresh legislation which Montalembert had hoped for, the clergy, now a free and privileged body, were determined to acquire full control in matters relating to education. Fortoul, Minister of Public Instruction from 1851 to 1856, undertook the task of securing the submission of the University to the Government. The professors were required to take an oath of fidelity; but this the most distinguished among them refused to do. The Government obtained control of the chief Council of Public Instruction and of the Academic Councils by assuming the right to nominate the members, who had hitherto been elected. Professors of higher education (those of the Faculties, the Museum, and the Collège de France), who had previously been irremovable, became liable to dismissal by a decree of the Chief of the State; professors of *lycées* could be dismissed by order of the Minister, assistant-masters by a simple decision of the Rector without appeal. Degrees in History and Philosophy were abolished; and in 1854 the Minister congratulated himself on having reestablished the Trivium and the Quadrivium of the Middle Ages.

The Church had a free field after these blows had been dealt at the ancient University. In the secondary schools religious instruction, under the inspection of the Bishop, was made compulsory for all boarders; while the small seminaries and the large private schools proved formidable competitors to the *lycées*. In the department of primary education the "Congregations" also by degrees gained possession of the schools. There were 60,579 primary schools in 1850; there were 68,761 in 1863. But, while in 1850 the secular schools (public and private) numbered 50,267, and the "congregationist" schools 10,312, in 1863 the secular schools numbered 51,555, and the "congregationist" schools 17,206. The development of girls' schools, and the fact that the law of 1850 gave power to the Communes to indulge their preference for "congregationist" teachers, explains this progress made by denominational education. Finally, the ease with which the "Congregations" obtained assistant teachers secured to their schools an unprecedented prosperity. Between the years 1850 and 1863 the secular schools gained 376,080 pupils; the "congregationist" schools 588,000. Little by little the "wretched little pedants" (*affreux petits rhéteurs*), as Montalembert called the secular teachers, were ejected from their posts; and the Church won over the bulk of the country districts to "religion, morality, and the Empire." Nevertheless 27 per cent. of the conscripts of 1863 were illiterate.

But it was by means of prosperity, general ease, and the satisfaction of material interests, even more than by education, that Napoleon III hoped to win over the bulk of the French people to the Napoleonic dynasty. First among those willing to be reconciled were the "Parliamentarians," Guizot's old supporters, such as Fould, Magne, Billault, and Morny, who, under Louis-Philippe's Minister, had learnt "to give satisfaction to the great army of the quiet and reasonable"; and, secondly,



the "Saint-Simonians," a party traditionally indifferent to political forms; who, since 1830, had clamoured for "a progressive government" which would develop credit, set on foot great public works, and raise national industry to a higher pitch. To this group belonged *Enfantin*, *Talabot*, *Michel Chevalier*, and the brothers *Péreire*, men who took the lead in all the great industrial and financial enterprises of the new reign.

The Government assisted the expansion with all its power, scattering favours in all directions, encouraging every fresh venture, and by its own action multiplying new schemes for the development of credit, in order to excite and to uphold the spirit of enterprise. Two great banking institutions were founded, the *Crédit foncier* and the *Crédit mobilier*. The decree of February 28, 1852, had authorised the creation of *Sociétés de crédit foncier*, which were to grant proprietors long loans on first mortgages, redeemable by annuities, and to raise capital by the issue of debentures. Land-banks (*Banques foncières*) had already been established on this basis, at Paris, at Nevers, and at Marseilles. A decree issued on December 10, 1852, transformed the Paris house into the *Crédit foncier* of France, and at the same time authorised it to buy up the two banks of Marseilles and Nevers, and granted it a subsidy of 10,000,000 francs but compelled it to make advances at a fixed rate of 5 per cent., to include both interest and sinking fund. Finally, the decree of July 6, 1854, by giving it a director and two subdirectors, to be nominated by the Emperor, converted it into a state institution like the Bank of France. By 1854, the *Crédit foncier* had already lent fifty millions, chiefly on mortgages of property in the towns.

The *Crédit mobilier*, which was developed on parallel lines, was founded in November, 1852, by the brothers *Péreire*. The operations of the Paris banks had hitherto been confined to loans for short terms, discount operations, and exchanges (*arbitrage*). The new institution was to be a joint-stock bank, in which money could be invested and which was to contract loans, make advances and issue notes. Its function was to set on foot and support great enterprises, to take part in public loans, to help in the promotion of great companies, and to issue securities itself to the value of ten times its capital. It soon secured a position of the highest importance; it took part in the foundation of the railway system and of the Transatlantic Company, in the public works of Paris (1854) and in the amalgamation of the ten gas companies into a single company, for which it obtained the monopoly of lighting the capital for fifty years. In 1855, it paid its shareholders a dividend of 178½ francs a share, the shares, issued at 500 francs in 1852, being now worth, three years later, no less than 1982 francs. It was not long, however, before it experienced serious difficulties.

The Bank of France, whose operations, owing to the general prosperity, had been considerably extended, was authorised (March 28, 1855), to advance money on deposits of stock and railway securities;

and by the law of June 9, 1857, the term of its privileges was extended to 1897. By 1867 the business of the bank had increased to such an extent that the Government was able to insist that it should establish at least one branch in each department of France.

The financial organisation was thus adapted to the growing expansion of commerce, which was on the eve of being further extended by new developments in the means of communication, especially of the railways. By the close of the year 1851, the impulse given in 1842 had slackened, and only 3627 kilometres of line, divided among eighteen companies, were open for traffic. So much subdivision made the working of the lines expensive and transport difficult. Without abandoning the general principles of the law of 1842, the Emperor, by the wise advice of Morny, extended the concessions for ninety-nine years, guaranteed a minimum interest of 4 per cent. for half the duration of the concession and, to diminish the cost of constructing and working the lines, urged the formation of larger companies, capable of systematically developing the internal traffic in a methodical manner and of entering into relations with companies abroad. Such a policy speedily bore fruit; and six great companies were established by a series of concessions and amalgamations. The total length of French railways open in 1858 was 16,207 kilometres. For the moment the Government neglected communications by water, under the mistaken idea that canals would be rendered useless by the development of railways. It however organised the Postal and Telegraphic Services, and by 1855 every prefecture was supplied with the electric telegraph.

A powerful impetus was given to the trade and industry of the nation by these new institutions. But agriculture, strange as this may appear, profited very little by them. The peasants, so long as they had a good market for their wheat, were contented; and the Government, in spite of solemn declarations, and regardless of the fact that the rural classes were its principal supporters, did very little on their behalf. It increased, it is true, the number of agricultural societies; it drained the marshes in the Landes, and encouraged horse-breeding; but the few individuals interested in these matters as often as not found the indiscreet protection of the Prefects and other incompetent authorities burdensome. Between 1852 and 1864, the *Crédit foncier* laid out half the 714,000,000 francs, which it advanced on real securities, in rebuilding Paris, and only lent 57,000,000 francs for agricultural enterprises. The rapid rebuilding of the large towns drew away the labourers and absorbed capital. There was a tendency also for the greater landowners to buy up wholesale the little patches of land belonging to the smaller farmers who were in debt. In 1862, peasant holdings were sold to the value of 2,000,000,000 francs.

Manufacturing interests, on the other hand, had little cause to complain. Not only were they well supplied with capital, and assisted

by the new facilities in transport and communication, but they received many favours at the hands of the Government. On May 31, 1856, the patent law was amended; on July 17, 1856, disputes between partners were referred to the jurisdiction of commercial Courts of arbitration (*jurisdiction consulaire*), and liquidation in bankruptcy was facilitated by the institution of bankrupts' certificates. The formalities relating to the issue of warrants were simplified in 1858. By a succession of measures great numbers of the smaller tradesmen were exempted from the license tax (*impôt des patentes*). Finally, freedom was given to the trades of butcher and baker, both of which had hitherto been subjected to the narrow regulations deemed necessary either from dread of famine or from fear of monopoly. A decree of February 24, 1858, abolished the monopoly of the butchers' guild in Paris and its regulations. The bakers' trade, however, had to wait till June 22, 1863, the municipality still retaining the right of taxing bread. In Paris, indeed, a compensation fund (*caisse de compensation*), a half measure originally established in 1863 in order to keep the price of bread at 40 centimes a kilogramme, existed until 1870.

In 1855, the Emperor invited the industrial world to the great *fête* of the general Exhibition. A crowd of French manufacturers responded to his call, and thereby bore witness to the progress which industry was making. A fever of enterprise had seized upon the whole nation. The *bourgeoisie* was weary of politics, and business had become its sole pre-occupation. New inventions, facilities for borrowing, the favour of the Government, all invited to enterprise. From 1852 to 1856 was a golden age for the Bourse; and even London, the chief market of capital, yielded precedence to Paris. Not even the bad harvest of 1853, nor the Crimean War, nor the cholera, which from March to July, 1854, ravaged first Paris and then the provinces, nor the terrible floods in 1855 and in 1856, put a check on the expansion of business. Speculation rose to such a point that it alarmed not only socialist philosophers like Proudhon, but the Emperor himself: so much so that he publicly congratulated the opponents of the stockjobbers, and attempted to put some check on the joint-stock companies by the law of July 17, 1856.

The production of the nation as a whole, nevertheless, made substantial progress. The statistics for the years 1852-70 do not always make it possible to distinguish how much of the economic development belongs to the earlier, and how much to the later years of the period, but speaking generally, it is certain that the earlier years were the more fruitful in initiative; and the results as a whole are remarkable. Between 1847 and 1867, the number of patents taken out annually was doubled; and the use of steam became so general that the total amount of horse-power increased fivefold. In the manufacture of wrought-iron and cast-iron, the substitution of coal for wood and charcoal, and of puddled for wrought steel, enabled the metal trades

to satisfy all the new demands made upon them for constructing machines and ships, for rails, iron buildings, and the like. In the textile industries, the preparation of cotton and wool was greatly accelerated by the Heilmann and Hübner combing-machines; so that between 1848 and 1869, the cotton industry, in spite of the crisis of 1864, doubled its consumption of raw material. In the chemical industries, the total value of the output increased tenfold between 1847 and 1865. An enquiry made in 1865 estimated the total value of French industrial products at 12,000,000,000 francs; thus showing that, in spite of a considerable fall in prices, the figure was double what it had been twenty years earlier.

This economic revolution led to the concentration of great masses of workmen in the industrial districts in the north, in the Loire valley, and in Alsace; a concentration which proved a source of uneasiness. The Government had to rely on the police and on the watchfulness of its administration for keeping them in check. Men thought for a short time that the remarkable increase in wages (they rose from 10 to 40 per cent., according to the trade, between 1850 and 1860) would be enough to gain the Government the affection of the working classes. Unfortunately, however, during the same period, and especially between 1850 and 1856, the price of food and the cost of rent in the great towns rose formidably; according to the majority of contemporary writers the cost of living in fact increased by 50 per cent.

In its anxiety to check any Republican propaganda amongst the masses of artisans, the Government made every attempt to better their lot. Its social policy was a most ingenious one. We have spoken of the exemptions it had granted to artisans, and also of the bakers' "Compensation Fund," by means of which it had tried to assure cheap bread to the working classes. In order to prove that "it had constantly before its mind the project of ameliorating the lot of those who suffer and of those who are struggling with the difficulties of life," the Government set in motion a great number of original schemes. A decree of 1852 reformed and regulated the pawn-shops (*monts-de-piété*). When the property of the Orleans family was transferred to the nation by the decree of January 22, 1852, 10,000,000 francs were devoted to the improvement of workmen's dwellings. In times of crisis or of scarcity the Government, or its agents, opened or gave their support to subscription-lists. The Emperor multiplied his donations to private individuals and his charitable foundations.

Among the demands put forward by the workmen were some which the Government would not have been sorry to satisfy, at any rate in appearance. A law, for example, was passed on June 1, 1853, to regulate the composition of the boards of arbitration (*Conseils de Prud-hommes*). By it the election of the boards was placed in the hands of the masters and the workmen together. The nomination of the presidents, however, was reserved to the Government; and posts of

this kind were usually filled by former employers of labour, men over-zealous for "the master's authority." A law concerning records of identity and employment (*livrets ouvriers*) in 1854, permitted workmen to keep their "*livrets*" in their own hands for the future, as they desired; but, to facilitate the work of the police, the "*livret*" was made compulsory for all workmen. The working classes further desired the right to organise themselves and to form associations; but the Government would not at first authorise the existence of societies in which ideas of class warfare and socialism were asserted, and whose objects were resistance or cooperation. For the sake of social peace, however, it encouraged the formation of Friendly Societies, on the basis of the decree of 1852. In addition to the independent societies, and certain recognised organisations of public utility, this decree was directed towards establishing licensed societies, to be endowed, on the one hand, with numerous privileges, such as free quarters, free equipment, and free registers, to be supplied by the commune, state subsidies, and the like, but to be subjected, on the other hand, to numerous restrictions, such as the nomination of a president by Government, the admission of honorary members, and the acceptance of rules which forbade the giving of relief to the unemployed. By means such as these, the societies would be kept under supervision and control; and above all would run no risk of becoming in reality Trade Unions, under the name of Friendly Societies. To sum up, "beneficence coupled with supervision" is perhaps the phrase which best expresses the social policy of the imperial autocracy.

The greatest triumph of the Empire, however, was won in the Department of Public Works. "When a labourer is out of work," said Napoleon I, "he is at the mercy of every intriguer, and can be roused to revolt; I fear insurrections caused by lack of bread. I should be less afraid of a battle against 200,000 men." The great Emperor's nephew knew the truth of this even better than his uncle, for his agents had gained experience from the crisis of June, 1848. Great public works were a means by which the disparity between workmen's wages and the increased price of food might be made good; and they would therefore make the Empire popular. At the same time, they could be made to increase the power of the Government over the working classes; for the broad thoroughfares, which the Government had built everywhere in Paris, were unsuitable for barricades and street fighting, and would therefore facilitate the maintenance of order.

In all the great towns of France the municipalities undertook an increasing number of improvements, stimulated at once by the industrial development, by the building of railways, and by the instructions of the Government. At Marseilles the great docks, whose construction had been begun in 1844, were completed and opened, Notre Dame de la Garde was rebuilt, and in 1858 the new cathedral was begun; the Prefecture, the Palais de Justice, the Bourse and the Palais de Longchamp

date from the same period. The port of Havre also was enlarged, and Lyons and Lille were beautified. The Emperor, however, was chiefly interested in Paris, the revolutionary capital. The very day after the *Coup d'état* he decided to carry out the great works which preceding régimes had so often discussed, such as the embellishment of the Halles, the completion of the Louvre, and the opening up of a number of broad thoroughfares. As Berger, Prefect of the Seine, an "aedile of the old school," hesitated to undertake these works, he was replaced by Haussmann, an iron-handed official, who had repressed socialism in the Departments of the Yonne and the Var, and whose will-power and boldness of enterprise had attracted the attention of the Emperor. From the very first, the new prefect's audacity carried the day, and overcame the secret hostility of the executive officials and the public authorities. His plans included improved facilities for traffic, especially in the approaches to railway stations, the opening out of great buildings, such as palaces, churches, and barracks, and the making of large, straight, and magnificent boulevards. By these means he intended to create a city beautiful at all points, which would be agreeable to visitors and to foreigners, "whose advent would repay the cost of the improvements."

In a few years the Paris of the Second Empire was an entirely new city. Not only was it changed in outward appearance, and in geographical extent—the suburban districts being annexed to it in 1860 and the number of *arrondissements* increased from twelve to twenty—but its population, and even its very life, had altered. In 1851, the number of its inhabitants was 1,297,064; in 1866, it had risen to 1,825,274. By degrees, however, the working class population was drawn more and more towards the outer circumference, while the central districts developed into a city of trade, luxury, and pleasure.

The tone of Parisian society was set by the Court. A theory was then in vogue, and was upheld by the *Moniteur* itself, that entertainments were necessary to keep trade going. The Court therefore organised innumerable entertainments; and banquets, reviews, and gorgeous official ceremonies succeeded one another without interruption. In their gaieties the provinces imitated Paris and the Tuileries, all the Prefectures gave dances and dinners, for the good, as they said, of "local trade." The citizens, suddenly grown rich, spent their money in the pleasures of society and were not to be deterred by the mocking criticism of their aristocratic neighbours. Social moralists, Republicans, or Orleanists of the old school, who knew the real worth of political life, were uneasy at this widespread demoralisation. Music-hall songs and *opéras-bouffes*, races and public festivals, evening restaurants, and the amusements which they provided, made the fame of this new Paris. Important foreign events were only looked upon as so many stage plays, performed to amuse the spectator. "In the depth of their swamp," wrote the journalist Pessard in his *petits papiers*, "croaking in chorus the name of their Emperor, an

emasculated people lived on undisturbed, without memories of the past or aspirations for the future. It read nothing, it would listen to no voice that was lifted to recall its abasement."

Society, then, was contented; it agreed to everything that the Emperor undertook, asking only that there should be an end to party-strife and revolutionary agitation. On the morrow of the *Coup d'état*, the whole Conservative party in France had rallied spontaneously round the agents of strong government, in order to resist the "Reds," with the result that the Executive was obliged to prosecute Socialists and Republicans with even more severity than it really desired. The *bourgeoisie* did not wish to be disturbed in its industrial enterprises, and was grateful to the "man of order" for restraining the "anarchists."

The ranks of the Republican party, on the other hand, had been thinned by proscription; its leaders were either exiled or in prison; and its rank and file had been sent to Algiers or Cayenne. The "mixed commissions" had terrorised the country by 26,884 convictions; and, in 1858, a "bill for the preservation of public safety" revived apprehensions, if indeed the measures taken daily by the police had ever allowed them to subside. Nevertheless the reports of the *Procureurs Généraux* bear witness that, in most of the large towns, the workmen, and many of the *bourgeoisie*, who filled Liberal offices, had remained faithful to their Republican ideas. Any attempt at revolt, indeed, was impossible. During the whole period of the Empire, there was only one insurrection, that of workmen in the slate quarries of Trélazé, near Angers (1855). Republicans who desired to take active measures were only able to contrive one or two sudden strokes, which were quickly frustrated; such as the conspiracies of the *Reine Blanche* in September, 1852, of the Hippodrome in July, 1853, and of the *Commune révolutionnaire* in 1854; or to make attempts upon the life of the Emperor, like that of Perenchies. Foremost among the would-be assassins were the Italians, Pianori, Tibaldi, and Orsini, who sought to avenge their country on the *Carbonaro* who had betrayed his oath. But all attempts were fruitless.

In 1857, accordingly, the few Republicans of note who remained in France, and some young lawyers who were impatient to take an active part in affairs, decided to bow to the imperial Constitution, and to offer themselves for parliamentary election. Three of the party, Cavaignac, Carnot, and Goudchaux, were returned for Paris at the first ballot and two others, Émile Ollivier, a clever and eloquent lawyer, and the son of an illustrious refugee, and Darimon, Proudhon's disciple and a great favourite with the workmen, were successful at the second. Two other Republicans were also returned, Hénon at Lyons, and Curé at Bordeaux. Carnot and Goudchaux refused to take the oath, and were therefore treated as forfeiting their seats. Cavaignac died before the opening of the Legislative Body. Émile Ollivier, Darimon, Hénon, and Curé took the oath; but Curé shortly made his peace with the Empire. In 1858

two more Republicans, Picard and Jules Favre, were elected, and in this way was constituted the party of "Five" (*les Cinq*). The isolation of its members however—they were kept in the background, and hardly even listened to when they spoke—rendered this little group absolutely powerless; and advanced Republicans denied that any useful end had been attained by this compromise with principles. Order had been maintained, society was saved, and for this the *bourgeoisie* was as grateful to Louis Napoleon as it had been in 1851.

In point of fact, however, the antecedents of the new sovereign might well alarm his supporters. For, let the *bourgeoisie* be ever so devoted to peace, might not a "Napoleon" be tempted to defy the whole of Europe to an armed conflict? and was not his name alone sufficient to invite attack by coalitions of the Powers? The main object of Napoleon III was to prove that this would not be the case. "The Empire is peace," he declared at Bordeaux; and, in the early part of his reign, he was careful in all diplomatic transactions to prove the truth of his words. Although, to use Bismarck's words, "he was vaguely aware that he needed a war" in order to impose himself on Europe, his diplomacy for two years invariably aimed at evading one. However, what was necessary was to prevent this policy of peace from degenerating into a policy without glory. "*La France s'ennuyait*," Lamartine had remarked with reference to Guizot's Ministry; and from that boredom a revolution had ensued. Napoleon knew very well that what the French had required from the Monarchy of July during the previous eighteen years, they would also expect from a Napoleon. They required two things—glory abroad, and the satisfaction of their national vanity. To provide this glory for them without compromising "the material interests which were making such good progress," and if possible to accomplish it without war, must be the aim of the imperial foreign policy. The greatest glory, it was clear, was to be obtained by immediately realising the "Napoleonic idea," by tearing up the treaties of 1815, by giving freedom to oppressed nations, and by restoring her natural frontiers to a liberty-giving France. But it was improbable that all this could be attained without a war; and, in order even to make the attempt, the new Government must first be firmly established.

In the meantime, the foreign policy of the Catholic party provided the Emperor with his first opportunity for the active pursuit of glory. The complication of events which led to the Crimean War will be related elsewhere; it will be sufficient here to point out the relation of that conflict to the Emperor's designs. The war originated in the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches for possession of the Holy Places at Jerusalem. Since 1850, French diplomacy, inspired by the Prince President, had upheld the Latin claims at Constantinople. When Louis Napoleon became Emperor, in great measure through Catholic assistance, he could not possibly withdraw this support. Circumstances, indeed,



obliged him to place himself at the service of the Catholic party, whose policy, since 1830, had been to claim the assistance of French arms for the propaganda of the Church. Never before, probably, had the policy of the country abroad depended so much as it did now upon the policy pursued at home. The Emperor would have been very glad to satisfy the wishes of the Catholic party without resorting to arms. But Russia, as we shall see, would not allow this; and it was not long before the embassy of Menshikoff, at the beginning of March, 1853, and the determination of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, rendered war inevitable. In October, 1853, hostilities broke out between Russia and Turkey; and, when the Turkish fleet was destroyed at Sinope by the Russians on November 30, all Frenchmen, Catholics and Republicans alike, demanded the safeguarding of the national honour. The Emperor, perceiving that the old national sentiment had reawakened, no longer hesitated; and in March, 1854, both France and England, for reasons that are fully stated elsewhere, declared war against Russia.

The struggle, though long and difficult, terminated with glory; and it ended, as the Emperor had hoped, in an apotheosis of his Government, the whole nation having learnt, by the dissemination of popular illustrations, how brave, how heroic, and how victorious was its army. The terms of peace were signed in Paris on March 6, 1856, and gave the imperial Government what it desired more than anything else in the world—glory. Frenchmen, indeed, gave little thought to the Four Points of the treaty; they only congratulated themselves that the Congress of Paris had avenged the humiliation of 1840. Not without pride they compared this new Congress, solemnly presided over by the great Emperor's nephew, to the Congress of 1815, in which a victorious Europe had crushed both France and the Revolution.

From this time onward, strong in "the esteem and admiration with which he felt himself encircled," the Emperor began to dream more and more of the realisation of the "Napoleonic idea"; the hour seemed to be at hand when by his help the nations of the world would gain their freedom. Between 1856 and 1858, he busied himself actively with the question of Roumanian nationality, annulled the elections conducted under Turkish intimidation, and secured that the Constituent Assemblies of Moldavia and Wallachia should be chosen by the people themselves without Turkish or Austrian interference. But eventually, after complications which nearly led to war, he had to content himself with bringing about, by means of another Conference at Paris (1858), that union of the two Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which is described elsewhere.

But it was above all the liberation of Italy which haunted the Emperor's imagination. He had already enhanced the prestige of Piedmont by accepting her proffered help in the Crimean War (January 26, 1855) and by favours to her at the Congress of Paris (1856). The

project of liberating Italy was assuredly gratifying to the self-esteem of many of his own subjects, and could hardly fail to rally to his side all the enthusiasts for the "Legend," both Liberals and Republicans. But the idea was not acceptable to the Catholics who feared, not without reason, that the popular movement, centring round Piedmont, would turn against the Papacy; and they accordingly persuaded the Empress to bring her personal influence to bear against that of the Emperor's Italian advisers. Thus confronted, the Emperor hesitated; but the Italian Orsini, by attempting to assassinate him (January 14, 1858) as a traitor to the cause of Italy, supplied him with a reason for disregarding all resistance and thus decided the fate of the Empire.

Napoleon III utilised the disclosures made by the Italian patriot, and the discussions aroused by his trial, to persuade the Empress and the Catholics that it was necessary, at all costs, "to do something for Italy." Their resistance once overcome, he was free to realise his great scheme. On July 21 and 22, 1858, Cavour met the Emperor at Plombières, where he arranged the conditions of the French intervention. At the reception of the ambassadors of foreign Powers held on New Year's Day, 1859, Europe was dramatically informed that the Italian question threatened European peace. Hostilities were not declared till towards the end of April. But during those few months the Emperor could not fail to be conscious of direct hostility on the part of his clerical allies, who were uneasy at the situation which would be created for the Pope. He was able indeed to congratulate himself on the adherence of the Liberals, and even of the Republican propagandists; but Jules Favre reserved the right of asking him, after the victory, to give an account of "the eternal principles," which he violated at home but defended abroad. Worse than this, he felt that the strong diplomatic position which France had gained was likely to be seriously compromised; and that the English Government, on this occasion, was hostile to his plans, even while it looked on those of Piedmont with a friendly eye.

Ever since the *Coup d'état* the good understanding with England had been a solid support to the Napoleonic régime. At the time of the reestablishment of the Empire the refusal of England's cooperation had destroyed the plan of a European coalition, which the Tsar desired to form against Napoleon III. Alone among the Great Powers England had not treated the Emperor as an intruder. She had in fact need of his support in her resistance to the claims of Russia in the East, while Napoleon on his side had need of her alliance to support him in that search after glory, which he believed to be necessary for the firm establishment of his throne. It was not long before the action taken by Lord Palmerston and the necessities of the Eastern question firmly united the two Powers. When therefore, in March, 1854, the Tsar refused to answer the Anglo-French summons, England as well as France was compelled to declare war; and, on April 10, the two countries joined in an

agreement which bound each Power not to make a separate treaty, nor to seek any private advantage during the war. England, however, after the conclusion of the Alliance, had become conscious that the "Napoleonic ideas," as they gradually revealed themselves, were not in accordance with English interests. In December, 1855, even before hostilities ceased, Napoleon III was already dreaming of a great conflict of nationalities, in which Poland and Circassia were to gain independence and in which France, by means of a struggle with Prussia, was to appropriate the left bank of the Rhine and possibly Belgium also. To all this England was opposed; and her opposition drove Napoleon back to the peace party; while the concessions, which were made by Russia, for the moment prevented any further accentuation of the divergent views of the two Allies. By the Treaty of Paris both Powers and especially England secured substantial advantages; but the development, even so far back as 1854, of the Emperor's policy of "nationalities" and his plans for reversing the treaties of 1815 inevitably reawakened English susceptibilities. In China in 1857 the two nations worked well together; and at an interview at Osborne (August 6, 1857) the Emperor won the friendly sympathy of Queen Victoria. The vastness of his plans was somewhat alarming to the Queen and her Consort; but England, having her hands full with the Sepoy Mutiny, agreed not to oppose his "nationalist" policy in Roumania. Lord Derby, however, as English Prime Minister, from March, 1858, followed with much anxiety the Austro-Piedmontese crisis which the Emperor had provoked. He feared lest the compensations, which would certainly be demanded in the event of the triumph of the principles of "nationality," might lead to a French annexation of Belgium, and he therefore exerted himself to maintain peace. Public opinion in England, much shaken by the Orsini incident on which Frenchmen had commented with much bitterness as the plot had been originally hatched by Orsini in London, showed itself more and more hostile to Napoleon. Finally it led, as is elsewhere described, to the panic and the volunteer movement of 1859, both directly due to a belief in Napoleon's aggressive designs. It was all to no purpose. The Italian Revolution was to lure the Emperor on from one enterprise to another; and his boundless ambitions could not fail to destroy what was left of the good understanding with England.

At home as well as abroad, the outbreak of the Italian War marked the beginning of a great upheaval. The system of imperial autocracy, so perfect in its centralisation and methods of repression, was severely shaken. From the very beginning of hostilities, the various political parties and classes in France began one and all to make their claims heard; while the ambition of the Emperor alarmed those very "nationalities" whom he professed to be assisting.

## CHAPTER XI.

## GREAT BRITAIN AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

(1852-6.)

THE division in which the Conservative Government was defeated in December, 1852, showed that neither of the great parties in the State could rely on the support of the House of Commons. The minority which followed Disraeli into the lobby was a compact body of 286 members. The 305 members who voted in the majority comprised the Whigs under Lord John Russell; the men who had followed Sir Robert Peel; and independent Radicals like Bright and Cobden. Lord Derby's Ministry had been destroyed by the temporary coalition of all sorts and conditions of politicians, who were almost as much opposed to one another as they were to their opponents. In the first instance, the Queen sent for Lord Lansdowne, the Nestor of the Whigs, and for Lord Aberdeen, who commanded the confidence of the Peelites. Lord Lansdowne was too ill to obey the royal commands; and the difficult task of forming a new Administration devolved on Lord Aberdeen.

Its composition caused some natural heart-burnings. In the House of Commons the Peelites stood to the Whigs as one to nine: in the Cabinet they stood as six to seven. It was natural that such a distribution of the prizes of office should lead to some irritation; and unfortunately this irritation was shared by the Whig leader. Lord John Russell had already once filled the office of Prime Minister; he had led a great party with varying success, but with constant capacity, for nearly twenty years; and he undoubtedly had some claim to the chief place in any Ministry. He finally consented to lead the House of Commons, accepting for a time the seals of the Foreign Office, but agreeing to resign them at the commencement of the session, when the conduct of Parliament would leave him neither strength nor leisure to discharge the laborious duties of Foreign Minister. Lord Aberdeen, from the first, intimated that he intended to retire at the end of the session and thus open the office of Prime Minister to Lord John himself. In the meantime he strengthened the Whig section of the Cabinet by appointing Lord Clarendon to the now vacant Foreign Office. Intellectually, the

new Cabinet was unusually strong; but its very strength was a source of anxiety. Men like Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston, and Gladstone were not likely to yield their own opinions; and Lord Aberdeen was hardly adapted by temperament to control or restrain dissentient colleagues. The difficulty thus arising was enhanced by the anomalous position which the leaders in both Houses occupied, for Lord Aberdeen's authority was to some extent weakened by the knowledge of his contemplated retirement.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the new Ministry acquired credit by its conduct of business during the session of 1853. It succeeded in doing an act of justice to one great dependency by surrendering to the Canadian legislature the control of territories known as the Clergy Reserves, whose revenues were applied to the maintenance of the Established Church in the colony. It conferred a still greater benefit on another great dependency by abandoning the transportation of convicts to Australia. In renewing the Charter of the East India Company, it opened the Civil Service of India to public competition; and it appointed Commissioners to enquire into the management of charities, and to form schemes for the better application of endowments. But the chief measure of the session was the Budget, which Gladstone introduced as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Its author had been the foremost critic of the financial proposals which Disraeli had brought forward in the previous autumn; and it was said at the time, with some force, that, as he had destroyed one Budget, he ought to make another. Those who made the statement hardly foresaw the use to which Gladstone was to put the opportunity before him.

The figures on which his Budget was based were simple. The expenditure, for which he had to provide, slightly exceeded £52,000,000; the surplus reached some £800,000. But these figures assumed that the Income Tax, which had been reimposed in 1842, and periodically renewed, would be continued; and, as a matter of fact, the Income Tax expired in 1853. Gladstone decided not merely to renew the tax, but to render it more efficient by extending it to Ireland, and applying it to incomes varying from £100 to £150 a year. On the other hand, he proposed that its rate should be reduced from 7*d.* to 6*d.* in 1855, to 5*d.* in 1857; and that the tax should altogether cease in 1860. He held out, therefore, the agreeable prospect of the extinction of an unpopular tax at a comparatively early date; and he reconciled the Irish to the extension of the tax to Ireland by remitting the interest due on the loans advanced to the Irish during the famine of 1845-6.

In Great Britain an objection was constantly raised to the tax that it fell with equal severity on the secure income which landlords derived from houses and land, and on the more precarious one which the professional and trading classes won by their skill and enterprise. Gladstone was able to allay much of the popular discontent by an analysis of the

facts, which showed that the existing tax did actually differentiate between the two classes of income, since it was levied on the gross return from land and houses, and on the net return from the profits of trade and professions. Recognising, however, some injustice in the existing arrangements, he extended to all successions whatever the legacy duty, which had hitherto pressed but lightly on holders of real property. But the new expedient was not very fortunate in result. Gladstone had designed the Succession Duty as the first among other projected reforms, which were intended to provide for the ultimate abolition of the Income Tax. Owing to the encumbrances on estates and the previous operation of the Legacy Duty, the new expedient had far less success than had been anticipated. Furthermore the Succession Duty as to land and houses was calculated on the annual value during the life of the successor, an amount in most cases much below the actual capital value. But, despite its disappointing character, the actual yield of the Succession Duty, together with an increase of the duties on Scotch and Irish distilleries, brought the surplus to more than three millions.

The additional revenue thus acquired enabled Gladstone to make extensive changes in taxation. He continued Peel's policy of Free Trade by sweeping away several Customs duties, originally imposed for purposes of Protection, and by reducing others; he brought down the duty on tea by successive stages of descent from 2s. 2½d. to 1s. the pound; he simplified and systematised many of the minor taxes, such as those relating to domestic servants, horses, carriages, and the like; and he repealed the duty on soap, which Adam Smith had condemned. These great and drastic changes placed the Budget on the same plane as Sir Robert Peel's memorable measures of 1842, 1845 and 1846; and they were explained with a lucidity and eloquence which raised their author to the first rank of parliamentary statesmen. Large, however, and comprehensive as the Budget was, it had two defects. First, the Succession Duty had produced an inadequate return, and, secondly, the whole plan of the Budget depended on the maintenance of expenditure at its existing proportion. Unhappily events were already in progress destined to disarrange the national balance-sheet, by menacing the peace which the country had enjoyed since 1815.

Since 1740 France had enjoyed a treaty right to the custody of the sacred places in or near Jerusalem, which were the chief objects of the pilgrimage of devout men belonging both to the Latin and Greek Churches. For more than a hundred years, however, France had done little or nothing to carry out the duties thus entrusted to her. During this period of her neglect members of the Greek Church had occupied and repaired the shrines which France had permitted to fall into decay; they had even obtained permits from the Sultan to enable them to do so. In 1850, however, Napoleon, as President of the French Republic, anxious to conciliate Roman Catholic sentiment, renewed the claim,

which had been suffered to sleep for more than a century ; and, after a negotiation protracted over many months, the French ambassador at the Porte succeeded in obtaining a substantial recognition of the French demand. The news of this concession at once elicited a strong protest from Russia. The Porte found, to its dismay, that it could not conciliate one of the disputants without incurring the hostility of the other. It endeavoured, in the first instance, to gain time ; it tried later on to concede something to both parties in the quarrel. It communicated its decision in different, and not quite consistent, terms to the two Powers. The dispute which thus arose between France and Russia was aggravated at the close of 1852 by the conversion of the French Republic into the Second Empire. The Tsar, Nicholas I, nurtured amidst Legitimist traditions, disliked their infraction by the elevation of a new Napoleon to the imperial throne. He marked his displeasure by the childish expedient of writing a letter to Napoleon in which he addressed him not as "Brother" but as "Friend." Napoleon took no active steps to express his displeasure, but doubtless resented a slight which a hereditary sovereign might possibly have ignored.

While an unfortunate estrangement had thus arisen between Russia and France, the Tsar, at the beginning of January, 1853—a few days after the accession of Lord Aberdeen to office—took occasion to speak to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador at St Petersburg, on the future of Turkey. The change of ministry in England probably suggested the conversation ; for Nicholas had paid a memorable visit to England nine years before, and had discussed the Eastern situation with Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Minister. To Sir Hamilton Seymour, in 1853, he used much the same language that he had employed in talking to Lord Aberdeen in 1844. The Turk, so he said, was very ill. It would be a grave misfortune, if we were not to provide beforehand for the contingency of his death. Five days afterwards he asked Sir Hamilton to communicate his opinion to the British Government ; and Lord John Russell, who still held the seals of the Foreign Office, replied in a friendly despatch that provisional arrangements, made without the cognisance of the Powers, might provoke the crisis which England was anxious to avoid ; but that she would in any case enter into no negotiation for the disposal of Turkish territory, without arriving at an understanding with Russia in the first instance. On February 20, 1853, when Sir Hamilton had received Lord John's despatch, the Tsar at a third interview again dwelt on the fate impending over Turkey. He had no desire, so he said, to see Constantinople in the occupation of Russia or any other great Power ; on the other hand, he would not consent to the restoration of the old Byzantine Empire, to the extension of the boundaries of Greece, or to the division of Turkey into a series of little States. The Principalities already enjoyed independence under the protection of Russia ; Servia, Bulgaria and the other Turkish provinces might be given a similar

constitution; and England might ensure her communications with the East by occupying Egypt and Crete. The new conversation, like the old, led to no results. Lord Clarendon, the new Foreign Secretary, repeated the language of his predecessor. The British Government did not think the end of Turkey so near as the Tsar supposed; but, should the catastrophe come, the future of Turkey could be regulated at a congress of the Great Powers.

Convinced in his own mind that Turkey could not survive, the Tsar had already taken a step calculated to hasten her end. He had despatched Prince Menshikoff on a special mission to Constantinople, and had strengthened his own armies on the Moldavian frontier. Menshikoff reached Constantinople on March 15, 1853; he deliberately neglected to call on Fuad, the *Reis Effendi*, or Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Fuad at once resigned office. In the panic which ensued the Grand Vizier appealed to the Ministers of England and France. It so happened that, in the absence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who was in England, and of La Cour, who had not arrived at his post, both of these countries were represented by *chargés d'affaires*. Benedetti, the representative of France, contented himself with at once despatching a grave warning to Paris. Colonel Rose, who represented England, and who was afterwards raised to the peerage for his services in India, decided on sending to Malta for the British fleet. On the arrival of the news in London, the British Government overruled Colonel Rose's decision, and ordered the fleet to return to Malta; the French Government, on the contrary, on March 20 directed the French fleet to sail from Toulon for Greece.

So far nothing had occurred to involve this country, either in the original dispute about the Holy Places or in Prince Menshikoff's mission. On April 19, however, the Prince formally asked that the Greek Church in Turkey might be placed under the protection of Russia. From a Russian point of view there was something to be said for this demand. It expanded a principle which had been laid down some eighty years before in the Treaty of Kainardji, when the Greek Church at Constantinople and its officiating minister had been placed under Russian protection; and it merely accorded to Russia a right similar to that which Austria already possessed, of protecting the members of the Roman Catholic Church. But the members of the Roman Church were few, those of the Greek Church were many; and Lord Stratford, who had now resumed his duties as British Minister at the Porte, considered that the Power entitled to protect them would obtain a right of intervention in almost every Turkish province. Lord Stratford accordingly induced the Porte to reject courteously but firmly the Russian proposal; in consequence of which attitude Prince Menshikoff broke off the negotiation on May 22, 1853, and withdrew from Constantinople. Through the action of Lord Stratford, and without any express authority from home, the whole aspect of the situation had been changed; and



England, which originally had been no party to the dispute, had become a principal to the quarrel. The change in her position was at once accentuated by her proceedings. For, in consequence of Prince Menshikoff's withdrawal, Russia at the end of May threatened to send her armies to cross the Pruth and occupy the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), and the Western Powers retaliated by ordering their fleets to the mouth of the Dardanelles.

Diplomacy, however, did not relax its efforts to prevent a rupture. Austria, interested in the free navigation of the Danube, and alarmed at the prospect of the occupation of the Principalities commanding its banks, added her efforts to those of the Western Allies to compose the dispute. Through her influence the negotiation was transferred to Vienna, and the representatives of the Great Powers in that city adopted in July a Note, originally prepared in France, which they agreed to present both at St Petersburg and at Constantinople. On August 3 the Russian Government accepted this proposal, and the diplomatists believed that peace was ensured. Before the end of the month, however, the Porte intimated that it could only adopt the note if certain amendments were introduced into it. Officially, there is no doubt that Lord Stratford urged the Porte to accept the decision of the Great Powers. Unfortunately, there is equally no doubt that he took no pains to conceal his opposition to their policy. Even his apologists declare that "it is not to be believed that he could hide his real thoughts from the Turkish Minister"; and the universal judgment of historians is that the Sultan's Ministers, in demanding the alteration of the note, carried out the private views and disregarded the official language of Lord Stratford.

For the moment it seemed that Turkey by her conduct had deprived the Western Powers of every pretence for continuing to her their support. She had refused, while Russia had accepted, the terms on which Austria, France, England and Prussia had concluded that the dispute should be settled. The British Cabinet, however, with some inconsistency, decided on submitting the Turkish modifications of the note to St Petersburg. They were naturally rejected by the Tsar, and the Russian Minister drew up a memorandum detailing the reasons for their rejection. This memorandum found its way into a Prussian newspaper. On its publication the diplomatists of Europe were startled to find that the Russian Government attached a meaning to the note, different from that which its authors had intended to express. This revelation had the effect of breaking up the concert of the four mediating Powers. For, while Austria and Prussia still endeavoured to secure the Porte's acceptance of the note, France and England forbore from doing so. Reassured by the attitude of the Western Powers, at the beginning of October, 1853, the Sultan, with Lord Stratford's approval or at his suggestion, called upon Russia to evacuate the Principalities within fifteen days, and added that a refusal would be considered as tantamount to a declaration

of war. In pursuance of this threat, the Turkish army under Omar Pasha actually crossed the Danube; and, though Russia announced her intention of remaining on the defensive during the winter, both in Europe and Asia, engagements occasionally took place between the hostile armies. A state of war had now actually arisen; yet diplomacy at Vienna was still renewing its efforts to preserve or restore peace; and, in the beginning of December, a new Note was drawn up in which the Ministers of the Four Powers undertook to mediate between the combatants. Whatever hope existed that this new intervention might avert hostilities was destroyed by an event which, strangely enough, no one had foreseen. On November 30 a Turkish squadron, on its way from the Bosphorus to Batoum, was attacked at Sinope by a Russian fleet, and virtually destroyed.

The news of the "massacre" at Sinope reached London and Paris towards the middle of December, 1853. It was received in both countries with the same feelings of strong indignation. Opinion in neither capital stopped to enquire whether the attack had been caused by the hostile action of the Western Powers, or whether it could be justified by historical precedent. Yet it is apparently certain that the "massacre" was Russia's answer to the decision of the Western Powers in the previous September to order their fleets to pass the Dardanelles; for the Tsar naturally desired to strike a blow at the Turkish navy before the reinforcements, which had arrived at Constantinople, could intervene in its favour. The action of the Russian Government, moreover, was not unprecedented; but provoked or unprovoked, justified or unjustified, the action was eminently unwise. The chances of peace were almost destroyed by the news of it; and, in Great Britain, the war party in the country and in the Cabinet became almost irresistible.

For, unhappily, throughout the long diplomatic struggle, there were two parties in the British Cabinet. Both of them were sincerely desirous of peace; but their methods for maintaining peace were absolutely opposed. Lord Aberdeen and his immediate friends believed in the good faith of the Emperor Nicholas and had little confidence in Turkey. Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, had no faith in Russia, but a strong belief in the possible regeneration of the Turkish empire. Lord Aberdeen thought that peace could be preserved by endeavouring to meet what was reasonable in the demands of Russia. Lord Palmerston thought, on the contrary, that peace was to be secured by convincing Russia that, if war broke out, she would have to deal with other Powers besides Turkey. If Lord Aberdeen had stood alone, he might have averted war by conciliation. If Lord Palmerston had stood alone, he might have averted war by action. But Lord Palmerston's action robbed Lord Aberdeen's conciliation of its grace; and Lord Aberdeen's conciliation took the strength out of Lord Palmerston's action. The contrary counsels, which to some extent paralysed the Cabinet, gave Lord

Stratford his opportunity. Lord Stratford, like Lord Palmerston, believed in the possible regeneration of Turkey; and he was determined to resent Russian intervention in her affairs.

While the war party in the Cabinet were supporting Lord Stratford, Lord Aberdeen's contrary efforts were weakened by Lord John Russell's attitude. Lord John was not prepared to go so far as Lord Palmerston, but he was dissatisfied with the drift which was carrying the country into war. He thought that Lord Aberdeen was not exercising a sufficient control over affairs, and that the time had come for the Prime Minister to carry out his promise of retirement. But, while it was easy for Lord Aberdeen to promise retirement in January, it was much more difficult for him to fulfil his purpose when negotiations were in progress, on whose issue peace and war depended. Thus, as 1853 drew to a close, Lord Aberdeen was still labouring for peace; Lord Palmerston was making ready for battle; and Lord John Russell was contemplating retirement from the Ministry. He was finally induced to reconsider his opinion on the assurance that Parliamentary Reform, which, in his eyes, was only second in importance to European peace, should be seriously proposed in the succeeding session. But this concession, which secured a continuance of Lord John's services, produced a new crisis. Lord Palmerston, who disliked Reform at home as much as he was opposed to autocracy on the Continent, resigned office. The Cabinet was nearly broken up in consequence of his resignation, which he was ultimately persuaded to withdraw. But he returned to power with the authority attaching to a man whose presence has been found to be indispensable.

Notwithstanding the excitement which followed the "massacre" at Sinope, and though, at the instance of France, the French and British fleets were instructed to enter the Euxine, and "invite" all Russian ships of war to return to Sevastopol, diplomacy made its last effort to avert the impending calamity. At the end of December, 1853, Lord Stratford prevailed on the Sultan to accept a new Note, which the representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna had drawn up. In the beginning of January, 1854, it was forwarded to St Petersburg for the Tsar's acceptance. By an unfortunate coincidence, it reached St Petersburg at the moment when the news came that the British and French fleets were "inviting" the Russian vessels to return to port. Nicholas refused, in the circumstances, to answer the new proposal; and, in the beginning of February, the Russian Ministers were withdrawn from Paris and London, the British and French Ministers from St Petersburg. War did not actually break out with the suspension of diplomacy. The first object of war was obviously to clear the Russian armies out of the Principalities, which they had occupied since the failure of Menshikoff's mission. And in this object Austria had a more direct interest than either of the Western Powers. On February 22, she offered to join France and England in requiring the evacuation of the Principalities by a fixed date.

But the indignation of the British public at the Sinope "massacre" was so great, and its impatience was so marked, that the Ministry were unable to resist the demand for war. Without waiting for a formal arrangement with Austria, the Western Powers addressed an ultimatum to Russia; and, on the Tsar refusing to reply to it, declared war.

The opening months of the War were marked by a Turkish success and a British failure. The Turkish armies under Omar Pasha, encouraged by the presence of the forces which France and England were collecting at Varna, and by the menacing attitude of Austria, were enabled to secure the evacuation of the Principalities by Russia. On the other hand, the British fleet despatched to the Baltic under the command of Sir Charles Napier did nothing quite worthy of its own reputation or the expectations of the public. The failure was unfortunate, for otherwise the evacuation of the Principalities might have led to a resumption of negotiations. The public, however, in England and the army in France were by this time longing for military success, and desired to inflict a serious blow on Russia by destroying the great arsenal at Sevastopol, which they regarded as a standing menace to the Turkish empire. Thus in September, it was decided that the Allied armies should be moved from Varna and landed in the Crimea. Under the command of Marshal Saint-Arnaud, an officer who had seen service in Algeria, and of Lord Raglan, a veteran who had served on Wellington's staff in the Peninsula, they landed in the Crimea on September 14, 1854. On the 20th, they encountered the Russian army under Prince Menshikoff, drawn up on some wooded heights above the Alma, a little river which flows into the Euxine to the north of Sevastopol. The Allies had to cross the stream and scale the heights on which the Russians stood. The battle resulted in a victory which was purchased at a serious loss. The victors, out of a force of some 60,000 men, had some 3300 killed and wounded; and the larger proportion of this loss fell on the English. The enemy, with a smaller force engaged, left 1800 dead bodies on the field; their wounded exceeded 3000. If the Allied armies had followed up their success, it is possible that they might have entered the north side of Sevastopol with the flying enemy. But the troops were tired out with the protracted struggle; and, instead of pursuing the enemy, they remained on the scene of their victory. The delay enabled Prince Menshikoff to carry out two momentous decisions. Convinced that the north side of Sevastopol could not survive the combined assault of the Allied fleets and armies, he blockaded the harbour by sinking the Russian fleet at its entrance; and, practically leaving the town and fortress to be protected by the crews of the sunken ships, he withdrew his own army to the north-east, holding it in a position to watch the Allies, and at the same time secure its line of communications with Russia. The sinking of the Russian fleet convinced Marshal Saint-Arnaud that the north side of the town could not be attacked. A task

which would have been easy to fleet and army combined, seemed difficult or impossible to the army alone. With Lord Raglan's concurrence, therefore, it was decided to march round Sevastopol and assail it, where probably assault was least expected, from the south. This strange movement commenced on the 25th, and was completed on the 27th of September. The line of march of the Allies cut the line of retreat of Prince Menshikoff. The English who formed the van actually encountered the Russian rearguard. Yet the Intelligence Departments of the two armies had received such defective information that neither of them suspected the movements in which their enemies were engaged.

The conditions, in which the expedition had been undertaken, required that the flank march should be followed by an immediate assault. The British Cabinet, when deciding on the invasion of the Crimea, had relied upon some secret information that Sevastopol, though strongly fortified on the sea front, was incapable of defence against an attack by land. So confident was the Cabinet of the accuracy of this information that it made no adequate preparations for a winter campaign. So convinced were the leaders of the army that the town would fall, that three out of the four Generals of Division directed their men to leave their knapsacks behind them. Three-fourths of the troops thus arrived before the town with no tents and no change of clothing. The want of equipment was the more serious because the troops, which had been suffering at Varna from cholera, had brought with them the seeds of that disease; and cholera is especially fatal, if an army is chained to a particular position. If, then, the leaders of the army had seriously examined the situation in all its bearings, they would probably have concluded that, if they were not prepared to carry Sevastopol by assault, they ought not to have been in the Crimea at all; and that the loss of life attending an attack would in any case be inferior to that arising from the ravages of disease. These considerations, however, do not seem to have occurred either to Lord Raglan or to General Canrobert, who had succeeded Saint-Arnaud in the command of the French army. Acting on the advice of their engineers, they decided that it was wise to shake the place by bombardment, before attacking it with infantry; and, before commencing the attack, they were consequently compelled to wait till October 17, the earliest day when they were able to concentrate on the front the guns and ammunition required for the bombardment.

The decision gave the Russians their opportunity; for, while no man of first-rate military capacity held any important position either in the British or in the French army, one man of genius came forward in the Russian ranks to animate the defence. Colonel Todleben, a Russian officer of Engineers, was aware that the town must have fallen if the Allies had attacked at once. The three weeks' delay enabled him to throw up a series of earthworks, which were destined to detain the Allied armies for the best part of a year. When the bombardment at last took place,

the Allies found that an open town had been converted into an almost impregnable fortress. The Russians succeeded in repairing at night the ravages effected in the day; and Sevastopol was actually stronger after the bombardment which was to have precipitated its fall, than when the Allies arrived before it.

Their fatal decision to postpone the attack was attended by another consequence. At the Alma, the Allies had 60,000 men against 40,000 Russians. Before the end of October, the rapid arrival of Russian reinforcements had reversed the relative strength of the combatants. The Allies had received no material reinforcements, while the Russians had 100,000 men. The Allied armies were, thenceforward, attempting the siege of a town which the genius of one man had converted into a fortress, with a force only half as strong as that of the enemy they were attacking. This alteration in the conditions of the campaign naturally suggested to Prince Menshikoff that the time had come for attempting to drive the Allies from their positions; and, on October 25, he directed an attack on the rear of the British position at Balaklava; on November 5 he struck at the British line at Inkerman. The first of these movements led to a series of engagements in which Sir Colin Campbell, with the 93rd foot in line, received and repulsed a formidable onslaught of Russian cavalry, while General Scarlett, at the head of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, completed the victory Sir Colin had gained; and Lord Cardigan led the Light Cavalry Brigade in that famous but useless charge, of which the French said, "*c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre.*" The sortie of November 5 resulted in the battle of Inkerman, in which a comparatively weak British force, eventually supported by the French, withstood and ultimately defeated a large Russian army.

The losses sustained by the British seriously reduced an army already too weak for the work before it. For, after the failure of the bombardment, it was evident that the Allied armies would have to remain in the Crimea during the ensuing winter. The resources at their disposal were, however, obviously inadequate for a winter campaign. The resources of the transport had been strained to provide the troops with the guns and ammunition required for the bombardment; and nothing had been done to provide the men with the equipment which was absolutely necessary for their health. Even the soldiers who were wounded in battle or struck down with cholera had neither adequate shelter nor the necessary medical comforts. Deplorable as was their condition, it was aggravated by the consequences of a great storm which burst over Sevastopol on November 14, wrecking many vessels laden with munition and stores, levelling almost every tent to the ground, and, worse than all, blocking with snow and slush the roads by which the stores were brought from Balaklava to the camp. It became almost impossible to supply the army with the ammunition and food on which its existence depended, or to provide the baggage animals with the necessary forage.

For want of forage the horses died; for want of horses the transport was paralysed; for want of transport the stores awaiting at Balaklava could not be brought to the front; and for want of stores the army melted away.

A generation which had no experience of war in Europe, which had entered into the struggle with a light heart and a confident expectation of victory, was appalled by the tidings of suffering and death brought to it from the Crimea. For the first time in the history of war, newspaper enterprise was maintaining at the front correspondents specially qualified to convey vivid impressions of what was passing by their pens. A public whose own impatience was, in one sense, the cause of the suffering called loudly for the punishment of the men who were ostensibly responsible for it. And, when Parliament reassembled on January 23, 1855, John Arthur Roebuck gave notice that he would move for a Committee of Enquiry. The notice at once produced Lord John Russell's resignation. Lord John, it is fair to say, had strongly recommended the reorganisation of the War Office in the previous autumn; and he felt that he could not defend in public an organisation which he had condemned in private. His retirement made the defence of the Ministry impossible. After two nights' debate it was defeated by a large majority (305 to 148), and Lord Aberdeen resigned office.

Thus ended, in disgrace and contempt, the career of a Minister who in happier circumstances might have been recollected as a great British statesman. During the long administration of Sir Robert Peel, indeed, he had conducted the affairs of the Foreign Office with consummate prudence, tact, and self-effacement. But the cautious and conciliatory temperament which admirably qualified him to preside over the Foreign Office in a period of calm unfitted him for the leadership in a time of stress and storm. He had not the personality which would have enabled many men of capacity inferior to his own to impose their will on a divided Cabinet; and, under the pressure of Lord Stratford at Constantinople and of Lord Palmerston at home, he drifted into a policy which he disliked and disapproved. On his resignation, the public instinct pointed to Lord Palmerston as his successor; and, after a vain attempt to secure the services of Lord Derby, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord John Russell, the Queen was forced to send for the Minister whose conduct of foreign policy she had condemned in 1849 and 1850. In the first instance all the old Cabinet, with the exception of Lord John Russell, consented to serve under the new Prime Minister. When, however, Roebuck insisted on the appointment of the Committee of Enquiry, the three men, most intimately associated with Lord Aberdeen—Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and Sidney Herbert—retired from the Cabinet.

While this crisis was still acute, the authorities were straining every nerve to relieve the wants and sufferings of the army. Supplies were hurried out; a good metalled road was made from Balaklava to the camp;

the debilitated army was steadily reinforced; Florence Nightingale and a devoted band of ladies introduced order into the hospitals at Scutari and Kulali on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. The lengthening days and the finer weather of the spring assisted the work of administration; and the sanitary condition of the army in May, 1855, was about as creditable as it had been disgraceful in November, 1854.

At the moment when the public at home and the army in the Crimea were equally regaining confidence and looking forward to fresh glories, a serious effort was made to restore peace. In April, 1854, the Four Powers, assembled in Conference at Vienna, had agreed on a vague Protocol recording their desire to maintain the integrity of the Turkish empire, and to provide securities for the rights of its Christian subjects. In the following August three of the Powers, Austria, France, and Great Britain, adopted a Note detailing four points which they professed themselves anxious to secure. These points were: the substitution of an international for a Russian protectorate of the Danubian province; the freedom of the navigation of the Danube; the maintenance and independence of the Turkish empire; and the renunciation by Russia of any claim to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte. In the middle of November, 1854, the Tsar authorised Prince Gorchakoff, his Minister at Vienna, to discuss the terms of peace on the basis of these points. At the beginning of January, 1855, he definitely consented to treat on this basis; and early in March a new Conference was opened at Vienna. Lord Palmerston entrusted Lord John Russell with the task of representing Great Britain at the Conference. While Lord John was on his way to Vienna, the Tsar, whose obstinacy was regarded by Western Europe as the cause of the war, died at St Petersburg. It was naturally considered that his son and successor might prove more tractable than his father and desire to inaugurate his reign by terminating an exhausting struggle. When the Conference actually began, this hope seemed likely to be fulfilled. The first two points—the future of the Principalities, and the freedom of the Danube—were found to raise no difficulties. When, however, the third point was reached, it was found that the Western Powers desired to ensure the independence of the Turkish empire by converting the Black Sea into a neutral lake. It was the misfortune of the Western Allies that this particular demand was faintly supported both by Austria and Turkey. Austria had secured the objects at which she was aiming when the two first points were conceded; Turkey was chiefly anxious for the concession of the last, which would deprive Russia of any pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire. Prince Gorchakoff had, therefore, reason for believing that he might venture on resisting the third point. Instead, however, of rejecting the proposal, he offered either to open the Black Sea to the ships of every nation, or to vest in the Sultan the right of permitting at his discretion the warships of any Power to pass through the Straits. The



Western Powers refused the alternatives, and the Conference practically came to an end.

At this moment Count Buol, the representative of Austria, unfolded a new proposal. He suggested, as an alternative to the "neutralisation" of the Black Sea, that an arrangement should be concluded between Russia and Turkey, under which any addition to the Russian strength might be met by a corresponding addition to the Turkish fleet and the admission of a certain number of French and British war-vessels into the Euxine. If this suggestion was adopted, Count Buol undertook to form a triple alliance between Austria, France, and Great Britain. Both Lord John Russell, the representative of England, and Drouyn de Lhuys, the representative of France, considered Count Buol's proposal to be outside their instructions, but they decided on at once returning home and on recommending it to their principals. Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon were, from the first, opposed to the new project. Napoleon III, who in the first instance was inclined to regard it with some favour, was induced to reject it. A premature and inadequate peace—so he was told by Vaillant—would have the worst possible effect on the army. Both the Western Allies, therefore, decided to reject the Austrian principle of counterpoise as an adequate solution of the difficulty; Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John Russell retired from the Cabinets which rejected their advice, and the War went on.

The struggle was renewed under new men and new conditions. The armies of the Allies were no longer decimated with disease, and their spirits rose with the lengthening days of spring and summer. The little State of Piedmont, in whose counsels Count Cavour was predominant, threw in its lot with the Western Powers and sent a contingent to the Crimea in May, which bore a large and distinguished part in a battle on the Chernaya. While the conditions under which the struggle was continued were thus altered, the men under whom it was conducted were changed. In May, 1855, General Canrobert was replaced in the command of the French army by General Pélissier; in June Lord Raglan succumbed to the labour and the disappointments of his position, and was succeeded by General Simpson, and ultimately by General Codrington. The difficulties of the Russians were increased by some successful operations in the Sea of Azoff, where large quantities of stores intended for their army at Sevastopol were destroyed. An assault on the Malakhoff and the Redan, which proved unsuccessful in June, was renewed in September; and, though the British were repulsed a second time from the Redan, the French obtained possession of the Malakhoff, which was to give a title to their commander. The Russians, recognising the importance of its capture, withdrew across the harbour and gave the Allies possession of the south side of the town.

The fall of the southern half of Sevastopol did not immediately end the War. Lord Palmerston indeed declared that Russia was not beaten

enough, and wished to continue the struggle. Public opinion in England, a little sore at the failure of British troops at the Redan and the success of the French at the Malakhoff, was equally anxious, before consenting to peace, that some new laurels should be acquired by the English army. On the other hand, the reverses which Russia had sustained, and the exhaustion from which she was suffering, made her more ready to negotiate; while Napoleon, satisfied with the success which his arms had secured, and conscious of the strain which the War was causing to his finances, was anxious that it should end. Peace, so he said, was his object. But if the War went on he should give it a new character, and make an appeal to nationalities, in Poland and elsewhere, to rise against autocracy. Napoleon's intentions to give the War a new character by appealing to the doctrines of nationalities induced even Lord Palmerston to pause. Anxious as he was to push matters to an extreme, he was unprepared to raise revolutions in every part of Europe. Austria again came forward to urge peace on the Tsar; Prussia, which had hitherto held aloof, recommended the new Tsar to yield, and on January 16, 1856, the Russian Court finally consented to treat on the basis of the four points. In the last days of February the representatives of Austria and of the belligerent Powers, assembled in the Congress of Paris, agreed on an armistice to endure till March 31.

The task of the plenipotentiaries at Paris proved much easier than that of their predecessors at Vienna. In retiring from the south to the north side of Sevastopol, after the capture of the Malakhoff, Russia had herself destroyed what remained of her fleet; and, in consenting to the neutralisation of the Black Sea, she was practically only affirming a state of things which she could no longer ignore. She claimed, and received, the right to construct some small vessels of light draft for the policing of her shores; and, with this reservation, accepted the condition which she had so firmly rejected at Vienna. The lot of the Christians created more discussion; and the plenipotentiaries ultimately contented themselves with a formal promise from the Sultan, to place his Christian subjects on an equality with their Mussulman neighbours. The navigation of the Danube was opened to all nations. The Danubian Principalities were granted entire independence, under the suzerainty of the Porte; and a small strip of Bessarabia was added to their territory. The boundaries of Turkey and Russia in Asia were restored to their position before the War; Turkey was allowed to participate in the advantages of the public law of Europe; the contracting Powers agreed to respect and guarantee the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, while three of them—Austria, France, and Great Britain—perhaps a little distrustful of the others, pledged themselves collectively and severally to regard any infraction of any part of the Treaty as a cause of war.

Such were the chief provisions of the famous Congress which brought the Crimean War to a close. It is perhaps worth while adding that the

firman, under which the Sultan promised to grant religious liberty and equality to all classes of his subjects, was never acted on; that the neutrality of the Black Sea was maintained only till 1870; that the strip of territory, which was taken from Russia in 1856, was returned to her in 1878; and that none of the Great Powers, when the integrity of the Ottoman empire was assailed in the latter year, intervened in its defence. If the policy of the Congress of Paris was not destined to survive, the arrangements which the Emperor Nicholas desired to make have been largely carried out. The provinces of Turkey have, to a great extent, been made the autonomous Principalities which Nicholas suggested they should become. England is in occupation—not of Egypt and Crete, which Nicholas suggested she should receive—but of Egypt and Cyprus. So far the views of the defeated belligerent have come true; the aims of the victorious belligerents have been set aside. Yet Russia is no nearer Constantinople than she was in 1856. For, clearly as Nicholas foresaw the trend of events, he failed to see that autonomous provinces placed under Russian protection would sooner or later cast off their protector; and that, instead of assisting the expansion of Russia, they would become new and formidable obstacles to her advance towards the Bosphorus.

Whatever may have been the result of this great war, the price which was paid for it was heavy. The estimate of La Gorce that the French lost 95,000 men, the English 20,000, the Russians 110,000, from death and disease in the Crimea, inadvertently compares two different things. It includes in the French loss and excludes from the British loss the men who were discharged from effects of wounds and disease and died on their return home; and the estimate of the Russian loss is avowedly imperfect, for it excludes the victims of disease during the second winter of the siege, and the enormous numbers, who succumbed to fatigue and illness, during the long marches across Russia to reinforce their wasting comrades in the Crimea. The English Secretary of State for War computed the total Russian loss at nearly half a million of men; an estimate since accepted by English writers. Allowing for a Turkish loss of 30,000, and a Sardinian loss of 2000, it does not seem an exaggeration to say that the Crimean War cost the lives of 600,000 men.

Huge and horrible as the death-roll was, it does not tell the whole story. From 1815 to 1854 the Continent of Europe had practically enjoyed peace; no two of the great European Powers had, at any rate, been engaged in war with each other. But from 1856 to 1878 the Continent of Europe was afflicted with five great Wars—the Franco-Austrian of 1859; the Danish of 1864; the Austro-Prussian of 1866; the Franco-German of 1870; and the Russo-Turkish of 1878—all of which can be lineally traced to the war of 1854. Thus the obscure and unintelligible dispute about the custody of the Holy Places developed into a quarrel, which let loose war upon Europe and terminated the forty years of peace which had followed Waterloo.

## CHAPTER XII.

GREAT BRITAIN, LAST YEARS OF WHIGGISM,  
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

(1856-68.)

WHILE the Crimean War still lasted, there was a general desire among all classes of the English people that Lord Palmerston should remain Prime Minister. He had been called to office and maintained in it from a belief that he could be trusted to conduct the War with vigour. But, when the War was closed by the Treaty of Paris, the necessity for retaining Lord Palmerston in power disappeared. It was then recollected that without the support of the Peelites and of Lord John Russell, who had left him in 1855, he could not command a majority in the House of Commons; while it was assumed that a man who had completed his seventy-second year, and who was thought to be feeling the weight of age, could neither expect nor desire to continue in a position which no one equally old had ever filled in England before.

Thus, when Parliament met in February, 1857, men were speculating on the chances of a change of Ministry. But, before a month of the session was over, news arrived from the Far East which affected the situation. Owing to certain disputes concerned with the *lorcha* "Arrow," of which an account is given elsewhere, Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, under orders from Sir John Bowring, British Governor of Hongkong, sunk a large number of Chinese junks, and destroyed the forts in Canton harbour. The Ministry at home, on hearing of these doings, hastily approved Sir John Bowring's action.

Public men of all parties in Parliament were almost unanimous in regretting these high-handed proceedings; and motions adverse to the Government were carried by majorities of 36 in the Lords and 16 in the Commons. Lord Palmerston at once saw that the division must be fatal either to the Government, which had sustained, or to the House which had inflicted, the defeat; and he decided on appealing to the country. In the general election which ensued the electors rallied to the Minister who, they thought, was upholding British interests. Men like Cobden, who had led the attack on Sir John Bowring's policy, and who

had incurred unpopularity by opposing the Crimean War, lost their seats, and Lord Palmerston found himself in the new Parliament, for the first time in his life, at the head of a compact majority.

It so happened that, almost on the day on which the new Parliament assembled, news reached England of grave unrest in the native army of India, destined to develop into a formidable mutiny, and to strain the resources of the British Empire. The Sepoy Mutiny, whose history is related elsewhere, had the effect of strengthening the strong position in which the results of the general election had already placed Lord Palmerston. It was generally felt that the Minister who had brought the Crimean War to a conclusion, was better qualified than any of his contemporaries to deal with the new and grave crisis.

In the meanwhile a session, begun late, afforded only few opportunities for legislation, and the chief achievement of Parliament in 1857 was the passage of a Divorce Act. Down to 1857, the Ecclesiastical Courts had been authorised to grant a divorce *a mensâ et thoro*, in cases where the husband had reason to complain of the misconduct of his wife, or the wife of her husband's cruelty. But the divorce merely released the parties from the obligations of marriage, without leaving them free to marry again. For three centuries, however, rich men, divorced from their wives, had been in the habit of promoting private Bills in order to obtain Parliamentary sanction for the contraction of fresh marriages. By a standing order, eminently characteristic of English legislation, the House of Lords required that every such Bill should contain a clause forbidding the marriage of the guilty parties, and this clause was invariably struck out in committee. The Divorce Act of 1857 enabled the poor man to do what the rich man, who could afford the luxury of a private Act of Parliament, had constantly done. It removed the hearing of divorce cases from the Ecclesiastical Courts to a new Civil Court; it enabled that Court to grant the husband, on the misconduct of his wife, or the wife on the cruelty and desertion of her husband, a divorce (*a vinculo matrimonii*) or a judicial separation (*a mensâ et thoro*); and, when a divorce was granted, it empowered the parties to it to contract fresh marriages. As it was imagined in 1857 that the new Court would have some leisure, Parliament decided on transferring to it testamentary jurisdiction which, in the case of realty, had been hitherto administered by the Court of Chancery, in the case of personalty, by the Ecclesiastical Courts. The measure, therefore, incidentally marked a new stage in the legislation which was gradually transferring secular matters from the Courts of the Church to the Courts of the State. It was opposed by Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, in one House and by Gladstone in the other, on the grounds that divorce was contrary to the spirit of the Bible, and that the marriage of a divorced person had been expressly condemned by Christ himself. Lord Palmerston, however, refused to prohibit the marriage of the guilty parties, on the ground that such

prohibition would be cruel and immoral, and, when Gladstone opposed clause after clause of the Bill with a persistency which the obstructionists of a later period might have admired, declared that he was ready to sit through September for the sake of the measure. His perseverance was rewarded. Except that the Government assented to an amendment which excused a clergyman who conscientiously objected from celebrating the marriage of a divorced person, the Bill became law almost in its original shape.

This success achieved, Parliament was prorogued. But immediately after its prorogation, news reached London of a serious financial crisis in the United States. Almost every bank in the United States was compelled to suspend payment in cash. In New York money was only procurable at an interest of 60 per cent. Institutions in this country which had extensive dealings with the United States naturally felt the crisis. In the latter half of October and the first half of November, banks and other institutions in Liverpool and Glasgow were compelled to stop payment. The Bank of England, on November 12, was forced to raise its rate of discount to 10 per cent. ; and, at the close of the day, its reserve (the aggregate of the coin and notes in the banking department) was less than £600,000. The Cabinet was forced to recognise the gravity of the crisis by authorising the Bank to disregard the law, and issue notes in excess of the limit imposed upon it by the Bank Charter Act of 1844.

The remedy was as effectual as it had proved in 1847. Confidence was at once restored by the knowledge that the Bank was armed with effectual powers ; and the financial hurricane of 1857 subsided almost as rapidly as it rose. The action of the Government, however, in authorising the Bank to disregard the law, forced it to summon Parliament, and to ask for an indemnity. Thus the session, which otherwise would have been postponed till February, 1858, commenced early in December, 1857. Before any serious business had been transacted, an event occurred in Paris which, in its ultimate consequences, was destined to overthrow the Administration. On January 14, 1858, the Emperor Napoleon III narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of Orsini and other Italian conspirators. It was unfortunately proved that the "Orsini Plot" had been planned in London, that the bombs had been made in Birmingham, and that Orsini had travelled to Paris under the protection of an English passport made out in an English name. French opinion was inflamed against England. The Duc de Morny, half-brother of the Emperor, publicly asked how it was that a neighbouring Government was powerless to destroy the laboratories of assassins ; the colonels of French regiments sent addresses to congratulate the Emperor on his escape, and called on him to destroy the assassins' den ; and Count Walewski, the Foreign Minister of France, denounced England for sheltering persons who by their flagrant acts placed themselves under the ban of humanity.

The language thus publicly used created almost as much excitement

in England as Orsini's attempt had produced in France. The Government, anxious to appease agitation, refrained from formally replying to Walewski's despatch, and introduced a short Bill making a conspiracy to commit murder either within or without the United Kingdom a felony punishable by imprisonment for life. People, however, both in and out of Parliament, whose passions had been inflamed by the language of the French colonels, and who thought the conduct of the Government in neglecting to answer Count Walewski tame, had no fancy for a measure thought to be dictated by France. On the second reading of the Bill, Milner Gibson asked the House of Commons to express its regret that the Government had not replied to Count Walewski, before attempting to alter the law of conspiracy. He was supported by advanced Liberals like Bright, by Whigs like Lord John Russell, by Gladstone, and by the Conservative party, and his motion was carried by 234 votes to 215.

There was something exceptionally dramatic in this division. Of all the public men in England Lord Palmerston was most closely identified with what was popularly called the *Civis Romanus* policy; and Lord Palmerston was driven from power in a House, in which he usually commanded an overwhelming majority, in consequence of the general conviction that he had, for once, failed to maintain the honour of the British name. In his place the Queen selected Lord Derby; who, after trying but failing to secure the cooperation of Gladstone, succeeded in forming a Ministry, in which Disraeli again held the Chancellorship of the Exchequer with the leadership of the House of Commons, while Lord Ellenborough, who had been recalled from the Governor-Generalship of India in 1844, was placed at the Board of Control.

The new Administration contained men of ability and character; but it really depended for its existence on the sufferance of its opponents, or on the differences which distracted the Liberal party. Abroad and at home questions of great delicacy or difficulty awaited solution. The tension between France and Great Britain was unhappily aggravated by the circumstances of a trial which attracted general attention. A Frenchman named Simon Bernard, living in London, suspected of being actively engaged in the Orsini conspiracy, was charged as accessory to the murder of an Englishman who had been one of the victims of the explosion in the Avenue de l'Opéra. Bernard was defended by Edwin James, who, declaring that the prosecution had been directed by foreign dictation, asked the jury to tell the French Emperor that he could not intimidate an English jury. Amidst a scene of wild excitement the prisoner was acquitted. Happily, however, the incident did not quench Napoleon III's desire to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Replacing Persigny, his representative in London, by the Duc de Malakhoff, the bluff soldier who had been the hero of the final struggle in the Crimea, he created an opportunity for reconsidering the whole controversy. Lord Malmesbury, the new Foreign Secretary, who in

other days had enjoyed Napoleon's friendship, showed every disposition to meet his advances; the foolish language of the French colonels, and the discreditable incidents of the Bernard trial were gradually forgotten, and the harmony between France and England was restored.

If the management of this unfortunate controversy brought some credit to the new Government, another and more difficult problem nearly led to its fall. On the suppression of the Mutiny it was felt that the government of India could not be left with the old East India Company. Before his fall, Lord Palmerston had introduced a Bill transferring the political functions of the Company to a president and council of eight members appointed immediately by the Crown. The proposal was, not unnaturally, resisted by the directors of the Company, and they formulated their objections to it in a petition to Parliament, drawn up by John Stuart Mill, the most distinguished of their servants in England. Lord Derby's Ministry, possibly influenced by Mill's arguments, decided on placing the government under a Secretary of State, assisted by a Council of eighteen members, half of whom were to be appointed by the Crown and the other half to be elected by the holders of India stock and five great commercial communities. The idea of entrusting the formation of a governing body to the holders of India stock and to the electors of five great manufacturing towns was received with derision; and the Government would have been defeated, if Lord John Russell had not come forward with a suggestion that the Bill should be withdrawn and its place taken by resolutions, on which a new measure might ultimately be prepared. The eventual Bill founded on these resolutions effected a compromise between the plan of Lord Palmerston and the original scheme of Lord Derby's Administration. The government of India was transferred to a Secretary of State, assisted by a Council of fifteen members (in subsequent years reduced to twelve), eight of whom were to be appointed by the Crown, and seven by the directors of the old East India Company.

While these measures were still under discussion, Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, sent home a proclamation in which he proposed, as a sequel to the Mutiny, to confiscate the proprietary rights in the Province of Oudh. He wrote at the same time a private letter to Vernon Smith, Lord Ellenborough's predecessor at the Board of Control, saying that he intended to accompany the draft with an explanatory despatch, which he had not found time to complete before the mail sailed. By a strange neglect Smith omitted to communicate this letter to his successor; and Lord Ellenborough, in a secret despatch, took occasion to condemn Lord Dalhousie's policy in annexing Oudh, and, in still sterner terms, Lord Canning's draft proclamation. On May 6 the *Times* published a copy of Lord Canning's proclamation, which Lord Canning, it was then seen, had himself amended. In questioning the Government on these circumstances Bright was able to obtain from



Disraeli, not only the pledge that the Government's despatch to Lord Canning should be published, but the admission that it disapproved his policy in every sense.

The danger of the Government's proceedings in the House of Commons was emphasised by their contrary action in the Lords. Lord Derby, in that House, declined to produce the whole despatch which his subordinates had consented to lay on the table of the Commons. The action of the Government in one House condemned its action in the other. The difficulty created by this inconsistency was only averted by the resignation of Lord Ellenborough, who, after a vain attempt had been made to secure the services of Gladstone, was succeeded by Lord Stanley. For Lord Stanley's place at the Colonial Office Lord Derby selected Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, a man whose eminence in the world of letters has inevitably dimmed the part which he played in the world of politics.

The session had, so far, afforded many illustrations of the difficulties attending a Ministry unable to command a majority in the Commons. Oddly enough, the next dilemma of the Government arose from the action of the Lords. From 1847, when Baron Rothschild was elected to represent the City of London, the Commons had shown a growing desire to concede, the Lords a resolute determination to resist, the claim of the Jews to sit in Parliament. In 1858 the Lords maintained, in the first instance, their previous attitude. But it was plain that, however much they could refuse this reform while a Liberal Government was in power, they could not do so while a Conservative Ministry, dependent on the sufferance of a Liberal majority in the Commons, was in office. The fact that the leader of the Commons was a Jew by extraction, and that he warmly advocated the claims of his race, facilitated concession. Lord Lucan suggested, as a compromise, that either House should be entitled to determine by resolution the form of oath to be administered to its own members, and his suggestion was adopted. The resolution, which the Commons thereupon passed, was converted, two years later, into a standing order; and in 1866 Parliament adopted a new oath, from which the words offensive to Jews were omitted. The resolution of 1858 enabled Baron Rothschild to take his seat in the House of Commons; and a few years after the Act of 1866 Baron Rothschild's eldest son, on Gladstone's advice, was raised to the Peerage and took his seat in the Lords.

The Ministry still had to deal with the much more difficult question of Parliamentary Reform. No one, indeed, expected that a Cabinet new to office would produce a Reform Bill in its first session; and the subject as a whole was postponed to 1859. Even in 1858, however, the Ministry was compelled to assent to the abolition of the property qualification for members of Parliament, the repeal of which had formed one of the six points of the People's Charter. At the commencement of the session of 1859 it introduced a new Reform Bill, which extended to counties the

£10 occupation franchise instituted in boroughs in 1832, and conferred votes on lodgers, fundholders, graduates of Universities, and other persons whose position implied superior intellectual qualifications. The scheme cost the Cabinet the loss of two of its most important members (Spencer Walpole and Henley), who objected to the assimilation of the borough and county franchise. The Ministry, weakened by their defection, was beaten on an amendment to the second reading by 330 votes to 291, and decided on appealing to the country. The general election strengthened the Conservative party, but did not convert a minority into a majority. In these circumstances, on the meeting of the new Parliament, Lord Hartington, who had lately commenced a parliamentary career destined to raise him to a position of unusual influence, was entrusted with an amendment to the address, equivalent to a motion of want of confidence. The amendment was carried by 323 votes to 310, in the largest House which had so far ever participated in an important division, and Lord Derby at once resigned office.

At the time of this decisive division Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell had so far forgot their previous rivalry as to leave to the Queen the selection of either of them for the first place in the new Cabinet. Her Majesty, not unnaturally, first attempted to avoid an invidious duty by selecting a third statesman, under whom she hoped that both of them would serve. Lord Granville, however, on whom her choice fell, failed to form a Ministry, and the Queen then sent for Lord Palmerston. Lord John Russell took the seals of the Foreign Office; and Gladstone, who had long been hesitating between the traditions of his earlier career and his growing convictions, definitely joined the Liberal party and became Chancellor of the Exchequer.

At the time when the new Ministry was formed, Napoleon III was anxious to conclude the short and decisive war in northern Italy, which had broken out three days after the defeat of Lord Derby's Reform Bill. The excitement arising from the war had undoubtedly affected the issues of the general election, since many people thought that Lord Malmesbury—strenuously as he had laboured for peace—was prepossessed against France, whilst Lord John Russell hardly concealed his wish to get the Austrians out of Italy. In accordance with this view, when Napoleon III suggested that the new Government might usefully mediate between the combatants on the terms which were subsequently adopted at Villafranca, Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to declare the arrangements not favourable enough to Italy. In fact, the policy of the new Cabinet, from its first formation, was to leave Italy free from foreign intervention; and it soon became evident that this policy, steadily pursued, would do much more for the cause of Italian unity than had been accomplished by the arms of France. For nothing but armed intervention could induce the rich provinces of central Italy to take back the old rulers, whom the war had dispossessed, or could prevent

their combination with the new kingdom made at Villafranca from the union of Lombardy and Piedmont.

The policy of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet received a still more striking interpretation in connexion with Garibaldi's famous expedition from Genoa to Sicily and Naples. It was not easy, on any principle accepted in the Chancelleries of Europe, to justify the expedition sailing from a Piedmontese port to stir up insurrection in the Neapolitan kingdom. But Lord John Russell had the hardihood to say in the House of Commons that "we had once a great filibuster, who landed in the month of November, 1688, on the south-west coast of England"; and it was difficult for a Whig of Lord John's temperament to place Garibaldi higher than by comparing him with William III. When, moreover, Garibaldi, after his sensational success in Sicily, decided on crossing the Straits, and Napoleon III desired that the British and French squadrons should stop his passage, the British Government replied that such interference would involve a departure from the principle of non-intervention. Non-intervention, in fact, as Lord John Russell interpreted it, became a doctrine under which every Italian, or every Italian State, was at liberty to interfere in any part of Italy, but under which no other Power had any right to interfere at all. It is not surprising that the frank avowal of these views seemed almost as deplorable in autocratic Europe, as it was popular in democratic England.

The constancy with which the British Cabinet and Lord John Russell as its exponent enforced the doctrine of Italy for the Italians won for England the enduring sympathy of the new Italian kingdom. But, in one respect, the Ministers sustained a serious reverse. The annexation of Nice and Savoy by Napoleon III (the motives of which are elsewhere described) elicited a warm remonstrance from this country, and Lord John Russell in the House of Commons and Lord Palmerston, in conversation with the French ambassador, used language which threatened war. The views of the Government were shared by the people, who feared that Napoleon III was embarking on a policy deliberately intended to reverse the territorial arrangements made in 1815 at Vienna, and even to humiliate in succession the Great Powers by whom these arrangements had been imposed on France. The knowledge that Napoleon was strengthening his own fleet, and completing the naval works at Cherbourg, suggested the suspicion that the next blow might be aimed at England, and created the apprehension that the defences of the country, neglected during a long period of peace, might be unequal to withstand the invasion on which some people thought that the Emperor had already determined.

The prevailing uneasiness led to one of the most remarkable movements that English history has to record. The people came forward in their thousands to enrol themselves as volunteers in the defence of the United Kingdom, and the Government, availing itself of an old Act,

which had been passed during the Great War, had the good sense to avail themselves of their services. In the enthusiasm which gave birth to the movement, the whole expenses of the new force fell on the men or on their friends and neighbours. But, as its importance became gradually manifest, the Government consented to provide them with arms, ammunition, instructors, and finally a pecuniary grant. The formation and organisation of a volunteer force was the most enduring consequence of what Cobden called the "panic of 1859." But many members of the Cabinet wished to take other steps to guard the country from attack. Haunted by the apprehension that steam, in Lord Palmerston's phrase, "had bridged the Channel," they desired to fortify the most important and most exposed positions on the coast. The more extravagant of these alarmists actually suggested the construction of a ring of forts round the whole island. But the more moderate among them—including the members of a Royal Commission, appointed in 1859 to consider the matter—recommended the fortification of the chief dockyards, and the completion of some works at Alderney as a convenient outpost. Sidney Herbert, the Secretary for War, who had persuaded himself that war with France was imminent, staked his position as a Cabinet Minister on the acceptance of the Royal Commissioners' scheme. Lord Palmerston, whose distrust of Napoleon III was continually increasing, vigorously supported him; and the Cabinet, as a whole, was naturally disposed to accept their recommendations. There was, however, a considerable party both in the country and in the House of Commons who did not agree with this opinion. The safety of Great Britain—they were already urging—was to be found not in fixed fortifications but in a mobile fleet; and money would be better spent in increasing the navy, than in the erection of forts certain to become obsolete in the near future. Some of these men, moreover, refused to believe that alarm was justified. They held that the French Emperor was actuated by no feelings of ill-will towards this country; that he realised, on the contrary, that the Anglo-French alliance was the best guarantee for the security of his dynasty. They contended that, instead of arousing French susceptibilities by preparations for war, it was wiser to unite the great nations of western Europe by opening new facilities for trade.

An opportunity happily occurred for giving effect to this policy. Cobden, who was paying a visit to Paris, with the warm approval of Gladstone and with the sanction of Palmerston and Russell, sought an interview with the Emperor, and explained to him the advantage which free trade might confer on France. The readiness with which the Emperor received the advice induced the Government to associate Lord Cowley, the British ambassador at Paris, with Cobden; and in the course of January, 1860, a treaty was concluded in which France undertook to reduce the duties on all articles of British manufacture, in return for the reduction of British duties on French wines and

spirits. Thus, when Parliament met in February, 1860, it had two distinct policies before it. It was invited, on the one hand, to conclude a treaty with France, framed and designed to consolidate the alliance between France and England; while, on the other, everyone knew that it would be asked to vote large sums of money for the construction of fortifications, which were intended to resist a French invasion. It fell to Gladstone's lot as Chancellor of the Exchequer to secure the assent of Parliament to the treaty which Cobden had secured; and he at once decided to widen the scheme. The treaty only committed the country to reduced tariffs on French goods. Gladstone determined that the reduction should be applied universally. He thus converted a measure of reciprocity into a measure of Free Trade. But he also decided to seize the opportunity for making other and larger changes in the financial system of the country. Estimating the net cost of the French treaty as a little more than £3,000,000 a year, he devoted another £1,000,000 to purging the tariff of many vexatious and unproductive duties, and a third £1,000,000 to cheapening newspapers and books by sweeping away the excise duty on paper. He found means for accomplishing these reforms by modifications of the stamp duties and other taxes and by raising the Income Tax, which according to the promise of 1853 should have ceased in 1860, from 9*d.* to 10*d.* in the pound.

A scheme so comprehensive naturally excited criticism. Some men were disposed to condemn the French treaty on the ground that it lowered for France the price of commodities like iron and steel, almost essential to her existence, while for Great Britain it only affected luxuries like silk, or stimulants like spirits and wine. Other men argued that, when Napoleon was offending opinion by the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the moment was inopportune for concessions favourable to France. But the chief attack on the Budget was directed against the repeal of the Paper Duties. It was contended that there was no necessity for reducing the duties on paper; if £1,500,000 could be thrown away, it would be much wiser and better to encourage an article of universal consumption like tea, than to squander the money on the promotion of cheap newspapers. These arguments had their weight in the House of Commons, where Gladstone was supported by diminishing majorities; and Lord Derby was emboldened, by Lord Palmerston's avowed dislike of the Bill, to throw it out when it reached the Lords. The fact was that, while the Prime Minister disliked Gladstone's Budget, he disliked still more Gladstone's hostility to the scheme for fortifying the dockyards. Lord Palmerston desired to spread the cost over a series of years. Gladstone insisted that, if fortifications were to be erected, they should be paid for out of the revenues of the year in which they were constructed. The struggle in the Cabinet was keen, and it was only with difficulty that a compromise was arranged.

In the meantime, the action of the Lords in throwing out the Paper

Duty Bill was raising a grave constitutional question. For nearly two centuries the Lords had accepted the position that the right of taxation rested with the Commons alone. It was argued that, if the Lords continued a tax which the Commons agreed to abolish, they in effect imposed taxation on the people. Lord Palmerston, with some prudence, avoided the controversy by referring the matter to a Select Committee; and the Committee, while reasserting the privilege of the Commons, declared that it was within the power of the Lower House so to impose or remit taxation as to preserve its rights inviolate. In accordance with their recommendation, the Commons embodied the financial arrangements of the Budget in one Bill in 1862, and thus threw on the Lords the alternative of accepting the plan as a whole or rejecting it altogether. In these circumstances, the Lords found it necessary to agree in 1861 to a proposal which they had refused in 1860. As the growth of the revenue enabled Gladstone concurrently to reduce the Income Tax to the old limit of 9*d.*, the cup which the Lords were required to drink was, to a certain extent, sweetened.

The controversy, thus concluded, left its mark on the Constitution. Thenceforward the Commons uniformly acted on the advice of the Committee of 1860. The temporary victory gained by the Lords resulted, therefore, in a permanent curtailment of their power. But it so happened that, in 1861, or at any rate in 1862, public opinion was concentrated on subjects other than those which had engrossed it in 1860. The dread of French invasion had disappeared in the dangers and difficulties created by the American Civil War. On the first outbreak of hostilities, the British Government decided on maintaining a strict neutrality, and on recognising the Confederate States as belligerents. From this policy it never swerved during the four years of war. With much reason for intervention—since the blockade of the Southern ports deprived northern England of the cotton which was the foundation of its prosperity—it refrained from any hostile act. The North at the time, however, expected more sympathy. Recollecting the sacrifices which England had made for the prevention of the Slave-trade and the abolition of slavery in her own colonies, they hoped that Great Britain would range herself in favour of the Northern States and resented the haste with which she had recognised the belligerent rights of the South. Indeed, they afterwards complained that the action of England had encouraged rebellion and converted insurrection into civil war. Towards the close of 1861, Captain Wilkes, an officer of the United States Navy, created a new and sharp dispute between the two countries by stopping a British Mail steamer, the *Trent*, on her voyage from Cuba to England, and taking from her the envoys, Mason and Slidell, who were going to represent the Confederate States at London and Paris. The British Cabinet, on the receipt of this grave news, at once decided that the affront to the flag must be made good, and

enforced its decision by sending a large expedition to Canada. There seemed reason to fear that the excitement, in both countries, might lead to a new war between the two great English-speaking races. Happily, this calamity was averted by prudence on both sides of the Atlantic. In England, the Prince Consort suggested a modification of the despatch to America, by the insertion in it of a belief that Captain Wilkes' action had been neither directed nor approved by his Government: and in Washington President Lincoln had the wisdom to acquiesce in this view.

When the Prince Consort rendered this great service to the Anglo-Saxon race, he was already suffering from the illness which caused his death a few weeks later on December 14, 1861, at the early age of forty-two. The prejudices which had occasionally influenced Englishmen during his life were forgotten on his death, and a later generation soon recognised the nature and value of his influence upon the Queen. It is sometimes forgotten that, in the twenty years from her marriage to her husband's death, when she was elaborating, by her own conduct, the traditions and duties of a Constitutional sovereign, the Prince Consort was her closest adviser. He assisted her to lay down the principle governing the relation of a Foreign Minister with the Crown in 1850; he supported her in extending her confidence in 1855 to the Minister whom she had practically dismissed in 1851; and he suggested, in the final and most beneficent achievement of his life, the modification of the despatch referred to in the previous paragraph. In these things he was the Queen's adviser; in his patronage of music, of science, of industry, and of art, he acted more independently. In almost every movement intended to encourage development, to stimulate knowledge, and to diminish poverty or crime, he bore his part. The Queen was profoundly affected by his loss. For ten years she remained in comparative seclusion, unwilling and perhaps unable to discharge most of the public functions attaching to her position. During those ten years the cause of monarchy suffered from the self-effacement of the monarch. At the end of the ten years, the dangerous illness of the Prince of Wales aroused the sympathies of the nation with the Queen; and, when she accompanied her son, in February, 1872, to return thanks for his recovery, her progress through London to St Paul's was a scene of heartfelt enthusiasm.

The crisis created by the incident on the *Trent*, at the time of the Prince Consort's death, was followed by graver difficulties. The Confederate Government naturally desired to harass the commerce of the Northern States, and decided on purchasing, in neutral ports, some fast vessels to be equipped as privateers. In March, 1862, they bought at Liverpool a vessel then known as the *Oreto*, renamed the *Florida*: and at the same time they were building at Laird's works on the Mersey another vessel, destined to win notoriety as the *Alabama*. Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister in London, drew attention to the construction of the vessel in June, 1862; the Commissioners of Customs declined,

however, to order her detention. On July 22, Adams renewed his application, supporting it on the 24th with the opinion of an eminent counsel, Robert Porrett Collier: that, if the Foreign Enlistment Act were not enforced, the American Government would have serious grounds for remonstrances. Lord John Russell at once forwarded this opinion to the law officers of the Crown on Saturday, July 26. By an unfortunate circumstance Sir John Hardinge, the Queen's Advocate, to whom the opinion was forwarded, was incapacitated by sudden illness; and Lord John's communication remained unopened till Monday, July 28. On that evening the law officers considered the case, and advised that the vessel should be stopped. Orders were at once issued accordingly. But, in the meantime, the *Alabama*—the 290, as she had previously been called—had left the Mersey ostensibly on a trial trip; and received her guns and warlike stores at sea, preparatory to commencing her career of destruction.

There was little doubt that the leisurely proceedings of official England had facilitated the unfortunate escape of the vessel. After her flight Lord Russell desired to repair the mischief by directing the arrest of the *Alabama* in any British port she visited. But the Cabinet, as a whole, would not sanction this course. A large party in the House of Commons, at the time, was in favour of mediation in the war; three months after the *Alabama's* escape the Cabinet was actually summoned to consider whether the time had not arrived for intervention: and, a little later, Gladstone made the unfortunate speech at Newcastle in which he declared that Jefferson Davis had made an army, was making a navy, and had made, or was making (the words are differently reported), a nation. This famous speech marks the nearest approach of the British Cabinet to intervention in the American Civil War. Thenceforward some successes of the Federals strengthened the hands of those members of the Cabinet opposed to a policy of interference: and, in the next case that arose, when a great English shipbuilder was building some vessels of war apparently for the use of the Confederates, the Cabinet took active steps to enforce England's neutrality.

Meanwhile the rival pretensions of Germany and Denmark with regard to Schleswig-Holstein led, as described elsewhere, to increasing disputes from 1863 onwards. At last, in the summer of 1863, the German Diet authorised Hanover and Saxony to occupy with their troops the duchy of Holstein. Paget, the British Minister at Copenhagen, advised the Danes not to resist this "execution"; and Lord Palmerston, speaking about the same time in the House of Commons, declared himself convinced that, if any violent attempt were made to overthrow the rights or interfere with the independence of Denmark, those who made the attempt would find that they would not have to contend with Denmark alone.

Federal execution in Holstein did not induce the Danes to give way:



and Prussia forwarded an ultimatum in conjunction with Austria. The Danish Government, on the advice of England, consented to convoke the *Rigsraad* and to submit to it the reforms which Bismarck was demanding. Prussia, however, refused the brief delay; and on February 1, 1864, her armies, with those of Austria, crossed the Eider, and the Danish War of 1864 began. There was no doubt that the people of this country were inclined to support Denmark against what was, in their opinion, an unjust aggression. The marriage of the Prince of Wales, in the previous year, with the daughter of the new King of Denmark, gave them a dynastic interest in the matter; and, had Lord Palmerston been able to secure the cooperation of France, he would probably have taken steps to give effect to his rash promise that, if Denmark was attacked, she would not be left alone. But Napoleon III was annoyed at the curt refusal by the English Foreign Office of his favourite scheme of a European Congress in connexion with the Polish question, and was unwilling, if he went to war, to refrain from accomplishing some improvement of the French frontier on the Rhine. The Queen, moreover, used her influence most effectively against a war, which she believed would have been opposed by the Prince Consort if he had been still alive; and the Cabinet was at last compelled to fall back on a Conference, reluctantly accepted by Prussia. The Conference failed to settle the dispute; the war went on; and Denmark, beaten by her powerful adversaries, was forced to submit to the loss of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg, and to the payment of an indemnity. The inglorious part played by Great Britain naturally annoyed the people; the Lords carried a motion condemning the Ministry, and a similar censure in the House of Commons was only averted by an amendment, which expressed satisfaction that Her Majesty had been advised to abstain from armed interference.

The closing years of Lord Palmerston's Administration were thus clouded by the failure of his Danish foreign policy. During these years the country enjoyed unusual prosperity. The expenditure was brought down by four millions in the years 1862-6; the Income Tax was reduced from 9*d.* to 4*d.* in the pound; the duties on sugar from 5*s.* 6*d.* to 3*s.* 4*d.* per cwt.; those on tea from 1*s.* 5*d.* to 6*d.* per lb.; the tax on Fire Insurance from 3*s.* to 1*s.* 6*d.* for every £100 assured. The trade of the United Kingdom rose by leaps and bounds, and the value of the exports and imports increased from £375,000,000, the year of the French Treaty, to £534,000,000 in 1866.

Parliament in 1865, however, had completed the sixth year of its existence. Its dissolution was inevitable; Lord Palmerston's colleagues availed themselves of the prestige, which still attached to his name, to influence the electors, and succeeded in increasing their majority. But the old Minister was not destined to meet a new Parliament. He died in the autumn of 1865, after a career almost unique in English history. For nearly sixty years, he had sat in the House of Commons; for nearly

fifty years he had been a Minister of the Crown. Abroad, he had steadily advocated the introduction of constitutional reform. At home he had, during later life, constantly resisted any large changes in institutions. After the promise which he had given in 1858, and the action of the Conservative Government in 1859, he could not avoid the introduction of a measure of Parliamentary Reform. And Lord John Russell on March 1, 1860—the anniversary of the day on which he had introduced the first Reform Act—was entrusted with the task of explaining a new measure of Reform. After six weeks, free from either parliamentary excitement or popular enthusiasm, the Bill passed its second reading. But this effort exhausted the energy of a reluctant House of Commons. The Bill was eventually withdrawn; and it was tacitly understood that, while Lord Palmerston lived, no further measure of Reform should be made by the Government, and no serious effort to displace the Ministry should be attempted by the Conservatives. The truce, thus established during Lord Palmerston's life, was terminated by his death. His successor, Earl Russell (as he now became) had for the preceding fifteen years strenuously advocated the extension of the Reform Act of 1832. Gladstone, his representative in the House of Commons, no longer restrained by the associations of his earlier life, was almost as eager as Lord Russell. On behalf of the Cabinet, he introduced a new Reform Bill at the commencement of the session of 1866. The measure contemplated the reduction of the borough franchise to £7, and of the county franchise to £14 householders; while it postponed the redistribution of seats for some more convenient opportunity. It was calculated, at the time, that this proposal would only add some 144,000 persons to the Register, and would leave the working classes in a numerical minority. But, mild as the measure was, it was assailed with great force by men like Robert Lowe, Edward Horsman, and Lord Grosvenor. From a saying of Bright's, that Horsman had retired into the cave of Adullam, and had called about him everyone that was discontented and in distress, these men became known as "Adullamites." They contended that the scheme of the Government only dealt with the least important part of the subject, and that it was impossible to pronounce any opinion on its merits until the clauses relating to Redistribution, as well as those affecting the franchise, were before Parliament. They also argued that the rent of a man's house was a less perfect test of his claim to vote than the assessment at which he was rated. On the first point the Government succeeded in resisting an amendment, but their success was only secured by a majority of five votes—a Pyrrhic victory which compelled them to produce their scheme of Redistribution. On the second point, after defeating a motion that the county franchise should be based on the rateable value of the house, they were defeated on the same issue on the borough franchise, and at once determined to resign.

In the protracted debates on the Bill, the chief part had been taken

by Lowe, whose early experience in Australia had filled him with a profound dread of democracy, and who enforced his opinions with an eloquence which made a deep impression on the House and on the country. But, if the chief part was played by Lowe, his success was due to the constant support which he received from the Conservative party; and it was to Lord Derby that the Queen turned on Lord Russell's resignation. Thus, it happened that, for the third time in his life, Lord Derby was entrusted with the task of forming a Ministry with only a minority of the House of Commons at his back. After a vain attempt to obtain the support of individual members of the late Government, and of the Adullamites who had done so much to compass its fall, he was forced to call on those, who had served under him in the Cabinet of 1858, and on younger men like Lord Carnarvon and Lord Cranborne (afterwards Lord Salisbury).

The hour in which the Russell Ministry was defeated was marked by difficulties at home and anxiety abroad. For, in the week which preceded its defeat, the great house of Overend and Gurney fell with liabilities of £19,000,000; and the day of gloom, which succeeded the great disaster, is still remembered in the City as "Black Friday." Moreover, the day on which Lord Russell actually resigned was the day on which Prussia declared war against Austria, and commenced the campaign which brought her in seven weeks to the victory of Königgrätz. These difficulties were now forgotten amidst the domestic troubles which followed the change of Government. So long as the Russell Administration endured, the people showed no enthusiasm in the cause of reform. They watched the slow progress of the measure with the indifference with which they had regarded the withdrawal of the Bill of 1860. But the defeat of the Bill of 1866 at length supplied the impulse which its proposals had proved powerless to exert. The working classes of London, under the auspices of the Reform League, which had recently been organised under Edmond Beales, a barrister of ability, met in Trafalgar Square on July 2. Encouraged by the passive attitude of the authorities, the League decided on a much greater meeting to be held in Hyde Park on July 23. The Government, which was advised that, if the people once entered the Park, no legal right resided in any body to disperse them, decided on closing the Park gates. This decision gave a new zest to the crowds which marched at the appointed hour to the Park. The railings gave way before the pressure of the thousands who surged round them or hung upon them; and the demonstrators, a good-humoured laughing crowd, thus triumphantly took possession of the Park.

The Duke of Wellington once said that it was a difficult matter to march 20,000 men into Hyde Park, but that there were not three men in Europe who could march them out again. The people, on that fine summer afternoon in 1866, had settled the first part of the problem in their own way. The Cabinet were at a loss to know how to

solve the second part. They found it necessary to negotiate with the League, and to undertake that, if the crowds withdrew, the right to use the Park for political demonstrations should be judicially determined. This sensible decision, which the Reform League unfairly interpreted as a permission to hold one more meeting, excited indignation and alarm in certain quarters, and many denunciations were heard of the Government which had yielded to mob violence. And their denunciations were not without reason. For the fall of Hyde Park railings had swept away all resistance to democracy, and had made the passage of a new Reform Bill indispensable. The Cabinet as a whole decided to submit to the House of Commons a series of resolutions, on which a Bill might be ultimately founded, and which might secure the assent of both timid and bold reformers.

The resolutions, which Disraeli brought forward in February, 1867, contained some harmless platitudes affirming the expediency of increasing the number of electors and of reducing inequalities by the redistribution of power. But the resolutions were hardly announced, before the House showed an increasing impatience for details, and the Cabinet were, at last, forced to draw up a Bill. They only succeeded on Saturday, February 23, 1867, in adopting the details which Disraeli had promised to announce to a meeting of his party and to the House of Commons on the following Monday. On the intervening Sunday, one of his colleagues, Lord Cranborne, came to the conclusion that the scheme was too democratic for his taste. He communicated his fears to Lord Carnarvon, who shared his apprehensions; and the two Ministers thereupon informed Lord Derby that they could not assent to the Bill. Never, perhaps, had a British Ministry been placed in so awkward a position. It was pledged to explain its scheme on Monday afternoon, and on Monday morning the only scheme which it had before it involved its own disruption. Hastily summoned, with literally only ten minutes for consideration—as one of its members subsequently declared—it decided to throw over the original scheme, and to confer the franchise on householders rated at £20 in counties and at £6 in boroughs. The proposal rested on a principle. For £20 was the minimum rate at which the house tax began, and £6 was the maximum limit at which the smaller householders were permitted to pay their rates through their landlords in boroughs in which such compositions were allowed. The new scheme proved unacceptable to the Liberal party, as less comprehensive than the Bill of 1866, and to many Conservatives, who thought it wiser, since reform was necessary, to conciliate the working classes by adopting a more extended franchise. In consequence, the Cabinet, thinking that it was useless to persevere with a proposal which no one liked, decided to fall back on their original plan. The new decision led to the resignation of Lord Cranborne, Lord Carnarvon, and General Peel.

The Bill, in its final form, admitted to the franchise all house-

holders in boroughs rated for the relief of the poor, after two years' residence, and in counties all householders rated at £15 a year. It disfranchised some corrupt boroughs and deprived of one member some of the smaller boroughs hitherto returning two. But it found compensation for these large proposals by the creation of "fancy" franchises. For example, a man with £30 in a savings bank or £50 in the funds, or with certain educational qualifications, was to receive a vote. A man who paid 20s. a year in direct taxation was to receive a second or dual vote. It is difficult to believe that the Ministry had any confidence in these curious proposals. By amendments in Parliament, the county franchise was given to all householders rated at £12 a year, the redistribution clauses were widely extended, and the "fancy" franchises, one after another, disappeared. The safeguards, on which the Government had relied, were thus abandoned; and the Conservative party found itself face to face with household suffrage. Thomas Carlyle described the Bill as "shooting Niagara"; Lord Derby admitted that "he was taking a leap in the dark"; and Lord Cranborne denounced "the Conservative surrender" in the *Quarterly Review*. Disraeli, on the contrary, justified the concessions that he had made by declaring that "he had to prepare the mind of the country and to educate his party." His party, at any rate, accepted under his guidance a measure that, in the first instance, had seemed only tolerable from the safeguards which were now removed from it.

The passage of the Bill gave the Conservative Ministry another eighteen months of office. But its chief was compelled by the failure of his health to resign. Lord Derby's retirement was remarkable for another reason. Previously to its occurrence, the first place in every Ministry since 1832 had been held by statesmen born in the eighteenth century, and appointed to high office before the first Reform Act had been passed. For the seventeen years after 1867 the country was governed by Disraeli and Gladstone, men born in the nineteenth century and introduced to political life in the reign of William IV. Public attention was concentrated on the rivalry of these two men. The contrast in their characters and opinions added to the interest of the struggle. Gladstone had begun life as a Conservative. Educated at Eton and Oxford, he only slowly shook himself free from the influence of his earlier training. His intense earnestness, his striking personality, his tempestuous eloquence, excited the enthusiasm of his followers. Disraeli, on the contrary, nurtured in a library, the author of a series of admirable novels and romances, had been accepted by his supporters as a necessity. But the consummate prudence with which he had led the Opposition, from the fall of the Government of 1858 to the rise of the Government of 1866, had at last convinced them that they had found a leader on whom they could rely. The mystery with which he enveloped his utterances added to the interest of his remarkable personality. For, if

men were attracted to Gladstone by what he said, they were fascinated by an attempt to ascertain what Disraeli thought.

Disraeli had hardly attained the object of his ambition by securing the post of Prime Minister, when the struggle between Gladstone and himself became acute. Since the unhappy period of the Irish famine, Ireland had seen a vast emigration of her people. Her population had decreased and was still decreasing. In 1845 she had a population of more than 8,000,000. Twenty years later, her people had diminished to 5,600,000. In Ireland this rapid decrease led to a not unnatural alarm. In England it was regarded as the only hope for prosperity in the future. The third Sir Robert Peel, who held the office of Chief Secretary in Lord Palmerston's Administration, was never weary of quoting statistics to prove that, if the people were fewer, their flocks were more numerous, that wealth was accumulating if men were decaying. Irish discontent was not appeased by this official disregard of Goldsmith's famous couplet, and it was increased by the events of 1865. The termination of the Civil War in America released from military service thousands of Irishmen, who had not much disposition to engage in industrial enterprise. These men joined in large numbers a secret organisation of Fenians—as they were called—intended to bring about the independence of Ireland. James Stephens, who became the leader of the Brotherhood, proclaimed early in 1865 that the flag of the Irish Republic should be raised in Ireland in that year. The Government was so much alarmed that it decided on the arrest of the chief leaders of the conspiracy and on trying them before a Special Commission. Stephens, either through the connivance or the neglect of his gaolers, succeeded in making his escape from prison. But the Government procured the conviction of almost all the other prisoners; and the Irish Attorney General, at the conclusion of the proceedings in January, 1866, declared that every individual of mark, except one or two who had fled the country, had been made amenable to justice.

When Parliament met on February 6, 1866, Her Majesty was advised to repeat in substance the Attorney General's declaration, and to say that the authority of the law had been amply and firmly vindicated. It was, therefore, with some surprise that Parliament heard only a week later that Lord Wodehouse and Chichester Fortescue, the Lord Lieutenant and his Chief Secretary, had arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland. The Bill was at once passed through all its stages, with memorable protests from John Bright and John Stuart Mill. The Act extinguished for a time the flame of insurrection, which the proceedings of the Special Commission had already done much to smother. Outside Ireland, however, the leaders of the Fenian Brotherhood attempted fresh acts of violence. In 1866 bands of armed Fenians crossed the frontier from the United States into Canada and

were only repelled after bloodshed; and in February, 1867, large bodies of Fenians assembled at Chester, with the intention it was believed of attacking the Castle, and of seizing the arms and military stores it contained. On September 18, a body of Fenians attacked in the streets of Manchester a prison-van containing some Fenian prisoners, and shot the officer in charge of it; while, a few weeks later, the walls of the House of Detention in Clerkenwell were blown down in daylight, in order to facilitate the escape of some Fenians confined in the gaol. One man was condemned to death for his share in the outrage; and, as his sentence immediately preceded the passage of an Act for private executions within the walls of prisons, he happened to be the last person who was publicly hanged in England.

These outrages gave the Government an excuse or a justification for again suspending the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland. But the necessity for this legislation naturally drew renewed attention to the chief source of Irish discontent—the ascendancy of a Protestant minority in a Roman Catholic country. Gladstone subsequently declared that Protestant ascendancy overshadowed Ireland like a upas tree; and that the chief branches of the tree—the Irish Church, the Irish land system, and the arrangements for the higher education of the Irish people—must be pruned before Irish discontent could cease. Arguments of this sort, used year after year by a small knot of Irish Liberals and English Radicals, had hitherto made little impression. And just as in 1828 it had required the Clare election and its consequences to bring home to the House of Commons the justice and necessity of Catholic Emancipation, so in 1867 it required explosion at Clerkenwell and murder in Manchester to force home the arguments which the friends of Ireland were using. One of these friends, John Francis Maguire, immediately after the accession of Disraeli to the first place in the Ministry, drew attention to the state of Ireland. The debate thus initiated was illustrated by speeches from men like Bright and John Stuart Mill. But its true importance arose from the declaration elicited from Gladstone, whose speech altered in a moment the whole position of the Irish question. Everyone knew that the annual discussion upon it had hitherto been as purposeless as the utterances of a debating society. But Gladstone now came forward, with a majority of the House of Commons at his back, to demand the instant disestablishment of the Irish Church. In a letter to Lord Dartmouth, intended to rally his supporters, Disraeli declared that Gladstone was preparing to destroy “that sacred Union of Church and State which has been the chief means of our civilisation, and is the only security for our civil and religious liberty.” But this trumpet note of defiance dwindled into a feeble strain in the Commons, where Disraeli met Gladstone’s motion with an amendment affirming that considerable modifications in the temporalities of the Church were expedient, but that the question should be deferred for the consideration of a new Parliament. Mild as the

amendment was, it seemed milder from the fact that it was entrusted to Lord Stanley who, of all the members of the Cabinet, was the least disposed to give expression to the old Tory sentiment of that sacred Union of Church and State which had inspired the Dartmouth letter. The amendment was rejected; and Gladstone persuaded the House to affirm that it was necessary that the Established Church of Ireland should cease to exist as an establishment.

The political conditions of a time, in which the Scottish and Irish Parliamentary Reform Bills were still under consideration, made it impossible for the Minister to demand the dissolution to which he would have otherwise been entitled; and it was ultimately decided that the business of the session should be wound up as soon as possible, and that Parliament should be dissolved in the following November. The arrangement enabled Gladstone to extort one striking reform from the Conservative party. For more than thirty years the power of the vestry to levy a rate for the support of the Established Church had been questioned by Non-conformist England. And in the earlier years of Peel's Ministry it was judicially decided that the churchwardens were powerless to levy a rate which the vestry refused to grant. In the course of the next four years, Church rates were refused in over 1500 parishes. These refusals strengthened the arguments for abolition; and in 1858-9 motions for Church Rate repeal were either carried in the House of Commons, or defeated only by small majorities. The House of Lords stood resolute in defence of the law as it stood. But, just as in 1857 the Peers found it necessary, when a Conservative Government was in office, to discover some expedient for admitting Baron Rothschild to the House of Commons, so, in 1868, the Peers, with a Conservative Ministry again in office, felt themselves obliged to give way. The Lords accepted Gladstone's suggestion that the power of levying a rate should be maintained, but that the rate itself should be made irrecoverable in every case where it had not been assigned as security for a debt. Under this measure Church rates gradually became little more than a voluntary offering of Church people for the repair of the church and, in the great majority of cases, were suffered to expire.

In the meanwhile both parties were making vigorous preparations for the electoral campaign of the coming autumn. Its results were remarkable. In the boroughs—where the effect of household suffrage was felt—the Conservatives suffered an overwhelming defeat. In the counties, on the contrary, where the electors were mainly drawn from the middle class, the Liberals were less successful. Gladstone himself, who did more than any one to influence the campaign by the eloquence of his speeches and the fire of his personality, lost his seat for South Lancashire, and had to take refuge in Greenwich. But the result of the elections as a whole was decisive. In a House of 658 members the Conservative party could not command more than 270 votes. Disraeli determined on the convenient



but unprecedented course of resigning his office into the Queen's hands, instead of waiting till the House of Commons had affirmed the decision of the electorate. His fall was a noteworthy event in the history of modern England. The Reform Act of 1867 had not only led to the crushing disaster of a great political party; it had closed finally and for ever a chapter of History. The new Parliament, elected by a larger constituency, had other interests, other aims than those which the old Parliament, the creation of a narrower electorate, had contemplated. The government of the middle classes had been replaced by the government of the people; and, for good or for evil, legislation was henceforth to be directed by the people.

Before finally parting from the old system, which the Act of 1867 had terminated, it may be convenient to sum up the material results of the sixteen years after 1852. In those years the population of the United Kingdom had increased by nearly 3,500,000 persons. Some 3,000,000 others had left these shores to repeople the waste places of the earth, in the United States, the British Colonies, and elsewhere. The gross value of the trade of the country had risen from £268,000,000 to £532,000,000 a year. The mileage of the railways had advanced from 7336 to 15,000 miles, and the sum expended on these undertakings had grown from £264,000,000 to £518,000,000. The number of passengers which they carried annually had risen from 102,000,000 to 300,000,000; their net earnings from £11,000,000 to £21,000,000. The tonnage of the mercantile marine had risen from nearly 4,000,000 to nearly 5,800,000 tons; the steam tonnage from 250,000 to 948,000 tons. The movements of international commerce and the intercourse between nations had been greatly expedited by the invention of the submarine telegraph. Effective communication across the Straits of Dover had been established just before Aberdeen took office (1851). Between 1852 and 1858 cables were placed under the Irish Sea, the North Sea, the Baltic, and the Straits of Bonifacio. The oceans were less easily crossed. The Atlantic cable of 1858, laid with the support of the British and American Governments, transmitted a few messages and then became dumb. A few years later the first cable from Suez to Karachi also failed. But at length in 1866—after numerous mishaps—the Atlantic was conquered, and a few years later (1870) the Far East was linked to Europe both by land and by sea. The wealth of the country had increased so rapidly that the income assessed to Income Tax had risen from £260,000,000 to £434,000,000; and the prudence of administrators was so great that the whole debt, which the Crimean War had accumulated, was paid off, while the National Debt stood at a lower point in 1869 than in 1853. Statistics of this kind are sometimes regarded as unworthy of a historian's notice. But, if the history of a nation is the record of its vigour and its growth, they are far better worth recording than the Parliamentary conflicts of rival statesmen. For it is by such figures as these that a nation's progress should be tested, and that the capacity of its people for rule must be determined.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## ENGLISH LITERATURE.

(1840-70.)

THERE are two gateways to the English literature of the Victorian era: the key of one is labelled "Germanism" (a word which sixty years ago indicated dislike and fear), that of the other "Tractarianism"; and the master-key to both is Romance. The former key is held by Carlyle and the latter by Newman; and, even though some violence may be done to the chronological order, it will conduce to lucidity to treat these two subjects and these two men first.

Since the time of Chaucer there always has been some foreign influence (other than the classics) moulding English literature. Now it has been Italian, and now French. The fact that in the nineteenth century it became German is of vital importance; and this great change is mainly to be ascribed, first to Coleridge and afterwards to Carlyle. The dominance of Goethe is due principally to the latter. Through Germany transcendentalism and mysticism entered the English thought of the nineteenth century, and ever since their influence may be detected in forms and places the most unexpected. Carlyle himself made them felt in almost every field. With ideas derived from Germany, but remoulded in his own mind, and coloured sombrely by that Scottish Calvinism in which he was bred, he proceeded to reform criticism, to rewrite history, and to probe the diseases of society. The fundamental principle of his criticism is sympathy. He finds the point of view of the author, and judges him by his success or failure in respect of that, but never by any canon which the writer does not acknowledge; of course, however, the nobility or ignobleness of the aim itself is an element in the critic's judgment. Thus such bad criticism as the classical instance of Jeffrey's criticism of Wordsworth ought to be impossible. In point of fact, the difference between the older criticism and that of recent times is less than it is sometimes supposed to be. More depends upon the critic himself than upon anything else. There was good as well as bad criticism then, and there has been bad as well as good criticism ever since. Still, Carlyle was one of the means of destroying an evil tradition and of substituting a better principle.

As a historian Carlyle stands alone. He was not content to spin theories out of his inner consciousness, as so many writers of the eighteenth century did; but, on the other hand, no one ever had less belief in the modern theory that history is a science, in the sense that the one thing needful is a sufficiency of the sort of facts recorded in state documents. To him universal history was the biography of great men, and all his historical work is in reality an illustration of the principles expounded in *Heroes and Hero-Worship*. An authentic portrait of a great man of action was of more value in his eyes than many state documents. And at least this conception of history enabled him to produce some of the most vital books of the century. For what Carlyle himself said of it is strictly true: "there has not been for a hundred years a book that came more direct and flamingly from the heart of living man." And, though his *Frederick* (1858-65) may be in some respects perverse, the fact that it was long used in German military schools as an authority on the campaigns of Frederick, is better evidence of its essential soundness than the judgment of any individual.

Alike in the histories and in all his other works from *Sartor Resartus* (1833) onwards, the gist of Carlyle's teaching is that the essence of good and evil lies in the soul of man. If that be right, nothing can be wrong; if wrong, nothing can be right. The spiritual, he maintained, is the real, the material is mere appearance. This is the "mysticism" which he learnt from Germany. Hence his denunciations of mechanical theories of the universe and "mud philosophies"; for these laid emphasis on the wrong things and led men astray. This, too, is the point of contact between him and that remarkable group of ecclesiastics who initiated the Oxford Movement. That there is a connexion is evident. Fiercely as Carlyle denounced "spectral Puseyisms," he has sometimes been charged with being himself the source of them. That is a mistake. Carlyle's mysticism and "Germanism" were not the cause of the Tractarian movement, but both are effects of the same group of causes. They are phases of a revolt from the negations of the French Revolution. But there is a profound difference at the root of them, for Carlyle builds upon reason, and the Tractarians upon authority.

The Oxford Movement is said by Newman himself to have taken its rise from a sermon of Keble's preached in 1833; but it really can be traced much further back, and it was by no means confined to England. There were cognate phenomena in Germany and France too—movements of revolt against the rampant and aggressive scepticism of the Revolution. In England, the very soul of it seems to be embodied in Keble's *Christian Year*, which appeared in 1827, that is, six years before the date when Newman held that the movement first began. But, if Keble had stood alone, it would not have come to much. In his verse, to adopt the pungent phrase of Bagehot, he translated Wordsworth for women; and this femininity of spirit is not the stuff of which leaders are made.

Neither had Pusey the gift of leadership. The most learned man among the Tractarians, he was destitute of the driving power which was essential to success, and, though he entered into the inheritance left vacant by the secession of Newman, he could never have made that heritage himself. The richly gifted Richard Hurrell Froude died young; while William George Ward lived to prove that, great as were the intellectual endowments of the author of *The Ideal of a Christian Church*, they were accompanied by defects almost equally great. The true motive-power, then, was John Henry Newman. He believed that the course of the unfettered modern mind—what he called “liberalism”—was towards materialism and the negation of all religion. But, like Carlyle, he was profoundly convinced that the universe was in its essence spiritual. The question was, how to bring the modern mind into harmony with the universe. If Newman had known German, that keen intellect might have risen to some solution like that of Carlyle himself. Not knowing German, he could devise nothing better than to fall back upon authority. At first he was sure that he found it in the Church in which he had been born and bred; later, he became convinced that it could only be found in the Church of Rome, and the great secession took place which split the band who had laboured in *Tracts for the Times* (1833–41) for what they sincerely believed to be the truth.

Characteristically, then, the English revival of religion manifests itself as a compromise. The *via media* was to run between the extreme of a Protestantism leading to rationalism on the one hand, and Romanism on the other. Its importance for our purpose lies in the fact that it was one manifestation of the spirit which, during this period, informs not only religion, but poetry, painting, and architecture as well; and all the manifestations are simply phases of the spirit of romance, the essence of which is the belief that the things which can be weighed and measured, or stated in logical formulae, are as nothing in comparison with the things which are impalpable and which we can never demonstrate. Life, says Carlyle, is a progress from mystery to mystery. The Tractarians agreed, but they taught that there was a body clothed with authority to dictate absolutely as to the mysteries.

Tractarianism is of the first importance as a force and as a symptom; but, with the exception of the works of Newman, its whole product is, as literature, negligible. The author, however, of the essay on *The development of Christian Doctrine* is not negligible as a thinker, the writer of the noble *Apologia* (1864) holds a high place among the masters of prose style, and the author of *The Dream of Gerontius* is no mean poet.

Such was the matter out of which literature was to be fashioned in the years between 1840 and 1870. For the most part it was fashioned by men who in the former year were still young; but two veterans survived from the previous generation. Though the fame of Wordsworth was at its height, for production he was merely *magni nominis umbra*, and

the only important addition to his verse, *The Prelude*, had been written many years before. Landor, however, not only lived but wrote; and, after all allowance is made for pieces of earlier composition, the *Hellenics* and *Heroic Idylls* prove that his poetic faculty remained fresh even in old age, just as the *Imaginary Conversations of Greeks and Romans* show that on the verge of fourscore he was still a master of stately prose.

Yet marvellous as was Landor's vitality, in all essentials he was a man of the preceding generation, and to understand the poetry of this period we must turn, not to him or to Wordsworth, but to Tennyson and Browning. Of the two, the former was by much the more influential. Except Carlyle, no one did more to form the period; and few were more sensitively responsive to its influences. When the juvenile volume of *Poems by Two Brothers* (1827) was published, Tennyson was still under the dominion of Byron. In the quiet Somersby rectory, where even "the roar of Hougoumont" was unheard, the boy-poets knew nothing about such obscure writers as Keats and Shelley. Alfred Tennyson learnt about them at Cambridge, where he became a member of one of the most remarkable groups of young men that even Cambridge has ever nursed. They were not least remarkable for their championship of neglected poets, and it was they who revealed to Tennyson the poetry of Keats, and so helped to bring it about that the new romanticism was akin to *La Belle Dame sans Merci* rather than to *Childe Harold*.

Prior to 1840, Tennyson had published two volumes of poems containing much exquisite and delicate work, yet not without flaws of triviality in thought and theme. The question whether he would develop the "high seriousness" which is inseparable from greatness was not decided until the two volumes of *Poems* (1842) established him in general estimation as the foremost poet of his generation. The author of *Paracelsus*, it is true, deserved a consideration which he did not then receive; but there was no one else to set in the scales against Tennyson. During the ten years of silence he had reached maturity, and sorrow for his friend Hallam had led him to sound depths before unplumbed.

Hitherto the poems of Tennyson had all been short; but doubtless he had cherished the natural ambition of the youthful poet to execute a work wide in its scope as well as high in quality. There is probably an element of fact in the playful allusion in *Morte d'Arthur* to the burned epic. At any rate, in later years the poet repeatedly made the attempt, but never (except, curiously enough, in his late dramatic work) demonstrated that he possessed the power of construction. Though *The Princess* (1847) contains some fine blank verse, and though it shows that the author was keenly alive to the life of the world around him, neither in form nor in substance is it a great poem. *In Memoriam* (1850) is far more profound and subtly-wrought. But it is really a collection of lyrics, many as well as one. Again, the theory that the *Idylls of the King* form a single poem of the epic order with a consistent and unbroken thread

of allegory running through and uniting them, can hardly be maintained. To the first group, published in 1858, additions continued to be made down to 1885; they were made without discoverable order or system, and the most rational conclusion seems to be that the poet had no systematic scheme in his mind. Whatever be the value of the architectonic faculty, there is in these poems no sure proof that Tennyson possessed it.

Tennyson's highest gift was lyrical, and perhaps his fame is most securely based upon such gems of song as "O that 'twere possible" and "Break, break, break." It is partly because *In Memoriam* is also lyrical that it is usually felt to be the greatest of the longer poems. Another reason is the nature of the subject, which appeals to a serious-minded race; a third, that it is the record of the deepest emotions, probably, ever felt by the poet. It should be contrasted rather than compared with the great elegies of Milton and of Shelley. *Lycidas* and *Adonais* are battle-cries rather than laments; but Tennyson lingers in the churchyard with Gray. Yet here again there is more of contrast than of similarity; for, while Gray's is the mood of pensive musing, Tennyson's is that of poignant feeling.

Some critics of Tennyson have curiously underrated or even wholly ignored the dramas. Yet *Becket* (1884) is one of the few successful and even great plays of the nineteenth century, and the dramatic phase is the most striking part of the development of Tennyson's mind. It is not confined to the dramas proper. There is a dramatic element in many of the later lyrics which sets them in striking contrast to the earlier ones; the dialect poems in particular are profoundly dramatic in spirit, and so are several of the later patriotic poems.

This strain of patriotism, which runs through the whole work of Tennyson, attains its finest expression in the *Ode on the Death of Wellington* (1852); it is, however, a feature of the time, which faithfully reflects the political development. The Crimean War inspired quite a considerable number of poems, among which Tennyson's *Maud* (1855) was one. But the martial spirit is perennial in poetry: the point of special interest is the ready response of the poets to that spirit of nationality, the working of which is shown elsewhere in this volume. England had realised her own national individuality long before, but the great exiles Kossuth and Mazzini found ready sympathy, and when Garibaldi visited London he was greeted as a hero. These were but the most conspicuous of a numerous band. Carlyle has left pictures, touched with his customary vividness, of the exiles whom the national movements on the Continent had driven to England; and one of the greatest poets of the time, Rossetti, was himself the son of a political exile. Sympathy with nationalism was natural in a country which believed itself to have attained what Hungary and Italy and other countries were striving for, and it was made all the keener by the presence of the exiles. This sympathy inspires *The Roman* (1850) and *The Magyar's New-Year Eve*,

by Sydney Dobell, the chief of that "spasmodic" group, now as unduly depreciated as they were unduly praised fifty years ago. The throb of the same emotion may be felt in Clough's *Amours de Voyage*, which was the outcome of a visit to Italy when the French were besieging Rome; while Elizabeth Barrett Browning's enthusiasm in the cause of freedom finds expression in *Poems before Congress* (1860).

A subtler manifestation of the same spirit, and one which indicated that England had not solved the problems of nationality as completely as she supposed, may be found in the rise of Celticism. Wales reentered English literature through Lady Charlotte Guest's translation of the *Mabinogion* (1849), as the Scottish Highlands had found a place in the literature of Europe two generations before through Macpherson's *Ossian*; and both in fiction and in poetry there was in the early part of this period, even as there is at the present day, a noteworthy Irish element. For the most part it fell below excellence, but it produced one poet, James Clarence Mangan, who would probably have been great, if the Mangan who communed with the immortals could have gained the mastery over the Mangan whose home was the gutter. Superior in achievement to Mangan, though probably not greater in native capacity, was Robert Buchanan, a descendant of Scottish and Welsh Celts, though he chanced to be born in England, and a member of the Celtic School by reason of *The Book of Orm* (1870), though his best work is far less mystical and far more realistic. All this indicates a remarkable change of spirit as compared with that which was prevalent a century before. At the earlier date the whole tendency was towards the absorption of the weaker and more backward sections of the population in the stronger and more progressive; at the later date it was towards the belief that the weaker sections too had gifts of their own, which it was desirable, in the interest of the whole, that they should develop.

In most respects Browning stands in strong contrast to Tennyson. From *Pauline* (1833) to *Asolando* (1889) their courses ran exactly parallel, yet they never touched. Tennyson was popular, Browning was the poet of the few; Tennyson was insular in sentiment, Browning cosmopolitan; till past middle life Tennyson was lyrical even when his work bordered on the dramatic, while Browning was dramatic even in his lyrics. In the last fact lies the key to Browning's genius. From beginning to end he was concerned with "incidents in the development of a soul." And yet the greatest dramatic genius among the Englishmen of the nineteenth century never wrote an entirely satisfactory drama.

However we may explain the fact, it is certain that, after many trials, the nineteenth century failed conspicuously in the drama. As a rule, Victorian dramas have either been closet studies, or they have been of the stage stagey. The works of Sheridan Knowles and Tom Taylor are not sufficiently literary; those of Bulwer are melodramatic and sentimental. The work of Sir Henry Taylor is far more pure and true, but even

*Philip van Artevelde* (1834) lacks the fire and energy of life. Though the underlying thought is sound, and the poetic form good, it is the work of a student, not of a playwright. Browning was incomparably more dramatic than Taylor, but his interest centred rather in striking and illuminative incidents than in the orderly and gradual evolution of character; and hence he had a surer touch in dramatic scenes (*e.g.* *Pippa Passes*) than in regular dramas, and the dramas sometimes resolved themselves into single-character studies. At his highest point, the great scene of Ottima and Sebald, he will bear comparison with Shakespeare. Yet, though the dramatic period was inevitable in his evolution, it was one out of which it was desirable for Browning to develop. He was nearer his true self in *Paracelsus* than he ever was afterwards, until he definitively adopted the dramatic monologue.

Browning did not invent the dramatic monologue, but he made it peculiarly his own, and in the end he made it popular. Tennyson in his later days followed Browning's example; so did Rossetti; so did Robert Buchanan. Much of the best work of our least adequately appreciated poetess, Augusta Webster, is in this form; so is some of the best of our least adequately appreciated poet, Lord de Tabley (John Leicester Warren). But Browning remains the master, and his *Men and Women*, *Dramatis Personæ*, and above all *The Ring and the Book*, that wonderful collection of dramatic monologues, half of miry clay, but half of the purest gold, are among the richest of all the rich treasures of English poetry.

Though no other poets of the time were as comprehensive as Browning and Tennyson, there are some who bring into clearer view particular phases of its thought and feeling. One of these is Thomas Hood. Most of his work was done when this period opened; but it is rather as author of *The Song of the Shirt* and of *The Bridge of Sighs*, than as the jester, the master of *vers de société*, or the humourist of *Miss Kilmansegg*, that Hood will live in literature. And the cause which inspired him in these masterpieces was one which inspired also not a little of the verse and prose most characteristic of the time. The sense of something amiss in the social condition of England was growing acute, even while Philistines were boasting of "our incomparable civilisation." Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Tennyson among the poets, and many of the prose-writers give expression to this feeling, but none more effectively than Hood. *The Song of the Shirt* was a force on the side of social reform hardly less notable than Lord Shaftesbury's philanthropic labours.

Like Hood, Elizabeth Barrett, who in 1846 became Elizabeth Browning, was a writer of considerable experience before the period opens. Her first girlish venture—*An Essay on Mind*—proclaimed her a disciple of the school of Pope; but the change to romance had taken place before she became acquainted with Browning. Her marriage with him gave rise to the most interesting personal connexion in the annals of English literature. Her influence on him was slight, for his was by far



the stronger and greater mind of the two, and he had been characterised from the start by an almost defiant originality. On the other hand, his influence on her was great, though not in all respects beneficial; yet for all the evil he did there is rich recompense in *Sonnets from the Portuguese* (1850), which are not only Mrs Browning's greatest work, but which also form a collection unique in literature. Nowhere else do we find such an expression of a virtuous woman's love for a man. Nearest to them, perhaps, comes Christina Rossetti's *Monna Innominata*, inspired apparently by emulation of the elder poetess. Elizabeth Browning's is unquestionably the greater work, and if she permanently retains her reputation as the greatest of English poetesses, it will probably be by reason of these sonnets. For her title is not so absolutely indisputable as it is commonly assumed to be. Christina Rossetti was more exquisite if less forcible. If her work is never so massive, it is far less faulty. Possibly Emily Brontë had it in her to surpass both. Not without cause did Matthew Arnold declare that she had known no fellow for might, passion, vehemence, grief, and daring since Byron died.

Except in Keble and Christina Rossetti there is in these poets little trace of the direct influence of the Oxford Movement. Indeed, its most conspicuous effect was at first negative rather than positive; for Clough and Matthew Arnold are the product of a reaction. Oxford was in the turmoil of the Tractarian controversy when they went up, and both were affected by it (Clough for a short time profoundly). Though neither could long yield unquestioning obedience to authority, this influence compelled them to examine more deeply the intellectual foundations of their life, and made them the poets of doubt, the leaders of a sceptical reaction, even as the Tractarians themselves were leaders of a Catholic reaction against the negations of the French Revolution. In this respect there is something akin to the two Oxford men in Edward FitzGerald, who, out of the materials of a Persian poet of the twelfth century, contrived to fashion an image, perhaps the most perfect we possess, of the English mind in the nineteenth century.

Clough is less negative than Arnold. He suggests doubts, but he does not deny old beliefs. On the whole, he gives the impression of a man scarcely equal to the task imposed upon him. *Dipsychus*, his most ambitious poem, deals with a theme which demands a greater intellect than his. He is at his best in a few of the shorter poems, such as *Easter Day* and the beautiful *Qua cursum Ventus*, which immortalises the very friendship whose close it was written to commemorate.

Arnold, on the other hand, definitively rejects immortality, and reduces God to "a stream of tendency, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." It might seem that there is little left. But then, he thought that stream of tendency the most real of all things. Many a sentence published during his life, but most of all the extracts from his notebooks published since his death, prove that to him the spiritual was

the real; and the tone of wistful longing which gives the subtlest charm to his verse is due to the wish to believe many things he cannot prove, combined with the "sad lucidity of soul" which convinces him that they remain unproven. Naturally therefore it is in the elegiac strain that Arnold expresses himself most happily; and if he has not quite equalled the masters of the English elegy in any single piece, he is the only poet who has, not once or twice, but over and over again written elegies of exquisite beauty. *The Scholar Gipsy* and *Thyrsis*, the *Obermann* poems, the *Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse* and *A Southern Night*, all rank with the best poetry of the time. The secret lies in the pathos of Arnold's own intellectual position. In sympathy he is Catholic; but loyalty to "the high white star of truth" keeps him unswerving in the conviction that the Catholic position is untenable. He is a Newman who has gone the other way, but who looks back with longing at the closing gates of the Paradise promised by the Church. The same substratum of thought and emotion underlies all Arnold's verse. It is present in *Empedocles* (1852), though the theme is ancient. *Dover Beach* and *To a Gipsy Child* are elegies of the spirit, though they are written over no grave; and "the eternal note of sadness" sounds through the lyrical groups entitled *Faded Leaves* and *Switzerland*. Thus the range of Arnold is not great; and perhaps it was this fact that led him in later days to confine himself almost wholly to prose. He is the only writer of the period who is nearly as eminent in the one form as in the other.

The most striking characteristic of the age is the pervasiveness of romance, which moulded thought through Carlyle and religion through Newman. Its influence upon art and the close connexion between art and poetry were illustrated with peculiar effect about the middle of the century by the rise of the group of artists who took the name of the Pre-Raphaelites, and who were in several cases also poets.

It is easy to trace a parallel movement in poetry and in architecture well back into the eighteenth century. Horace Walpole wrote *The Castle of Otranto*, and also gothicised Strawberry Hill; at a later date the author of *The Lay of the Last Minstrel* was the builder of Abbotsford. But the stages of development were very different. While the Gothic of Abbotsford is notoriously false, there is no more wholesome and sound romance in literature than that which is embodied in Scott's works. In architecture the writings of Pugin had already done something for the diffusion of sounder principles; but the works of Ruskin show how much remained to be taught. The chapter on the nature of Gothic in *The Stones of Venice* was almost a revelation; and Ruskin's very errors are less a reproach to him than a proof of the need of such teaching. More serious, because irretrievable, mistakes were made by the practical men who, venturing to meddle with churches and cathedrals without fully understanding the art of the medieval builders, contrived

to make the word "restoration" odious. But, whatever were the errors of the reformers, the significance of the reform is unmistakable. The lofty towers and soaring spires, the dim vistas, the varied and seemingly lawless ornament of columns and arches and windows, the grotesque corbels, present the same contrast to the severe simplicity of classical architecture that romantic presents to classical poetry.

As in architecture so also in painting; when the mystic and weird and wonderful had taken full possession of poetry, painting still remained conventional. Turner looked at nature with the eye of a fresh imagination, and just about the time when the period opens, Ruskin in *Modern Painters* (1843-60) was extolling him as the greatest of the painters of landscape. Before Turner died (1851) the battle was won, and romanticism was victorious in painting also. In the same year Ruskin's pamphlet, *Pre-Raphaelitism*, and the first volume of *The Stones of Venice*, were published. The author was then in the midst of his career as dictator on all questions of art, and had already published two volumes of *Modern Painters* and *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849). The show of system with which *Modern Painters* begins is not justified in the end; but the fact is hardly to be regretted, for Ruskin, here as elsewhere, is often best in the digressions. Those digressions revealed already the literary critic as well as the critic of art, and prepared the observant for the development during the next decade of the political economist and the social reformer who in *Unto this Last* and in *Munera Pulveris* and, later still, in *Fors Clavigera* (1871-84), proclaimed war against the conventions of practical life as he had previously proclaimed it against convention in art. In their mingling of wisdom with what looks singularly like its opposite, these works are among the strangest and most puzzling of the century.

Ruskin's defence of the Pre-Raphaelites was upon artistic grounds alone, for he greatly disliked the ideas which seemed to underlie their work. The cause of his dislike is, however, to the student of thought the most interesting feature of Pre-Raphaelite art. Ruskin conceived that Popery and Puseyism were written large upon the work of the young painters, and, detesting these things as he did, he was relieved by their repudiation of them. The repudiation was made in perfectly good faith, yet the kinship was real. Painters, architects, poets, and ecclesiastics, all were carried along by the same spiritual current.

The young painters had followed Ruskin's own maxim, and gone to nature, "rejecting nothing, selecting nothing, and scorning nothing." The soundness of the maxim may be doubted; for the "art to omit" can hardly be without a place in painting when it has so great a place in literature; but at least it was a good weapon in the warfare against convention. Here again extremes meet. Just as in the early romantic movement the return to nature goes hand-in-hand with mysticism, as the poetry of the supernatural and the poetry of common life are wedded

in *Lyrical Ballads*, so now dreams of heaven are united with minute and elaborate studies of twigs and leaves.

Art and literature were never more closely allied than in the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. For a short time in 1850 the Brotherhood had a literary organ, *The Germ*, which expounded their principles in poetry as well as in painting and sculpture; and their intellectual chief, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, though by profession a painter, was greatest as a poet. His earliest volume of poems was not published till 1870, while Morris' first volume appeared in 1858 and Swinburne's in 1860; but it was nevertheless Rossetti who moulded the new school. His *Blessed Damsel* was printed in *The Germ*, other poems appeared in *The Oxford and Cambridge Magazine*, and yet others circulated in manuscript among the faithful. Nearly the whole of the *Poems* of 1870 had been written in the early fifties or still earlier.

Rossetti's poetry is profoundly sensuous; but, when Buchanan attacked it on this ground, he failed to perceive that it is also powerfully intellectual. Rossetti's was one of the most massive, though not one of the most comprehensive, intelligences of the time; and the intellectual force of poems like *Jenny*, *The Burden of Nineveh*, and *The King's Tragedy*, and of sonnets like *Lost Days*, is alone sufficient to ensure his fame. The sensuousness which accompanied this intellectuality is one of the lines of connexion between Rossetti and an ecclesiastical party about whose theories he knew nothing and cared nothing. As they loaded the air of their churches with incense and made them gaudy with colour, so, but with a far subtler skill, does Rossetti load his poems. The languid air seems heavy with odours in *The Bride's Prelude*; and *The Blessed Damsel*, the most characteristic poem of Pre-Raphaelitism, is marked by a singular materialism.

William Morris was led astray by his connexion with the Pre-Raphaelites. His genius was far more objective than Rossetti's. He had much of the story-telling power of Chaucer and Scott, and his best work is to be found, not in volumes like *The Defence of Guenevere*, where the Rossetti influence is strong, but in *The Earthly Paradise* (1868-70), and still more in the splendid northern epic of *Sigurd the Volsung* (1876). For Morris did more perhaps than any one else to strengthen the Scandinavian element in our literature, which Gray had introduced, and which Carlyle had helped to foster.

A far more typical Pre-Raphaelite is Swinburne. He may even dispute the throne with Rossetti himself, for with characteristic vehemence he out-Heroded Herod. All that marks the school is present in him, more intense in tone, more vivid in colouring. The world had scarcely finished praising *Atalanta in Calydon* (1865) when it was startled, puzzled and dismayed by *Poems and Ballads* (1866). These early volumes may be taken as types of most of Swinburne's subsequent work. The first, a drama on the Greek model, is Greek with a difference; for it

is also intensely romantic. It has little of the Greek restraint, and it has a wealth of colour which no Greek ever permitted himself. The rich poetic and especially metrical qualities it displays are illustrated over and over again in his later works. He is among the greatest masters of English rhythm and metre; and, if he could have observed measure in thought as severely as he could in his verse, he would have had scarcely a superior among English writers. It was excess in *Poems and Ballads* which alarmed contemporaries—the excess of an undisguised and exultant sensuousness, derived partly from Rossetti and partly from the French romantic writers. But it carried its own cure, and already in *Songs before Sunrise* (1871) the poet showed a more restrained and saner sensuousness, accompanied by profounder thought.

Rich as the period has been in verse, it has been still more rich in prose. The brilliant success of Scott in prose fiction hastened a development which was inevitable in any case, and two men of considerable note had begun to write before his death. Edward Bulwer, afterwards Lord Lytton, attempted nearly every form of fiction current during his life, and in all just missed greatness. The fatal flaw in his works, as in those of Disraeli, is artificiality; but the latter have that extraneous interest attaching to the writings of a man who has made history. If they reveal nothing else, they at least reveal himself. The central group of his novels, *Coningsby*, *Sybil*, and *Tancred*, written after his *début* as a politician and before he was completely absorbed in office, are especially worthy of attention. They show that the “Jew adventurer” was already entertaining schemes of social reform which, if they had been Gladstone’s, and if they had been presented with Saxon sobriety in the place of oriental gorgeousness of imagination, might have been accepted as proofs of earnest character and high patriotism.

Far greater as novelists were the two rival chiefs of the early Victorian period, Charles Dickens and William Makepeace Thackeray. From *Pickwick* (1836–7) onwards the career of Dickens was a succession of triumphs, while it was not till eleven years later that *Vanity Fair* gained for Thackeray a reputation comparable to that of Dickens. In popularity he never approached the latter, for Dickens appealed to the people in an age when popular influences had begun to count for much in literature as well as in politics; Thackeray, belonging, as he did, to the upper middle class by birth and training, revealed his aristocratic leanings, both in tone of mind and in theme. No great man of letters ever had a smaller equipment of learning than Dickens. His university was the streets of London, and the best proof of his genius is the masterly way in which he handled the materials he found there. All his best scenes are located in or near London, or deal with London characters; and therefore, for his own peculiar work, his early training was as good as any that could have been devised for him. His humour is racy of the streets. After Falstaff there is no more humorous character than Sam

Weller; but Dickens could not have found him anywhere but in London, nor would all the learning of the Egyptians have served him as well as his own experiences there. His faults, which must just be forgiven him, come from the same source. That pathos, so much lauded by contemporaries, which rings false now, is the pathos of the streets. The perennial Londoner is sentimental, a lover of melodrama, sometimes maudlin or mawkish in his sympathy. And this fault is precisely the defect of the pathos of Dickens: he dwells upon it too long, he insists too much.

It is just here that the more refined and educated Thackeray has the advantage; for, though Thackeray was among the admirers of the pathos of Dickens, it is impossible to conceive him falling into the same errors of taste. His very merits, however, helped to limit his popularity, for it needs some training to appreciate the satire of *Vanity Fair*, and still more to feel the exquisite skill of *Esmond* (1852) (perhaps the most perfect, which does not necessarily mean the greatest, of historical novels). The chapter on Waterloo in the one is among the classical passages of English literature; and there is nothing in fiction more beautifully written than that entitled "The 29th December," in the other. A considerable number of the most highly educated have been champions of Dickens; but on the whole each of the two masters has commanded the suffrage of the class to which he specially appealed.

Dickens as well as Disraeli was keenly interested in social problems; but, while the latter was hardly taken seriously, the immense popularity of Dickens gave importance to his attacks on the abuses of the law-courts and of schools whose object was not the education of the children but the enrichment of the proprietors. This was a phase of fiction which attained its full development about the middle of the century, when the problems begotten by the Industrial Revolution were pressing for a solution. Carlyle thundered out his denunciations in *Latter-Day Pamphlets*, as he had done before in *Chartism* and in *Past and Present* (1843); and Kingsley, Charles Reade, Charlotte Brontë, and Elizabeth Gaskell, all in one way or another drove home the same doctrine.

The most effective of Charles Kingsley's works, *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*, were directly inspired by this sense of social wrong. But Kingsley's very earnestness made these books chaotic, and he touched a higher point of art in the historical romances *Westward Ho!* and *Hereward the Wake*. Neither in the one sphere nor in the other, however, was he the equal of Charles Reade, whose problem-novels are so solidly based on documents that they merit close attention, and whose one great historical novel, *The Cloister and the Hearth* (1861), is of such sterling quality that there needed but a few more of the same sort to make Reade the peer of the greatest. Blackmore's *Lorna Doone* stands out similarly among its author's works, and is surpassed in its class (during this period) only by Reade's great work and by Thackeray's *Esmond*.

The two female writers who have been named illustrate in an interesting way the gradual emancipation of woman. There were now not merely literary women here and there; but a class of literary women who interested themselves in a widening range of subjects. Charlotte Brontë showed in *Shirley* (1849) a masculine power of dealing with the problems of labour, and her picture in *Jane Eyre* (1847) of the schools, to which girls were condemned, was almost as effective as the satire of Dickens on schools for boys. Old prejudice, however, still showed itself in the opinion entertained by some that the author of *Jane Eyre* had "unsexed" herself, and that Mrs Gaskell had shown deplorable indelicacy in *Ruth*. In some respects Charlotte Brontë is clearly inferior to Jane Austen, and in others to "George Eliot"; but in intensity she surpasses both. She is, however, far less mistress of herself than they, and it may be questioned whether, had her life been longer, she could have produced other works equal to *Jane Eyre* and *Villette* (1853). Her friend and biographer, Elizabeth Cleghorn Gaskell, though her genius was not storm-tossed like Charlotte Brontë's, wrote many books of enduring power and charm, and in *Cranford* (1851-3) produced an English classic as delightful as *The Vicar of Wakefield*.

Among the many other women of letters, Charlotte Yonge was believed in the fifties to have composed one of the great books of the world. Such a judgment on *The Heir of Redclyffe* was, however, due, not to any intrinsic merit in the book, but to the adaptation of its High Church sentiment to the time and to the circle, chiefly of Oxford men, who entertained this opinion. Margaret Oliphant, though her productions were largely hack-work, was a greater writer than Miss Yonge. But George Eliot is the only person worthy to be named with Charlotte Brontë and Mrs Gaskell; and, though critics differ as to her precise position among novelists, none can doubt that it is a high one. When she wrote *Scenes of Clerical Life* (1857), she was already in the full maturity of her powers and her accomplishments. Her learning and philosophy, never obtruded in her earlier works, were the firm canvas on which those wonderful pictures of the life of the English midlands were painted. Her excursion into the region of the historical romance in *Romola* (1863) is to be regretted. Though her psychology was never finer than in the masterly study of Tito Melema, the book as a whole is decidedly below her own standard. And the change was permanent. She reverted to English subjects, but it was "never glad, confident morning again." The canvas shines through, the philosopher is avowed. In *Middlemarch* (1871-2) the philosopher is so great that the change is hardly to be lamented; but probably most readers prefer the ease and grace of *The Mill on the Floss* (1860) and *Silas Marner* (1861).

Few think of Anthony Trollope as strictly contemporary with these writers. Yet he was only three years junior to Dickens, he was four years senior to George Eliot, and he had begun to write fiction about

a decade before her. The most recent of his books is now more than twenty years old, and it cannot be denied that his fame suffers from the enormous mass of his work. He never gave his thought time to mature, and consequently, though his work is good, it is rarely good enough. Wholesome is perhaps the word which best describes it.

If it is not easy to realise the chronological position of Trollope, it is still more difficult to bear in mind that the veteran George Meredith began his career as early as George Eliot. Yet *The Shaving of Shagpat* was published in 1856, the year prior to the appearance of *Scenes of Clerical Life*. That singular satire revealed to a few appreciative readers the advent of a powerful and original genius. *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel* (1859) made him known more widely, and *Rhoda Fleming* (1865), perhaps the least unusual of all his works, reached a wider circle still. But the very originality of his genius has prevented him from becoming really popular. In this respect he resembles Browning, and it is difficult to acquit either writer of a certain wanton defiance of common opinion and taste. Each hugs eccentricity to his heart; and Meredith has certainly cultivated the epigrammatic style to excess. The ability which can sustain that style through a whole book, and which can repeat the exploit indefinitely yet with constant variety, is amazing; but, if prose plain and unadorned sometimes palls, so does prose which sparkles and glitters from start to finish without relief.

Though, with Fielding and Scott in view, it would be dangerous to say that fiction in this period reached its highest point, there can be no doubt that more good and even great novelists were then writing than in any previous age. Their activity was part of the popular movement, though, as a whole, the novelists took no sides in politics. The point is that prose fiction is the easiest form of imaginative literature. Making less demand than poetry upon intelligence and education, it suits the man who has little time to read, and who probably brings to what he reads a mind exhausted by the work of the day. Thus it answers the needs of a world much occupied in the struggle for existence, a world in which the power to read and a certain taste for reading are far more widely diffused than they have ever been before, while the higher education has not spread in anything like a proportionate degree. There is a literary as well as an economic law of supply and demand, and in unconscious obedience to it the copious floods of fiction continue to be poured out.

What is emphatically true of fiction is true also of all forms of prose. Ever since the seventeenth century, prose has been gaining in relative importance upon poetry. In particular, there has been a surprising growth in miscellaneous prose writings, such as those of Carlyle, Macaulay, Leigh Hunt and De Quincey. This is another mark of the popularisation of literature. It was by no means solely to gratify a class which desired and was contented with a superficial knowledge of many



things that journals and periodicals were established in the early years of the nineteenth century, but it was certainly the existence of this class that enabled them to flourish. The catering for their taste became the surest means of subsistence for writers who were dependent upon the pen and who were not writers of fiction. Monumental works of philosophy or of history can only be produced after long years of reading and thought; even if he had been ripe for it at the start, Macaulay could not have made a living immediately by such a work as the *History of England*, and the savings of frugal and anxious years were needed to give Carlyle leisure to write *Frederick the Great*. The reviews and magazines, the rise of which is one of the most striking facts in the recent history of literature, afforded the labourer subsistence. *The Edinburgh*, *The Quarterly* and *The London Reviews*, *Blackwood's Magazine*, *The London Magazine*, *The Examiner* and many other periodicals supported a number of writers who could hardly have lived but for them. It is to the credit of the periodicals that among those writers are included a number whose fame is still unobscured.

The ultimate influence upon individual writers of this connexion with the magazines depended partly upon character, and partly upon the nature of their literary gifts. The stronger and greater writers used the periodicals as a staff, not as a crutch. But some remained simply journalists of genius. Where there is any weakness in the character, the temptation to rest content with the ephemerality of journalism is deadly. De Quincey, with great accomplishments and a marvellous gift of style, only now and then soars beyond such ephemerality: the innate tendency to diffuseness, fostered by the conditions under which he wrote, fatally weakens most of his work. The same is true of John Wilson, better known as Christopher North; while his friend and coadjutor, Lockhart, though saved from oblivion by a noble biography of a noble character, left all the work of his later years buried in the obscurity of old *Quarterlies*. It was partly adverse circumstances that made Leigh Hunt also essentially a journalist through life. He deserves, however, honourable mention for his manly championship, while he edited *The Examiner*, of neglected poets like Shelley, whom he was one of the first to appreciate. His volumes on *Fancy and Imagination* and on *Wit and Humour* show a fine and sympathetic taste. But perhaps he is most memorable for his *Autobiography*, rich in interesting details about the life of the time, and in that charm which never fails to accompany sincere self-revelation, and surpassed in this period only by the autobiographies of Haydon and of John Stuart Mill.

Among the men who made their entry into literature by the avenue of the reviews, none attained fame more easily than Macaulay. His early recognition was due in about equal measure to his merits and to his defects. His bright and lucid style attracted readers, and his ideas

won ready acceptance, because they were essentially the ideas of the time. The style goes far to guarantee the permanence of Macaulay's place in literature; but the nature of the thought makes it tolerably certain that his place will not be among the greatest; for, though the world goes on reading what is well written, the ideas it ultimately approves are rarely those which were most popular when they were first promulgated. The truth lies between the extreme which ranks Macaulay among the greatest writers and that depreciation of the *History of England* (1848-60) which was once becoming the fashion. Those who like Freeman really knew what historical work was never joined in the depreciation. Its defects are obvious. Macaulay was full of Whig prejudice, and his essay on Bacon proves clearly enough that he had no depth of philosophy. He makes some mistakes as to fact, and one or two of them are surprising; but, considering the enormous number of facts given, it is far more surprising that the mistakes are so few. Macaulay's weakness was, in truth, more in the drawing of inferences than in the statement of facts.

Macaulay stood between two periods. The historians of the eighteenth century, with the exception of Gibbon, had been inspired by ambitions and had followed methods essentially literary, while the men of the rising generation were scientific in the sense that they conceived their primary obligation to be to investigate the truth and to state it when they had discovered what it was. Macaulay acknowledged the obligation, but he would not have set a high value upon a history which was not also a piece of literature. The change was marked by an immensely increased respect for origins as well as by an incomparably more exhaustive investigation of authorities. After a sharp struggle the study of Modern History gained a position in the two great English Universities such as it had never held before; but the period was near its close before the modern view of history attained complete ascendancy. It was not till Stubbs had been appointed professor at Oxford (1866) and Seeley had succeeded Kingsley at Cambridge (1869) that the old era could be said to have passed away completely. Meanwhile the materials for research had grown with embarrassing rapidity; for the state documents of many countries, which had been gathering dust ever since they were written, were made accessible. In the light they afforded many old theories had to be abandoned, and new ones were invented to take their place.

In this work the lead was taken by Oxford. Among those of her sons, however, who have written history, the most brilliant, James Anthony Froude, is hardly recognised as a man of the Oxford school. The Oxford school prided itself above all upon accuracy, of which Froude seems to have been constitutionally incapable. No fault could be more grave: it immensely diminishes Froude's value as a historian. But from the point of view of the historian as a man of letters, Froude is masterly. His limpid English in some ways surpasses Macaulay's. He

is admirable in narrative, and for pictorial power he has rarely been surpassed. But perhaps it is his life of Carlyle that will be longest read. Though the Carlyle there depicted is largely mythical, the book is incomparably vivid. Great part of the credit, however, must be ascribed to Carlyle, for no one ever furnished more ample or more excellent material for a biographer.

If Macaulay and Froude, dealing with subjects centuries old, failed to free their narrative from bias, far less could the two great military historians, Napier and Kinglake, treating as they did of things which they had seen, be expected to do so. Napier had suffered from Spanish incompetence; Kinglake, with the *Coup d'état* fresh in his mind, was virulent against Napoleon. But if they show the defects of contemporary history, they also illustrate its advantages. Because their knowledge was direct and personal, they have succeeded in making the Peninsular campaigns and the war in the Crimea more real and more fascinating than any other struggles ever waged by Englishmen. Their methods are widely different. Napier, richer in technical knowledge, is also far more nervous and strong in his English. There is nothing in Kinglake comparable to the terse yet eloquent description of Albuera. Napier's rare illustrative anecdotes seem to be drawn from a vast store, from which, had he chosen, he might have doubled the length of his history. Kinglake, on the contrary, is exhaustive, and appears to aim at telling everything that can be told. The vice of his style is diffuseness; but, on the other hand, it is picturesque and readable. He is emphatically the historian of battle; and, thanks to him, no battles ever fought by Englishmen, not even Waterloo, are known in all their details as are the Alma and Balaklava and Inkerman.

In thirty years a young man becomes old; and, occasionally, in thirty years a literature which has the air of youth about it comes to wear the signs of age. Such was the case, in a remarkable degree, in the period under review. In 1840 the destinies of English literature were in the hands of young men; in 1870 the survivors of those men were still the leaders. But they were old and weary. After the completion of his *Frederick* Carlyle did nothing great; Browning never rose to his old level after *The Ring and the Book*; only Tennyson seemed to be as vigorous as ever. As it was with the men, so was it with the ideas they represented. They remained dominant; but they showed signs of wear. Romanticism, notwithstanding phases of realism in fiction and of classicism in poetry, was still the key, but it was not quite the same romanticism. "Germanism," in philosophy, had scarcely yet attained its full influence, but in imaginative literature it was already on the wane, and the events of 1870-1 were prejudicial rather than helpful to its development. The empire made of blood and iron was a material empire. Technical education, practical skill, commercial success, were won at the cost of some of the old fine spirituality. The dreamers turned less eagerly to a nation

which was itself awaking from its dream. France, on the other hand, had already won back a large part of her prestige in literature. Matthew Arnold was never tired of insisting that, for the English, French models were far safer than German ones; and, through his influence, our later criticism has been largely based on Sainte-Beuve. Contrast the disparagement of Coleridge and De Quincey, and the great change of opinion in the course of half a century becomes manifest. In poetry, again, the Pre-Raphaelites were French rather than German in their sympathies: Hugo, not Goethe, is the god of Swinburne's idolatry. This is still more true of the younger men, sometimes called the "Neo-Romanticists," who were just beginning to write about the year 1870. O'Shaughnessy was more deeply under French influence than Swinburne or any of the older Pre-Raphaelites. Rossetti was quite alive to its dangers, and in 1873 spoke of Flaubert's *Salammbô* as a phenomenal book which "could only have emanated from a nation on the brink of a great catastrophe." *Fleurs du mal* are indeed poisonous food; and the poetry of the Neo-Romanticists is not very wholesome. The writers were young men, but there are more of the signs of age and decay about their work than there are in the contemporary verse of Browning and Tennyson.

There was, however, one most fruitful and altogether wholesome conception which has for the first time to be reckoned with about the close of this period. Darwin is primarily a figure in science rather than in literature; but the idea of evolution may prove to be the most important contribution of the nineteenth century to literature as well as to science. The idea existed, it is true, before Darwin, in Hegel and in Comte as well as in Lamarck, and can be traced far away behind any of them; but it was Darwin who made it effective. The year 1859 is, therefore, a memorable date, though it was long before the idea came home to men and its full scope was understood. Gradually, it has been applied to politics, to religion, to criticism, to history, to philosophy, and the probability is that it will influence the treatment of such subjects in the future even more than in the recent past. There are, moreover, traces of it already in poetry, and it would be rash to set limits to the possibilities of a conception of nature at once so comprehensive and so revolutionary.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## CAVOUR AND THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

(1849-61.)

VICTOR EMMANUEL II, known to his contemporaries as *Il Re Galantuomo*, and to posterity as *Padre della Patria*, began his reign, after the abdication of King Charles Albert, on the awful night of Friday, March 23, 1849, which followed the defeat of Novara. On March 24 he went to a conference with Marshal Radetzky at the village of Vignale, not far from Novara, and there, while doing his utmost to reduce the demands of the conqueror, he accepted defeat with resignation, and left the conference with head as high as when he entered it. The terms of the armistice of March 25, 1849, were undoubtedly onerous. They were as follows: withdrawal from the district bounded by the Po, Sesia, and Ticino; occupation of the fortress of Alessandria by a mixed garrison of Austrians and Piedmontese till the conclusion of peace; immediate evacuation of the Duchies; recall of the Sardinian fleet from the Adriatic; disbandment of the Lombard volunteers; and repayment of the expenses of the war.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Turin remained quiet and apparently indifferent; but the Chambers were violently agitated. On the night of March 26 Victor Emmanuel returned, and, accepting the resignation of the Rattazzi Ministry, replaced it by one under General Gabriele de Launay. On the 29th the new King swore fidelity to the Constitution, in the presence of the two Chambers. He was everywhere received with a cold hostility, which drew from him tears of indignation. The Chamber of Deputies, having formally declared the armistice to be unconstitutional, was (March 29) prorogued, and next day dissolved, without any indication as to the date of the new elections; and hence arose an increase of the suspicion that the liberties of the country were in danger.

The ill-success of the war had an indirect result, in the shape of an organised revolt at Genoa, which was principally due to Mazzini; this was energetically put down by General Alfonso La Marmora, who took the city by assault. It is not clear that there was any connexion between the revolt at Genoa, and the disobedience of the turbulent ex-Mazzinian, General Girolamo Ramorino, which had been

one of the causes of the defeat of Novara; but it is certain that the Genoese insurgents were counting on his aid, and that Charles Albert had felt much hesitation in entrusting him with the command of the division which included the Volunteer Lombard legion. On April 11, La Marmora entered Genoa; and on May 29 Ramorino was shot by sentence of court martial, for disobedience in face of the enemy. The Lombard legion were sent to Rome on their own petition; where, instead of assisting in a crazy revolt, they covered themselves with glory, fighting the French.

The date of the new elections was fixed for July 15, the reopening of the Chambers for the 30th. The demand of a war indemnity of no less than 230 millions (£9,840,000) caused Piedmont to appeal to the mediation of France and England, and thus interrupted the negotiations; meanwhile, it was thought better to accept the occupation of Alessandria, which was carried out on April 24. Since May 7 Massimo d'Azeglio had succeeded de Launay as President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Austria had no love for the name of d'Azeglio; nevertheless, on the intercession of France and England, she voluntarily proposed a resumption of the conferences. She evacuated Alessandria on June 18; and on the 20th the plenipotentiaries again met. The war indemnity was reduced to 75 millions (£3,000,000); and peace was signed on August 6, 1849. The new Piedmontese Chamber, which met on July 30, 1849, refused to approve the treaty of peace, or to recognise its terms; on November 16 it passed a resolution to suspend the operation of the treaty. On the 20th it was dissolved, and new elections were ordered for December 9. Victor Emmanuel now addressed himself directly to the electorate, in the famous proclamation of Moncalieri, dated November 20, 1849. The country listened to his appeal; and the new Chambers approved the treaty by an enormous majority on January 9, 1850.

The first question, that arose in the Chambers, was the glaring contradiction between the first principle of constitutional government—the equality of all citizens before the law—and the privileges of the ecclesiastical Courts in Piedmont, with all their appendages of medieval barbarism. To induce the Roman Curia to give its voluntary assent to the abolition of a state of things which was not tolerated in any other civilised country, even in those under absolute rule, Massimo d'Azeglio, in September, 1849, sent Giuseppe Siccardi as envoy to Pius IX, only to find that at the papal Court political hatred prevailed over every other consideration. D'Azeglio replied by nominating Siccardi to the office of Keeper of the Seals in February, 1850, on the advice of Cavour; Siccardi thereupon, again at the instigation of Cavour, brought in a Bill for the abolition of the ecclesiastical Courts, and of all their special jurisdictions. This Bill extinguished the right of asylum attaching to churches and holy places; it forbade the acquisition or acceptance by institutions or

corporations, whether lay or spiritual, of any property under deed or will without the consent of the Government; finally, it foreshadowed further legislation for the regulation of marriage as a civil contract. The Bill was enthusiastically received by the majority, and its principles were embodied in three statutes, known as the Siccardi Laws, and famous for this sole reason, that, whereas in all other countries these arrangements had been carried out by Concordats, to which the Roman Curia was a party, Piedmont was compelled by the force of political circumstances to enact them independently of Rome.

There is no doubt that Cavour was the original author, as he was later the principal supporter, of these proposals, or that his ends were twofold. He wished, first, to carry out a reform which appealed to his deepest convictions as a Liberal, and secondly to test how far the Right section of the Chamber were willing to go with him. For this purpose he had selected a ground on which the Right Centre, under his leadership, could count on the certain support of the Left Centre; thus already pointing the way to a future coalition by means of which Liberal reforms might be carried out even against the opposition of the Right. His speech on this occasion—a masterpiece of political wisdom and of closely-reasoned argument—was his true maiden speech; for he had never before taken part in parliamentary discussions with such complete and decisive success. His speech moreover contained an entire programme of administration, to realise which he must of necessity break sooner or later with his friends of the Right, and put himself at the head of all the intelligent Liberals in the Chamber. The Siccardi Laws were carried in both Chambers. The acceptance of these laws by the Senate, in which Conservatism was naturally expected to prevail, roused even in quiet Turin a popular enthusiasm which unluckily degenerated into riotous attacks on the Clerical party, requiring to be put down by force. Thus it came about that Massimo d'Azeglio was to be seen charging the crowd in his uniform as a colonel of cavalry—"Fieramosca," as a comic paper put it, "pigeon-shooting on the Piazza Castel"; a joke which at any rate marked the stoutness of the Minister's impartiality towards both the Blacks and the Reds.

He won, however, little credit thereby from either Pope or Piedmontese Bishops. The Pope protested most solemnly against the Siccardi Laws, as an attack on religion, and recalled the Nuncio. The Bishops started a very real and open rebellion against the Government; this was headed by Monsignor Luigi Franzoni, Archbishop of Turin, who was zealously followed by the Bishops of Sassari and Cagliari. But not an inch would the Government yield. On the refusal of Franzoni to appear before the Court, he was forcibly brought into the fortress, and sentenced by the Court to a month's imprisonment and a fine. The Bishop of Sassari was also condemned to a month's confinement to his own palace, and the Bishop of Cagliari to banishment from

the kingdom; the Bishop of Asti had already fled the country, partly no doubt on account of other charges, but partly also through fear of the application of the Siccardi Laws.

War being now openly declared, the quarrel was further embittered by the case of Pietro di Santarosa, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. At the beginning of August, 1850, Santarosa, feeling that his end was drawing near, asked for the last consolations of religion. By the orders of Monsignor Franzoni, who had resumed the exercise of his archiepiscopal functions on the completion of his punishment, these were only to be granted him on condition of his acknowledging the sinfulness of the part he had taken as a Minister in passing the Siccardi Laws, and of withdrawing his adhesion to them. The invalid refused with dignity, and on August 5 met his death, amid the grief of a family devoted to their Church, without having received the Sacraments, and under the threat that a religious funeral and burial might also be denied him. On this last outrage Franzoni dared not insist; but the funeral of Santarosa excited popular passion to such a pitch that the Government, who were by this time thoroughly incensed with the Clericals, suspended the religious body to which the parish priest belonged who had denied the Sacraments to Santarosa, and sequestered its property. The Archbishop was again arrested, and this time condemned to exile.

On October 11, 1850, Count Camillo di Cavour was appointed to Santarosa's vacant post. For this the opinion of the nation had already selected him, though he had never been acceptable to the more conservative of the nobility or to the Court. When the Ministers submitted his name, the King is said to have observed: "So be it; but, mark you, it will not be long before this man will send your Worships flying head over heels." And indeed, Cavour had scarcely entered the Ministry, before he began to display that energy, which the more slow-moving d'Azeglio was a little later to dub "diabolic." Day by day Parliament saw him perform the functions of all the Ministers, and take part in every discussion, and thus gradually came to accept him as the mouthpiece, or rather as the actual representative, of the Government. Moreover in November, 1851, on the retirement of Nigra, Cavour became Minister of Finance as well as of Agriculture and Commerce; being thus placed at the head of two reciprocally complementary Departments, he was practically enabled to direct all the material interests of the country, and became in fact the head of the Cabinet. Thus the shrewd prediction of Victor Emmanuel began to find its fulfilment.

After the disturbances caused by the Siccardi Laws, Cavour's economic reforms and his new taxation widened yet further the split in the main body of the Right, which had so far supported the Ministry. The d'Azeglio Ministry was thus sailing in troubled waters; and the admission of de Foresta in the place of Siccardi as Keeper of the Seals, and of Luigi Carlo Farini, one of the most illustrious of the exiles of the



Romagna, as Minister of Education, had not proved helpful. All that was now possible, as Cavour clearly saw, was to secure new and surer support by turning towards the Left Centre, which might easily work in harmony with the more progressive portions of the Right Centre. Probably d'Azeglio himself was of the same opinion; but he could scarcely bring himself to sanction such a change of front.

Then fell the thunderbolt of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's *Coup d'état* in France, on December 2, 1851. This undoubtedly alarmed the Liberals, and at the same time emboldened the reactionary governments and factions throughout Europe in general, and the Clericals and Conservatives of Piedmont in particular, to call for a halt, nay, even for measures of repression. Cavour and d'Azeglio, with clearer and deeper political insight, recognised that Italy had nothing to fear from a Bonaparte at the head of France, who had dabbled from his youth upwards in the conspiracies and disturbances of Italy, who was the heir of the Napoleonic feuds, and consequently the hereditary foe of the treaties of 1815 and of the European system thereby constituted. It became, therefore, all the more important to gain the favour of this new Republic, which was already standing on the slippery incline which led towards the Empire; and, as a certain part of the Press were exuding their venom over "the man of December 2," a beginning was made by expelling some of the lower class of French refugees from Piedmont. The next step was a Bill introduced by de Foresta, providing for the transference of indictments for offences against heads of States from the cognisance of juries to the ordinary Courts. It was thus hoped to anticipate any awkward requisition on the part of Napoleon; the retrogrades and Clericals indeed demanded much more than this, and talked undisguisedly of "leaping the ditch"—an expression which became famous. But at this point disagreement began; d'Azeglio, while admitting the justice of their past action, thought that they had gone as far as the occasion required; Cavour maintained that, as their proposed measure, though really unimportant and dictated by ephemeral considerations, was to a certain extent restrictive of liberty, the Ministry was bound to give the Liberals some guarantee of its honesty. It ought therefore to separate from the retrogrades and Clericals of the Right, and form a new parliamentary combination by the union of the Moderate Right and the Left Centre.

On February 2, 1852, Rattazzi attacked this measure; but he promised his support to the Ministry in the next session, should no further measures of restriction be introduced. The Right, on the other hand, by demanding measures of much greater severity, gave Cavour his opportunity. Whilst courteously acknowledging Rattazzi's promise, he rejected the proposal of the Right with great energy, thus clearly indicating that he had broken with them (February 5, 1852). The new coalition was cemented by the nomination of Rattazzi (again under Cavour's influence) to the Vice-Presidency, and finally on May 11 to the

Presidency, of the Chamber. Hereupon d'Azeglio revolted, carrying another of the Ministers with him; and Cavour, seeing that he was suspected of double-dealing, resigned; the Ministry was then reconstructed under d'Azeglio, Cavour and Farini being omitted. But the new Ministry had to take the same line as the old, thus showing once more that there was no question of intrigue, but only of meeting the actual political situation; for their first step was to introduce a Bill on Civil Marriage, which passed the Chamber, but was shipwrecked by a single vote in the Senate. Its mere introduction, however, at once rekindled the wrath of the Pope, and once more threw the unfortunate d'Azeglio into the pathless maze of ecclesiastical discussions. The King, it may be added, was beginning to hesitate, under the pressure of family and Court influence; and d'Azeglio was weary, and also suffering from the wound so gloriously received at Vicenza. On October 11, 1852, he tendered his resignation, and advised the King to recall Cavour. The latter had been travelling in France and England since his resignation; in Paris he had presented Rattazzi to the Prince President, in order to remove the suspicion which that statesman had incurred in some quarters in France. On receiving the King's commands, Cavour at first declined the task, and suggested Cesare Balbo as better fitted for it. Balbo thereupon attempted to form a Ministry, but failed. The King, loyal to his duty, then reverted to Cavour, who forthwith constructed a Ministry (November 4, 1852); his triumphal entry as Prime Minister was greeted, and justly, as the great and definitive victory of the Liberal coalition, henceforth known as the *connubio*.

Nevertheless, to all appearance, the honeymoon was but short-lived. Cavour was beaten in the Senate on the Civil Marriage Bill; but, as he had promised the King not to make it a Cabinet question, he remained in office and withdrew the Bill. In carrying out the reorganisation of the finances, he was very soon obliged to resume the practice of alternating between large loans and heavy taxation, measures which certainly did not increase his popularity; but he neglected no opportunity of invigorating the country, of winning for it outside sympathy and respect, and of ensuring it against the ever present danger of the implacable hostility of Austria. To these years belong the various commercial treaties, and the revision of the Customs Tariffs, a first approach towards Free Trade, which had the immediate effect of cheapening the necessities of life and the raw materials of industry; the domestic legislation on Companies, Cooperative Societies, Agrarian Credit, on Banks of deposit and of discount; the completion of the Railway System, and its connexion with neighbouring districts, the institution of permanent lines of Atlantic Mail steamers, even the project for the Mont Cenis Tunnel; and, lastly, the reorganisation of the army and the fortification of Alessandria and Casale. The whole constitutes a monument of administrative achievement, the like of which has not since been seen in Italy.

But such a programme involved the treatment of Piedmont as if it were already Italy, an assumption which created enormous difficulties with other Powers, especially with the other Italian States and with Austria, to whom it was a standing menace; and, while the principle had the support of the loftier intellects in Piedmont as elsewhere, and of the more earnest Liberals and the refugees, it was opposed by the vast mass of the uneducated, who had to bear the brunt of the temporary sacrifices required, while incapable of seeing, or at any rate of appreciating, their purpose. At one time irritated by the retrogrades—the priests, at another by the demagogues, or by public calamities, such as bad harvests or the vine-disease, the uneducated masses and ultra-demagogues made Cavour responsible for everything, and even attacked his palace, and attempted his life, on February 18, 1853. He, however, kept true to his course; and, in October, 1853, Rattazzi was made Keeper of the Seals, thus formally consummating the alliance with the Left Centre. As the Senate, in which the retrograde and ultra-conservative elements prevailed, was inclined to hinder or even reject his Bills, Cavour did not hesitate to call upon the electors to decide between them; he dissolved the Chambers, and summoned the new House for December 19, 1853. The result was a triumphant majority for the policy of Cavour; the small amount of popularity that he had lost by his financial provisions, being returned to him, with interest, on account of his foreign policy; and this not in Piedmont only, but throughout Italy.

One of the charges made by Austria against Piedmont was that of complicity in the ever recurring Mazzinian conspiracies. The brutality of the political trials held in Lombardo-Venetia during 1852 had not satisfied the vengeance of Austria; and on the failure of the attempt organised by Mazzini in Milan in February, 1853 (to which, as of the trials previously mentioned, reference will be made later), an Imperial Edict, dated February, 1853, sequestered the whole property, real and personal, of all, without distinction, who had left Lombardo-Venetia for political reasons. Cavour protested, but in terms of the strictest legal correctness, confining himself to the cases of refugees naturalised as "Sardinians"; Buol made an ill-tempered reply, to which Cavour retorted by recalling his ambassador from Vienna. Thus Piedmont openly assumed the defence of Italians crushed under the unwarrantable outrages of Austria; and this new attitude brought over some of Mazzini's most conspicuous adherents to her side. Piedmont's protest, supported by the good offices of France and England (which Buol had rejected with the same rudeness), was the first step towards the isolation of Austria, which from this time forth became Cavour's chief object.

In consequence of the financial condition of the country, Rattazzi now introduced a Bill for the abolition of sundry ecclesiastical corporations and the confiscation of their property. This rekindled the religious controversy; though the fire was momentarily smothered by another

matter of far wider scope, the alliance of Sardinia with France, England, and Turkey against the Russian Empire, and her participation in the Crimean War. The alliance between France and England was signed on April 24, 1854, and after long negotiations, rendered additionally difficult by the hostility of Austria towards Piedmont, was joined by Cavour, on January 25, 1855. Piedmont and all Italy appreciated and enthusiastically backed his bold initiative and farsighted intuition. On April 21, 1855, 15,000 Piedmontese, commanded by General Alfonso La Marmora, sailed from Genoa to the Crimea.

But, in Turin, the quarrel about friars and nuns began afresh. Cavour's enemies were not slow to make profitable use of the sovereign's grief for the death of his mother, wife, and brother (January—February, 1855), and the Ministry found themselves face to face with an insidious scheme of compromise, elaborated in clerical workshops and favoured by the King, which left them no alternative but resignation. But the effect on the King's emotions had been less serious than the retrogrades and Clericals had hoped. Cavour retained his post, and the King signed the slightly amended Bill (as Cavour writes) "with a graciousness which has enabled me to forget several uncomfortable moments." The Minister's path was at last brightened, after long and anxious delays, by the news of La Marmora's victory on the Chernaya, August 16, 1855. The military importance of this deed of arms has perhaps been exaggerated; but the ill-nature, which derides the Italian enthusiasm occasioned by that victory, fails to take into account the moral value of the ray of glory thrown on her tricolour after so many disasters. And it ignores the share, small as it was, which Italy might fairly claim in the triumph of her two powerful Allies, at the very moment when Austria had alienated Russia by her ingratitude, and offended France and England by her equivocal neutrality.

The improvement in the position of Italy was at once seen on the visit of Victor Emmanuel to Paris and London in November, 1855, with Cavour and d'Azeglio in his suite, and in the spontaneous cordiality of the reception accorded to the warrior King alike by Governments and peoples. On their return through Paris, the Emperor Napoleon III publicly proclaimed his heart-felt interest in the Italian cause by suddenly putting to Cavour the celebrated query, "What can be done for Italy?" Cavour's reply to this question is to be found in his Memorandum of February, 1856, a diplomatic document which contained an eloquent description of the extreme sufferings of Italy, and a judicious suggestion of the more obvious remedies, while it avoided forcing any premature conclusions on the Emperor.

The general political situation of Europe had begun to change; the Crimean War, like every other undertaking of Napoleon III, was cut short at the moment of success; and the preliminaries of the peace which the desperate straits of Russia had forced Alexander II to accept

were the work of Austria, who thus secured a very dangerous preponderance in the Congress then about to assemble in Paris. Under these unfavourable conditions Cavour saw the moment approaching when he was to make good before a sceptical world the value for Italy's own safety, in a very broad interpretation of that term, of the patriotic crusade which she had gone out of her way to wage in the Crimea. For it was still doubtful whether the King of Sardinia would be admitted to the Congress on equal terms with other Powers, and still more doubtful whether, if the last difficulty were surmounted despite Austrian opposition, any mention of Italian affairs would be allowed. Thus Cavour started for the Congress—more, as he said, to “sniff the air” than for any better reason. He was at length able to bring up the Italian question (on April 8, 1856), and with outstretched finger he pointed at Austria as the author of all Italy's woes. He defended Italy with gallantry; “*a viso aperto*” said the Tuscans, applying to him Dante's phrase as the highest of compliments; but his own confession was that the results of his advocacy had been disheartening. Nor did the visit he paid to London, on the advice of Napoleon III, raise his spirits. Yet he had induced even the representatives of Prussia and Russia to condemn Austria, and perhaps had a vague consciousness that he had in fact won a moral victory of great value in the eyes of the world, and that he had given a gloriously new sensation to Italy, hitherto known in the diplomatic Olympus only by the wails of her exiles, the platitudes of her sentimental amateur politicians, and the incendiary proclamations of Mazzini. The universal feeling in Italy that Cavour had won his battle at the Congress of Paris, was needed in order to bring home to him his own success.

Austria had been the object of so many accusations at the Congress of Paris, that she determined, against the opinion of the experienced Radetzky, to make a final attempt at conciliation. She therefore relaxed the severities in Lombardo-Venetia, and removed the much-impugned sequestrations of the property of emigrants (December, 1856). The Emperor Francis Joseph visited the provinces in person in January, 1857, accompanied by his handsome wife; and he sent them Maximilian, the best-natured of his brothers, as Governor. Milan replied by erecting, at her own expense, a monument in Turin to the Piedmontese army; Venice declared through its illustrious exile, Daniele Manin, then a resident in Paris, “We do not want Austria to mend her ways in Italy; we want her to go”; and Cavour, who, in his alarm at the cajoleries of Maximilian towards Lombardo-Venetia, had bidden his friends “force Austria, if you can, to restore the state of siege in Milan,” took the opportunity, supplied by the violent invectives of Count Buol, to break off all relations with her, even severing the last diplomatic threads which remained after 1853.

The attitude of Piedmont was becoming daily better defined after the Congress of Paris, in spite of the coldness of England, and the

advice, not to say the reproofs, of France. But however imprudently audacious Cavour's attitude may have appeared in some quarters, it was clearly impossible to effect any speedy solution of the questions at issue. Piedmont was incapable of provoking a crisis single-handed; and, besides the cost of her sacrifices old and new, had to face the expenses of the Crimean expedition and of the necessary renewal of her armaments. The Mazzinians and the Clericals took advantage of the distrust of Cavour; the former to repeat the rebellion of 1849 at Genoa in June, 1857; the latter to capture, by skilful manœuvres, a large number of seats in the Chamber at the general elections of November 15, 1857. The attempt at Genoa was undoubtedly the most criminal of Mazzini's enterprises; and his admirers have tried in vain to excuse him, on the absurd suggestion that he only wished to obtain arms for the support of Carlo Pisacane's revolutionary movement in Naples. The fact is that Mazzini, feeling that his revolutionary quasi-dictatorship was slipping from his hand, was now making a desperate attempt to recover it, by striking at the one hindrance in his path. The attempt in Genoa was put down; and the excess in the number of Clerical deputies was modified by the discreditable expedient of disqualifying many of them on scrutiny. But no sooner was one difficulty overcome than another arose, of far more serious character.

The sensation produced throughout Europe by the abominable crime of January 14, 1858, when the Italian, Felice Orsini, attempted the life of the Emperor Napoleon, was enormous. Orsini was executed on March 13, 1858. Soon afterwards the Emperor made public a letter from Orsini, dated March 11, 1858, in which he accepted the permission given to his counsel to submit a previous letter to the Court during his trial, as an indication not only of the Emperor's generosity, but of his good-will towards Italy. He thanked him for the consolation thus afforded to him in his last moments, and, while offering his head as an expiation for his crime, which he declared to have been the result of temporary aberration, expressed his horror of all political murders.

The attack of Orsini, the conspiracies in Lombardo-Venetia, the attempts of Mazzini, the rising at Genoa, and the expedition of Pisacane were the last of the efforts, as varied as they had been unfortunate, of the Secret Societies to work on their traditional methods, before their final absorption into a wider policy. From this time public opinion tends towards the idea of the political unity of Italy—the one invaluable outcome of Mazzini's persistent preachings—but through, and by means of, Piedmont and the Savoy dynasty. This was the political testament of Daniele Manin, as delivered by Giorgio Pallavicino, Giuseppe La Farina, and Giuseppe Garibaldi. It was also the accepted programme of the "National Society" which these three men had started in August, 1857, and which became a powerful instrument for preaching and developing the perfect harmony that prevailed during the next three years.

In Piedmont the attack of Orsini all but upset the friendly relations with France, at the very moment that Cavour was straining hard to improve them yet further, and when the advent of a Tory Ministry in England was threatening Piedmont with further isolation. This difficult situation, however, was overcome; and there can be no doubt that thenceforth Orsini's attempt and the *rapprochement* between England and Austria rather hastened than retarded the resolution of Napoleon. In June, 1858, he invited Cavour to a secret conference at Plombières. Three points were settled under the shade of the great trees of Plombières: war with Austria, the marriage of Prince Napoleon with the eldest daughter of Victor Emmanuel, and the cession of Savoy to France. The detailed steps were rather vaguely discussed; and the final events did not entirely correspond with the prognostications.

Before proceeding to describe the attack on Austria, designed and executed by France and Piedmont in cooperation, it is necessary to notice the condition of those other Italian States, which exercised so profound an influence on the course of the war. The disasters of the Revolution of 1849 had been followed by reaction in every State of Italy. "Reaction and the hegemony of Austria, whose mastery is felt even where her arms are absent"—these words summarise the condition of Italy everywhere, except in Piedmont, from 1849 to 1859. In Milan and all Lombardo-Venetia the vigorous rule of Radetzky prevailed, unrestrained even by the scruples which sometimes affected the Viennese politicians. Reform was in this case mere court-plaster to a gaping wound, and Radetzky knew it. Of the summary military executions, the imprisonments, the floggings, on mere suspicion, for imaginary crimes or for petty offences, no count is possible. The result was seen in the immediate revival of conspiracies, into which the more impetuous threw themselves with the determination of despair. Here, too, Mazzini made himself felt; he was now enjoying in London a short period of revived influence, which he was, however, soon gradually to fritter away by his adherence to the figment of universal revolution. In addition his dictatorial attitude, almost that of a Pretender in exile, was odious to many, and led him to multiply those demands for purposeless self-sacrifice which were as unsuccessful in their result as they proved detrimental to his reputation.

Thus the first conspiracies in Lombardo-Venetia after 1849 (since the claim of Monarchical Piedmont to the leadership had not yet been declared) were Republican, if not entirely Mazzinian. The most important of these was that started at Mantua, on the evening of November 2, 1850, by Enrico Tazzoli, a priest of blameless life, of distinguished intellect, and of heroic temperament, a sublime type of the inspired martyr of patriotism. During 1851 the conspiracy grew, its existence remaining unknown to the Austrian police. It had central committees in Milan and Venice, and branches everywhere. Part of its business was to raise money by

the sale of the National Loan Stock, started by Mazzini; but its principal object was to shake off the iron rule of Radetzky and the Austrians. The first suspicions of the Government, the first prosecutions, and the first condemnations appeared to deal with isolated cases. But the arrest of Enrico Tazzoli on January 27, 1852, and of many others, gave rise to the notorious “Mantuan Trials,” the scandal and abomination of the entire world for the brutality of the tortures inflicted on the accused. It was a pitiful fact that, although one among the many dreams of these poor conspirators had been to seize the Emperor’s person on his visit to Venice in 1852, of real revolutionary action there had been absolutely none. The legal proceedings lasted, one following upon another, from 1852 to 1855. Beginning the count with Enrico Tazzoli, who was hanged with four others on December 7, 1852, and closing it with Pier Fortunato Calvi, hanged on July 2, 1855, there were twelve of these “martyrs of Belfiore” (so called from the name of the terrace outside one of the gates of Mantua where executions were carried out), the heroes of a tragedy of patriotism and self-sacrifice which is the sublimest episode in the present story, and to which is due the impassable gulf then created between Austria and Italy.

The same can scarcely be said of the next attempt, one of purely Mazzinian origin, viz. that of February 6, 1853; though intended to be another Sicilian Vespers, it only afforded some excuse for the rigours of Radetzky, and finally made impassable the breach between Mazzini and the best of his supporters. But it was at any rate an additional testimony to the implacable hatred, against which the tardy repentance of Austria and the blandishments of the chivalrous Maximilian in 1857 were alike powerless. Throughout these ten years Milan and all Lombardo-Venetia maintained their inflexible resistance, their determination as to union with Piedmont, and their willingness to follow the direction given by Cavour to the Italian Revolution.

Slightly different was the state of affairs in Florence and Tuscany. Leopold II had been restored by a vote of the people; but he had returned a confirmed Austrian. The amnesty which had at first been proclaimed turned out to be a mere blind, and resulted in an increase of severities. The Constitution was certainly mentioned, but it was not put into force, being treated as in abeyance. The Moderates who had advocated the restoration became restive; but, with the Austrians installed, there was little to be done. On September 21, 1850, the Grand Duke, alleging (with some show of reason) that the Constitution had been wrecked, not by himself, but by the democrats, Montanelli, Guerrazzi and their friends, adjourned the meeting of the Chambers indefinitely. Finally on May 6, 1852, he simply abolished the Constitution.

Such was the temper of one side and the other when the famous trial of Guerrazzi began. This was a review of the whole past, and in



fact an indictment of all concerned : of the Grand Duke, for his fickleness and breach of faith ; of the gloomy and violent Guerrazzi, for seeking only to gratify his own ambitions and dislikes ; of the Democrats, for hounding their country into anarchy ; of the Moderates, for giving the first impulse to reaction, a remedy worse than the disease.

On the close of the Austrian occupation (April, 1855), the Government, though still the creature of Austria, resumed on the whole its old attitude of kindness and respect for law ; prosperity returned ; life in Florence and fertile Tuscany became once more easy and cheap. All might have settled down again comfortably, but for that national idealism which had been awakened in 1848, and which was now working in the minds of all. The principles of the "National Society" had spread everywhere ; and the only opposition lay in some petty provincial vanity, and in the insignificant and self-interested protests of the adherents of the Grand Duke. The Moderates were working against the Government on a system of pin-pricks ; the lower classes mainly by the methods of Mazzini, especially in turbulent Leghorn. The Government on its side had no strong feelings of dislike, except for Constitution-loving Piedmont and for Cavour. And it was towards Cavour, too, that the foremost of the Moderates were now looking, though still somewhat doubtfully, the most resolute among them being he whose iron will was to knit all the Liberal parties into one, and decide the fate of Tuscany—Baron Bettino Ricasoli.

In Rome, after the restoration of the Papacy, it was evident that the Pope and Cardinal Antonelli, while thoroughly sympathising with the Grand Duke's dislike of Piedmont and of Cavour, were also specially incensed against Napoleon III. The personal views of that monarch the Pope and Antonelli never forgave. As for his expedition to Rome in 1849, its only result for France and for himself was that he was compelled to mount guard over the Vatican throughout nearly the whole of the Second Empire, without securing a single one of the reforms which he had laid down as absolutely indispensable. The Pope, suspicious of French intentions, delayed his return as long as possible. He had heralded his arrival by a *motu proprio*, dated Portici, September 12, 1849, which promised some trifling reforms (never carried out), and by an amnesty, from which some 7256 persons were excepted. Meanwhile there was a deluge of indictments, condemnations, and political persecutions of all sorts ; and the reaction in the whole country was still more strongly accentuated after the return of the Pope on April 12, 1850. Political excesses were succeeded by disciplinary and dogmatic extravagances ; the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in England and in Holland (1851-2), and, lastly, the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception on December 8, 1854, to be soon followed by the Syllabus (1864), and later by the proclamation of the dogma of Papal Infallibility (1870).

But the situation in Rome was as nothing to that of the kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand II had started his own reaction on May 15, 1848; indeed, in the conferences of Gaeta and Portici, where he was the host, and the exiled Pope and Grand Duke his guests, he put on all the airs of Agamemnon, King of Kings. His sole thought was now for himself, his one desire vengeance, first on the Liberal party, and next on all of his subjects whose political wishes or aspirations extended beyond the kingdom of Naples.

Silvio Spaventa, perhaps the only Neapolitan who ever supported Charles Albert, had been a member of the Constitutional Parliament of Naples in 1848, and had then formed a new secret "Society for the Monarchical Unity of Italy," which had little success and ended at last as Republican and Mazzinian. The Administration knew and cared little or nothing about it. The police nevertheless, by dint of intrigues, perjuries, and other devices, got up a prosecution against forty-two of its members, which lasted from June 1, 1850, to January, 1851. So monstrous was the procedure that William Ewart Gladstone, who attended the trial, and visited the convicts after their sentence in the prisons of Nisida, thought it incumbent upon him to write to Lord Aberdeen the well-known letters in which he quoted and made popular the description of the Neapolitan Government as the "negation of God"—letters which were endorsed by Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, and subsequently circulated through every Court in Europe.

This was followed by two other political trials, resulting from the occurrences of May and September, 1848, which had given the excuse for suspending the Constitution. The two were intimately connected; but the second is the better known, as it resulted in the conviction of Silvio Spaventa. Though he was the founder of the *Unità Italiana*, his name had not been mentioned in the course of the proceedings against that Society, in which Carlo Poerio had been tried and convicted, in spite of proof that he had refused to be a member, and had, in fact, publicly repudiated its principles.

The second of the above-named trials, which lasted over ten months, was one long triumph for the accused, and one long disgrace to the Government. Not the least extraordinary part of the business is that, while the Bourbon King had so strenuously objected to the criticism of any constitutional body, in these trials he created a debating-ground in which his prisoners were the judges, and himself the accused, and where the audience was the whole civilised world. The occurrences in Naples had their counterpart in the provinces, at Lecce, at Potenza, and in Calabria. The victims were counted by hundreds; and, though the King did not venture to carry out the capital sentences against political offenders, of whom the majority, by their spotless lives, their high birth, and their culture belonged to the very flower of the nation, yet by herding them into gaols, which were sheer hells on earth, by racking

them with every form of torture, and by classing them with thieves and murderers, he wreaked on them a more deadly revenge.

Though the Revolution in Sicily in 1848 had been put down by Carlo Filangieri with ruthless severity, he would no doubt have been personally inclined to conciliatory and lenient methods, but for the blind and jealous hostility of the King and his Ministers on the one hand, and the incessant conspiracies and disturbances in Sicily on the other. The only result of this brutal system was the isolation of Ferdinand II, and his increasing discredit both at home and abroad; and hence even his attempts to put the economic condition of the kingdom on a better footing by legislation were of no effect.

After the revelations at the Congress of Paris as to the condition of Naples, France and England made continued efforts to induce the King at least to show a little clemency towards political prisoners. The fatuous pride with which he rejected their advice may have deserved the praise of his courtiers, but it exhausted the patience of the two great Powers, who recalled their own ambassadors, and dismissed those of Naples on October 24, 1856. He was deaf as ever to the suggestions of Piedmont, which Cavour so skilfully framed that, come what might, all the blame should lie on Naples. The terrible solitude, which the King had thus created around him, occasioned the renewal of Sicilian conspiracies and troubles, in which Mazzini also took part; the most notable of these was the attempt made in November, 1856, by Baron Francesco Bentivegna, who was executed for it on December 19. On the 18th of the same month, during a review in Naples, a private soldier named Agesilao Milano, an enthusiastic Mazzinian, suddenly stepped out of the ranks, and made a murderous attack on the King. In the same year, the celebrated refugee, Antonio Panizzi, tried to assist the escape of Luigi Settembrini and his unfortunate companions from the prison of Santo Stefano; and in June, 1857, Carlo Pisacane effected a landing on the shores of Naples, with the view of starting a revolution. This and other similar acts of violence, in which the hand of the revolutionary party was to be discerned, seriously affected the health of the King and completely upset his already tottering mental equilibrium.

None of these attempts had succeeded, but the constant repetition of them showed the uselessness of repression, and at the same time sapped the King's power of resistance. Worn, infirm, and perhaps at last alive to the truth, he determined to ship off his troublesome political prisoners to America. The first batch, 66 in number, including Settembrini, were put on board in December, 1858; but, instead of going to America, they managed to land in England; and the opportunity was taken to make fresh demonstrations against the Bourbon King. The last ray of sunlight that fell on his gloomy Court was the arrival of the Bavarian Maria, a Princess of great beauty and charm, who was married to the Crown Prince Francesco in January, 1859. King Ferdinand died a few months

later, on May 22, 1859. With him the kingdom of Naples may be said to end. All that came to his unlucky successor was a kingdom in a state of dissolution, an edifice so crumbling from the foundations upwards, that—as the event proved—it could not but fall to pieces at the first vigorous blow.

During the reaction of 1849-50, Parma and Modena, while nominally independent, were in fact mere provinces of Austria. The "National Society" had spread itself far and wide through the two duchies; and the period of reaction was, as far as they were concerned, a mere interlude preceding their union with Piedmont.

Such were the more characteristic features of the general condition of Italy from 1849 down to the moment when the secret of Plombières was revealed, and the words of Napoleon III and of Victor Emmanuel sounded through the country like a war-cry. Though no doubt prepared for any risk, Cavour was well aware of the dangers of French assistance; and he was determined first that the rupture, when it came, should be brought about by Italy single-handed, and secondly that Piedmont, even though unsupported, should take the initiative in throwing down the gauntlet to Austria. But the language addressed by the Emperor to Hübner, the Austrian ambassador, on New Year's Day, 1859—"I regret that our relations are not as satisfactory as formerly"—disconcerted the whole of his plan: so much so, that, while they kindled a perfect blaze of rejoicing in Italy, Cavour described them to his ambassador in London as an "ill-mannered outbreak." This reckless revelation of the Plombières plan was tantamount to a direct provocation to war, whereas it was of the first importance to secure the isolation of Austria by forcing her to become the provoking party. The Emperor had imagined that his New Year's greeting to Hübner, as well as the Note in the *Moniteur* by which he attempted to allay the resulting clamour, would be taken in good part by Austria and others. But the contrary was the case; and the anxiety was increased a thousandfold by the speech with which Victor Emmanuel opened his Parliament on January 10, 1859—a speech to which Napoleon had added some touches, which really aggravated, while pretending to moderate, its tone. "With all our respect for treaties," said the King, "we are not insensible to the cry of pain which rises towards us from so many parts of Italy"—words which resounded like a trumpet-call to war against Austria, and to revolution against all the petty tyrants of Italy. For of all these Austria was the mainstay; and a threat addressed to her was equally addressed to them.

Close upon these events followed Prince Napoleon's visit to Turin, the Treaty of January 19, 1859, the Military Convention between the two Allied Powers, and the marriage of the Princess Clotilde. Events were thus moving rapidly; and Cavour was the soul of the movement. He left it to Napoleon to discuss the Italian question at his leisure in the

apocalyptic pages of de La Guéronnière, whose newly published pamphlet, *The Emperor and Italy*, had been notoriously inspired by Napoleon III. In that work the author depicted the actual situation in Italy in vivid colours; rejecting all idea of unification, he advocated a federation of the Italian States (including an enlarged Piedmont), under the presidency of the Pope, who, in return for this honour, was to modernise and humanise his administration. As for the future of Austria, the conclusions of the imperial pamphleteer were somewhat more vague. He appealed to public opinion, and expressed a hope that, in view of the clear recognition of the rights of Italy by all statesmen of repute, Austria would yield to persuasion. But what if she refused to yield? Then, it would perhaps be necessary to revert to force.

But this last point was the only one about which Cavour cared. So long as Austria had a direct hold on Lombardo-Venetia, and an indirect one on all the rest of Italy, it was idle to discuss the future Constitution of the country; although his views on that point were by no means those of the Emperor. He therefore obtained the assent of the Chambers to a war loan, while at the same time he urged the "National Society" to yet intenser activity, so as to draw closer the fiery circle within which Austria was to be eventually enclosed. Moreover, he had now embarked on that great political campaign which has been justly accounted his masterwork, and which he may be said to have fought unaided, that is, if we except the assistance received from English statesmen. The objects before him were threefold: to quash every attempt to stop the war; to isolate Austria; and to force her to declare war on her own account, and thus ensure her isolation during the contest. As for Napoleon, Cavour's great anxiety was to prevent him from wandering off into any of his usual dreams, or from allowing his generous but unstable mind to be swayed by the arts of his advisers, who were nearly all hostile to Italy.

Suddenly, however, Napoleon, being much troubled by the evident aversion of the French from a war in favour of Italy, proposed to override their objection by enlarging the ambit of his plans, so as to include a war on the Rhine. While England first suggested disarmament, and next adopted as her own the customary specific of a Congress, which had originally been proposed by Russia, Cavour on his side had already summoned his contingents of recruits to the colours. Volunteers were flocking into Piedmont from all Italy, showing how universal was the determination to accept her leadership in this great crisis. Some of these were drafted into the regular army, others were formed into a new corps, called the Chasseurs of the Alps, the command of which was given by Cavour with a happy audacity to Giuseppe Garibaldi, the ex-General of the Roman Republic, the man who had escaped from Rome, sword still in hand, and miraculously evaded the pursuit of four armies and ten generals—the man who therefore now represented, in its purest

ideal, the revolt of Italy against the Papacy and the Empire, against Austria and the petty Italian tyrants who had made common cause with her.

If Cavour was now to make head against the warnings and threats of united Europe, his only course was to maintain an unshakable grip of the principles asserted so gloriously by Piedmont and its King during the last ten years, and fearlessly to confront every menace. In March and April, 1859, the enemies of Italy made their final effort; they brought to bear upon Cavour the representations of those interested in the preservation of peace, who one and all charged him with being ready to plunge Europe into war in order to satisfy the personal ambition of his King, and to further the cause of Revolution. The crisis was terrible, but Cavour maintained his position against the diplomatic deluge which threatened to overwhelm him. It was fortunate that he had foreseen the obstacles in his path, and had taken care, before having recourse to arms, to secure the equally important preliminary support of public opinion. Morally, the cause of Italy was won, before a shot was fired in 1859. But, before reaching the issue of war, not only Cavour, but the whole of Italy, had to pass through much cruel uncertainty. At one moment a Congress and a general disarmament seemed inevitable, and this would have meant death to all the hopes of Italy; for disarmament, in view of the acute differences among European nations, could only suit those who looked for a Congress to restore everywhere the *status quo*, or, in other words, to give a fresh sanction to the treaties of 1815.

Cavour's game was much facilitated by the blind obstinacy of Austria; but none the less admirable were the ease and versatility with which he steered through the rocks, up to the moment when war, which had been declared on April 19, 1859, was actually commenced by the Austrian invasion of Piedmont on the 29th. On April 27, Tuscany had called upon the House of Lorraine to choose finally between Austria and Italy. The Grand Duke solved the problem by electing to leave the country, and Tuscany then rose, quietly, but as one man; this was the first of those extraordinary revolutions which succeeded one another in central Italy during 1859. On May 1, Victor Emmanuel put himself at the head of his army; on the 12th Napoleon followed his example. On the 20th the Austrians were beaten at Montebello; on the 30th at Palestro, both victories being specially Piedmontese: on June 4, the French, after crossing the Ticino at Turbigo, won the battle of Magenta, and thus freed Milan; on the 8th they conquered at Melegnano, after a tremendous and sanguinary struggle. The Allies then advanced towards the Mincio; but, before they crossed it, the Austrians once more confronted them in full force at Solferino and San Martino, on June 24. The battle was on an enormous scale, and the victory was won with difficulty, mainly by the valour of the French and Piedmontese soldiers.

The previous defeat at Magenta had obliged the Austrians to abandon

the Duchies and Bologna, and the territories on the right bank of the Po. These districts immediately rose, and, in obedience to the instructions of the National Society and to the general sentiment, offered the dictatorship to Victor Emmanuel. Cavour accepted the offer, and sent royal Commissaries to carry on the administration during the war. As in 1831, the movement which began at Bologna on June 12, spread like lightning to Ferrara, the Romagna, the Marches, and Umbria. But in the Marches and in Umbria the papal mercenaries reunited in force sufficient to reduce these defenceless countries again to the papal authority, shedding much blood at Perugia.

The further the war advanced with its rapid succession of victories, the more evident was the yearning for unity felt, if not always openly acted on, by the whole Italian world. This result, as we have seen, was exactly what the Emperor had neither foreseen nor intended. It was true that Umbria and the Marches had been restored to papal dominion; but at any moment they might revolt again if assisted from without, and the whole Pontifical State might thus be thrown into confusion, while a French garrison still lay in Rome. The problem was large and complicated, and likely to create further embarrassments for Napoleon. Germany, suspicious of French ambition and egged on by Austrian diplomacy, was beginning to grumble; Prussia was calling on the Confederation to arm in defence of the Rhine. The burden of the war might become excessive; so far victory had been won only at great cost of labour and blood. What if a defeat occurred? This argument was urged from Paris by the Empress, and the many influential opponents of the Italian war; and after the battle of Solferino all these considerations pressed heavily on the mind of the Emperor. At any rate, from June 25 to the beginning of July, although the Allies crossed the Mincio and prepared for an advance, they did not attack the Austrians, who were now concentrated inside the well-known Quadrilateral of fortresses. Cavour was beginning to dread the uncertain mind of the Emperor, which might manifest itself at any moment in some unexpected arrest of action, some "half-peace," as he described it to Kossuth at the time. Nor was he mistaken.

On the evening of July 6, without any preliminary understanding with Victor Emmanuel, Napoleon submitted to the Emperor Francis Joseph proposals for an armistice, and for a conference at Villafranca. On July 8, an armistice was concluded, to remain in force till August 15; on July 11, the two Emperors met at Villafranca and agreed that Lombardy (exclusive of Mantua and Peschiera) should be ceded to France, and that France should transfer the territory thus ceded to the King of Sardinia; that Venice should remain Austrian; that the Italian Princes should be restored on guaranteeing the pardon of their subjects. The preliminaries of peace were shortly afterwards arranged at Verona, and were signed by Victor Emmanuel; with the qualifying clause,

"I agree for so much as concerns me," which secured him a certain amount of liberty in dealing with the question of central Italy.

On the first intimation of a suspension of hostilities, Cavour hurried to the royal quarters. However strong might have been his suspicions, the actual news struck him like a thunderbolt, and almost drove him out of his senses with grief. Hence the violence he displayed in his interview with the King, and the wildness of the advice which he then dared to offer him, but which the King refused to accept. He resigned, and was succeeded by a La Marmora-Rattazzi Ministry. In the beginning of August, 1859, the plenipotentiaries of Sardinia, Austria, and France met at Zurich to negotiate the formal treaty, which was a mere repetition of the Preliminaries of Villafranca. After some lengthy and tortuous discussion, the Treaty of Peace was signed on November 10, 1859. Except in some administrative and financial details the Treaty of Zurich only needs mention at all, because its futile ambiguity is the best illustration of the extraordinary political situation, which arose from the Preliminaries of Villafranca on the one hand, and from the insurrection of central Italy in favour of unity on the other.

Before resigning office, Cavour sent instructions to his friends in central Italy, which contained the germs of the programme that was to ensure future success. After wandering about with no fixed object, he finally turned his steps towards Switzerland, the "sanatorium of wounded politicians," as he described it to the Countess de Circourt. There his temper became calmer, and he gradually recovered his former serenity. On his return to his villa at Leri some months later, he was able to write to Prince Jerome Napoleon: "How often have I, in this solitude of Leri, felt thankful for the Peace of Villafranca!" What was it that had so completely altered his feelings and his attitude? Nothing but the unconquerable and now triumphant resistance of central Italy, which had developed during the negotiations at Zurich. Napoleon resisted so long as he could, raising objections principally to the union of Tuscany and Piedmont, which was the real pivot of the Unionist programme, and which excited the most opposition. But, to make up to the Italians for the interruption of the war at its most favourable conjuncture, he stood stoutly by the principle of forbidding all armed intervention tending to hamper the free expression of the popular vote. The *plébiscite* had been the foundation of his own power in France, and its maintenance was a service which, as Cavour said, was worth more to Italy than the victories of Magenta and Solferino.

In spite of all this, the Preliminaries of Villafranca, the Peace of Zurich, the immediate withdrawal of the Piedmontese Commissaries from central Italy, and the threatening hostility of Austria, so completely and so unexpectedly upset all the hopes formed during the war, that no nation less attempered to misfortune than the Italian could have stood fast. But the inhabitants of central Italy had no difficulty in understanding



that, if the conditions of Villafranca gave their exiled rulers the right to return, it did not secure them the power to do so; and, under the guidance of the great intellect and determination of Luigi Carlo Farini, who had been proclaimed Dictator first in the Duchies and later in Romagna, and of Bettino Ricasoli, who had the same position without the name in Tuscany, they recognised that it lay with themselves to prevent any such restorations. This deliberate movement of central Italy in favour of union, though it encountered great difficulties in the Romagna and Tuscany, met with little or none in the Duchies. The first public indication of it took the shape of a popular vote in Parma; later, in August and September, 1859, the Representative Chambers of Modena, Florence, Bologna and Parma, decreed the downfall of their late rulers, and their union with Piedmont under the Constitutional government of Victor Emmanuel II. These votes were passed unanimously, and practically without discussion—an unusual feature, denoting the resolute temper of the voters. But, on the notification of these votes at Turin, the Rattazzi Ministry were smitten with nervous timidity, and, hesitating whether to accept them or not, turned to Paris for advice. Still greater was their anxiety when the idea was mooted, not of a mere military confederacy consisting of Parma, Modena, Bologna, and Florence, but of their incorporation into a State under the Regency of the Prince of Carignano, preparatory to the final unification of central Italy with Piedmont. This scheme, be it said, was not favoured by Ricasoli, who considered that this meant nothing but the creation of a separate kingdom, with a throne ready prepared for any prince that might choose to occupy it. Such an one might be the son of Leopold II, or the Duchess of Parma, or Prince Napoleon. The visit of the last-named to Florence at the outbreak of the war, at the head of a *corps d'armée*, on the pretext of forming a rallying-point for the small forces of Tuscany, was probably not without a purpose; and though, in the face of the marked coolness of his reception, he had gone away again, who was to say that his return might not suit the views of his imperial cousin? The Piedmontese Ministry dared not give their formal sanction to a regency under Carignano; and the project ended like a dream, while the dictatorships of Farini and Ricasoli in the Emilia and Tuscany continued to have a very real existence.

Such was the general situation at the signature of peace; and it looked as if an European Congress was imminent for the definitive settlement of the Italian question. For Napoleon III, however, the assembly of an European Congress at this moment would have been singularly inopportune. Despairing of finding an issue from the contradictions and confusion created by the calculated ambiguities of an incoherent policy; swayed in one direction by his own Italian inclinations, and in the other by the anti-Italian views of his Ministers; recognising at last the impossibility of hindering the Union between central Italy and Piedmont—he had determined to seek compensation by the annexation of Nice and Savoy

to France; and he could not submit this plan to an European Congress. On December 22, 1859, on the very eve of the meeting, one of the usual semi-official pamphlets appeared, from the pens of de La Guéronnière and Mocquart, entitled *The Pope and the Congress*. Its main theme was that the Pope must resign himself henceforth to the loss of the Marches, and be satisfied with the possession of the city of Rome. As for the Marches and Umbria, it appears to assume that the Pope might keep them, if he was strong enough, and if they were willing—conditions in which the germ of future events may be perceived. But Rome was another matter; Rome was the city marked out by fate from the beginning of history to be for ever the property of the Popes. The arguments in support of this thesis to be found in the pamphlet are so crudely artificial as almost to give it the air of an ironical parody in the style of Voltaire. More important is the assertion that, as counsels and threats had availed nothing with the obstinate people of central Italy, it was not for France to impose her will upon them by force. Still less would she allow Austria to do so, and thus neutralise the benefits won by French arms; nor could France admit the interference of the King of Naples without risking civil war in Italy. As a political tract the pamphlet is worthless, as a diplomatic move it was decisive. The Pope was infuriated, and used abusive language in reply; the Liberals welcomed it with an enthusiasm, which was increased when Napoleon dismissed Walewski, made Thouvenel his Foreign Minister, and addressed a letter to the Pope on December 31, 1859, affirming and adopting the ideas of the pamphlet. England did not perceive till later that this characteristically Napoleonic outburst was only a mask for the cession of Nice and Savoy to France. With results all thus cut and dried, a Congress became useless, and the idea was allowed to drop.

Rattazzi had already disgusted Lombardy by the avalanche of ill-considered and very questionable legislation under which he had overwhelmed her, on the pretext of carrying out unification; and now, when called upon by Napoleon to face the necessity of the cession of Nice and Savoy, which Cavour had already accepted, he gave an emphatic refusal. He resigned his post to Cavour, whom the whole country had already designated for office, hoping evidently that his dreaded rival would lose some of his popularity through the cession. Thus Cavour resumed power on January 20, 1860; and, on the return of the great Minister, Italy breathed again. But it then appeared that in addition to the cession of Nice and Savoy, to which Victor Emmanuel had pledged himself in the secret compact of July 20, 1858, Napoleon was insisting on the formation of a separate State in Tuscany. England therefore proposed to remove every difficulty by calling upon the population of central Italy to confirm, by a formal *plébiscite* under universal suffrage, the wishes they had already expressed. The *plébiscite* was taken in Tuscany and the Emilia on March 11 and 12, 1860, and was practically unanimous; on

March 18 and 22 the King signed the decrees for their union with Piedmont. At this juncture the Emperor desired that the treaty for the cession of Nice and Savoy should be made public. Cavour demurred, but at last he was obliged to give way, and, at the signature of the Treaty of Turin on March 24, 1860, he is reported to have said to Benedetti, the French plenipotentiary, "Now we are fellow criminals!" It may be that even at that humiliating moment he found some consolation in looking beyond Bologna and Florence to another phase of the Italian Revolution which was already beginning to emerge. The Parliament, which met on April 2, was now formed of deputies from Piedmont and Tuscany, from Liguria and Lombardy, from the Romagna and the Emilia; and, not without justification, Victor Emmanuel opened it with the proclamation that the Italy of the Italians was born.

It is true that, so far, those words only expressed a pious hope. But on April 4 a revolution had broken out in Sicily; and Giuseppe Garibaldi was girding on his sword to convert the King's hope into a great reality. On May 5 he started with his "Thousand" to the aid of Sicily, landed at Marsala on the 11th, won the battle of Calatafimi on the 15th, and entered Palermo on the 27th. The revolution was now triumphant; the victory of Milazzo, on July 20, only confirmed its success, and won all Sicily to his cause. On August 22 Garibaldi crossed the Straits of Messina and seized Reggio di Calabria. From that moment the Bourbon army, which ought to have stopped him, was dissipated before him, like mist in the sun; on September 7, with a few companions, he entered Naples, whence the King Francis II had already fled. This brief summary not inaptly symbolises the lightning-like rapidity which marks that marvellous compound of audacity, heroism, craft and good-luck, which makes up the Garibaldian epic, and at the same time illustrates the state of rottenness and disintegration to which the Bourbons had reduced their country.

Cavour's attitude towards the Sicilian Revolution and the expedition of Garibaldi, with all its hesitations and inconsistencies, can only be properly judged in the light of the great duties incumbent upon him as a patriot and a Minister, which were often in diametrical opposition—a fact often forgotten by his many detractors, republican, Bourbonist, legitimist, and radical. The origin of the Sicilian Revolution of 1860 was Mazzinian; and Mazzini was the more willing to take part in it, since he knew how much ground he had lost in northern and central Italy. Garibaldi, by his watchword of "Italy and Victor Emmanuel" had completely dislocated Mazzini's plans; the Mazzinians then rallied round their leader to hinder the union of Sicily and Naples; and the Bourbon King showed a willingness to negotiate. This was of course merely a new trick devised in the Austrian and Roman Foreign Offices to the detriment of Piedmont; and Cavour, while conforming of necessity to ordinary convention, was not its dupe. He tried,

but unsuccessfully, to have a popular vote for annexation carried in Naples before Garibaldi's arrival; thus widening the existing breach between himself and Garibaldi, to which the cession of Nice to France had already given rise. There was a critical moment, of painful anxiety to all, a moment of uncertainty and dimness even for the lucid intellect of Cavour. But his genius soon recovered itself; and his clear perception of the proper solution of the problem is manifested in the despatch of troops to the Marches and Umbria, and in the appearance of the Piedmontese army with the King himself at their head in the kingdom of Naples (October 3, 1860).

The threats uttered by Garibaldi, since his accession to the command of the forces of the "League" in central Italy, the Sibylline prophecies of the pamphlet *The Pope and the Congress*, Napoleon's letter of December 31, 1859, and the return of Cavour to power, had all increased the anger and the warlike impulses of the Court of Rome, and its distrust of Imperial France. Monsignor Saverio de Merode, a political visionary, came forward with a rival policy to that of Cardinal Antonelli, and conceived the idea of making Rome the centre of a great legitimist crusade against France, another war of the Vendée, only larger and more cosmopolitan than the first. Pius IX adopted this grand idea with his usual impetuosity and enthusiasm; and Merode, being now Pro-Minister of War, selected for his Commander-in-chief General Christophe Lamoricière, a personal enemy of Napoleon. From all sides there now flocked into Rome (along with a herd of mere adventurers) the flower of the Belgian, Irish, and French nobility, the blue-blooded descendants of the Crusaders, dreaming of the defence of religion and of the return of the Legitimate King and the White Standard to Paris. Thereupon Cavour, who had been alarmed at the turn which events were taking in Naples under Mazzini's influence, determined, with unerring judgment, to strike there himself with King and army. Napoleon—if he did not actually utter the words attributed to him, "Make haste, and good luck to you!"—can scarcely have been displeased at the promised conclusion of this new war of the Vendée, which had been organised in Rome under the protection of his own troops for the destruction of Italy and of himself; especially as both Merode and Lamoricière were living in hopes of a speedy resumption of war by Austria. Without a moment's delay, Cavour summoned Cardinal Antonelli to disband his papal "adventurers"; and on the 10th, the Italian forces entered the States of the Church on two lines, under General Manfredo Fanti; on the 11th they occupied Orvieto, on the 14th Perugia. On the 18th the army of Lamoricière was annihilated at Castelfidardo; Lamoricière withdrew, almost unaccompanied, to Ancona, which capitulated on the 25th.

The change of policy which had led King Francis II of Naples on June 20, 1860, in sheer despair to renew the promise of a Constitution (although his father had never positively annulled the former) and to

change his Ministry, had only created fresh trouble which degenerated into anarchy. The disheartened King withdrew from Naples with the better part of his forces to a position between Capua and Gaeta. On October 12, 1860, an attack was made upon the Garibaldians on the Volturno, and Garibaldi was placed in a very critical position, from which he only extricated himself with serious loss. This situation, together with the constant bickerings between the Unionists and Non-Unionists on his staff, began to weary and disgust the honest and frank-minded soldier; he had had trouble enough already with the Mazzinians, and now a new sort of cosmopolitan revolution was beginning to grow up around him.

Meanwhile Victor Emmanuel, at the head of his army, had crossed the Neapolitan frontier on October 13. Cavour, confident and audacious as ever, called upon Parliament to decide between himself and Garibaldi; and Parliament, while applauding the enterprise of the hero, asserted its entire confidence in its great Minister. Garibaldi, shaken by this vote, submitted the question of annexation to the decision of popular assemblies. The Neapolitan vote was taken on October 21, the Sicilian on the 22nd; and in both cases the cause of annexation triumphed. Meanwhile the Italian forces advanced, beat the Bourbonists at Isernia, Sessa, Capua, the Garigliano, and finally at Mola; after the last defeat the remains of Francis II's forces, some 10,000 in number, accompanied by the King and the Queen, took refuge in the fortress of Gaeta, which did not fall till February 13, 1861. The 25th of October, 1860, will be for ever memorable as the date of the meeting of Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi at Caianello between Teano and Calvi; there Garibaldi saluted Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy. On November 4 and 5 the Marches and Umbria in their turn gave an unanimous vote in favour of annexation. On November 7, Garibaldi rode by the side of Victor Emmanuel into Naples; on the night of the 8th, after refusing a dukedom, he sailed for his hermitage at Caprera.

The Parliament that met at Turin on February 18, 1861, included deputies from Naples, Sicily, Umbria, and the Marches; on March 17 the kingdom of Italy was proclaimed. In this rapid current of events the only signs of disapprobation given by Napoleon were the recall of his ambassador from Turin, and the permanent location of a French squadron before Gaeta, thus preventing the completion of its investment by the Italian forces by sea. Later, however, on January 19, 1861, he withdrew the ships, yielding to the remonstrances of Piedmont and the evident annoyance of England, who had openly justified the attack on the Neapolitan Bourbons, and who viewed the continued presence of the French squadron as nothing but a disguised form of intervention. In less than a month Gaeta, the last bulwark of the Bourbons, was forced to capitulate.

Great as was the glory of Garibaldi, it was not greater than that earned by Cavour for his combined versatility, good luck, and courage,

which had succeeded in controlling the two dominating motive-forces of Italian reform: that which would work by lawful methods only, and that which is more popular and frankly revolutionary. By his inimitable skill he compelled them to cooperate, in spite of the discrepancy of their methods, towards the wonderful result so speedily effected.

But it was now made manifest as a political necessity that the Temporal Power of the Popes must be entirely extinguished, and Rome made the capital of Italy. Cavour perceived this fact from the day of Garibaldi's entry into Naples; for it was obvious that, if Garibaldi were persuaded by Mazzini to postpone the annexation question, it could only be with the intention of making an immediate move on Rome from Naples, and in the teeth of the French garrison; and this would mean not only the entire reversal of the principles on which the policy of Italy was based, but the committal of the country to the endless horrors of a general European revolution. By his expedition into the Marches and Umbria Cavour succeeded in stopping Garibaldi on that fatal road. At the same time, he saw how urgent it was that the Government should state openly their views on the subject of Rome, lest it should be thought that Garibaldi, Mazzini, and the party of action stood alone in their desire for that city. In the famous speech delivered on October 11, 1860, he associated himself with the general desire to make Rome “the magnificent capital of the new Italian Kingdom.” As to the methods by which he was to attain his end, they were to be such as would leave undisturbed both the alliance between Italy and France, and the moral and religious order of the Catholic Church.

In this way Cavour once more assumed the political lead of the revolutionary movement, and initiated the policy which became a tradition in dealing with the question of Rome. He explained his ideas more fully on March 25 and 27, 1861, insisting as before on the absolute necessity of working in full accord with France; while as to the Catholic Church, he summarised his views in the formula, “A free Church in a free State!” (*libera chiesa in libero stato*). It has been suggested that this formula was, in the mouth of Cavour, a mere device, borrowed from a spurious French Catholic Liberalism. This is not the fact; Montalembert, who claimed priority of authorship in it, forgot that the liberty of which he was thinking had for its object the subjection of the State to the Church, whereas Cavour's engagement was to do away with all the old devices for defending the civil jurisdiction against ecclesiastical encroachments. Thus State and Church were to move, each in its own orbit, to react on each other for mutual improvement, and, where occasion offered, to cooperate in forwarding the well-being of humanity. Cavour never claimed the paternity of this somewhat idealistic and Utopian conception, although he had preached it with sincere conviction from his earliest youth, as appears from every record of his public and private life.

It is this conviction of his that explains the almost passionate haste with which Cavour, in October, 1860, pushed on confidential overtures to the Court of Rome, in the belief that the now inevitable loss of her Temporal Power would make her more disposed to negotiate. These transactions were conducted by Dr Diomede Pantaleoni, a Liberal of old standing, two Cardinals of rather slight authority, Vincenzo Santucci and Girolamo d'Andrea, and one Jesuit, Father Carlo Passaglia. Pantaleoni even got so far as to draw up actual heads of agreement, which might be submitted to the Pope and Cardinal Antonelli, after receiving certain modifications from Cavour's own hand. At the same time Cavour also allowed himself to be approached by certain secret agents of a lower order, in a manner which smacks of the secret conspirator, and is little in harmony with the importance and novelty of the matter in hand. Cavour's impatient and feverish hurry certainly show that in this respect he suffered from serious illusions, and even from a singular ignorance as to the traditional atmosphere of the Roman Curia, the men who compose it, and their mental and moral dispositions. This fact he was to find out for himself, through the final breakdown of all these negotiations, and the banishment from Rome of all who had taken any part in them, small or great, and especially of Pantaleoni and Passaglia.

Thereupon Cavour devoted all his energies to bring about the evacuation of Rome by the French: relegating the religious questions to his own special field of action, that of formal parliamentary discussion. His two speeches on this theme, on March 25 and 27, 1861, had a marked and triumphant success; their echoes were still sounding through all Europe, when another personal quarrel between him and Garibaldi, as to the treatment of the disbanded Garibaldian Volunteer force, developed into an actual conflict. On April 18, 1861, Garibaldi appeared in Parliament, and, in a savage burst of passion, charged Cavour with having attempted to stir up civil war by his expedition to the Marches and Umbria. Confronted with an accusation of such enormity, Cavour lost all self-control; and the House broke out into an indescribable uproar. Garibaldi retired beaten and humiliated from this deplorable scene, for which he alone was responsible; possibly, it was owing to his own consciousness of this fact that there is not one word on this incident in his memoirs. The tempest was stilled for the moment by an apparent reconciliation effected by the command of the King, and chivalrously accepted by Cavour. But Cavour had evidently received a mortal blow. From April 18 onwards his intimate friends noticed an unusual change in him. Under incessant fatigues, and the long-continued and excessive tension of intellect and nerve, even that iron constitution had lost the power of resistance. At the end of May he was attacked by fever. On June 6, 1861, he died, in the arms of his favourite niece, the Marchioness Giuseppina Alfieri.

## CHAPTER XV.

AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND THE GERMANIC  
CONFEDERATION.

## (1) REACTION AND REORGANISATION.

(1852-62.)

THE Revolution of 1848 ran very different courses in Germany and Italy. Austria had to subdue Upper Italy by force of arms and France to take violent possession of Rome, before Italian hopes of unity and freedom were destroyed; but in Germany the issue was determined by internal dissensions and the weakness of King Frederick William IV. Though he would gladly have extended Prussian influence over all Germany outside Austria, his love of power was less than his hatred of the democratic revolution; and he therefore preferred coming to terms with the Emperor of Austria, an end which could only be achieved by the humiliation of Prussia by the Convention of Olmütz (November 29, 1850), which has been already described. Catholic Austria carried off the victory over Protestant North Germany, in spite of the undoubted superiority of the latter in intellect and culture. But, in a struggle for dominion, strength and will are the decisive elements; and in these qualities the Austrian President of the Council Prince Felix Schwarzenberg had proved more than a match for the Prussian Ministers. His indomitable courage, sullied though it was by cruelty after his victory over Hungary, and his absolute disregard for the feelings of others carried him from success to success. Whenever a blow at democracy could be struck in any part of Europe, Austrian support might be counted on. So early as September, 1851, Prince Schwarzenberg vainly urged the Prussian Government to repeal the recently granted Constitution, and Louis Napoleon, after his *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, found plenty of sympathy at Vienna. In this conflict with Liberal principles he found his only declared opponents in England and especially in Lord Palmerston. Schwarzenberg was indignant at the honourable reception accorded there to Louis Kossuth after his long exile in Asia Minor. The triumphs achieved by the patriot's eloquence were a condemnation of the policy of suppression in Hungary.

Prussia rescued one valuable treasure from the shipwreck of her hopes, the German *Zollverein* (Customs Union), which, founded twenty-five years before, had continued steadily to increase. The State owed



this result to its bureaucracy, which here at any rate kept the King in the domain of actuality. In the defence of the Zollverein Rudolf Delbrück, the future assistant of Bismarck, won his spurs. Schwarzenberg had intended to overthrow even that bulwark of Prussian influence, by admitting Austria into the Zollverein, and thus taking from Prussia the direction of German commercial policy. He found an excellent supporter in the Austrian Minister of Commerce, Carl Ludwig Bruck, perhaps the greatest political talent possessed by Austria at that time. Bruck was born at Elberfeld in 1798, but found a second home in Trieste, where he founded the Austrian Lloyd service, which controlled the navigation in the Levant from 1840 to 1860. In the capacity of Minister of Commerce he was literally a pioneer (1848-51). For the prohibition of foreign imports he substituted a moderate protective tariff, and in 1850 Austria and Hungary, which had up to that date been separated by a customs frontier, became a joint customs territory.

But Bruck's aims went beyond this. He and Schwarzenberg not only desired the admission of Austria into the Zollverein, but also the establishment of a common tariff union, including central Europe and, if possible, the Balkan peninsula and Italy. In order to check Austria's advance a clever and effectual antidote was devised at Berlin. After the reform of her tariff Austria was no longer completely cut off from foreign countries, but in the weak condition of her industries, a transition to complete free trade seemed too dangerous. In view of this, Prussia imposed on herself and the Zollverein a tariff with so great an inclination to free trade, as to make the entry of Austria impossible. This tariff was arranged by Prussia and Hanover, by which means the latter State was won for the Zollverein. Austria now put pressure on the south-German States to prevent them renewing the customs treaty with Prussia (which was to expire in 1852), and to bind them to Austria instead. But, during the last decades, these south-German States had been incorporated with northern Germany in an economic union, and found a good market there for their productions. Therefore, they neither could nor would separate themselves from Prussia, and renewed their agreements, in spite of the annoyance caused by her arbitrary proceedings in determining the new tariff. As Hanover, Oldenburg, and Brunswick also joined, the whole of non-Austrian Germany was comprised in the Zollverein, and Austria definitely set aside. This success, compensating in some degree for the political defeats of Prussia, formed the prelude to the era of victory which was to begin in 1866.

Amidst these negotiations, Schwarzenberg died on April 7, 1852, only fifty-two years old, but prematurely aged by dissipation. He resembled the princes and politicians of the Renaissance rather than his kinsmen of the Austrian aristocracy. But, in trying to keep down Germany, Italy, and Hungary, while refusing liberty and self-government to the Austrian peoples, he overestimated the power of Austria.

Directly after his death the tension between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin began to relax, and his successor, Count Buol-Schauenstein, abandoned the hopeless contest with the Zollverein. In 1853 Bruck was sent to Berlin, to arrange a commercial treaty with Prussia, which effected a closer union, but set up a higher tariff rate against the rest of Europe. Bruck saw in this the beginning of a complete economic union between the two countries—an expectation not to be fulfilled.

The internal development, as well as the external policy, of Austria and Prussia proceeded on different lines. At Vienna a ruthless imperialism, prone to heroic means of action, rode roughshod over every obstacle; at Berlin King Frederick William cherished a deep-rooted dislike of the modern State, with its concession to the masses of a participation in government and legislation. Yet his was a loyal nature; and, as he had confirmed a new Prussian Constitution on February 6, 1849, he refused to abrogate it at the suggestion of Schwarzenberg and his own brother-in-law, the Tsar Nicholas. His Ministers, however, were unfavourable to the extension of the rights of the people or of the personal liberty of the individual. Westphalen, Minister of the Interior, and Raumer, Minister of Education, on all occasions manifested religious intolerance, and advocated reactionary principles, though the President of the Council, Otto von Manteuffel, showed greater comprehension of the tendencies of the age. But not being averse from intrigue, he tried to retain office by giving in to the wishes of the Court and the aspirations of the nobles. The persecution of independent politicians and deposition of liberal teachers was the order of the day. Daily prosecutions, in which perjured police agents brought false testimony against the accused, roused the indignation of all right-thinking men. The Berlin president of police, Hinckeldey, was universally unpopular on account of his severity and brutality, and his death in a duel caused general satisfaction.

It was not the weak sovereignty of Frederick William IV, but the nobility and Prussian *Junker* class who reaped the advantage of the political reaction. This class utilised the King's prejudice in favour of feudal institutions to recover and strengthen the privileges which had been lost or weakened in 1848. These privileges consisted legally in a lower scale of land taxation and in the magisterial authority appertaining to a class of estates still in the hands of the nobility; but, as a matter of fact, the Junkers really directed the State by filling all the Court posts, and nearly all the high military and official positions. The King found in them his best allies against an exacting democracy, whose proceedings in 1848 had filled him with a life-long disgust. Oddly enough, the intellectual leader of the Conservative aristocratic party was a converted Jew, Friedrich Julius Stahl, Professor of Constitutional Law at the Berlin University and the most remarkable brain in the Upper Chamber. Stahl was a convinced convert to orthodox Protestantism,

and attacked the conception of the sovereignty of the people, to which he opposed the rule of authority, in learned works as well as in brilliant speeches. He likewise opposed the modern representative Constitution with its free popular elections, preferring to it the rule of the Estates, especially of the nobles and ecclesiastics. He largely supplied the ruling party with the learning and wealth of ideas on which to found their claims. Their organ was the *Kreuzzeitung*, and the party was called by its name. Hermann Wagener, its chief editor, and Ludwig von Gerlach, brother of the King's Adjutant-General, who wrote the monthly survey for the paper, fought in the front rank of the small but powerful party which dominated the King, and which included Otto von Bismarck, until in his capacity of ambassador at Frankfort he speedily outgrew its narrow outlook. This *Kreuzzeitung* party cherished a certain suspicion of the Prime Minister, Manteuffel, and accused him of a leaning to Caesarism, because he on occasion defended the rights of the State against the excessive claims of the Junkers. In this guerilla warfare the Prime Minister had recourse to unworthy weapons; he bribed some servants to procure him a copy of the King's correspondence with Adjutant-General Leopold von Gerlach and Marcus Niebuhr, the King's Secretary, in the hope of thus getting on the track of his enemies' plots. But he paid the police agent, who had procured him the copy at the greatest personal risk, so badly, that the latter sold the secret papers to the French ambassador and others. In this way the intrigue was made public and the Government exposed.

The opposition to this foolish and intolerable rule did not come from the Liberal party only; it was reinforced by a group of high officials and diplomatists. These men, among whom were Bethmann-Hollweg, Count Robert von der Goltz, and Count Albert Pourtales, published their views in the *Preussische Wochenblatt*, which gave its name to the group. An important adhesion to their moderate point of view was that of the heir to the throne, the Prince of Prussia, afterwards Emperor William I. Before the Revolution, he had been in full accord with the Conservative party, and had himself opposed his royal brother's proposal to satisfy public opinion by creating a representative assembly. His clear intellect was able to derive a lesson from the events of 1848, and on his return from exile he was more strongly in favour of the acceptance of the German Imperial Crown by his brother than was Frederick William himself. His opposition to the Government was due to his disapproval of the King's weak attitude towards Austria, and he joined with Radowitz in voting for war, which, with the pride of a soldier and a Hohenzollern, he preferred to humiliation. This ill-humour also prevented him from accepting any office in Berlin; instead, he took up his quarters at Coblenz as commander of the Rhenish army corps. Though a sincere Protestant, he was opposed to the orthodox Church policy of the Government, as well as to the romantic doctrines

of Leopold and Ludwig von Gerlach; and being more clear-sighted and less prejudiced than his versatile and fantastically-minded brother, he opposed the petty reaction of these years.

Meanwhile the *Kreuzzeitung* party was reaping the fruits of its influence over the King, and storing up its harvest. While still under the influence of the Revolution, the Government had, by the law of March 11, 1850, created a Liberal municipal system, which had put an end to the privileged position of the nobility, in so far as it affected the village communities. The Junker party would not put up with this, and they succeeded in getting the law repealed by a ministerial decree. The old order of things, and with it the magisterial power of the landed proprietors, was reestablished. The next step was the transformation of the Upper House. The number of elected members was diminished and the great landowners regained the preponderance. Since the arrangements for the elections to the Lower House had been forced upon it by the Crown, the democratic party had abstained from voting; and, as a result, a House was elected in which there were only Conservatives, and some moderate Liberals under the leadership of Georg von Vincke. But even these were for the most part excluded in the elections of 1855, and after that date the majority of the members consisted of officials. The leading men were Stahl in the Upper House, and Ludwig von Gerlach in the Lower; and Prussia seemed entirely given over to reaction.

Events took a similar course in the smaller and middle-sized German States. The condition of things was, as has been seen, at its worst in Electoral Hesse. It was much the same in Hanover and Mecklenburg, where the nobles could not rest till the Government had repealed the laws passed during the Revolution, and restored their former privileges. In Hanover this was effected by a decision of the Diet, to which the nobles had referred their grievances. In Saxony, where Beust, and in the grand duchy of Hesse, where Dalwigk was at the head of affairs, matters were conducted with a greater pretence of deliberation, but no less decision. Only a few rulers, like Duke Ernest of Coburg and Grand Duke Frederick of Baden, showed any feeling for the wishes of their people. King Maximilian II of Bavaria also was an enlightened ruler, who appointed Protestants equally with Catholics to official and professorial posts, and, after a conflict between the von der Pfordten Ministry and the Chamber, dismissed the Cabinet, saying: "I mean to live in peace with my people." His early death (1864) gave the crown to his young, highly cultured, but eccentric, son Louis II.

A striking contrast was presented by Austria, under a Government characterised by audacity, strength, and a certain greatness. On the other hand it showed a lack of considerateness and of due respect for the law, as well as of prudent regard for the requirements of the age. When the sword had achieved a decisive victory, the Government went

back on all its promises, and an arbitrary absolutism set aside not only the recent Liberal legislation, but all former rights and customs. The years 1849-51 witnessed a number of important reforms, many of them of a social character, which were in great part due to the Minister of the Interior, Count Francis Stadion, whom disease obliged to retire from active life in 1849, after a short but fruitful term of office. (He died in 1853.) The emancipation of the peasants from *corvées* and tithes was satisfactorily accomplished; and the State definitely took over the magisterial and police functions wrested from the landowners. Although there was no cause to fear any further revolts, the state of siege in Hungary, Galicia, and Italy continued, together with executions and confiscations. The only reform left untouched was the emancipation of the peasants from their former burdens, because the dynasty wished to win over the agricultural population, and to deprive the Hungarian and Polish nobility of the possibility of revolting from Austrian rule. However, the great landowners throughout the Empire received a sum of 600,000,000 florins in compensation for the loss of their feudal rights.

The period after 1848 received its stamp from the dominating personality of Schwarzenberg, but took its name from Alexander Bach, who in 1849 succeeded Stadion in the Ministry of the Interior, and retained this post till 1859. He was remarkable for his intellectual gifts as well as his business capacity and unusual administrative powers; and this period is commonly known in Austria as that of Bach's system. Yet, there were weak points in his character, for he was prompted by ambition to renounce the Liberal ideas he had cherished before the Revolution and in 1848, and to become an instrument of oppression. The Emperor's mother, the Archduchess Sophia, shared Schwarzenberg's view, in which the Generals also concurred, that the collapse of the patriarchal system in 1848 was really due to its weakness and clemency, and that the spirit of the Revolution could only be suppressed by iron severity. Similar opinions animated the eighteen year old Emperor, Francis Joseph, and overcame the natural kindness of his disposition. After 1852 the most influential persons at Court were, besides the Archduchess Sophia, the Emperor's former tutor Cardinal Rauscher, and his Adjutant-General, Count von der Grüns, who was almost all-powerful in military affairs. By accommodating himself to the overpowering force of circumstance, Bach was enabled to obtain an authority which he would have been obliged to renounce had he remained faithful to his past.

Hungary was the worst sufferer under the Bach system. After the suppression of the rebellion, the Old Conservative party, which had remained faithful to the monarchy, approached Prince Schwarzenberg, and advised a reconciliation with their country. They recognised that, for good or ill, Hungary must cease to be an independent State, and must henceforth regard itself as a part of Austria; on the other hand, they expected the national language to be maintained for official and legal

purposes, as well as in the schools. They also demanded the restitution of their autonomy; a parliament, though with restricted rights, like that which had existed before 1848; and above all, the continuance of self-government in the counties and towns. But Schwarzenberg and Bach would not permit any part of the old Hungarian Constitution to be revived. Instead, they resolved to govern Hungary as a province of Austria, like Bohemia or Styria, and to replace elected officials by Crown nominees. Bach organised these new offices with remarkable skill and indefatigable zeal, and for this purpose flooded the country with German and Čech officials, since there were not enough natives available for his needs. Croatia, Transylvania, and Southern Hungary (the Banat and Voivodina) became provinces separated from the kingdom; the rest of Hungary was split up into five administrative districts, though all were placed under the jurisdiction of one Governor resident at Buda. The final aim was no doubt to blot out by degrees all remembrance of the former unity of the lands of St Stephen's crown, and to add to the three provinces Croatia, Transylvania and Southern Hungary the five more definitely Magyar provinces. German also became the State and official language in Hungary. Every Hungarian citizen, who knew German, was bound to use this language officially and in the law Courts, and to accept decisions given in German. The Magyar language, like the Slav and other dialects, was only employed by officials in intercourse with the common people, when it was necessary to be understood by them. Bach thus became the medium of a ruthless centralisation, accompanied, at first cautiously, but afterwards more definitely, by a rigorously Germanising tendency.

This policy alienated even the monarchical elements in the Magyar people, as well as the German middle classes, who had been accustomed to municipal self-government in Hungary, and who were now suffering from the state of siege and martial law, besides having to obey Austrian officials. An even greater blunder was the fanaticism which extended these unpopular measures to the Slavs and Roumanians, who had remained faithful to Austria in 1848. Although many of the Croats, Slovaks and Serbs had taken up arms for the Emperor and against the Magyars, they, as well as the Saxons of Transylvania, forfeited their autonomy, and were governed from Vienna quite as autocratically as the other nationalities. The Hungarians said to them in scorn: "What is meted out to us as a punishment is given you as a reward." The Government desired to create a united kingdom by these autocratic measures, to rule in the grand manner, to fuse all into one united Austrian nation. A great scheme, but impossible to achieve, and one which Joseph II had already attempted in vain.

The tariff walls between the two halves of the monarchy having been, as already mentioned, overthrown, the Austrian system of taxation had been introduced *en bloc* into Hungary. Taxes on wine and meat had

been unknown in the rural districts, as also the tobacco monopoly, which interfered with the freedom of cultivation. These innovations were not calculated to make Austrian rule popular. Yet the people gradually grew accustomed to them; and, when in 1867 Hungary again became independent, they were retained along with many reforms, chiefly in the administration of agriculture and education. For the German officials administered the land in a more modern spirit and with greater social justice than did the nobility, who had formerly elected the magistrates and officials every three years in the county assemblies. Before 1848 the nobles only were allowed to vote. The Parliament of 1848 had already abolished the *corvées* of the peasants and other oppressive customs instituted for the benefit of the nobles; and Louis Kossuth, the spokesman of the reform party, had become the idol of the Magyar peasantry. There had been very many political executions and confiscations of land; but it is to the credit of absolutism that, although hard and oppressive in all political matters, it carried out the social legacy of the Revolution in the most thorough manner. The Hungarian nobility were the more embittered by the concession to the peasants in the abolition of the *corvées*, because this deprived them of many economic advantages as well as the privilege of rule. The country, however, was the gainer, especially as the Government instituted a general cadastral system of property registers (*Grundbücher*), previously almost unknown, laid out good roads, and, by removing the customs line, brought about a considerable export trade in corn and meat to Austria, although the tariff did not favour the development of Hungarian industries.

Still, the Hungarian people would not have been reconciled to the break-up of their national life and the loss of their old liberties, even if the Austrian administration had been quite exemplary. In view of the breach with the ancient established conditions, the executions and alienations of land, and the multitude of innovations, this was far from being the case. And, as the non-Magyar nationalities were also discontented, Hungary became an open sore in the body of the Empire. Moreover, the Hungarian people was so well provided with political ability that a comparison of her statesmen with the Austrian officials, who were dubbed "Bach Hussars," always gave the advantage to the former. Those who had remained in the country were principally the men who disapproved of the rebellion kindled by Kossuth as well as of the breach of the Constitution by the Viennese Court. Of these the most prominent were Francis Deák and the foremost political writer of Hungary, Baron Joseph Eötvös, with many others of ability and reputation; and they were joined by Count Julius Andrassy in 1857, when an amnesty permitted his return to his country.

A tragic fate was that of Count Stephen Széchenyi, who, of all the men then living, had done most towards the reawakening of the Hungarian nation. After his attack of madness in 1848, he remained

in the asylum of Döbling near Vienna; but his brain was restored to its restless activity in 1851. In his indignation at the development of events in Hungary and the suppression of its independence, he devoted himself to the refutation of a pamphlet published by the Government, and entitled *A Retrospect of the latest period of Hungary's development*. Széchenyi's answer, called *A survey of the anonymous Retrospect*, appeared anonymously in London in 1858, soon after the visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph and his Queen Elizabeth to Hungary in 1857. It is a passionate indictment of the Bach system, full of bitter irony and sarcasm, with passages that recall the writings of Swift, and it kindled the greatest enthusiasm. Many other Hungarian patriots were however so completely discouraged by the impregnable position of the system, that they signed an address to the Emperor (1858), which said nothing as to the restoration of the Constitution or of an independent Hungarian State, but prayed only for the retention of the national language and institutions. The Ministry would have acted wisely in profiting by this conciliatory mood to make a few concessions and so reconcile Hungary with the idea of the united Empire. They neglected the opportunity, and thus missed the last chance of coming to an agreement on the basis of a united monarchy. Two years later, on April 8, 1860, Count Széchenyi committed suicide in the asylum at Döbling, to escape arrest by the Austrian police.

The Minister of the Interior, Alexander Bach, though allowed a free hand in Hungarian affairs, was in many respects hampered by Court influence. The nobility mistrusted him, because he owed his rise to the Revolution. He therefore tried to obtain support from the Catholic Church, and to this end entered into the closest alliance with the Archduchess Sophia, a strict Catholic, Cardinal Rauscher, and the Minister of Education, Count Leo Thun. The latter won great credit by instituting, on the advice of distinguished authorities, a thorough reform of the Austrian Universities and High Schools, which brought them up to the level of the German institutions. But in all political matters his point of view, both spiritual and political, was that of Rome. Thus Bach and Thun helped to bring about a Concordat with the Roman See (August 18, 1855), which handed over the supervision of the national schools to the bishops and clergy, gave the Church the decision as to the legality of Catholic marriages, and promised the restoration of the estates confiscated by Joseph II. All the more liberal-minded inhabitants of the Empire were repelled by this agreement, and at the predominance of bigotry which it attested; and Austria's position in Germany unmistakably suffered through this blunder.

Another injurious factor was the disordered state of Austrian finance. Matters came to a climax when, during the Crimean War, Austria sent a force of 300,000 men to the eastern frontier, to compel Russia to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia. Since foreign loans did not suffice



for the military preparations, the sale of the railways constructed by the State, and a compulsory loan, in which every man of property was forced to invest, were the expedients used to raise 611,000,000 florins. The national debt increased between 1848 and 1860 from 1,200,000,000 to 3,000,000,000 florins. After the subscription of the so-called national loan, Bruck, as the most capable man for the post, was appointed Minister of Finance (1855–60). But all his endeavours were frustrated by the enormous military expenditure and other extravagance; he did what he could for the prosperity of the country; but he could not cure its financial ills.

This epoch had thus witnessed a great advance in administrative reform, and the adoption of a military policy in Germany, Italy, and the East, despite the financial crisis and the decline of Hungary. Even the Germans in Austria, who were apparently the gainers by the Germanisation of Hungary, Galicia, and Bohemia, were dissatisfied, because they, as the most cultured people of the monarchy, disapproved of the political reaction. The centralising and Germanising absolutism stood on a basis of clay, and was incapable of resisting any attack from without.

Everything now depended on the question, whether the direction of foreign policy and of the military organisation would be sufficiently skilful to ensure the permanence of the radical changes made in the body politic. Unfortunately Count Buol-Schauenstein, the successor of Schwarzenberg, had inherited none of his ability, and quickly squandered his whole inheritance of European influence. He was haughty and bad-tempered, though attaching excessive importance to diplomatic arts; and his lack of consistency caused him to offend all the European Powers in turn during the Crimean War. Austria entered on an agreement with Prussia (April 20, 1854) to maintain an armed neutrality between East and West. Relying on this compact, Austria, by sending an army to her eastern frontier, compelled the Russians to evacuate the Balkan peninsula. The Tsar Nicholas I was deeply wounded by the ingratitude of Austria; and he and his son, Alexander II, cherished an undying grudge against the Emperor Francis Joseph. It was expected that Austria would now substitute for her traditional alliance with Russia an understanding with England and France; but, though a treaty to this end was drawn up on December 2, 1854, Francis Joseph refused to take the decisive step of forcing Russia by threats, or even by a declaration of war, to conclude a satisfactory peace. The result was an extreme annoyance on the part of the Western Powers; and, as her alliance with Russia was naturally broken, this weak and indecisive policy led to the eventual isolation of Austria.

It was at this time that Bismarck, in his capacity of ambassador at the Frankfort Diet, gained his first insight into the weakness of Austria; and it vexed him that this State, in its condition of internal weakness, should take precedence of Prussia. He disapproved most

strongly of the Austro-Prussian agreement of April 20, 1854, because it might cause hostility between his country and Russia. Indignant with the vacillating policy of the Viennese Cabinet, he expressed his opinion with his customary frankness to the French ambassador, Marquis de Moustier, saying that Prussia ought to enter into an alliance with France and Russia, *against* Austria. These hostile utterances came to the ears of the Austrian Government, which remonstrated in Berlin about Bismarck. When Manteuffel informed him of this, he answered haughtily: "When I went to Frankfort four years ago, I was not in principle opposed to Austria; but I should have had to belie every drop of Prussian blood in me, had I desired to preserve even the smallest affection for that Austria which its present rulers have called into being."

These circumstances were utilised by Napoleon III and Cavour to throw a net round Austria in her isolation. This time Buol advised a cautious policy; but the Emperor Francis Joseph, indignant at the aggressive communications and acts of Piedmont, resolved on war, and sent an ultimatum to Turin without informing Buol (1859). That Minister handed in his resignation, and was succeeded by Count Rechberg. Then the unsatisfactory organisation of the army under Count Grünne, the Emperor's favourite, came to light. Count Gyulai and the other Generals whom he had favoured proved themselves utterly incapable; and the defeats of Magenta and Solferino (June 4 and 24, 1859) overthrew Austrian power in Italy, and as a result in Hungary also.

Public opinion throughout Austria, without distinction of nationality, demanded the fall of the Bach system. Consequently, the Minister of the Interior was dismissed from his office, and was followed soon after by the Count von der Grünne, Adjutant-General; while the Emperor, in a manifesto, issued with a view to meeting the wishes of his people, promised to put an end to the "inherited abuses" in his dominions.

In the reorganisation of the Empire two plans were possible. The first, the idea of Count Stadion, was to create a single central Parliament comprising the whole Empire. This would have preserved centralisation, though with certain modifications, would have given all parties and opinions some opportunity for free expression, and would, by increasing political freedom, have compensated the nationalities, especially those of Hungary, for the limitation of their former authority. The Finance Minister, Bruck, was the representative of this view in the Imperial Council, and he was supported by the German middle class and the official section, which at that time was also exclusively German. Very different were the wishes and aims of the Bohemian and Hungarian nobility, who strengthened the Emperor in his dislike for an Imperial Parliament, on the ground that a vigorous popular representation would endanger both monarchy and aristocracy. They therefore suggested giving a limited measure of independence to each of the kingdoms and provinces, especially to Hungary, and the institution of provincial

parliaments in them all; while in Vienna there was only to be an Imperial Senate with limited authority and deliberative powers. The Magyars and Slavs naturally followed the lead of their nobles, since nothing could be more in accordance with their wishes than the weakening of the united and predominantly German Empire. Thus two opposing parties faced each other—on the one side the German Liberal centralising party, on the other the various federalistic and centrifugal sections.

The Emperor summoned the notabilities of the Empire to an assembly at Vienna, known as the enlarged Imperial Council (*Verstärkter Reichsrat*) (spring of 1860). Here the members of the aristocracy were in the majority; and their vote had the greater weight because the new Minister of the Interior, Count Goluchowski, supported them. In the end Goluchowski and his Hungarian colleague Count Szécsen drafted a Constitution, which was published on October 20, 1860, and became known as the "October Charter." Its fundamental aim was the restoration of the institutions which had been in force before 1848, and which the nobility perhaps regretted. Hungary received back its pre-revolutionary form of government, and the Constitutional Laws of 1848 were abrogated. Even this was a great concession. From the provincial Parliaments of the whole empire an Imperial Diet was to be chosen, to consist of a hundred members, whose function should be the voting of fresh supplies and a deliberative voice in legislative matters. Full of hope, the Magyars and Slavs watched the revival of Hungarian and Bohemian privileges, while the German centralising party anticipated the break-up of the Empire into two or more parts.

The first important result of the October Charter was a change in the administration of Hungary. The restoration of the pre-'48 institutions revived the county assemblies in Hungary as well as the free election of officials and judges by these bodies, and the revival of this historic system of self-government once more placed power completely in Hungarian hands. The whole system of German administration, as organised by Bach, thus fell to pieces; and the non-Hungarian professors and officials were without exception dismissed. The Emperor's counsellors had assured him that the country would show its gratitude by leaving the connexion with Austria unbroken, and that the monarchical party among the nobles would continue to direct the people. But this proved to be an error. The committees and their officials were not satisfied with the Constitution in force before 1848, and clamoured for the laws enacted in that year. Several of the counties tried to force their point by refusing to levy taxes and recruits; and the result was complete anarchy. The Crown therefore had given up all its authority without satisfying the people.

The Emperor now resolved to keep Hungary as part of the Empire, and gave his adhesion to the German centralising party, which had opposed the October Charter. Their leader Schmerling headed

the new Ministry (December, 1860), though the Emperor's cousin, Archduke Rainer, took the presidency in the Cabinet which he formed. Their work was the Imperial Constitution of February 26, 1861. It achieved what the Liberals had desired, a united Parliament for the whole Empire with the functions of legislation and taxation. This was a great step in advance and a final breach with absolutism. True, this Imperial Diet was not to be elected direct by the people, but by the Diets of the provinces, Hungary included. In this way, and by granting to Hungary a separate administration, similar to what she had enjoyed before 1848, Schmerling hoped to come to a satisfactory agreement with that country. But this was not to be. Excitement in the country was at the highest pitch, and the programme adopted was: no elections to the Viennese Imperial Council, restoration of the laws of 1848, establishment of an autonomous State, complete independence of Vienna. Each individual concession was rejected; and in the name of continuity of rights, and on the basis of the oaths of former kings, they demanded that the Emperor Francis Joseph should also by oath confirm the Hungarian Constitution. The Diets were summoned to conduct the elections to the Imperial Parliament. In Austria there was almost universal agreement, but the other votes were overpowered by those of the Diet of Hungary, which created a great impression by its unanimity, and clearly indicated that Hungary was ready to come forward armed in defence of its freedom. Very impressive too was the personality of the national leader, Francis Deák, who, in a historic address to the King, rejected the Constitution of February 26, 1861, and pronounced all Imperial decrees which had not been ratified by the Hungarian Diet unconstitutional. His fundamental demand was always restitution of the laws of 1848, which had been granted in due form by the Emperor-King Ferdinand.

At first there seemed no possibility of harmonising the opposing views. For the fundamental idea of Deák's address was that the union between Austria and Hungary was merely of a personal character, that the two countries had nothing in common but the dynasty, and that, save in regard to this bond, Hungary must have complete autonomy. There was more than one occasion during the next few years when the flames of civil war seemed on the point of breaking forth. Kossuth, from his exile, advocated separation from Austria, the deposition of the Habsburg dynasty, and the formation of a great union—including the liberated Balkan peoples—under the leadership of Hungary. But her experiences in the Civil War of 1849 and the suffering that resulted from it had brought Hungary to a calmer and more prudent state of mind, and she rejected the leadership of Kossuth in favour of the wiser counsels of Francis Deák. Recognising that the Emperor Francis Joseph was prepared to revive the Hungarian Constitution, Deák published an article (Easter, 1865), in which he pointed out a way of peace. He put aside

the rigid demand for a personal union, and sketched the outlines of a dualistic Constitution as a mode of settlement. According to this scheme, the two countries were to be united, not only under one dynasty, but also in foreign affairs and military organisation; in all other matters Hungary was to have complete freedom of action. This hopeful beginning gave promise of allaying the storm. But Austria was still too powerful to be willing to accept Deák as lawgiver. But the defeat of 1866 forced her to consent to the division of the Empire into two independent but closely allied States. It was unfortunate for Austria that, while engaged in these internal conflicts, she was forced into the decisive struggle for predominance in Germany, and it is no wonder that she was overcome by an aspiring and united Prussia.

Prussia was nearing the fulfilment of a great destiny when, in 1857, Frederick William IV fell a victim to mental malady, and his brother William took over the Regency, to mount the Prussian throne on January 2, 1861, as William I. His capacity for rule was not at first apparent, as his abilities were not of the dazzling order, nor had he the genius that carries all before it. But he was conscientious, industrious, well-meaning, and, above all, absolutely trustworthy in his dealings. And, as he possessed the gift of discovering the most capable men for each post, and gave them his fullest confidence when appointed, he was enabled by their help to found a great empire. At the very beginning of his regency he appointed Moltke head of the Prussian general Staff; and in 1859 that admirable organiser, Albert von Roon, was made his War Minister. He was King William's first adviser in the reorganisation of the army, and without his help it is certain that Bismarck would have striven in vain to subdue and unite Germany.

William was a rigid conservative, deeply religious, and fully convinced of the divine origin of kingship; but he was as opposed to Manteuffel's detestable police government as to the pietistic environment of Frederick William IV. He therefore dismissed his Ministers, and appointed a Cabinet of Moderate Liberal tendencies (1858), with Prince Anton von Hohenzollern at its head, and Count Schwerin as Minister of the Interior. The new elections resulted in a majority of Moderate Liberals in the Lower House, and some reforms were at once undertaken, such as the abolition of the fiscal privileges of the noblemen's estates. The people rejoiced at the relief from oppression in the "new era," and were hopeful of great reforms. Above all, they desired Prussia to set herself at the head of the Liberal movement, unite all the national elements throughout Germany and utilise the irresistible spirit of the age to create a strong and united fatherland. Similar advice was offered to King William by his friend, the Prince Consort of England, and by his son-in-law the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden; his son, the future Emperor Frederick, was also a believer in a broad Liberal policy on

these lines. William I had indeed stated, on taking over the Regency, that Prussia must achieve moral conquests in Germany; but he was too cautious and also too Conservative to be carried away by the flood of popular enthusiasm. He had mistrusted the Liberals since 1848, and only followed cautiously the lead of his Ministers, or rather of Roon, the man of his heart and his choice. Roon too was a Conservative, and confirmed the King in his theory that he ought to govern his people from above, and not to share the power with his Parliament. The greatness of Prussia must be sought in military achievements, alliances with German Princes, and the strengthening of the monarchical power. For the attainment of this end, the hegemony of Prussia in Germany without any diminution of the power of the Crown, a great Minister was needed; since the King himself was not a man of bold initiative, and his clear but slow intellect had to be gradually won over to far-reaching undertakings.

Hence arose the uncertainty of Prussian policy during the Italian War and the following years. William I was prepared in 1859 to come to the assistance of Austria on the Rhine against France, but insisted that Austria should give him the chief command in this campaign over the troops of the smaller German States. The Emperor Francis Joseph preferred to conclude a disadvantageous peace with Napoleon III, which compelled him to give up Lombardy, rather than accept help from Prussia, and allow her to take the military lead in Germany. The result was to increase the bad feeling between the two chief German Powers. The unity of Italy had an inspiring effect on the German nation, which could not endure being outstripped by its southern neighbour. A National Union was formed, with the Hanoverian statesman, Rudolf von Bennigsen, as President; its aim was to unite all Germany outside Austria under the lead of Prussia, with due regard for Liberal ideas. The success of this scheme would inevitably lead to the exclusion of Austria, and this was opposed by many sincere patriots in Germany proper, especially the Catholics of southern Germany and the Rhine, who disliked the idea of a Protestant Empire. In opposition to the Prussian party, another was formed on a Pangerman basis, which was to include the whole German fatherland, and which took another association, the "Reform Union," as its centre. Once more jealousy blazed forth between Berlin and Vienna, and the two Governments became rivals for public favour. Count Albert Bernstorff, Foreign Minister in King William's Liberal Cabinet, at last induced his sovereign openly to declare Prussia's intentions in the diplomatic note of December 20, 1861. Prussia reiterated the declaration of 1850, that the unity of Germany could only be brought about by a closer union of the smaller and middle-sized States under her leadership. Afterwards a treaty might be made with Austria, so as to combine all German races into one powerful whole. This announcement however was a theoretical programme rather than a political fact. Both at Vienna

and in other German Courts indignation was rife at the revived pretensions of Prussia, which were not unreasonably looked upon as calculated to humiliate all other German dynasties. The reaction did not fail to set in. The Saxon Minister Beust had already made another proposal for a sort of triarchy, consisting of the two Great Powers with the combined smaller and middle States as a third partner. Such was the idea for the future that prevailed at Munich, Dresden, and other Courts—a condition of things which would have given a kind of casting vote to the third factor, in case of a dispute between Austria and Prussia. Yet this dream of the lesser German Princes could never be realised, because they were quite as much divided among themselves as Austria and Prussia.

The Viennese Cabinet neither could nor would be left behind in these reform projects, and came forward with a third proposal. Schmerling, who at that time was the leading Minister, had already led the Pan-German party at the Frankfort *Reichstag*; and, now that he had come into office, he wanted to carry out its programme. His aim was to unite Germany under the lead of Austria; this was to be accomplished by a directorate of a few persons, representatives of Austria, Prussia, and the most important of the other States. Of course the Vienna Cabinet would claim the presidency, an arrangement which would greatly increase its power. As a concession to Liberalism, there were to be some elected deputies besides the members of the directorate; but the Chambers of the individual German States and not the people were to have the right to elect. The whole scheme bore the impress of weakness, and it could not have been carried out, as the Hohenzollern would in no circumstances have entered a confederation, whose army should be subject to the orders of a directorate controlled by the Habsburg. Wise men perceived even then that this was the main hindrance to German unity, and that this question could only be decided by the sword. Schmerling would have shrunk from violence as little as Bismarck; but he did not find in the Emperor Francis Joseph the same support that Bismarck had in his King. Still, Schmerling was determined to pursue his project energetically and at once; and with this object Francis Joseph invited all the German Princes to discuss in person the question of German unity at Frankfort in August, 1863. Since the Ministers and representatives of the people had not been able to achieve it, the Kings and Princes must take the matter in their own hands. This was such an attractive way of putting it, that all the Princes accepted the invitation, and even King William doubted the wisdom of being the only one to stay away. But at that time Bismarck was already his Minister; and, as he threatened to resign if the King helped Austria to her desired triumph, the project had to be abandoned.

Amidst all this medley of projects, speeches, and endless diplomatic correspondence, an act of incalculable importance occurred, in which King William took the initiative. This was the reorganisation of the

Prussian army, which converted it into the strongest military force in Europe. In this domain William I was an expert and past master; in every other he followed the advice of experienced and carefully selected Ministers, humbly conscious of his own limitations. He was a soldier to the core, and knew all the faults of the Prussian military system, which had come most clearly to light in 1859, when the troops were mobilised against France. The King himself had taken part in the French campaign of 1814, and knew the capacities of the newly formed *Landwehr* (militia). He was fully aware that a great European policy could not be carried through with a standing army of 200,000 with 400,000 *Landwehr*; it was sufficient for the defence of the fatherland, but not for the foundation of a Prussian-German Empire. The Liberals refused to acknowledge this, and either kept aloof from the King's proposed reforms or gave them a hesitating adhesion, for they believed that their ideas would prevail even without fighting.

The King insisted on a stricter interpretation of the universal liability to service; of the 156,000 young men who every year attained the age of twenty, he wished to include 63,000 in the army, instead of, as before, 40,000. The length of service in the standing army (effective forces and reserve) was to be raised, and that of the *Landwehr* forces diminished; thus the striking efficiency of the army would be increased. This reform resulted in a large increase in the number of recruits, which became too numerous for the old *cadres*. It was necessary to form thirty-nine new regiments at an annual expense of 9,000,000 *thalers*. The Chamber now agreed to the King's wishes, on condition that the infantry service should be reduced to two years, as in the campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815. But, even in his brother's lifetime, William had lengthened the term of service, and he now refused to go below three years. At first a compromise was attempted: the thirty-nine new regiments were sanctioned and enrolled, and the decision about length of service and the other questions at issue was reserved. The Liberal Ministers vainly sought to induce their partisans in the Chamber to yield this point, if only to avoid driving the King into the arms of the Conservatives. On the other side the *Kreuzzeitung* party encouraged the King to abide by his proposal, and not yield to the Chamber. The strongest pressure was brought to bear by the Chief of the military Cabinet, Edwin von Manteuffel, and by Roon, who wrote to King William that the Parliament was trying to degrade him to the rôle of a sham-king, and exhorted him not to be intimidated by the noisy clamour of the day. William I was ready to come to terms with the Liberals, if only they would consent to the continuance of the new organisation, which would provide an effective war force of 371,000 line, 126,000 reserve, and 163,000 *Landwehr*. As these troops were at that time the only ones in Europe armed with the breech-loader (needle-gun) and had been trained under the King himself and the most capable masters, an army had come



into being fit to grapple with any foe in Europe. The King often said to his faithful friends, with tears in his eyes, that he would rather abdicate than give way; and he himself believed that it was destined for his son and not for himself to found the unity of the German fatherland.

The new elections turned out badly for the Army Reformers. In the Chamber, which met on January 14, 1862, the numbers of the Conservatives and Moderate Liberals were decreased, and the Progressive party (*Fortschrittspartei*), which formed the real Opposition, had a stronger representation, though not an absolute majority. The Government proposed a definite scheme of military organisation to the Chambers, and, on its meeting with an unfriendly reception, at once dissolved the Lower Chamber. The Ministry thereupon resigned, and Prince Adolf von Hohenlohe formed a Conservative Cabinet. This had but a short life, because the result of the new elections made all compromise impossible. The Conservatives numbered 100; the Moderate Liberals had sunk to 23; but the Progressive party counted 235 members, and these were resolved to compel the King, if necessary by force, to leave the power and government to the parliamentary majority. Prussia was now face to face with the alternatives that had confronted England under the Stewarts: her choice lay between government by King or by Parliament. In order to make their power felt by the King at the outset, the majority decided, on March 23, 1862, to strike out of the Budget the estimates provisionally agreed on for army reform. This would have necessitated the dissolution of the 39 new regiments and the dismissal of two or three thousand officers; and the proud edifice built up by the King and his generals seemed about to fall to pieces. William I was deeply grieved at the frustration of his projects, and the impossibility of cooperation with the representatives of the people. But there seemed no way out of the difficulty, as the Hohenlohe Ministry scrupled to maintain the army in its increased strength in defiance of the Chamber, if the necessary sums were not voted.

With the former Chamber a compromise would have been possible, if the Government had consented to shorten the service to two or two-and-a-half years; now it was too late, and the whole army reform was in jeopardy. At this juncture Roon and Manteuffel advised the King to entrust Otto von Bismarck with the formation of a Cabinet; for all who knew him were convinced that he would not shrink from an open battle with the Chamber, and would risk his life to enable William I to hand on the royal power undiminished to his son. The King, who knew Bismarck's fiery spirit, hesitated to challenge public opinion by his appointment. But he found himself at length compelled to decide in its favour; and, from this time forth (September, 1862), he followed all his Minister's counsels with unhesitating confidence. Nor had he cause to repent; for Bismarck contrived to conciliate or overcome by the success of his foreign policy the bitter opposition, which his disregard

of legality for some time aroused. While he served the cause of national unity, which at that time dominated every other, he contrived also to increase the power of the Prussian monarchy. He gave the Germans a united fatherland, and also checked the victorious course of democracy in central Europe, which was making more and more headway in the west. His fellow-countrymen could not agree as to the motives of his action, some asserting that the unity of Germany, and others that the greatness of Prussia, was his aim. To those who raise that question, Bismarck's mind must remain a sealed book; for, in his political laboratory, ideas and theories were never an end in themselves, but rather a changing series of means which he used to influence the minds of men, to create an Imperial polity, and to maintain it upon a firm and enduring basis.

## (2) GERMAN LITERATURE.

(1840-70.)

During the nineteenth century German Literature passed through three great revolutions, which took place, roughly speaking, in the first, fourth, and eighth decades. Between 1800 and 1810 occurred the Romantic revolt; between 1830 and 1840 the literary revolution of the authors of "Young Germany"; while about the middle of the eighties the latest upheaval was produced by writers who are often called the "Youngest Germany" or "*Die Moderne*," and who attempted to strike out altogether new lines in poetry and art. The two earlier literary revolutions have been dealt with in a previous volume; the last movement does not fall within the limits of this chapter. The period between 1840 and 1870 is one of comparative calm, a time of sustained endeavour, and, on the whole, of remarkable artistic achievement. It includes in every domain of literature some brilliant writers who, although they did not surpass the great Weimar classics at their best, nevertheless produced a considerable number of works of a high order, and who proved no unworthy successors to the masterpieces of Lessing and Wieland, Goethe and Schiller. They eclipsed the poetic output of the Romantics and of the writers of Young Germany, and much of their work bids fair to live for a long time to come.

In 1840 and for several years following some authors of consequence, such as Tieck, Immermann and Lenau, noticed in the preceding volume, were still actively engaged in writing, but the more important part of their life's work was done, and their productions can therefore be passed over in this place. Others, such as Heine, Gutzkow, and Laube, brought out not a few of their most brilliant works during the period dealt with

in this chapter, and these productions will be mentioned in due course. Again, some writers of importance, such as Anzengruber, Konrad Ferdinand Meyer, Luise von François, began their literary career in 1870 or immediately before that date, and the consideration of their works belongs in reality to the later period. It is worthy of notice that women authors, the number of whom had been exceedingly small up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, began from the days of the Romanticists to take an ever increasing part in German literature, especially in the domains of lyric poetry and prose fiction, but among the great dramatists of the period, quite up to modern times, there is not a single woman.

Lyric poetry, the stream of which had been flowing freely in the various parts of Germany ever since the days of Bürger and Goethe in his first period, was represented between 1840 and 1870 by a number of excellent writers who distinguished themselves in widely different styles. The political events of the times called forth a host of political songs, some of more than ephemeral value; many splendid ballads were composed; and a large number of simple and touching *Lieder* that are still widely read and some of them sung in Germany, but are not yet familiar to British lovers of German literature.

The political songs were partly called forth by foreign complications, and partly served as weapons of attack on the German and Austrian Governments and institutions during the years preceding the great revolution of 1848. In the autumn of 1840 the whole of Germany was deeply stirred by the scheme propounded by some French writers of repute to obtain for France the left bank of the Rhine. In October, 1840, Nicolaus Becker wrote his vigorous song, *Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein*, and in November Max Schneckenburger entered the lists with his *Die Wacht am Rhein* ("Es braust ein Ruf wie Donnerhall"). This poem was repeatedly set to music and was much sung in 1840; but the impressive setting, in which it became the national song of the Germans in 1870, was composed as late as 1854 by Karl Wilhelm. In the following year (1841) Hoffmann von Fallersleben, a learned professor as well as a popular poet, wrote the patriotic *Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*, which is still often sung on public occasions by the side of *Die Wacht am Rhein*. The Danish troubles and the unsuccessful struggle of the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein in the following years for freedom from Danish control gave rise to the composition of *Schleswig-Holstein, meerumschlungen*. This was written by Friedrich Chemnitz, and was much sung all over Germany for many years; while the sad fate of Schleswig-Holstein left its traces in some fine poems by Theodor Storm, such as his *Abschied* (1853).

The great year of 1870 did not produce so many really fine and stirring songs as the years of the Wars of Liberation (1813-5). Most of the songs that were then sung with real enthusiasm were of an older

date and had been written either in 1813-5 or in 1840-1. Among the contemporary poets of repute Freiligrath and Geibel produced a few poems that were often recited at the time, and some of the actual combatants, such as Jensen, Wolff, and Liliencron, wrote admirable verses. But none of these were genuine songs like the old ones that had been sung on the march or in the camp. The only new poems of this kind that were actually sung everywhere in Germany and were favourite marching and camp songs with the troops in the field were two humorous compositions. Both were written in August, 1870, by men who were not poets of any importance. One of them (by Wolrad Kreusler) begins "*König Wilhelm sass ganz heiter*," and was sung to the tune of the old popular song *Prinz Eugen, der edle Ritter*. The other (by Gotthelf Hoffmann) is that known as the "*Kutschkelied*," which at the time enjoyed an immense popularity.

The principal political poems called forth by the internal struggles of Germany were written immediately before and after 1848. The most important among a great number of political poets of various shades of opinion were Georg Herwegh, Franz Dingelstedt, Ferdinand Freiligrath, Anastasius Grün (Count Auersperg), Heinrich Heine and Emanuel Geibel. Herwegh and Freiligrath were the most radical and earnest among the advocates of revolutionary measures, while Heine ruthlessly satirised and ridiculed, fairly and unfairly, any person, party or political tendency which he thought gave him a chance of attack. In contrast with Herwegh, "the iron lark (*i.e.* the song-bird of war)," and Heine, "the mocking-bird of Germany's poetic grove," Emanuel Geibel opposed in a dignified and manly way the destructive and revolutionary spirit of Herwegh's muse, maintaining that the true poet should in his art rise above party politics. In later years, when the revolutionary poetry had grown pale and been forgotten, Geibel became the mouthpiece of the feelings and political aspirations of millions of his countrymen. He was the true herald of the New German Empire, the creation of which he demanded in his *Heroldsrufe* and other pieces with the earnestness of a genuine patriot and the impressiveness of a great poet. Freiligrath and Grün are now remembered as the authors of charming songs and poems rather than as writers of revolutionary lyrics.

Those epic-lyric poems which in German are sometimes called "*Balladen*" and sometimes "*Romanzen*" flourished during the three decades preceding 1870. After the great ballads of Bürger, Goethe, Schiller, Uhland, and Platen, we find ballad poetry in our period represented by Heine, Strachwitz, Geibel, and above all Fontane. Heine reproduced with marvellous success the simple popular style of the old German ballad; and several of his ballads, well set to music, have long been the property of all lovers of poetry and music. Such are *Die beiden Grenadiere* and *Die Lorelei*. Among his finest short ballads are no doubt *Belsazar* and *Der Schelm von Bergen*; and English readers

will be interested in his *Schlachtfeld bei Hastings*, a curious mixture of the rugged straightforward style of the old ballad with Heine's own very modern ironical touches. Moritz von Strachwitz—like his greater successor Fontane—was obviously imbued with the spirit of Percy and the old English ballad, and in this respect continued the traditions of Bürger and Herder. His finest ballads are poems in celebration of faithful devotion, viz. *Helges Treue*, a grand Scandinavian subject, and *Das Herz von Douglas* in the old ballad metre of *Chevy Chase*. Less powerful than Strachwitz, more truly lyrical, and sometimes directly philosophical in his ballads is Emanuel Geibel. Still his *Bothwell* and his *Tannhäuser* are true ballads, while in *Der Tod des Tiberius*, *Herkules auf dem Oeta*, and others, he created fine specimens of philosophical ballad poetry. The greatest of the four, and indeed one of the greatest ballad writers of Germany, is Theodor Fontane. Ballads of the first order were produced by him in very large numbers, the subjects being mostly taken from Prussian, English, Scottish or Scandinavian history and legendary lore, though even modern occurrences, such as the disastrous collapse of the Tay bridge, supplied him with the material for some splendid poems. His *Archibald Douglas*, *Schloss Eger*, *Der 6 November 1632*, *John Maynard*, *Gorm Grymme*, *Die Brück' am Tay*, are worthy to be ranked with the best of Uhland's ballads. Apart from these his numerous fine translations and adaptations from Percy, and his spirited treatment of the popular old Prussian generals Derffling, Zieten, Seidlitz, and "*der alte Dessauer*" deserve mention.

In the domain of the lyric proper we find several great masters of the *Lied*. The most important are Heine, Mörike, Geibel, Storm and Groth, the last mentioned of whom wrote in Low German. Some of the songs of Hebbel, Heyse, Lingg, Freiligrath, and Fontane, will likewise live for many years to come; and during this period the first German woman poet of importance, Annette von Droste-Hülshoff, published her fine lyrics. In the domain of humorous verse and students' songs must be mentioned Victor von Scheffel's *Gaudeamus*, which in the seventies became the acknowledged pattern for similar compositions. The greatest writers of lyrics were composing between 1840 and 1850, and some good poets also appeared in the next decade, while the last decade before 1870, so rich in political achievement, yielded a less brilliant crop in the field of lyric verse and indeed of literary production in general.

In the domain of dramatic literature the same tendencies are exactly reproduced, and the great decade for new talent is that between 1840 and 1850. In 1840, the year in which the Austrian Franz Grillparzer ceased from publishing, although not from writing, his grand tragedies, a new star of the first magnitude rose above Germany's literary horizon—the Frisian poet Friedrich Hebbel. About the same time Gutzkow, Laube, Freytag, Benedix and Bauernfeld enriched German dramatic literature with many successful plays, not a few of which are still frequently acted.

In the field of musical drama Richard Wagner produced his *Tannhäuser* (in 1845) and several similar operas, of which the subjects were taken from German legendary lore while the texts were written by the composer himself. On the other hand, in the fifties the only new writer of real eminence is the Thuringian Otto Ludwig, who deserves a place by the side of Hebbel as one of the great tragic dramatists of the middle of the nineteenth century. The sixties did not give Germany any new author of the first order, although Heyse made some welcome contributions to the stock of good plays. But, immediately after 1870, Austria was again well represented by Anzengruber, though his full value was not immediately recognised throughout Germany. In the domain of high tragedy, the names of Grillparzer, Hebbel and Ludwig shine above all others, while Gutzkow, Laube and Freytag were the authors of much creditable work. In the domain of comedy, the best plays were produced by Bauernfeld, Benedix, Gutzkow and Freytag. Some of the dramas of Lessing, Goethe, Schiller and Kleist continued to draw large audiences; and the centenary of Schiller's birth (1859) was made the occasion throughout the whole country for impressive manifestations of devotion to the manly and lofty spirit of Germany's favourite poet and greatest dramatist. The longing for political unity, which had been steadily growing in Germany between 1840 and 1870, found its own ideal forcibly and beautifully expressed in many passages of Schiller's poems and dramas. Hebbel and Ludwig, it is true, protested by their works and critical writings against the style of Schiller's later historical dramas. They wished to free German dramatic literature from the idealistic and typical style of the great Weimar classics, and were anxious to cease the imitation of the Greek tragedians and abandon too close an adherence to the tenets of Aristotle, and return to a more truly national style of poetic realism. Ludwig, who criticised Schiller rather unfairly by censuring every point in which his practice deviated from Shakespeare's, wished, like Hebbel, to create a truly national drama, based on the earlier plays of Goethe and Schiller and on some of the work of Kleist, while acknowledging the influence of Shakespeare, the greatest of Teutonic dramatists. Both Hebbel and Ludwig were highly gifted and earnest men, whose influence on the modern German drama is far from exhausted.

Although he produced some minor comedies and a number of fine lyrics and epigrams, Hebbel is above all a tragic dramatist of stupendous power of language which is united to a gift of penetrating psychological analysis. This was at once apparent in his first (biblical) tragedy, *Judith* (1840), and in the grand domestic tragedy *Maria Magdalena* (1844) in which he shows himself a worthy successor to Lessing in *Emilia Galotti* and to Schiller in *Kabale und Liebe*. But *Genoveva* (1841), *Herodes und Mariamne* (1850), *Agnes Bernauer* (1855), *Gyges und sein Ring* (1856), and the grand trilogy *Die Nibelungen* (1862) are also, each in their own

way, excellent works. Hebbel was the first German dramatic author who, in 1862, was awarded the Schiller prize (founded in 1860 by the then Prince of Prussia); and the appreciation and study of his works is still steadily increasing. In most of these, the great hardships through which the poet had to pass during his youth and early manhood have left their traces—a certain acerbity and harshness of feeling and expression; but his lofty nature, his manly courage, and his wonderful imagination, in addition to his purely dramatic talents, render his plays without exception worthy of attentive study.

Otto Ludwig was unable to complete a large number of great plays, as ill-health and his meticulous and unsparing self-criticism prevented him from achieving the majority of his dramatic plans. But his grand biblical tragedy *Die Makkabäer* (1852) and his impressive domestic tragedy *Der Erbförster* (1849), both entirely recast more than once, are productions of the highest artistic value. Hebbel's *Maria Magdalena* and Ludwig's *Erbförster* were intended to hold up the mirror to the narrow-minded and self-satisfied *bourgeoisie* of the middle of the century, who were unable to get out of their narrow groove and sacrificed dignity and happiness to their short-sighted prejudices. Both Hebbel and Ludwig scorned to pander to the taste of the masses; they despised the use of empty phrases, and combined with the high-mindedness of Schiller the directness of Kleist.

Grillparzer, whose comedy *Wehe dem, der lügt* (1840) had been badly received by the Viennese theatre-goers, gave up writing for the stage. But he still continued his dramatic authorship, and the works produced by him after 1840 were published after his death (1872). They were the three tragedies *Libussa*, *Die Jüdin von Toledo*, *Ein Bruderrzwist in Habsburg*, and the fine fragment of a psychological biblical drama *Esther*.

Among Karl Gutzkow's dramas the comedies *Zopf und Schwert* and *Das Urbild des Tartüffe* deserve to be mentioned; his fine tragedy *Uriel Acosta* is perhaps the best German play dealing with the subject of religious toleration since the time of Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*. Heinrich Laube, who afterwards was for many years the influential and successful manager of the excellent Burgtheater at Vienna, produced several good plays for the stage, among which *Graf Essex* is still sometimes acted. In greatness of conception, depth of feeling, and psychological analysis Gutzkow and Laube are much inferior to Hebbel and Ludwig. Gustav Freytag's tragedies, some of which reflected the social problems of his time, are now antiquated; but his delightful play *Die Journalisten* (1853), which grew out of his own experience as an editor and political writer, is one of the best German comedies and is still frequently acted. The comedies of the Austrian Eduard von Bauernfeld either satirised the despotic police *régime* of Metternich, as in *Grossjährig*, or gave amusing sketches of Viennese society, as

in *Bürgerlich und Romantisch*. The prolific comedy-writer Roderich Benedix did not attempt to deal with any deeper problem arising out of the nature of the characters which he portrayed. With him, amusing complications are brought about by accident or intrigue. His plays, the best-known of which are *Dr Wespe*, *Eigensinn*, and *Die Hochzeitsreise*, are good stage-pieces; the best of them are still amusing and depict the weaknesses of the *bourgeoisie* of his time with cleverness and good-humour.

In the domain of prose fiction there is an unusually large array of excellent writers who began their literary career after 1840 and continued it in not a few cases long beyond 1870. Of the writers of the Romantic School and of "Young Germany" (who have been dealt with in an earlier volume), Ludwig Tieck and Karl Gutzkow continued to write novels during our period—but Gutzkow's most important novels "with a purpose" ("*Tendenzromane*"), *Die Ritter vom Geist* (1850–2) and *Der Zauberer von Rom* (1858–61), were written long after 1840 and remodelled in the early seventies. After 1840 the novel becomes of quite exceptional importance in Germany; in the hands of many writers it is lifted high above the atmosphere of unrest and fermentation characteristic of the times. It deals with interesting problems, but in a truly artistic fashion; it is true to life, but its realism is of the poetic order. The writers of these novels are still mostly men; and the majority of them—Keller, Storm, Freytag, Heyse, Ludwig, Riehl, Raabe, Spielhagen, Scheffel, and Reuter—began their brilliant literary career in the decade between 1850 and 1860. Besides Tieck and Gutzkow there are only three new important novelists to be noted between 1840 and 1850—one an accomplished writer of historical romances, the other two distinguished by their successful sketches of contemporary peasant life.

Willibald Alexis (whose real name was Wilhelm Häring) produced a long series of excellent historical novels, the scene of which is the Mark Brandenburg and the events of which are taken from different periods of Brandenburg and Prussian history. They were not written in chronological order with the intention of forming a series, but as a matter of fact they do accomplish this end. They reach from the medieval struggles of *Der falsche Waldemar* down to the rising of Prussia against Napoleon (*Isegrim*). To the intervening period belong *Der Roland von Berlin*, *Die Hosen des Herrn von Bredow*, *Dorothea*, *Cabanis*, and *Ruhe ist die erste Bürgerpflicht*. Alexis did for Brandenburg, and for the Prussia which has grown out of Brandenburg, something of what Scott did for Scotland. While his older contemporary, Wilhelm Hauff, was the author of some good romances based on Swabian history, Alexis became the father of the North German historical novel. He found several followers in this field, but was not surpassed by any of them.

The Bernese pastor Albert Bitzius, who called himself Jeremias Gotthelf, produced a large number of capital studies of Swiss peasant



life, the most important of which are *Uli der Knecht* and *Uli der Pächter*, while the Swabian novelist, Berthold Auerbach, published delightful sketches of peasant life in the Black Forest under the title *Schwarzwälder Dorfgeschichten*. Among his later tales of village life *Brosi und Moni*, the tragic *Diethelm von Buchenberg*, and the longer story *Barfüssle*, deserve to be mentioned. Later, Auerbach contrasted the life of the peasants with the life of the Court in his long novel *Auf der Höhe* (1865), and treated in subsequent works of fiction with much cleverness, but with an increasing artificiality of style, the political and social problems of his time as they presented themselves in south-western Germany.

Early in the fifties the Swiss Gottfried Keller brought out his fine psychological novel *Der grüne Heinrich* (1854-5), the greatest work in its line since Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, full of thought and poetry, and exhibiting a great variety of contents. After this important and largely autobiographical novel, Keller published several shorter stories under the collective title *Die Leute von Seldwyla*, an imaginary typical locality somewhere in Switzerland, and added to their number in later editions. One of the finest among these is the "*Dorfgeschichte*" *Romeo und Julie auf dem Dorfe*. Many important tales were written by him after 1870, and he is without doubt one of the ablest representatives of poetic realism among the novelists of the last century.

Before the publication of Keller's *Der grüne Heinrich* Theodor Storm, a native of North Germany, had begun to publish his first novels and lyrics. His novels are all short stories—*Novellen*, not *Romane*—but all exquisite in their way, admirable character studies in refined language saturated with poetry and full of true sentiment. The number of Storm's fine novels is very large; most of them are serious or tragic, and they are often told in the form of reminiscences, chronicles or diaries of North German men or women. Among the best-known are *Inmensee*, an early work, *Späte Rosen*, *Psyche*, *Renate*, *Aquis submersus*, *Die Chronik von Grieshuus*, *Carsten Curator*, and *Der Schimmelreiter*, some of which were published after 1870.

The two great *Romane* of Gustav Freytag written during this period take the reader to German homes where the work of the nation is done in the office, and the study, and on the estate or farm. They are *Soll und Haben*, a Silesian story with Breslau as its centre, and *Die verlorene Handschrift*, of which the scene of action is to a great extent laid in Leipzig among the professors of the university. Both novels reflect very faithfully the healthy and active life of the German middle classes between the time of the Revolution and the Franco-German War. After them Freytag wrote (in the seventies) a series of nine historical novels in six volumes, under the title *Die Ahnen*, the clue to which he has given in his autobiography. He also published, in five volumes, a splendid series of sketches of German life from the early Middle Ages down to the War of Liberation under the title *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit*.

To these historical sketches the poetic tales of *Die Ahnen* form a sort of counterpart.

Paul Heyse began his vast novelistic productivity in 1855 and has for over fifty years written a very large number of *Romane* and *Novellen*, many of which are works of art of the first order. On the whole his short stories are superior to his *Romane*. His language and style are of the highest excellence, his characters interesting, his problems attractive and well developed. His scenes and personages are not unfrequently Italian, but usually south German, for Heyse, although a native of Berlin, lived the greater part of his life in Munich or in Italy. His novels do not so much reflect the German problems of the time in which he has lived as the themes which move the hearts of men and women at all times and under all climates—love and friendship.

Otto Ludwig, the great dramatist, is no less excellent as the author of some *Novellen*, the heroes and heroines of which belong to the peasantry or to the lower middle classes of Thuringia. The two best are *Die Heiteretei* and the grand tragic tale of a slater's family, *Zwischen Himmel und Erde*, one of the finest short stories of modern German literature.

Wilhelm Heinrich von Riehl not only distinguished himself as a professor and writer on questions of sociology, political economy and German archaeology, but also wrote many short "*kulturhistorische Novellen*" in a number of collections with different titles; some of these are capital stories told by a man who was thoroughly familiar with the social conditions and the state of feeling existing in Germany at very different periods. Like Keller, Freytag, Heyse, and many others, he produced much of his best work in the fifties and sixties, but continued to write for many years after 1870.

The novels of Wilhelm Raabe, like those of Riehl, depict the life of small German towns, out of the way nooks, simple and genial people, men and women in humble positions, but with rich treasures of kindness and humour. He is one of the greatest German humourists. Among his works published during the period of 1840-70 *Die Chronik der Sperlingsgasse*, *Der Hungerpastor*, *Der Schüdderump*, deserve to be mentioned, while, of his later works, *Horacker* is a most delightful story characteristic of German life and feeling in small North German country towns about 1870.

Friedrich Spielhagen, who began to write about the same time as the before-mentioned authors, excels in stories in which the scene of action is laid on the island of Rügen or on the shores of the Baltic. He is fond of depicting the life of noblemen, the owners of large estates, gentlemen farmers, and the society of small North German towns between the Elbe and the Oder. Among his early novels *Auf der Düne*, *Ultimo*, *Hammer und Amboss* should be mentioned; among his later *Quisisana*, *Sturmflut*, and *Faustulus*. The first novel by which he made a great impression on his contemporaries, *Problematische Naturen*, is, in spite of

many interesting details, not free from numerous exaggerations and must be used with some caution by readers desirous of studying the state of Pomerania and Rügen before the revolution of 1848. In all his novels Spielhagen proved himself a staunch Liberal, and his political views sometimes largely influenced his poetic representation of the aristocracy.

If Spielhagen is above all the painter of modern men and modern conflicts, Victor von Scheffel created, in the same year in which Spielhagen began to write, one of the finest novels dealing with old German life and conditions. In 1857 he published his *Ekkehard*, a tale of the tenth century, the scene of which is laid partly in the monastery of St Gall and partly on the Hohentwiel, a castle of the Duchess of Swabia perched on a steep hill north of the Lake of Constance. This novel, based on the most thorough historical and literary research, became the model for many similar works dealing with old German life and conditions.

The last great novelist of this period is the humourist, Fritz Reuter, who wrote his racy Mecklenburg stories in his native Low German dialect. The finest of these are *Ut de Franzosentid*, a tale of the years 1812 and 1813; *Ut mine Festungstid*, a tale of the time when Reuter was, on the strength of an absurd accusation, imprisoned successively in several Prussian fortresses; and, best of all, *Ut mine Stromtid* ("a story of my farming days"), in which he created the quaint and sympathetic figure of inspector Bräsig and produced from personal experience most graphic sketches of the life of the farmers in the North German agricultural districts.

From the outline attempted in the foregoing pages it will be seen that, during the thirty years preceding the great War and the foundation of the new German Empire, there was a fruitful literary activity in all German-speaking countries, and that it is wrong to say that, after the death of Goethe, there was no German literature worth mentioning. If the golden age of German letters came to an end with the death of the patriarch of Weimar, there was certainly in every domain of German literature no lack of writers of very high poetic talent, the value of whose work far surpassed the productions of the Romantic School and of "Young Germany." The lyrics of Mörike, Geibel, Storm, and Groth, the dramas of Hebbel and Ludwig, and the novels of Alexis, Auerbach, Keller, Storm, Freytag, Heyse, Ludwig, Riehl, Raabe, Spielhagen, Scheffel, and Reuter—not to mention many others of but little lesser merit or any of those who, like Anzengruber, produced excellent novels and dramas in the years immediately following the great War—furnish conclusive proof that German literature was developing in several new directions, while successfully continuing old styles inherited from the classicists or romanticists. It is consequently not in accordance with the facts to brush aside the literary works produced by the successors of Goethe in Germany—works which contain so much that is valuable in achievement while varied in range and subject—with the contemptuous term of "*Epigonenendichtung*."

(3) THE NATIONAL SPIRIT IN HUNGARIAN LITERATURE.

(1686-1900.)

Of no nation in the world can it be so truly said that its soul is wrapped up in its literature, as of the Magyars; and their attempts to preserve their peculiar form of political independence have always been, and still are, indissolubly connected with their anxiety to maintain the ascendancy of their national language and literature.

It is impossible to attempt here to treat of the beginnings of Magyar literature, of the old sagas, of the grandeur and high intellectual standards of the Courts of Lewis the Great (1342-82) and Matthias the Just (1458-90), or to discuss the effects of the Reformation upon both language and literary achievements. Our summary begins with the new era that opened with the recovery of Buda (1686) and the final expulsion of the Turkish invaders in 1687. Hungary was fatigued and languid, a result not merely of the Ottoman oppression but of civil wars and discord, and the rising of Francis Rákóczi II (1704-11) was, as it were, the last effort of national aspiration. The "peace at any price" party wished to show its gratitude to the ruling dynasty for the liberation of Buda. The Hungarian nobility made their castles the familiar haunts of German players, and found their principal pleasure in frequenting the Court at Vienna, where they were gradually stripped of their national feeling and character. The only people who, in aristocratic circles, seem to have introduced a Hungarian tone into social functions, were the gipsy-musicians, whose strains recalled the days of Bocskai, Bethlen, and Rákóczi, and their struggles for national rights and aspirations.

The scientific literature of this age, called the *aureum scientiarum saeculum*, was for the most part written in Latin. Yet the writings of Francis Faludi (1704-79), a Jesuit who may justly be considered the regenerator of Hungarian prose, were in the vernacular. But the most important work, that served to mark the Magyar literary Renaissance, was carried out by the members of the noble bodyguard formed by Maria Theresa as a mark of her gratitude for the loyalty of the Hungarian nation, and stationed in Vienna. The leader of this devoted band of noble youths was George Bessenyei (1747-1811)—the first writer in Hungarian literature to mention Shakespeare's name—who, in the cultured atmosphere of the Viennese Court, discovered and set himself to remedy the ignorance of himself and his compatriots. In 1772 he published his first drama, *Agis tragédiája* ("The Tragedy of Agis"), not a very successful production, though important as marking the commencement of the new literary era. It shows the influence of French models, particularly Voltaire, whose radical spirit and formal fineness attracted the mind of Bessenyei, though he drew his real inspiration from Magyar

sagas and Magyar history. Bessenyei did much to reform the style of Hungarian literature, opposing strongly all bombastic tendencies, and always endeavouring to strengthen the language and establish it on a firm basis.

The "French School" which he founded had many adherents, of whom the most famous were Alexander Bárczy, a careful and laborious translator; Abraham Barcsay, a brilliant penman and ardent enthusiast; Joseph Naláczy, the talented translator of Young's *Night Thoughts* and of the *Spectator*; Baron Laurence Orczy, whose national pride and patriotism alone saved him from becoming the prey of the attractions of the Court circles; Paul Ányos, "the melancholy poet of the pale moon"; and Joseph Péczeli, who won fame by an adaptation of Young's *Night Thoughts*, and whose works denote the triumph of the Alexandrine in Hungarian poetry.

Side by side with this "French School" we find the "Classical": of which Vergil was the fountain-head and main inspiration. The adherents of the "Classical School," of whom the most eminent was Benedict Virág a monk, found that, of all the modern European tongues, Magyar was best adapted to the reproduction of classical metres. Latin had always been of importance, not merely politically as the tongue of Parliament until 1833, but socially and educationally. The spirit of the Latin language, its use in oratory and satire, the political and military ideals of the Latin people were influences that could not fail to inspire every Magyar with a touch of classic feeling, and to suggest Vergil, Horatius, Propertius, and Ovid as their models.

The system of Joseph II, the son of Maria Theresa, whose centralising and Germanising tendencies aimed at the overthrow of the Hungarian Constitution and the suppression of the Magyar tongue and traditions, gave rise to a third school, which is indelibly connected with the name of Stephen Gyöngyösi (1625-1704), the poet who created the so-called "Magyar School." Its chief exponents were Andrew Dugonics, the enthusiastic champion of narrative prose and a scientific neologist, Adam Horváth de Pálóc, who in his lyrics recalled the spirit of Balassi and the *Kurucz* (Crusaders') poetry, those monuments of national ardour and patriotic Germanophobia, and Count Joseph Gvadányi (1725-1801), a man of Italian extraction, who surpassed even his fellow-enthusiasts in his Magyar Chauvinism, and created an immortal figure in his *Peleskei nótárius* (the journey of the notary of Peleska to Buda, 1790).

The subjects of this school are taken from Hungarian history or popular life, and their inspiration from the ancient folk-lore and traditional poetry, while their aim was to keep national feeling alive. The Parliament held at Buda in 1790 heralded their success and the triumph of the national movement. The ambitions of Joseph II were buried with him; the Rákóczi airs were struck up afresh, and Hungarian national costumes appeared again. In literature, the enthusiasm for the develop-

ment of a national culture and a national literary genius left no class of society untouched.

One of the leading spirits of this age was Joseph Kármán (1769–95), who threw himself heart and soul into the literary movement. Saturated as he was with love and admiration of Wieland and Schiller, he was yet a bold and outspoken champion of the lawful rights of his native tongue. Kármán's greatest importance rests on his creation of a style which combined the graces of extensive erudition and wide reading with the vigour and expressiveness of his native language.

The influence of Pope is seen in the *Dorottya* ("Dorothy") of Michael Vitéz Csokonai (1773–1805), who, like the minstrels of old, wandered from place to place singing his peerless songs. Though he felt the charm of Bürger, Metastasio and Rousseau, he never allowed their influence to tamper with his originality. He took life easily, with the *abandon* of a true *viveur*; but he was not void of deep sentiment and a real enthusiasm for great ideas. Besides the *Dorottya* Csokonai wrote another comic epic, *Béka-egérharcz* ("The War of Frogs and Mice"); a *Lélek halhatatlansága* ("on the Immortality of the Soul"), a poem treating of the fearful struggles over the theme of a world beyond the grave between sceptics, deists, and followers of the various religious confessions, and ending with the triumph of simple Christian faith; the *Lilla-dalok* ("Lilla songs"); and the *Anakreoni-dalok* ("Anacreontic songs"). He displays a Tennysonian mastery of epithets, and many of his songs were written not merely to be a "poetry of words," but to be set to music. And though at times distinctly inclining to euphuistic conceits, he is the greatest exponent, after Petöfi, of Hungarian popular songs and ballads.

A complete contrast to Csokonai was Alexander Kisfaludy, his rival in popularity. In his wanderings abroad he learned to love Petrarch, under whose influence, and during his journeys in Italy and Provence, he began to write his *Himfy-dalok* ("Himfy songs") in a sonnet form of his own creation, the passionate ardour of which is as inexhaustible as is his lyrical imagination. In these poems we have, for the first time in Hungary, Rousseau's conception of nature, in its full poetic force. The poet's imagination takes the whole of nature into the service of his passions. Yet the poems are written in the old-world popular rhythm in which the oldest relics of Hungarian poetry sound the praises of the Virgin Mary. Kisfaludy wrote *Regék* ("Tales") in verse dealing with the storied ruins of the Balaton district, subtle stories "instinct with the chivalrous ideals of knighthood and love," and dramas chiefly dealing with subjects taken from Hungarian history.

Though these two men were the most popular poets of the time, the real leader in literature, the Johnson of Hungary, was Francis Kazinczy (1759–1831). He began his literary activity early, with sentimental poems of a German tone which, for poetical worth, were later surpassed by his witty epigrams and his lively, instructive, and scathing

epistles. But his influence was not due to these; rather to his remarkable susceptibility, his wonderful enthusiasm, great learning, and refined taste, to his whole individuality, in which—for the first time in Hungary—the conception of a modern *littérateur* was embodied. His correspondence with his contemporaries fills volumes that are the richest sources for the literary history of his age. He was a voluminous translator and critic, in fact a “living academy,” bent upon the perfection of the language he loved. “In his aesthetic conceptions he was inspired by the Germano-Greek classicism of Goethe, with a little touch of sentiment, yet without any national bombast.” As a neologist his principle was to enrich the Hungarian language with new words, and to adapt it to the forms that had taken root in foreign tongues, and by his translations he served the same purpose. His position and his theories met with an opposition considerable enough to divide the whole country into two camps; a whole voluminous pamphlet-literature arose, in which both sides used all the weapons of satire and wit to prove their cause; and poets, linguists and politicians all took part in the discussion.

Enthusiastic pupils of Kazinczy were Daniel Berzsenyi, “one of the most brilliant writers of odes of all ages,” and Francis Kölcsey (1790–1838), the immortal author of the Hungarian National Anthem (“*Isten, áldd meg a magyart!*”), who followed in the wake of Bürger and introduced the ballad into Hungarian literature.

Like a flash of lightning in the sombre darkness which overspread the political horizon during the period of the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent reaction, Joseph Katona (1790–1830) appeared with his drama of *Bánk bán* (1821), the first glory of Hungarian tragedy. An episode taken from the era of the Árpád dynasty served as the poetical outlet for the feelings of the day. The drama is a portrayal, on the stage, of national sufferings, the outcry of a nation struggling under the yoke of foreign despots, with recollections of the tragedies of Brutus and Hamlet, which show the author's deep study. Katona's other dramas, *The Destruction of Jerusalem* and *Lucza széke*, remind us of the “dramas of horrors” of the early Elizabethan period.

Charles Kisfaludy (1788–1830), “the most popular dramatist of the twenties and the real founder of Hungarian speculative poetry,” entered the lists with historical dramas, the first of which, *A Tatórok Magyarországon* (“The Tartars in Hungary”), was received in 1819 with an applause that knew no bounds. This enthusiasm was due to the feeling that the poet was the interpreter of national self-esteem and pride. His *Irene* shows the influence of Voltaire's *Zaïre*, his *Stibor vajda* (which treats of the opposition of the oppressed feudatory to his despot liege lord) that of Schiller's *Kabale und Liebe*. A whole cycle of dramas is taken from the history of the Hunyadis. His dramatic treatment is decidedly weak, but this defect is counteracted by his sincere and earnest patriotism; and his excellent portrayal of the amusing

sides of Hungarian life, the typical figures which crowd the stage in his dramas, make his work of inestimable value as a reflection of the age in which he lived, and have given him the title of the "Father of Hungarian Comedy." He wrote also short novels, humorous sketches and lyrical poetry: but it is as a dramatist that he must stand or fall.

To the influence of Kisfaludy was due the foundation of the *Auróra-Kör* (Aurora Circle), which in 1831 developed into the *Kisfaludy Társaság* (Kisfaludy Society). One of its most prominent members was Michael Vörösmarty (1800–55), who was born at Debreczen. He was the founder of the new Hungarian poetic diction, which went back to the older language for its inspiration, and, while accepting the principles of Kazinczy, endeavoured to form new words in accordance with the natural laws of analogy and linguistic feeling. His muse was inspired by the mighty movements of the twenties, which reached their acme in the reforms introduced at the great Diet of 1825, from which period the real hour of national awakening may be dated. His great epic poem, *Zalán futása* ("The Flight of Zalán"), began with the significant line:

"Ancestral glory, where art thou belated in the dusk of night?"

The poem was intended to arouse the nation to emulation of the past: it thrills with patriotism and national pride. It is written in hexameters, a form of verse which Vörösmarty made popular at one blow.

His tragedies written for the stage are less successful, their characters refuse to develop into dramatic characters, and they suffer as a whole from a dearth of action. All the more wonderful are his translations from Shakespeare—*Julius Cæsar*, *King Lear*, and a scene of *Romeo and Juliet*. The first almost takes rank beside its original for beauty of language, power, and wealth of expression. It is certainly the finest translation of the play that has appeared in any European language. His dramatic poem *Csongor és Tünde*, founded on the old legend of Argirus and Tündér Ilona, reproduces the enchanting fairy-world of Shakespeare.

Distinguished alike as dramatist, linguist, and politician, Vörösmarty was greatest of all as a lyric poet. Here he is at his best as a reformer of his native tongue. The forms of the Latin school are replaced by the prosody of the West, while he displays complete freedom from any German sentimentalism. The ringing glory and beauty of his lyrics reflect the happiness of mankind, his native land, and his own heart. His *Szózat* ("Address to the Nation") embodies everything that could raise his compatriots to higher things.

The leader of the New Hungary was Count Stephen Széchenyi (1791–1860), whose political achievements are elsewhere described. The work of the "greatest Hungarian," who was the founder of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1825), and who, in a score of different ways, helped to elevate and develop the economic and political greatness of his native land, was not chiefly seen in literary achievement. Yet he was a fertile



writer, and among his works those dealing with political economy were of the most importance. His style was somewhat long-winded and extremely subjective; but he coined new words of importance (e.g. *alkotmány*, "constitution"), and abhorred purism of every kind. Some of his works are of permanent value as the beginnings of a sound development of economic science in Hungary, while others are only less essential to the understanding of Hungarian politics than are the speeches and writings of Louis Kossuth, the leader of the Revolution of 1848-9, and of Francis Deák, the statesman of the *Compromise* (*Ausgleich* or, in Magyar, *Kiegyezés*) of 1867.

Literary criticism, too, received new impetus in this age. Of the critics of the day the most famous were Joseph Bajza (1804-68), the initiator and editor of the *Kritikai Lapok* and, after its decease, of the *Athenæum*; Alexander Vachott; and Francis Toldy (1805-75). The latter's most important work, *A short History of Hungarian National Literature from the oldest times to the present day*, was published in 1864. Toldy wrote many other critical and biographical works, and was also the greatest exponent of his day of literary criticism.

Before the War of Independence three important novelists appeared on the scene—Baron Nicolas Jósika (1794-1865), Baron Joseph Eötvös (1813-71), and Baron Sigismund Kemény (1814-77). All three entered the political lists too, in the cause of Széchenyi's policy of reform. Jósika was the pupil of Walter Scott. Brought up in the romantic surroundings of a Transylvanian castle, "amid collections of ancient armour and manuscript chronicles," he breathed the spirit of the past, that most potent inspiration of the historical novelist. In *Az utolsó Báthory* ("The Last of the Báthorys") and *Rákóczi Ferencz II* are reflected the influence of his great English predecessor; *Abafi* is a Hungarian *Waverley*, and, in *A csehek Magyarországon* ("Bohemians in Hungary") Jósika transplants the figures of *Ivanhoe* on to Hungarian soil. His later works show a tendency to imitate Dumas in preference to Scott, and, though his popularity was too great to allow of his being neglected, the critics received his *Eszter* coldly. They felt that the magic charm of the romantic world, which he had conjured up, had vanished. He remains, however, the founder of the novel-literature of Hungary.

Eötvös' greatest work is his *Karthausi* ("The Carthusian"), 1838, a peep into the wonders and mysteries of life in France, with the moral that "unselfish work is our greatest possession." It is in truth a lyrical poem in prose, "the despairing cry of the human heart over the thousand miseries and wretchedness of life," which only belief in God and adherence to the teachings of Christ can relieve. Eötvös also produced some important political writings, in addition to founding the *Budapesti Szemle* ("Budapest Review"), the leading literary review of Hungary, which is still in existence. Of these political writings the foremost is that entitled "The Predominant Ideas of the 19th century" (*A XIX század*

*uralkodó eszméi*), the most important work on political philosophy in Hungarian literature. These writings were aimed at the abuses practised during his days, particularly in county administration and parliamentary usage. Eötvös detested "caste" arrogance and privileges, and was one of the boldest pioneers of the centralisation of power in the hands of a strong "responsible" Ministry, the activity of which should be controlled by the representatives of the *whole people*. Of his novels, perhaps the "Village Notary" (*A Faln jegyzője*) is almost better known than "The Carthusian," bearing as it does a distinctly political character; for it serves the purpose of a protest against the unjust suppression of the masses, and against a system which reserved political rights for the privileged few. The same object is served by his historical novel "Hungary in 1514" (*Magyarország 1514 ben*), which treats of the peasant revolt under Dózsa, the Hungarian John Ball, and was intended to act as a finger-post to Eötvös' countrymen to warn them of the awful consequences that might arise from a continuance of the hard and fast line of demarcation between villeins and the nobility. Kemény, the scion of a princely Transylvanian family, took the subjects of all his greatest works from Transylvanian history; he treats of the weakness, the fallibility of humanity, and creates veritable tragedies in his novels.

The influence of French literature, which towards the end of the eighteenth century had given place to that of German writers, began to assert itself afresh, and Victor Hugo, Dumas, Sue and Balzac were the writers most in vogue in the thirties and forties. In 1837 a permanent home (which later became the National Theatre) was given to Hungarian dramatic art. The first drama presented at this theatre was the *Árpád ébredése* ("The Awakening of Árpád") of Michael Vörösmarty, but the greatest popularity was attained by Ede Szigligeti (1814-78). He began his career as a dramatist "with the imitation of the sharp antitheses, extravagances and surprises of the French Romanticists." But he was soon induced by his democratic sympathies to create dramas *à la vaudeville* with characters and situations peculiar to the lower grades of society, with their poetical feelings, songs and humour. In thirty years he produced no less than 87 dramas, which were presented 842 times!

The national feeling awakened by the age of Széchenyi proved stronger than the imported influences of Latin, French and German literatures. A movement similar to that seen in English literature in the eighteenth century now took place in Hungary too. People began to look for inspiration to the traditions and poetry of the past, and the work of men like John Erdélyi (1814-68), the compiler of a collection of *Popular Songs and Folk-lore*, and John Kriza, whose *Vadrózsák* ("Wild Roses"), which resuscitated the ancient ballads of the Transylvanian Széklers (who are racially akin to the Magyars) as Percy's *Reliques* did those of England, was received with national acclamation. A certain

feeling of Chauvinism, awakened by the justifiable pride in national tradition, due to the reaction of the day, invoked the genius of the past. A return to a simpler and more natural vehicle of thought, the language of ancestral poetry, was proclaimed, and the new spirit gave birth to three great poets, Michael Tompa, Alexander Petőfi, and John Arany.

The first of the triumvirate to appear was Michael Tompa (1817-68), the son of a simple shoemaker. Taking orders as a Calvinist priest, Tompa, inspired by the beauty of his surroundings, began to publish his *Népregék és Mondák* ("Popular Tales and Folk-lore"), in which he combined creations of his own romantic fancy with the traditions of the past. These were followed by *Virágregék* ("Tales of Flowers"). In both collections Tompa maintained his individuality, the subjectiveness of the truly lyric poet, and a freedom from all external influences. The popularity of these works came as a surprise to everybody; but the tendency of the age accounted for it. Though not so zealous in his accentuation of patriotic feeling and sentiment as Petőfi, there can be no doubt about his patriotism and his love for the traditions of his country. His style, like that of Petőfi, is popular, simple, unstudied, sincere.

Alexander Petőfi has been called "the Burns of Hungary." The son of a butcher, Petrovics by name, a Slav by descent and birth, Petőfi was born on January 1, 1823, amid the monotonous, but, in its own way, grand and majestic scenery of the Hungarian Lowlands, the romance of which inspired some of the poet's finest lines. Petőfi led a most remarkable life. Unhappy at home, though he loved his father and mother passionately, he fled from the fetters of what he called "slavery"; sought refuge in the attractions of a wandering actor's career; enlisted as a private, only to find that the yoke of a military life was harder still to bear, and, after finally discovering that his true vocation was that of a poet (much to his father's disgust), ended by following the standard of national liberty and fell, as he had wished to fall, in the midst of clashing arms, at the battle of Segesvár, in 1849. In his popular songs and poems we find the whole world of feeling of the Magyar race: he was born in the heart of Magyardom, the home of the purest Magyar tongue, and the most downright Magyar sentiment. As we read his poems we become familiar with the most typical figures of Magyar country life. Here we have a Magyar to the backbone. "But there is another source of his popularity," as Professor Zsolt Beöthy has written, "the connexion of his personality with his age. Petőfi is not only the idol, but the ideal representative of the youth of that Hungary which was rejuvenated in the age of reform by the *aqua vitæ* of national feeling. His nation is the Hungarian people; his dream the liberty of the world. He hates princely despotism as heartily as he detests the privileges and indolence of the upper classes." He has won for himself a worthy place in the literary appreciation of all the great nations of Europe, except perhaps

that of England, and Herman Grimm has described him as a kindred spirit of Homer, Shakespeare and Goethe.

This fertile age, which produced the greatest lyrical poet of Hungary, also brought forth her most distinguished epic poet, in the person of John Arany (1817-82), like his great contemporaries, the son of poor parents. His poetry was inspired by the legends and folk-lore of his native soil, traditions of the old days of Turkish occupation, and of the struggles of the nation for political and religious liberty. But perhaps the most decisive influence was exercised by his thorough study of the classics, both ancient and modern, as seen in his translations of Aristophanes and Shakespeare. Yet his studies in no way impaired his originality or *naïveté*; he clung with true devotion to the traditions of the past, to the sanctity of his home, and the teachings of the Bible. He felt the pathos of the tragedy and the humour of the comedy of popular life, and took as his models the "free and fresh poetry of the fields."

Arany was well advanced in years when he first appeared in the field of literature. Encouraged by the success of *Az Elveszett Alkotmány* ("Loss of the Constitution"), a satirical epic written in 1846, Arany produced *Toldi*. This work gained not only the laurel wreath offered to "the best Hungarian epic written in a popular form and spirit," but also the admiration and friendship of Petöfi, who was already the darling of his country. In this epic of the age of Lewis the Great (1342-82) Arany not only made careful use of history and tradition, but contrived to interweave the spirit of his own age—the desire for political rights and equality—into this romantic setting. Arany then set himself to elaborate the whole story of Toldi in the form of a trilogy. The final part, *Toldi Estéje* ("The Downfall of Toldi"), was written first (1854). We feel that, in portraying the death of Toldi, Arany is really tolling the death-knell of the golden era of knighthood. The second part of the trilogy, *Toldi Szerelme* ("Toldi's Love"), was completed in 1879, and consists mostly of creations of the poet's imagination. There is more pathos here than in the other two, and less of humour. Of his trilogy connected with the Hun sagas, Arany only completed one part, *Buda Halála* ("The Death of Buda"), "the epic of the men of iron," a complete contrast to his poems dealing with the age of chivalry. "It is no longer a story told by the shepherd's fire, but a solemn song." Arany wrote a comic epic, *A Nagydai Czigányok* ("The Gypsies of Nagyida"), which won its way at once to the front in this field of literature by the soundness of its conception and the humorous reflexion of the spirit of despair, which the failure of the national ambition had awakened.

After 1848 he turned to the writing of folk-songs, and for his productions in this field he has been called "the Shakespeare of the ballad." He took his inspirations from the songs of the outlaws of the Lowlands, the collections of Percy and Kriza: yet, with one exception (*The Bards of Wales*), his subjects are Hungarian, his method of

presentation and his musical language all his own. Arany wrote lyrics as well, and his wonderful translations of Shakespeare's *King John*, *Hamlet*, and *A Midsummer-Night's Dream*, with their wealth of language and poetical inspiration, vie with Vörösmarty's *Julius Cæsar* for the palm of beauty and greatness.

The popularity and influence of Petöfi created a school of lyrists, of whom the most eminent representative was Kálmán Tóth (1831-81), with his tender, warm and rich love poems. The extravagances and flowery bombast of this school were counteracted by the publication of the shorter poems of Arany, with their masterful simplicity; by the transplantation of the masterpieces of the literature of other civilised nations; and by the comments of Hungarian critics. Of the latter the greatest was Paul Gyulai (born 1826), who still acts as the editor of the *Budapesti Szemle*, a man who all his life through has been the sworn enemy of all extravagance, himself a poet of no mean calibre and the author of five classical works of literary criticism, and of lives of Vörösmarty and Katona. Another critic was Charles Szász (1809-1906), who also did great work as a translator.

In 1861 was produced one of the greatest triumphs of Hungarian dramatic literature, the *Az ember tragediája* ("The Tragedy of Man") of Imre Madách (1823-64). It is a treatment of the fate of mankind, a speculative enquiry into the meaning of human life, after the manner of Goethe and Byron. The "Tragedy of Man" reaches the greatest height to which Hungarian speculative poetry has attained. Its tragedy lies in the collision of interests between great men and the general mass of human beings,—the strivings of the latter after freedom being always nothing more than an endeavour to secure ruling power. "The people is a deep sea, into the depths of which no sunlight can penetrate." The whole is the strife of feeling against cunning and the power of knowledge. There are recollections, here and there, of *Faust*: they are, however, so scattered as to prove nothing more than that Madách had studied Goethe. The whole drama reflects the ultimate triumph of good over evil; the trials and temptations of mankind must end with the overthrow of the tempter, and—"God fulfils Himself in many ways."

The historical novel in the *genre* of Kemény was continued by a whole array of younger writers, from among whom we must mention particularly Louis Abonyi; and Jósika found a greater successor in a friend of Petöfi, Maurice Jókai (1825-1905), who is probably the best known in England of all Hungarian writers. He created a new style in narrative prose, wealthier, more Hungarian, more lively and coloured than that in vogue before his days. In point of vocabulary he is the Shakespeare of Hungary, and he takes his inspiration from direct contact with the people, thus continuing in prose what Petöfi, Tompa, and Arany had begun in poetry. His characteristics are seen in the flight of his fancy when dealing with foreign scenes or with events of

the distant past, and in his wonderful mastery of detail and nice exactness when treating of the world around him and of events better within his reach. His inexhaustible fund of humour and his mastery of pathos throw an irresistible spell over his readers; and his descriptions of the beauties of nature are fascinating in the extreme. His characterisations are often exaggerated; but not one of his figures fails to excite our sympathy or our horror. As a tale-teller he is peerless: his *naïveté*, his optimism, his good humour attracts and delights. The best known of his two hundred and fifty odd works are *Egy magyar nábob* ("The Hungarian Nabob"), *Az új földesúr* ("The New Landlord"), *Mire megvénülünk* ("Debts of Honour"), *Kárpáthy Zoltán, A Locsei fehér asszony* ("The White Woman of Lőcse"), *A szegény gazdagok* ("The Poor Plutocrats"), *Erdély Arany-Kora* ("Midst the Wild Carpathians").

Scientific literature and scholarship was not neglected. The work begun by Francis Toldy was continued. The field of linguistics was covered by scholars of the calibre of Paul Hunfalvy (1810-91), Budenz, Vámbery, Czuczor, and Fogarasi; and the work of all these eminent men found a fitting centre in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. History was not neglected, and the work done in this field is the undying merit of scholars like Michael Horváth, Ladislas Szalay, and Alexander Szilágyi.

The slight sketch here given of the development of Hungarian literature during a period of some two centuries shows that the writers—poets, prose writers, dramatists—had to deal with difficulties thrown in their way by the defects of the language, by its neglect for other tongues (particularly for Latin), and by the attempts made, especially under Joseph II, to Germanise the country. Their efforts had to be devoted to the creation of a national spirit, to the arousing of an enthusiasm for the traditions of the past, and to the formation of a uniform literary medium of speech. The work begun by Bessenyei and Faludi was completed by Kazinczy, Vörösmarty, Arany, Petőfi, and Jókai. A national drama has been created: the legendary figures and episodes of bygone days have been set in a literary framework of surpassing merit; the old folk-lore has been revived, and a new literature of the fancy and the imagination has arisen. The Magyar language, standing alone amidst a confusion of other tongues, has served as the means of literary expression to such men as Arany, Petőfi, Széchenyi, Louis Kossuth, Katona, Kisfaludy, all of whom—in one respect or another—are entitled to a renown that should not only be national but European.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY.

THE keynote of Bismarck's policy is to be found in his resolve to drive Austria out of Germany and make Prussia the leading Power there. As Austria was not likely to relinquish voluntarily the preeminence she had enjoyed for centuries, Bismarck was prepared to face a war to gain his end, and from the first he endeavoured to make Prussia ready for the contingency. To effect this it seemed to him essential that the entire political control should remain absolutely in the hands of the King and not devolve on the Parliament, as he was convinced that no party government was capable of carrying out successfully so dangerous a policy. For neither Conservatives nor Liberals would hear a word of war and conquest: the Conservatives wished to uphold the alliance with Austria, the Liberals hoped to wrest the leadership from that State with the help of public opinion. In these circumstances, when the King and Parliament disagreed about the organisation of the army, Bismarck had to insist that Parliament should give way. Hence, his first step after his appointment (September, 1862) was to urge his sovereign to continue the struggle. King William, who had despaired of solving the difficulties confronting him and was prepared to abdicate, allowed himself to be persuaded when Bismarck appealed to his honour as a soldier to hold to his post. But, ready as the new Minister was to fight, the conflict with the Parliament was by no means the end he had in view. He first tried to bring about a peaceable settlement by offering to include the leaders of the Liberal Opposition in the Ministry, if they would consent to the army reforms. The negotiations were wrecked by their demand for reducing the term of military service to two years, which the King, having consistently opposed it before, could not now grant without humiliation. Bismarck, for his part, was generally regarded as a thorough-paced reactionary. The result of the first parliamentary debates was that the House of Representatives was prorogued without having passed the army estimates—in fact, without having voted a budget—for 1863. At the same time, the House had expressly declared it unconstitutional for the Government to enter into any fresh expenditure without the sanction of the Representatives. Bismarck was, however, resolved, in spite of this pronouncement, to carry out the rejected proposals for reorganising the army, and therefore

did not hesitate to dispose of the state revenues as he deemed necessary in the public interest. He proceeded to govern without a budget, the Constitution being thus rendered nugatory. Any cooperation with the Liberals being thus impossible, he had no alternative but to rely on the support of the Conservatives, who, though neither knowing nor sharing his views as to foreign policy, recognised their own principles in the Minister's defence of the prerogatives of the Crown. With characteristic relentlessness Bismarck put his plan into immediate execution: important military and administrative posts were given to Conservatives; officials of the opposite party were pensioned or degraded; Liberal judges were insulted by having others advanced over their heads; officers of the *Landwehr* were persecuted by judicial enquiries on points of military honour, and so forth. The Press was to be held in check by confiscations and lawsuits. By these means he hoped to subject all the organs of the State to his control; he was in no fear of a revolution, as he could depend upon the army, and, moreover, the mass of the people took little interest in the constitutional struggle. The conflict was carried on principally by the middle class—which was the predominant class among those represented by the Parliament. Bismarck hoped gradually to conciliate it by his successful foreign policy and the establishment of German supremacy in Europe. Thus Prussia came, in effect, to be governed by a party (the Conservative) which only possessed eleven votes in the House of Representatives.

The beginning of Bismarck's Ministry was not calculated to improve Prussia's position in Germany. As has been pointed out, Prussia was strongly opposed to Austria on the question of Federal reform; should a conflict ensue, Prussia could not count upon the support of public opinion. The political sections which longed for a united Germany, with Prussia at its head, were for the most part Liberal, and now the Prussian Government was carefully shutting out every breath of Liberalism and apparently pledging itself to the most narrow-minded reaction. Austria, on the other hand, appeared to have adopted far more popular lines of government. The Constitution of February, 1861, was, for the time being, working well, and was in particular approved by the German subjects of the Habsburg monarchy. This approval influenced public opinion among German Liberals at large; there were many sceptics with regard to Prussia's German policy; and the widespread *Nationalverein*, for instance, favoured the proposals for Federal reform advocated by Austria and the secondary States.

Abroad, Prussia's policy could not but depend upon the relations existing between the continental Great Powers, especially between France and Russia. When their mutual relations were strained, Prussia was able to hold her own between her stronger neighbours; when the two Powers were in alliance, she was exposed to overwhelming pressure, especially if—as at the moment—she were on bad terms with Austria.



Already when ambassador in Frankfort, Bismarck had always made it an axiom that Prussia must try to prevent a Franco-Russian alliance; but that, should such an alliance be formed, she must be a third member of it to escape being crushed by the other two. When he became Minister, he strove to bring about an agreement between France and Russia, though public opinion in France was averse from a Russian alliance because of the oppression of the Poles. This obstacle, however, was not insurmountable; for Prince Gorchakoff, the Russian Chancellor, was trying to establish a separate Liberal administration for the former kingdom of Warsaw. Thus a treaty between Tsar and Emperor became possible, which might not only damage the general political position of Prussia, but, by creating an autonomous Russian Poland, might react dangerously upon the Poles under Prussian rule.

This situation Bismarck entirely changed, thanks to an unforeseen event which he turned to account with resolute promptitude. When the Polish insurrection suddenly broke out in Warsaw, Bismarck persuaded the King to send Count Alvensleben to St Petersburg to assure the Tsar that Prussia would not countenance any assistance sent from Posen to the Polish insurgents, but, on the contrary, considered herself the natural ally of the Russian Government in opposing them. At the same time Prussia put half her army—four army corps—in the field so as to be able to guard the frontier. This attitude, in the first place, caused the Tsar to repudiate Gorchakoff's plan of pacifying the Poles by concessions and launched him upon a war of extermination with the rebels. An end was thus effectually put to the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance; for in France public opinion had enthusiastically espoused the cause of the Poles. A further consequence was that henceforth Alexander placed implicit confidence in William, who, of his own accord, had shown himself a friend in need. The friendship between Russia and Prussia became yet closer when, a few months later, France, England, and Austria attempted to intervene on behalf of Poland; relying on his understanding with Prussia, Alexander could refuse to listen to their threats, well aware that the three Powers would not dare to make war upon both Russia and Prussia. Thus Bismarck's prompt initiative had substituted a Russo-Prussian for the threatened Franco-Russian agreement, and had rescued Prussia from her isolation.

Only a bold spirit could have been capable of such a course of action. There was no doubt that Prussia would have to bear the brunt of the first encounter, if the three Powers really decided upon war; for Russia's hands were too full with the Poles during the summer for her to have been able to render prompt and efficient help against France and Austria. Bismarck, it is true, did not believe in the danger of war; but public opinion considered the situation in which he had placed Prussia extremely critical, and all Liberals resented his alliance with Russia. In this way the chasm between the Prussian Government and public

opinion was still further widened; while Austria was winning fresh sympathy, by combining with the Western Powers in defence of Poland.

These circumstances, which seemed so favourable for Austria, provided the Emperor Francis Joseph with the opportunity for a sudden move in German politics. In July, 1863, he convened a meeting of all the German Princes at Frankfort in order to obtain their sanction for a scheme of Federal reform, by which the reconstituted central authority was to be placed permanently in the hands of Austria and of her allies, the secondary States. As the Federal Constitution made no provision for an assembly of rulers of this kind, it was essential that all of them should attend it voluntarily. Francis Joseph therefore endeavoured personally to persuade the King of Prussia to attend, by representing to him that this Congress was the best means of carrying out the reform of the Confederation on Conservative lines and without danger of a revolution. King William, under the influence of patriotic and dynastic feelings, was on the point of yielding to these arguments; but Bismarck, convinced that Austria would strengthen her position in Germany by obtaining a majority at Frankfort, persuaded the King, after considerable demur, to absent himself from the assembly and so render its decisions abortive. Bismarck had expressed his intention of resigning if the King were to go to Frankfort, and William knew that he could not spare Bismarck in the struggle with the Parliament. In consequence of Prussia's absence from the assembly of Princes, nothing could be accomplished. Austria's proposal for a closer union within the German Confederation, on the lines of her own scheme of Federal reform, was rejected by the secondary States as definitely as they had formerly rejected analogous proposals brought forward by Prussia. They perceived that, if they were to ally themselves with one of the two Great Powers, their relation to it would be that of subordinates; allied to both, they might decide the issue. Neither was Austria's proposal received with greater approbation by public opinion. An informal assembly of about three hundred representatives declared her scheme inadequate, as making no provision for a parliament elected by popular franchise (August 22). To such a demand it was impossible for Austria to accede. Bismarck, on the other hand, hastened to announce that on this point Prussia's views coincided with public opinion. Prussia, according to an official note, was anxious for a reform of the Confederation, including "an assembly made up of members from the whole of Germany, in proportion to the population, elected by a direct franchise." The general distrust of the reactionary Minister was not allayed by this declaration; which, however, showed that Prussia was less averse than Austria from the national demands. An alliance between Habsburg and the Liberal advocates of union was out of the question. It had proved impossible for Austria to take any decisive step against Prussia with the help of the secondary States; consequently it became necessary for her to find a *modus vivendi* with

Prussia, so that the two Powers might conjointly control the Confederation as they had done in the past. Thus an immense improvement had taken place in the position of Prussia during the first year of Bismarck's Ministry: the German question had lost its ominous aspect, and Prussia's rival, Austria, was courting her friendship. At the same time (in the autumn) the Russian troops had been successful in Poland, so that Russia, the friend of Prussia, was once more free to take action; and this again was to Prussia's advantage.

Of the very greatest importance for Prussia was a sudden move on the part of Napoleon, who had suffered a grievous defeat on the Polish question, and was anxious to find a means of erasing all traces of his discomfiture by some success. He conceived the idea of proposing a congress of all the Powers at Paris (November 5), at which the European questions under dispute might be discussed, and which, under his presidency, might serve to restore his lost prestige in France. The proposal was directed against Austria, as concerned in the Italian question, which Napoleon was manifestly desirous of settling. As his purpose was to make an attack upon Austria, it was natural that he should put himself on good terms with Prussia; and he hinted to the Prussian ambassador that France would be willing to help Prussia against Austria in German affairs.

The proposal for a congress was received with suspicion by all the Powers, more especially by Austria. Though determined in no case to agree to the congress, she refrained from openly declining the proposal: for she could not expect support from any quarter if an open rupture with France ensued, being as she was at enmity with Prussia on the German question, and with Russia on the Polish. In this dilemma, compelling him either to offend France deeply or to agree to the congress, distasteful as it was, Count Rechberg resolved to attach himself without reserve to Prussia in the hopes of frustrating the congress by her help. Thus, Prussia, as a result of the independence she had shown on the Polish question, found herself courted by France and Austria, and in a position to dictate the terms of a *rapprochement* with the latter.

These advances by Austria to Prussia were most opportune (November, 1863). For it was just the time when a question, which had repeatedly occupied the attention of the European Powers, was approaching a solution, viz. the quarrel between Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. We have seen elsewhere how the Danish Government had refused all demands, on the part of the two German Great Powers and the Germanic Confederation, that the conditions under which the London Protocol of 1852 had regulated the relations between the duchies and Denmark should be fulfilled by the latter. She had trusted to the differences among the Great Powers, notably between Austria and Prussia. The Polish insurrection, which for a time seemed likely to lead to a European war, caused the Eider-Danes, then dominant in Denmark, to go one step

further. On March 30, 1863, a royal charter was issued, proclaiming a new Constitution. By this Schleswig became merely a Danish province; Holstein retained its independent position, but was to be exploited financially in the interests of the whole Danish State. This proceeding on the part of Denmark was a twofold infringement of the law. First, she had thrust the new charter upon Holstein without consulting its representatives; secondly, she had annexed Schleswig: in the one case disregarding the rights of the German Confederation, in the other acting contrary to the London Protocol.

In Germany, this proceeding called forth great indignation. Public opinion demanded that the Confederation should forthwith declare the agreement of 1852 to have been violated, should forcibly wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, and establish the Duke of Augustenburg as reigning sovereign. Most of the minor German States, under the influence of a sustained agitation, were inclined to support these demands at the Federal Diet. But the two Great Powers, with whom the actual decision of the question lay, steered their political course in accordance with their particular interests. The Austrian Government, far from caring for the emancipation of the duchies on its own account, was anxious not to be entangled in these remote disputes, particularly now that it was entering upon diplomatic discussions of the Polish question with Russia. But to remain neutral was out of the question. Everyone in Germany considered the protection of Schleswig-Holstein of vital importance, and Austria could not afford to disregard public opinion, as being at this point most anxious to gain the support of the nation for her scheme of Federal reform. Accordingly, Rechberg proposed that the Confederation should demand the withdrawal of the charter of March 30 under penalty of Federal Execution, on the ground that the charter disregarded the vested rights of the Holsteiners. Bismarck, like Rechberg, did not regard the emancipation of Schleswig-Holstein as an end in itself; he considered that, if the duchies were wrested from Denmark and given a Constitution of their own under Augustenburg, the interests of Prussia would be hindered rather than promoted, since the Duke would be in constant dread of annexation by Prussia and would therefore attach himself to Austria. If, then, Prussia undertook the liberation of the duchies, it was necessary, in his opinion, that they should be bound to her by some kind of political tie. Bismarck also knew that the Great Powers were opposed to the reduction of Danish territory; and he was therefore not prepared to enter upon a war with Denmark so long as Prussia was, as in 1850, confronted by the opposition of every one of them. At least, he wished to be certain that Austria would second Prussia, instead of, as then, attacking her in the rear. The Austrian proposal that federal execution should be carried out by the Confederation fitted in exactly with his wish for postponement; for, as experience showed, considerable time must elapse before this could be

carried out, and in the interval entirely new combinations in foreign politics might arise, to which Prussia would be able to adapt her action. Thus, although strongly opposed to each other on the Polish question, Austria and Prussia conjointly carried the resolution in the Federal Diet (July 9, 1863) that Denmark should be directed to annul the March Charter and put in force the provisions of 1852. In case of refusal the Confederation would occupy Holstein in order itself to restore the administration of justice. Meanwhile, in spite of this threatening language, the Danish Government repudiated any kind of compromise and bluntly announced (September 28) that an edict for a Constitution embodying the main provisions of the March Charter would shortly be issued. Only one answer was possible: on October 1 the German Confederation resolved amid general rejoicing to take action at once. This decision was unwelcome to both the German Great Powers. The enthusiasm throughout Germany made it impossible to evade carrying out the resolution, and interminable complications might result from the conflict with Denmark, because of England's friendly attitude towards her. In particular, Bismarck advocated another attempt at a peaceful solution, because the conditions which, as has been seen, he considered requisite for a termination of the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty were not yet realised. Bismarck accordingly endeavoured, with the help of England and of the Moderate party in Denmark, to postpone the rupture once more. In these attempts he was favoured by fortune inasmuch as Napoleon's sudden proposal for a congress caused Austria to side with Prussia: Bismarck could, therefore, rely on Austria's support. Just as the situation began to assume so promising an aspect, another unforeseen event occurred: Frederick VII, King of Denmark, died (November 15). His successor, Christian, the "Protocol Prince," coerced by the Eider-Dane party, put the recently drafted Constitution into force, and thereby broke off all relations between himself and his German subjects on the one side and the German Confederation on the other. Moreover, a new entanglement resulted from the change of sovereign. Prince Frederick of Augustenburg, the son of the aspirant to the throne in 1848, laid claim to Schleswig-Holstein as the heir by right of birth. The fact that his title was doubtful in consequence of his father's resignation of his claim (1852) was ignored by the German nation; he was regarded as the national candidate whose accession would deliver Schleswig-Holstein once for all from the hated Danish yoke. Hence a more persistent agitation in his favour was now carried on by the Confederation, and he was acknowledged by several of the German principalities, such as Baden and Coburg. The two Great Powers were unable to adopt this attitude so light-heartedly, since they had signed the London Protocol and by so doing had excluded Augustenburg from the succession. For the same reason they now recognised the new King Christian as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. Nevertheless, Bismarck hoped

that an opportunity of settling the old dispute had now come. He intended to allow the federal execution voted by the Confederation to take place; if, as might be assumed, King Christian under pressure from the Eider-Dane party still adhered to the November Constitution, it would be possible to declare that the London Protocol had been violated, and to set about the liberation of the duchies. In this way, he considered, the Germans might make the Protocol the legal basis of their action, while the Danes, by rejecting this basis, would put themselves in the wrong and so make it difficult for friendly Powers to interfere on their behalf. Only a few weeks earlier, this course of action had seemed to him too hazardous; now, thanks to the changed European situation, he saw that the right moment had come. Prussia, as a matter of course, must play the leading part in a Danish war of this kind, so as to be able afterwards to dispose of the conquered duchies to her own advantage. Bismarck's plan of making the London Protocol and the resolution of the Confederation the starting-point of his procedure coincided exactly with the views of the Austrian Government; although Rechberg, unlike Bismarck, hoped by this policy to reach a pacific solution. In accordance with the instructions of the German Confederation, the federal execution was rapidly carried out; in December, 1863, Saxon and Hanoverian troops occupied Holstein; Austrian and Prussian forces being stationed behind them in reserve. The Danes evacuated Holstein without striking a blow; but in Schleswig they prepared to offer a stubborn resistance.

It need hardly be said that the policy of the two Great Powers was strongly condemned by a large majority of the German people, for, should it be carried out, the Danes might, if they pleased, by recognising the London Protocol, remain in undisturbed possession of the duchies. In fact there was a widespread suspicion that the Great Powers were willing to hand over the duchies to the King of Denmark because of their repugnance to any kind of popular movement. This apprehension was shared by the Prussian Parliament, whose Lower House attacked Bismarck vigorously and at the same time demanded immediate recognition of the Duke of Augustenburg (December 2). Even the Federal Diet allowed itself to be carried away by the general excitement and declined to continue the federal execution in support of the resolutions of 1852, thus tacitly refusing to acknowledge Christian IX, and relinquishing its adherence to the London Protocol (January 14, 1864). This decision was welcomed by Bismarck. Since the Confederation no longer recognised the constitutional principle involved, Prussia determined thenceforth to act in the matter independently of the Confederation, as one of the European Great Powers and as signatory to the London Protocol, and to settle the whole question without reference to the Confederation. Austria, who in her fear of Napoleon had no alternative but to be on friendly terms with Prussia, gave her consent. After brief negotiations both Powers agreed (January 16, 1864) to send an ultimatum

to Denmark, demanding the repeal of the Constitution imposed by the King on the duchies in the previous November. Should Denmark refuse, 60,000 Austrians were immediately to march into Schleswig. What was to be done with the duchies after they were taken was not stated; but both Powers pledged themselves to regulate their future course "by mutual agreement." This arrangement was a great achievement for Bismarck, who had now secured the wished-for ally in the liberation of the duchies together with the possibility of, somehow, attaching the provinces to Prussia. Rechberg would have liked some final understanding as to the future so as to prevent later complications in the north; but, as Bismarck did not respond to his wishes, he had to give way. The developments foreseen by Bismarck took place; the Danes refused the ultimatum; war was declared; and the allies marched into Schleswig.

Neither in Prussia nor in other parts of Germany was the success of Bismarck's diplomacy appreciated, because the Great Powers still ostensibly adhered to the London Protocol. The Prussian House of Representatives even refused funds to defray the expenses of the war (January 22, 1864), because it considered Bismarck's policy to be anti-national. This opposition—no new experience to Bismarck—caused him little anxiety; more serious was the fact that the King's attitude was for a time doubtful. His German patriotism and his natural regard for legitimism engaged his sympathies on behalf of Augustenburg, and inclined him to withdraw his support of the London Protocol. The Crown Prince Frederick, a whole-hearted adherent of the National and Liberal views of the time, naturally encouraged his father's inclination. Many Conservatives too—even Bismarck's closest ally, Roon, the Minister of War, and many other military men—favoured Augustenburg. Thus Bismarck stood quite alone, but nevertheless he did not waver. He alone perceived that the recognition of Augustenburg meant the relinquishment of future advantages to Prussia, and might, by this disregard of the legal basis of the international problem, furnish the Great Powers with both pretext and motive for supporting Denmark. Once more he forced his policy upon his sovereign by threatening to resign. From motives concerned with internal policy the King reluctantly accepted the foreign policy of his Minister.

The campaign brought success to the superior forces of the allies, although the conduct of the war by the Prussian Field-Marshal Wrangel left much to be desired. The Danes were surrounded and driven out of their strong position at the Danewerke (February 5), but made their escape with few losses to Düppel. With the exception of this stronghold and the islands, the whole of Schleswig-Holstein was now in the hands of the allies. But the Danes' power of resistance was not broken so long as their army was intact and so long as they held the command of the sea; their hope was to protract the war, to tire out the Germans by interrupting their commerce, and if possible to induce the European

Powers to intervene. In addition to Sweden they counted especially on England, where the Government and public opinion had always protested vehemently against the dismemberment of Denmark. Meanwhile, they suffered further serious reverses: they lost Jutland, and a still more grievous blow was the storming of the Düppel entrenchments (April 18) by the Prussian army—the most notable military achievement of the war.

As Bismarck had foreseen, the result of the strictly legal procedure of the Germans was that no intervention of the Powers took place. Even England, the Power most friendly to Denmark, had to content herself with summoning the signatories of the Protocol of 1852 to a Conference in London. Immediately after the fall of Düppel a truce was arranged and the Conference met (April 25). The German nation, which had acclaimed the successes of the war with enthusiasm, regarded the Conference with aversion, and in the midst of a strong public agitation, petitions were sent up to the King and the Emperor demanding that the whole of Denmark should be overrun and the wishes of any other Powers ignored. The Prussian statesman again went his own way. He followed the same tactics as hitherto and, trusting to the obstinacy of the Eider-Danes, advanced the most conciliatory proposals, in order to put the enemy in the wrong in the eyes of all Europe by his refusal of them. Naturally, Bismarck now claimed more than the reinstatement of the London Protocol: he demanded, as the price of victory, the union of the duchies as independent States under the sovereignty of Denmark, and the admission of Schleswig to the German Confederation, so as to ensure its safety from Danish future encroachments. In spite of his contempt for public opinion, he knew how to make use of it as an ally when it served his purpose. Thus, he secretly abetted the agitation in favour of the separation of the duchies, and in London pointed impressively to this excitement in Germany, which might end in revolution if the nation were not appeased by at least this one token of victory. By this argument he compelled Austria to support him. Again Rechberg would have preferred to adhere to the less drastic provisions of the London Protocol; but his fear of alienating all sympathy in Germany, and the fear of France, drove him anew into Bismarck's arms. Once again, Bismarck's calculations proved correct. The Danes, relying on England's aid, refused the German demands, and after prolonged negotiations the Conference broke up without result (June 25). An appeal to arms was now inevitable. The general situation favoured the German Great Powers: Russia was unwilling to put difficulties in Prussia's way; France desired her friendship; and England saw in her and Austria the best security against Napoleon's restless policy. After this general refusal of help to Denmark by the Great Powers, the Scandinavians in the north were of course unable to succour her.

Even before the fate of the Conference was decided that of the Duke of Augustenburg was settled. So soon as Bismarck perceived that the London



Conference would prove fruitless, he had to consider the question of the investiture of Prince Frederick of Augustenburg. King William had never lost sympathy with Augustenburg, and, as the abandonment of the London Protocol made the establishment of the independence of the duchies probable within a short time, it was more difficult than ever for Bismarck to oppose his wish. The Minister was therefore prepared to recognise Prince Frederick's claims, but only on condition that he gave certain guarantees of his future political action, such as putting his army, post and railways under Prussian control. However, in the end, the Prince declined these conditions, unwilling—perhaps in consequence of Austrian influence—to limit his independence. Henceforth his cause was hopeless. Bismarck immediately published the negotiations with Augustenburg and the Prince's refusal of terms (beginning of June), and convinced the King and a great part of the Prussian people that Augustenburg's candidature was ill-timed. At this point Bismarck's policy for the first time received the general approval of the country; Conservatives as well as members of the Opposition began to see that a Duke in league with Austria was a source of great danger both to Prussia and to the future of Germany, and were ready to discuss the alternatives of annexing the duchies or establishing a protectorate over them.

The military operations, which formed a necessary preliminary to the fulfilment of Prussia's wishes, were rapidly carried out. Immediately after the conclusion of the Conference the Prussians captured Alsen (June 29) with a great part of the Danish army; and the allies were just preparing to cross over to the Danish islands, the backbone of the kingdom, when the Danish Government capitulated. The Eider-Danish Ministry resigned, and their successors instantly concluded a preliminary peace, by which the German duchies Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, *i.e.* about two-fifths of the whole kingdom, were handed over to Austria and Prussia (August 1). Some further negotiations followed, defining the exact frontiers, and fixing Schleswig-Holstein's share of Denmark's national debt; but they were soon brought to a conclusion, and on October 27 the final treaty was signed at Vienna.

By this peace the duchies were protected from Danish encroachments; but in other respects their future was obscure. Provisionally, they were administered in concert by the two victorious Powers. It has been seen by what different considerations the two Powers were actuated at the outset; and no sooner had the common foe been defeated than this divergence in their point of view made itself felt. While the war was still in progress, Austria had recognised Bismarck's avowed intention of securing some prize for Prussia, and naturally sought to hinder an unfair addition to Prussia's power. With this end in view, the Austrian Government wished the duchies to be handed over to Augustenburg, this course being no longer blocked by international difficulties. Austria would thus be relieved of the inconvenient necessity of maintaining troops in the far

north, and would besides win the approval of non-Prussian Germany. Bismarck of course rejected this solution; but he was not yet able to carry his intentions to their ultimate conclusion. He had to reckon with the fact that Austria would try to frustrate these ends even at the price of a war, and for such a war he was not nearly ready, since at present it would be quite impossible to gain the King's consent to it. Bismarck knew that his sovereign would not draw the sword until he had palpable proof that Austria was attacking the honour or welfare of his country. But this contingency was still remote. Moreover, the Minister was unwilling to provoke a war with Austria, unless he was secure from all outside interference, especially on the part of France. As at present he had no such security, his object, unlike that of Austria, was to preserve the *status quo*. The provisional joint administration assured the predominant influence in Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia because of her geographical proximity; and the claims of Augustenburg were set aside. Thus Bismarck rejected Rechberg's proposal on the grounds that the titles of all claimants, and in the first place that of the House of Oldenburg, must be investigated before Augustenburg was accepted. Pending this investigation, the European situation might perhaps assume the aspect desired by Bismarck. The Austrian Government could not adduce any legal justification for its proposal, while, still less than Prussia, could it afford to hurry on a breach; for French policy had continued to direct menacing shafts towards Austria, and within the last few months had again made overtures to Italy, Austria's mortal enemy. Hence the Vienna Government, in the event of wishing to concentrate its forces against an attack from the south, would find great difficulty in withdrawing from the northern entanglement without important concessions to its German rival. Manifestly, the Austro-Prussian alliance had so far been advantageous to the Prussians and disadvantageous to the Austrians.

And at the same time Prussia was scoring an economic victory over Austria. When the struggle between the two Great Powers on the question of Federal reform had broken out again (1860), Austria had renewed her former attempt to overthrow the German Zollverein. She hoped with the assistance of the south German secondary States, which disapproved of Prussia's liberal customs policy, to become a member of the tariff union and then decide the whole customs policy in her own interests. This attempt was rendered abortive by the divergent economic interests of the north German secondary States which, as being enclosed by Prussian territory, were excluded from benefiting by Austria's policy of protection. Saxony, in particular, in spite of her political sympathies with Austria and Bavaria, adhered to the old Zollverein policy. The south German secondary States, which had counted on the agreement of their north German sister States, were left out in the cold, and were consequently obliged to accept the Prussian customs policy, since they

were unwilling, by forming a tariff union with Austria without the north German States, to fall a helpless prey to the economic interests of the Empire which in many respects differed from their own. Still less could they remain alone; so that the best course still open to them was to accept the north German Free Trade policy. Hence the Zollverein was renewed in its original form for a period of twelve years (October, 1864). In this matter, as on the question of Federal reform in 1863, it was evident that Prussia, and not Austria, represented the wishes and interests of the great majority of the German nation.

The events of the last year were, as was inevitable, severely criticised in Austria. In the imperial Council as well as in the Cabinet, Rechberg was sharply censured; he was accused of sacrificing the ancient friendship with the secondary States and of impairing the relations with all the Great Powers; the alliance with Prussia, which had nearly brought about the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, would be sure to end in the surrender of Austria's position of supremacy in Germany to Prussia. In particular, Schmerling, the Minister of Home Affairs, and Privy Councillor von Biegeleben represented this point of view; both were dominated by the conviction that Austria was bound to retain the leadership in Europe and prevent any accession to Prussia's power. Rechberg, on the contrary, saw plainly that his opponents were working towards a war with Prussia, since Bismarck, he knew, would never give way before Austria's threats. Nor did he at any time disguise from himself that Austria's future in Germany must be determined by this war, and that Italy would take the opportunity of seeking to seize Venice. He would have preferred to avoid all these dangers by maintaining the alliance with Prussia, even at the cost of concessions in Schleswig-Holstein. But he was not the man to impose his will upon his Emperor and his colleagues after the manner of Bismarck. Since the Emperor could not spare Schmerling from his Home Department, and as it was impossible for both Ministers to work together, Rechberg was obliged to quit the field. He was superseded by General Count Mensdorf, like Rechberg a strong Conservative at bottom and an adherent of the Prussian alliance. But under the new Minister, who had hitherto held aloof from foreign affairs, Biegeleben became the moving spirit in politics; and it was his determination to revive the dropped friendship with the secondary States, and to settle the fatal Schleswig-Holstein question with all possible speed. Buoyed up by his hatred of Prussia and his confidence in Austria, he believed that by an attitude of firmness he would be able to compel Bismarck to give way. Immediately, therefore, upon the change in the Ministry, Mensdorf despatched several aggressive notes to Berlin in which he again represented the investiture of Augustenburg as the best solution of the difficulty. As may be imagined, they failed of the desired effect. Since, as we know, Bismarck was not concerned to hurry on a crisis, he allowed nearly three months

to elapse before making any answer, and then replied that Prussia could allow Augustenburg to become Duke only under certain conditions. Prussia would always be obliged to protect the Duke against Denmark, and must therefore claim in return the control of his army and finances (beginning of February, 1865). As Bismarck had expected, the Court at Vienna refused these terms unconditionally, as inconsistent with the principles of the German Confederation of which only sovereign Princes formed part. The new leaders in Austria replied by encouraging the Augustenburg agitation in the duchies and appealed to the secondary States, which were all in its favour, to help in inducing the German Confederation to bring about a decision in the same sense. But this appeal to the Confederation was contrary to the agreement of January 16, 1864, and Prussia retaliated at once. The Augustenburg agitation was suppressed in her dominions by special police regulations, and her chief naval station was transferred from Danzig to Kiel, in order to show her intention of settling down in the duchies. To Austria's protest against this strengthening of Prussia's position Bismarck replied by referring to their agreement, which he was interpreting quite correctly when he pointed out that there was nothing to prevent Austria from acting in the same way and from transferring her fleet from Pola to Kiel! Prussia could adopt this tone, for Austria had put herself in the wrong; and Napoleon's anti-Austrian attitude made the position of foreign affairs more favourable to the Prussians than to their rivals. Negotiations were continued in the same spirit until the advisability of going to war on the question of the duchies was debated at Berlin in a Crown Council (May 29). The King was now in favour of annexing Schleswig-Holstein, since the Crown lawyers had pronounced Augustenburg's right of succession to be unfounded; and, now that his conscientious scruples were removed, he could adopt the course most consonant with Prussia's interests. Nevertheless the decision to provoke war was not taken as yet. The King commanded that another attempt to arrive at a mutual understanding should be made; and, as Austria was by no means in a state of readiness for war, after months spent in discussions, both Governments agreed upon a compromise, embodied in the Convention of Gastein (August 14, 1865).

By this Convention both Powers were to share the administration of the territory under dispute; Austria undertaking to administer Holstein, Prussia to administer Schleswig. Lauenburg, the third territory taken from the Danes, fell to Prussia in return for the payment of a sum of money to Austria. In its case there was no rival claimant; Austria could, therefore, resign her share to Prussia without infringing on the rights of anyone else; moreover, the increase to Prussia's power represented by this small domain was inconsiderable. In this purely provisional solution, the real point at issue, Augustenburg's right of succession, had been left untouched. Bismarck was quite sure that the dispute would

soon break out again, but he accepted the compromise because he was aware of the King's desire for peace, and because the European situation did not seem to him favourable for war. The attitude of France was still undeclared; moreover, at this point Prussia would have had to face Austria and the secondary States alone. Hence his plan was to make use of the lull afforded by the Convention of Gastein to secure the friendship of Italy and the neutrality of France. Prussia was thus able to profit from the new situation without losing anything; while for Austria the agreement meant the continuation of the troublesome tie in the north; taken altogether, the agreement was generally regarded as marking a further success in Bismarck's policy and as a step on the part of Prussia towards annexing the duchies or establishing a protectorate over them. Consequently Bismarck's foreign policy received increasing support from the several parties in Prussia; and among the *Kleindeutsche* outside Prussia there were some who, like Mathy in Baden, felt that Bismarck was the man to place Prussia in the van of the German States; for the same reason Prussia's enemies, *Grossdeutsche*, Ultramontanes, Democrats and Particularists exhausted themselves in attacks upon the Convention and upon Bismarck's dupes at Vienna. They even tried by means of a popular demonstration to compel the Great Powers to abrogate the Convention. The south German Democrats convened a great meeting at Frankfort (October), to demand in the name of the German people the speedy investiture of Augustenburg; but the attempt was a lamentable failure. For hardly any Prussians attended the assembly, and the few who did expressed their disapproval of a demonstration directed against their own country. As to the present issue Bismarck clearly had the whole of the Prussian people at his back.

In foreign countries the same view was taken of the Convention as in non-Prussian Germany. Under the pretext of safeguarding the rights of the population of Schleswig-Holstein, the two Powers were declared to have forcibly wrested the duchies from Denmark and to be now themselves rudely violating the ancient right of the duchies to permanent union. English and French official despatches pointed out that the love of justice and the conscience of the nations could not fail to be outraged by so high-handed a policy. In spite of these outbursts of feeling, there was no need to apprehend warlike measures against the signatories of the Gastein Convention, since the two Powers which had protested had not been parties to the agreement; but Bismarck used his utmost endeavours to overcome this feeling as soon as possible on the part of France at all events. Napoleon's friendship was essential to him for two reasons: first, to secure the neutrality of France during the war with Austria, and, secondly, as a preparation for the alliance between Italy and Prussia, to which Bismarck knew that Victor Emmanuel would not consent without consulting Napoleon. In order to conciliate Napoleon, the Minister sought a personal interview with the Emperor,

In consequence of his unfortunate venture in Mexico, Napoleon was feeling even more strongly than before the necessity of some definite success in foreign policy, and German affairs seemed to offer the best opportunity for achieving this end. The antagonism between Austria and Prussia seemed to him to make a war between them probable, and in this he hoped to play the part of umpire; settling the German question according to his pleasure, and securing in return for his services a slice of Germany or some other acquisition. The plans evolved by his fertile brain changed frequently, but his general intention seems to have been to strengthen Prussia in northern Germany, so that she might be a match for Austria, which he considered the stronger of the two. With Prussia supreme in the north, and Austria in the south, the forces of the two Great Powers might hold each other in check yet more effectually than before, for the benefit of France. Besides solving the German question, Napoleon wished at the same time to settle the Italian difficulty, by compelling Austria to surrender Venice. We have little information about the conversations held in Biarritz in October, 1865; but it seems certain that Napoleon encouraged Bismarck to proceed against Austria, holding out a prospect of France remaining neutral and signifying a wish for compensation should Prussia gain fresh acquisitions by the war. Bismarck, in return, appears to have made no definite promises, but to have implied that if Prussia improved her position in Germany, there would be no objection to the acquisition of new territory by France: both parties must have referred to the annexation of Belgium or of part of the Rhine province. The Emperor was strongly in favour of the alliance with Italy and promised to recommend it in Florence: for Prussia would, he thought, instead of attacking Austria, eventually succumb to her unless supported by Italy. Both statesmen parted outwardly on the best of terms: Napoleon counted on war in Germany, with France as arbiter claiming a share of the spoils, while Bismarck was confident of overcoming Austria with Italy's cooperation, and of then tricking France out of her expected booty. For, of course, he never contemplated any cession of German territory: in no circumstances would King William have given his consent, nor, after such a concession to her natural enemy, could Prussia have looked for sympathy and respect in Germany or have become a dominant Power. Henceforward Bismarck and Napoleon are the two chief actors who confront each other in all important European transactions; and a struggle, at first secret, then open, begins between them which ends at last on the high road to Donchéry.

With all possible speed Bismarck set about gathering in the fruit of the Biarritz interview: a commercial treaty between the Zollverein and Italy was to pave the way for the political alliance (November). Naturally the *rapprochement* between Prussia and Italy and the consequent danger to Austria did not remain a secret. The only possible alliance against the threatened danger was that of the German secondary States.

In order to induce them to join, Mensdorf had to meet them on the Augustenburg question: accordingly, he again began to encourage the agitation in favour of the Duke; which was precisely what Bismarck wanted. He could now denounce Austria to the King and to the world at large as a faithless ally and a breaker of the peace of Gastein. King William, as a matter of fact, allowed himself to be convinced that the Convention would not last long and that, as Prussia must not loose her hold on Schleswig-Holstein, the prospect of war would have to be faced. It was therefore resolved (February 28, 1866) to send General von Moltke, Chief of the Staff, to Florence. The negotiations for an alliance with Italy began in February; but some time passed before either of the two Powers, mutually suspicious, was convinced of the serious intention of the other to go to war; at last, after renewed stormy representations from Napoleon, the alliance was concluded. If within three months war broke out between Prussia and Austria, Italy was also to declare war, while neither Power was to conclude peace without the consent of the other (April 8, 1866).

Thus the task of provoking war within three months was laid upon the Prussian Minister. The German question was to furnish the means: but still more important than the discovery of a pretext were the military preparations. The King was, however, anxious not to be thought the originator of the war, as having forced Austria to an outbreak by his premature armaments. William's cautious attitude was everywhere approved by public opinion; even the *Kleindeutsche*, such as Treitschke, who could not sufficiently condemn Austria's policy, were still anxious for a peaceful solution of the German question, and there was always in the background the fear of French interference. Once again, Bismarck stood alone; while his sovereign's opposition to warlike preparations increased Italy's suspicions as to Prussia's good faith. Luckily for him Austria, afraid of being surprised by Prussia and Italy, began to collect troops in Moravia and in Venetia. In view of this threat the King gave his consent to certain military preparations, but not to a mobilisation of the whole army (end of March). Then, when the Italian alliance had been successfully concluded, another serious difficulty occurred. The Viennese Government suddenly made a proposal in Berlin for simultaneous disarmament, and the King, with the approval of his people, was prepared to assent. Thus the whole Bismarckian policy was called in question; even a merely temporary agreement would end the alliance with Italy, and so favourable a European conjunction was not likely soon to occur again. However, the danger passed away, since Austria was willing to disarm only in the north and not in the south; whence the King concluded that Austria, in a state of partial preparation, would very soon come to terms with Italy and then fall upon Prussia while she was wholly unprepared. From this time forth (end of April) William was in favour of rapid mobilisation. During those days of suspense Bismarck's agitation threw him on a sick

bed; now, after the decision to mobilise had been taken, his joy, as Roon wrote, restored him to health.

On April 9 Bismarck had brought forward a motion for Federal reform in Frankfort, amounting to a further development of Prussia's former proposals and advocating a strong central authority and representation of the people by universal suffrage. This motion was intended to arouse Austrian opposition and to win popular approval. But Bismarck found that the Prussian nation refused to support him, for it considered him a violator of popular rights in consequence of his having governed without a budget; and that in various quarters, his proposal was declared to be pure hypocrisy. His purpose of rousing Austria succeeded better, for she began to prepare systematically for war. But Austria differed from Prussia in having no one man at the head of affairs; hence the object aimed at and the method of attaining it changed again and again. Hitherto the idea had sometimes been to make war on Prussia and Italy simultaneously, at other times to make peace with Prussia in order to settle accounts with Italy; now, a sudden resolve was taken to sacrifice Venice and let Prussia make good the loss. The French Emperor was therefore asked by Francis Joseph to obtain from Italy a promise of neutrality during the Austro-Prussian war. Napoleon consented, but the scheme was foiled by Italy's refusal to break the alliance with Prussia (middle of May). Napoleon made a second attempt to settle the difficulty peaceably, and he proposed his favourite expedient of a European congress under his presidency—but to no purpose. Bismarck, it is true, though with a heavy heart, consented to the congress, in fear of appearing implacable in the eyes of the world; but Austria rejected the proposal. Although Francis Joseph was prepared to sacrifice Venice, he did not relish the idea of giving it up at the dictates of a congress. He thus gave Bismarck new cause to represent Austria as eager for the attack, and enabled him to overcome the last vestige of opposition to the war in the King's mind.

By about the beginning of June a speedy explosion had become inevitable; and in fact it was Austria that directly brought about the rupture. The feeble state of her finances would not allow her to maintain the army on a war footing for any length of time; to avoid bankruptcy she had to strike at once. A sudden move in favour of Augustenburg was to provide the occasion. Directly after the rejection of the proposed congress the Austrian ambassador in Frankfort proposed that, seeing that Prussia had refused to come to any agreement on the subject, the Confederation should decide what was to be done with the duchies. At the same time the Austrian Governor of Holstein convened a meeting of Holstein representatives to find out the wishes of the Holsteiners as to their future. Austria hoped by this means to force Prussia into open rupture and at the same time to find a satisfactory pretext for war. She counted upon all the secondary States to take her side. Bismarck



immediately responded with a vigorous counter-thrust: he declared in an official despatch that the Convention of Gastein had been violated by the appeal to the Confederation, and accused Austria of trying to provoke a war. He proclaimed the joint administration, as established before the Convention, again in force, and forthwith marched Prussian troops into Holstein. It was mere sarcasm when he declared that this was not meant as an act of hostility, and urged the Austrians on their side to send troops into Schleswig. Instead of complying, the Austrian Governor retired to Hanover, protesting against the entry of the Prussian troops (June 7). The aim of all Prussia's measures was to deprive Austria of every possibility of return along the path she had chosen. On June 10 Bismarck published the substance of his scheme for Federal reform, which aimed at a closer union and the exclusion of Austria. But the action taken in the duchies had already determined the desired rupture. The Austrian Government declared the entry of the troops into Holstein an act of hostility and proposed that the Confederation should mobilise the Federal army in order to resist Prussia's breach of the peace (June 11). At the same time the Austrian ambassador was recalled from Berlin, and the Prussian at Vienna received his papers. Thus war was declared. There is no question that Austria by this course had put herself in the wrong, for the Confederation's right of jurisdiction over Schleswig-Holstein was doubtful in the extreme, and the proposal that the Confederation should instantly proceed to Federal execution was out of order. Bismarck, of course, did not overlook these weak spots in his adversary's attack; he announced at Frankfort that the discussion of this unconstitutional proposal was a violation of the terms of the Confederation, and Prussia would regard every member who voted for the motion as her enemy. These threats impressed the secondary States so far that a Bavarian modification of the Austrian proposal was passed (June 14). The adherents of Austria were Prussia's old enemies, the lesser kingdoms, both the Hesses, Nassau and several smaller States. Thereupon Prussia formally withdrew from the Confederation and immediately began military operations.

Having now assumed the offensive, Austria took steps to improve her international position. With this end in view the Hofburg, after bringing the Augustenburg question before the Confederation, at once proceeded to negotiate once more with Napoleon, in order to obtain from him a guarantee of neutrality. He was willing to grant it, in return for the promise that the Emperor Francis Joseph after conquering Silesia would hand Venice over to him, and not enter upon the redistribution of German territory without consulting France (June 12). In spite of this agreement, the Vienna Government continued the defence of Venice, thus dissipating its forces. Although willing to give up Venice, the Austrians did not consider it compatible with the dignity of the Empire to evacuate the country without striking a blow, while the

Italians, whom they had so often defeated, looked on. Both Emperors believed that they would not be the losers by this agreement. Francis Joseph looked forward to overmastering Prussia and conquering Silesia; Napoleon hoped to play a remunerative part as umpire on the further side of the Rhine, Germany paying the cost. For his part, Bismarck also believed he had hit on a favourable moment for the conflict: he was sure of the neutrality of Russia and France, and Italy was his ally. The decision must depend upon success in the battlefield. What strikes us most in Bismarck's character at this time was his unalterable faith in the superiority of the Prussian over the Austrian army—a faith on the strength of which he embarked on a war with a kindred race and therefore abhorrent to the majority of his contemporaries. At last his courage enabled him to carry out his policy, which was successful because of its boldness. Had the war ended badly or even long remained doubtful, and Napoleon came forward to claim the compensation which Bismarck had not, indeed, formally promised but had led him to expect, Prussia would have had either to grant the compensation or with weakened forces carry on an arduous war with France, and Bismarck would have been condemned as the betrayer of his country, who behind the back of his King had conspired with the national foe.

In the meantime he was at odds with public opinion. The Prussian people were not anxious for war; on the contrary, during May and June the King was deluged with petitions entreating him to preserve peace and dismiss his terrible Minister. Only a few voices protested against a weak compliance and expressed confidence in the patriotism of the Prussian people. Among those who upheld this view were an assembly of Old Liberals in Halle, the municipal council of Breslau, and in the Press the *Preussische Jahrbücher*. On the other hand the Germans in Austria were burning with military ardour, for they were anxious to assert their connexion with Germany and the preeminence of the Empire over Prussia; their Press threatened Prussia with a second Olmütz or Jena. Thus in 1866 political insight and energy prevailed over popular aims and desires.

Bismarck's efforts to make Austria appear as the aggressor must be regarded as a mere diplomatic manoeuvre. On the other hand, his opponent was as a matter of fact, in a sense, aggressive; for Austria was constantly endeavouring to effect some change in the German Confederation, which should be to her own advantage and to the detriment of Prussia. This covert struggle had been going on for a long time, and only awaited the right moment to be decided openly. Then it became patent that the Prussian leadership was more resolute than the Austrian. The minor States were by no means desirous of war; they feared that a victory, whether Austrian or Prussian, would impair their position in the Confederation, where they had hitherto decided the balance. They therefore plied Vienna and Berlin simultaneously with

admonitions of peace. In the final voting, indeed, they had to take the part of Austria, for she accepted their standpoint in the Augustenburg question, while, for the time being, Prussia was more active than her rival in prosecuting the reform of the Confederation, which they had hopes of frustrating with the aid of Austria. Thus the minor States were by no means entirely at one with Austria: they wished to retain the constitution of the Confederation, Austria to see it altered. The consequence of this political discord was that even in the war the minor States did not range themselves unconditionally beneath the Austrian flag. Instead of advancing their troops on Bohemia, so as to concentrate there in overwhelming numbers against Prussia, they kept their armies separate. They were quite willing that the two Powers, unassisted, should wear themselves out by fighting without coming to any definite issue, so that everything might remain virtually *in statu quo*. But Saxony sent her army into Bohemia, and thus there came to be two theatres of war, the Bohemian and the German. This division allowed the Prussians to mass their main body (263,000 men) against the Austrians and Saxons (261,000 in all); while, to meet the Confederate troops, Prussia sent only 48,000 men under General Vogel von Falkenstein. Moltke well understood the doctrine of Clausewitz, that victory at the chief seat of war brought victory all along the line. This distribution over two seats of war also meant that Austria's German allies were acting slowly, so that they could be defeated in detail. The first blow struck the Hanoverians: at Langensalza their way southwards was blocked by a smaller force of Prussians; and, although they repulsed the first attack (June 27), within the next two days they were surrounded by other Prussian columns and forced to capitulate (June 29). Hereupon, Falkenstein turned to the south Germans; but, before he could fall in with them, the die had already been cast in Bohemia.

During April and May the Austrian army had been mustering in Moravia; and, after war had been declared, it advanced into Bohemia in order to get between the Prussian forces. These were collecting in two great masses, in the kingdom of Saxony under Prince Frederick Charles and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and in Silesia under the Crown Prince of Prussia. Moltke's plan was that the two columns should advance separately with the view of concentrating towards the same point, Gitschin (Jičín) in northern Bohemia, for decisive action. The Austrian Commander-in-chief, Field-Marshal Benedek, was trying with a few divisions to block the passage of the Prussian army in Silesia across the mountains into Bohemia. While the Crown Prince was to be held in check in the passes in the neighbourhood of Nachod, Benedek was to march against Prince Frederick Charles with his main body, and annihilate him somewhere on the Isar. After that he could make short work of the Crown Prince. This plan broke down, inasmuch as the Crown Prince's army won its way through the defiles on the frontier in several engage-

ments (at Nachod on June 27, at Skalitz and at Burkersdorf on the 28th), and was able to collect in the plain to the south. On the same days Prince Frederick Charles' army had repulsed Benedek's vanguard repeatedly (at Hühnerwasser on June 26, at Münchengrätz on the 27th, and at Prodol on the 28th), and occupied Gitschin on the 30th after an encounter on that day. After that, if his original plan were to be retained, Benedek must have simply waited to be caught between two fires. His troops were demoralised by their defeat and his retreat would be cut off in case of defeat. Consequently, at Josephstadt (Jaroměř) on June 30 he decided to abandon the offensive against Prince Frederick Charles, and to lead his army back into a safe position on the Elbe between Josephstadt and Königgrätz. If he there succeeded in repelling the Prussian attack by a victorious counter-stroke, the campaign might perhaps yet be won. But luck had deserted the Austrians. Prince Frederick Charles, who was marching up from the west and was therefore nearer to the Austrian position, attacked it from the front early on July 3. Two Austrian corps on the right wing, which were to have carried out the defence against the Crown Prince, quitted their position to attempt an effective counter-stroke. When the Crown Prince advanced from the north, he found Benedek's right flank almost unprotected, and the victory was in fact decided. The Austrian army could be crushed into helplessness, from north to south. With this battle the campaign was won; after such a blow it was impossible for the Austrians to redress the balance.

The unparalleled successes of the Prussians were mainly brought about by two causes, the superior strategy of their chief command, and their better infantry tactics. The Austrian mode of attack was to advance in close order for bayonet charges, after firing for a short time by way of preparation. The Prussian infantry had laid greater stress on fighting in loose order, and thus managed to keep up a steady and powerful fire against the massive attacking columns of the Austrians. This advantage, due in the first place to the tactics of the Prussians, was enhanced by the fact that in the needle-gun they possessed a quicker firing weapon than the Austrian percussion-gun.

The Austrian empire was not, however, annihilated by the defeat at Königgrätz. The splendid behaviour of the imperial cavalry and artillery induced Moltke to underestimate the extent of the victory; the pursuit was therefore conducted with caution, and the defeated side was able to save a large proportion of its troops. But, as a change in the fortunes of the war was no longer to be anticipated, the Emperor Francis Joseph decided to appeal to diplomacy. On the day after Königgrätz he telegraphed to Napoleon asking his intervention and, in order to win his good-will, carried out the cession of Venice previously promised by him. Napoleon was on the horns of a dilemma. The rapid victory of the Prussians was entirely contrary to his expectations. Austria had no

German territory to give away, as had been assumed on June 12; and, if he now meant to step in and dictate peace, or even demand compensation, he must be prepared for an encounter with the Prussian army in the flush of victory. His own army was far from being ready for war. He could not, however, remain passive, for throughout the length and breadth of France the Prussian victory was regarded as a direct blow to French interests, and the Emperor was already being censured on all sides for having allowed Austria to be abased, and the unification of Germany effected by the hand of Prussia. In this exigency, he determined on intervention; called upon both Prussia and Italy to cease hostilities, and to set about negotiations for peace; and even tried, by means of threats, to deter the Italians from entering Venice (July 5).

Meanwhile, the military position of Prussia was still thoroughly insecure. The extent of the victory had not yet been ascertained; the powers of resistance of the Austrian army were still overestimated, and the south German troops had remained in the field; lastly, it was uncertain whether Italy would keep faith, and whether Austria could move her Italian army into Bohemia. The situation would be one of extreme danger if Prussia, while still occupied in the east, should be attacked by France in the west. Bismarck's mind was soon made up; he urged that energetic hostilities should be resumed against the Austrians, but without running the risk of a reverse. The south Germans were to be overthrown with all speed, so that French troops might not join with them. However much Bismarck might resent the intervention of Napoleon, he was perfectly ready to treat with him amicably, and to act in conjunction with him in settling the terms of peace. First and foremost, he desired to learn whether Napoleon fell in with his views for the aggrandisement of Prussia, and the reorganisation of Germany, and whether he would demand compensation for France.

The Prussian statesman's plan for the treaty was, first, that Prussia was to be consolidated in such a way that her territory should be no longer separated into two large almost detached pieces; secondly, that she should secure the lead in Germany north of the Main. Austria was to withdraw from Germany, and have no connexion either with north or south, so that the States south of the Main might remain independent. In deference to France, Bismarck confined himself to the leadership of northern Germany. He knew from his discussions with Benedetti and Napoleon that the Emperor, while he would never allow the union of the whole of Germany, had already conceded the aggrandisement of Prussia in the north. If he now adhered to his word, Austria would have to accept the conditions proposed. Bismarck had not as yet determined what districts were to serve for the consolidation of Prussia; the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein alone was resolved upon, and, for the rest, Hanover, Hesse, Saxony, and Nassau were under consideration. The details depended upon the agreement with Napoleon; the great

thing was to obtain his complete compliance with an extension of the Prussian frontiers amounting to some four million fresh inhabitants. The King, in his turn, cherished other schemes—a vague plan for restoring German unity, a more definite one for extending the power of Prussia, by reducing the size, rather than by annihilating the existence, of the smaller north German States. It was contrary to his legitimist principles to dethrone ancient and honourable dynasties. Last, he required that Austria should cede territory, say on the Glatz frontier, in order that the chief offender, as he said, might not escape unpunished. Bismarck would not hear of all this. He opposed the cession of territory by Austria on the ground that it would be a grave insult to the empire, and would occasion a lasting estrangement between Austria and Prussia. If Austria withdrew from Germany and no longer disputed the leadership with Prussia, the two Powers would have no further conflicting interests. They had much better be faithful allies against France and Russia. The preservation of the small dynasties seemed to him sentimental and unpractical; kings whose dominions had been curtailed would always be stirring up their former subjects against the new *régime*.

Even in the face of these difficulties from within and without, Bismarck succeeded in carrying out his own views. To begin with, the Italians adhered to the alliance; Falkenstein gained several successes and occupied the whole territory as far as the Main (July 16); most important of all, an agreement was reached with Napoleon, who at length consented to Prussian annexations to the extent of four million inhabitants, to the reestablishment of a North German Confederation, and to the expulsion of Austria from Germany (July 22). He did not demand any concession for himself, but only stipulated that Austria should remain intact: he felt himself bound to protect the Emperor Francis Joseph, on whom he had strongly urged this war, at any rate from loss of German territory. Next, Bismarck had little by little to win his master over to his own view; first of all, William agreed to the deposition of the dynasties, and decided that Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, Nassau, together with the Free City of Frankfort, should be annexed; then, he consented to let Saxony remain intact—a point on which Austria insisted, King John having been her best ally. Last, King William relinquished his plan of acquiring a district on the Bohemian frontier, and of making a public entry into Vienna.

In these encounters with the King, Bismarck's best helper had been the Crown Prince, his keen opponent before the War. But, so soon as war was imminent, he began to support him, recognising that the man who had brought on the war must also carry it through. He had therefore joined Bismarck in impressing upon his father at an early date the necessity for armaments, and in the negotiations at Nikolsburg also steadfastly upheld the Minister. The Crown Prince had a more versatile mind than his father and could therefore grasp Bismarck's ideas more

quickly, although, to him too, some of them were in the first instance absolutely strange—as, for example, the deposition of the princely families. At Nikolsburg the old King was left almost alone in his opinions. In his *Thoughts and Recollections* Bismarck, indeed, states that he had to face single-handed a close military ring, who had prejudiced the King against him, and who urged more severe conditions, protraction of the war, and an entry into Vienna. We find, however, that all the military leaders like Moltke, Roon, Blumenthal, and others of independent judgment like Stosch and Boyen, were of opinion that the Austrians must be dealt with gently, and that peace should be made with all speed.

The negotiations with Austria passed off rapidly. So soon as a favourable reply from Napoleon reached headquarters, an armistice was concluded (July 22), and in four days' time (July 26) the preliminaries of peace were signed at Nikolsburg. Austria had to submit, as help from France was not forthcoming. But, though their terms had been accepted, the Prussians were not yet out of the wood, for, now that the French intervention had been settled, Russia threatened to interfere. Friendly as Tsar Alexander was to Prussia, he was unpleasantly affected by the enormous increase of her power, because she thus became more independent as towards Russia—a point of view very specially present to the mind of the Chancellor, Prince Gorchakoff. The Russian Government, therefore, proposed an international congress to settle the terms of peace, as the Confederation had been founded in 1815 by the whole of Europe in concert, and could, therefore, not be set aside by Prussia alone. Bismarck was obliged to fear that Napoleon would come forward once more and claim compensation, now that Russia had stepped in. It might be, too, that the Russo-French understanding in all its terms would be restored at the congress. Once more Bismarck's courage and dexterity enabled him to avoid the pitfall before him. He at once refused the proposed congress, since Prussia had no intention of allowing the Powers to settle the reward of her victory for her; and he hinted that she would leave no stone unturned in resisting any foreign interference. The whole force of the German nation would be called into action, with that of the border countries, which meant that insurrections would be organised in Poland and Hungary. These threats took effect both in Paris and in St Petersburg, and the proposed congress fell through. Bismarck was not, however, content with this. With a view to dispelling the Tsar's continued vexation at the independent attitude of Prussia, he sent to Russia General Manteuffel, who was popular at the Court of St Petersburg, to explain more fully the reasons for the changes in Germany, and to offer the help of Prussia in the event of Eastern complications. Thus the Tsar became really reconciled to the new state of affairs, while Prussia retained his invaluable friendship.

After Nikolsburg and the withdrawal of Russian intervention, the

conclusion of peace with the allies of Austria was only a question of time. They had met with a series of misfortunes in the field; by August 2 the Badeners, Würtembergers, and Bavarians had been successively defeated; then an armistice was concluded and the negotiations for peace began. The terms were not for the most part oppressive. Hesse-Darmstadt and Bavaria were obliged to surrender certain districts in order to rectify the Prussian frontier, and the northern half of Hesse-Darmstadt had to enter the North German Confederation, while the southern had simply to pay an indemnity. Würtemberg and Baden were the first to accept the terms, the others, Hesse in particular, resisted, but by October peace was signed with them all. The final treaty with Austria had been already concluded at Prague, on August 24. Some difficulty had been occasioned here, for a short time, by the desire of the Italians to secure a part of southern Tyrol as well as Venice. However, as Prussia had only promised them Venice, they had to withdraw this further demand and to make their peace with Austria. Bismarck immediately put the finishing touch to his work of pacification by entering into a secret defensive and offensive alliance with the south German States. They were eager and willing to take this step because, in their isolated position, it was now their only chance of protection against annexation by France. So soon as the proposed North German Confederation had been established, the whole of non-Austrian Germany would for the first time be united, at all events in case of war. As a matter of fact, there was every need of defence against the greed of France. For, just at the time of the negotiations with the south Germans, Napoleon suddenly came forward with his demand for compensation, which he had refrained from pressing in the critical days between Königgrätz and Nikolsburg. Benedetti, the French ambassador, now received orders to demand the left bank of the Rhine and Mainz; but the reply was even blunter than he had anticipated: the demand of France, Bismarck pointed out, meant war, and in this war against her hereditary enemy the whole of Germany would be at one. For such a war the prospects of France were by no means favourable, as she was unprepared for it and would have to face Prussia, whose army was still mobilised. Napoleon accordingly waived his demand, which now afforded Bismarck fresh means of inspiring the southern Germans with a terror of France, and of thus attaching them the more closely to Prussia.

The battle of Königgrätz had a twofold significance: for non-Austrian Germany it smoothed the path to unity, and for the vanquished foe it marked an immense step forward. By the separation from Germany and Italy, the Habsburg State was rid of the burden of maintaining its sway in those countries, and its energies were set free for a vigorous Eastern policy. This beneficial effect on its external policy only became manifest, it is true, some ten years later, but these events likewise had



an important bearing on the home policy, which will be discussed in a later volume.

The treatment of Austria's former German allies furnishes a brighter page of history. The first task before the victorious Prussian Government was to make its peace with the Diet. The struggle had proceeded with unabated vigour since 1862; the approval evoked by Bismarck in the Schleswig-Holstein question had not secured a majority for him in the Diet; and his policy of war against Austria was condemned by almost the whole nation. But Bismarck was not mistaken in his conviction that victory abroad would imply victory at home. When the Diet met on August 5, 1866, after the preliminaries of peace had been concluded, the numbers of the adherents of the Government had been increased not only by the general election in the middle of the war, but by secessions from the ranks of the Opposition. The victorious Minister, who was now acclaimed by the nation, had it in his power peremptorily to close the budget controversy; but he preferred to follow constitutional methods, and sued for an indemnity for having carried on the government without a budget for the last four years. This the Representative Chamber could not do otherwise than accord (September 8) by a large majority. A portion of the Left veered towards the Old Liberal party, and by degrees combined with it to form the "National Liberal" party, which was practically Ministerial in the years that followed, though it had by no means renounced its traditional adherence to parliamentary government. Together with the Conservative party, it henceforth formed a safe majority in questions concerned with foreign policy and army.

The next important point was to confirm the North German Confederation, the formation of which was the chief result of the war. When Prussia had declared the German Confederation dissolved, Bismarck had at once (June 16) invited the supporters of Prussia among the north German States to form a fresh Confederation. After the preliminary peace, he had repeated this invitation to all the Governments north of the Main, and had proposed his scheme of reform of June 10 as the basis of the alliance. All the States assented within a few weeks, and in December delegates from all the north German Governments assembled in Berlin for discussion. The principle of Bismarck's scheme was that the Confederation should ensure the integrity and independence of the individual States and the integrity of their territories as towards foreign Powers, while they continued to manage their own home affairs so far as was possible. Hence, of course, it lay with the Confederation to regulate the fighting strength and foreign policy of its members. To cement the union between them, a common right of settlement was established, and legal jurisdiction in economic and judicial matters was for the future vested in the Confederation. Within its limits legislation was to be carried on by means, first, of the *Reichstag*, elected by universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage, and, secondly, of the *Bundesrath*

(federal council), an assembly of deputies from all the several States, closely modelled on that of the old Confederation. The King of Prussia was of course President of the new Confederation, and the Chancellor (*Bundeskanzler*) presided in his name over the debates of the *Bundesrath*. What the old Confederation had chiefly lacked was a definite military system and a united foreign policy, such as were now secured by the obligation laid upon the Confederate States to bring their armies up to the Prussian standard of efficiency, and to place them under Prussian chief command both in peace and war, the King of Prussia thus securing as a matter of course the direction of foreign policy. The federal officials were also appointed by the President, in whom alone the executive power was thus vested. For the rest, considerable scope was allowed to the Confederate States. The *Bundesrath* consisted of forty-three members, seventeen of whom were appointed by Prussia, which could therefore be outvoted by the smaller States. There was no federal Ministry—only the Chancellor with Secretaries of State for the various departments under him, so as not to restrict the independence of the several States too greatly. Bismarck was convinced that the stability of the new Confederation depended on the good-will of its members, rather than on its legal provisions.

Objections were of course not wanting from many Prussians. Bismarck, in reply, pointed to the potent prerogative of the President and the enormous ascendancy of Prussia, which made it plainly impossible that she should be overborne in matters of real importance. For the same reason, it had been possible to forgo the presidential veto in legislative affairs. His argument was irrefutable, that the sense of being able to outvote Prussia would relieve the lesser States of the bitter feeling of subjection to her, and enable them to become willing members of the Confederation. In this, as in everything else, Bismarck managed to temper extreme energy with caution. Many Conservative and Liberal politicians disapproved of the universal franchise, fearing revolutionary disturbances or the return of a despotic Government on Napoleonic lines. Bismarck's reply to them was that the masses had, at one time, bid fair to be more conservative than the middle class, and to prove better supporters of the Government. From other quarters came complaints about the prerogatives of the presidency, and the infringement of the legislative powers of the separate States. As the whole nation was looking for a speedy settlement of the question of Federal reform, the Governments had perforce to adopt Bismarck's scheme (February 2, 1867).

Then came the election of a constituent *Reichstag* (February 12), for the discussion of the scheme. The elections turned out well: a large majority of the deputies were seriously resolved to come to an agreement with the Governments. The objections were of course revived; the restriction of the Confederation to northern Germany was made a further

ground of complaint; the Left, in particular, were dissatisfied that in the Constitution the supreme power should lie, not with the *Reichstag*, as in the Constitution of 1849, but with the *Bundesrath* and its President, that the Constitution embodied no schedule of liberties, and so on. In answer to all these attacks, the framer of the Constitution maintained the necessity of devising not what was absolutely best, but what was feasible and adequate; and thus gained a majority. After several weeks of deliberation, the *Reichstag*, on April 16, 1867, passed the Constitution by 230 votes to 53. The minority consisted of Ultramontanes and Radicals. The struggle had been keenest over the army estimates, the Left attempting to carry a demand already preferred in Prussia for a yearly vote of supply. In the end, a compromise was reached, to the effect that the existing arrangement should hold good till 1871, and should then be further determined by legislation. The army could, therefore, not be reduced, as the Left wished, by the independent action of the *Reichstag*, since every law had to receive the sanction of the *Bundesrath*. During the following months the Constitution was adopted by the separate Diets of the States affected; and on July 1 it came into force.

Within a few years the regulations in respect to army, navy, right of settlement, and finance were adopted so far as the Constitution required; then, the postal arrangements for the Confederation territory were centralised by the purchase of the old hereditary postal administration of Prince Thurn and Taxis. The reduction in postage, with which the new Administration began its operations, contributed materially to the promotion of internal communication and to the consolidation of the Confederation. On these measures followed the drafting of a uniform penal code (completed in 1870), and several minor bills dealing with economic and financial matters. The Confederation was constantly extending the range of its legislative power to branches of home affairs, and the socio-political legislation of the Germany of to-day shows how far-reaching and salutary have been the effects of the process. Bismarck purposely, and, as it has proved, most judiciously, left the powers of the Confederation undefined in regard to internal affairs.

The principle of the North German Confederation having once been established, all parties desirous of German unity assumed that sooner or later southern Germany would also join it. Here, however, there was keen opposition to this idea. The Governments of Bavaria and Württemberg were disinclined to limit their sovereignty by entering the Confederation, and among the populations too various currents set strongly against a union. The Pangermans, notably the Ultramontanes, deplored the exclusion of Austria; the Democrats continued to mistrust Bismarck, as one who despised parliamentary rights, and they detested the military régime in Prussia; the thorough-going Particularists desired to be protected from France by Prussia, with as little inconvenience as possible to themselves. But in Baden both Government

and people wished to join the Confederation, and repeated endeavours to gain admission into it were here made from 1867 onwards. Bismarck abstained from promoting such efforts, having regard both to the state of feeling in the south and to the jealousy of foreign Powers. The Peace of Prague, which formed the basis of relations between north and south, left it open to the south German States to form a southern Confederation of their own, which could then conclude an alliance with the Northern Confederation. This southern Confederation had not come to pass, and the Baden Government inferred in consequence that every southern State was now at liberty to join the Northern Confederation, being as an independent State possessed of the power to control its foreign relations according to its own discretion. The Bavarian Government, on the other hand, was of opinion that the four southern States (including Hesse) could only act conjointly in the matter of entering the North German Confederation; similarly, of course, Austria interpreted the provisions of the Peace of Prague in such a way as to impede the encroachment of Prussia in southern Germany. Inasmuch as the compact in regard to the future position of southern Germany had been concluded with Austria, the protest of that Power against a separate transaction with Baden could not be simply passed over. Bismarck paid the more heed to it, because he knew that France also was against an extension of the Confederation beyond the Main, and that thus an Austro-French alliance against Prussia might easily ensue. Since a large proportion of the southern Germans were still opposed to joining the Confederation, he moreover saw no reason for hastening that step by pressure on Bavaria or otherwise; besides, he was, in any case, sure of their support in the event of war. He thought that, when once the system of the Confederation had proved its efficiency, the southern Germans, who continued ill-affected towards Prussia, would gradually recognise its value and sue for admission. This was the policy of securing voluntary allies with which we are already familiar.

If political union must be postponed, the economic agreement could still be cemented. The Zollverein needed reforming, as it had been established on the principle of the old German Confederation: every measure required the unanimous agreement of the members; therefore any alteration of tariff-policy, the conclusion of commercial treaties, and so on, could only be accomplished after interminable negotiation. To remedy this drawback, a committee must be formed, which could expedite legislation as modern economic conditions required. On the motion of Prussia all the members of the Zollverein, accordingly, expressed their readiness (in the summer of 1867) to place the management of economic affairs in direct connexion with the legislature of the North German Confederation. The *Bundesrath* and the *Reichstag* were to vote on matters concerning the Zollverein. On these occasions the southern Germans sent government representatives and deputies to Berlin, so that

they might have a voice in such decrees. Thus the committee of the North German Confederation actually developed into the *Zollbundesrath* (federal tariff-council) and *Zollparlament* (customs parliament). The economic disadvantage of this innovation is obvious; but it was of political consequence, on the other hand, that subjects of all the States of Germany met in a single council, and that the German people grew accustomed to receiving the impulse from Berlin in one important branch of public life. Here, again, there was, of course, much parliamentary resistance; and the first elections to the *Zollparlament* in Bavaria and Württemberg proved substantially anti-Prussian (1868). Gradually, however, the sheer weight of economic interests overcame the political dislike of a closer union with the north.

Bismarck's blunt refusal of the French demands of August, 1866, did not deter Napoleon from renewing them. He had, indeed, renounced all idea of acquiring Rhenish territory, but he asked Prussia to "compensate" France by assisting him to obtain possession of Luxemburg (1866-7). This negotiation led, as related elsewhere, to the evacuation of Luxemburg by Prussian troops, to its disarmament and subsequent neutralisation (May, 1867). The French public regarded Germany's endeavours to compass a union with more disfavour than ever, and looked upon Bismarck as the sworn enemy of France. Wherever things went amiss for France, the French thought they could detect the work of their evil genius: so, for example, when Garibaldi menaced the Papal State and thus compelled Napoleon to garrison Rome (1867); when in Spain, Queen Isabel, who was friendly to the French, was exiled (1868); and when Napoleon's attempt to subject Belgium to France, by means of a railway convention, was frustrated by Belgian opposition (1869).

After these mishaps it became increasingly urgent for Napoleon that he should have some success to offer to the French. The alliance with Prussia having failed, he, therefore, endeavoured to ally himself with Austria and with Italy, and, as is narrated elsewhere, secured expressions of good-will but no definite or binding engagements from both Powers.

Bismarck was tolerably well-informed as to the brewing storm, though of course unaware how far precisely the negotiations of this triple alliance had proceeded. The vacancy which had existed on the Spanish throne since 1868 gave him the means for thwarting the policy of France, and for strengthening the position of Prussia. When, as described elsewhere, the Spanish Government offered the Crown to Leopold, Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a kinsman of the Prussian royal family, he strongly recommended the King and the Prince to accept that honour. With a friendly dynasty reigning in Madrid, he had hopes of an economic and political *rapprochement* between Prussia and Spain. He felt, too, that France would always mistrust such a Government and that therefore, in any complication with Prussia, she would not leave the

Pyrenean frontier without military protection. The King and the Prince hesitated for some time and began by refusing, but in the end Bismarck succeeded in persuading them to decide on acceptance (June, 1870).

The Prussian Minister was well aware that in France nation and Government alike regarded Prince Leopold's candidature as prejudicial to French interests; nevertheless, he did not scruple to urge it. Should the French Government complain on the subject at Berlin he would represent it as a private family affair of the princely House of Hohenzollern, which concerned neither the Prussian State nor the reigning dynasty, and so refuse to treat on the subject. If, regardless of this refusal, France insisted on the withdrawal of the candidature and even threatened war, he felt sure of the support of the whole of Germany against so unjust a demand. Matters turned out, in the first instance, as Bismarck had intended. The Press and the Chamber demanded with threats that the Prince should withdraw, and the French Government was obliged to put forward these wishes in Berlin. There, as Bismarck directed, all discussion of the question was refused on the ground that it was no affair of Prussia's; but King William entered into the matter with Benedetti at Ems. Meanwhile, the Prince withdrew his candidature (on July 12, 1870). The French were not content with this *de facto* termination; the Government, under pressure from the Chamber, required of King William that he should give a further assurance that it should never be repeated. This preposterous demand—in itself a keen humiliation for Prussia—was curtly rejected by the King personally and by Bismarck officially, who even hinted that he should expect satisfaction from France for this insult (July 13). He immediately made these last dealings public, so that the German nation might be fully cognisant of the obtrusiveness of the French policy and the repulse it had received, and in order to "wave the red rag before the Gallic bull." Thus the French Government, in its arrogant efforts to degrade Prussia, itself met with a fall: and no other course was now open to it but to declare war. On July 14 Napoleon accordingly resolved on a declaration of war, and on the 19th this was carried into effect. Thus, by adroitly seizing the opportunity which the unjust demands of France afforded, Bismarck involved the French in war before their allies were ready for action. The war appears to have been inevitable, but the occasion and pretext were selected by Bismarck, who caused all German patriots to look upon France as a wanton disturber of the peace, and the conviction which had never been entirely lost, that France meant to get the upper hand over Germany and lessen her power, now once more gained currency. No doubt the German nation judged correctly at that time. It has often been stated subsequently that the war was Bismarck's doing; that he deliberately insulted the French nation by means of the Hohenzollern candidature and by his reply to their demands on July 13, and forced them to take up arms. But it can easily be shown that it was not in Bismarck's power

to avoid the war, since Napoleon had long been making careful preparation for it.

The French declaration of war found a loud echo throughout Germany. The North German *Reichstag* immediately voted a large loan for mobilisation and emphatically expressed the hope that the war might end in the union of the country; and the south too was soon imbued with this idea. Among the Ultramontane population of Bavaria there was at first, it is true, but little inclination for war with France. In the first half of July the Press agitated against the recognition of the *casus foederis*, and the majority in the Chamber was actually in favour of cutting down the army estimates, since Bavaria had nothing to fear unless she allowed herself to be made the tool of Prussia's aggressive policy. The Government indeed was more far-sighted and began to equip the troops for war, even before the money for the purpose had been voted. Then came the French demands of July 13, which here also awakened the sense of common German brotherhood. Even those who did not share this feeling perceived that Bavaria too would forfeit her independence if France were allowed to subdue Prussia. On the day on which war was declared, the Chamber voted the supplies by a large majority. Things went more smoothly in Würtemberg, where, from the outset, patriotic enthusiasm was stronger than in Bavaria; and, as the Diet only met on July 21, the supplies were therefore voted as a matter of course. Baden, where Government and people had long been desirous of joining the Northern Confederation, determined from the first to support Prussia.

In the *Reichstag*, and in nearly all the war demonstrations, stress had been laid on the idea that the time had now come for setting aside the dividing line of the Main. Soon, it was further demanded that the war should lead to the reconquest of Metz and Strassburg, the territory of the old German Empire. Only then would Germany be secure against further invasion. So early as 1814 this idea had found expression and had never since been forgotten. The south German Governments and the leaders of the Northern Confederation had to face these questions, so soon as all doubt as to the result of the war had been removed by the first battles. The Unionists in north and south were at no loss for a solution of the question which they had at heart. They considered that the next step was for the south Germans to enter the North German Confederation, whose President should take the title of Emperor. Among the south German States Baden fully concurred in this plan, while Bavaria and Würtemberg demurred to it: subordination under the leadership of Prussia seemed to them to involve a loss of their independent power. In the German empire that was to be they wished at all events to occupy a privileged position, and to withhold from the jurisdiction of the imperial legislature certain branches of administration, such as army, railways and post office. In this matter Bismarck

acted as he had done at the establishment of the North German Confederation: he endeavoured, so far as the general security permitted, to meet the wishes of the south Germans, in order to gain willing members for the great alliance. He had no intention, therefore, of inviting the Governments to join while undecided; he meant rather that they should be compelled by public opinion to solicit admission. As a matter of fact, so soon as Baden had led the way shortly after Sedan, the other two southern Governments began to treat about the terms under which they might join. In the ensuing discussion Bavaria began by putting forward sweeping claims; but she had to moderate them in the end in accordance with the feeling of the majority of the German nation. She still insisted on independence with regard to army, postal and railway affairs; she also declared that she must retain a certain measure of influence on foreign policy. A confidential committee of foreign affairs was to be formed in the *Bundesrath*, of representatives of the four smaller kings, with Bavaria as perpetual president. Thus the federal character of the German Empire was still more strongly marked than had been the case in the formation of the North German Confederation. These concessions were, in the opinion of many Unionists, carried too far, and Bismarck had to submit to severe criticisms from the leaders of that party—the Crown Prince and several lesser Princes. He adhered to his opinion, however, well knowing how deep-seated was the particularism of the Bavarians, and being unwilling to drive them into any attempt to gain support from Austria. Würtemberg was weaker than Bavaria and could not rely on Austrian help; she had therefore to content herself with reserving fewer rights as regards military and postal affairs.

By November 25 these treaties of union had been concluded with all four south German Governments, that is to say with Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden and Hesse (as to its southern half); henceforward the North German Confederation took the name of the "German Empire," as now extending over all Germany. It still remained for the North German *Reichstag* and the south German Diets to ratify the terms and sanction the alteration of title. All these Parliaments promptly expressed their approval, except the Bavarian, which could only be induced to do so by a small majority (January 21, 1871). This fact proves how well-considered was Bismarck's policy of concession. The new Constitution of the Empire, however, came into force on January 1, 1871, before it had been ratified by the Bavarian deputies. Jointly with these negotiations, others were being carried on as to the assumption by King William of the title of Emperor. There were two obstacles in the way of this: William's own belief that as Emperor he would have to maintain a magnificent Court and give up the simpler old Prussian ways, and the disinclination of Lewis of Bavaria, who felt that the exaltation of the Hohenzollern meant the abasement of the Wittelsbachs. The Crown Prince convinced King William as to the necessity of establishing an



Imperial throne in Germany, representing to him that such was the desire of all patriots and that it was of great political importance as symbolising the unity of the nation in the eyes of the outside world. Thus the King was prevailed upon in October to accept the dignity of Emperor; his only requirement being that the Crown might be offered him by the German Governments and not by the representative assemblies, as in his brother's case in 1849. There was considerable difficulty in obtaining King Lewis' consent, but in the end he was led to concur by the promised reservations in favour of Bavaria under the prospective Empire; and even undertook the duty of proposing to King William, in the name of the German Governments, that he should take the title of Emperor (December 17). King William immediately expressed his acceptance. After the envoys from the Princes, the King also received a deputation from the North German *Reichstag*, to which he gave the same assurance, so that there seemed to be nothing further to prevent the solemn proclamation of the Empire. But Bavaria suddenly raised fresh objections, demanding that the new title should not be "Emperor of Germany" as William and the Unionists had assumed, but "German Emperor" in order to imply that the Emperor did not claim sovereignty over the members of the Confederation. Bismarck attributed no political importance to this demand on the part of Bavaria, and succeeded in carrying it in face of violent opposition from the King and the Unionists, who felt the new title to be empty and meaningless. The Crown Prince, as in 1866, helped him to overcome the King's resistance, and although himself dissatisfied yielded the point in order to arrive at a settlement. At length, all these obstacles were removed, and the Empire was solemnly proclaimed at Versailles on January 18, 1871.

And so the keystone was added to the great imperial structure. There can be no question as to who was its architect. Bismarck did not of course create the desire for an empire, but he stimulated the movement which he found already begun and he infused his own spirit into it. He employed all that could be turned to account in the work—the interest of the various Governments, foreign affairs, the most widely differing parties and persons, however little they knew or approved his aims, willing and unwilling helpers alike must bring him stones, but he himself directed where and how they were to be fitted into the building. The sovereign in whose name the new Empire was brought about had no part in its plan or execution. But, in spite of that, the importance of the first German Emperor must not be underrated. Without his protection the execution of the Minister's task would have been impossible, and it must not be forgotten that his popularity materially helped to gain for Bismarck's work the whole-hearted support of the nation.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THE LIBERAL EMPIRE.

(1859-70.)

"A FEELING of satisfaction was to be found everywhere; and all men, with the exception of those whose minds were filled with the evil passions of party spirit, rejoiced in the public good fortune." These words, used by Thiers in speaking of the Consulate, were recalled by Napoleon III on February 16, 1857, when, in the full splendour of his fame, he described and extolled the benefits which France had received from his reign. Indeed it really seemed as if a stormy period in French history had at last been brought to a close. For the time being, within the fixed limitations imposed upon them by the Imperial Government, all classes of the community were apparently submissive and peaceable; and seemed to consider economic prosperity and national glory to be the only subjects worthy of their attention. At the same time, the demands of the various classes of society and the national aspirations were either controlled or used for his own advantage by the Emperor, who flattered himself that his policy of personal government was securing a great reign for himself, and a certain future for his dynasty. This personal policy of the Emperor, however, was destined to arouse the opposition of the several parties and classes, so great as to force the Government to make concessions to them; and was finally, in the midst of most tragic vicissitudes, to bring it to utter ruin.

Trouble was first started by the Italian War, the progress and results of which are elsewhere described. Ever since the latter part of 1858, the Catholic party, always the faithful supporters of Napoleon III, had shown considerable anxiety on this subject. To prevent the anxiety of the Catholics from interfering with his designs, the absolute monarch, therefore, appealed to the Liberal party. He endeavoured to excite the sentiment of national *amour propre* among all Frenchmen. He ordered—it is possible that he even dictated—the famous pamphlet entitled *The Emperor and Italy*, which appeared on February 3, 1859, with the signature of de La Guéronnière, one of the Councillors of State; and in which France was reminded that her rôle should be that of

arbiter among peoples and protector of nations. The Liberal Press acted in concert with the Emperor.

Matters grew far worse during the war. After the victory of Magenta (June 4, 1859) the Emperor issued an enthusiastic proclamation, in which (June 8) he invited all the States of Italy to emancipate themselves, and to form a free confederacy. The bulk of the Italian people, however, answered this proclamation by an insurrection in favour of union; the States of Parma, Modena and Tuscany drove out their Princes, and the Legations rebelled against the Pope. The fears of the Catholics were thus fully justified. The clergy expressed their displeasure. The Empress and Walewski became alarmed, and despatched telegram after telegram to the Emperor. It was probably this movement in the Catholic party, even more than the threats uttered by Prussia, or the outbreak of disease in the army, which brought about the Emperor's hasty decision to bring the war to an end, on July 11, by the Preliminaries of Villafranca. Napoleon III thus abandoned the attempt to realise his promise to give the Italians "an Italy free to the shores of the Adriatic," and endeavoured, instead, to save the temporal power of the Papacy. He now proposed to make the Pope president of an Italian confederacy. In taking this course, the Emperor, for the first time in his reign, gave way to party pressure. But it was already too late for concessions; for it was no longer in his power either to satisfy the Catholic party or to arrest the course of the Italian revolution.

Accordingly, the Emperor made use of the tactics employed at the end of 1858, but on a larger scale. For the second time he appealed to the Liberals, and sought for support against the Catholic party among the members of the Left. On April 17, 1859, "a full and complete amnesty was granted to all persons who had been sentenced for political crimes or misdemeanours, or who had been the object of measures taken for the public safety." Proscribed Republicans, even the most uncompromising enemies of the Government, were permitted to return to France unconditionally. Perhaps the principal reason for the recall of these exiles was that they were anticlericals, who he believed would serve as an effective counterpoise to the Bishops, in the new quarrel which the Imperial policy was on the point of provoking.

In December, 1859, the publication of another pamphlet by de La Guéronnière, entitled *The Pope and the Congress*, was the signal for the commencement of a new phase of Napoleonic action in Italy. Through the pamphlet the Emperor advised the Pope to renounce his claim to the Legations, and allow northern Italy to unite with Sardinia, if he desired to have the remainder of his temporal power guaranteed to him. In January, 1860, these terms were indignantly refused by the Pope, and Napoleon III, now once more "the accomplice of Cavour," agreed to recognise the annexation of the Central States by Piedmont, on the condition that Nice and Savoy were ceded to France (Treaty of

Turin, March 24). In April, Garibaldi, as described elsewhere, organised a successful revolution in Sicily, with some suspicion of Imperial connivance; and in August, he crossed the Straits and drove Francis II from Naples. In September, 1860, Cialdini, with a Piedmontese force, defeated the Pope's troops at Castelfidardo, overran Umbria and the Marches, and only refrained from attacking Rome, because it was still occupied by the French garrison quartered there since 1849.

In France, in the meantime, opposition to the Imperial policy had reunited the whole Catholic party from Montalembert to Veillot. Hostilities were opened by Monsignor Dupanloup; who, in his *Letter to a Catholic*, a pamphlet written in answer to *The Pope and the Congress*, delivered a public challenge to the Emperor. On January 19, 1860, an Encyclical was issued; and on every side the Catholics set their pens furiously to work. Mandates, pamphlets and articles followed one another in rapid succession. Lacordaire, Monsignor Gerbet, de Falloux, de La Rochejacquelin, Nettement, Veillot, and Monsignor Pie—almost every Catholic indeed who knew how to write—intervened in the controversy. Members of the Senate gave vigorous support to petitions in favour of the temporal power (March 29-30, 1860); while guarantees for its preservation were imperiously demanded in the Legislative Assembly, by the Catholic deputies Lemer cier, Plichon and Keller (April).

These oratorical and epistolary demonstrations were supplemented by solemn church ceremonies after the action at Castelfidardo on September 18. The defenders of the Pope who fell on that day were honoured as martyrs. Monsignor Pie denounced the new Pilate; and the aisles of the cathedrals rang with cries of grief and hatred. Repressive measures, such as the suppression of the *Unvers* in January, 1860, the regulation which obliged all episcopal mandates in pamphlet form to be stamped and legally registered, and the suppression of illegal associations formed to collect subscriptions for the papal cause, were all alike unsuccessful in checking this clamorous opposition.

Just at this time, also, another scheme, personally initiated by the Emperor, began to cause trouble. A second opposition party—consisting of the great manufacturers of the country, whom he had raised to the rank of legislators in 1852—now showed itself seriously displeased on account of the Treaty of Commerce with England, which the Emperor had concluded in defiance of their objections. Napoleon III was a Free Trader. The experiment made by England had early convinced him that modern requirements would be best served by a system of Free Trade, which would draw nations closer to one another, and encourage each country in the rational development of its individual resources. Mechanical improvements, he was persuaded, would prove a sufficient incentive to competition; and he felt confident that the harmonious relations which he desired could be established without friction. A reduction of duties, he believed, would assure cheap living to the

consumer, and would therefore secure him the gratitude of the working classes. But, at the same time, he was well aware—as the *procureurs généraux* had often reported to him—that such a policy would run counter to the prejudices and customs of manufacturers traditionally devoted to protection. For this reason he had always moved in the matter with extreme caution; and had limited his experiments in free trade to tentative measures, such as making the scarcity of 1853 a pretext for the temporary removal of the duty on corn; or taking advantage of the great industrial prosperity of the country to lower the taxes on raw materials, such as coal, iron and wool (1856). In that year the opposition of the Legislative Assembly had forced him to abandon a project for the removal of all prohibitions.

But, at the end of 1859, after the Free Traders in England had helped to bring back Palmerston to power, Napoleon believed that he could safely carry out his designs. At a meeting between Michel Chevalier, his confidant in economic matters, and Richard Cobden, then travelling in France and acting with the approval of Gladstone, the new English Chancellor of the Exchequer, a Treaty of Commerce was provisionally sketched out. The fact that France stood in need of English support for the further development of her Italian policy, after Villafranca, was expected to prove a valuable argument against the Protectionists; while hopes were entertained that the actual commercial prosperity of the country—now completely restored after the slight crisis of 1857—would render the change bearable to the manufacturing classes, and mitigate any inconvenience which might be caused by the new system.

Accordingly, on January 5, 1860, a letter from the Emperor to his Minister of Finance gave France solemn warning of a new fiscal programme. Free Trade was to be introduced, and to be rendered endurable by encouragements of all kinds to agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. On January 23 came news that the Emperor, exercising his privilege with regard to treaties of commerce, and with the assistance only of Rouher, had elaborated and signed an Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce with Cobden. Prohibitions on English goods were suppressed, and were replaced by duties which could not be raised beyond 25 per cent. *ad valorem*; in return, French products were admitted into England duty free, except where similar articles produced in England were subject to internal taxation. No sooner had this treaty become known than the opposition of the Protectionists burst forth with a violence which surprised the Emperor. Throughout their ranks this fiscal *coup d'état* was denounced as a national disaster. In April, in the Legislative Assembly, and at the manufacturers' meetings in May, Pouyer-Quertier eulogised Protection, and declared that the French negotiators had been duped by Cobden. The two Chambers, indeed, which were both entirely submissive to the Government, passed the Bill for the treaty almost unanimously; but the agitation continued throughout the country. Dissatisfaction reached

its height during October and November, when the special conventions fixing the new tariff became known.

By the end of 1860, Napoleon III, now censured and opposed both by Catholics and Protectionists, found himself in a singular position. His triumph in 1856 had led him to believe that he would succeed in establishing his personal policy—Free Trade and the policy of nationality; and he had sufficient confidence in the “Napoleonic idea” to believe that it would rally all Frenchmen to him, and secure his dynasty. As it was, however, he had only succeeded in making his most faithful supporters discontented; and, now that their irritation, which he alone had provoked, was beginning to cause trouble, he became alarmed. If he was to succeed in rallying all parties to himself and his dynasty, it was obvious that he must not be held solely answerable for all administrative mistakes; it was necessary to make the representatives of the nation share in the responsibilities of government, in appearance at any rate. As de Gramont said at the time: “The moment has come to lighten the Emperor’s burden, and to relieve him of the full weight of the discontent which his policy must inevitably produce. In saying this I do not mean to reproach him; I merely point out a fact from which there is no escaping. The Emperor can satisfy neither reactionaries nor revolutionaries. The rôle of mediator, which he has elected to play single-handed, makes it impossible.” The Comte de Morny, a faithful follower and counsellor of Napoleon III, was also of this opinion. Give the Opposition the right to advise, and let there be a strife of parties, and eventually the Emperor’s rôle of mediator would win appreciation; while the blame for his mistakes, if he made any, would fall upon one or other of the parties, and not upon him alone.

It was this small-minded Machiavellian calculation, be it noted, and not a trustful, generous belief in the principles of Liberalism, which produced the decrees of November 24, 1860. These empowered the Senate and the Legislative Assembly to move, and to discuss freely each year, an address in reply to the speech from the throne. This gave them an opportunity of criticising the policy of the Government, which was to be defended in both assemblies by Ministers without portfolios. For the future, also, parliamentary debates were to be fully reported. Thus the country would be kept informed of the responsibilities incurred by all parties; and, if the policy of the Government should ever prove unsuccessful, it would at any rate appear to have been approved and discussed by a majority of the nation’s representatives. But this majority, having been carefully selected, as has been pointed out, was certain to be faithful to the Government; and indeed the Emperor did not despair of adding to it from the Left itself, by utilising his policy of nationality to rally to his side the democratic Opposition.

His calculations were, however, disappointed. The parties which he was seeking to play off one against another took advantage of the

decrees of November, 1860, to make a unanimous demand for greater powers; the decrees became the point of departure, first, for a slow but certain revival of parliamentary institutions, and, before long, for a return to liberty. Even in March, 1861, when the Chambers first voted on the address, the new interest taken by the nation in parliamentary debates made itself felt. The little group of Republicans, it is true, known as the *Cinq*, were as yet only able to attempt an opposition that was quite elementary; and the manœuvres of de Morny so quickly disunited them, that Émile Ollivier even promised the Government his conditional support. Members of the Catholic Opposition, on the other hand, such as de La Rochejacquelin, and Heeckeren in the Senate, and Plichon and Keller in the Legislative Assembly, violently criticised the Emperor's Italian policy; while minorities of 61 in the Senate, and 91 in the Legislative Assembly, demanded the maintenance of the Pope's temporal power. Manifestations such as these had, however, been expected, and were undoubtedly insufficient in themselves to modify the policy of the Emperor; indeed they made him better able to understand the conditions under which the parliamentary shadow, which he had just evoked, might be rendered harmless to his own power.

The first condition of success for the Government was a strong financial position. But on this point the wisest advisers of the Empire could only endorse the opinion of the Opposition—that the absolutism of their sovereign was leading the country to bankruptcy. A policy of glory abroad and of favouritism at home, distant expeditions, and great public works, were all equally costly. The Emperor's power to redistribute the estimates for the various departments, after the Budget had been voted *en bloc* by the Legislative Assembly, and to authorise supplementary loans on his own responsibility, enabled him to spend money without accounting for it. Between 1851 and 1858 supplementary loans amounting to 2400 million francs had been contracted. During 1858-61 the public debt and the deficit in the Treasury increased by another 400 millions. The annual deficit was about 100 millions; and by the end of 1861 the floating debt had almost reached 1000 millions. Business men were growing anxious; and Fould himself echoed their uneasiness in a confidential report which reminded Napoleon III that, if he was to be sole sovereign, he must also be solely responsible. It concluded by telling the Emperor that, "if he would restore to the Legislative Assembly the privileges which unquestionably belonged to it, he would identify that Assembly with his Government"—that is, would make it share, in some degree, in his responsibilities. Here again the idea inspiring the decree of the preceding year made its appearance. In financial measures, as in measures of general policy, Napoleon III decided to attempt making the nation share in the responsibilities of administration. In a letter of November 14, 1861, he renounced his right to borrow money while the Chambers were not sitting, and declared that, for the

future, the ministerial Budget should be divided into sections, on each of which the Chambers should vote separately. At the same time Fould was appointed Minister of Finance; a decree of December 1 made him even a kind of prime minister. For the future, no decree authorising or ordering public works, or any measure capable of leading to charges on the Budget, was to be submitted to the Emperor for signature without a recommendation from the Minister of Finance. On December 31, 1861, the Senate issued a decree for the ratification of these reforms.

But, like the parliamentary reforms in 1860, these measures were intended to be only a blind. The fact that the Emperor retained the right to alter the estimates section by section, even in case this led to supplementary borrowing, made parliamentary control illusory. In 1862, supplementary loans, the deficit, and the floating debt, were still increasing, and it was somewhat naive to suppose that parliamentary parties would accept responsibility, unless they received compensation in the shape of more real powers. The decrees of 1860 had revived a taste for parliamentary control and liberty; but the parties had been made to perceive their own want of power, and before long were to find it insupportable. In 1862, this result was already noticeable, and the question of the control of the Budget was continually debated. Before the firm opposition of a commission, the Government was obliged to withdraw its project for a grant of 50,000 francs to General Cousin-Montauban, on his return from China; while Émile Ollivier emphatically pointed out the necessity of extending the financial powers of the Chamber.

Still more serious was the fact that even the Catholics no longer limited their opposition to the Government's foreign policy. They had been quite ready to agree with the internal policy a short time previously, when it only injured their adversaries; but they protested when measures were taken against themselves on account of their violent campaign in the papal interest. Owing to the recognition of the kingdom of Italy by the Emperor, in July, 1861, and to the help he had given the southern provinces in suppressing the brigandage which the Bourbonists had encouraged, and at which the papal Government in Rome had connived, the opposition of the Catholics had redoubled in fury. The religious Orders, and other powerful associations at the Church's disposal, joined in the battle. At a general assembly of the Society of St Vincent de Paul at Lusignan, the Bishop of Angoulême declared that Catholics ought not to be afraid of Judas. The Minister of the Interior, de Persigny, representative of democratic and anticlerical Bonapartism, had no difficulty in recognising whom the Bishop meant by Judas; and he decided that measures must be taken. In a circular of October 16, he asserted the right of the State to supervise charitable associations, praising, indeed, their aim, but declaring that certain persons were proposing "to use them for a purpose other than that of charity." He also ordered the Society of St Vincent de Paul to accept—like the



Freemasons before them—a president nominated by the Emperor. As the Society refused to agree to this condition, its central committee was consequently obliged to retire into obscurity.

During 1862, it was not without significance that the protagonists of the Catholic party intervened for the liberty of the Press and the right of association. Segur d'Aguesseau called the Minister Persigny a "Polignac," and complained of the restraints on the liberty of the Catholic Press. Once again there were protests against the surveillance to which the religious Orders were subjected; while the Government proved in vain, by enumerating the riches and effective strength of these associations, that its control had not injured their development. The Catholic party was no longer content to receive favours; it demanded, in its turn, guarantees and liberty.

The Emperor became uneasy at these symptoms. Up to this time he had remained tolerably faithful to the Italian policy which he had followed since the middle of 1861. He had helped Piedmont in its difficulties; and he had endeavoured to obtain from the Papacy, "a real compromise, which would bring peace to the bosom of the Catholic Church; and also permit it to share in the triumph of Italian patriotism" (*Instructions to M. de La Valette*, January, 1862). But the Pope had obstinately refused any concessions; while, on the other side, the consequences of the national movement led by Garibaldi, the new impulse of the Italian people towards Rome, as described elsewhere, all showed the Emperor that conciliation was impossible, and that any encouragement given to the Italians would quickly let loose a storm. At the Tuileries, the Emperor was surrounded by a Catholic coterie, headed by the Empress, who pointed out to him the danger at home from the approaching elections. In October, 1862, this party carried the day. Drouyn de Lhuys replaced Thouvenel as Minister of Foreign Affairs; and the Cabinet of the Tuileries gave the Piedmontese Ministers to understand that it was not going to lead them to Rome.

This concession to the Catholics came, however, too late. The most ardent spirits among the party, having once again realised the value of constitutional liberty, enrolled themselves for the future in the ranks of the Opposition, whence they prepared to claim that liberty in concert with its old defenders. For this purpose, a coalition was gradually formed; and Catholics and Protectionists alike reconciled themselves with the enemies of the Government, with Catholic Liberals, with Orleanist Doctrinaires, with Legitimists, and even with Republicans. The *Cinq*, who in their annual amendments to the address had demanded a more independent and genuine universal suffrage, liberty to hold meetings, liberty of the Press, ministerial responsibility and complete financial control, were well qualified to play a part in this Opposition. A large number of young men, from both the labouring and the educated classes, were reading Proudhon, listening to Blanqui and the exiles of 1852, and

publishing an increasing number of ephemeral and insignificant newspapers. Burning for action, this party sought everywhere for an opportunity of striking at the Empire. The Orleanist Doctrinaires, also, who between 1852 and 1860 had only been able to mourn over the unhappy times in letters to their friends—often very beautiful compositions—or in discourses at the Academy, no longer looked askance at the Republicans. Thiers himself, the old Orleanist Minister, again took part in the battle, where he proved more ambitious and warlike than ever. In spite of conflicting opinions—on such subjects for instance as the temporal power—democrats and men of the old parties combined against a Government which was now intolerable to them all.

On the very eve of the elections a common emotion cemented this union. In January, 1863, the young men in the Polish towns, who were suspected of encouraging the agitation for Polish nationality, were ordered to serve in the Russian army; and an insurrection broke out in Warsaw, which public opinion in France unanimously supported. The Catholics considered that nation a martyr to its faith; for Democrats its independence was a dogma; while even Conservatives remembered the historic rôle of Poland as the ally of France against Austria. This event gave the Emperor a unique opportunity of rallying all parties; but the distrust of England, the embarrassment of Austria, and the complicity of Prussia, caused him to renounce the idea of intervention. He sought indeed to satisfy parties at home with a semblance of glory; for, at the very time when he was allowing the unhappy country to be crushed, he addressed a remonstrance to Russia (*Notes* of April and July, 1863). But in doing this he hopelessly alienated the latter Power, without giving satisfaction to the various opponents united against him.

Such were the conditions under which the general election of 1863 took place (May 31 and June 1). Neither Proudhon's abstention from the election, nor the resistance of those Republicans who still scrupled to ally themselves with Royalists, nor finally the resistance, more energetic than wise, of the Government, which once again made alterations in the constituencies, and denounced its adversaries as traitors to their country, were able to prevent the Liberal Opposition from obtaining a notable success. 7,262,623 voters went to the poll, and the Opposition obtained 1,954,369 votes against 5,308,254 secured by the Government candidates. For the future, an Opposition numbering thirty-five (of whom seventeen were Republicans) existed in the Legislative Assembly, of whom the greater part were men of talent, well known for their parliamentary services. Members such as Jules Favre, Émile Ollivier, Ernest Picard, Jules Simon, Berryer, and above all Thiers, were quite able to baffle the ablest supporters of the Empire.

The moral effect of the election in the country was very great; and several exiles in London or Brussels imagined that the end of the régime had come. But in this they were mistaken. This Liberal opposition

was not, in itself, at all revolutionary. The Emperor estimated the situation more accurately when he dismissed Persigny, the incompetent Minister of the Interior, and made Duruy, a democrat and a reformer, Minister of Public Education. At the same time he gave the portfolio of Public Works to an Orleanist, Béhic, and sought to form a closer link between the Government and the Chambers by creating, as a kind of prime minister, a Minister of State, who—in the place of the Ministers without portfolios of 1860—was charged with defending the Imperial policy, and of commending it to the general public (Decrees of June 23, 1863). But, if concessions of this kind were to become an effectual means of stopping, or at least of controlling, the Opposition, it was necessary that the Emperor's personal policy, and the administration of his Ministers, should refrain in future from giving offence to the sentiments of their opponents, from reawakening the desire for guarantees, from discouraging loyalty, and from ultimately turning an opposition to the Government into an opposition to the Empire.

As it happened, however, the foreign policy of Napoleon III was quickly to turn all parties against him. By the end of 1863, France had quite lost the prestige acquired by the peace of 1856. The abrupt change of the Emperor's policy in October, 1862, had alienated Italy, without gaining over the Holy See. Remonstrances to Russia on the Polish question had estranged all those Powers who had interests in Poland; while relations with England were every day growing more strained, on account of the colonial expeditions. Syria and China, and finally Mexico seem to have attracted Napoleon III. In Mexico, ever since 1821, the Clerical and Liberal parties had been engaged in a struggle; and since 1859, an Indian, Benito Juárez—the Liberal vice-president—had managed to hold his own there against a Conservative rebellion, and a financial crisis precipitated matters. The Liberal Government being unable to pay European nations the debts recognised by the "Foreign Conventions," France, England and Spain decided to force Mexico to fulfil her financial obligations (October 31, 1861). From the very outset, the Emperor's imagination was busily at work. While England was proposing to assure herself an advantageous compensation for her wasted loans in Mexico by administering the customs; while Spain was dreaming of reestablishing one of her own Princes there; Napoleon III was seeking to satisfy both the Catholics and the Liberals at the same time, by the establishment of a great Catholic and Latin Empire in Mexico—a scheme which was, in fact, "the great idea of his reign."

Conflicting designs, and the intrigues of French agents, quickly brought about a rupture between the allies. The English troops re-embarked; and the Spaniards, as elsewhere described, soon followed their example. By March, 1862, only the French remained in Mexico, where they were now definitely engaged in a war for the purpose of conquering Juárez. In May, 1863, Puebla was taken; and in June the French troops

entered Mexico, where they proclaimed as Emperor, Maximilian of Austria, a son-in-law of the King of the Belgians, to whom Napoleon III had promised this Catholic throne. But, even before the new Emperor embarked for Mexico, the ultimate success of the expedition had become very doubtful. Juárez in the northern provinces, and Porfirio Diaz in the south, collected an ever increasing force of patriots to oppose the foreign invader. The expedition was costing France fourteen millions a month; it locked up 40,000 troops far from home; and sensible people began to ask if it would not be better to make terms with Juárez.

Just at this moment there arose the further question of the Danish Duchies. In November, 1863, Frederick VII of Denmark died; and the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein proclaimed the Duke of Augustenburg King, in defiance of the Protocol of London. In February, 1864, Prussia, with Austria following suit, occupied the Duchies with an armed force. To this high-handed action the Emperor, restrained at once by French public opinion, which showed much sympathy with Prussia, and by his policy of nationality, offered only a vague and partial objection, although he had a dim presentiment of its danger. In the following August, the conquered Duchies were ceded by Denmark to the two Powers.

These events were not of a nature to increase French prestige abroad, or to pacify the Opposition. In the debate on the address for 1864, Thiers, who, according to Pessard, had become the “Egeria of all the groups of the Opposition, whether in alliance or independent,” denounced the squandering in Mexico, and sharply criticised the “great idea” of the reign. At the same time, Jules Favre pointed out the violation of right which was being committed in the Duchies; while the whole Opposition unanimously denounced the financial confusion, military waste, and loss of prestige abroad. With as much firmness as moderation, Thiers demanded what he called “the indispensable liberties”; and in so doing supplied his party with a watchword (January 11, 1864).

Meanwhile Rouher, who in October, 1863, had succeeded Billault as Minister of State, and who was, to all appearance, a real prime minister, was very far from advising his master to execute any pledges for constitutional reforms. He kept repeating, it is true, the official formula which asserted that in 1860 the Emperor had been a voluntary and generous promoter of liberty; and he even declared that, when the right time came, he would “crown the edifice” by definitely establishing that liberty; but in reality he abandoned few of the practices of the absolute Empire. In August, 1864, he answered Thiers’ challenge by prosecuting the thirteen principal members of a committee which, at some bye-elections in February, had supported the Opposition candidates, Garnier-Pagès and Carnot. These men he had sentenced to a fine of 500 francs; while at the same time public lectures, or dinners, which were disapproved by the authorities, were again forbidden. The numerous strikes, brought about by the industrial expansion between 1861 and

1864, had indeed forced the Government to acknowledge the right of combination by a law passed on May 25, 1864. But this law was incomplete, for it did not allow workmen the right of association, a corollary without which no strike could be effectual. Since, moreover, the law was made use of by the Government to win over a portion of the working classes, it could not, in any circumstances, be made to look like a concession to the Democrats.

A year later, in spite of the solid facts supporting their arguments, and in spite of the firmness with which they presented their demands, the Liberals still appeared unable to obtain those privileges and guarantees which they desired. But, once again, the Emperor's foreign policy was to give them an opportunity. In the situation occupied by France after the events in Poland, in the Duchies, and in Mexico, the only country in Europe with which she could possibly form an alliance was Italy, and to obtain it she must abandon the cause of the Pope. By another sudden change of policy on September 15, 1864, Napoleon concluded a convention with the Cabinet of Florence, by which he undertook to withdraw his troops from Rome within two years, Victor Emmanuel on his side engaging not to attack the actual dominions of the Holy See. The Emperor secretly hoped that he might be able to give Venetia to Italy, and thus divert her from Rome.

The immediate result of these negotiations was the exasperation of the Holy See, and a renewal of the religious quarrel. On December 8, 1864, Pius IX. replied to the convention concluded on September 15, by issuing the Encyclical *Quanta Cura*, and the *Syllabus*. The tendencies of these documents will be examined elsewhere; but it is necessary to notice here that, though their meaning was veiled by generalities, they were partly an attack upon the French Government. Not only the philosophical principles of modern societies, such as liberty of worship, liberty of the Press, and free speech were condemned in these documents, but also the supremacy of the nation and universal suffrage. Napoleon III had gloried in being the representative of the revolutionary tradition; and had always advanced this profession with much solemnity. He understood the Pope's intention immediately, and forbade the publication of the *Syllabus* in France, on the ground that it "contained propositions contrary to those principles on which the Constitution of France rests" (January, 1865). This roused the resistance of the Bishops, who, from their pulpits and in their charges, read and commented on the papal document, of which almost all of them unreservedly approved. They went so far as to issue a protest against the Government's decision, but the Council of State refused to consider their grievance. The Government, irritated in its turn, seemed as if it meant to take the offensive; for it permitted a demonstration to take place at the funeral of Proudhon, the great Socialist thinker and enemy of the Church (January, 1865); encouraged Rouland, when he vigorously

refuted the Encyclical in the Senate; and published a remarkable report by Duruy in the *Moniteur*, recommending free and compulsory primary education (February, 1865).

Such a bold resistance, however, only increased the anxiety of moderate and loyal Catholics. Those statesmen, also, who had remained faithful to the traditional foreign policy of their country, and who had watched the accomplishment of Italian unity with profound regret, did not hesitate to denounce the September Convention as disastrous for France. Thiers, especially, demonstrated with unsparing precision the new dangers (April, 1865). Many deputies entirely devoted to the Emperor now found agreement with the orators of the Opposition; many, also, began asking if the Empire could not be regenerated by a gradual development of free institutions, and if a constitutional Opposition could not be created, which, before long, would be capable of supplying the Emperor with a new Government.

The events of 1866 hastened this evolution. In Mexico the Emperor Maximilian was powerless between the Liberal and Monarchical parties; while Bazaine, the commander of the French troops, was intriguing against him, with a view to taking his place. As Juárez still held out, it became necessary either to send fresh troops or to abandon Maximilian. The one course would ruin French prestige; the other would probably lead to a war with the United States, whose Government, now that the war of Secession was ended (April, 1865), was in a position to assert itself, and was already sending haughty notes to Paris. In either case France was forced again to deprive herself of useful troops, at the very moment when affairs in Europe were becoming seriously complicated. A more detailed account is given elsewhere of the quarrel between Prussia and Austria, which had arisen in August, 1864, over the settlement of the Duchies; showing how, between February and August, 1865, these two countries appeared to be on the eve of war; and how, in order to avoid hostilities, Prussia consented to the Convention of Gastein which awarded Schleswig to her, and Holstein to Austria. A useless circular, protesting against this Convention, was issued by Drouyn de Lhuys, in which he recalled the partition of Poland, and invoked the rights of nationalities. It was evident that the Convention was only a patched-up reconciliation. Bismarck had need of a war. In October he visited Biarritz; and conversations took place there which led to an alliance between Piedmont and Prussia against Austria, under French auspices, on the understanding that Piedmont was to have Venetia. In January, 1866, the differences of Austria and Prussia began to be acute; and in April, a Treaty of Alliance was signed between Italy and Prussia.

With this great conflict impending, public opinion in France became more and more uneasy. Not only did Thiers draw new arguments from the situation abroad for the "indispensable liberties"; not only did the Republican Left reiterate its demands, declaring that "the French people,

surrounded by free States, to which it had shown the path to liberty,... could not be treated as incapable or unworthy of bearing the glorious burden of its destiny"; but forty-five of the Imperialist majority at last decided to separate from the Right, and to assert their favourite ideal by asking the Emperor "to further the natural development of the great act of 1860." This was the first appearance of what was known as the Third Party, which with the help of Ollivier and a few others, who joined the original forty-five, mustered 63 votes in favour of an amendment on March 19, 1866. From this time onward, the Liberal Opposition was no longer the only party demanding constitutional evolution and the development of parliamentary guarantees—a visible sign that the public confidence in an absolute *régime* was gradually being shaken.

It was useless for Rouher to declare "that the Emperor had established the prosperity of his dynasty and of the country" upon the solid basis of that absolute government which was now being called in question. The Opposition believed that the reestablishment of a parliamentary system would be a better guarantee of prosperity than the genius of any sovereign; and the country was beginning to be of the same opinion. A speech delivered by Thiers, on May 3, upon Prussian ambitions and the reconstitution of the Empire of Charles V, produced a considerable stir; and the Emperor tried in vain to appease it by reviving the popular hatred of the treaties of 1815—treaties which, he declared, "some persons presume to make the sole basis of our foreign policy."

While public opinion was in this state, the news of Königgrätz startled all parties (July 3). The victory of Prussia, the swift and complete overthrow of Austria, at once put an end to all the Emperor's hopes of appearing as an armed mediator, in his own interest, between two exhausted belligerents. Italy, indeed, obtained Venetia, but the control of northern Germany was acquired by Prussia. The interests of France called for immediate intervention. But the army was not ready, and the best troops were still in Mexico. The Emperor, ageing and in bad health, was unable to come to any rapid decision; and he ultimately acquiesced in the formation of the North German Federation. "Nothing is left for us to do," said Drouyn de Lhuys, "but to shed tears."

An outburst of indignation followed in the Press. Public opinion was not in the least grateful to the Emperor for peace; it was conscious only of the humiliation of France. All Frenchmen alike dreamt of "*revanche*." Those political parties which the Emperor had formerly hoped "to unite beneath the mantle of his glory," now indeed united, but in opposition to himself. Republicans, Liberals, Nationalists, Conservatives, even Imperialists, all alike demanded satisfaction for the national *amour propre*. The unfortunate sovereign, now anxious for his dynasty, was for the future obliged to seek the dazzling but ever illusive glory which he needed, in novel diplomatic intrigues and fresh adventurous contrivances. By such devices, however, he only succeeded in giving a

still severer shock to his authority at home, and in concentrating the anger of every patriot in Germany upon the French nation.

At home the consolidation of the Third Party, brought about in the early months of 1866, had been the signal for the opening of a struggle between the supporters of the Absolute, and those of the Liberal and Constitutional Empire. This Third Party now formulated its programme. It did not desire a complete parliamentary system, but rather, as it said, "a development of political freedom"; by which it meant, a homogeneous Ministry, whose responsibility to the Legislative Assembly would give that body the power of controlling the Government, and the means of intervening effectually in matters of general policy. It also demanded the liberty of the Press and the right to hold public meetings. Before claims of this nature the partisans of authority began asking themselves whether granting the right to vote an address had not been a regrettable concession, which ought to be repealed; and in any case they made up their minds that for the future the constitution should be defended by some definite bulwark.

The struggle rapidly assumed the form of a personal rivalry between Rouher, the Minister of State, who had been the accomplice of the events of December, 1851; and Émile Ollivier, who was now seeking to convince the Emperor that, provided confidence were placed in him, he would save the *régime* by his own unaided efforts. The struggle for parliamentary liberty was therefore transferred to the Tuileries, and it lost the character of an opposition to the *régime*, which had still belonged to it in 1863, in the view of Thiers as well as of the Republicans. The conflict—no longer a subject of eager popular interest—was nevertheless to bear fruit almost immediately. At first, Rouher appeared to be carrying all before him. He brought forward a *Senatusconsultum*, which became law in July, 1866, and which decreed that all constitutional changes should be discussed by the Senate only; and that power to debate on such subjects should in future be denied to the Legislative Assembly. Any discussion, also, on these questions in the press was to be punished by a fine, which might amount to 10,000 francs. Petitions to the Senate, relating to any modification of the constitution, were only to be brought before a public sitting if they obtained the authorisation of at least three public offices. Such was the bulwark with which Rouher sought to defend the mock Constitution of 1852. But at the very hour of its promulgation foreign events had already rendered the *Senatusconsultum* a dead letter. The consequences of Königgrätz were unfolding themselves; the situation in Mexico was growing more embarrassing; while outside the Chamber opposition and discontent were increasing. The vacillating Emperor believed that the time had arrived for new concessions, and for transferring a few more responsibilities to the nation. On January 19, 1867, a semi-Liberal decree made Émile Ollivier believe that his triumph was at hand. This decree



restored the right of interpellation to the Deputies, suppressed the address as useless, and enacted that a Minister might be specially deputed by the Emperor to represent him at the Luxembourg or the Palais Bourbon. A letter from the Minister of State, accompanying this decree, also gave notice of two new Bills; one for the purpose of freeing the Press from government interference; the other for partially restoring the right of public meeting.

During the first six months of 1867, Imperialist deputies were much occupied in speculating as to whether this measure foretold the fall of Rouher, and the triumph of Ollivier. But it required no very fine discrimination to perceive, even at the publication of the decree, that Rouher might very possibly still retain the favour of the Emperor; and that the hour for a new *personnel* had not yet come. All interpellations required the signature of at least five members, and the approval of four committees; formalities which permitted the majority to reject any demand disagreeable to the Government. The presence of Ministers in the Chambers by no means indicated ministerial responsibility; for a communication of January 19, expressly stated that Ministers were responsible to the sovereign alone. In fact, Rouher, who was supported by a majority still secretly hostile to Ollivier, continued to hold his own in everything. At the moment when a numerous society of ultra-reactionary Bonapartists—firmly resolved to oppose every Liberal concession—was establishing itself under his auspices in the Rue de l'Arcade, he boasted shamelessly in the Chamber that he had himself inspired the Emperor with the idea of introducing the Liberal measures of January 19. At his instigation, also, on March 12, the Senate demanded and obtained the right of thoroughly examining all laws, instead of merely deciding if they were constitutional, and thus constituted itself a collaborator, and one sure to be reactionary, in the work of legislation. Before long, Walewski, Morny's successor, and Émile Ollivier's friend and protector, was obliged to resign the presidency of the Legislative Assembly. Finally, the Bills promised in a communication issued on January 12 were adjourned indefinitely. Ollivier—defeated and dissatisfied—attacked the "Vice-Emperor" in a most violent speech; but this action only secured a more dazzling mark of favour for his rival. On the morrow of this attack the Emperor sent Rouher the insignia of the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour in diamonds; in order to compensate him "for the unjust attacks to which he had been subjected" (July 12, 1867).

But parliamentary battles and court intrigues were alike vain; indeed, they would have probably nullified the action of the constitutional Opposition had not events abroad, together with a revival of the Republican and Socialistic movements, suddenly compelled some definite concessions. The advocates of despotism were fully aware that the Imperial Government must give satisfaction to the national *amour*

*propre* if it was to win power and prestige. To attain this object the *Arcadiens* (i.e. the supporters of the Government) did not shrink from the possibility of war. But the Emperor, who was ill, and had also a real knowledge of the situation, preferred to use diplomatic means to gain the success which another method would have been less likely to secure.

During the negotiations at Nikolsburg between Austria and Prussia, after the battle of Königgrätz, Benedetti, acting for France, had presented a demand for the cession of Mainz and a portion of the left bank of the Rhine. Bismarck styled this "an hotelkeeper's bill," and refused to accede to any such demand, expecting an outbreak of war in consequence. But no war ensued; and by not declaring it Napoleon III admitted his weakness. On August 20, however, he again naively claimed a price for his neutrality by demanding the friendly connivance of Prussia for an occupation of Luxemburg, and an invasion of Belgium. Bismarck allowed him to engage in negotiations, to state his demands, and to supply everyone with some pretext for alienating themselves from him, and then declined to pursue the matter further. At the beginning of 1867, consequently, Napoleon III was obliged to content himself with demanding a much humbler compensation, namely, Luxemburg, "the road to Brussels, in default of Belgium itself." In January, 1867, the Dutch, who were the actual owners of Luxemburg, offered to cede that province to France, in return for a payment in cash, if the Prussians would agree to withdraw the garrison they had maintained there since 1815. The proposed annexation had been agreed to by the people of Luxemburg, and the King of Prussia had consented to it; when, at the beginning of March, 1867, German patriotism suddenly took fright, and the Prussian ambassador von der Goltz in Paris roughly summoned de Moustier, who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs since October, 1866, to put a stop to the treaty of purchase. French diplomacy, which was skilfully conducted, was fortunate enough to maintain an honourable position during this crisis; and the question was referred to a Conference of the Powers in London. Eventually, France renounced her scheme for the purchase of Luxemburg; but Prussia evacuated the fortress, which was declared neutral and dismantled.

Harmony being thus reestablished between the two Courts, the magnificent *fête* of the Great Exhibition at Paris in 1867 opened under favourable auspices. This was a gay and brilliant episode. For a period of two months, the reception of sovereigns, and of pleasure-seekers from all nations, together with a succession of reviews, banquets, and fireworks, obliterated all thought of public affairs from the minds of the French people. But the *fêtes* were destined to end in a cloud of melancholy and anxiety; and the awakening to reality was a sad one.

During the night of June 29-30, a telegram brought the intelligence that the Emperor Maximilian had been shot at Queretaro. The lamentable adventure was now indeed at an end. Ever since February, 1866,

Napoleon III had decided to withdraw his troops from Mexico, and to abandon the unfortunate Maximilian, whose wife, the Empress Charlotte, had been to Saint-Cloud in the hope of awakening the Emperor's pity. But she could obtain no help from him; and in her despair she had gone out of her mind (September, 1866). In December, Maximilian refused to abdicate his throne at the request of Napoleon III; and in March, 1867, Bazaine embarked the last of the French battalions. In the following May, while trying to organise a last despairing resistance, Maximilian was traitorously delivered into the hands of Juárez, and shot without mercy. This mournful news made a deep impression upon public opinion. It was the end of the glory of the Empire. From every side, also, during the summer of 1867, came tidings of humiliations and rising difficulties. The Emperor had hoped that the Tsar's visit to Paris would obliterate the impressions of 1863; but, when the Pole Berezowski shot at the royal visitor, and a Parisian jury brought in a verdict of extenuating circumstances for the patriot, this diplomatic expectation was disappointed (June). A few weeks later, when the Emperor reminded Germany in a Note of the rights of the populations of the Duchies, the Prussian Government gave him to understand that it was not his place to intervene in German internal affairs (July). The discouragement of the sovereign after this rebuff is easy to realise, and also the anxiety with which he watched "the black shadows," as he called them, which overshadowed the horizon (Speech at Lille, August 27).

At this point, however, an understanding was arrived at with Austria. In August, to the great dissatisfaction of the Prussian Press, the French Emperor went to Salzburg, on a visit to the Austrian. In the following October, Francis Joseph returned the visit, and during his stay in Paris admitted the possibility of an alliance, which "would be a fresh guarantee for the peace so essential to the prosperity of the nations of Europe." But, in order to secure a lasting alliance between France and Austria, which would become a real guarantee for a balance of power against the ambitions of the Berlin Cabinet, Italy must first be detached from her alliance with Prussia. By a sort of fatality, however, at the end of 1867, Napoleon III, in answer to the Catholic demands, was once again to engage in hostilities with the patriots of Italy. After the sharp conflict at the beginning of 1865, the Emperor, whose determination was never much more than a half-determination, had made the Clerical party some important concessions. Duruy's report had been quickly disowned; and Prince Napoleon was publicly reprimanded for declaring that the Empire would never betray the Revolution (May, 1865). In defiance of the September Convention, Napoleon III had even allowed French officers and soldiers to enter the service of the Pope. But all this was insufficient to satisfy the Catholics and the Bishops who, like Dupanloup and Pie, had joined with the *Univers* against the Emperor. They grew more arrogant than ever, and demanded fresh concessions. At

home, they furiously attacked Duruy, the Minister of Education, who was increasing the number of elementary schools, claiming the right of the State to superintend the education of girls, endeavouring to make the encroaching religious Orders keep within the law (Bill of 1867), and working, like a true democrat, by means of popular libraries, evening classes and public conferences, at the task of educating the voters under universal suffrage. Abroad, the Catholic party demanded that efficacious means should be employed for the protection of the Pope's temporal power.

By the end of December, 1866, the last French troops had evacuated Rome, in accordance with the September Convention. In February, Garibaldi left his nest at Caprera, and revived the zeal of his faithful followers with the cry of "Rome or death!"; and in September led his followers into the States of the Church. This time Napoleon was not strong enough to withstand the anger of his Catholic subjects; and on October 25, a French force left Toulon for Rome. On November 3, this army completely routed Garibaldi's troops at Mentana; and General de Failly telegraphed "that the *chassepots* (the new breech-loading rifles) had done wonders." Napoleon's rupture with the Italian patriots was now complete. A few weeks later, on December 4, Rouher in the Chamber officially sanctioned this rupture, declaring amid the applause of the majority, "that Italy should never take Rome; that France would never, never permit such a violence to her honour and to Catholicism."

In France, however, this last expedition to Rome at once showed the power of a new opposition, alike irreconcilable and irrepressible, that of the new reconstituted Republican party. Mentana had not only set Italians and Frenchmen at enmity; it had also set the Revolutionists against the supporters of authority. The word for action came from the Republican Congress sitting at Geneva. Napoleon III had sent his troops to Italy principally in order to avert a revolution; on November 2, by way of an answer, the first attempt at a public demonstration took place in Paris. Since the election of 1863, the Republican party had been growing larger and stronger. Side by side with the Parliamentary Opposition composed of the veterans of 1848, the returned exiles of 1859, the young lawyers who had supported the *Cinq*, and who had been candidates in 1863 (to all of whom an alliance with the Liberals became daily more unbearable), another opposition, at once more audacious and uncompromising, had now come into being. Men like Jules Favre, Jules Simon, Ernest Picard, and Émile Ollivier, had been the most illustrious representatives of the earlier generation. Léon Gambetta, a young lawyer from Cahors, whose eloquence was the admiration of the *Quartier Latin*, quite realised the utility of their work, but at the same time was already conscious that an opposition of another sort had become necessary. Between 1863 and 1868, a great quantity of political and religious criticism had been published, and had influenced the minds of the younger generation. Wise and moderate Reviews, like the *Revue de*

Paris, insignificant daily papers containing literary criticism, like the *Revue pour tous*, the *Jeunesse*, and the *Travail*, all of which had been quickly destroyed by their own audacities, had now been succeeded by papers of even stronger Republican and Socialistic tendencies. Such were the *Rive Gauche*, to which Rogeard and Charles Longuet contributed; the *Courrier français*, under Vermorel's direction, in which Vallès collaborated; and *Candide*, edited by Blanqui and his disciples. An International Congress of students at Liège, in October, 1865, and the aforementioned Republican Congress for the promotion of Peace and Liberty at Geneva, in September, 1867, had given the new men opportunities of solemnly affirming their materialistic opinions and their violent Republicanism.

The formation, in the wake of this party, of a strong labour opposition was of special importance. The industrial expansion, which had been going on since 1851, had concentrated the working classes in the towns; and little by little a perception of their interests as a class had arisen among them. The sentimental and utopian form of socialism, current in 1848, had given place to a more reasonable scheme for defending their own interests. At first, the Government had endeavoured to use this new force for its own purposes. In 1862, it assisted the working classes to send delegates to the London Exhibition. It allowed them to express their demands freely, and granted them the right of combination (May 25, 1864); and, though it had not permitted the formation of unions, it had tolerated the existence of French branches of the "Workmen's International Association," founded in London in 1864.

But since 1866 any realisation of the Government's hope of attracting anticlerical and Republican workmen, until now more or less neutral, by means of social concessions had grown more and more problematical. When, however, the Empire, on the one side, required a declaration of support from them, while the Blanquists, on the other, pressed them to proclaim their Republicanism—the working classes realised, as time went on, that they would be obliged to declare themselves politically, if it were only with a view to the future of their own movements for cooperative and social purposes. In September, 1867, the second International Congress at Lausanne sent a delegation to the Peace Congress at Geneva; and Socialistic workmen thus united themselves with genuine Republicans against the Empire. On November 4, 1867, the Internationalists took part in the demonstration against the second expedition to Rome; and, on December 30, the members of the Paris Branch were prosecuted for having interfered in political matters.

At the beginning of 1868 the position of the Empire seemed more than ever precarious, and the Prussian danger loomed larger. "Any accident," wrote the French military *attaché* at Berlin, "may bring on war." In view of this coming struggle the alliance with Italy was indispensable to France, but after Mentana it was out of the question.

After the Mexican fiasco and in face of Prussia's military position, a reorganisation of the army was necessary, and for this the consent of the nation had to be obtained. But the nation exacted fresh pledges and guarantees; the parliamentary Opposition was hostile; and Republican and Socialist tendencies were undermining the Imperial authority.

The unlucky sovereign was thus compelled to carry out in 1868 some of the reforms which he had succeeded in putting off. At the risk of offending all parties and classes, he began by demanding the reform of the army. After the campaign of 1866 Niel had proposed universal service in imitation of Prussia. The Chamber, however, would not agree, and the Republicans advocated the creation of a militia on the Swiss system and the adoption of a pacific policy. The Chamber rejected these proposals contemptuously, but compromised by conceding to the Government a system of nine years' service (five years in the active army and four in the reserve) which was calculated to yield 200,000 men. It also agreed to the establishment of a *Garde Nationale*, to include those who had escaped or avoided regular service, and thus double the number of effective troops (February 1, 1868). But the Government shrank from increasing the general discontent by calling out this force for service, and in 1870 it existed on paper only.

The time to make concessions had come, and it was necessary to make them openly and not under specious pretexts as in 1860. From this time forward the Emperor could only hope to silence his opponents by yielding to their demands. The Liberals and the members of the Third Party obtained the enactment of two laws which had been promised on January 19, 1868. On May 11, a Statute relating to the Press reduced the formalities for founding a journal to a simple declaration, and abolished administrative interference in the way of warning, suspension and suppression. Newspapers were placed within the jurisdiction of the Courts, that is to say, of correctional tribunals, not juries. The stamp and the deposit by way of security were still insisted on; but the administrative system was practically at an end. On the other hand, an enactment of June 11 authorised the holding of public meetings subject to the signature by certain persons of the necessary declaration, and provided that each meeting should take place in a closed building under the supervision of a commissary of police who had power to dissolve it.

But these half-liberties came too late; men are not grateful for what they extort by force. No one was deceived. The edifice was no sooner complete than it began to crumble away; the concessions were turned into weapons against the Government. Immediately on the publication of the Press law, Republican journals began to multiply. The elections were to take place in May, 1869, and an active propaganda was necessary. In addition to the *Siècle*, to the *Opinion nationale* (founded in 1859), to the *Temps* (1861), and the *Avenir national* (1865), there appeared the *Tribune*, edited by Eugène Pelletan, the *Revue politique* of Challemeil-Lacour, the

*Démocratie* of Chassin, the *Électeur* of Ernest Picard, the organ of the Moderate Republicans, and the *Réveil* of Delescluze, a gloomy revolutionary who had returned to Paris from Cayenne ready once more to enter the lists as the champion of a Jacobin Republic. On May 30, 1868, Henri Rochefort began to publish his *Lanterne*, a periodical pamphlet which quickly eclipsed these other publications. The witticisms, the puns, the impertinences of that able and fervid controversialist flew from mouth to mouth; neither prosecutions nor police measures could prevent the terrible little sheets from crossing the frontier. At the Tuileries all was consternation. At the same time the public gatherings of Socialist workmen became more frequent; social questions were ventilated, and the various economic systems came into violent collision; but before long the discussions degenerated into political disquisitions. Imperial institutions, religion and the rights of property were made the subjects of debate; and Conservatives of every hue, Imperialist or Liberal, began to feel misgivings.

Towards the end of the year certain events showed how strong and uncompromising was the opposition to the Empire. Eugène Ténôt in *Paris in December, 1851*, in moderate and simple, but merciless, terms had told the story of the *Coup d'état*. On November 2, All Souls' Day, some Republican workmen, after a demonstration over the grave of Manin, the Italian patriot, discovered the forgotten tomb of Baudin, who had fallen while fighting on a barricade. The Republican newspapers opened a public subscription for a monument. They were prosecuted; and during the trial Gambetta, who defended Delescluze, fulminated a crushing charge against the *Coup d'état*. He denounced the men "plunged in debt and crime" who had originated it, recalled the "slaughter" in the streets of Paris, and wound up by invoking a "great national expiation." His clients were found guilty; but Gambetta's words were applauded throughout Republican France.

Every day new enemies appeared. The democratic propaganda made headway even amongst the *bourgeoisie*, that "influential class" whose example had much weight with the people. The adventurous and revolutionary spirits whose aim it was "to disturb public tranquillity," in the words of the Emperor at the opening of the Chambers (January 18, 1869), gained more and more influence. Even the parliamentary Opposition, inspired by the popular movement, gained both in activity and numbers; and during the session of 1869 it terminated successfully its protracted campaign in defence of the liberties of Paris. From that time forward the extraordinary Budget of the City was to be voted by the Municipal Council under the sanction of the Legislative Body, and no longer depended entirely on the will of the Government.

The elections of May 23 and 24, 1869, gave proof of the progress of the Opposition in the country. The parties of which it was composed fought their battles separately, sometimes even in rivalry with each other,

but with the certainty that their common cause—such was its strength—could not suffer from their divisions. The Republican party, the most robust and the boldest of all the political groups, ventured even in Paris to support candidatures hostile to the Government, some of its members giving their adherence to Moderates, others to Irreconcilables, others even to *Insermentés*—that is, candidates who refused to take the prescribed oath, while a few even advocated the candidatures of working men. The Government had not ventured to put forward its officials as candidates, and the nation could therefore concentrate its interest in the struggle between the Moderates and the Irreconcilables, between Carnot and Gambetta, Jules Favre and Rochefort. The result more than fulfilled the hopes of the Republicans. Throughout the country the Government secured 4,438,000 votes, the Opposition 3,355,000. Since 1863 the Government had lost 662,000 adherents, while the Opposition had gained 1,350,000. In Paris the number of those who voted for the Government did not exceed 74,000 while 231,000 rallied to the Opposition. The Opposition moreover gained not only in numbers but in strength; Orleanists and Liberals were defeated by Republicans and Democrats; and out of ninety candidates of the Opposition something like forty were the irreconcilable foes of the Empire. The Government did its best to alarm the country and to rally the Moderates to its side by pointing to the red spectre of revolution. Its own agents, the *blouses blanches* (white blouses), instigated disturbances; and domiciliary visits, arrests and prosecutions followed. Its paid writers enlarged upon the terrors of the Socialist propaganda which, under the guidance of able and prudent leaders like the chiefs of the second “International Congress,” was gaining ground rapidly amongst the working classes. These tactics, which the Republicans had no difficulty in exposing, might rally to the Empire a few moderate Liberals alarmed at democratic and Socialistic tendencies; but, in order to detach and win over again to the dynasty a part of the Opposition, it was necessary to admit the justice of their claims.

During a whole year, while Prussia was arming and the tide of democratic revolution rising, there ensued between the two factions, each of which proclaimed that it would save the Empire, a last and dramatic struggle which ended in the ruin of France. The Third Party imagined that they could restore order and create a stable government by means of a Liberal *régime*; and on June 28 the 116 deputies, of which it was composed, brought forward an interpellation, in which they demanded “the creation of a responsible Ministry, and the recognition of the right of the Legislative Body to regulate the essential conditions of its own activity.” With the help of forty deputies of the Left the 116 obtained a majority. The Emperor had no choice, if he was to avoid a struggle with at least one-half of his subjects, but to grant the demand of the Third Party. On July 12 by a Message to the Legislative Body the Emperor adopted the programme of the 116;



but to prevent the discussion of these constitutional questions, he, in a strange spirit of contradiction, prorogued the very body whose powers were in process of being enlarged (July 13). For another six months, by a succession of intrigues, the contest was maintained between the party of Government and the Liberals, while the unhappy sovereign, worn by illness (in August his life was despaired of), and helpless in the face of opposing influences, hesitated to cast in his lot with one party or the other.

On July 13 the Emperor had suppressed the Ministry of State and appointed Rouher President of the Senate, but he had chosen Forcade de La Roquette, the great supporter of official candidatures, as Minister of the Interior, and he shrank from calling to office the men who, in the eyes of the country, would have heralded the new *régime*. On September 6 the Senate adopted the draft of the Decree framed in accordance with the promises of the Message. The Legislative Body became a parliamentary assembly after the English fashion; it had the right to choose its own president and secretaries, to propose enactments, to criticise and vote the Budget, and discuss amendments in detail. The Senate also became a deliberative assembly; its sittings were public; it had the right of criticising and discussing laws voted by the Chamber and of sending them back for reconsideration, the Ministers too were declared responsible and liable to be arraigned before the Senate. The Emperor, however, shrank from becoming a constitutional monarch in the true sense. The *Senatus-consultum* declared that the Ministers depended on him alone—a reservation showing how unreal was their responsibility. There could be no doubt that at heart he sympathised with the Government party—the *Arcadiens* or *Mameluks*—who found in the Empress, now that the physical strength of the Emperor was declining, an ally more powerful than ever. Rouher continued to be the Emperor's trusted adviser.

On November 29, in opening the Chambers, the Emperor expressed incidentally his doubt and distress at the prospect of all these reforms. The new *régime*, "avoiding reaction on the one hand and revolution on the other, ought," said he, "to be founded on order and liberty." "As for order," he added, "I answer for it; as for liberty, it is for you to aid me in preserving it." But the Third Party, after the six months' grace, were no longer satisfied with declarations and promises, and the negotiations between their chief Ollivier and the Court were hurried on. On December 28 Émile Ollivier was entrusted by the Emperor with the "formation of a homogeneous Cabinet, representative of the majority of the Legislative Body"; and on January 2, 1870, the new Ministry was constituted. The Ministry was, from the first, confronted with grave difficulties, both in Parliament and in the country. The party which should have formed its chief support was already divided; the majority following Ollivier were satisfied with the *Senatusconsultum* and formed the Right Centre; but the other members, under the leadership of former

parliamentarians and former Orleanists, Buffet and Daru, detesting all that savoured of Caesarism, demanded wider powers for the elected chamber and that ministerial responsibility should be made a reality. After protracted negotiations Ollivier had been compelled to admit to his "homogeneous" Cabinet four members of the Right Centre and four of the Left Centre, while he retained three of the former Ministers.

What was to be the trend of the new Minister's policy? On the Right he was supported by the official ministerialists, original adherents of the Empire who had grown with its evolution, and who secured him an enormous majority; but he was opposed by the Extreme Imperialists, men whose intractable temper was stiffened by the fact of their secret relations with the Court, and who welcomed any blunder of the Minister's as a pretext for the advocacy of their own methods. On the Left the forty Liberal or Republican deputies were no doubt helpless; but they spoke in the name of the populations of the great towns, of the working classes and of the educated middle class, and their pronouncements had the weight of revolutionary manifestos. The Republicans, as a matter of fact, no longer felt for parliamentary opposition the enthusiasm of 1863. The programme of their most popular deputies—of Gambetta for instance, known as the programme of Belleville, comprising as it did "universal suffrage in its widest sense, the freedom of the Press, the right of meeting and of combination and of trial by jury for all political offences, the separation of Church and State, the suppression of permanent armies," could exist under the empire only as an enunciation of principle, for it was a declaration of open war. Behind the Radicals moreover sprang up the Socialists of the "International," preaching republicanism and revolution to the workmen in the great towns, organising trades unions, supporting strikes and denouncing even the most advanced politicians for their timidity on economic questions. The collectivist theories adopted by the "International" at Brussels (September, 1868) and again at Basel (September, 1869) together with the Blanquist traditions, were preparing the ground in the artisan quarters of Paris and the great towns for acts of open revolt. So early as October 26 an outbreak was only averted by the absence of the Deputies. In November the election of Rochefort, who was returned by 17,900 votes for Belleville at a bye-election—Gambetta having decided to sit for Marseilles—was regarded as a Socialistic and revolutionary triumph. On January 12, 1870, the Ollivier Ministry had to deal with the manifestations provoked by the death of Victor Noir—the victim of Prince Pierre Bonaparte—around whose body a crowd of 100,000 persons assembled to testify their hatred of the Empire.

In reality, at the beginning of 1870, it was no longer a question whether the Left Centre or the Right Centre would prevail, or if Ollivier was capable of converting a Liberal Empire into a Constitutional

monarchy, but only whether he could save the Empire from destruction by dint of liberal concessions and a policy of peace. The history of his Ministry is the history of his surrenders to the *Arcadiens*, and to the policy of despotism and war. At the outset he had promised legislation in favour of the Press, the repeal of the Law of Public Security of 1858, and the authorisation of the public sale of newspapers. The Ministers, too, of the Left Centre were anxious to emphasise their fidelity to their principles, and to do away with the right of the Government to reshape at will the electoral districts and support its official candidates. They proposed in addition to suppress the constituent authority of the Senate, which made it impossible for the elected Chamber to achieve Constitutional progress. In February, by a clever manœuvre of the Republican Left, Ollivier was compelled to condemn the system of official candidature. In March he was forced to redeem his pledges by proposing a revision of the Constitution; and, in a Message of the 21st of that month, the Emperor proclaimed his willingness to adopt all the reforms that Constitutional government demanded. By April 20 the reform was accomplished; the Senate became an Upper House sharing legislative power with the elected Chamber, and the constituent authority was henceforth to rest with the people. No change in the Constitution could be made without a *plébiscite*, and the Orleanist Ministers hoped that no change would be made without the sanction of the Chambers. In spite, however, of these reforms, nothing indicated that Ollivier had succeeded in consolidating the Empire. In dealing with the Republicans and Socialists, whose audacity grew day by day, he was compelled to return to the methods of absolutism. He arrested Rochefort at Belleville (February 9) for taking part in the obsequies of Victor Noir; he arrested the editors of the *Marseillaise*, and kept under police supervision the leading spirits of the International—Varlin at Paris, Richard at Lyons, Aubry at Rouen and Bastelica at Marseilles. But, notwithstanding all these measures, and in spite of the acquittal of Pierre Bonaparte by the High Court of Tours, uneasiness was still felt in Imperial circles.

It was at this point especially that the suggestions of the Absolutists were listened to, and that the counsels of Rouher prevailed once more over those of Ollivier. Already the idea of war, and of seeking beyond the frontier the needed popularity, haunted the Imperial counsels; but the Emperor, weary and old, with no confidence in the future, inclined to less perilous measures. A triumphant *plébiscite*, placing fresh power in his hand, was his dream. The Senate, led by Rouher, supported him. The extreme Bonapartists hoped to find in this repetition of an act in itself peculiarly Napoleonic, a check on the growth of parliamentarism, and the assertion of the triumph of personal government over Liberalism. Ollivier saw through the manœuvre; he resisted at first, but afterwards gave way. The Orleanists Buffet and Daru would be no parties to this return to despotism; and, as they could no longer look forward to the

establishment of the parliamentary and constitutional monarchy of their tradition, they resigned.

On April 23 the French nation was summoned to declare by *plébiscite* "whether it approved the Liberal reforms effected in the constitution since 1860 by the Emperor with the concurrence of the chief bodies of the State, and whether it ratified the *Senatusconsultum* of April 20, 1870." In his summons to his people, Napoleon III urged them to vote "aye" in order "to avert the peril of revolution," to "establish order and liberty on a firm basis," to "assure the transmission of the crown to his son." From April 23 to May 8 a great battle raged between the Empire and the Republic. The Republican forces, it is true, were once again divided; some, amongst them Ernest Picard, became alarmed at the Republican and Socialistic movement, and feared that the Empire might use it as a weapon against the Republic; they resolved therefore to break with the Extreme Left, and formed the Open Left (*Gauche ouverte*), as contrasted with the Closed (*Gauche fermée*). The Democratic Committee of the Rue de Sourdrière carried on nevertheless a vigorous campaign; and in opposition to it the Central Plebiscitary Committee (*Comité central plébiscitaire*), the organ of the Autocratic Right, engaged in the struggle. While the contest went on, Ollivier could not remain in the background. He required of his officials a "devouring activity," and to emphasise the vigilance of the Imperial Government, the defender of order and property, he announced the discovery of a plot against the life of the Emperor, and began a fresh prosecution of the "International." The voting took place on May 8: 7,358,786 voted "aye," 1,571,939 voted "no," and there were 1,894,681 abstentions; Napoleon III secured once again the triumphant majority which in the past had raised him to the throne. The Empire seemed to have gathered strength, and the Emperor called upon Frenchmen to contemplate the future with confidence. The Ministry was reconstituted; the Duc de Gramont, a trained diplomat, became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Plichon Minister of Public Works. The revolutionary agitation seemed to be quieting down, and abroad also there was apparent calm. In reply to Jules Favre on June 30 Ollivier declared: "On whichever side we look there is an absence of troublesome questions; at no moment has the maintenance of peace in Europe been better assured." A few days later, the storm broke which was to sweep away a government undermined in every direction, and to lay bare the contradictory impulses which convulsed the French nation. The effort of the Liberals to extort a system of constitutional guarantees and parliamentary liberty, coupled with the social demands of the working class, had given fresh vigour to all political parties; Parliamentary Orleanists, Moderate Republicans, Radical Democrats and Socialists—all joined forces to attack the Empire. But which of them was to carry the position and to use for its own ends the vast energies thus let loose? Once more, it was the

shock of events beyond the frontier which decided the question and it was amid the scenes of a cruel tragedy that the political constitution was reshaped.

From the beginning of 1868 the threat of a Franco-Prussian war hung over Europe. War was necessary to Bismarck to enable him to create German unity under Prussian headship, while the French were driven headlong into it by the interests of their dynasty combined with the intense feeling excited by the campaign of Königgrätz. It was with an eye to Prussia that in July, 1868, the Emperor, with the aid of certain picked officers, had attempted to reorganise the army; and it was against Prussia that he had been endeavouring to form permanent alliances with Austria and Italy. During the whole of 1869 negotiations had been going on between Florence, Paris and Vienna: Italy especially leaned to war as a means of satisfying Italian patriotism after Mentana and of reconciliation with France. Austria on her side dreamed of revenge for Königgrätz; and the French Government anticipated a success which would restore all its former authority. But the Emperor, whose energies were sapped by successive attacks of hæmaturia and whose hesitation and timidity increased with age, was anxious to come to such an agreement with Prussia as should ensure peace and at the same time bring glory to France; and, contemporaneously with his negotiations with Italy and Austria, he pursued the project of a Franco-Belgian Zollverein for which the assent of Prussia was necessary.

The Italian alliance, though indispensable, was offered only on a condition which prevented a treaty. Italy demanded a return to the Convention of 1864 and the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome. In June and again in September, 1869, this condition was pressed upon the Emperor, but he still hung back. The Catholics, in the consciousness that the support which they furnished against the rising wave of revolution was necessary to the Empire, asserted themselves with greater energy. Since the middle of 1868 they had carried on a furious campaign against Duruy, the democratic Minister of Public Instruction, and they finally brought about his dismissal (July, 1869). So early as July 10, 1868, the Pope had summoned an Œcumenical Council to meet at the Vatican on December 8 of the following year; but he had omitted to invite, in accordance with the invariable custom of the Church, the ambassadors of the Great Powers; and it soon became known that the object of the meeting was to proclaim the infallibility of the Pope and to make all bishops immediately dependent upon him. The French Government, more endangered than any other by these attempts to trench on the civil authority, tried a remonstrance and, for a moment, even contemplated breaking off negotiations with the Vatican. On the other hand, in order not to offend its Catholic subjects and to avail itself of their aid against the Vatican, the Government was compelled to maintain its soldiers at Rome and thwart the aspirations of Italy. Under these

conditions the negotiations for a triple alliance had very little chance of achieving success.

At this juncture, while the diplomatic position was still uncertain, the candidature of Leopold of Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain was announced. From the time when he was first spoken of (April, 1869), the comments of the French Press and certain steps taken by the Government satisfied Bismarck that this was the "red rag" for the "French bull." From March to June, 1870, he was quietly preparing for his great stroke; and on July 2 France was informed that Leopold of Hohenzollern was undoubtedly a candidate for the throne of Spain. The excitement at the Tuileries was intense, and in the opinion of Emile Ollivier, who since May 8 had drawn nearer to the Imperialists, the Emperor needed a great diplomatic success, which, following on the *plébiscite*, would complete the discomfiture of the Republican and Liberal Opposition. Such a success was indispensable; the newspapers devoted to the empire were foremost in clamouring for it.

Ollivier, Marshal Leboeuf, and the Emperor desired that this satisfaction should be gained by diplomatic methods; but during the night of July 5-6 the counsels of the Empress and de Gramont prevailed, and a note was framed in arrogant terms. If, however, Bismarck wished for war, the King of Prussia was not equally decided. On July 10 he yielded to the demands of the French Government; and on the 12th, by his order, the father of Leopold, on behalf of his son, renounced the throne of Spain. Bismarck, in despair, was on the point of resigning; while Ollivier was overjoyed in the belief that he had secured peace abroad and tranquillity at home. The Absolutists, infatuated by their conception of Imperial glory, regarded the proffered satisfaction as insufficient; it was also necessary, they considered, to humiliate the King of Prussia or to conquer him. It will be seen elsewhere how on the evening of July 12 the Government decided to require from the King of Prussia an undertaking for the future; how on the 13th Benedetti obtained by a piece of unexpected good fortune a further concession from the King—the public approval by Prussia of the withdrawal of the candidature—and how, finally, Bismarck on the same day, making use of a telegram received from Ems during the last negotiation, turned it into an attack on France, which, while it roused German patriotism, at the same time excited the "French bull" to fury. The fates had declared for war. The French Government, after contemplating the summoning of a congress on the 14th, decided that evening, on the strength of information which promised the assistance of Austria and the south-German States, to propose to the Chambers a declaration of war. The Emperor shed tears; but the Empress rejoiced in a war which seemed to her to bring salvation. On the 15th the Chamber, without requiring further information, voted for war, Thiers, Gambetta, and eight others alone opposing the motion.

The *Marseillaise* was sung in the streets, and the people shouted "*À Berlin.*"

As a matter of fact, in spite of the assurances of Marshal Leboeuf, the army was not ready; and, with respect to alliances, it is now known that, at the moment when she entered upon the struggle, France had received nothing more than vague assurances from Austria and Italy. On July 14, to obtain the armed cooperation of the Italians and consequently that of Austria, the Government decided to recall its troops from Civita Vecchia. It was too late to induce Italy to abandon her neutrality; before doing this she demanded the evacuation of Rome and a free hand to deal with the Holy See. It was in vain that Count Beust insisted that the French Government should consent to take the only steps by which the alliance could be brought about; for on July 25 the Emperor declared that he "could not defend his honour on the Rhine to sacrifice it on the Tiber." When on August 19, after the first defeats, he yielded, it was once more too late; the concessions forced from him failed to induce Italy to stretch out a helping hand. In their eagerness to save Rome, the Catholic party had brought about the ruin of the Empire and the humiliation of France.

The end of July and the beginning of August witnessed the first defeats. On receipt of the news the Republicans and Socialists of Paris, burning with patriotism and intoxicated with memories of the Revolution, clamoured for war to the knife. The majority, yielding to the pressure of public opinion, abandoned Ollivier. The Emperor being with the army, the Empress, as regent, chose the new Ministers from among the Bonapartists of the extreme war party (August 10, 1870). The National Guard were thereupon called out; a loan of 1,000,000,000 francs was arranged; and Councillors of State were despatched on special missions. The Government of the Empire accepted all the methods adopted during the revolutionary wars, except the permanence of the Chamber and the creation of a Committee of National Defence, which were demanded by Jules Favre (August 13).

But this ill-assorted Government could not bring itself to pursue a frank and bold policy, the only one which under the circumstances could possibly succeed. They confined their efforts to searching for assistance in Europe, which England, alarmed by the revelations of Bismarck as to the designs of Napoleon III upon Belgium, was perhaps not anxious that they should find; and, fearing an insurrection, they neglected to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Paris the remaining armies. It was the opinion of some persons that a Republic alone was capable of defending the country. Blanqui attempted to establish a Republic on August 14 by seizing the barracks of La Villette. He failed, but by the end of August Bazaine had been forced back into Metz; and on September 2, at Sedan, the Emperor and 80,000 men under Macmahon surrendered to the Germans. The army had remained the sole support of the Empire against the tide of republicanism and Socialism. The

Emperor had refused to preserve the army for his own ends by making peace, and, now that it had been destroyed, the fall of his Empire was inevitable.

On September 3, at the news of the capitulation of Sedan, the Left proposed to the Legislative Body to vote the deposition of the Emperor and the appointment of a committee of government. On the following day the Ministry made an attempt to preserve the regency by urging the acceptance of a proposal, under the sign manual of the Empress, for the formation of a council of five deputies (September 4). But the revolutionaries, who in 1869 had attempted Republican outbreaks, now under Socialist leaders felt themselves to be irresistible. They invaded the Legislative Body with cries of "Deposition" and "Republic"; and in the midst of tumult the Republic was proclaimed. Thereupon the Left, refusing to negotiate with the former majority, repaired as in 1848 to the Hôtel de Ville; and a Provisional Government under the presidency of Trochu, the Military Governor of Paris, and including certain deputies of the Left, such as Jules Favre, Ernest Picard and Gambetta, took over the National Defence. Through the medium of a proclamation, issued by Blanqui and his friends, the proletariat of the capital declared that they would support the Provisional Government ungrudgingly in carrying on the struggle with invaders and reactionaries to the last extremity.

Thus, at the very beginning of the new government, two of the chief influences which had combined against the Empire were brought into collision: on the one hand, the republican and Socialistic population of Paris, who had brought about the revolution, with the express purpose of carrying on war to the knife; on the other, the moderate parliamentary Republicans, between whom and the Revolutionaries disputes had already occurred, had come to the Hôtel de Ville to rescue the national movement from the hands of the extremists. The history of the Provisional Government is that of the struggle between these two forces; and they first came to blows on the question of the conduct of the war. At first the Government of Defence seemed to encourage the praiseworthy self-devotion of the Parisians. The 300,000 men of the National Guard were armed, and Paris was turned into a vast entrenched camp; but neither Trochu, Jules Favre, nor Jules Simon had faith in the efficacy of this "heroic madness." On September 12 Thiers departed to visit the European Courts and, if possible, to arrange for a European congress and a diplomatic intervention; and on the 19th, hardly a fortnight after the proclamation of the National Defence, Jules Favre was at Ferrières attempting to treat with Bismarck.

In order to negotiate it was necessary, in the first place, to know if the Germans would recognise the Government of National Defence. They would perhaps have done so, had Jules Favre agreed forthwith to a cession of territory, or to the surrender of some fort commanding Paris, in exchange for an armistice. The Parisian patriots however



would never have permitted this, and Bismarck was compelled to have recourse to the late Government. He had endeavoured by a series of somewhat obscure negotiations and intrigues to induce the Empress to agree to the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, in return for which the army of Bazaine was to be released from Metz, and so left free to aid in reestablishing her authority. On October 23, however, the Empress, who was in London, declared, on the advice of her Council, that she would not agree to the mutilation of France, and asked that an armistice might be granted for the army of Metz. The King of Prussia refused. On October 27 the army of Metz capitulated; and from that time forward the German Government declined to treat except with the Government of National Defence. The delegation, composed of three members, sent into the provinces by the National Defence, had started previously to the investment of Paris, had been reinforced on October 9 by Gambetta, and seemed thoroughly imbued with the spirit of passionate hope which animated the capital. Since his arrival at Tours, Gambetta had worked furiously, recruiting, calling out and arming new regiments. He acted like the Government of 1793, as an absolute dictator "for the welfare of the country"; and he nowhere met with opposition except for a moment at Lyons (September 22). His armies, however, were in no condition to march on Paris; and the inhabitants of the capital, to whom every day brought news of a fresh disaster, grew exasperated at the sluggishness of Trochu and the leaders in authority there. Little by little, the inaction of the rulers weakened their authority, and the voice of the Revolution made itself heard. Already, on the negotiations at Ferrières becoming known, the revolutionary party showed signs of disquiet; and at a meeting held at the Bourse nineteen majors of the National Guard had supported the proposal of Blanqui and Flourens to proclaim martial law and to organise a "Commune" as in 1792.

At the end of October the capitulation of Metz, at first denied, but later admitted by the Government, the abandonment on the 30th of the village of Le Bourget, which a force from Paris had succeeded in capturing on the 28th, and finally the rumour of negotiations between Thiers and Bismarck at Versailles—all these events, happening one after another, exasperated the people of Paris and provoked a formidable rising against the incapable men whose object it was to arrange a peace—Trochu, Jules Favre and Picard. A revolt, even in the presence of the enemy, seemed justifiable, as it offered the only prospect of carrying on the war to the end. "In 1848," wrote Blanqui, "Democracy stood alone and allowed itself to be destroyed; in 1870 it has the country behind it, and this time it will defend itself with teeth and claws." On October 3 the National Guard were persuaded by Flourens and Blanqui to imprison all the members of the Government and set up another in their place. The members of the new Government did not however put in an appearance, and, on the evening of the same day, the "battalions of order" and the *Gardes Mobiles* of Brittany liberated Jules Ferry and

Trochu. The Government of the Defence remained master of the field; it suppressed the revolt in no very vigorous fashion, and then caused the municipal elections to be held. They obtained a vote of confidence in themselves by means of a *plébiscite* (November 5); 557,996 "ayes" approved their action against 62,638 "noes."

For three months yet the armies of the National Defence held out against the Prussians, but they were unable to force the lines encircling Paris. Gambetta and his subordinates showed tireless energy, but Paris once again lost hope. A prey to famine, feeling no confidence in leaders without energy and without a programme, the Parisians gave signs of serious restlessness, crying "*Vive la Commune!*" and displaying the red flag. When, after the last attempted sortie on January 19, it was learned that Trochu, while he remained President of the Government, had abandoned the command of the National Guard to the Bonapartist Vinoy, the National Guards liberated the prisoners of October 31 and prepared for a fresh revolt (January 22). The affair however was ill planned; the Government, forewarned, had occupied the Hôtel de Ville with the *Mobiles* of Brittany; the Moderate Republicans deserted the Revolutionaries; and the Government refused to proceed to the immediate election of the Commune. The discharge of a few rifles before the Hôtel de Ville provoked a sortie of the garrison, and fifty National Guards were killed. On January 28, the extremists of the war party having thus been brought under control, the Government of National Defence felt that its authority was assured; and Jules Favre in conjunction with Bismarck signed an armistice. On the same day the Government abdicated and summoned the voters to elect a National Assembly, which should discuss and arrange the terms of peace. The election of the Assembly was to follow the forms of 1848, the electors voting in their cantons and upon a list of candidates for each department; 750 deputies were to be returned who were to receive payment for their services.

What would this Assembly do? to what hands was the fate of France about to be confided? In October, when Gambetta had wished to appeal to the electors, an Assembly pledged to peace and genuinely Republican would without doubt have been returned. After the furious crusade of Gambetta, at once a Republican and an advocate of war to the knife, the candidates supported by the delegates at Bordeaux seemed, as was inevitable, to belong to the war party, whereas on the other hand Gambetta's opponents appeared to belong to the party of peace. It was for this reason that the peasants elected a body of Orleanists and Legitimists, not, in most cases, because of their political opinions, but simply because they were well-known men, who could be trusted and who were in favour of peace. These men formed the majority in the Assembly (400 against 350). The departments in the south-east which had suffered invasion had elected Republicans; while, as for Paris, the

electoral struggle was merely a fresh episode in the conflict between the Revolutionary party and the adherents of the Government. Many of the Revolutionaries were elected. The Assembly met at Bordeaux on February 12, 1871. It was clothed with absolute power; but the majority fell short in the necessary monarchist elements, and dared not, at the outset, risk a collision with the Republicans. It shrank from entrusting a prince (whether Legitimist or Orleanist) with an enterprise so precarious and so difficult. The Assembly was determined, however, that it would not submit either to the dictatorship of Gambetta, or of Paris. It refused to proclaim the Republic; it decided to reserve to a future time "the decision of France as to the definite form which her Government should take"; but it chose Jules Grévy, a Republican and an opponent of Gambetta, as its president, and at the head of the executive power it placed Thiers, who had been elected in twenty-six departments, and whose protest against the war in 1870 had made him the most popular man of the day.

From the first, all men turned to him, members of the loyalist parties because of the clear foresight which he had shown in his opposition to the Empire; the people in general, because of his share in the peace negotiations, the Moderate Republicans because they had faith in his "honest attempt" to form "such a government as would create the fewest divisions." On February 17 a decree of the Assembly organised the executive power; it was Thiers who was chosen to exercise it under the supervision of the Assembly and with the help of Ministers whom he was to select and preside over. He selected Moderate Republicans who belonged to the peace party, and undertook that his policy should be confined to the task of "pacification, reorganisation, the restoration of credit and the revival of industry" (February 17). This promise of neutrality, so far as it related to constitutional questions—renewed once more on March 10—became known as the "Pact of Bordeaux."

The Assembly had been elected, above all, to conclude a peace; and on February 26, Thiers and Jules Favre signed the preliminaries. On March 1, by 546 votes against 107, there being 23 abstentions, the Assembly ratified them, and formally pronounced the deposition of Napoleon III, who was declared responsible for the ruin of France. Four of the revolutionary deputies for Paris thereupon resigned, on the ground that they refused to sit in an "assembly which had surrendered two provinces, dismembered France, and ruined the country." It was inevitable that a conflict should break out in the Bordeaux Assembly between the Revolutionaries of the towns—of Paris especially—and the *ruraux* representing country districts. The patriotic and Socialistic passions—excited by the siege—were only intensified by the decisions of the National Assembly.

In arranging the preliminaries of peace, Thiers had ransomed Belfort, by agreeing that the Germans should enter Paris and march through the Champs Élysées. This decision aroused intense indignation in the city;

and between February 26 and March 1 there were signs of a coming storm. The populace employed themselves in removing into the districts of Montmartre and Belleville the cannon for which their own subscriptions had paid, though they had sufficient good sense not to attack the Prussians. On March 10 the Bordeaux Assembly gave fresh cause of offence in deciding to sit at Versailles and not at Paris. Further than this, it forgot the sacrifices that the Parisians had made and attacked their material interests. Commercial transactions and payments due in respect of rent had been postponed during the siege, and a further postponement was asked for, on the ground that business had not yet revived; but this the Assembly refused. Working men too were without employment and had no means of support besides their pay of 1 franc 50 centimes a day as National Guards; and this also the Assembly declined to continue. Finally, Thiers, when he arrived at Paris on March 15, decided to assert the authority of the Government and sent troops to bring back the cannon from Montmartre. On March 18 the soldiers, surrounded by the men of the *faubourg* and their wives, refused to fire and made common cause with the people. General Lecomte, who commanded them, and General Clément Thomas, who happened to be passing, were both made prisoners and shot by the mob. During the day, as the insurrection grew, Thiers and the other members of the Government quitted Paris. Thiers' plan of action—the plan which he had advised Louis-Philippe to adopt in 1848, and which Windischgrätz had actually adopted at Vienna in 1849—was to reenter the city with an army, and make short work of a “body of rebels who would pillage Paris and work the destruction of France.” On the morning of the 19th Paris was without any regularly constituted government; and, as was inevitable, all authority passed into the hands of the former advocates of war to extremity—the National Guards and the revolutionary Republicans. Since the end of January the National Guards, especially those of the revolutionary quarters in the east, had decided to combine and form a central committee, by way of protecting themselves against the reaction in the rural districts. At the end of February, after long discussion, the Republican Federation of the National Guard had been formed; it was to be managed by a Central Committee of delegates which had been definitely chosen on March 15. On the 19th, when Thiers had deprived Paris of all its administrative machinery, this Central Committee installed itself in the Hôtel de Ville and sent representatives to the different ministries.

The mayors of the *arrondissements* and the deputies who sat for Paris attempted, nevertheless, during more than ten days, to avert the threatened struggle. Many of them acted from a genuine desire to conciliate, and with the object of preventing the Federates from marching on Versailles and of thus gaining time in the interests of Thiers. In the first instance, they succeeded only in exciting the middle-class Liberals of the western quarters against the Central Committee, and in provoking

those demonstrations which, on March 22, culminated in the massacre of the Place Vendôme. A few days later, however, they contrived to obtain from the Chamber a promise that, at all events, a further delay should be granted for the payment of debts and rents; that the National Guard should have the right to choose their officers; and, finally, that members of the Paris Commune should be elected by universal suffrage. The Central Committee, who had cause for mistrust, desired that the elections should take place at once, and fixed them for March 25; but the National Assembly treated this decree with reference to elections as illegal, and the rupture became final.

These preliminaries marked clearly the character of the movement in Paris. In spite of the fact that they were for the most part Republican Socialists, the members of the Central Committee formulated no social programme; their one desire was to defend Republican principles and the autonomy of the *communes* against the "men of Versailles." 226,167 free citizens (out of 485,569 voters, of whom many had left Paris) elected the ninety members of the "General Council of the Commune" on Sunday, March 26. Fifteen retired within a few days of the election; men who had been returned for the more well-to-do districts, such as Ferry, Méline, Marmottan and others of the party of conciliation. The rest, who belonged to the party of insurrection, retained their seats. Among them were a dozen members of the Central Committee, obscure individuals such as Ranvier, Billioray, and the like; but there were associated with them representatives of all the revolutionary doctrines which had, since the fall of the Empire, attracted the proletariat of Paris. There were Blanquists pure and simple, or dissident Blanquists; advocates of a democratic dictatorship, such as Rigault, Ferré, Ranc, Protot, Tridon; Radical publicists of the last years of the Empire, steeped in the Jacobin tradition of 1793, such as Félix Pyat and Delescluze, or imbued with Socialistic ideas like Vermorel and Flourens; the representatives of "the red clubs" knowing little of either theory or practice, but reflecting the vague craving for revolution of the populace of Paris, such as Amouroux, Allix, Rastoul; finally, seventeen members of the International, who favoured sweeping social changes to be carried out by peaceful means—Varlin, Theisz, Lefrançais, Malon, Vaillant, Beslay—the stout hearts and clear heads of the new Government.

It was thus that the new Government of Paris was constituted; but beside it, after a show of definite abdication, the Central Committee continued to act, under the pretext of "serving as a bond between the Council and the National Guard." The Central Committee, in spite of the Socialist minority on the General Council, succeeded by degrees in obtaining a share of the actual power; and it was able to do this by reason of the peculiar authority which it exercised over the National Guard. It is, in fact, this double authority of the General Council and the Central Committee which characterises the rule of the Commune.

On March 29 the General Council set to work; it framed a scheme

of government by appointing committees with full powers; an executive committee, a finance committee, and committees having charge respectively of war, justice, public security, provisioning, labour, manufactures and commerce, foreign relations, public services and education. The Commune then proceeded (March 29) to remit all rents due in October, 1870, and January and April, 1871, and after due consideration granted a respite of three years in respect of commercial obligations. It abolished conscription, established compulsory military service for all able-bodied men of from eighteen to forty years, adopted the Republican calendar and the red flag, and declared all the acts of the Government of Versailles null and void. In each of the Committees the ablest of the members laboured with praiseworthy zeal to realise the democratic programme. Protot, a member of the Committee of Public Security, endeavoured to teach respect for individual liberty; Vaillant reorganised education by an appeal to public spirit, and by relying solely on trained secular teachers; Fraenckel endeavoured to make the artisans cooperate and use the workshops which their owners had abandoned; he forbade the bakers to work at night, and abolished the system of commercial travellers. If circumstances, for the most part, forbade the realisation of these measures, the *Journal Officiel* enables us to form an idea of the serious nature of the preparatory work which they entailed.

But it was inevitable that the struggle with Thiers and the Assembly at Versailles and the effort to find support in France should determine the line to be followed by the Commune. On April 3 the Federates (*Gardes Nationaux fédérés*, the name given to the soldiers of the Commune), in retaliation for a sudden attack by the *Versaillais* on the evening before, attempted a sortie, and marched upon Versailles in three columns. Some of their leaders were taken prisoners and shot without trial, the Government treating the *Communards* not as political rebels but as criminals. The Commune ordered certain men of good position, who were suspected of an understanding with Versailles, to be taken as hostages, and gave out that the execution of a Federate would be followed immediately by the execution of three hostages.

The Reds, however, of the south and centre incited the towns to revolt against the Assembly and to set up Communes of their own. At Lyons, where an irregular government was installed, but which allowed itself to be peacefully dissolved under the eye of delegates from Paris (March 19-23); at St Étienne, where the prefect de L'Espée was killed (March 25); at Creusot, where the Mayor Dumay proclaimed the Commune (March 26); at Narbonne, where Digeon, who had been exiled under the Empire, seized the *Mairie* (March 22-31); at Marseilles, where Gaston Crémieux carried the Clubs with him, but where the movement was speedily checked by artillery (March 23-April 3); at Toulouse (March 23-26), and finally (April 4) at Limoges, where the National Guard drove back the regular troops—in all these towns, the

populations which had risen at the cry of "*Vive Paris*," though for a moment successful, showed themselves devoid of authority and in the long run incapable of combination. Thus the attack could be concentrated on the Commune of Paris; and, when the army of Thiers, composed largely of soldiers who had returned from Germany, was sufficiently strong to enter upon the struggle, the second siege of Paris was undertaken.

The final attempts at conciliation made by the Chambers of Syndics, by the League of Republican Union, or by masonic bodies, during the first fortnight of April, were thwarted by the blank refusal of the Government to treat with the insurgents. On April 10, obstinate fighting began in the suburbs to the west and south of Paris round the positions from which the Prussians had previously bombarded the town; and by the end of the month the investment was almost complete. Meanwhile, within the city the drama of the Commune was developing. Brought to bay by the army of Versailles, the Federate leaders were determined to proclaim their creed. On April 20, in the midst of the struggle, appeared the Declaration to the French people. "What does Paris ask for?" it enquired. "The recognition and the establishment of the Republic and that the absolute autonomy of the 'Commune' should prevail everywhere in France....Paris asks for nothing more... provided that the chief central administration which derives its powers from the Federate Communes shall realise and carry out their principles." This declaration marked an advance over that of March 25: it proclaimed, in the face of Jacobin centralisation and possibly under the influence of Bakunin, the theory of communal federalism; it described the situation in Paris and indicated a growth of Socialistic influence. Disputes amongst themselves, however, occurring at the same time as the struggle with Versailles, prevented the "Internationals" from proceeding with their work. The supplementary elections held on April 16 had added twenty-one new members to the Council; and on the very day of the Declaration (April 20) the executive was reorganised: each one of the nine special Committees was replaced by a delegate who acted as Minister, and the nine delegates together formed what was practically a ministry. In this recasting of the Government the theories of the Radical revolutionary majority had prevailed over those of the Socialistic minority. On the 28th, after a panic at Fort d'Issy, the majority carried by forty-five votes to twenty-three the appointment of a Committee of Public Safety; but the Committee itself, whose members had been renewed more than once in the midst of fierce disputes, was reduced to impotence by the encroachments of the Central Committee. On May 15, the minority in disgust declared that they would no longer attend the sittings of the Committee, but their electors compelled them to do so.

While this was going on, the Versailles troops were preparing to enter Paris; and on the 21st they advanced without fighting as far as the *Point du Jour*, and occupied the western districts. The Council of the Commune dispersed each member to his district. The Ministry of

the purpose of organising the defence; barricades were erected, and every man defended himself as best he could; no general plan having been agreed on. Fierce fighting continued for seven days (May 21-28), the so-called "Bloody Week." The army of Versailles, officered by aristocrats and composed of well-drilled troops—taught to hate and to fear the republican capital—were sufficiently ruthless; while the Federates, in order to defend themselves, had recourse to the traditional methods of terrorists—the murder of hostages and the destruction of public monuments. Archbishop Darboy, Louis Bonjean, and many priests were put to death; the Hôtel de Ville, the Palais de Justice, the Tuileries, the Ministry of Finance, and the Cour des Comptes were burnt down.

The work of repression was carried out with terrible severity. District by district, barricade by barricade, the city was retaken by the besiegers from the *Point du Jour* to *Père La Chaise*. Thiers had proclaimed on the 21st that the full penalty would be exacted; and the army proceeded to massacre the conquered. Officers, provosts-marshal, and soldiers put men to death as they chose, after a pretence of trial or without any trial at all. It was admitted that the dead numbered 17,000—they amounted in fact to 20,000 at least—while 38,568 persons were arrested, of whom 1058 were women and 651 children; and of the total number arrested 1179 died in consequence of bad treatment. The prisoners were tried by Court martial; and, in contradiction to French usage, which looks upon acts committed during civil war as political offences punishable by transportation, the Federates were condemned to death or penal servitude. 13,450 persons were sentenced, of whom 270 were condemned to death and 7500 transported. The Courts martial continued to sit as late as 1876.

As the result of this massacre, which exhausted the principal corporate bodies of Paris, the revolutionary and Socialistic party, which had seemed destined to give a powerful impulse to the democratic movement in France at the fall of the Empire, was swept out of existence. It was, in the words of Malon, "the third defeat suffered by the French proletariat." The ancient party divisions were all that remained; on the one side, Monarchists, Legitimist or Orleanist, and on the other Republicans. How, after the storm had subsided, was the evolution, which had been taking place since 1860, to be completed? What was the definite form of constitution which France should finally attain? Which of those two parties but lately united against the Empire—Liberal Monarchist or Republican—would end by carrying the country? Seven more years were still to pass before the question was definitely decided. After 1871, however, various symptoms pointed out the direction in which French political life must inevitably develop. It was undoubtedly true that the monarchist deputies had obtained the abrogation of the laws relating to exile and the confirmation of the elections of the Duc d'Aumale and the Prince de Joinville, but at the



very moment of the struggle with the Commune, official communications and private intelligence disclosed the advance of republican feeling in the towns; and Thiers himself accepted the legislation relating to the princes, only subject to formal reservations.

The nation indeed had chosen the Assembly with a view to peace, but it already showed a preference for those who had been most careful of the national unity, for those who, while they rejected all thoughts of war for the present, were determined that the country should be strong. In July, at the supplementary elections, the Republicans were successful in twenty-five out of thirty-nine departments; and of twenty-one deputies returned for Paris, sixteen candidates, belonging to the Union of the Press and followers of Thiers, were elected. Thus the monarchical majority in the Assembly no longer represented the opinion of the country; but they held the supreme power, and no legal process existed by which they could be deprived of it. They proceeded to exercise the constituent power "which they looked upon as the essential attribute of their supremacy"; and, in virtue of it, they forthwith bestowed on France a provisional Constitution. Thiers was sufficiently adroit to make his authority felt and to prevail upon an Assembly which was monarchist at heart to legislate in such a way as to prepare for the future of the Republic. But, as his friends asserted when they brought in their Bill dealing with the organisation of the Government, it was essential, in the interests of the working classes, of commerce and manufactures, that there should be a feeling abroad of stability, unanimity and reconciliation.

On August 31, 1871, by 491 votes to 94, the enactment known as the Rivet-Vitet Law was passed. It provided "that the Head of the executive should take the title of President of the French Republic"; that he should have the power of appointing and dismissing his Ministers, and the right to address the Assembly whenever he thought necessary; but that the individual Ministers, the Ministerial Council as a whole, and the President himself, should remain responsible to that body. This, then, was the outcome of the continuous efforts of Constitutional Liberalism during the Empire, which the pressure of events had inevitably produced. The Monarchists saw that, after the late crisis, it was impossible to rekindle the old political animosities, while the advanced Republicans, who were looked upon as advocates of war, and who had lost their working-class vanguard, were unable to make headway. The provisional Constitution expressed with accuracy the position of political and social forces brought about by the events of the last few years; and, after the convulsions of this terrible year, it was, broadly speaking, the Liberalism of 1863 which had prevailed. The definitive Constitution was not to come for another four years; but from this time forward, while the energy of the whole country was concentrated on its work of reconstruction, its political life was to enjoy a development more continuous in its character, and, above all, more independent

## CHAPTER XVIII.

THE REACTION AGAINST ROMANTICISM IN  
FRENCH LITERATURE.

(1840-71.)

LITTLE did Madame de Staël guess when she introduced the term "Romanticism" into France the stir that it was destined to make. Yet it heralded the most important literary movement, and the most fruitful in unforeseen results, which Europe has seen since the Renaissance.

And yet, if Romanticism were at its zenith in 1830, by 1848—owing, first, to the failure of *Les Burgraves*, and to the speedy success of the naturalistic and realistic theories in art—it seemed almost dead. Thus, in the space of thirty years, the main stream of literature had apparently divided into two great currents, not merely flowing in different, but in what seemed totally opposite, directions. How did it come to pass that a movement on so large a scale, and of such importance not only in France but in Europe generally, should have experienced so brief an existence, and won such barren victories? The answer to this must be sought in the fact that under the one term "Romanticism" we are apt to include two wholly different things—a literary *coterie* which gained much notoriety but whose life was short, and a revolution in the world of letters, not only French but European, under whose influences and amid whose results we are living to this day.

The name of this literary *coterie* was the "*Cénacle*": it consisted of the group of authors who gathered round Victor Hugo, and met at Charles Nodier's *salon* at the *Arsenal*; their theories of art and of literature are to be found in the preface to *Cromwell* and in the articles of Deschamps in *La Muse Française*. It was above all in their work for the stage, which as it were sets the crowning and ratifying seal upon all literary reforms, on whose boards, moreover, the noisiest battles of the new School were fought, that the weak points in the *Cénacle's* theories made themselves most conspicuous, and that it showed its inability to reconstruct where it had pulled down. A manifesto, in fact, is of no value unless based upon achievement and illustrated by example. The Romanticists, it is true, produced works constructed according to their theories; but, instead of supplying their justification, these works seemed only to help them to fall the quicker into a predestined disrepute.

Moreover, it is worth noticing that, if the period saw the growth and blossoming of so much fine literary achievement, it was a time marvellously suited to the *cultus* of letters and to the experiments of literary innovators; and, while we admit the genuine inspiration of the authors of the period, we do not find it attributable to the theories of the *Cénacle* but, rather, independent of them: it is not by rule and precept that masterpieces are made. Men like Lamartine, de Musset, and Vigny were in no way indebted to such doctrines; and even Hugo himself, in his capacity of lyric poet, rather expounded his theories to justify his works, than wrote his works to illustrate his theories.

To sum up, Romanticism, regarded as a poetic school, did not and could not last long; but to regard it under this aspect is to see merely its smallest and least interesting side. Romanticism was, in reality, a literary revolution, which originated in Germany towards the close of the eighteenth century, and preached, before all else, a return to nature and to the ideas and formulae of the Middle Ages. It spread rapidly throughout Europe because it responded to a certain intellectual need—the longing to substitute for the worship of an antiquity but ill-understood, of classic models but poorly imitated, something new and personal, in the realm of art as well as in that of letters. Its direct progenitors were Rousseau and Chateaubriand, who were the true forerunners of the new birth of religious feeling and of admiration for the Middle Ages; it was they who revived the feeling for Nature, who preached revolt against accepted ideas and prejudices, and who taught the theory of the fatality of passion; it was they who, by developing the sense of human personality, prepared the soil wherein lyric poetry could flower. It was, in truth, a revival, under other names, of the old conflict between Regnier and Malherbe, between the Independents and Boileau in the seventeenth century—between the Ancients and the Moderns at the beginning of the eighteenth. A movement so important, so widespread, so vast, came, by the very multiplicity and vagueness of the principles which it enforced and of the rights which it claimed, to have incalculable consequences. One of the most apparently surprising, but in reality most natural of its results was its eventual development into realism and naturalism from which in its origin it seemed so far removed. To put the matter more clearly: Romanticism, or rather the *Cénacle* regarded merely in the light of a literary School, went too far, and failed to keep its promises, especially in the realms of the drama and the novel; its existence was inevitably short, for it was consumed by its own zeal and its own exaggerations. As was to be expected, a reaction in the opposite direction set in. That every too sudden advance must of necessity be followed by a recoil is a fixed law; and, in this instance, the recoil consisted in a perception of the excess and absurdity which had marked the pretensions of the *Cénacle*, and in a keener appreciation and admiration for the great classics of the seventeenth century. But, if the *Cénacle*

were dead, Romanticism proper remained very much alive, with all its elements of sanity, fruitfulness, and essential novelty—elements which had already ensured its victory over an outworn and conventional idealism; and one of its fundamental principles, more fully understood and applied to better purpose, was destined to give birth to realism.

We have just seen that Romanticism demanded “truth drawn from Nature herself”; it would have none of “historical landscape,” pretentiously arranged and grouped—of heroes on an extra-human scale—of false idealism. This “natural” truth, this reality, the writers of 1830 had seemed scarcely able to appreciate or delineate, and they had fallen rapidly into the extraordinary and the improbable. Their works were essentially the outcome of imagination and feeling. Acting under the influence of the scientific spirit, of that love of clearness and precision, that quest for the definite fact and the document, which was the peculiar characteristic of the latter part of the century, a new literature gradually took form and shape, a positive literature which adopted as its guiding principle the faithful reproduction of the life around it, without any modifications save those which the laws of art necessarily impose upon the artist. When the Romanticist claims “to reproduce Nature in its crude entirety,” as it appears to our eyes, it seems to be a realist who is speaking, and, when Victor Hugo describes the environs of Le Tréport, his method seems to foreshadow that of the painters of the Barbizon School. The best proof, however, that there is no real antinomy between Romanticism and realism and that the difference is one of degree and not of kind, is the fact that the majority of the great writers of the nineteenth century belonged, at one and the same time, to both schools. For example, Balzac, Gautier, Michelet, Renan, Flaubert, and many others, borrowed from each school what was best in it, and harmoniously mingled the two influences.

Thus, Romanticism tended in the beginning towards the development of the lyric and individualist spirit; then, its exaggeration and excess produced a natural and inevitable reaction; and later, under the influence and through the normal development of the salient principles of the scientific spirit, it experienced a complete transformation, passing finally into realism and naturalism. This result will be traced in greater detail later, in dealing with the particular writers and especially with the men of pronounced literary genius to whom this chapter is devoted.

One of the definitions which has been applied to Romanticism is that it is “a literature in which the lyric element predominates.” Lyric poetry did not, so to speak, exist in France before the Romantic period; and, if Hugo is to be regarded as the leader of the new School, it is for this reason among others—that he was almost exclusively a lyric poet and that the basis of his inspiration was generally lyrical. All the early works of Hugo since *Odes et Ballades* (1832) up to *Les Rayons et Les Ombres* (1840) are essentially lyrical and subjective; from 1840, on the

contrary, a difference is perceptible and other influences are apparent. Careful as always to follow the varying currents of prevailing taste and fashion, penetrated moreover by the idea that the poet should be not only a poet but a shepherd of his people, a "*vates*" responsible for the doctrines of the common herd, we find him throwing himself ardently into political life, and endeavouring to guide and direct public opinion. His poetry reflects these preoccupations, and becomes more detached, more lofty—in a word, more objective. Viewed from this standpoint there is a marked difference between the tone of the *Contemplations* and that of the preceding volumes. With him every sensation tended more and more to develop into a symbol, every symbol into a myth. This tendency, which grew daily more and more noticeable and which formed the basis of his lyric faculty, made him the most objective of the *Cénacle* poets: his poetry became the expression of emotions, human it is true, but expressed in a universal sense. And it is precisely this quality which gives to his poems their peculiar and original charm. In *Les Châtiments*, for instance, we see the product of a disappointed vanity, a violent outburst of political hatreds and personal bitterness. Thanks to his peculiar mastery over his materials, Hugo succeeded in creating a type of literature in which he often excelled, in which occasionally, as in *L'Expiation* and *Les Abeilles*, he was supreme. And his finest works are precisely those which are most largely symbolic, most impersonal.

All the violent and passionate emotions which had shaken his soul, time was to soften, to purify and to universalise. His personal hatred of the Emperor was merged in a horror of tyranny in general, in pity for all the unhappy and oppressed; and *La Légende des Siècles* presents a series of pictures on the heroic scale, a cycle of turbulent dramas, symbolic rather than historical, and inspired by the same philosophic and social ideas—by an unshakable belief in God and in immanent justice, by love for the poor, the suffering, and the helpless, by hatred for the oppressor whether in the form of priest, king, or conqueror. It is a "cycle of incomplete epics," which fill a gap in French literature and in which he has tried to enclose the history of humanity, characterised by what he believes to be its chief epochs, from Creation to the Last Judgment. All Victor Hugo is contained in these three volumes, which filled a void in French literature. In them, passing from poetry of the personal type, he attained an inspiration purely symbolic and objective, thus revealing himself as one of the great lyric poets of the world.

Though a member of the famous *Cénacle*, Théophile Gautier was a man of wholly original character, altogether distinct from the other members of the circle. His genius was narrow and peculiar; but, confined within its limits, he was a poet of the first rank. He was without ideas, without eloquence, and possessed of only average sensibility and intelligence. The sole principle to which he clung, and which was indeed

the very source of his inspiration, was a hatred of everything which either closely or remotely savoured of middle-class Philistinism. Both literally and figuratively, he never put off the red waistcoat in which he arrayed himself on the first night of *Hernani*.

Théophile Gautier (who had been for a time a pupil in Rioult's school of painting) was essentially a painter whom chance had made a poet. Though he is scarcely ever more than this, his peculiar faculty enabled him to accomplish the apparently impossible, to render by means of words and phrases, so as to make his reader feel, the precise sensations experienced in the presence of the actual scene, of the visible landscape described. He transcribes a corner of the park at Versailles, or a Flemish Cabinet picture, in the manner of a painter, and never fails to produce his effect. Moreover in all his work there is always this kind of specialised talent which is the essence of his originality. A large part of *Mademoiselle de Maupin* is devoted to a series of descriptions of various landscapes; the *Roman de la Momie* brings to life before our eyes, like a picture from the brush of some Eastern painter, the actual Egypt of the Pharaohs; and the larger half of *Le Capitaine Fracasse* is nothing but a series of pictures irresistibly recalling the etchings of Callot. Even in his capacity of critic, instead of critically appraising works of art or literature he contents himself with the reproducing them, in his own inimitable fashion, with offering them, so to speak, for the individual inspection of the reader.

To this rare and individual gift he joined a keen and unerring sense of colour and decorative effect, an inexhaustible vocabulary, both rich and accurate, a brilliant virtuosity sometimes verging on insolence and excess. Finally, in his style, whether in prose or verse, though always smooth, polished, and carefully wrought, he never betrays effort—rather seems to be improvising in a language full of lightness, ease and sanity. All these qualities make of him a writer altogether apart, bearing no resemblance to any other; and his work, small in output, but delicate, refined, perfect, even to the smallest detail, has often been compared with the masterpieces of Benvenuto Cellini. His influence over his contemporaries was immense, and he is a striking example of those writers who passed insensibly from romanticism into realism. "His hatred of what was Philistine and commonplace lent inspiration to Baudelaire; his pictorial sense of form and colour led him to renounce the subjective methods of the lyric poet in favour of devotion to the thing seen—and thus gave birth to an impersonal literature. The perfection of his aesthetic faculty quickly enabled him to appraise the medieval colour of the romanticists at its true worth; the Parthenon conquered him. He ended by abjuring the Gothic ideal, that he might the more fully reveal that worship of the classical which formed the basis of his whole being. In him, indeed, we see the actual pivot upon which French literature revolved, in passing from romanticism to naturalism."

Alfred de Vigny was one of those rare poets to be found among the romanticists—perhaps indeed the only one—whose inspiration, though he never spoke of it himself, was at all times purely lyric, and at the same time always impersonal. To say nothing of his plays and his novels, even his poems take the form of narratives, episodes, the theme of which is always a being or an object altogether distinct from himself. This is in complete accord with Vigny's own character: he was a solitary from his youth up, and one to whom the acute and painful consciousness of his solitude brought deep suffering. A Catholic by birth and education, he had lost his faith; a soldier, who knew the soldier's life through and through and had realised both its heights and its depths, and whose hopes of personal glory were extinct, he saw around him nothing but grounds for disillusion and disenchantment. Ever a prey to doubt he gave himself up to meditations upon the great problems which agitate humanity—problems to him for ever insoluble. A stranger to the over-confident and exaggerated optimism of a Lamartine, Vigny turned towards pessimism and unbelief. Indifferent and contemptuous as he was towards political affairs and persons, he suffered much through the state of things brought about by the Revolution; for him the past was dead indeed, the future full of darkness. All that he saw around him—even the circumstances of his private life—offended and alienated him from the world. He sought refuge in poetry, which should at least bring him consolation. But of poetry he had formed for himself so high, so lofty an ideal, that even here he was tormented by self-distrust, even here he found nothing but suffering and disappointment. This is the explanation at once of that detached and impersonal note in his work and of the smallness of his literary output. Filled with respect for his art, and sensible of its difficulties, he was content to leave nothing to chance, to await inspiration in a state of religious withdrawal and—through a medium ever more finely wrought and more perfected—to seek patiently the realisation of that ideal of beauty which he had fashioned for himself. These were the ideas—at once individual, in the sense of being profoundly and painfully felt, and universal, in that they were capable of arousing the interest of all men—developed or rather condensed in his few works, some of which compare worthily with the finest achievements of Lamartine or of Hugo.

In many aspects of his work he was a true romantic poet, but through his own life, through his conception of art, through his poetic ideal and method, through the restraint and conciseness of his manner, he ultimately diverged as widely from romanticism as Musset himself, or as Leconte de Lisle in later days. Occasionally, at certain points, a personal touch unveils to us for one moment the suffering soul of the poet. But these moments of sensibility, which the true romanticist hugged to his breast, and which fused their emotions into literature, are very rare. De Vigny's poems demand a place apart in the history of romantic poetry, as the

work of an individual and peculiar temperament, rather than as a consequence or illustration of the theories of a new literary school.

Alfred de Musset began his career as a perfervid romanticist with *Contes d'Espagne et d'Italie*, which contained everything that the poets of the new school were then claiming and advocating—love of the exotic, local colour, exaggeration of manner and of feeling. The Romanticists were easily deceived and acclaimed him as one of themselves. Yet in truth Musset, in advance of his age, perceived all that was false and futile in Romanticism, and, while the new School fought and triumphed in defence of their ideas, he was gradually returning from them to the classics of the school of 1660. He soon realised how much was meretricious, artificial, and trumpery in the exaggerated search after local colour, in the high-sounding, empty epithet, in the rich yet needless rhyme, and could never bring himself to admit that form and expression should take precedence of the matter and thought to be expressed. Does that mean, however, that Musset owes little, or nothing, to Romanticism? This was impossible; but he borrowed from it only what was best: he laid down as a principle that the whole art of the poet consisted in laying bare his heart, in “moving” others through his own emotion, a principle which is, in fact, the very essence of lyric poetry and, consequently, of Romanticism.

On the other hand, certain sides of his character were in direct opposition to the principles animating the writers of the new School; or rather the qualities, which they lacked, were possessed by him. Owing to temperament, to an innate fastidiousness, and also to the natural limitations of his talent, the artist in him was by no means faultless; yet Musset was the sole romanticist who showed “psychological intuition,” and this not only in *Les Nuits*, where he analyses, with a delicacy and an exquisite precision very rare in those days, the finest shades of the soul's diverse emotions. This trait is above all conspicuous in his plays, in which, though clearly showing the influence of the foreign literatures then newly revealed by the Romanticists, he accomplished original and charming work, unlike anything he had hitherto achieved. To sum up: it must be admitted that Musset was influenced, though perhaps unconsciously, by the Romantic movement; but his natural gifts likewise made him a great and original poet. “He found inspiration in his own nature, and instinct and taste taught him what to avoid.”

Charles Baudelaire, a late comer in the Romantic field, who found little save the gleanings left by his great predecessors—the idol of some, the scorn of others—is to us the last representative and the last champion of the ideas and principles of the *Cénacle*. His work, original and strange, sometimes disturbing and often unequal, may be taken as typical of the Romantic methods, both at their best and at their worst: at their best, because Baudelaire was curiously preoccupied with form, because, as a writer, he was subtle, painstaking, for ever striving after



the highest, and occasionally realising perfection; at their worst, because of his deliberate and too frequent unveiling of repulsive things. There were two reasons for this: one, since by merely exaggerating one Romantic tendency—hatred of the commonplace—it was easy for a man to become pretentious, non-moral, unreal, and unwholesome; the other must be sought in the fact that all the highest places were already filled, so that, desiring at all costs to be original, he had to fall back upon the bizarre and the subtle. He invented a “new thrill,” and, all his life, was a slave to the form of art he had chosen to make his own. This deliberate abandonment of the realm of seriousness and beauty for that of strangeness and ugliness was a profound blunder on his part; and that Baudelaire triumphed in spite of it was due to the faultlessness of his workmanship, the perfect finish of his form. Unfortunately, however, he was idolised by a host of incompetent and unintelligent imitators who could not fail to detract from the effect of his work—last direct offspring as it was of the Romantic poetry of 1830.

Leconte de Lisle, on the other hand, brings us back to the domain of pure beauty and serenity, and in him we can watch one of Romanticism's evolutions actually at work. When he began writing, the great lyric themes were, to a certain extent, exhausted. Poetry was growing gradually less personal, and was becoming steeped in the scientific spirit. Vigny's completed work had already given us many wonderful examples of that symbolic poetry, which tends to efface whatever personal and intimate element there may be in the actual emotional life of the poet. In harmony with the taste of the age, and following in the new direction of a poetry at once impersonal and scientific, the soul of Leconte de Lisle despised a lyric poetry which confined itself to an outpouring of the intimate hopes and fears of the poet himself. He concealed his own suffering, doubt, and despair behind that of humanity in general, whose pain became his own. Despising the too personal, over-intimate note of modern life, he sought refuge in the past, in the contemplation of ancient civilisations, in the portrayal of the ever varying religions whereby men at all times have endeavoured to benumb their insatiable curiosity, to assuage their griefs. In this way he created a new subject-matter—new because so very old—the germ of which existed already in Romanticism. It is to Leconte de Lisle that we owe the idea of historical reconstruction, aided by science, and the intellectual effort to comprehend all art, of whatever age or country; and for such a task no one moreover was better equipped than he. Learned and conscientious, faithful interpreter of the great Greek poets, he brings before us in long procession, all the gods and all the faiths of old—Indian, Celtic, Polynesian, and Hellenic—giving to all in turn their peculiar character.

Finally, in this poet and student there was ever the fervent lover of form and plastic beauty, striving to compress into verse, imperishable and immortal because of its perfection, those fleeting aspects of being in

which his soul delighted; of each passing phenomenon, however brief and fugitive, he tried to seize the peculiar beauty, and as a rule he succeeded. These descriptions of his, though absolutely objective, are marked by an intensity, a glow, a purity and an exactitude to which nothing else is comparable. Thus, claiming descent from Victor Hugo and regarding him as his sole master, though all the while an unconscious disciple of Vigny, Leconte de Lisle touched romanticism at a thousand points, while at the same time moving further and further away from the theories of 1830. He easily outstripped those men of secondary talents, who had not the power to win freedom for themselves nor to fix their own standpoints, once for all, amidst all the incoherent impulses which, at that time, swayed men's minds. Hence he became the leader of that new School which was to include masters like Sully-Prudhomme, and Hérédia, serving as a link and transition-point between the *Cénacle* of 1830 and the *Parnasse contemporain*.

The Romantic School had made the theatre the scene of its noisiest battles, but, all the same, had never succeeded in producing live drama. The failure of *Les Burgraves* was the best possible proof of this; but, apart from this, no author of the time seemed to possess the true dramatic instinct: the only merit of Hugo's plays lies in the beauty of their verse; the dramas of Alexandre Dumas père are as poor in style as in psychology. Musset's comedies alone deserve a place to themselves in the history of the French theatre, but it is well known that they were not written to be acted, and that it was owing to a peculiar chance that they were ever staged. Romanticism had freed the theatre from all rules and all conventions; but its work was purely destructive, and it had laid no new foundation. Tragedy was dead, historical drama no longer appealed to the public, the play of passion was tending towards melodrama pure and simple. The vacant place had to be filled by comedy, which became, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the only permissible literary form for drama to assume.

Few men have had a luckier or more prosperous career than Scribe; few men also, especially since his death, have been so persistently depreciated. The real explanation of his success is to be found in the fact that he provided the play-goer with precisely what he wanted—and with nothing more. He was the typical representative of the middle class—of the general public of his day. Neatness, clearness, logic: these were the favourite intellectual qualities of the time. But, despite his limitations, it must in justice be admitted that the stage instinct of Scribe, and his mastery over all the resources of his craft, were both supreme. Judged from this standpoint, *Bataille des Dames* and *Un Verre d'Eau* are without a rival. Gifted with an inventive faculty of great range and fertility, he confined himself to the search for dramatic conjunctures, and, led by admirable sagacity and ingenuity, he found them in endless number. He was solely but perfectly a writer of the

stage, and, through this very quality, exercised a noteworthy influence over both his contemporaries and his successors. The notion that play-writing, apart from its aspect, as a school for the study of manners and character, is a highly specialised art, having its own technique, its own peculiar methods of workmanship, is traceable to him; and it is hardly too much to say that, in all the plays which have come after him, we can trace a comedy or an idea, originally emanating from Scribe.

On the other hand it is impossible to ignore the influence exercised upon modern comedy by the innovators of the eighteenth century—those inventors of middle-class drama and sentimental comedy who, as it were, discovered the setting wherein the author of the future was to place his characters, thus paving the way in a direction along which others were advantageously to follow. Finally it should be noted that the Romanticists, by ignoring the unities, by mingling tragedy with comedy, by devoting themselves to the exact reconstruction of the surroundings appropriate to the personages of their plays, provided all subsequent comedy with some of its leading characteristics. Of this later comedy we may take Émile Augier and Alexandre Dumas *filis* as the two great representatives.

On many sides of his character Augier touches Scribe very closely. He too was a representative of the *bourgeois* spirit—both in its best, and in its most limited, aspects—a man of reason and good sense. He was to find his true polarity when subjected to the influence of Balzac. The novel had in fact preceded the drama in the depiction and observation of real life and character. The drama was, in its turn, to take up the task of the novel, while making use of the methods peculiar to itself. A study after the manner of Balzac, strengthened by a plot after the manner of Scribe—such seems, in fact, to be the formula by which the comedies of Augier and Dumas *filis* were constructed. The whole problem consisted in the transference to the stage, in a manner interesting to the general public, of a study or picture—no longer merely of a particular vice, eccentricity, or absurdity, as was the way with Molière, but of a man, as a member of society, planted amid his own immediate surroundings—and in the subsequent endeavour to show to the spectator the slow and successive development in this man's character under the influence of his profession, of the current standard of manners, and of the circle in which he lived.

Since it was essential to interest a public spoilt by the comedies of Scribe, a situation had to be selected which would serve to throw into as high relief as possible the characteristics of the leading personage, and produce the most striking dramatic effect attainable. The field was a vast one, since it comprised no less an area than the study of mankind and its imperfections. Augier especially delighted in studying the vices of our social organism, and interested himself principally in questions relating to money and the intermingling of different classes,

realising, clear-sightedly enough, that in them were to be found the keystones on which the society of his day rested. This is the basis of what is undeniably his finest comedy, *Le Gendre de M. Poirier* (1854), the play of all others in which his qualities as a painter of the society he saw around him shine with the most brilliant lustre. His portraits are marked by an arresting fidelity and boldness, an incomparable depth and subtlety of insight, a supreme largeness of touch. For example, Maître Guerin, the peasant-notary who bends the law to his own uses and steals while quoting his favourite authority; Giboyer, type of the Bohemian, who has tried his hand at all trades; and, finally, Poirier himself, that perfect picture of the *bourgeois-gentilhomme* of the nineteenth century. Add to this a dialogue of simple, easy and natural quality, a true and subtle observation of traits which reveal the character in a single word, a moral attitude at once sturdy and straightforward if at times somewhat limited, and you have in Augier one of the most typical representatives of his age, a mind steeped, moreover, in the characteristically French tradition of the nineteenth century.

In certain of his plays, not perhaps to be numbered among his best (as *Lions et Renards*, *Le fils de Giboyer*), Augier tried his hand at political comedy; but he particularly devoted himself to the comedy of manners. Alexandre Dumas fils busied himself principally with the problem of love, and was led on insensibly, by the peculiar bent of his temperament, to the "problem-play." Instead of confining himself to the depiction of human vices or of social incongruities, to presenting his fellow-men with a picture of their failings or their vices, Dumas, confronted with the problem of evil, was irresistibly drawn to desire an improvement in manners, and, within his limitations, to prepare the way for it. In his work for the stage he came gradually to aim at the acquirement of a guiding and moralising influence over his audience; and it was thus that Dumas, through his desire to reconstruct family life and society in general, upon a basis of love, justice, and equality, through his attacks upon those laws, customs, and prejudices which he held responsible for the existing state of things, found himself naturally drawn to the *comédie à thèse*. It should not be forgotten that Dumas fils, passionate admirer of his father as he was, was completely steeped in Romanticism, especially at the outset of his career. But in his case Romanticism gave place gradually to a mystical habit of mind, to the tone of a visionary moralist who must preach, even in the most brilliant of his plays. Realising as we must the moralist in him, combined with the insight of a keen observer, with a capacity for taking swift and sure surveys of life, and for producing in us the sensation of life itself in all its intensity and actuality, we can perhaps appreciate something of the alluring—sometimes even a little disconcerting—originality of Dumas' plays. Beginning his career with comedies of manners (e.g. *La Dame aux Camélias*, 1852), he sought to realise his

ideal of a morally helpful drama, wherein should be solved, or at the least discussed, the most pressing and serious problems which beset contemporary society.

The dramatic genius of Dumas has indeed its limitations; one could wish that he had given a somewhat larger range to his studies, that he had not always interested himself in exceptional cases; one might blame him for his taste for paradox, sometimes, even, for things bordering on the unclean. At the same time it should never be forgotten that he possessed in a supreme degree those rare qualities which go to make the playwright—actuality, the *vis comica*, a vigorous style, the gift of biting, witty dialogue; above all, it must be remembered that his influence over his contemporaries was considerable, and that a large part of our present-day drama owes its existence directly to him.

Of a very different order was the spirit animating all the plays of Labiche. All that he cared about was to laugh himself and to make others laugh, and in the pursuit of this ambition, he was triumphantly successful during a period of thirty years. It would be a complete misconception, a stupid blunder, to take his plays seriously, to dissect them and endeavour to construct a philosophy from them. The value of Labiche's plays lies in their droll imaginings, their inconceivable buffoonery, the fascination of their extraordinary and absurd situations as exemplified for instance in *Le Chapeau de Paille d'Italie* or *La Cagnotte*. What gives them their peculiar flavour is their practically universal basis of good sense and shrewd observation; while occasionally, as in such plays as *La Poudre aux yeux*, *Le voyage de M. Perrichon*, or *Le Misanthrope et l'Auvergnat*, a certain insight into the human heart is revealed.

In spite of having tried his hand, and that successfully, at most things, perhaps even because of this very versatility, Victorien Sardou, direct disciple and successful rival of Labiche, is first and foremost, a playwright—and is perhaps scarcely more than that. Gifted with exceptional faculties, with an incomparable inventiveness and wealth of resource, he has always reflected too faithfully the fickle taste of the public, passing, as he has, from the comedy of observation (such as *Nos bons Villageois*, *La Famille Benoiton*) to political comedy (*Rabagas*), from moral comedy (*Daniel Rochat*) to historical drama (*Patrie*). In all, thanks to his vigour, his suppleness of mind, his instinct for the stage, he has achieved genuine success—in none has he given us that masterpiece which one had almost the right to expect from him.

Before the advent of the nineteenth century the output of fiction—with certain brilliant exceptions all the more noteworthy for their rarity—had been devoid of any real literary value. *L'Asirée*, *Le Roman Comique*, *La Princesse de Clèves* cover the seventeenth century; with *Gil Blas*, *Manon Lescaut*, *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, *Paul et Virginie* we have exhausted the eighteenth. On the other hand, in the nineteenth century the novel is the form of literary expression which, during the whole

course of the century, has shown the highest capacity for expansion, and some of the masterpieces of our time belong to this hitherto but little appreciated category. This is, no doubt, due to the fact that the literary form of novel is at once the most subtle and the most plastic imaginable. Moreover, throughout the whole of the last century, the novel was undergoing a perpetual process of transformation, thus presenting us with the fullest possible picture of the changes in literary taste and temper, from the most extravagant Romanticism to the crudest naturalism. The majority of the Romantic novelists had made their reputation before 1840. We need not therefore concern ourselves with them in this chapter. We need only note that coming first under the influence of Sir Walter Scott and the Romanticist taste for historical reconstructions the novel was at the outset chiefly of the historical or personal type. Alfred de Vigny's *Cinq Mars*, Hugo's *Notre-Dame de Paris* and a great part of *Les Misérables*, and especially the novels of Alexandre Dumas père, may be taken as typical of historical fiction, the first three basing their claim to attention upon serious qualities of style, literary workmanship, and genuine literary beauty; while the last, though the success which they attained was remarkable, possessing only a somewhat remote link with pure literature, in spite of their astonishing qualities of invention, ready wit and infectious gaiety. There was in truth something false, something self-condemnatory, in this whole class of work. It exercised, nevertheless, a certain influence at this period, and through its preoccupation with the surroundings, its careful construction of the setting of its characters, it paved the way by degrees for the conception of the novel of manners as we know it to-day. We may take Chateaubriand's *René*, or Madame de Staël's *Corinne*, as the type of the personal novel in its lyric, while Benjamin Constant's *Adolphe* may serve to represent its analytical, aspect. It is from this type of fiction that we derive the modern psychological novel.

George Sand, in her early works at any rate, combined both these two aspects. Influenced by the romanticist advocacy of the lyric note, of sentimental exaltation, of the worship of the *ego*, of the fatality of passion, George Sand, admiring follower of Rousseau as she was, published one after the other and with prodigious success, *Indiana*, *Valentine*, and *Jacqucs*. In her depiction of their heroines, sisters of Werther and of René, suffering from the malady of the century, and wearing ever, like Chateaubriand, their hearts upon their sleeves, we see her rebelling against all prejudices, opinions and principles, then accepted and established, and boldly championing the rights of passion. Thence she passed on naturally to the novel with a purpose, wherein the story serves merely as a vehicle for the author's admirable theories—theories characterised, in her case, by a socialism as generous as it was vague and ill-defined.

Among the most interesting of her novels of this type may be mentioned *Consuelo* and *Le Meunier d'Angibault*. Later, her socialism

developed a rustic tinge, and she produced such little masterpieces as *La Petite Fadette*, *La Mare au Diable* and *François le Champi*. Her mind had, indeed, always inclined in the direction of country things, and even in her most passionate or most mystical novels, such as *Valentine*, *Le Mucnier* and *Consuelo*, one comes across enchanting descriptions of country sights and sounds. "What I wished to write was 'the eclogue of humanity'" she says in a letter to Balzac; and no one has ever succeeded in achieving clearer-cut, fresher, more supremely true, word-pictures of the country and its peasant-dwellers than hers. She has been accused of idealising her peasants; the real truth is that she was an optimist, and that it was her pleasure to view things and people from the angle most favourable to them. Finally, in her last works, *Jean de la Roche*, and *Le Marquis de Villemer*, steeped as they are in simple poetry and in sunny philosophy, she produced idylls after the pattern of *François le Champi* in a setting similar to that of *Valentine* and *Indiana*. As a writer she was chiefly remarkable for an extraordinary facility, an incomparable wealth of ideas, a careless prodigality full of charm and grace, a style varied, flowing, and subtle—all of which qualities go to place her in the front rank of the Romantic novelists.

No two writers more remote from George Sand could well be imagined than Stendhal and Merimée, whom we may group together for purposes of study, so like were they to each other in both work and character. Henri Beyle (Stendhal) stands out as one of the most original figures in our literary history and one of the most difficult to appreciate. He belonged to no one school, yet, through some one side of him, to all. In his irony and enthusiasm, in his harsh sincerity and delicacy, in his impulsiveness and cool analysis, he was essentially a man apart, clinging all unconsciously to the traditions of the eighteenth century, and seeing in literature nothing save a means of amusement. He was a sensualist like Condillac, an atheist like Chénier; force was the chief god in his Pantheon, and Italy ever the land of his predilection. What he chiefly prided himself upon was his knowledge of the human heart. In *Le Rouge et le Noir*, for example, he sets himself to trace in his hero, Julien Sorel, all the varying influences—temperament, climate, surroundings—by which human beings are affected. As he himself predicted, it was not until the latter years of the nineteenth century that he was really appreciated and admired, and proved him to be one of the immediate precursors of the psychological novelist.

Prosper Merimée was one of those few contemporaries of his upon whom Stendhal exercised an undoubted influence. They had, in truth, the same tastes, the same antipathies, the same type of character, the same tendencies. Both, in their worship of force, regarded literature as a profession with disdain, both possessed in equal degree the passion for sarcasm, and mystification, and both display the same hankering after the objective and impersonal note. Steeped to the lips in irony and

pessimism, Merimée confined himself to the short story in which he excelled. His plots are solidly put together, his characters logically conceived and developed; a lover of simplicity and clarity, he viewed emphasis and sentimentality with dislike. He tells his stories with brevity and sobriety but with an astonishing insight, conciseness, and truth. In six lines he draws a landscape, in as many words a character; but he has an extraordinary faculty for making a character live, and live humanly, completely (as in the case of *Colomba* or *Carmen*); and an equal faculty for the accurate and vividly realistic presentment of scenes, whether tragic or commonplace (e.g. *La Chronique de Charles IX.—Matteo Falcone*). His style, by its purity, its intentional and studied restraint, its perfection of form, enhances the illusion, and to it he owes his definite and unique place in literature.

In Balzac's imaginative faculty, in that element of the extraordinary and the visionary which he had in him, in the extravagance and superabundance of his work, in his taste for incredible adventures and fabulous personages, the influence of Romanticism can easily be traced. Nevertheless, posing as a philosopher and man of science, his ambition was to write what may be called the Natural History of Man. His aim was to be a *savant*, a student of natural science, solely occupied in observing, describing, classifying, unconcerned with the award of moral praise or blame: he studied humanity in fact as an entomologist dissects an insect. To study society as a whole under all its diverse aspects, he must needs bring them all under one focus, conceive for their closer union one universal plan. This was to be called *La Comédie Humaine*, in which the same characters were to appear and reappear—studied, now in the provinces (*Eugénie Grandet*); now in Paris (*Le Père Goriot*, *La Cousine Bette*); now in private life (*La Femme de trente ans*); now following a military career (*Les Chouans*); now the life of the fields (*Le Curé de Village*, *Le Médecin de Campagne*), and so forth. He set himself, in truth, to describe all he saw, good as well as bad, the grotesque and the repulsive as well as the sublime, and, in truth, his temperament and inclination impelled him to the depiction of humanity in its more degraded and vicious aspects. Such preference is, indeed, one of the salient characteristics of the realistic art, and in this direction, moreover, he achieved his most striking successes.

On the other hand it must be confessed that Balzac, ill-served by a style heavy, pompous, often in bad taste, and never either delicate or refined, failed in his portrayal of the higher types of humanity. We may go even further, and find him lacking in sense of proportion, in restraint, and with absolutely no feeling for nature. His field was limited to the study of average characters, and of life as lived among the middle and working classes; but in this domain he was supreme. Never has the wreckage of a whole cycle of existences, nor the ruin of a whole family, through the vice or madness of one of its individual



members, been revealed with greater power and knowledge. Take for instance the avarice of Père Goriot, the envy of Cousine Bette, the lust of Baron Hulot, the madness for invention in the house of Claës, all of them types, monstrous, out of proportion, almost symbolic if you will, yet incomparably vivid, intensely real in their moral and physical determinism. A Romanticist, then, Balzac certainly was—at times even extravagantly so—and Romanticism is the element in his work which is most salient. But, in the main, he must be regarded, alike in temperament, in his choice of subjects, and in his method of treatment, as the father of our contemporary realism.

Where Balzac had failed was in his appreciation of the subtleties of poetic feeling, and most of all in his delineation of well-bred, distinguished society: it was in this latter direction, on the other hand, that Octave Feuillet won his most signal triumphs. A disciple of George Sand, he stands for us as the representative of the idealist and romantic type of fiction (*e.g. Le Roman d'un Jeune Homme pauvre, Sibylle*). Nevertheless, in his later novels (*La Morte, M. de Camors, Julia de Trécœur*) conscious of the depth of moral deterioration reached by the members of a certain limited world of fashion, he seems to have aimed at unsparing verity and strength. Herein he was often successful; but he remains chiefly a delicate, optimistic writer, invaluable as a real inmate of the world of fashion, as the sole "Romantic" who succeeded in painting aristocratic society as it really is.

After 1850, the novel, which had so greatly extended its range since the beginning of the century, shows a tendency to oust all other literary forms. It was the sign of a new literary standpoint, the novel being, with rare exceptions, essentially the perception and expression of sentiments external to the author. If, therefore, one may trace in it both of the two main tendencies which characterised the century as a whole, it is nevertheless, realism which we find predominating. And Flaubert's originality lay precisely in the fact that he caught up and combined harmoniously in himself the main elements of both realism and Romanticism. He was a Romanticist by taste and by temperament, also by natural reaction (he began his career with verse and his first book was *La Tentation de St Antoine*), by his disgust with his age, his hatred for the commonplace and the Philistine, his admiration for Chateaubriand and Hugo, in his passion for perfection of form and faultlessness of style, and in the very selection of his subject-matter; all this his private letters and notes show more than abundantly. He is a naturalist, by reason of his absorbing interest in physiology (to which he subordinated psychology), his scientific habit of mind, his documentary accuracy (as minute as that of Balzac), his passion for describing the platitudinous mediocrity of middle-class life (*e.g. L'Éducation sentimentale, Madame Bovary, Bouvard et Pécuchet*), and, most of all, by reason of his impassive, impersonal attitude towards life. These dual tendencies are

to be found running in harmonious combination through all his works, remarkable for their accurate analysis of feeling, for their appropriate setting, their incomparable beauty of word-painting, their brilliant, restrained, and perfect style, their intimate combination of "dramatic interest and documentary truth, of the ideal and the real, of perfection of form and depth of meaning."

Lyric poetry, fiction and history—these had been to the time of the Revolution the three great lacunae in the classic literature of France—lacunae which it was reserved for the nineteenth century to fill. Before 1789, in fact, almost the only works which can be cited as purely historical, are *L'Essai sur les Mœurs* and *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* of Voltaire. It was the nineteenth century which gave history a new eminence in the field of literature; and it was to Chateaubriand, in his sixth book of *Les Martyrs*, that the initiative in the direction of picturesque and descriptive history was due. Nevertheless we must also take into account, in this connexion, the influence of Sir Walter Scott, the awakening of the patriotic spirit brought about by the Revolution, and the publication of authentic documents (e.g. the *Mémoires de St Simon*, 1830, and the like).

History, indeed, in common with all other kinds of literary achievement, was destined to undergo those two great influences by which our century has been dominated—to become "extravagantly Romanticist" in the hands of Michelet; realistic, in those of Thiers; scientific, in those of Taine and Renan. Under the influence of Romanticism, history began by being, before all things, artistic, picturesque, evocative of past times; it sought to make the men and ages of the past live again, in all the colour, specific traits and outward characteristics peculiar to each historical character and to each epoch, endeavouring always to relate and to describe, rather than to philosophise or discuss. What Thierry and Michelet wished to do was "to create an art, fashioned out of the materials furnished by an exact and impartial erudition"—a work at once of science and of the imagination, alike of art and of criticism. In this manner, Thierry tried to relate *La Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands* and to depict France in the sixth century in the *Récits des Temps Mérovingiens*. Unfortunately, despite a certain picturesqueness of colour and a certain happiness in the choice of epithets, the form, in his case, lacked grace, harmony, and beauty, and as a rule remains unworthy alike of his intentions and of his theme. Michelet, on the other hand, possessed all the qualities which Thierry lacked—imagination, overflowing sensibility, enthusiasm, poetry, a sense of the picturesque, a faculty alike for form and colour. If he has the defects of his qualities, if many errors are to be found in his history of the Revolution, no one, on the other hand, has better understood or resuscitated the mystic and Catholic Middle Ages, and his *Vie de Jeanne d'Arc* is a work unique of its kind. But the historical work of Michelet, the Romanticist, remains, in spite

of all his efforts, lyric and personal. We read our facts as mirrored in the soul of the narrator, and it is solely through the subjective processes of his own genius that we are made aware of the reality of facts.

With Guizot and his followers, on the other hand, history becomes more precise, more scientific, more philosophic, more impersonal, and confining itself to the field of ideas rather than of facts (thereby continuing the traditions of Montesquieu and of Voltaire), sets itself to deduce the social philosophy therein contained. Guizot—a statesman first and foremost—who wrote only to defend his two great political principles, religion and Liberalism, neglects the recital of facts to devote himself more to causes and consequences; the very titles are the proof of this; *Histoire générale de la Civilisation en Europe*, *Histoire de la Révolution d'Angleterre*, and the like—"great works, cold and strong, in which he studies the progress of society, in such fashion as to represent the Monarchy of July as the necessary and legitimate crown of the whole history of France." Fashioned in this School, yet never writing solely in defence of his ideas, de Tocqueville (1805-59) gave evidence of a larger, deeper and more impartial spirit, and his work may, for our time, be regarded as the model of historical philosophy and philosophic history. He set himself to study the progress and the future of *Democracy in America*, and produced an original and profound work, "an austere and vigorous presentment of precise facts, of judgments and of forecasts." In *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* he tries to explain the underlying causes of 1789, and to study the play of political and social institutions. These two books are sufficient to establish his renown, and are the most solid works of social philosophy that have appeared in France since Montesquieu's *Esprit des Loix*. Louis-Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877), in his old age, compared Romanticism to the Commune, which means, in very truth, that he understood nothing of the movement, that he even went through it all without understanding its content of art and poetry. But that which he possessed in the supreme degree, that which he introduced into the study of history, was the faculty of clarity, of precision, and, above all, "*le don de comprendre*," applied to matters till then neglected—such as finance, diplomacy, administration, strategy, and the like. He was, at least, the first to relate a whole section of French history (*L'Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*)—the first to carry light and leading into realms hitherto lying fallow and unexplored. After him, history, falling under the influence of Taine, becomes more and more precise, accurate and scientific. Take for example Mignet, with whom it becomes a generalisation based upon specific facts; or Renan, whose whole work springs in reality from Semitic philology, and others. The only historian, whom we must needs place in a class apart, is Lamartine, who carried on the romantic tradition, and whose *Histoire des Girondins* (1847)—eloquent, impassioned, enthusiastic as it is—is no more history than is Michelet's *L'Histoire de la Révolution*.

It was, indeed, inevitable for history to develop more and more into a science—and as exact a science as possible—as it came more and more to rely upon original documents, as criticism of the original sources became more definite and more exacting, in proportion also as, side by side with it, there grew up new and auxiliary sciences—philology, epigraphy, the history of art, archaeology (especially Egyptology with Champollion (1790–1832) and his successors, Assyriology, etc.)—which brought to it ever new materials, preventing its relapse into abstraction.

With Fustel de Coulanges (1830–89), for example, history, detached once and for all from all Romanticist influence, becomes at once the work of a philosopher and a man of science. He himself declared history to be “the science of human societies and of sociological fact,” and he seeks only an exact presentment of the past, studied solely and scrupulously in the texts themselves. In *La Cité Antique* (1864) and in *L'Histoire des Institutions de l'Ancienne France* (1875) he dissects the causes which led up to the two great revolutions of history. In these two books there is a range of information, a force of thought in the setting forth and interpretation of facts, a firmness and robust simplicity of style which, taken all together, entitle them to rank as masterpieces.

Instead of claiming for criticism that it profited by the progress of history, it would be fairer and truer to say that it experienced a simultaneous renewal and transformation, in obedience to the same causes, and yielding to the same influences. History, in renouncing its former errors, developed into an affair of science, art and truth. In like manner the old type of criticism, whether realist or dogmatic, which judged all things by the light of the one “canon,” the one dogma, according to one sole and unvarying ideal, gave place by degrees to the modern type, which judges works of art by replacing them in their original setting, by taking into account the social conditions and circumstances under which they were produced. The names of Villemain, Vinet, Scherer, and Fromentin can here only be cited, since each would deserve a special study; but it is in Sainte-Beuve that we find nineteenth century criticism really personified, first, because he was incontestably its leading spirit from 1835 to 1867, and, next, because, beginning his career as a Romantic poet and ending it as a critic and historian, he stands as one of the most striking exemplifications of the evolution of literary taste in the nineteenth century.

Up to 1835 Sainte-Beuve, himself a Romantic poet, bravely upheld the Romanticists, and came boldly out as an innovator. During this period he accustomed the public to the innovations of the new School and gave wise counsel to his *confrères*. By degrees, removed from the friendship and influence of Hugo, and seeing with clear eyes the exact condition of Romanticism—realising, moreover, that henceforth it would be quite capable of defending itself—he came to judge it with perfect detachment, and, up to 1850 or thereabouts, we find him growing ever more

circumspect, more noticeably conservative. He joined, in a word, the "Left Centre," to which, at heart, he had always belonged, and in whose bosom he remained to his death. Finally, after 1850, he showed himself in the light rather of a literary historian than of a critic—even in that of a historian pure and simple as opposed to a literary historian. He possessed, indeed, in the supreme degree the qualities essential to the critic—profound erudition, vivacity, intelligence, above all, an insatiable curiosity, which caused him to seek in everything the spectacle of humanity engaged in the actual work of living; and the very plasticity and alertness of his mind enabled him to pass through the most varied surroundings and judge them with understanding and insight, to see into and analyse the most opposite types of character. By dint of studying, first and foremost, the life-story, the moral and physical presentment of a writer, he seeks to get at his temperament, his manner of being, his tastes, endeavouring always to revivify the past of a man in his present, to explain his work by explaining the man himself. And thus his criticism, by its pure realism, by its elucidation of individual character, possesses an immense artistic value.

We might here associate journalism with criticism; but, as a matter of fact, during the whole of the nineteenth century, the small claim which the Press ever possessed to be regarded as literature grew smaller and smaller, absorbed as it was, on the one hand, in politics, and, on the other, in the pursuit of information, however obtained. We will confine ourselves to the mention of Paul-Louis Courier (1772–1825) who wrote in defence of liberal ideas under the Restoration, and whose "vivid alert prose carried on the tradition of Voltaire"; of Émile de Girardin, the discoverer in France of the value of advertisement and the founder of the halfpenny paper; of Armand Carrel, one of the last representatives of the old newspaper apostolate; of Veuillot (1813–83), the champion of the Catholic Church and of the temporal power of the Pope; of Prévost Paradol (1829–78), a man of brilliant and scornful intelligence who fought against the Imperial *régime*; lastly, of Edmond About (1828–85), "exquisite story-teller and charming talker," independent Voltairian and republican; and many others.

With regard to philosophy, viewed in its purely literary aspect, it is difficult to consider it apart from other things. Maine de Biran, Saint-Simon and especially Auguste Comte, "the most powerful thinker of his half-century," must be at once dismissed from this survey, their purely literary merits being of the smallest: Comte writes badly and the whole of his school is outside the domain of literature. Victor Cousin (1792–1867) was at once university orator and learned philosopher, at first a Romanticist, then purely a scholar, an eloquent and admired professor. Eclecticism—the philosophic system, which he defended, has fallen into discredit. Besides being a writer, he discovered the original text of Pascal's *Pensées*, was one of the founders of the history of philosophy, and

did something towards making German philosophy known to Frenchmen. There remain Renan and Taine, who are as much to be classified as critics and men of learning as either philosophers or historians. In Renan there were two personalities, representing the dual tendencies of the time—a delicate and exquisite artist, a weighty historian and man of learning. His wit, the charm of his style, the superior literary vesture in which he clothes his philosophic ideas have brought upon him accusations of dilettantism; the truth being that in studying faith he lays most stress upon the need of exact knowledge, that in criticism he never strays far from the moral aspect of things. For France he will ever stand as the founder of religious history, the historian of Judaism and of Christianity (*L'Histoire du Peuple d'Israel, La Vie de Jésus, Les Origines du Christianisme*). It was he who first brought the method of comparative philology to the study of history, who succeeded in reconstructing the characters of bygone personages, in making the scenes and the setting of past ages live again; as a philosopher, he “represents, in the history of thought, a kind of metaphysical scepticism at once subtle and lofty.” As a writer he is especially remarkable for a simplicity, a subtlety, a harmony, which do not exclude the gifts of a painter or of a colourist; and, because of his very delicacy, he has influenced only a few choice spirits.

As for Taine, it is difficult to speak freely of and judge fairly, a writer so close to our own day. His philosophic theories practically created the naturalist and realist movement of the latter half of the century. A disciple of the English Empiricists, he became the champion of psycho-physiology, maintaining that humanity should be studied scientifically, so that through the interpretation of a host of minor details, carefully observed, the underlying psychological laws might be revealed. For him, the true task of the historian consisted in so grouping facts under their different formulæ as to bring them readily into conformity with one universal axiom. What the historian does for the past, the novelist and the dramatist were to do for the present. It was for them to collect all the “human documents” possible, so that reality and truth might be the more loudly proclaimed; the most interesting cases being naturally the abnormal ones, viewed either pathologically or teratologically, because in them reality is magnified. Finally, when all this has been accomplished, we may proceed to introspection and to the study of ourselves. From this brief survey, we may estimate the influence he exercised over men’s minds, when we consider how many men of letters, novelists, and dramatists have worked on his lines, and how largely the criticism of to-day, adopting his theories concerning “the surroundings, the time and the race” has followed in his footsteps, while adding on its own account that analysis of individual character which he was too apt to neglect. Whatever may have been his defects and his errors, we cannot but recognise in him one of the most powerful minds of that

half-century, which "by its opening out of so many new paths has left such a profound impression upon contemporary thought."

Art has ever presented the same features and undergone the same influences as literature. The resemblances between Poussin and Corneille, Watteau and Marivaux are undeniable; between Greuze and Diderot they are infinitely more striking, because, towards the end of the eighteenth century, art and art-criticism entered into the domain of literature. Since then, the links between them have been drawn ever closer and closer, until we come to men like Fromentin, at once a painter and a writer of distinction. May we not even divine something far stronger than a link or a relationship between such men as Fontanes and Guérin, Delacroix and Hugo, Delavigne and Delaroche, Courbet and Flaubert? Art in the nineteenth century in fact underwent precisely the same variations as literature—from the pseudo-classicism of Girodet-Trioson down to the naturalism of Manet, passing through Romanticism and realism on the way.

After 1840 Romantic art (represented only by Hugo and Delacroix) withered; nevertheless, even then, this art set moving a current of new ideas, and provided each of the various arts with a fructifying germ which it was for each to develop according to its own nature.

In painting, it meant the triumph of nature-study and pure landscape, as exemplified by such men as Corot, Rousseau, Millet, Troyon and above all Courbet. Historical landscape had had its day; henceforth there were to be no more rules for any particular type of work, save those each individual man of genius fixed for himself. Italy and Greece were forgotten, men turned to nature, devoting themselves to its faithful interpretation as it presents itself to our bodily eyes—sun, sky, trees, water, air, chiaroscuro. If there must be figures they must be the peasants of Millet, or the wood-cutters of the neighbouring forests. Instead of seeking inspiration at Capri or Paestum, men began to paint the wild or picturesque environs of Paris—Fontainebleau and Barbizon. Was it not by these same principles that Flaubert was actuated when he wrote *Madame Bovary*?

Thus, in the arts as in the literature, Romanticism culminated, in the middle of this century, in the triumph of that which, from Rousseau and Bernardin de Saint-Pierre down to Chateaubriand, had first inspired this whole great school of French thought—that is to say, in the admiration and worship of nature, studied and observed as it really is.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE COMPLETION OF ITALIAN UNITY.

## (1) THE SUCCESSORS OF CAVOUR.

(1861-70.)

THE purposes and life work of Cavour have been nowhere more worthily summarised than on the morrow of his death, by Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, and Lord Palmerston, when they described him as the real author of that great work of liberty, the resuscitation of Italy, which had earned him the gratitude, not of his country, but of mankind. "The man who has wrought this great deed," said Lord Palmerston, "will live eternally in history; and premature as his death may seem, and indeed is, and deeply as it may have shaken the hopes of his fellow citizens, it has not come too early for his glory."

Such was the judgment on Cavour of the leading statesmen of England, the classic land of constitutional liberty, from whom the great Italian had learnt his lessons, and drawn his inspirations. Massimo d'Azeglio, on the other hand, thought that he had died exactly at the right moment for his reputation, so precarious did he think the life of the hastily constructed edifice, so vast the piles of ruin on which its foundations were laid. His immediate successors earned the somewhat contemptuous nickname of the "Generals of Alexander," not always without reason. But it is only fair to observe that the change in the dispositions of men and of things, which had begun shortly before the death of Cavour, had become seriously aggravated since the sudden removal of his immense authority. Italy had staggered under the blow; her unification was still incomplete, the financial need was sore and continual: and, while the lines of external policy were pretty well fixed and secure, those of internal administration were still uncertain.

In the end it was determined to adopt throughout the kingdom, with a few alterations, the laws enacted by Urbano Rattazzi in virtue of his extraordinary powers. These were, however, modified, in consequence of some jealousies, by a number of provisos, such as the division of the country into districts corresponding to the former States, and by the arbitrary union of provinces. Unfortunately, these laws contained the



seeds of a yet graver difference, in the shape of a revolt against centralisation under Piedmontese hegemony; and in the meanwhile the real decentralisation for which the people craved, the decentralisation which would secure the true and complete autonomy of the Commune, that historical germ and essential principle of Italian life, remained little more than a phrase. At the same time, the riddle of Naples and its provinces was puzzling in succession the various Viceroys who were sent there. The problem remained unsolved; in Naples every function of ordinary government was impossible; in the southern provinces, anarchy borrowed strength from the brigandage indigenous there, which, much to its discredit, the Government was unable to cure.

Baron Bettino Ricasoli, who had succeeded Cavour as Prime Minister, was undoubtedly the most influential political leader of the moment. A man of powerful mind, inspired with patriotic feeling and noble ideals, he was yet, owing to a stiff and rather unbending character, in many respects the antithesis of the great statesman he had succeeded. The external outlook was gloomy, the new kingdom was nowhere recognised, except by England in an informal and semi-official fashion. It is true that a few days after the death of Cavour, Napoleon III recognised her, as a fresh proof of the good-will felt towards her in her immense loss. But though he had previously come to an understanding with Cavour as to the withdrawal of the French from Rome, he now declared that this recognition was not to be construed as detracting from the validity of the papal protests against the occupation of the Marches and Umbria, or as approving the results of the Unionist policy of Italy; he further signified that France was resolved to maintain the occupation of Rome, so long as any of the interests she had undertaken to protect remained unsecured. Thus the value of the French recognition was reduced to a minimum. Nevertheless, her example was followed, first by England, this time acting officially; and then by other nations, notably, in the following year (1862), by Russia and Prussia. Italy having been thus duly adopted into the family of nations, was naturally the more anxious for the accomplishment of her own unity, to which Rome and Venice only were now lacking—Rome, the cause of all her difficulties with France; Venice, on whose account the chronic hostility of Austria, now the more formidable in that she had less territory to defend, might at any moment become an imminent and mortal peril to the new kingdom.

Though convinced that his duty was first to establish the country on a peaceable and orderly basis, and to strengthen the army both in numbers and organisation, Ricasoli nevertheless felt bound to follow up the Roman question at once. The failure of the confidential negotiations of Cavour, which is mentioned in a previous chapter, had exasperated the hostility of Pope and Curia against Italy. The presence of the Neapolitan Bourbons in Rome so demoralised the Pope and his Administration as to make them deaf to the most elementary rules of political morality. Recruiting for

the brigand bands was carried on openly at regular well-known centres ; Chiavone, Crocco, Guerra, Giordano, brigand chiefs notorious for their enormities and atrocities, came and went without hindrance, and all this under the very eyes of the French garrison and their commander General Goyon. Ricasoli determined to try the effect of direct and public overtures to the Pope, by invoking the good offices of the French Government. The latter, however, declined its aid ; but Ricasoli held to his purpose too firmly to lose heart on this account. What he had been unable to obtain from Napoleon and the Pope by diplomacy, he determined to wrest from them by means of a vast national agitation, by the voice of all Italy, throughout its length and breadth, demanding Rome. With this idea in his mind, he showed greater cordiality towards Garibaldi, whose name was being used to organise a network of democratic associations throughout the country. Their objects, indeed, extended beyond Rome, but nevertheless Ricasoli hoped to be able to keep them in hand. He went a step further, and left Mazzini free to return to his country, so that all divisions might disappear, in the growing unanimity of the Italian cry for Rome. Besides endeavouring to appeal to the democrats, Ricasoli also set on foot a movement among the Clergy, to induce the Pope to be reconciled to Italy. The movement was headed by Carlo Passaglia, Monsignor Eusebio Liverani, and other prelates, but it did no more than give birth to the so-called "Petition of 9000 Priests." It was generally looked upon as an attempt to start a new schism on a magnificent scale ; but it was weakly supported and had no success, as is, strangely enough, invariably the case with the agitations of rebellious clergy in Italy. The parliamentary majority that supported Ricasoli was becoming alarmed at his domestic policy, and at his procedure towards Rome ; still, they dared not break with him. Indeed, they accepted sundry very important proposals of his, one after another : *e.g.*, the abolition of the vicerealties of Naples and Sicily, and that of the administrative independence of Tuscany ; the issue of a loan for twenty millions sterling ; the consolidation of the debts of all the States ; the increase of expenditure on the great public works, and especially on railways, which were to restore the economic prosperity of the country ; a law on weights and measures, involving the universal adoption of the decimal system ; unification of the coinage ; fresh taxation on a large scale for the replenishment of the Treasury.

The attitude of Ricasoli towards Rome had displeased Napoleon III, who considered that Italy made no sufficient allowance for the serious embarrassments to which he was thereby subjected at home. Victor Emmanuel, for his part, was quite ready to devote himself entirely to the liberation of Venice (therein agreeing with Mazzini, rather than with Garibaldi and Ricasoli), by planning an insurrection in Hungary, which would force Austria to abandon Venetia. Ricasoli was now becoming the object of a sort of conspiracy, which, originating at the Court, was

spreading to the Chambers and beyond, and was even favoured by no less a person than Benedetti, the French Minister at Turin. Rattazzi was the soul of this conspiracy, and to his ambitious and intriguing spirit all weapons were lawful. Meanwhile, the semi-official agents of Victor Emmanuel had secured for Rattazzi a more exalted support, and a conference between him and Napoleon III actually took place in Paris in October, 1861.

Ricasoli was fully aware of what was going on, and warned Victor Emmanuel not to risk his country and his Crown in a hazardous game, which might end in his finding himself, not at the head, but at the tail, of the Mazzinian and Garibaldian parties. The King received his frank observations with ill-humour; and at length, on February 28, 1862, he sent a letter which caused Ricasoli to offer his resignation. It was at once accepted; and Rattazzi was commissioned to form a new Cabinet. Ricasoli had no doubt been guilty of many mistakes, but was at least pure in intention, while the King had given way to evil counsels and to the impulses of an impatient patriotism; and Rattazzi's rise to power signified the success of a low intrigue.

Rattazzi was apparently surprised at his own victory; and his first Ministry was hastily and imperfectly constructed of representatives of different parties. The old Cavour majority distrusted him; but, after its desertion of Ricasoli, it dared not open its mouth. The extremists came to some temporary arrangement with the new Ministry, which might have been of some solid value to them, but for the plottings, the secret understandings, and the general atmosphere of conspiracy. Of the extremists Mazzini was perhaps the least dangerous, inasmuch as he always conceived revolution as a cosmopolitan affair; he would make one revolution engender another; Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, next Greece, then the nationalities of eastern Europe were to pass on the sacred lamp; the Austrian empire was to be dissolved, and the destinies of Europe were to be changed! Garibaldi, on the contrary, had but little faith in such far-reaching schemes—both from old experience and from an equally old opposition to Mazzini. All he desired was an understanding with Rattazzi to enable him to go his own way; and Rattazzi, on his side, fully believed in his own ability to control Garibaldi's activity. Garibaldi summoned a congress of the democratic associations, which had been growing up for some time, partly under his auspices, partly under those of Mazzini. The meeting was held at Genoa on March 9, 1862, with Garibaldi as president, and was numerously attended; a resolution was passed merging all the societies into one, under the name of the "Society for the Emancipation of Italy." War was declared for the liberation of Rome and Venice; and Garibaldi was persuaded not only to be reconciled to Mazzini, but even to insist on his recall from exile.

Meanwhile the Government gave no sign by word or act, and seemed

more than ever to have some secret understanding with Garibaldi. But just then King Otho was driven from Greece by a military revolt, which appeared to be connected with the Slav agitations on the Danube and the movements in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Servia, and Montenegro. We cannot say what impression these events made on the mind of Garibaldi; but we know that Rattazzi promised to supply him for the purpose of some armed enterprise with arms and a large sum of money (£40,000, as declared by Crispi in open Chamber, and Rattazzi did not gainsay him). Shortly afterwards Garibaldi took a journey into Lombardy, whence he sent a request for the promised arms and treasure; Rattazzi, fearing that the prestige of the King might suffer in the general uncertainty as to the nature of Garibaldi's next enterprise, arranged to accompany Victor Emmanuel to Naples; and was received there with great enthusiasm, in spite of the wretched condition of both capital and provinces. Whether Rattazzi and Garibaldi kept to their reciprocal engagements is doubtful. Rattazzi thought that he could play with fire; Garibaldi had but one clear idea, which was to attack Austria. He continued to hesitate between an attempt on Greece and one on Venice; but meanwhile he had taken up his quarters at Trescorre, the central point of the valleys that lead into Italian Tyrol, whither, according to the information of the Government, he proposed to penetrate by way of Anfo and Edolo.

Peremptory orders were immediately sent to stop him at all costs, and many Garibaldians were consequently arrested and imprisoned in various border-towns, amongst others at Sarnico. Thence they were transferred under arrest to Brescia, where the populace attempted to rescue them; a conflict ensued with the Italian troops, in which many of the inhabitants were killed or wounded. Garibaldi took up the cause of the prisoners of Sarnico as his own, and charged the Government with a breach of their understanding; although in all probability it was he who, yielding not unwillingly to the arguments of the Mazzinians, had departed from his promises to Rattazzi. It is easy to conceive the disgust felt by Cavour's old majority at these discreditable proceedings. Nevertheless, though much against their will, they supported the Government; and Garibaldi retired to Caprera, sick at heart, indignant both with the Government and the Mazzinians, and yearning to act once more with entire independence and without any secret understandings. On June 29, 1862, he appeared unexpectedly at Palermo, passed in triumph along the path of his former victories from Calatafimi to Marsala, and there, in the midst of a vast crowd assembled in a church, he raised for the first time the cry "Rome or death!" The Government, in its first surprise and terror, took no active steps, an attitude which gave rise to a general belief that the King and Rattazzi were still in collusion with Garibaldi. Intrigues of such a sort have sometimes been too readily admired in Italy as examples of superfine astuteness. Garibaldi himself never even dreamed that an attempt would be made to stop him; but he did all he could to

avoid collision with the troops in Sicily. However, on August 3, 1862, a royal proclamation was issued, countersigned by all the Ministers, which publicly disavowed his action, and threatened him and his followers with the most rigorous penalties of the law. But this was unheeded by Garibaldi. On August 24 he crossed the Straits on two vessels, with some 3000 volunteers, and landed near Mileto in Calabria; but, hearing from Reggio that a state of siege had been proclaimed in Sicily and Naples, and that the King's army under Cialdini was advancing, he directed his forces to concentrate on the table-land of Aspromonte, which he reached himself on August 29. On the same day Colonel Pallavicini, at the head of the royal forces, arrived at the same spot and attacked the Garibaldians with great vigour. Few volleys were exchanged, as Garibaldi had forbidden any resistance; but unluckily a bullet struck him on the right ankle. His companions were made prisoners of war; and he was himself placed with all due respect on board a man-of-war, and taken to the fortress of Varignano near Spezia. This was the second step on the road to Rome, and it was not taken without bloodshed. Rattazzi now issued, through Giacomo Durando, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, a circular dated September 10, 1862, in which he laid claim to Rome as the reward of it, and adopted the cry of Garibaldi, "Rome or death." On October 8 he addressed a despatch directly to the French Government, in which he put his demands still higher; ignoring all that had happened, he proposed, it was said, to take up the question of Rome at the point where Cavour had left it, and insist upon the withdrawal of the French occupation of Rome, and the recognition of the principle of non-intervention in Italian affairs. He thus gave a monumental example of political tactlessness and diplomatic *naïveté*, and the attitude immediately adopted by Napoleon must very quickly have enlightened him. Drouyn de Lhuys (who had replaced Thouvenel at the French Foreign Office) simply left this despatch of October 8 unanswered; and, as to the circular of September 10, he only reminded its authors that, in the negotiations concerning Rome, the imperial Government must confine itself to the attempt to reconcile two interests equally deserving of respect, and could not hear of sacrificing one to the other.

So far, therefore, the external situation was settled, and unfavourably for Italy. What was to be done with the domestic difficulty? Was Garibaldi to be indicted? Fortunately the marriage of Maria Pia of Savoy to the King of Portugal relieved the Ministry of trouble on this point, by giving them an opportunity of declaring the customary amnesty. Rattazzi next tried to regain touch of the old majority of the Right by a rearrangement of the Ministry, but without success. He also thought of dissolving the Chambers, but was afraid to do so; on November 18, however, a bitter discussion took place in the Chamber, in which the Ministry were violently attacked: and, on December 1, 1862.

Rattazzi announced the resignation of the Ministry. It was succeeded on December 8, 1862, by a Ministry of the pure Right, or, to adopt the name by which the Moderates were now beginning to be known, a *Consorteria* ("log-rollers") Ministry. This was headed first by Farini, and later, on his somewhat sudden retirement, by Marco Minghetti (March 24, 1863). Out of the troubles and vicissitudes of the Rattazzi Ministry the old majority of the Right had issued in a more disintegrated condition than ever. The principal deserters were the Piedmontese members, who felt that they were losing much of their former predominance with the resignation of Rattazzi. By the side of the great parliamentary *Consorteria* clique there were smaller provincial and local associations, which were perhaps even more intolerant and more exclusive. Minghetti, now President of the Council, was undoubtedly one of the widest intellects and most disinterested spirits among the *Consorteria*; but he was without the nerve requisite for controlling the profound antipathies to which their mutual intolerance and systematic exclusiveness had given rise. Face to face with this party of order stood a body which was not so much an Opposition, in the true sense, as a confused and chaotic crowd; old antagonists of the Moderates and enemies of Cavour; ambitious young men struggling to rise; Garibaldians acting rather from sympathy with their old general than on any political principle. Around these were grouped the derelicts of the shipwreck of Mazzinianism, and of other old dogmas and lost causes—Neo-Guelfs, Autonomists, Bourbonists, Republicans, Federalists, the still impenitent survivors of the secret societies, and other political combatants of 1848-9. All Italy was still agitated by the late occurrences at Aspromonte; Turin and Piedmont suspected the new Ministry of designs hostile to them; the reactionary feelings which had been provoked by the extravagances of Garibaldi were now giving place to the opposite sentiment; in Sicily discontent was profound and threatening; brigandage showed signs of lifting up its head again in the provinces of Naples.

The fact is that the brigandage of those countries was partly a symptom of local reaction, partly an ancient evil, deep-rooted in the social and economic conditions of those provinces, which was not curable by force alone. It has been said, with some plausibility, that the true conquest of Naples was effected, not when Garibaldi flashed like lightning from Reggio di Calabria to Naples, but by the war against brigandage. The situation created by the prevalence of brigandage was essentially a problem demanding the interference of the National Government, as Garibaldian enthusiasm and the good sense of Neapolitan Liberals had failed to suppress the disorders. For, though the middle class Reformers, who took up arms in 1860 to the number of 18,000 (according to the trustworthy estimates of Racioppi and Turiello), unquestionably aided the success of the general movement in favour of Garibaldi, they proved unable even to stop the reactionary peasants from recovering possession

of the whole provinces of Abruzzo and Molise, within a few days of the battle of the Volturno; nor could they prevent that reaction, combined with the dispersion of a part of the Bourbonist army after the first victories of Cialdini, from giving rise to brigandage. It is with this problem of brigandage in Naples that the success of the newly formed kingdom of Italy was largely bound up, for its suppression had become a pressing necessity. Brigandage began by being mainly political; later, as its existence was prolonged by the aid of the Bourbons who had taken refuge in Rome, by the complicity of the papal Court and the toleration of the French, it once more became a social institution. Moreover, while the old Government had lost all power of controlling it, the new had, for some time, failed to make itself felt directly by its own strength.

The reaction in favour of Bourbonism which brigandage kept up, had been started some time before, as we have seen; and, during their vicerealties, neither Farini nor Prince Carignano, nor San Martino had been able to arrest it. From the military point of view Cialdini had been the most successful; his method was, while vigorously repressing the Bourbonist plots in the interior, so to envelop the brigand bands as to force them away from the papal frontier—their base of operations—and drive them into Calabria, where he hoped to be able to crush them by a single blow. But the vice-regal office was abolished, Cialdini was recalled, and La Marmora succeeded him with the title of Prefect of Naples and Commander-in-chief. The ranks of the brigands were at first eagerly filled by foreign fanatics of Legitimist views, who really believed they were joining a new Vendean Crusade, but these gentlemen adventurers could not give Neapolitan brigandage an exclusively political character. When they were got rid of, brigandage returned to its original type, which was that of a morbid anarchic development. It had been fostered by superstition, ignorance, and misery, by the impulsiveness of Southern blood, by class hatred, family feuds, and personal quarrels, by selfishness on the part of the rich and wretchedness among the poor; and finally by the state of semi-villanage, by which peasants and agricultural labourers were tied to the soil, starving and hopeless of redress. It is to be feared after all that the only efficient remedy for these evils is one that has come without the assistance of statesmen, viz., the emigration of these poor country folk in a body; and even this, in the proportions that it has now assumed, promises to become a scourge in its turn.

The Minghetti Ministry, immediately on assuming power, appointed a parliamentary commission on this question. Giuseppe Massari, an old and respected Neapolitan patriot, drew up their report, which remains to this day a standard authority on the matter. Their proposal was to extend the basis of property in these provinces by getting rid of mortmain, to make roads, to cut down the woods which sheltered the brigands, to start schools, and to increase the vigilance of the police. as

well as the severity and swiftness of punishment. . On this report an Act was based known as the Pica Law; its effect was good, but its operation was neither general nor continuous. Besides the repression of brigandage, there was another pressing necessity—that of regulating the finances of the State, which the great political changes between 1859 and 1863, and the wastefulness of the various provisional Governments, that held power before the annexation, had reduced to something very near ruin. Minghetti, as a moral philosopher and a learned political economist, went back to first principles, and drew up a complete scheme, which, he had the audacity to predict, would in four years' time produce equilibrium between the debit and credit side of the ordinary (not the extraordinary) budget, if nothing interposed to disturb its symmetry. He submitted his proposal to the Chambers in a speech of great eloquence and lucidity on February 14, 1863; beside it a previous scheme of Sella, drawn up under the Rattazzi Ministry, now looked rather pessimistic; and people were grateful to Minghetti for his confidence. Unluckily, as it turned out, there was some flaw in the calculations of both; and he who had speculated with the greater confidence in the future was the financier who incurred the greater blame. But the Chambers went on to sanction a special loan of £28,000,000, out of which Minghetti proposed to meet immediate wants, at the same time keeping in hand a reasonable sum to meet eventualities in the political world.

In truth the atmosphere of Europe was growing murky. Russian Poland had been the first to rise in 1863. Germany was preparing to wrest the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark; and it was impossible to say whether Austria and Prussia would fall out or agree on the partition. Napoleon was nursing his day-dreams, as usual. A European conflagration was not impossible; and it behoved Italy to be ready. Unrest and disturbance had its counterpart in the internal life of Italy; Garibaldi, it is true, was incapacitated for a time by the wound received at Aspromonte; but Mazzini was busy with all manner of chimerical projects for the liberation of Venetia. During 1863 and 1864 events developed as follows: the Ministers were hesitating to avail themselves of any assistance from revolutionary bodies, being doubtful of their own ability to keep them under control; next, King Victor Emmanuel, self-confident and secretive, with a view of his Constitutional powers peculiar to himself, and intensely anxious to break with Austria on the first possible opportunity, was negotiating with Hungarian refugees. He also had relations with Mazzini himself, whose distrust and reservation he never succeeded in quite breaking down and whose promises of loyalty were always strictly limited in the way of date; and, finally, with Garibaldi, with whom he always found it easier to come to an understanding, from a certain conformity between their characters. The King's plan was, as usual, to foment an insurrection in the Austrian empire, to be backed up in the Danubian principalities; the first centre



of insurrection being Transylvania. Garibaldi was to form an army composed of the Hungarians, Roumanians, Servians, and other southern Slavs, and to take the command of it against Austria. Italy was to take that opportunity to declare war. The King was liberal in his promises of support in arms and money. As soon as all this warlike preparation became known to Mazzini, he broke off all negotiations with the King, and did his best to thwart his plans. Just then Garibaldi paid a visit to London, where he doubtless hoped to obtain valuable support for his new enterprises, and where he took the opportunity to effect, in appearance at least, a reconciliation with Mazzini.

As, for the time being, these questions had ceased to agitate Europe, the Minghetti Ministry felt it incumbent on them to take up the Roman question. The ever growing scandal of the complicity of the papal Court in the Neapolitan brigandage, the responsibility and disgrace of which was now beginning to be a serious burden on the French Emperor; the disgrace of the contract for the construction of the southern railways which had been given to an ex-Minister Bastogi; the attitude adopted in Parliament by the Piedmontese Opposition, all increased the difficulty of the Ministry. On the other hand, though the condition of the finances did not quite come up to the confident expectations of Minghetti, it had at any rate much improved. Indeed it may be said that the movement towards equilibrium in Italian finances dates from his tenure of office, having been initiated by three important measures of taxation, viz. the increase of the land-tax (with temporary provisions for its equalisation throughout the kingdom), the imposition of the tax on personal property, and the imposition of the tax on food. Besides this, new treaties of commerce were made, or old treaties renewed with France, England, Russia, Holland, and Denmark; and there were, in addition, to be discerned the first signs of an economic, industrial, and social awakening, which was of great importance for the first years of the existence of the new kingdom. Companies were started for the development of the sulphur mines, railways, gas-works, canals, and banks; also for the acquisition of public property; and there arose popular and cooperative loan institutions, workmen's associations on Mazzini's anti-socialistic basis, cooperative stores, and societies for making advances to landowners. Now that the old state boundaries had disappeared, the various districts began to exchange their products; while the public authorities gave constant attention to the supply of roads and schools. Of course all such developments were at present more or less in embryo, and the hindrances were so many and grievous that the Government was induced to attempt to score a success in its negotiations with Rome or France, in order to relieve the strain of its internal difficulties.

Negotiations with France were resumed in June, 1864; and a Convention, providing for the withdrawal of the French from Rome within

the next two years, was drawn up on September 15. Napoleon III required, in return, that the capital should be transferred from Turin to Florence. This condition gave rise to a dispute; the Italians contended that it recognised the advance of the capital one stage nearer to Rome, while, in the French view, it was a final renunciation of Rome. Turin resented fiercely the insult to its dignity and the injury to its prosperity; and the disturbances, in which the inhabitants of this generally peaceful and quiet city expressed their feelings, were put down with ill-considered recklessness. Two massacres of unarmed citizens took place on September 21 and 22; and the King was so shocked and upset by these disastrous events that he dismissed the Ministry on September 23, 1864.

Minghetti was succeeded by General Alfonso La Marmora with a Ministry consisting mainly of Piedmontese members, which induced both Chambers to approve the French Convention and transferred the capital to Florence. But the old majority was now broken up, and a Piedmontese Opposition had been constituted, with a temper so furious that even Mazzini thought he could use it for his own purposes. For many years this body had a disintegrating effect on the Government, and paralysed all its relations, especially towards the extreme parties, in spite of the sound parliamentary majority, by which the Ministry was supported.

Thus the Italians had reached the third milestone on the road to Rome; but there were yet to be terrors and convulsions before the *Milliarium Aureum*—the Golden Milestone of the Forum—was reached. So far as Rome itself was concerned, experience showed how difficult it was for both one and the other of the contracting parties to carry out the Convention, in the face of the refusal of Garibaldi and the party of action to come to any terms, and of the equally implacable hostility of Pius IX and the Roman Curia. The Pope, indeed, by way of demonstrating the impossibility of any accord, took the opportunity of declaring his disagreement, not with Italy only, but with the whole of modern civilisation, by the publication of the *Syllabus* (on December 8, 1864) whose importance is indicated elsewhere. The general elections of 1865 had laid bare the depths of the gulf which had been formed between political parties since the death of Cavour. There was a Ministerial crisis; and, scarcely had the Ministry been reconstituted, still under the presidency of La Marmora, than it narrowly escaped a second disaster. But the first whispers of war were in the air; and disputes were allayed under the influence of the thrill of expectation that heralds great events, and by the secret hope that the opportunity had at last come for expelling every Austrian from Italy. The rivalry between Austria and Prussia, Bismarck having come into power on September 23, 1862, was threatening to burst out into war. Italy thus had an excellent excuse for dropping the Roman question, and bringing the Venetian trouble to a solution by forming an alliance with Prussia—a policy known to have been favoured by Cavour so far back as 1858. The success of La Marmora

in negotiating and concluding this alliance will never cease to deserve the gratitude of his country.

The direct negotiations between Prussia and Italy, in the matter of this alliance, began only in March, 1866, and were conducted by Bismarck in person; but, indirectly, they had been going on much longer. His object in seeking an alliance with Italy was not only in order to secure her material aid against Austria, but in order to assure himself of the neutrality or at any rate of the acquiescence of France. Bismarck always distrusted Napoleon III, who was at any moment capable of crossing the purposes of Prussia; at the same time he distrusted La Marmora and Italy, as on too intimate terms with Napoleon. La Marmora on his side suspected that Bismarck's main purpose was to intimidate Austria, and that, if he succeeded, he would leave Italy in the lurch. These mutual suspicions at the outset, and the stratagems which Bismarck was compelled to adopt in order to draw his recalcitrant King and Court into the war, very seriously aggravated the difficulties of the negotiations, and later were to produce very serious consequences. However, on April 8, 1866, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between Prussia and Italy. Scarcely was this signed, under conditions of the greatest secrecy (which of course were not kept), than Napoleon, on May 5, 1866, notified to La Marmora that Austria had made a formal proposition to cede Venetia, in return for a simple promise of neutrality. Austria had in fact resolved, in face of the extreme peril that threatened her, to abandon Venetia, and throw it as an apple of Atalanta in the path of Italy. La Marmora had already rejected the proposal when first mooted. On its renewal on May 6, with more urgent insistency and in greater detail, he maintained his honourable refusal. Italy intended, he said, to remain faithful to her treaty with Prussia. Italy would otherwise fail in loyalty and in honour, and her honour was dearer to him than even the acquisition of Venetia.

On June 20, 1866, Italy declared war against Austria. Thus began the third war of independence. No description is needed of the universal enthusiasm of the country, of the hopes of glory which inspired both the army, under the command of the King in person, and the volunteers under Garibaldi. La Marmora went to the front by the side of Victor Emmanuel, and was succeeded as President of the Ministry by Ricasoli. But on June 24 the Italians were defeated at Custoza, and, what was worse, so badly defeated that, in the opinion of their chiefs, it was useless to resume operations before July 5. Two days before that date the Prussians had conquered at Sadowa; and Austria, beaten to the dust, renewed her offer to cede Venetia to Italy through Napoleon III, in exchange for an armistice which should enable her to concentrate the whole of her forces against the victorious Prussians. This then was the end of all the enthusiasm, all the hopes of Italy—this ghastly unavoidable dilemma; Venetia within her reach, but on terms which it was

alike shameful to accept, and madness to refuse! To add to the gloom, came a naval defeat at Lissa on July 20. Nevertheless Italy remained to the end true to her obligations towards Prussia; while Prussia, without troubling herself to inform her unfortunate but loyal ally, concluded an armistice at Nikolsburg. La Marmora took upon himself the responsibility which, in the general state of doubt and hesitation, no one else would assume, and agreed to an armistice on behalf of Italy also. This was concluded at Cormoy on August 12, 1866, and orders were given to Garibaldi to retire from the district of Trent, which he had just reached at the head of his volunteers. Garibaldi replied with one word only, "I obey." In connexion with this matter, he wrote in his autobiography: "it gave occasion later to the usual complaints of the Mazzinians, who once more wanted me to proclaim a Republic and march on Vienna and Florence." Prussia, ever distrustful of the intentions of Napoleon, hastened to make peace with Austria by the Treaty of Prague, August 12. Italy, with great but useless reluctance, was fain to accept peace also, and a treaty was signed at Vienna on October 3. The wretched farce of the retrocession of Venetia by France to Italy was then played—a farce which the demeanour of General Leboeuf, the French commissioner, rendered still more absurd. But, through the good sense of General di Revel, the Italian commissioner, it was possible to carry it out on October 19 without any parade; and an unanimous vote of the people, given on October 21 and 22, did all that could be done to rectify the awkwardness of the position in which Italy had been placed by the unskilful conduct of the war, and by French mediation.

Nevertheless, a period of general intense moral depression followed. The nation was vexed to its very soul; a reactionary movement, of which the purpose was less easily defined than the cause, had to be put down by force at Palermo; and when, after Venetia had been evacuated by Austria, and after the French had withdrawn from Rome in accordance with the Convention of 1864, the King was able to declare on December 15, 1866, that "Italy is at last free of all foreign domination"—even this announcement failed to raise the spirits of the Italians.

Pius IX, in spite of his affected indifference, was alarmed at being abandoned by the French, and negotiations with Rome were therefore resumed on the old pretext of providing for the vacant sees; but the results were as negative as before. A little later, the Government brought up a Bill to dispose of ecclesiastical property for the relief of the deeply indebted Exchequer, by way also of a sort of experiment in the organisation of a "free Church in a free State" (*libera chiesa in libero stato*). In substance, it provided for a sale of the property of all religious corporations, by which the State would benefit to the amount of £24,000,000. It contained a provision authorising the Bishops themselves to carry out the operation; and to redeem the property by the

payment of the £24,000,000 to the Government. The Opposition rose fiercely against this proposal both in the Chambers and in the country; and the Chambers placed the Ministry in a minority. A dissolution followed, and Garibaldi threw himself with all his energy into the ensuing contests, hot with delight at the hope of at last solving the Roman problem according to his own views. The elections went against the Government; and, without further challenge, Ricasoli resigned on April 4, 1867.

On April 10 Rattazzi once more appeared at the head of the Government. To the Radical party he was only known as the man of Aspromonte; to the Moderates he was a constant and inveterate enemy. Now, Rattazzi was a curious character, whose type still unfortunately exists on the political stage of Italy; his favourite rôle was to throw himself into the midst of a perplexed situation, in the belief that he could manipulate circumstances for his own benefit. He quietly explained his policy to the Chamber, and the Chamber not less quietly accepted it. No sooner had he tested his ground, than he hastily proceeded—with the deftness of a man well versed in legal chicanery—to carry out the complete confiscation of the Church property (the whole of it was afterwards miserably frittered away); he next proceeded to concoct one of his favourite political schemes, which came to the same end as all the others. Garibaldi, following his usual plan, had determined, if revolution would not break out spontaneously in Rome, to introduce it there on his own account. Rattazzi, on his side, pretended to object, and even went so far as to arrest Garibaldi; but, at the same time, he carried on underhand negotiations with him and others, intending in fact to forward his own ends by their help, while in fact they were playing with him. On finding that he had been out-generalled, he resigned. He was succeeded by Menabrea, who issued, on October 27, 1867, a royal proclamation formally disavowing connexion with Garibaldi's scheme. Amid the general unwillingness to assume authority or accept the responsibility of government, his Ministry showed a lack of courage, though it contained some men with a great reputation for bravery, such as Cialdini. Garibaldi was in no way moved by the proclamation; leaving Caprera, whither he had been banished, he once more placed himself at the head of the bands that had already entered the Pontifical territory, and marched straight on Rome. The scheme for raising insurrection inside the city had ended with the death of the heroic Cairoli brothers at Villa Glori on October 27, 1867; and the project of waiting for an outbreak and of then hastening to its assistance had therefore vanished, even before the occurrence of the final and decisive catastrophe. Garibaldi, seeing this, and, once in a way, following a suggestion from Mazzini, determined if possible to concentrate all his forces at Monterotondo, and march thence to Tivoli, with the ultimate object of throwing himself into the province of Abruzzo, and of carrying revolt into the interior of the old Neapolitan kingdom. This

might well have been the ruin of Italy; and, had the Papal troops only been aware of his object it would have answered their purpose to let him carry it out. Not knowing it, they devoted all their energies to hinder the concentration of the Garibaldians and to eject them from the Papal territory. Thus it came about that, on November 3, 1867, Garibaldi was taken in flank at Mentana, while on the march from Monterotondo to Tivoli, and was forced to accept battle. Quarrels and desertions had weakened his motley army; but there was left a residue of the stoutest hearts and the sincerest enthusiasts, who, though scarcely 4000 in number, held their ground against the Pontificals. They had in fact already repulsed them, when the French troops, which had returned to Rome, came up in support; the *chassepots* mowed down the handful of heroes, whose weapons were so inferior that they could not even reach their enemy; and the piteous tragedy came to a close. Yet it was this bloody sacrifice that actually opened to Italy the gates of Rome! It not only reduced the Convention of 1864 to a mere name, barely to be mentioned as a convenient diplomatic fiction; but it gave a mortal blow to the French alliance, up to this time the sheet-anchor of Italian foreign policy. This was very soon made clear; though it did not occur to de Failly, when he boasted of the "marvels worked by the *chassepots*," nor to Rouher, when, for the purpose of pleasing the clericals in France, he uttered his unlucky prediction, that the Italians would "never" enter Rome.

On December 15, 1869, in a welter of the worst possible financial and political conditions, Menabrea's Ministry gave way to a new one, in which Giovanni Lanza was President, Quintino Sella again Finance Minister, and Emilio Visconti Venosta Minister for Foreign Affairs. Their programme was one of modest frugality, and contemplated even a reduction of the army; they were confronted inside their own doors by grave Mazzinian disturbances; in Rome by the Œcumenical Council and the dogma of Papal Infallibility; abroad, by the first signs of the great struggle impending between Germany and France.

Not that they were much troubled by the Œcumenical Council, or by Pius IX's last move, the dogma of Infallibility, the effect and meaning of which are elsewhere discussed. The Italian Government let him entirely alone, and very wisely gave the Bishops absolute freedom to attend the Council, the more willingly as the Pope would have much preferred a prohibition. On July 19, 1870, the dogma of Papal Infallibility was solemnly voted. But war was on the point of breaking out between France and Germany and lay minds had other things to think about than clerical dogmas.

The imminence of the Franco-Prussian War made it impossible for the Lanza Ministry to indulge their pacific illusions. They were in fact once more in deep waters; they had, of course, nothing to do with the secret dealings for a triple alliance of Austria, Italy, and France, which had been going on from the date of Mentana to the dawning of this war,

inasmuch as these consisted only in an exchange of letters addressed by the several sovereigns one to another and in negotiations, couched in language so general, as in no way to commit their States. Still they were bound to take account of the moral obligation which Victor Emmanuel had assumed, on the mere impulse of a chivalrous generosity, towards his old ally of 1859; and, on the other hand, they were forced to respect the determination of the country to remain neutral and to have no thought but for Rome. Of this fixed purpose Quintino Sella was the chief and the stoutest representative in the Cabinet; but it derived its main support from the infatuated opposition of the unfortunate Napoleon III, who absolutely refused to give way on the Roman question. Even Austria, who withdrew from the negotiations before compromising herself, admitted that an alliance with Italy was out of the question, unless she received Rome. Though war began in July, the French troops did not entirely abandon Pontifical territory till August 19, 1870. Then, of course, every idea of alliance vanished; and all that Italy had to do was to declare a platonic adhesion to the "League of Neutrals." The Italian Government certainly, by way of expediting the departure of the French, consented to the revival of the Convention of September, 1864. But the disasters to the French arms, the defeat of Sedan, and the fall of the Empire, solved the whole problem once and for ever. The voice of the people was now heard, unanimous and irresistible, demanding the occupation of Rome. In order to meet, or rather, to anticipate resistance, the Government sent an army of about 60,000 men, under the command of General Raffaele Cadorna. Force, however, had to be used; a breach had to be made in the walls at Porta Pia, before an entrance could be effected on September 20, 1870. Rome was thus at length reunited to Italy by the general vote of the people on October 2, 1870.

## (2) THE LITERATURE OF THE *RISORGIMENTO* AND AFTER.

(1846-70.)

During this period it might almost be said that the engrossing interest of warfare and politics had absorbed all the activity that might have been expended upon quiet thought and study, upon the flights of fancy, and upon the beauties of art. As in France during the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, the minds of men were too much occupied in external things, too anxiously absorbed in the trend of events, to give free play to their literary and artistic faculties, which require for their development that life should be, indeed, intense and ardent, but not agitated or feverish. During this period, Italians gave to their country the foremost place in their hearts, and patriotism formed the keynote of their intellectual work. The patriotic note resounded most loudly amid the outburst of enthusiasm and exultation during the years 1846 to 1849. Long cherished hopes seemed about to be realised; and the

poetic muse was invoked to sing the praise of unity, to provide war songs, and to kindle hopes of victory. "We owe a large part of the new Italy to our poets," said Garibaldi. Certainly, at this time of strenuous action, the patriotic lyric spread far and wide, encouraging the brave and consoling the exiles and the prisoners. Gabriele Rossetti, who in 1820 had heralded the dawn of the short-lived Neapolitan Constitution, took up his lyre once more to welcome the Liberal Pope and to proclaim the first triumphs of Italian arms over Austria. His example was followed by hundreds. War songs were multiplied and met with extraordinary success. They were upon every one's lips, filling all hearts with the noblest aspirations. Among the most popular were three poems composed in 1847—Filippo Meucci's hymn to Pius IX, Giuseppe Bertoldi's *Le Riforme* in honour of Charles Albert, and beginning "*Con l'azzurra coccarda nel petto*" ("With the blue ribbon upon his breast"), and lastly Carlo Alberto Bosi's *L'Addio del Volontario*. All the fervent love which they cherished for their country vibrated in the stanzas of Alessandro Poerio and Goffredo Mameli, who both died fighting as heroes. Mameli's famous song "*Fratelli d'Italia—l'Italia s'è desta*" ("Brothers of Italy, Italy awakens") became the war-cry of those youthful bands who fought, without training or discipline, under the noble illusion that the holiness of their cause carried with it the certainty of victory. With this must be placed other songs by Luigi Mercantini, who afterwards wrote "*Si scopron le tombe—si levano i morti*" ("The tombs are opened, the dead arise"), which formed the musical accompaniment to the exploits of the red shirt on the battlefield, and thereby earned the great name of "Garibaldi's Hymn." Circumstances made poets of these men and of others like them, and, now that the conditions whence they drew life and vigour have disappeared, their artistic poverty is revealed. To-day these writings should be considered rather as documents illustrating the history of the *Risorgimento* than as contributions to literature. Others already tried and proved in the field of literature, who had won fame from works of another kind, sang of the hopes and vicissitudes of Italy with higher and more conscious artistic intention. Such was Giavan Battista Niccolini, the renowned author of *Arnaldo da Brescia* (1843), who expressed his opinions on the affairs of his country in a sort of rhyming diary, interspersed with epigrams, sonnets, hymns and odes. He has thus left a complete collection of political verse, consisting almost entirely of spontaneous outpourings during the years round 1848. Moved by the same impulse, Luigi Carrer and Nicolò Tommasèo turned from the more arduous work of research and criticism to the production of patriotic poems, notable alike for intensity of feeling and for originality of form and conception.

The political character, which satire had assumed with Carlo Porta and Tommaso Grossi, increased in bitterness and malignity. While Antonio Guadagnoli, Angiolo Brofferio and Arnaldo Fusinato all



distinguished themselves in this sphere, Giuseppe Giusti held the chief place. That love of liberty and of Italian independence which had, as Giusti himself says, always animated him, upheld and encouraged him in his last efforts. He died in 1850 in the house of Gino Capponi, to whom he had dedicated his *Terra dei Morti*. The following works belong to this period of Giusti's activity:—*La Guerra*, in which he mercilessly satirises the preachers of peace; *Sant' Ambrogio*, his famous masterpiece, in which irony and sentiment combine to create a splendid whole; *Delenda Cartago*, where a new aphorism, "*E non vogliam Tedeschi*" ("We will have no more Austrians"), takes the place of Cato's maxim; *Il Congresso dei Birri*, and other poems, in which the civic note of his genius is fully revealed. With Foscolo and Leopardi dead, and Manzoni in retirement, Giusti is the only really great poetic figure of these years. "I have no illusions about myself," he once said, "my verses will die, and are, perhaps, already dead, with the events and circumstances that brought them into being." Yet Giusti's verses are still read and studied with pleasure. In them we taste the crisp, fresh charm of the Tuscan tongue, which was all too rare among the enthusiastic but slovenly productions of the national revival.

The prose of this revolutionary period also savours of the battlefield. Vincenzo Gioberti's *Gesuita Moderno* (1847) elaborates the ideas first expressed in his *Primato* and in *Prolegomeni al Primato*, while he fiercely attacks the Jesuits. Moreover, d'Azeglio's celebrated *Lutti della Lombardia* (1848) exhibits him in a new character; and, instead of the moderate man who counsels prudence, we see the politician who adds fuel to the fire of revolution.

Literature as a whole shared in that great wave of feeling which swept through the length and breadth of Italy. At the theatres, the audience insisted that the last three words of the magnificent chorus from Giuseppe Verdi's *Lombardi*, "*Noi siamo corsi all' invito di un Dio*" ("We have come at the summons of a God"), should be changed to "*di un Pio*" ("of Pope Pius"); and the alteration was received with frantic applause. All forms of art, if they would meet with popular favour, were forced to yield to the predominating thought, to the one feverish hope of an eager and excited multitude.

In the twenty years after Novara this enthusiasm waned. But the change, more especially in its first years, did little to enrich or enliven lyrical poetry, of which the prevailing tones remained grey and monotonous. The principal figures in this domain were Giovanni Prati and Aleardo Aleardi. Their works, though possessing power of invention and depth of feeling, abound in a weak and sentimental romanticism which tends at last to become wearisome. The defects already visible in Prati's best work, *Edmenegarda* (1842), namely excessive sentimentality and thoughts, not always worthy of the stately and sonorous form in which they are clothed, became accentuated later. Aleardi is even more

morbid than Prati; there is a strain of weakness and poverty in his art, and his romanticism exhibits none of the balance of Manzoni and Silvio Pellico. Yet both writers were sincere and ardent patriots; and their poetry gained strength and nobility when it was inspired by the romantic uncertainty of their country's future. In works published between 1850 and 1860, Prati shows himself to be fully alive to the social and political mission of the Italian poet. All the great themes which occupied the mind of Italy, bearing witness alike to the sorrows of the moment and to the hopes of the future, were reflected in his lyrics, which rang with noble and sincere emotion. The death of Curtatone and Novara, the return of the ashes of Charles Albert from Oporto, Napoleon III's *coup d'état*, the triumphs of Montebello and Palestro, all supplied him with worthy material for poetry. The same may be said of Aleardi. Although a feminine strain runs through his work, he cannot be denied the merit of having done more than perhaps any other Italian poet to unite the love of woman to the love of country. A mixture of tenderness and wrath, of idyllic love and national pride and hatred lends an individual and wholly pleasing distinction to much of the Veronese poet's copious production. Between 1860 and 1870, Giacomo Zanella stood forth as the rival of Prati and Aleardi. Himself a priest, he united the faith of a Christian with enthusiasm for social progress, zeal for the Church with love of country. Though entirely modern in conception, his work has a certain classical tone. Yet his correct, graceful, and stately verse is too slight to excite strong feelings; it pleases and charms, but cannot enthral.

Prose, like poetry, failed to rise to great heights during this period. Books such as *I Promessi Sposi* (1827) and *Le Mie Prigioni* (1832) were not to be found. Art showed signs of weakness, and the end in view was uncertain and obscure. Yet here again writers gained fresh life with politics as their inspiration and guide. Among those who made public events the subject of books and pamphlets, Giuseppe Mazzini, Cesare Balbo, Carlo Cattaneo, and Massimo d'Azeglio, occupy the front rank. Gioberti, moreover, comes into the period of which we are treating owing to his *Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*, published in 1851. In this fine book, which proved to be his last, Gioberti abandons the opinions enunciated in the *Primato* and maintains that henceforth the hopes of all Italians must centre round Piedmont, and that the Pope should not be the temporal sovereign of "either a State or a territory." Volumes of reminiscences—which recalled the deeds of the immediate past, and seemed to lay down rules based upon experience for future conduct—were particularly acceptable at that time. Of these, *I Miei Ricordi* (1867) by Massimo d'Azeglio is especially notable. It is a sound and powerful book, seeming to take its keynote from the thought to which he wished to give expression after 1861: "Now that Italy is made, we must make the Italians." Autobiographical elements also have their

part in Ippolito Nievo's *Confessioni di un Ottuagenario* (1867), where the stirring and still unclosed episode in the life of Italy is depicted with historical accuracy and elegant simplicity of form. In this work, he set himself to show by means of a concrete example how, between the last years of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth century, the sentiment of Italian nationality arose, matured, and found expression.

In the sphere of romance proper, results were very meagre; and Alessandro Manzoni's influence, which had boldly asserted itself in the writings of Grossi and d'Azeglio, declined steadily. The fate of tragedy was no better. Setting aside the final efforts of Niccolini, *Filippo Strozzi* (1847) and *Mario e i Cimbri* (1858), there remain nothing but long dead and buried works. Comedy and modern drama were somewhat more flourishing, Paolo Giacometti as a playwright succeeded Alberto Nota, of the famous *Compagnia Reale Sarda*. The elements of tragedy and comedy were happily blended in his art; and some of his works, such as *La Morte Civile*, a play which found magnificent interpreters in Ernesto Rossi and Tommaso Salvini, still hold the Italian stage. Far superior to him, however, is Paolo Ferrari, whose historical comedies—*Il Goldoni e le sue sedici commedie nuove* (1852) and *La Satira e Parini* (1854–6)—are equally celebrated in literature and in the theatrical world. These works, with their rich humour, their picturesque setting and lively dialogue, will long survive all changes of taste and fashion. Ferrari's later "problem-plays," which aim at elucidating definite moral and social questions, are not without merit, yet they lack the freshness and originality of his earlier efforts. Yielding to the prevailing fashion, he adopted as his models the chief French dramatists of the day, such as Augier, Dumas *filis*, and Sardou. Hence his work lost its distinctive and wholly Italian character.

If historical writing did not attain to a high literary level at this time, it gained in scientific importance, thanks to stricter methods and to definite research. Besides Gino Capponi, Ercole Ricotti and Michele Amari, who are all well known and even famous, there are many others whose names deserve to be remembered—writers of national and municipal history whose work paved the way for future and more ambitious historians. Perhaps the best fruits of Italian thought during these two decades sprang up in the field of criticism, where Francesco De Sanctis, to whom we owe the revival of psychological and aesthetic criticism, held the first place among a host of able writers. In his admirable *Saggi Critici* (1866), he proves that the true task of a critic is to glean the animating thought from the work of art before him. He sweeps away the old rhetorical method, based upon formulas and precepts, and vindicates the independence of individual judgment which applies itself to literature, and connects it with the development of life. In this sense he is the Sainte-Beuve of Italy, less versatile and without Sainte-Beuve's elegance of style or power of reconstruction, but perhaps with greater philosophical depth and wider horizons of thought.

It has been seen that Italian literature was marked by no especial brilliance in these years. The same may be said of the arts, with the exception of music, where the genius of Giuseppe Verdi found new and marvellous means of expression. Between 1860 and 1870, however, there appeared on the scene a writer whose many-sided genius asserted itself in various spheres, quickening and ennobling the entire literary life of the nation. This was Giosue Carducci, whose poetry pointed the rising generation the road of escape from ultra-romanticist affectations and from the fluent versifiers, who sought nothing beyond the empty resonance of metre. "I am proud to own myself inspired by Alfieri, Parini, Monti, Foscolo, and Leopardi," Carducci once said in speaking of his work. "Through them and with them I arrived at the ancients and communed with Dante and Petrarch. Upon them my eyes have always been fixed." His debt to this school of poetry is already visible in *Juvenilia* and *Levia Gravia*, although it is more fully revealed in *Odi Barbare* (1877). In Carducci, classical art—the art of the Greeks and Romans—seems to flourish once more. Yet his classical style is no mere mannerism or servile imitation. It is rather the art of the ancients, stirred to fresh life by a breath of modern thought, the realisation of André Chenier's maxim: "*sur des penses nouveaux faisons de vers antiques*." By this means Carducci rescued Italian poetry from the feeble romanticism in which it had been plunged, not so much by Prati and Aleardi as by their followers, and which he himself calls "an extenuation of life," and in so doing, restored it to all the purity of its splendid traditions.

With the same ideals Carducci proved no less happy as a prose writer. Invective and satire, humour and pathos, grave learning and patriotic fervour, all flowed from his pen with equal ease and effect. His most celebrated works are, however, his numerous essays in criticism, which range from the origins of Italian literature to Parini, from Dante and Cino da Pistoia to Heine and Goethe, from Poliziano and Ariosto to the bards of the *Risorgimento*. In this sphere, Carducci perfected and completed the work of De Sanctis. Starting from the concrete study of literary facts, from the analysis of texts, from minute researches in archives and libraries, he rose to criticism of another nature, to aesthetic considerations, to wide and penetrating appreciations in which the artist joined hands with the scholar. He proved by his example, as no one had done before him, that there is not and cannot be any opposition between the aesthetic and historical schools of criticism. For him who estimates the critic's task at its highest, the two are blended into one. An opinion fails to convince if it is not based upon sound and carefully weighed premises. In the same way, learned researches fail of their effect if they are not clothed in the words of an artist, who sets them before our eyes in their true light, quickened by the spirit of the past.

## CHAPTER XX.

THE COURSE OF REVOLUTION IN SPAIN  
AND PORTUGAL.

(1845-71.)

A LONG period of reaction followed the overthrow of Espartero, which a coalition of extreme Conservatives and Radicals had produced; but the breach between these unnatural allies was not immediate, and the transition from revolution to absolutism was adroitly contrived. With the ostensible object of avoiding the difficulties inherent in a Regency, the two Houses assembled on November 8, 1843, and proclaimed Queen Isabel of age, before the legal term of her minority had expired. The election of a Liberal Regent being thus rendered impossible, the formation of a Cabinet was entrusted to the democratic orator Salustiano de Olózaga, formerly tutor to the Queen. The course of coming events was indicated by the inclusion of several Moderates in the new Ministry, and by the removal from the bench of Judges known to be Liberals; the Government candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber was defeated, and Pedro José Pidal, a Conservative, was elected. Convinced that no political reforms could be undertaken with success against an Opposition secretly fostered by Court influence, Olózaga determined to dissolve the Cortes, and on November 28 obtained the necessary decree. His plan miscarried owing to the Queen's statement that her signature had been extorted by the use of physical violence; and this fabrication—suggested to the sovereign by the Marquesa de Santa Cruz, the mouthpiece of the Palace *camarilla*—served its purpose. Olózaga was dismissed on the following day (November 29); his denials were received by the Chamber with cries of indignant incredulity; officers of the regiment of San Fernando in the tribunes threatened him with their drawn swords; he fled into exile, and his party was involved in his disgrace. The subterranean campaign of the Palace clique had succeeded; the Liberal group was seriously discredited; and a Conservative Ministry was called to power under the presidency of Luis González Bravo, once the editor of *El Guirigay*, a Radical journal notorious for its attacks on the Queen-Mother.

The articles published by González Bravo, under the pseudonym of Ibrahim Clarete, had been the starting-point of the movement which forced Cristina to abdicate. He had made public the fact that she had forfeited the Regency by her secret marriage, within three months of Ferdinand VII's death, to Agustín Fernando Muñoz y Sánchez, a handsome soldier, on whom the dukedom of Riázares was afterwards conferred. González Bravo now made amends for his malignant revelations by renewing the ex-Regent's pension, and by providing lavishly for the children of her second marriage. The pretence of respecting parliamentary forms was abandoned. A stringent censorship of the Press was established; such prominent members of the Opposition as Manuel Cortina and Pascual Madoz were imprisoned by ministerial warrant; the National Militia, the fighting force of Liberalism, was disbanded, and the country was placed under martial law. González Bravo executed his arbitrary policy with conspicuous ability and courage; but his position was insecure, for the sincerity of his sudden conversion was justly suspected by the reactionaries, and, despite his recent complaisance, the Queen-Mother had not forgiven his description of her in *El Guirigay* as an "illustrious prostitute." Moreover, he was a civilian mistrusted by the military element, and it was held that the policy of "thorough" should be carried out by a Minister who could reckon upon the unquestioning support of the army. Such a Minister was Ramón María Narváez, a general who had made himself remarkable by his severity during the Carlist war.

Narváez succeeded González Bravo on May 2, 1844, and speedily proved that his reputation as a martinet was deserved. Before the close of the year 214 political prisoners were put to death; while many more were sentenced, on insufficient or flagrantly false evidence, to long terms of imprisonment. Though the Cortes were in session, they were treated with contempt, and a levy of 50,000 conscripts was called out by ministerial decree. Insurrectionary movements in the provinces and colonies were ruthlessly put down; the right of public meeting was suspended; and the censorship of the Press became still more rigorous. Narváez, who was strangely sensitive to criticism, informed General Fernández de Córdova that, though confiscation of newspapers was a palliative, the execution of Opposition journalists was the sole safeguard against sedition; and two prominent editors, whom he had imprisoned, were only released in deference to a protest from the foreign diplomatic corps. Narváez has been described by a judicious admirer as a brigand of considerable intelligence. He was at least intelligent enough to know that something more than a negative policy of repression was needed, and he attempted to increase the efficiency of the administration. He reorganised the *Guardia Civil*, a body of military police established by González Bravo, and finally stamped out brigandage in Spain. No less beneficial were the reforms of his Finance Minister, Alejandro Mon. The

normal deficit annually amounted to two millions sterling; the pay of the troops, the navy, and other branches of the public service was in arrears; pensions were capriciously multiplied, and irregularly revoked, by phantom Ministers; departmental corruption was the rule. The incidence of taxation varied greatly in the different provinces, and was not always uniform even within the limits of smaller administrative units; duties and restrictions hampered industry, and the cost of collection was excessive. Mon produced relative order by substituting for the complicated, vexatious arrangement of *propios y arbitrios*—hereditary revenues and arbitrary specific taxes—a less cumbrous system of taxation, applied to commerce, agriculture, land registration, mortgages, rents, and legacies. The customs dues were simplified, and the establishment of *octroi* duties formed a lucrative but unpopular source of income. Incomplete as they were, these financial reforms went as far as public opinion would allow; they contributed largely to the material development of Spain; and the national credit was raised by the issue of three per cent. bonds, to meet the floating debt of £25,000,000.

Exhausted by the political anarchy of previous years, the country welcomed the stability secured by despotic administration. Even without the exercise of official pressure a majority for the Government was assured; it was made inevitable by the action of the Progressists, who, as a protest against the methods by which the elections were conducted, adopted a policy of abstention at the polls. The new Cortes of 1844 contained only one Liberal member. Parliamentary Opposition was at an end. Narváez was practically dictator, and he revised the Constitution of 1837 with characteristic thoroughness. The introduction of a property qualification narrowed the franchise by which the Lower House was elected; the nomination of senators was reserved to the Crown, and the senatorships were made tenable for life; the Upper Chamber was packed with grandees, ecclesiastics, successful soldiers, and financial magnates. By amendments to the Constitution of 1837 the duration of the Cortes was extended from three to four years. The recognition of Roman Catholicism as the established religion was emphasised; the recognition of the sovereign rights of the people was retained in a very attenuated form. As precautions against revolution, severer press laws were embodied in the Constitution; the calling-out of the National Guard was left to the discretion of local authorities, and the latter were placed directly under the central executive. Far-reaching as was the effect of these constitutional changes, they excited less attention than a clause authorising the Queen to contract a marriage without the preliminary assent of the Cortes. In its immediate results this was the most momentous article in the Constitution of May, 1845.

The question of the Queen's marriage was more than a matter of domestic interest, and the various candidates for Isabel's hand had already been discussed by French and English statesmen. The ex-

Regent Cristina had received the active support of the French Government in plotting the downfall of Espartero; as the price of this assistance she was prepared to sanction the marriage of her daughters Queen Isabel and the Infanta María Luisa Fernanda to Louis-Philippe's sons, the Duc d'Aumale and the Duc de Montpensier. The proposal was withdrawn at the request of the English Government, which undertook in return to abandon the candidature of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the cousin of Queen Victoria and of Prince Albert. The project was, however, brought forward again in a modified form by Guizot, who suggested that the choice of Isabel's husband might be postponed, and that meanwhile the Duc de Montpensier should marry Isabel's sister, the Infanta María Luisa Fernanda. Since the result of this arrangement would have been to make Montpensier King Consort of Spain, if Isabel had died without issue, it was declined by Palmerston. Henceforth it became the object of French diplomacy to detach the British Government from the Spanish Liberals; and the task became easy since Peel's accession to power. In 1843 Queen Victoria and Prince Albert visited Louis-Philippe at the Château d'Eu, where it was agreed that the British Government should refrain from promoting the candidature of any prince not of the Spanish Bourbon line, and that, after the succession to the Spanish throne had been secured, Montpensier should be free to marry the Infanta María Luisa Fernanda. The marriage of the Duc d'Aumale to the Princess Caroline, daughter of the Prince of Palermo, in 1844 was accepted as a guarantee that the French Government intended to abide by the recent agreement.

While these negotiations were in progress between the British and French Foreign Offices, the marriage of Queen Isabel became a party question in Spain; and the candidature of the Count of Montemolín was supported by the Austrian and Prussian Governments. By the abdication of Carlos María Isidro de Borbón at Bourges on May 15, 1845, his son Carlos Luis, Count of Montemolín, became the official leader of the Carlist party, to whom he was henceforward known as Carlos VI. His candidature was immediately vetoed by Narváez, whose hostility to Carlism never wavered. The ex-Regent Cristina suggested that her half-imbecile brother, the Count of Trapani, a lad of sixteen, should be accepted as Isabel's husband; and Narváez, anxious to avoid a rupture with her, affected to entertain the proposal. The candidate of the Liberal party was Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the elder son of Cristina's shrewish sister Carlota, and Don Enrique was reported to be personally acceptable to Isabel herself; but his chances of success were diminished by his ostentatious parade of Radical opinions. Early in 1846, Cristina—not without reason—suspected that Narváez, in spite of his friendly professions, was secretly intriguing against the candidature of Trapani. Though the ministerial majority in the Chamber was intact, the Queen-Mother secured the dismissal of Narváez (now Duke of



Valencia) on February 11. His place was taken by the Marquis de Miraflores, a courtier of mediocre abilities with the reputation of being amenable to court and clerical influence. But the Cortes, which were Narváez' creation, resented his dismissal; the new Minister declined to favour Trapani's candidature, and opposed the Queen-Mother in other ways. This decided his fate. Narváez was recalled; but his energetic action against stock-exchange speculators, and his refusal to support one of the Queen-Mother's morganatic sons as a candidate for the throne of Mexico, caused him to be dismissed again within nineteen days of his return to office. He rejected the offer of the Naples embassy, and retired to France to await his time.

A rising in Galicia was easily suppressed; and the Duke of Seville, who was implicated in it, was banished from Spain by Narváez' successor, Francisco Javier de Istúriz, a politician of Liberal tendencies, who had previously urged that the Cortes should be consulted with respect to the Queen's marriage. The advocates of this view, among whom were Francisco Pacheco and Pastor Díaz, were known as "Puritans"; and, as their leader was now in office, the projects of Cristina and of Louis-Philippe were imperilled. The Cortes might prove unable to resist pressure to repeal the article in the Constitution authorising the Queen to contract a marriage without parliamentary sanction, and it was not impossible that such pressure might be applied. The Opposition was gathering strength, and banishment had not destroyed the popularity of the democratic Duke of Seville. Isabel was believed to be well-inclined towards her cousin; and it was known that Palmerston, who was likely soon to be in office in England, would endeavour to thwart Guizot's policy. Finally, the arrogance of the Comte de Bresson, the French ambassador at Madrid, had alienated a section of the Moderate party, while the British Minister, Sir Henry Bulwer, made no secret of his sympathy with the Progressists.

The Queen-Mother and Louis-Philippe resolved to act without delay. It is doubtful whether Cristina's support of Trapani was more than a ruse. In any case, she suddenly withdrew it, consented to the marriage of Isabel with Don Francisco de Asís, the Duke of Seville's younger brother, and arranged that the Infanta María Luisa Fernanda should marry the Duc de Montpensier at the same time. This compact, concluded by Cristina and Bresson during the temporary absence of Bulwer from Madrid, was a manifest breach of the Château d'Eu agreement. In reply to the objections of the British Government, Guizot pleaded Aberdeen's consent to the arrangement that neither the Queen nor the Infanta should marry out of the Bourbon family, and further alleged that Palmerston had cancelled the Château d'Eu compact by secretly supporting the candidature of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. The latter assertion may have been made in good faith, on the strength of information supplied by Bresson: it was none the less incorrect, for Palmerston

hesitated between Coburg and the Duke of Seville. Bulwer was instructed to remonstrate with the Spanish Government; but it was too late. On August 27, yielding to the imperious command of her mother, Queen Isabel had formally contracted herself to Don Francisco de Asís. The marriages of the Queen and the Infanta María Luisa Fernanda were duly celebrated on Isabel's sixteenth birthday (October 10, 1846). The Spanish nation, as a whole, was indifferent to the international dispute; it resented Guizot's dictation on the one hand, and Palmerston's interference on the other; and, in ordinary circumstances, it would have rejoiced to see the question of the Queen's marriage settled. But her union to Don Francisco de Asís shocked the public conscience. Her husband was known to be a man of ignoble character, and of feeble constitution. This last consideration had recommended him to Louis-Philippe and to Cristina; they regarded it as certain that Isabel would bear him no children, and that the Duc de Montpensier would sit on the throne of Spain as the King Consort of María Luisa Fernanda. French influence and French prestige would thus be permanently established beyond the Pyrenees. The cynicism of this manœuvre revolted honest men; but the marriage was an accomplished fact, and the British Government sought to avenge its diplomatic defeat by promoting the designs of the Spanish Opposition.

A new Cortes was elected under the restricted franchise of the Constitution of 1845; and, as a Conservative majority was assured, it was thought expedient to allow the voters unusual freedom. The result was a disagreeable surprise: a minority of Radicals was returned, small in numbers, but composed of able and determined men, led by Mendizabal and Olózaga. The latter left France to take his seat, was arrested at Pamplona, and finally sent across the frontier; but his election was taken to show mismanagement on the part of Istúriz, who was consequently compelled to resign in favour of the Duke of Sotomayor (January 28, 1847). The new Cabinet, a "Ministry of Conservative concentration," was at once confronted with painful difficulties. The Queen openly flouted her unmanly husband, separated from him, and took more notice than was prudent of General Francisco Serrano Domínguez, a handsome officer of moderate Liberal opinions. The scandal was public property in Madrid; but the Government made no attempt to deal with it, till they discovered that the favourite had allied himself with Bulwer in order to undermine their credit with the Queen. To remove Serrano from the Court, they appointed him to a command in Navarre; Serrano declined the post, and was protected against the consequences of his insubordination by the Queen, who dismissed Sotomayor and called Pacheco to office (March 28). Pacheco, a representative of the "Puritans," was embarrassed by the inclusion in the Cabinet of Salamanca, who, through the influence of the Queen-Mother, became Minister of Finance; yet the Government introduced a more

Liberal spirit into the administration of affairs, and amnestied such political exiles as Mendizabal and Olózaga.

Meanwhile the relations between Isabel and the King Consort grew worse; and both resented the efforts of the Ministry to bring about a reconciliation. The Queen-Mother withdrew in anger to Paris; the Queen stayed at Aranjuez and La Granja with Serrano, and contemplated the formation of a Radical Ministry; surrounded by reactionaries, clericals, and Carlists, Don Francisco de Asís resided at the Pardo, scheming to profit by his wife's dishonour. At this time the general sympathies of the Liberals were with Isabel, while the majority of Conservatives sided with her husband. Political discontent was spreading; a serious Carlist rising took place in Catalonia; and local feeling was exasperated by the execution of Benito Tristany, a priest who headed one of the roving bands. The revolutionary movement in Portugal led to Spanish intervention, and a force under General Manuel de la Concha marched on Oporto. Order was easily restored, and Concha—now Marqués del Duero—was sent against the Carlists in Catalonia, who maintained a desperate struggle till the beginning of 1848.

Before this date, Pacheco had resigned office (August 31, 1847). Narváez had returned from France, and had refused to join the new Cabinet formed by Salamanca. His turn was soon to come. His policy, as he declared to his intimates, was "to kick Bulwer and to shoot Serrano." He found it advisable, however, to conciliate the favourite; and Serrano accepted his advances. The Ministry fell on October 4; Serrano became Captain-General of Granada; and Narváez undertook to govern Spain after stipulating that he should be free "to use the stick, and to strike hard." He had an early opportunity of striking. The fall of Louis-Philippe (February 24, 1848) and the establishment of a Republic in France encouraged the revolutionists at Madrid to rise on March 26; they were dispersed, the leaders imprisoned, and martial law was proclaimed. Before leaving for Paris, Decazes, the Duc de Glücksberg, Louis-Philippe's ambassador at Madrid, drew attention to the close relations which existed between the Radicals and Bulwer. Palmerston not only refused to recall his agent, but instructed him to suggest the formation of a new Government including "some of those men who possess the confidence of the Liberal Party." Bulwer obeyed, protested energetically against the unconstitutional conduct of Narváez, and published his menacing despatch in a Liberal newspaper. This proceeding was irregular, and the tone of Bulwer's note was offensive to the national pride. Narváez returned the British Minister's note with an angry reply, but went no further.

Another rising occurred at Madrid on May 7; thirteen ringleaders were executed that evening, and six or seven hundred prisoners were deported to the Balearic Islands and the colonies. The Madrid

movement, which was said to be financed by Salamanca, was followed by a rising at Seville (May 13), organised by Bulwer's close friend José Portal. Reckoning that the British Government would be too fully occupied with Chartist agitators to proceed against Spain, Narváez handed Bulwer his passport (May 17). It was a dangerous hazard; for Palmerston, confident that the Queen-Mother would rather sacrifice a Minister than risk her financial interests in Cuba, proposed to make a naval demonstration off Cadiz. His colleagues vetoed the project; and accordingly, for the first and last time in his life Narváez became popular in Spain, while he was admired in other countries as the man of iron who had humbled Palmerston. His good fortune continued. He cashiered the Duke of Seville from the army; he crushed the Carlists and struck terror into the starving peasants of Andalusia. His policy had succeeded, at least for the time: he had used the stick mercilessly, and every blow had told. He had tranquillised the country; in externals, he had reformed the morals of the Court; he had protected the monarchy from a tempest which had shaken other thrones. When he faced the Cortes in November, he was justified in assuming the air of a conqueror.

Yet, though his courage and energy were indispensable to the Moderates at critical moments, Narváez could not rely on their fidelity when the danger was past. The Clericals profited by his despotic methods, but complained that he was not sufficiently vigorous in promoting ecclesiastical interests; the despatch of an expedition against the Roman Republic failed to satisfy them; and they found an ally in the person of the King Consort. Under the influence of Fray Fulgencio, a foolish and disreputable monk acting in concert with Sor Patrocinio—a nun notorious for having fraudulently simulated the *stigmata*—Don Francisco de Asis procured the nomination of a new Cabinet, October 19, 1849, the day before the Cortes were to meet. But the "Lightning Ministry," as it was called, was spared the ordeal of facing Parliament. It was easier to obtain a decree dismissing Narváez than to enforce it against his will: he curtly rebuked Don Francisco de Asis, and stated that he had no intention of resigning. He remained in office, banished Fray Fulgencio and Sor Patrocinio in different directions, and ordered the King Consort's secretary to leave Madrid for Oviedo. The *camarilla* was beaten, but not discouraged. The birth of a son to the Queen in July, 1850, threatened to lead to grave complications, for the paternity of the child was doubtful, and its survival would have been fatal to the Montpensier succession: the death of the boy was attributed to foul play in which Isabel's mother and sister were alleged to have been concerned. These circumstances damaged the position of the Cabinet, and Bravo Murillo's Budget produced a ministerial crisis. Early in 1851 Narváez retired, and was succeeded by Bravo Murillo, who dissolved the Cortes, and passed his financial scheme by ministerial decree.

González Bravo had fallen because he was not a soldier; Narváez, because he was not a clerical. Relying on clerical support, Bravo Murillo resumed the negotiations with Rome, and concluded a Concordat (October, 1851). The concessions of the Pope were insignificant in substance: as the expropriation of purchasers who had bought church lands would have led to revolution, no direct attempt was made to cancel their newly acquired rights, but the necessity of restitution was implied. On its side, the State undertook to restore all ecclesiastical properties unsold, to provide stipends for the clergy, to confirm the right of the Church to moneys derived from the sale of indulgences, to recognise the Roman Catholic religion as established by law, to promote the teaching of its doctrines in all schools, and to aid its ministers in combating heresy. This arrangement was denounced by the Radicals as a surrender, and by the reactionaries as a betrayal. Absolutists had, indeed, ground for complaint. The Concordat secured to the Church some part of its former endowments; but its implicit admission of Isabel's dynastic claims amounted to a repudiation of Carlism.

The success of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* (December 2, 1851), tempted Bravo Murillo to repeat the experiment in Spain. He dismissed the Cortes (December 9), arrested his political opponents, and confiscated their newspapers. But he could not count upon the undivided support of the Madrid garrison; a mutiny, which occurred on January 10, 1852, was put down with difficulty, and officers of high rank were suspected of complicity in the outbreak. Undaunted by these disquieting symptoms, the Minister kept on his way. Prim, who represented the Radical element in the army, was given unsolicited leave of absence "to travel abroad"; other opponents were removed to a safe distance; and till the end of the year Bravo Murillo ruled alone, adding daily to his immense unpopularity. At last he resolved to legalise his position, summoned the Cortes (December 1, 1852), and published in the *Gaceta* his plan for revising the Constitution. The new project was tantamount to the abolition of the parliamentary system. The Senate was to be transformed into an hereditary body; the number of the deputies was to be reduced by more than half; and the franchise was to be still further limited, so as to diminish the power of the learned professions. Both Houses were to sit in secret session; the Presidents and Vice-Presidents were to be appointed by the Crown; the Budget was to be passed by royal decree; Government Bills were to be accepted *en bloc* without even verbal amendments. Ministers were to be relieved from the duty of attending parliament, and were to be represented by deputy; the settlement of all questions concerning public order, personal security, and private property, was to be transferred from the judiciary to the central executive. Lastly, the discussion of these proposals in the Press or on the platform was made a penal offence.

The political soldiers, headed by Narváez, and the more enlightened

Conservatives, headed by Pidal and Mon, joined with the Liberals in denouncing the proposed changes. Bravo Murillo met the military opposition by declaring that he would "hang the generals with their own sashes"; and, as a beginning, he virtually exiled Narváez by ordering him to Vienna. The order was obeyed, but Narváez halted at Bayonne, and there wrote to the Queen pointing out that the new constitutional scheme would end in disaster to the monarchy. The warning was understood, and the Queen-Mother withdrew her support from Bravo Murillo. Deserted by all except the *camarilla*, he resigned (December 14), and was succeeded by General Federico Roncali, Count of Alcoy, who summoned a new Cortes on March 1, 1853. Roncali hoped to obtain by persuasion the organic changes which Bravo Murillo had sought to impose by force; but the Opposition, though heterogeneous and numerically weak, was emboldened by the consciousness of popular support. Debate was skilfully diverted from constitutional issues to the corrupt practices of the Queen-Mother, the Duke of Riáñzares, and Salamanca in connexion with railway concessions; and the Cortes had to be hastily prorogued. The disconcerting integrity of the Finance Minister, Llorente, had already produced an unfavourable impression at Court; Roncali's own lukewarmness in defending the eminent speculators was punished by dismissal (April 12); and the more accommodating General Lersundi held office till September 18, when he was succeeded by Luis Sartorius, Count of San Luis, whom Narváez had drawn from obscurity. The new Ministry vainly endeavoured to appease the disaffected generals by recalling Narváez, and to conciliate the constitutional Moderates by external observance of parliamentary forms.

As San Luis, in his brief political career, had risen from poverty to wealth by methods open to reproach, he was not well-suited to withstand the attacks on the system of railway concessions which were now increasing in vehemence. His embarrassed explanations were coldly received by nominal supporters; even the Conservative Senate placed him in a minority. He replied by proroguing the Cortes, by expelling the Conservative senators who had voted against him, and by exiling the generals who acted with them. The Budget was enacted by decree; the Press was gagged; and Madrid was placed under martial law. But the long reign of reaction was drawing to a close; the resources of coercion were exhausted; men of all parties were allied against the Government. On January 5, 1854, the Queen gave birth to a daughter—an event which newspapers of every shade of opinion refused to announce. Indications were not wanting that the revolutionists were preparing to strike a blow; and a premature rising at Saragossa showed that the army was wavering. The scandals of the Court exasperated the respectable classes in the capital. In defiance of the press laws, a journal entitled *El Murciélago* (*The Bat*) was launched at Madrid without the names of editor, publisher, or printer. It brought detailed charges of peculation against the Queen-

Mother, the Duke of Riánzares, Salamanca, and San Luis; the Queen-Mother was alleged to have received a commission of £400,000 on a single transaction. In its fifth and last number *El Murciélago* exposed the Queen's immorality, stated that her present lover was José Arana (afterwards Duke of Baena), and mockingly described the rapid promotion of this young colonel who had never distinguished himself in the field.

Public opinion was now ripe. The conspiracy was organised by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo—a future Prime Minister—and by the end of June his plans were completed. Among the generals exiled by San Luis was Enrique O'Donnell, Count of Lucena, who had won his title by fighting for the Queen-Mother against Espartero. O'Donnell had concealed himself in the capital; and on June 28, 1854, at a signal from Cánovas, he left his hiding-place to join General Dulce, who awaited him in the suburbs with the cavalry garrison of Madrid. The troops "pronounced" against San Luis, while Cánovas plotted a popular rising in Madrid; the populace hesitated; and an indecisive encounter took place at Vicálvaro (June 30) between the cavalry under O'Donnell, and the rest of the Madrid garrison under General Blaser. On July 7 Cánovas published the "Programme of the Manzanares," which advocated the expulsion of the *camarilla*, financial reforms, pure administration, and the reestablishment of the National Militia. Up to this point the combat had been waged between two sections of Conservatives at Madrid. The promise of the National Militia brought the whole Liberal party into the field in every province of Spain. Barcelona and Valladolid rose to arms; Madrid followed on July 17; San Luis resigned and fled; and for ten days the capital was given over to the mob, which lynched Francisco Chico, the head of the police, and the detested instrument of Narváez and San Luis. The Court capitulated to the revolutionists; a Junta of Public Safety was formed; Liberal measures were promised. Liberal officers were promoted; and Espartero was summoned to save society (July 19). He duly became Prime Minister (August 3), while O'Donnell had to be satisfied with the Ministry of War. But O'Donnell knew his own mind, whereas Espartero undid himself by his procrastination and infirmity of purpose.

Within a month Espartero's popularity was on the wane. It was easy to provide for the military leaders of the movement against San Luis, and to substitute one set of partisans for another in the civil service; it would have been easy to deal with the charges of corruption against San Luis, if they had stood alone. But similar accusations were levelled against the Queen-Mother; and a large section of the public demanded that she should be brought to trial. Her old enemy Espartero was not unwilling to inflict on her this supreme humiliation; but it was scarcely likely that Queen Isabel would consent to it, and the Cabinet was divided on the subject. It was decided that Queen Cristina

should leave the country, but she refused to leave as a private person, and the Ministry was pledged not to connive at a clandestine escape. Her departure in state (August 28) irritated the populace to riotous demonstrations, which were promptly suppressed, and had no effect but to strengthen the Conservative wing of the Cabinet. Espartero had been willing to leave as open questions the maintenance of the dynasty and the opening of the Cortes by the Queen; he now adopted the Moderate view, and the monarchy was upheld by a large majority in the Constituent Cortes (November 8) against twenty-three Republicans. A Liberal Constitution drawn up by Olózaga and other Liberal deputies was presented to the Constituent Cortes in January, 1855. The forms of parliamentary government were guaranteed; life-senators were abolished; financial control was vested in the Cortes, which was to meet once a year or oftener; liberty of the Press was granted, and political offences were distinguished from ordinary crimes. After a prolonged discussion it was agreed (February 28, 1855) that, while the nation undertook to protect the Roman Catholic religion and its ministers, no Spaniard or foreigner should be prosecuted for his opinions or beliefs "so long as he does not manifest them by public acts contrary to religion." The Constitution of 1855, judged by Spanish standards, was drawn in a Liberal spirit; but it was never put into force, for the Constituent Cortes separated without promulgating it.

Another aspect of the ecclesiastical question was brought into prominence by the ministerial proposals concerning communal lands and church property. A Bill had passed the Constituent Cortes establishing peasant proprietorship; and, as part of the scheme, church lands as yet unsold were to be put upon the market. The project was strenuously opposed by the Clericals, who contended, with much force, that the clauses relating to church lands involved a breach of the Concordat. The Queen was sincerely attached to the Church, and refused her sanction to the measure. Espartero and O'Donnell threatened to resign; and Isabel at last gave her assent under protest (May 1, 1855). An agitation was set on foot by Don Francisco de Asís and Sor Patrocínio; the middle-class citizens regarded the action of the Government as a breach of public faith; and the latent fanaticism of the illiterate was stimulated by circumstantial reports that a crucifix in one of the Madrid churches had sweated blood after the Bill was passed. Riots were organised, and the Cabinet was forced to expel the clerical *camarilla* from the Palace. These proceedings were watched by the country with growing disapproval, and the responsibility for them was laid at Espartero's door. A band of able writers founded (September 24) *El Padre Cobos*, a journal which ridiculed the Minister's personal foibles, satirised his public conduct, and made him the laughing-stock of Madrid. As Espartero's influence waned, O'Donnell's grew. Every post vacated by a supporter of Espartero was filled by a supporter



of O'Donnell; O'Donnell's lieutenants held the most prominent military commands; and the Prime Minister was occasionally outvoted in the Cabinet by his own colleagues. Early in July, 1856, Escosura, the Minister of the Interior and Espartero's close ally, was sent to report upon the causes of recent riots in the province of Old Castile. The chief disturbing causes were famine and maladministration; but Escosura's minute barely touched on these points, and digressed into an indictment of Moderate principles. Rightly construing this tirade as a personal attack on himself, O'Donnell refused to remain in office as Escosura's colleague. Espartero sided with Escosura, but dared not part with O'Donnell; he suggested that, if the two Ministers could not agree to sit in the same Cabinet, they should agree to retire from it together. This suggestion implied a complete misapprehension of O'Donnell's strategy. Without a suspicion that Isabel would throw him over, Espartero begged her to compose the differences in the Cabinet, or to choose between his two colleagues. She decided in favour of the War Minister. Espartero at once resigned, and within a few minutes O'Donnell had formed a new Ministry (July 14).

Though the late Premier had been completely outwitted, the people still believed in him. The National Militia rose to arms, and severe fighting took place at Madrid on July 15 and 16; but the popular force was without a leader, for Espartero's nerve had failed him at the critical moment, and he hid in a friend's house till order was restored. He was soldier enough to know that the raw National Militia was no match for the regulars, and that a conflict could only end in defeat. His abstention from armed opposition to the Government was honourable to his humanity; but appearances were against him, and his flight ruined his reputation. The local risings of the National Militia in the provinces were sternly quelled, and the force was disbanded; the Constituent Cortes were dissolved (September 2), and the Constitution of 1845 was revived, mitigated by a supplementary Act (September 15) providing for the control of national finance by the Cortes, and for an elected Senate. But O'Donnell's position was far from secure. If he was the arm of the Cabinet, Ríos Rosas was its brain, and the brain dominated the arm. It was proposed to devote to the restoration of ecclesiastical buildings a sum of £600,000 raised on church property; the project was opposed by Ríos Rosas, and was vetoed by the Queen. O'Donnell reluctantly yielded and parted with his Finance Minister. But Isabel was not to be propitiated. She had sacrificed Espartero to O'Donnell; she now made ready to sacrifice O'Donnell to Narváez, who had returned to Madrid. The coldness of her demeanour left O'Donnell in no doubt as to her intention; he anticipated dismissal by resignation (October 12, 1856).

Narváez thereupon took office, and appointed to the Ministry of the Interior Cándido Nocedal, a recent convert from radicalism, whose manipulation of the elections reduced the Liberal Opposition in the

Cortes to five members. For the next twelve months the Cortes did not count as a political force. The reforming measures of the Constituent Cortes and of the O'Donnell Ministry were rescinded; the Constitution of 1845 was reenforced; the central executive was strengthened; and laws of exceptional severity were enacted against the Press. The harshness of this legislation seemed excessive even to a group of Conservatives in the packed Cortes; but their protests were treated with contempt. Narváez ruled despotically, invoking Liberal principles; Nocedal ruled no less despotically in the name of orthodox absolutism. The defiant brutality of their methods produced a slight Liberal rally; a mysterious affair at the Palace, which ended in the violent death of Urbiztondo, the Minister of War, once more drew attention to Court scandals; Narváez declined to promote over the heads of other officers the Queen's latest favourite—Antonio Puig Moltó, a lieutenant in the engineers. Narváez was dismissed in disgrace (October 15, 1857), and, after other parliamentary combinations had been tried ineffectually, a Ministry of a new type was formed by O'Donnell (June 30, 1858).

He had learned that no reliance could be placed upon the Queen; she had inherited her father's jovial perfidy with her mother's sensuality, had many superstitions but no principles, and alternated between the influence of her ecclesiastical advisers and that of her numerous transitory lovers. O'Donnell perceived that the support of the dynastic Progressists was indispensable, and that he must adopt a line of policy which should conciliate all Clericals except the obscurantist Ultramontanes. He therefore formed a broad-bottomed administration composed of men of divergent opinions, but from which extremists were excluded. Yet, though he had the wit to conceive this plan, he had not the patient skill to execute it. He enlisted the services of Posada Herrera, an astute tactician, whose conduct of the elections disarmed his adversaries by its artful moderation. When the new Cortes assembled (December 1), it was found that, though the Government had a commanding majority, every shade of opinion in the Opposition was represented. Posada Herrera had observed that, by reducing the parliamentary Opposition to a handful of members, Narváez, Bravo Murillo, and Nocedal fomented secret plots in democratic clubs and conspiracies in barrack-rooms; he preferred to reduce his enemies to impotence by apparent concessions. Friendly relations were resumed with Rome and the *camarilla* was mollified by the Ministry's general attitude. Progressists were nominated to high posts; Prim and other prominent Liberals were made senators; and the public interest was adroitly diverted to problems of foreign and colonial policy.

The refusal of the Government to entertain the American proposals concerning the purchase of Cuba was approved by the nation; the menacing terms of Buchanan's presidential message only served to strengthen O'Donnell's Cabinet. Opinion was more divided respecting

Napoleon III's campaign against Austria; while the Spanish Liberals hailed the emancipation of Italy as a revolutionary triumph, moderate men feared that success might encourage France to pursue an aggressive policy at the expense of Spain; and Absolutists, Clericals, and courtiers were alarmed as to the future of Austria, of the Temporal Power, and of the Spanish Bourbons in Italy. Differences on these points might, in ordinary times, have shattered "the Liberal Union," the heterogeneous majority which supported O'Donnell; but the prospect of a war with Morocco united all parties against the traditional enemies of Spain. A plausible pretext was afforded by the raids of Arab tribesmen in the neighbourhood of Melilla and Ceuta. O'Donnell demanded reparation for outrages committed on Spanish subjects, rejected the offers of the Sultan of Morocco as inadequate, mobilised an expeditionary corps of 40,000, and declared war on October 22, 1859. His peremptory action excited enthusiasm in a public unaware of his negotiations with the British Government. In language of unmistakable plainness Lord John Russell informed the Spanish Cabinet that no annexation of African territory would be permitted by Great Britain; and O'Donnell—less concerned to annex territory than to increase his personal prestige—gave way. The coast towns of Morocco were blockaded; and O'Donnell assumed the command of the Spanish troops. He was unequal to his position. He had expected a military promenade: he found himself engaged in an arduous enterprise. The plan of campaign was badly conceived; the troops were disembarked at an unsuitable spot; the roads were impracticable; cholera was rife; half the army was in hospital; and the Moors offered a stout resistance to the Spanish advance. A fierce engagement at Los Castillejos (January 1, 1860) was won by the brilliant intrepidity of Prim; Tetuan was occupied on January 31; and, after severe fighting at Wadi-Ras (February 23), peace was concluded on April 26. The cost of the campaign was ruinous, and the loss of life great. Yet, for the moment, the country was satisfied. The dukedom of Tetuan was conferred on O'Donnell; and Prim—now Marquis of Los Castillejos—became a national hero, with whose ambitions statesmen would have to reckon in the future.

The Carlists had profited by O'Donnell's absence, and by the transfer of regular troops to Morocco, to organise a rising. They won over to their side the Captain-General of the Balearic Islands, Jaime Ortega, who landed at San Carlos de la Rápita in company with the Pretender, the Count of Montemolín (April 2). The General proclaimed Montemolín King of Spain; but, as his men declined to follow him and the peasantry did not stir, the expedition proved an absurd fiasco. Ortega was shot; Montemolín was captured, and only released on signing a formal renunciation of his claim to the throne. The hopes of the Carlists were at an end when the Spanish army, returning from its victorious campaign, marched through Madrid (May 11). The Liberal Union

remained intact; and the Government continued its policy of postponing controversial measures. A foreign complication enabled O'Donnell to divert attention from domestic questions and to remove from his path a personal rival. The triumph of Benito Juárez over Miramón accentuated long-standing differences between Spain and Mexico. Juárez, the Mexican President, expelled the Spanish envoy Pacheco early in 1861, and on July 17 suspended the interest on the foreign debt for two years. The British and French Governments protested without effect, and finally agreed to make common cause with Spain against Mexico. By the Convention of London (October 31) the three contracting Powers disclaimed any intention of territorial aggrandisement, or "of exercising in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence calculated to infringe the right of the Mexican nation to choose and constitute freely the form of its government." So far as Great Britain was concerned, this declaration was sincere. Both France and Spain secretly hoped to set up a monarchy in place of the existing republic; but each concealed her intentions from the other. Napoleon III was bent on bringing forward the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as candidate for the throne of Mexico, Isabel on pressing the claims of her sister the Duchesse de Montpensier. Prim, whose exploits in Morocco marked him for promotion, was appointed to command the Spanish contingent of the allied forces (November 12), and was instructed as plenipotentiary to abide strictly by the Convention of London. Apart from his merits as a soldier, Prim was personally agreeable to the French Emperor, with whom he had discussed Mexican affairs; and it was thought that, as his wife was a Mexican, he would have little difficulty in winning the confidence of the local leaders. He disembarked at Vera Cruz on January 8, 1862. O'Donnell's motives in appointing Prim were not wholly patriotic and disinterested. He assumed that, if a Spanish Bourbon obtained the throne of Mexico, Prim would remain to consolidate the new kingdom; or that, if the Mexican Republic survived, Prim would be permanently discredited. In either case, O'Donnell would be rid of a daring competitor.

These calculations were false, for they were made in ignorance of the French Emperor's designs. These were unofficially disclosed to the Spanish Government at the beginning of January, and were communicated to Prim in a private letter from Napoleon III. Prim, by this time well acquainted with the state of public feeling in Mexico, warned Napoleon (March 12) that, though nothing could be simpler than to proclaim Maximilian King or Emperor of Mexico, his power would disappear with the withdrawal of the French soldiers. In the negotiations with Juárez, Prim dissented from the proposals of the French representatives, and acted in concert with the British Envoy, Sir Charles Wyke; finally, on discovering that the French contemplated a breach of the Convention of London, he took upon himself the grave responsibility of ordering the

Spanish troops to embark for Havana (April 22). The news of his retirement from Mexico was unwelcome to the Cabinet, and was badly received by the public. O'Donnell succumbed to the temptation of crushing a personal rival, who had taken independent action of the most serious character without consulting his official chief. A public repudiation of Prim would avert Napoleon III's displeasure, and smooth O'Donnell's path. But two officers sent by Prim from Havana to justify his actions were beforehand with O'Donnell at the Palace; and the Premier, to his astonishment, found the Queen emphatic in praise of Prim's sagacity. Ministers were therefore compelled to uphold their nominee; but their advocacy was lukewarm, and the attacks of the Opposition increased in bitterness. Prim defended his conduct with great spirit in the Senate (December 9), and came victoriously through a motion of censure in the Chamber (January 7, 1863). But, by this date, the Liberal Union was on the point of breaking up. The Ministry had lasted longer than any other Cabinet formed during the reign, but had outlived its usefulness and popularity. Its more Liberal supporters were alienated by its deliberate neglect of domestic reforms, and by its savage repression of agrarian disturbances in Andalusia; its restless policy of adventures and expeditions abroad had yielded no substantial results in Morocco or Mexico; its readmission of Santo Domingo as a Spanish colony (March 19, 1861) had been a blunder which had disorganised the national finances, and was likely to derange them still further. Reconstruction had been tried in vain; O'Donnell was himself condemned as lacking in foresight. As in 1856, he anticipated dismissal. He proposed to acknowledge the newly established kingdom of Italy, and, on the Queen's refusal to accept his advice, tendered his resignation (February 27, 1863). The Liberal Union was at an end.

It was not easy to find a successor to O'Donnell. The Queen appealed in vain to Prim, and to five other prominent politicians. The Marquis of Miraflores at last consented to take office (March 2), dissolved the Cortes, and issued a proclamation (August 12) restricting the right of public meeting to electors on the register. The Liberals resolved to adopt the policy of abstention from the polls; but, though only one Progressist was returned, the new Parliament was unmanageable, and Miraflores retired in favour of Arrazola (January 15, 1864). On the Queen's refusal to dissolve the Cortes, Arrazola gave way to Mon (March 1). The period of short-lived Ministries had returned. Debarred from Parliament, the Liberals formed secret associations, and Prim organised a mutiny of the Madrid garrison in June. His plans were rendered futile by a tactless speech of Olózaga's, hinting at the abolition of the monarchy; the army, though discontented, was not yet disloyal to the throne. The rising was abandoned; but the Palace clique was alarmed, and, as usual in times of danger, sent for Narváez (September 16). He formed a Cabinet which included González Bravo,

and, after ineffectual efforts to wean the Liberals from their policy of abstention, reverted to a policy of coercion. An excuse for striking hard was forthcoming. On the pretext of relieving the embarrassments of the Treasury, the Queen proposed that the greater part of the patrimony of the Crown should be sold, and that 25 per cent. of the proceeds should be paid to her private account, the rest to the exchequer. The financial position of the country was unquestionably bad, and it was rendered worse by ill-advised naval expeditions, which finally culminated in the bombardment of Valparaiso and Callao. The Queen's proposal was essentially unsound, and was declared to be unconstitutional by Emilio Castelar, afterwards famous as an orator and as the dictator of 1873, but then editor of *La Democracia*, a Radical paper, and professor of the philosophy of history at the University of Madrid. The Ministry instructed the Rector of the University to deprive Castelar of his chair. The order was not obeyed; the Rector was suspended; and a group of professors (including Nicolás Salmerón, afterwards President of the Republic) resigned as a protest. An orderly demonstration in their favour was organised by the University students (April 10, 1865); the authorities fired upon the crowd, killing eleven and wounding 103 persons. This proceeding excited the utmost indignation all over Spain, and was vehemently denounced by Prim in the Senate.

The Queen, perceiving that Narváez had gone too far, threw him over and recalled O'Donnell (June 29). Like his predecessor, he began by trying to persuade the Liberals to abandon their policy of abstention. He extended the franchise, and entered into diplomatic relations with Italy; he expelled the Palace *camarilla*, and sacrificed his personal feelings in endeavouring to arrive at an understanding with Prim. But it was too late. Prim was convinced that the dynasty must be swept away, and was indefatigable in his attempts to win over the garrison of Madrid. A rising planned for January 2, 1866, was a grievous disappointment to him; only two cavalry regiments joined him at Villarejo de Salván, and he escaped with them to Portugal by a series of forced marches. The abortive attempt drove O'Donnell to repressive measures. The garrisons of various cities in the province of Old Castile were known to be disaffected; a happy accident alone prevented a serious mutiny in Madrid. Martial law was proclaimed, but Prim's furtive propaganda continued. Two regiments of artillery stationed at Madrid rose on June 22; the mutineers were overcome after a desperate resistance, and 66 were executed. Isabel was ready to profit by O'Donnell's severity, but was unwilling to share his unpopularity. She refused to sanction his nominations to the Senate, and he resigned (July 10), declaring that he would never enter the Palace again so long as it was occupied by the Queen, "with whom it was impossible to govern." O'Donnell and Prim, by different routes and methods, had arrived at almost the same conclusion.

Narváez was reinstated in office, for the fifth and last time, and,

with González Bravo for his lieutenant, governed as an autocrat. Since the accession of Isabel, Ministers, however despotic, had gone through the form of assembling a packed parliament to ratify their decrees. Narváez set a new precedent, and, though the Constitution provided for annual sessions, the Cortes were not convoked between July, 1865 and December, 1866. After an interval of more than eighteen months, the members of the different parties, who were in Madrid, met to petition that the Cortes should be summoned. The meeting was dispersed (December 28); the petitioners were declared to be "enemies of the public peace," and exiled from Spain on the following day—Ríos Rosas, the President of Congress, being shipped abroad with a gang of common convicts. Serrano—then President of the Senate as well as Commander-in-chief—remonstrated with the Queen against this treatment of his colleague; he was arrested on his return from the Palace, and was deported to the Balearic Islands. Neither soldiers nor civilians, who criticised the executive, were safe. Moderate men, naturally averse from violent courses, began to think with Prim that absolutism could only be met by armed resistance, and that the army must be persuaded to declare against the Government. A new Cortes, elected under the severest ministerial pressure, met on March 30, 1867. As one nonentity after another took his seat, González Bravo, astonished at his own handiwork, exclaimed audibly: "Who are these people?" Only four members of the Liberal Union were returned to the Chamber, which obsequiously voted away all its rights and privileges before the prorogation (July 13).

Prim continued to organise his schemes at Brussels, and secured adherents among the garrison at Valencia, where a rising was to take place in August; he reached Valencia on August 11, but retired discomfited to Geneva, for his rash promise to abolish conscription had alarmed the officers, and they withdrew from the plot before the day appointed. But military rebellion was not the sole menace to the throne. Clouds of scandal were gathering round the Queen. The irregularities of her private life had long been known to those about the Court; and the simple-hearted Pius IX had amazed and amused the diplomatists of Europe by bestowing on her the Golden Rose in recognition of her virtue. Growing more and more careless of appearances, she conferred the marquisate of Loja on her latest favourite, Carlos Marfori, a cook's son, who had risen to be an actor, before royal caprice made him a Minister of State. Her shortcomings were now cruelly exposed in Radical newspapers, which the Government vainly strove to suppress; these revelations reached the provinces, and scandalised the whole community. Nothing contributed more to Isabel's downfall. Her position was further weakened by the deaths of O'Donnell (November 5, 1867), and of Narváez (April 23, 1868). Narváez, though he persistently declared himself a Liberal, was pledged to combat the revolutionary party to the last; O'Donnell, though

he wished Isabel to abdicate in favour of her son Alfonso, was staunch to the Bourbons; and both were influential enough to keep the army loyal to the dynasty. The generals attached to the Liberal Union shared their chief's opinion that it was impossible to work any longer with Isabel, but they were not agreed as to her successor; while Serrano intrigued on behalf of the Duchesse de Montpensier, Dulce endeavoured to bring about an understanding with Prim and other leaders of the anti-dynastic party.

The appointment of González Bravo in place of Narváez was injudicious. He remembered with unmitigated resentment that the military group had procured his dismissal in 1844; he knew that he was distrusted by many officers of high rank, and that they were once more banded against him. He appointed to important posts two distinguished soldiers on whom he could rely—José Gutiérrez de la Concha, Marquis of La Havana, and Manuel Pavía, Marquis of Novaliches—and, with force on his side, he believed that, civilian as he was, he could cow the disaffected generals. Since his enemies were irreconcilable, and bent on his humiliation, he determined to strike first. On July 7, 1868, he suddenly ordered the arrest of the Liberal Union generals—Serrano, Dulce, Caballero de Rodas, Córdova, Echagüe, Serrano Bedoya, Zabala and others—and exiled them to the Canary Islands. The Montpensiers were ordered to leave Spain at once. Most of González Bravo's foes were trapped, but not all; and what he thought to be a masterstroke of statecraft was his destruction. By expelling the Montpensiers, he made an enemy of Admiral Topete, the Commander-in-chief of the Cadiz squadron; before embarking at Cadiz, the Liberal Union generals enlisted Topete's sympathies, and a plan of combined action was agreed upon.

On September 8, the *Buenaventura* left Cadiz to bring back the Liberal Union generals from the Canaries; on September 17 Prim disembarked from the *Delta* at Gibraltar, met Topete and persuaded him to act instantly without waiting for the return of the *Buenaventura*. The *pronunciamiento* was made on September 18; the garrison at Cadiz rose next day; the banished generals arrived in the evening; and a joint manifesto to the nation was issued proclaiming a new Government on a popular basis. One passage drew scornful attention to Isabel's misconduct by insisting that "the motives determining the gravest issues should be such as may be mentioned before mothers, wives, and daughters." The taunt struck home at San Sebastián, where the Queen was now residing with her husband and Marfori; yet, as she had so often seen order restored at the point of the bayonet, she did not lose hope. She refused to believe that the game was lost, and that her kingdom was required of her. González Bravo knew better; the generals had beaten him once more, and he hurriedly abandoned office. Novaliches marched to check the advance of Serrano on the capital, was wounded at the battle of Alcolea (September 28), and retired with



his wavering troops, which deserted the royal cause four days later. On September 29, Madrid rose. The reign of Isabel was over; and, on September 30, she fled from the country which she had misruled for twenty-five years, leaving a few shillings in the national exchequer. Her errors may be explained; they cannot be forgiven. Many sovereigns have been as sensual, selfish, and superstitious; few have been so devoid of political instinct, so reckless of consequences, and so indifferent to the welfare of their people.

On October 7 a Provisional Government was formed at Madrid, with Serrano as its figurehead, and Prim as its leading spirit. On October 25 it issued a manifesto which, while promising universal suffrage and other democratic measures, left the form of future government an open question. Prim and his colleagues were known, however, to favour the establishment of a constitutional monarchy; but a noisy minority organised a republican agitation. Dangerous socialistic riots took place at Cadiz and Malaga; voters were intimidated at the polls, and sixty Republicans were returned to the Constituent Cortes, which met in January, 1869. A new Constitution was prepared guaranteeing individual liberty, trial by jury, the right of combination and of public meeting, and liberty of the Press. Civil marriage was legalised, but the proposal to establish liberty of worship was combated in the Cortes, and fiercely opposed in the country. Though finally passed, it was denounced by churchmen as sacrilege, by Republicans as a futile compromise, and it remained a dead letter. The clause in the Constitution providing that the monarchical form of government should be adopted was carried by 214 votes to 71, against prolonged Republican opposition in debates which gave Castelar, now member for Saragossa, a superb opportunity of displaying, with the eyes of Europe fixed on him, the vast resources of his impassioned eloquence. Serrano was elected Regent on June 18; the Cortes rose on July 15, and Prim was free to find, if he could, a monarch for the vacant throne. The result of his preliminary enquiries had been discouraging. The only candidate ambitious of the position was the Duc de Montpensier, whose claims had been pressed by Serrano, Topete, and Silvela; but Montpensier was unacceptable to Prim and the Cortes, and Napoleon III would have resented his selection. The Duke of Aosta had been approached without success; and, after some hesitation, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, father of King Luiz of Portugal, had rejected all advances (April 5).

New candidatures were suggested by various groups. Some representatives of the old Liberal Union would have welcomed the succession of Isabel's son Alfonso; but he was far too young, the feeling against his mother was still strong, and a meeting of the Government supporters (April 10) carried a motion that the Bourbons were incapable of holding any public office. This resolution of a party gathering had, indeed, no legal force, and was primarily aimed at Montpensier; but it effectually

excluded Alfonso, and could not be rescinded abruptly. The Pan-iberians, who desired a legislative union with Portugal, carried on a boisterous agitation in favour of King Luiz; this the King brought to a close by stating in an open letter to Loulé (September 26) that he meant to die, as he had lived, a Portuguese. Prim's original candidate had been the Duke of Aosta; he now supported the Duke of Genoa, Victor Emmanuel's nephew, and sounded the Italian Government. The offer was declined (January 3, 1870); and this new check was peculiarly mortifying to Spanish pride, for Prim, feeling confident of success, had announced his project unofficially through the Foreign Office. This series of refusals compromised the dignity of the country, and encouraged the Republicans. By temperament and training Prim was intolerant of disorder, and he dealt summarily with the instigators of riots in the provinces, with insubordinate militiamen, and with the "Volunteers of Liberty" who resisted disarmament. The financial situation and the uncertainty of the political future contributed to the general uneasiness. Prim struck as hard as Narváez, for the speedy establishment of order was essential to his plans. These continued to miscarry. He received a refusal from Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (March 15), and renewed his offer to Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who once more declined it (May 15).

Notwithstanding the ridicule heaped upon him by the Republicans, Prim persisted in his efforts; and, chiefly owing to the arguments of Bismarck's agent, Major von Versen, who had recently returned from a secret mission to Spain, Prince Leopold was prevailed upon to accept the nomination to the vacant throne. Prim had at last found a king; but the manner in which the news was received by Mercier de Lostende, French ambassador at Madrid (July 2), convinced him that he had blundered, and on July 10 he despatched a confidential agent to secure Leopold's withdrawal. Before the messenger reached Berlin, Leopold had declined to stand (July 12); but the mischief was done, and out of this trifling incident arose the Franco-German war. Prim had contrived to offend France and Prussia, but he avoided the efforts made by both Powers to enlist Spain on their side; and, while the Franco-German war was in progress, he again approached the Duke of Aosta, who gave a reluctant assent. On November 26 the Ministerial candidate was adopted by 191 votes against 153. The majority was significantly small. It is doubtful whether Prim was well inspired in choosing for the throne of so Catholic a country as Spain a prince whose father, Victor Emmanuel, was regarded by many Spaniards as a sacrilegious despoiler. It is possible, though unlikely, that the experiment might have succeeded under Prim's direction. But this was not to be. Attempts on Prim's life were made on October 25 and November 14; on December 27 he was shot in the street by a band of assassins, and died of his wounds on December 30, 1870, the day on which the Duke of Aosta touched Spanish

soil at Cartagena. It was a sinister beginning. The new King stood alone; and as Amadeo I he lived two years of political martyrdom, isolated and with every hand against him. Then he laid down the Crown which had been thrust upon him, and left Spain to the dreary round of anarchy, civil war, clerical intrigues, republican excesses, military conspiracies, and reaction.

During this period Portugal, like Spain, underwent a succession of revolutions and counter-revolutions. Thomar's administration was marked by acts of petty tyranny, which arrayed the commercial classes of the capital against him, and increased the discontent of the provinces. A popular uprising suddenly swept him from power (May 11, 1846); and he fled in disguise to Spain. His successor Palmella was unable to restore tranquillity. A general strike against the payment of taxes paralysed the executive; the Miguelists were allied with the Septembrists to annul the Charter, and Oporto fell into the hands of the insurgents. Disaffection spread to the regular troops; but the bulk of the army was kept to its allegiance by the influence of Saldanha, who became Minister of War on October 6, and was rewarded by a dukedom (November 4). The rebel forces were defeated at Torres Vedras (December 22); but the Opposition held Oporto till the following summer, when foreign intervention, constantly demanded by Saldanha in conformity with the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, was at last obtained. By surrendering to Sir Thomas Maitland, the military chiefs of the rebellion secured British protection against the vengeance of the loyalists; the promise of a general amnesty (June 9, 1847) induced the Junta to submit; and the regulars under Saldanha took possession of Oporto in the name of Maria da Gloria (July 7).

Though the insurrection was at an end, the condition of the country provided a predatory adventurer with an opportunity; and the sudden reappearance of Thomar at Lisbon (August 27) indicated that the reactionaries were preparing to seize office. Their plans were disturbed by Saldanha who, on becoming Prime Minister (December 18), adopted a policy of conciliation, restoring to the Conservative leaders the dignities of which Palmella had deprived them, and appointing Thomar ambassador at Paris. The establishment of the French Republic in 1848 raised the hopes of the Portuguese revolutionists; but Saldanha's firmness prevented the coalition of Miguelists and Septembrists from disturbing the public peace. He had to deal with a willer foe in Thomar, who returned to parliamentary life in 1849, and brought about Saldanha's resignation (June 18). Reversing his predecessor's practice of not allowing party politics to influence appointments in the civil service, Thomar discharged many of the late Ministry's nominees. The Opposition retaliated by accusing him of peculation, and a vote of censure in the Upper House was supported by Saldanha; the vote was

defeated, but the Minister was not content with this victory and, against all precedent, dismissed Saldanha from the post of Majordomo of the Palace (February 7, 1850). Incensed at the slight put upon the Marshal, the generals and the Liberal nobility joined with the Radicals; and during the ensuing months the probability of a revolution became so apparent that the British Minister, Sir Hamilton Seymour, urged the Queen to dismiss Thomar. The advice was rejected; but no overt action was taken till the following spring, when the storm burst. Saldanha raised the standard of revolt at Cintra (April 7, 1851), calling upon the army to save the throne and charter from the peril in which Thomar's despotism had placed them. The garrisons of Oporto and other cities responded, and Thomar once more escaped from his enemies to Spain (April 29). Saldanha was offered the presidency of the Council on May 1—but, as was widely believed, solely with the object of inducing him to return at once to Lisbon unaccompanied. If there was a design to assassinate or capture him, the plot failed. The wary soldier took the precaution of entering the capital with his troops, dictated his own terms, and formed a Ministry of "regeneration," which asked for the support of all independent men in purifying the executive and in carrying out a policy of moderate reform.

Saldanha failed to create a national party; but he rendered signal service to the country by passing the celebrated *Acto Adicional*, which introduced liberal clauses into the Charter, and settled a long-standing difficulty. The most important innovation of the *Acto Adicional* was a provision for the direct election of deputies; and among other changes were the curtailment of the power hitherto exercised by the central executive, the creation of representative municipalities, and the abolition of capital punishment for purely political offences. Measures to readjust the incidence of taxation met with so much obstruction that the Government prorogued Parliament, and resorted to the unconstitutional device of imposing its scheme by ministerial decree. Still, the unbroken peace which characterised Saldanha's long tenure of office reassured native capitalists, attracted foreign investors, and stimulated commercial enterprise.

On the death of Maria da Gloria (November 13, 1853), she was succeeded by her son Pedro, during whose minority the King Consort acted as Regent. Pedro V, who came of age on September 16, 1855, was a self-willed youth of narrow understanding, too prone to meddle in the details of routine administration. The inevitable crisis occurred when, on the rejection of a financial measure by the Upper House, the Ministry advised the creation of a sufficient numbers of peers to force the Bill through. The King refused his assent; and Saldanha resigned (June 6, 1856). He had rescued the country from despotism by his *coup d'état* in 1851; he had strengthened the monarchy by lowering the qualification for voting; he had administered affairs with integrity, and

with but few lapses from constitutional practice; and he left office at the end of five years, with the respect of his bitterest opponents. He was never again to stand so high in public esteem.

His successor, the Marquis de Loulé, formed a more democratic Ministry, which bid for the support of the Septembrists, and of the Freemasons. But the most memorable incident during Loulé's term of office was a diplomatic difficulty with France. Napoleon III had already protested against Saldanha's conduct in allowing French republican refugees to settle in Portugal; it was now in his power to mark his displeasure by humiliating Saldanha's successor. On November 29, 1857, the Portuguese authorities at Mozambique seized, in the neighbourhood of Quintanghona, a French slave, the *Charles-et-George*; the captain was duly tried, sentenced to two years' imprisonment, and fined. The French Government protested, and sent two men-of-war to the Tagus (October 3, 1858) to exact reparation. Loulé reckoned on English support, which he might have obtained, had Palmerston been in office; but Derby and Disraeli were not disposed to intervene, and Portugal was finally compelled to pay a sum of 349,000 francs as compensation. The Loulé Ministry was discredited, and resigned on March 16, 1859, but was recalled a year later. Towards the end of 1861, Lisbon was devastated by epidemics of yellow fever and cholera. Saldanha's life was despaired of; the King's brother Dom Fernando died on November 6; and five days later Pedro V fell a victim to the plague. He was succeeded by his brother Dom Luiz, who took the oath on December 22. But the misfortunes of the royal family were not at an end; the King's surviving brother, Dom João, died on December 27. The Lisbon mob fell into a panic, credulously imagined that poisoners were at work, stormed Thomar's house, and clamoured against Loulé. It was long before public confidence was restored; but the sympathy and courage shown by Luiz I made the monarchy more popular than it had been during the reigns of his immediate predecessors.

His marriage to Maria Pia of Italy (October 11, 1862) pleased all parties; Liberals welcomed her as a daughter of Victor Emmanuel, and Conservatives as the god-daughter of Pius IX. The Loulé Ministry abolished capital punishment in 1862, and continued a decentralising policy; but its financial measures were ill-conceived, and it alienated many supporters by expelling the popular Sisters of Charity. Loulé resigned on April 14, 1864; and, a month later, Saldanha, who had represented Portugal at the Vatican since 1862, reached Lisbon. He advised the King to dismiss the Ministry, and to govern by royal decrees, which might be confirmed when convenient by an amenable Parliament. Though not unwilling to nominate Saldanha to the first place in the existing Cabinet, the King declined to withdraw his confidence from Ministers upheld by a parliamentary majority. Saldanha returned chagrined to Rome, declaring that Portugal was "rotten to

the core." Apart from the personal rebuff which he had suffered, the growth of the democratic spirit filled him with misgivings; and his dissatisfaction deepened after the dethronement of Isabel, for the establishment of a Spanish republic would encourage the Portuguese republicans. His fears were exaggerated, yet they were shared at the time by many observers. Republican opinions were, no doubt, prevalent among the educated professional classes; but they were chiefly held by doctrinaires incapable of organising an armed rebellion. There was likewise a socialistic tendency among the workmen in the large cities, and among the labourers in the provinces; but these inchoate groups were without competent leaders, without definite aims, and without the franchise. Early in 1869 Saldanha was transferred to the Paris embassy, and took part in the negotiations to place King Luiz' father, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, on the throne of Spain. Later in the year, he returned to Portugal, denounced the policy of the Loulé Cabinet, and on May 19, 1870, made his last *coup d'état*.

The army again supported him; and the King appointed him Prime Ministér, good-naturedly allowing the octogenarian Marshal to believe that he had saved the dynasty once more. But it was not possible to indulge him for long; and his dismissal on August 29 caused no stir. The conduct of affairs was entrusted to statesmen of a less melodramatic type, more in accord with modern ideas, and more interested in the policy of colonial expansion. This process had been begun by Joaquim Rodrigues Graça's effective occupation of Angola in 1848; by the abolition of slavery at Macao in 1854, and at Ambriz, Cabinda and Molembo in 1856; by the settlement of a European colony at Mozambique in 1857, and by the exploration of Nyassaland. The further colonial developments lie outside the limits of our period.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

(1870-1.)

THE swift completeness of the victory of Königgrätz had raised Prussia at a bound into the front rank of the military Powers of Europe; the secret agreements following on the Convention of Nikolsburg, by which the south-German States bound themselves to fight under the leadership of Prussia in the event of war, had laid a broad foundation upon which the edifice of German unity might be solidly built. The French Emperor, conscious that his tenure of the throne depended upon the prestige of his Government, watched with deep concern the rise of a great and powerful neighbour; the French people, jealous of their military renown, looked with envy on laurels fresher and more glorious than those won at Magenta and Solferino. Thus the Treaty of Prague, while ending one war, sowed the seeds of another.

Napoleon III had committed a grave political blunder in 1866; sure of the success of Austria, he had planned to intervene at the right moment on behalf of Prussia, at the price of substantial concessions. Königgrätz found him unprepared to intervene in the only way in which he could hope to obtain any real advantage for himself or for France. Hence the victory of Prussia came to be regarded by the Imperialist party as a humiliation which it was essential to avenge. East of the Rhine, it was recognised at once that the situation created by the defeat of Austria was but temporary. Urged forward by the voice of the people, among whom the idea of a united Germany was gathering strength, as much as by the necessities of the moment, the rulers of the southern States had consented readily enough to place themselves under the hegemony of the Hohenzollern; but they made it perfectly clear to Prussia that, while France held Strassburg and dominated the left bank of the Upper Rhine, they lay under a menace more pressing and more real than the prospective advantages of a union with the Northern Confederacy. Thus, on the one side, Bismarck set himself to face a conflict with France as necessary to complete the work he had begun; on the other, Napoleon began to scheme to obtain some advantage at the expense of Prussia, which would lower the prestige of that Power in the eyes of Europe. In the years immediately following the downfall

of Austria neither Power was prepared to proceed to extremes; France was in the act of reforming her military system under the guidance of Marshal Niel; Prussia required time to fit the contingents of the allied States to her model; but Napoleon's repeated attempts to strengthen and extend his eastern frontier, always detected and met by Bismarck, produced a state of friction between the two countries which was viewed with growing apprehension in Europe.

In 1868 the principals were engaged in preparing for a conflict which both regarded as inevitable. Napoleon turned to Austria, Denmark, and Italy as the Powers most naturally inclined to resent the aggrandisement of Prussia or most disposed to repay past favours. But, since his foreign policy had for years been swayed by moods, and had lacked concentration of purpose, he found his prospective allies loth to commit themselves. Bismarck had been working towards the goal of German unity ever since King William had called him to office (September, 1862). Aware that Russia, as is described elsewhere, had deeply resented her abandonment by Austria during the Crimean War, he sought at St Petersburg an effective counterpoise to anti-Prussian designs. By ungrudgingly helping Russia in her Polish troubles, and finally by promising to acquiesce in the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, he obtained from Prince Gorchakoff a guarantee of benevolent neutrality; at the same time, he lost no opportunity of conciliating and assisting Italy, with whom Prussia had been allied against Austria in 1866.

Thus, in the year 1870, Austria, with her military preparations incomplete, with her finances disorganised, and above all apprehensive of the action of Russia, returned vague replies to the overtures from Paris. Italy, desirous of consummating her unity, coveted Rome, from which Napoleon, posing as the protector of the Pope, and fearful of losing clerical support at home, was not disposed to withdraw his troops. She was therefore anxious to avoid a conflict with her former ally, though she held that the cession of Nice and Savoy had more than compensated France for her aid in 1859. Denmark was equally bent on non-committal; for, though eager to regain Schleswig-Holstein, and to profit by the discomfiture of Prussia, she saw clearly that a false step would mean ruin. It was recognised, both in France and in Prussia, that England, busied with domestic reform under Gladstone, was unwilling to interfere in continental affairs, but that the neutrality of Belgium was very dear to the English people, who would certainly not brook the presence of either Power at Antwerp. The question was definitely settled by the publication, at the instance of Bismarck, in the *Times* (after the declaration of war) of a proposal made by Benedetti in the autumn of 1866 that Prussia should help France to acquire Belgium, in return for French connivance at certain annexations in northern Germany. England was intensely moved by this exposure; and Lord Granville at once



negotiated a treaty with the belligerents by which each was bound to oppose, jointly with England, any violation of Belgian territory by the other.

Though the political atmosphere was highly charged, there did not appear to be any immediate cause of danger in the middle of the summer of 1870. The French Premier, Émile Ollivier, was able to tell the Chamber on the last day of June that in no direction could a question be detected that was at all dangerous. Within four days the whole of France was in a ferment. The French Foreign Minister, the Duc de Gramont, was informed on July 3 that Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen had been selected, with his own consent, as a candidate for the vacant throne of Spain. It was more than probable that this step was approved by the head of the House of Hohenzollern. In the existing state of her relations with Berlin it was impossible for France to allow Spain to fall under the influence of Prussia. Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, was directed to proceed to Ems, where King William was taking the waters, and to press for an immediate renunciation of Prince Leopold's claims. He was informed that the matter was one for Prince Leopold and the Spanish people, but that his Majesty would communicate with Prince Leopold's father on the subject. The Duc de Gramont was not satisfied, and insisted on an explicit order from King William to Prince Leopold; but, while despatches were passing between Paris and Ems, it was announced from Madrid that Prince Leopold had withdrawn. This was not sufficient for Napoleon, who, in the state of French opinion, dared not close the incident without inflicting a public diplomatic defeat upon Prussia. On July 13 Benedetti was ordered again to seek an interview with the King, and to demand that he would not at any future time sanction any similar proposal coming from Prince Leopold. King William absolutely refused to bind himself by an engagement without limit of time, and on the persistent ambassador seeking yet another interview, he was politely informed that the King, who left Ems that evening, could not receive him. A telegram published by Bismarck, and conveying, through its abbreviated form, the impression that King William had treated the French ambassador with disrespect, drove Paris into a condition of frenzy. The Cabinet, in which the Liberal majority was at first disinclined to adopt extreme measures, was carried away by the popular outburst, and on the evening of July 14, 1870, the Emperor Napoleon III in Council decided on war. The next morning the forces of the Empire received orders to mobilise; on the evening of the same day the King of Prussia issued similar orders to the States of the North German Confederation, and his example was followed in southern Germany on July 16.

Though the formal declaration of war was not received in Berlin until July 19, it is from the issue of the orders for mobilisation that the war must be dated, since as much depended upon the smoothness and rapidity with which the ponderous machinery, then set in motion, did its

work, as upon the qualities of the rival leaders, or upon the valour of the opposing troops. The Prussian military system, adopted in northern Germany from the birth of the Confederation, and gradually extended with slight modifications to the southern States, after the Peace of Prague, was founded by Scharnhorst as an answer to the limit to her standing army imposed upon Prussia by Napoleon I. Briefly, Scharnhorst's principle was to make the standing army the school for the war training of the nation, and to pass through the school the largest number of men, compatible with sound teaching, with the object of creating an enormous potential reserve. Through years of patient labour, often in the face of violent opposition, the King, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon had toiled, until now, at their call, Europe saw for the first time not an army, but a nation in arms, preparing for the field. Under the Prussian system the army was in the true sense of the word territorial. The majority of its units drew their recruits from the districts in which they were permanently stationed; and these recruits, returning to their homes after their period of training, became the reservists required to bring the standing army up to its war strength. The villager, on rejoining the colours, drew from a shelf labelled with his name his clothing and equipment, ready fitted for his use. Thus the railways were left free to prepare for the movement of the completed units to their places of concentration. The battalion, when ready, joined its regiment, the regiment its brigade, and so in succession, without rest but without haste, till three great armies ready for the field were advancing towards the Rhine.

The obligation to serve was universal, and was rigorously enforced. Exemptions were rarely granted; but the period of service with the colours was at the same time reduced to the utmost, with the object both of keeping the youth of the country as short a time as possible from their ordinary avocations, and of passing the largest number through the ranks. In 1870, the terms of service, except for the more scientific corps, were two and a half years with the colours, four years in the reserve, and five and a half in the *Landwehr* (militia). The reserve formed the complement of the standing army; the *Landwehr* had a distinct organisation. This system produced a field army of 500,000 men on the outbreak of war. Moltke had recognised that armies of this size could no longer be controlled by precise orders issued by one man. To assist him in his scheme of organisation, and in the preparation of plans of campaign, he had called into existence a General Staff, to which the best brains of the nation were attracted. He kept this carefully chosen body of officers in closest touch with the army, by regularly sending them back for duty with the fighting units; and by means of them he taught the whole body to exchange the old rigid compliance with orders for an intelligent interpretation of general instructions. All ranks entered upon the war with the spirit of initiative highly developed, and with an intense belief in the advantage of adopting the offensive.

Moltke's plan of campaign had been prepared in the winter of 1867, its details being constantly revised by his General Staff, in accordance with the military and political conditions of the moment. So carefully was this done that more detailed information as to the capacity of the French railways was available in Berlin than in Paris, and a later and more accurate map of the country between the Rhine and Paris was issued to the German regiments than was in the hands of the French staffs. The plan consisted in the formation of three armies and a general reserve. The first army, commanded by Steinmetz, 60,000 strong, and the second, under Prince Frederick Charles, of 131,000 men, were drawn from the troops of the North German Confederation. The third army, under the Prussian Crown Prince Frederick, was composed of 130,000 men, chiefly south Germans. The general reserve, 63,000 men, was directly under the orders of the King of Prussia. Three army corps and one division of regulars and four Landwehr divisions, were utilised to watch the Danish and Austrian frontiers, and the northern coast. Thus 384,000 men were immediately available for the invasion of France. The information collected by the General Staff showed that the French could not place in the field at once more than 250,000 men. A study of the French railway system showed that, if this force were to be brought rapidly to the frontier, it must be assembled in two main portions about Metz and Strassburg, and must be divided by the Vosges. It was held improbable that France would violate the neutrality of Luxemburg and Switzerland, or would attempt an invasion of Germany from the south, which would leave Paris uncovered. Therefore it was decided to deploy the three armies behind the fortresses of the middle Rhine, and to move the first down the Moselle, the third down the Rhine, the second army followed by the reserve forming the connecting link. Thus a superior force could be brought against the French, should they invade Germany, without waiting to complete their mobilisation; for either flank or the centre could be reinforced more quickly than the parts of the French army, divided by a mountain range, could be brought together. Moltke's plan was simplicity itself; Paris was his ultimate objective, but his immediate intention was to seek out and crush the enemy's field armies.

Though universal service existed in France in 1870, its obligation was very partially enforced. The terms of service were five years with the colours, and four in the reserve. In practice, anyone who could pay for a substitute was allowed to do so; and the State's share of this money provided bounties for men who extended their service. This produced a long-service professional army which was not in touch with the nation, and also depleted the reserve. Those not required to serve did indeed join the *Garde Nationale* in the large towns, and elsewhere the *Garde Mobile*; but their training was purely nominal, and they had no organisation for war. Thus the standing army had little to fall back on; and the strength of the nation was undeveloped.

These defects did not lie on the surface. Under the second Empire the army had waged successful war in the Crimea, in China, in Algeria, in Mexico, and in Italy. The veteran soldiers parading on the Champs de Mars impressed the spectator more than the young troops which defiled before the King of Prussia on the Tempelhofer Feld. Europe had not yet learned that the men in uniform at a given moment do not represent the power of a nation in a life-and-death struggle. Though a few of the more thoughtful, Marshal Niel, the War Minister, among them, had been startled by the success of Prussia in 1866, the French army, in its own estimation and that of the world generally, was the first in Europe. Niel had carefully examined the system of mobilisation in 1867 and had formulated proposals for increasing the efficiency of the reserves. His premature death (1869) put an end to these reforms. The long-service system had proved the most convenient and effective for the numerous foreign expeditions of the Empire, and pressed lightly on the people as a whole. The proposed changes were unpopular and were not carried through by Niel's successor, Marshal Lebœuf. Lebœuf had calculated that on the ninth day of mobilisation 150,000 men could be assembled in Lorraine, and 100,000 in Alsace, and that the total would be raised to 300,000 within a few days, when all the reserves had come in. On this the Emperor based his plan of campaign. He was aware that united Germany could put into the field an army of about 400,000 men, but he expected that, if France acted swiftly and successfully, Germany would not long hold together. He believed that the wounds of 1866 were too recent to be healed; that a rapid advance across the Upper Rhine would divide Germany, and make the southern States hesitate; that an early advantage would bring them into the field with Austria once more at their head, and perhaps even with Denmark and Italy to support them.

This plan had much to recommend it, but it required before all rapidity of execution. A large part of the French army was quartered in eastern France. Napoleon hoped to assemble these troops quickly, and to be in a position to strike at Prussia while she was mobilising. But years of careful preparation in peace are essential to rapidity in war, and this preparation had been altogether neglected in France. The French officers were selected and trained for the staff as boys and never returned to the fighting units; their knowledge was almost entirely theoretical; and they were out of touch with the army. They had evolved a highly centralised organisation, which worked well enough in peace, but which killed initiative, and was fatal in war. The French headquarters, which should have been chiefly concerned with the doings of the enemy, were overwhelmed with details of the merest routine. Subordinate commanders, even of the highest rank, were not informed of the plan of campaign; the details of the concentration were not worked out. The railway companies, left to deal with the transport of the troops, were not acquainted with the data

of the problem they had to solve, though the organisation of the army made that problem extraordinarily complex. The French army was not localised, but regiments, quartered in accordance with the exigencies of the moment, were supplied from fixed depots. Thus reservists at Strassburg and Metz, whose regiments were within a few miles of their homes, had to travel to Brittany, to Picardy, or even to Algiers, for their arms and equipment, and, returning to take their places in the ranks, sometimes found their regiments had moved no one knew whither. The railways required for the concentration of the fighting units, and for the transport of war stores, were soon thrown into confusion by this incessant cross-traffic, nor was the supply of those essentials which make an army out of an assembly of units more successful. The system, centralised in the hands of a few overworked officials, broke down. While the troops were in want of everything, the sidings at Metz were congested with trucks of which no one on the spot knew the contents. Thus it fell out that, when the Emperor joined the army at Metz on July 28, the thirteenth day of mobilisation, he found that there was not a single corps in a condition to take the field, and that doubts as to the possibility of assuming the offensive were already expressed.

In one respect only was France incontestably superior; the Prussian navy was in its infancy; the French possessed the second fleet in Europe. It was proposed to land an expedition of 30,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein, and to invoke the aid of Denmark. But the preparation of the navy for war had been neglected equally with that of the army; and, before the first ships were ready for sea, every vulnerable point on the Prussian coast was guarded. Before the expeditionary force assembled at Cherbourg could be embarked, it was needed for the defence of the capital; and even the ships' guns and crews had to be diverted to arm and man the forts of Paris. Though part of the fleet under Bouet-Willaumez sailed for Denmark and passed through the Great Belt, it effected nothing; the navy remained impotent throughout the war, and Moltke was very soon able to leave the protection of the coast to the Landwehr. By the end of July any idea of combining the two forces assembling in Alsace and Lorraine in an immediate offensive movement was abandoned; and, though the Emperor still attempted to direct the whole, the French army was virtually divided by the Vosges into separate commands. The first corps and a division of the seventh in Alsace, about 35,000 strong, were under Marshal Macmahon; while the Emperor immediately controlled the second, third, fourth, fifth and Guard corps, called the army of the Rhine, 128,000 men, scattered over Lorraine at and to the east of Metz. The sixth corps, 35,000 strong, at Châlons, formed the general reserve under Marshal Canrobert; the remainder of the seventh corps concentrating at Belfort to watch the exits from the Black Forest.

Meanwhile, the German armies, covered by detachments on the

frontier, and by a boldly handled cavalry, were steadily drawing near. Daring reconnaissances had brought information that the main French army was near the frontier in Lorraine about St Avold, and that northern Alsace was clear of the enemy. Moltke, foreseeing the possibility of the French advancing, and sufficiently confident of the ultimate result to avoid any unnecessary risk, decided to check the second army in order to reinforce it with the 63,000 men of the reserve. At the same time, the first corps and first cavalry division were directed to reinforce the first army, as it had become obvious that there was no immediate danger of a raid on the coast, and as the formation of the Landwehr divisions was far advanced. This measure of precaution enabled the second army to move through the wooded defiles of the Palatinate in battle array, and the first army to check an advance against the second.

The French cavalry, accustomed to act as a reserve upon the battlefield, and untrained to be the eyes and ears of the army, remained inactive. No certain information was available at the French headquarters, where confused rumours, resulting in contradictory orders, added to the existing chaos. Partly to clear up the situation, partly to appease the Empress and the Court party, who, judging the temper of France from that of the noisy mobs which thronged the Boulevards, demanded an instant invasion of Germany, the Emperor decided on a reconnaissance in force for August 2. Its execution was entrusted to Marshal Bazaine, who, besides his own corps, the third, had the second (Frossard) and the fifth (de Failly) under his orders. But even this operation could not be carried out in its entirety, and resolved itself into an advance on Saarbrücken by Frossard's corps, supported on its flanks by detachments from the other two. The day, famous as the *baptême de feu* of the young Prince Imperial, was otherwise only remarkable for the stubborn resistance offered by a detachment of the German eighth corps, consisting of one regiment, three squadrons, and a battery pushed forward on outpost duty to the Saar. This little party was forced to evacuate Saarbrücken, but was not pursued by Frossard, who could not move far from his depots for want of transport and supplies.

This blow in the air served only to confirm the information already received at the Prussian headquarters. To give time for the second army to come into line with the first, and to ensure the cooperation of the two in the expected battle, Moltke directed the first army to delay its march and to concentrate towards the second. At the same time, the Crown Prince Frederick was ordered at once to cross the frontier with the third army, to prevent any transfer of force from Alsace to Lorraine and to cover the left flank of the second army. Macmahon had meanwhile pushed forward two divisions to cover the junction of the first and seventh corps. One of these divisions, the second under General Abel Douay, rashly advanced to the very frontier, and occupied Weissenburg on August 3, where it was unconsciously in presence of the third army,

advancing to cross the Lauter between Weissenburg and Lauterburg. Douay was surprised in bivouac on the morning of August 4. He was himself killed; and his division escaped with difficulty and joined Macmahon in the neighbourhood of Wörth. The greater part of the Crown Prince's cavalry, being delayed because their line of march was crossed by columns of infantry hurrying forward to the sound of the guns, did not reach the battlefield till dusk. Hence all touch with the retreating enemy was lost. On August 5, the third army, groping for the vanished French, discovered Macmahon in position behind the Sulz and Sauer brooks in the neighbourhood of Wörth. There the French Marshal had collected the whole of the first corps, and had one division of the seventh corps within reach. On hearing of the rout at Weissenburg, the Emperor had definitely placed Macmahon in command of all the troops in Alsace, including the fifth corps (de Failly) then near Bitsch, but immediately afterwards drew half of one of de Failly's divisions to himself. De Failly, in face of conflicting orders, could only send one division to Wörth, which arrived too late to take part in the battle, while the greater part of the seventh corps was still in the neighbourhood of Belfort; so that Macmahon had only 32,000 infantry, 4850 cavalry, 107 field guns, and 24 mitrailleuses available. The Crown Prince had within reach the fifth and eleventh Prussian corps, the first and second Bavarian corps, and part of the Würtemberg division; in all, 72,000 infantry, 4280 cavalry, and 231 guns.

The outposts of the two armies were in touch on the night of the 5th, yet neither commander intended or anticipated a battle on the next day. Macmahon, vaguely informed of the enemy's strength, had planned an advance on the 7th; while the Crown Prince, whose army had scattered in its search for the enemy, leaving him unfavourably disposed for attack, proposed to pass the day in manœuvring preparatory to enveloping the enemy's flanks. When armies are in contact, commanders have but limited control of events. An affair of outposts early on August 6 involved the second Bavarian and fifth Prussian corps in an attack, which could not be broken off in accordance with the Crown Prince's wishes. Both these corps, particularly the fifth, suffered heavily in this premature attack; but the fire of a greatly superior artillery, effectively massed on the heights east of Wörth, swept away the head of every counter-attack. Though the Crown Prince arrived too late upon the scene to take up the reins of control effectively, and although the German attacks were generally disjointed, the principles of Prussian training triumphed. Each commander hurrying forward to the noise of battle threw his men into the fight where they were most needed. The French, fighting with desperate valour, were pressed back on both flanks by weight of numbers. About 3 p.m. part of the Würtemberg division appeared on the French right, and the first Bavarian corps came into action on their left. Macmahon, who had exhausted his reserves, and had no troops to meet

these new assailants, withdrew his shattered troops through the Vosges passes; the tardy appearance of one of de Failly's divisions enabling the retreat to be covered to some extent. In panic haste the beaten army streamed through the mountains by Saverne and Lunéville to Neufchâteau, which it reached on August 14. Thence they were sent by rail to Châlons, arriving on August 19, and were joined eventually by the remainder of the fifth and seventh corps, which had been drawn into an ignoble retreat without firing a shot.

The battle of Wörth had not merely cost the French some 7000 men killed and wounded, 4000 unwounded prisoners, 24 guns, and much material of war, but the right wing of the French army was utterly demoralised, and all this though circumstances combined to make the German pursuit singularly ineffective. A pursuit cannot be improvised when approaching darkness is adding to the confusion of a battlefield. The headquarters of the third army being unprepared for battle on August 6, the greater part of the cavalry was not within reach; when it did arrive, it was assumed that Macmahon would seek to rejoin the Emperor either towards Metz or towards Bitsch. The French Marshal's rapid retreat westwards enabled him to get away undiscovered. Nor was this the only penalty which the assailants paid for provoking an unpremeditated fight. They lost 489 officers, 10,150 men killed and wounded—nearly a third more than the vanquished—while more than half this loss fell on the fifth corps which had attacked unsupported.

While the south Germans in Alsace were thus proving to Europe that German unity rested on solid foundations, events had been moving fast in Lorraine. It had been Moltke's intention that the first and second armies should be concentrated behind the Saar on August 6, and that they should not cross the frontier until the third army had secured the eastern passes of the Vosges, and had obtained a firm grip of the enemy in Alsace. The commander of the first army, Steinmetz, was not fully informed of Moltke's plans, and only knew that a general offensive was proposed. On the news of Saarbrücken, his divisional and corps commanders had already sprung forward, like hounds straining at the leash, beyond the line appointed them, in order that they might act on the flank of any attempt to interfere with the second army. Prince Frederick Charles had pushed his advanced guards well to the front to cover his march through the Palatinate; and thus it happened that the left of the first army, which Steinmetz had seen no reason to check, was approaching Saarbrücken on August 6, while the leading troops of the right of the second army were making for the same place about half a day's march ahead of the remainder.

After the theatrical display of August 2, Frossard had remained with the second corps in the neighbourhood of Saarbrücken, and had made no use of the French cavalry for scouting. Ignorance of the enemy's doings bred nervousness, which was increased by the constant presence of hostile



vedettes, and the dark forests across the frontier were believed to conceal masses of Prussians. The news of Douay's disaster convinced Frossard that his position was too exposed; he therefore applied for and obtained permission to withdraw his corps to a defensive position which he had prepared on the Spicheren heights, east of Forbach; the movement being quietly carried out during the afternoon and night of August 5. That evening Napoleon, after much vacillation, came to the conclusion that the enemy intended an advance on Nancy, and decided to effect a junction with Macmahon by way of Saargemünd and Bitsch. The operation was not to begin until the 7th. Earlier in the day he had, while appointing Macmahon to the command in Alsace, placed the second, third and fourth corps under Bazaine "for military operations only," retaining in his own hands the Guard and sixth corps as a general reserve. Thus, on the night of August 5, Frossard was holding the ground about the Spicheren heights with one and a half divisions, one and a half divisions and the cavalry being in support near Forbach. He could, if necessary, be supported by 60,000 men, for the third corps was *echeloned* along the Saargemünd-St Avold road, on a radius of some ten miles from Spicheren; the fourth corps was 15 miles away at and east of Boulay; the Guard had come up to Courcelles, 28 miles off; one brigade of the fifth corps was at Saargemünd, the remainder were near Bitsch, preparing to join Macmahon. Frossard's retirement from Saarbrücken had been duly reported by the ever watchful German cavalry, the news serving only to confirm Steinmetz and his subordinates in their intention of pressing forward.

Early on the 6th the advanced cavalry of the second army drew the fire of the French outposts; but Frossard's position was wooded, his troops were well concealed, and there was nothing to show that the heights were occupied in strength. General von Kameke, the commander of the 14th division of the first army arriving with his first troops at Saarbrücken about midday, made up his mind that the French were retiring, and that he had only a rearguard in front of him. He was sure of support, for he had met General von Goeben, the commander of the eighth corps, who had ridden forward to see the situation for himself, and had undertaken to hurry forward his 16th division. The cavalry of the second army had also informed him that Alvensleben, who commanded the third corps, had been similarly employed and was bringing up the 5th division. Therefore, without hesitation, he sent the only infantry he had at hand—a single brigade—against one and a half divisions strongly entrenched. A resolute counter-attack must have swept the rash assailants from the field; but Frossard was away at Forbach, telegraphing to Bazaine; and, owing to that fatal lack of initiative, which was the curse of the French army throughout the campaign, the opportunity was let slip. The gallant Prussian brigade, storming forwards in spite of the loss of their general, carried and held

the Rotherberg, a bluff which marked the centre of the French position. But they were beaten off on both flanks, and were only able to maintain themselves by the successive arrival of the remaining brigade of the 14th division, and of the leading troops of the 16th and 5th divisions which were thrust into the fight wherever they were most needed. On his arrival, Frossard, impressed by the boldness of the first attacks, had ordered forward a division from his reserve; and at no time were the Germans in superior numbers. Indeed, a counter-attack, delivered by a brigade of this division of Frossard's reserve, was pressing them steadily back, when it died away, and the French began everywhere to retreat sullenly and in good order. The appearance of the 13th division of the eighth corps upon his left flank, as darkness was coming on, caused Frossard, fearing that his line of retreat might be cut, to withdraw from the battlefield, and decided the fortunes of the day.

Again the victors had to pay in killed and wounded more heavily than the vanquished, the Germans losing 4871, the French 4078 inclusive of about 1000 prisoners, taken mostly on the left flank late in the day. The French had in action 23,700 infantry, 72 field-guns, and 18 mitrailleuses; the Germans 26,500 infantry and 66 guns; but this superiority was not attained until the arrival of the 13th division upon the field. On the one side every available rifle and gun had been employed, and as successive reinforcements arrived the command changed hands, first from Kameke to Goeben, then to Zastrow, the commander of the seventh corps, and finally at nightfall to Steinmetz. On the other side 60,000 French infantry had remained passive throughout the day, within reach of the battlefield. Frossard, anxious to keep in touch with Bazaine, did not join his men till late in the day; Bazaine, equally anxious to keep in touch with the Emperor, did not appear at all. Had a like spirit animated the two armies, the Germans must have suffered a great disaster. The same causes as at Wörth prevented an effective pursuit; indeed, Moltke was so impressed by the seriousness of the danger which he had escaped that the next days were spent rather in consolidating the armies, the advanced troops of which had pressed far beyond the line intended, than in following up the advantage gained.

The victories of Wörth and Spicheren were not won by superior generalship or greater valour; they were the outcome of years of thoughtful study in the military cabinet and on the training ground. The bubble of French prestige was pricked; Alsace and Lorraine, with the exception of their fortresses, lay at the mercy of the invader; Italy, Austria, and Denmark had abandoned all thoughts of intervention; the expedition from Cherbourg to the North Sea was given up, and the marines were hastily called to the capital; though less than a third of their armies on the frontier had been engaged, a profound depression, from which they never recovered, affected the French troops. Vacillation and lack of forethought had exposed them piecemeal and ill-equipped to

an enemy, fired with unity of purpose, equipped and ready, though he did not boast of the fact, to the last button.

The French army, reeling from these staggering blows, everywhere fell back. On August 7 orders were issued for a general retirement behind the Moselle—undoubtedly the wisest course in the circumstances. But the stability of the Empire was too uncertain to admit of the military situation alone being considered. Paris, injured in its pride, demanded at the least a general engagement east of Metz. This fortress, far from being a support to the harassed Emperor, proved, like the field army, to be unprepared. The forts were not provisioned; many were not even completed. The Imperialist party succeeded in ousting the Ollivier Ministry on August 9, and replaced it by one of its own creatures, with Montauban, Count of Palikao, at its head. The new Ministers could not face the prospect of Metz falling into German hands; and it was decided to make a stand on the French Nied. This position, which had been laboriously entrenched, was found to be untenable. Fresh orders were issued to retire on Metz, where the greater part of the army was collected under the eastern forts on August 13. The marching and counter-marching consequent on these changes exhausted and demoralised the troops; and the army heard, with a feeling of relief and of hope, that Napoleon had at last recognised his own incompetence and had definitely handed over the command to Marshal Bazaine.

Meanwhile the cautious Moltke was bringing his armies together. With this end in view, the first army on the right was kept back, while the third army on the left threaded the difficult passes of the Vosges. The advance was slow, for the many *forts d'arrêt* in the frontier provinces had to be masked; the direction of Macmahon's retreat was doubtful; and Moltke, aware that he had as yet met in the field a bare third of the French army, was inclined to treat his adversary with respect. A force sent to surprise Strassburg failed in its object; the Baden division was therefore detached from the third army to invest the fortress; the Guard and first Landwehr divisions with a siege train were brought from Germany, and the investing forces (40,000 strong) were placed under the orders of General von Werder. Strassburg was no better prepared than Metz; a single line regiment was the only formed body in the garrison; but, by dint of strenuous effort, the French commander, General Uhrich, succeeded in forming a defending force of 23,000 men, composed of depot battalions, Gardes Mobiles, and Gardes Nationales, and of a number of refugees from Macmahon's army. This motley force was handled with such energy that Werder, after a futile attempt to frighten the town into surrender, was compelled to begin regular siege operations.

On August 13 the first German army, on the right, had reached the French Nied; the advanced guard of the second army had secured the important bridge over the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson; while the leading

columns of the third army were approaching Nancy and Lunéville. Bazaine, on taking over the command, gave up the idea of defending the line of the Moselle, and ordered a retreat on Verdun. Additional bridges were thrown over the Moselle in Metz; but the river, coming down in flood, swept them away; the retreat could not be begun until August 14, and even then was greatly delayed by the congestion in the town. Thus, on the morning of August 14, a great part of the French army was still in position east of Metz, covering the retirement. As the day wore on and the lumbering baggage trains cleared the town, division after division quietly fell back on the bridges. This movement was observed by the advanced guard of the seventh corps of the first army, under Baron von der Goltz, who, like Kameke at Spicheren, dashed forward to hold the retiring enemy to his ground. He was met near Colombey by Bazaine's old corps, the third, now under Decaen, and eventually also by the fourth, under Ladmirault. The battle was not begun until 4 p.m.; and the lateness of the hour prevented a German concentration before dark. The French, everywhere in superior numbers, held their own, withdrawing under cover of night in accordance with their original orders. The encounter did not appreciably delay the French retreat, which was hindered by the encumbered roads in their rear rather than by any action of the enemy. The Germans lost close on 5000 killed and wounded, the French about 4000, Bazaine being slightly and Decaen mortally wounded.

While this combat was raging to the east of Metz, more decisive events were taking place to the south and west. The 5th cavalry division of the second army, crossing the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, pressed forward in a north-westerly direction on to the Verdun road. On August 15 the division came into contact with three French cavalry divisions near Vionville and Rezonville; but the French horsemen, waiting for their infantry to close up, made no serious attempt to drive back their weaker opponents, who established themselves south of Mars-la-Tour, nearer to Verdun than the French, and within striking distance of the main road. By that evening the tenth German corps was across the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson and the third at Novéant; thus the French retreat was already seriously compromised, though Prince Frederick Charles wrongly believed the enemy to be well on his way to the shelter of the Meuse. A general advance of the second army was ordered for August 10, in the hopes of catching the French before they reached that river, two corps only, the tenth and third, being directed on to the Verdun road. In point of fact, none of Bazaine's troops lay west of the French cavalry, which had been met by the 5th cavalry division. The conduct of the retreat of an army, in touch with an active and enterprising enemy, through the congested streets of a town, is perhaps the most difficult problem of war which a staff can be called upon to solve. Bazaine, suddenly placed in charge of a tottering

organisation, unaware even of the exact positions of his troops, could not issue the detailed instructions which a vicious training had taught the army to expect. Only two main roads, those from Metz to Doncourt and to Mars-la-Tour, were available for the retreat; and not till the night of August 15 did the leading infantry gain touch with the cavalry, which had passed the day about Vionville, while the tail of the army was still toiling wearily through Metz.

At daybreak on August 16 the Emperor decided to quit the army, and drove off to Verdun by the northern road, shortly before the guns of the German cavalry opened one of the most remarkable battles of the war. Bazaine, ignorant of his peril, had decided not to move till the afternoon, so as to allow his rear divisions to close up; his patrols from Vionville, trotting out for a mile or two after daylight, had come in reporting that no enemy was near; when suddenly, about 9 a.m., shells burst in the camp from German batteries, which appeared to have sprung from the ground. The cavalry retired pell-mell behind the shelter of Frossard's corps (the second), encamped in front of Rezonville, and the daring gunners, following them up, dropped their shell among the infantry tents. These were the artillery of the 5th cavalry division, which had been directed by Voigts-Rhetz, the commander of the tenth corps, to reconnoitre towards Rezonville, while he moved, in accordance with Prince Frederick Charles' orders, westwards in search of the enemy, believed to be retiring on the Meuse. The 5th cavalry division was almost immediately supported by the 6th and by the leading infantry of the third corps marching on Vionville. General von Alvensleben, the commander of this corps, on arriving on the scene, decided at once to attack. He had barely 30,000 men under his orders, while in front of him, though he did not know it, lay nearly the whole army of the Rhine. A cavalry brigade and Frossard's second corps had already been met; behind them at Rezonville lay the greater part of Canrobert's sixth corps, which had joined the army at Metz on the 13th from Châlons. A little further back at Gravelotte were the Guard and the reserve cavalry, in all some 70,000 men. To the north on the Doncourt road was Lebeuf who had succeeded Decaen in the command of the third corps, while Ladmirault with the fourth corps was coming up from Metz. Thus some 60,000 more Frenchmen were within reach.

Then followed a soldiers' battle, in which the decisive factor was the moral condition of the two armies. Confident in themselves and in their leaders, the German troops pressed forward without thought of the odds; doubt and hesitation prevailed in the French ranks. The French advanced troops were hustled out of Vionville and Flavigny; Frossard's corps fighting stubbornly was pushed back on Rezonville. Here Canrobert's sixth corps checked the triumphant enemy, who, obliged continually to extend his front to meet French reinforcements coming up, now from Doncourt, now from Gravelotte, had to throw his last infantry

reserves into the fight. It was now about 2 p.m.; the tenth German corps was still some distance from the field; and Alvensleben was grimly struggling to hold what he had won. A resolute advance must have reopened the French line of retreat. But Bazaine, who had just arrived upon the field, having narrowly escaped capture in a cavalry skirmish, was not the man to be resolute in adversity. He was in two minds; without definitely giving up the retreat on Verdun, he became suddenly anxious about his communications with Metz, and moved a great part of his precious reserve, which should have been supporting Canrobert, to the left where it remained comparatively inactive. Canrobert, with greater firmness, finding Lebœuf's corps coming up on his right and the enemy's fire slackening, ordered an advance to retake Vionville. The French divisions were seen by Alvensleben deploying in front of Rezonville. To meet the attack he had only eight squadrons of cavalry under General von Bredow. It was vital to gain time for the tenth corps to come up; and the cavalry were sent on a mission no less desperate but more useful than that of the Light Brigade at Balaklava. Straight at and through Canrobert's division rode these splendid troopers, bringing the French movement to a standstill before it had well begun, but at a cost of more than half the number of those who started on this famous death-ride. The charge was the turning-point of the battle. Detachments from the seventh, eighth, and ninth corps, crossing the Moselle, enabled Alvensleben to hold his own on his right. His left was indeed pressed back for a time by the arrival of parts of the third and fourth French corps; but these were in turn checked on the long-expected appearance of the tenth German corps. Prince Frederick Charles, arriving about 4 p.m., took over the command, and by hard fighting was enabled to hold his ground, till darkness gave relief to his exhausted men.

Neither side could claim any marked tactical success; the losses, about 16,000 on either side, were equal; but the moral and strategical advantages won by the Germans at Vionville and Mars-la-Tour were decisive. A French army of 130,000 men, glad to have held their own against an enemy barely half as numerous, abandoned the idea of the retreat to the Meuse. On August 17 this retreat was still possible by the northern roads; but the attraction of Metz was irresistible, and Bazaine ordered the army to fall back on a strong position west and north-west of the fortress. He alleged that the number of wounded, the state of the troops, and the want of ammunition and supplies left him no choice. That the army should have fallen into this condition, almost within sight of a great depot, shows how deeply the canker of disorganisation had eaten into the French military system.

The French movement was carried out without interference; and by nightfall on the 17th the army of the Rhine was in position. On the left, under the shadow of the great fort of Plappeville, lay Frossard with the second corps; Lebœuf with the third corps extended the line northwards;

next came Ladmirault with the fourth corps about Amanvillers, Canrobert with the sixth corps held the right at St Privat, with his flank extended and thrown slightly back to Roncourt; behind Frossard, on the glacis of Plappeville, Bazaine himself took position with the Guard corps as his general reserve—clear proof that his thoughts were still centred on maintaining touch with Metz.

Moltke had meantime been planning to reap the fruits of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour. The whole of the first army, and the second were within reach except the fourth corps, which was making a dash at Toul; and the reinforcing second corps, which was advancing by forced marches from Germany to the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson. The events of the 16th had shown that the army of the Rhine was west of the Moselle; therefore only the first corps and some cavalry were left to watch Metz from the east; the seventh, eighth and ninth corps were brought up on the right of the tenth and third corps, which remained in their positions at Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, while the Guard and twelfth corps extended the left of the third corps west of Mars-la-Tour. At nightfall on the 17th about 140,000 men were in line parallel to the Metz-Mars-la-Tour road. The second corps which had reached Pont-à-Mousson, and the fourth approaching Toul, formed a connecting link with the third army, which was at and beyond Nancy. The seventh and eighth corps had, in order to reach their positions on the German right, to make a flank march within striking distance of the Metz forts. It was essential to the safety of the movement that no dashing subordinate should bring on a premature engagement, such as had hitherto heralded every battle of the war. Stringent orders were issued from headquarters and were only too literally obeyed. The cavalry of the tenth and third corps were exhausted by their glorious efforts of the day before; but the fresh squadrons within call were not energetically handled, and the French were allowed to slip away not only unmolested but unobserved. At daybreak on the 18th, Moltke was still uncertain whether Bazaine had resumed his retreat to the Meuse by the northern roads, or had fallen back on Metz. But he was ready for either contingency, and his orders for August 18 directed the second army to move northwards to Doncourt, while the seventh and eighth corps of the first army covered the movement from any interference from Metz. If the enemy were in retreat, the second army could fasten on their rear till the first army came up in support; if he had elected to stand north of Metz, the second army pivoting on the first would wheel round to the right and envelop his right flank.

Soon after daybreak on the 18th the German corps were in motion; but still there was no certain information of the enemy, and it was not until 10.30 a.m. that Moltke knew that the French were in position and meant to fight. Even then he believed the enemy's right flank to be at Montigny, south of Amanvillers, a point actually at about the centre of

the line. In accordance with his plan the great wheel to the right began; pivoting on the seventh corps, the eighth, ninth, Guard and twelfth corps successively moved round, the tenth and third corps following in support. Thus the two armies were about to meet, each facing towards its own capital—a situation which meant disaster to the vanquished.

The battle of Gravelotte was opened prematurely about noon by the artillery of the ninth corps, which was unable to resist the temptation to shell Ladmirault's camp, where on the high ground south of Amanvillers the French could be seen quietly preparing their dinners. The position of the guns being too exposed, the infantry of the ninth corps had to be brought into the fight, and the battle began in earnest. Moltke had issued orders to hold the fiery Steinmetz in check until the second army had had time to envelop the enemy's right; but, believing this flank to be some miles south of its actual position, he now allowed the artillery of the seventh and eighth corps to become engaged. Steinmetz, anxious that the ninth corps should not be left without support, exceeded his instructions, and sent forward his infantry against the French left under Frossard, who held what was naturally the strongest part of a position, which he had skilfully strengthened by defensive works. After some two hours of hard fighting, the attack appeared to be making good progress; and Steinmetz, under the impression that the enemy was yielding, ordered a column of cavalry and guns to advance and confirm the success he imagined he had won. But Frossard's main position was unshaken; his men turned a deadly fire upon the helpless horsemen, crowded in a ravine, which ran in front of the French lines, and thus caused, about 4.30 p.m., something like a panic among the Germans in that part of the field.

Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles, moving with the Guard and twelfth corps behind the ninth corps, which was struggling desperately to make some impression upon Ladmirault, reached the village of Ste Marie aux Chènes, opposite St Privat, about 3.30 p.m., only to find that the flank, for which the Germans had been groping all day, stretched some two miles further north. The twelfth corps was accordingly sent to make a yet wider detour, while, partly to cover this movement, partly to assist the hard-pressed ninth corps, the Guards were moved to the attack; but, finding no cover in the open ground in front of St Privat, and advancing in too dense a formation, they suffered terrible loss, 7951 men falling killed or wounded, the greater part in one short half-hour. The remnant of the devoted corps disdaining to give ground, clung to what they had won, until the twelfth Saxon corps at last appeared, driving before it Canrobert's extreme right. By a combined attack of Saxons and Guards, St Privat, already in flames, was carried at the bayonet's point, and the French right was crumpled up. Ladmirault's corps, involved in the ruin of Canrobert's, gave way,



darkness and the tardy arrival of part of the French Guard alone stopping the weary pursuers. Though their right had suffered a disastrous defeat, the French centre and left had repulsed all attacks. A division of the second German corps had been hurried forward to support Steinmetz; and, on its arrival, a renewed attempt was made to carry Frossard's lines, with the object of preventing reinforcements being sent to Canrobert. This attack met with no better success than the former; and at nightfall the French in this part of the field had more than held their own. The battle of Gravelotte had, however, been won and lost, as Moltke had foreseen, on the other flank. There were many anxious hearts at the royal headquarters during the afternoon, but through it all Moltke had awaited the result with quiet confidence. Bazaine had altogether underestimated the strength of Frossard's position. Deceived by mere demonstrations against the town and by Steinmetz' fierce attacks, he was deaf to appeals from Ladmirault and Canrobert, and kept his reserves behind his left six miles from the point where the issue of the day was decided. Absorbed in the events on his left, he considered that he had at last succeeded in baffling the enemy, until late in the evening, when he received the news of the disaster to his right. Thereupon he issued orders to the army of the Rhine to retire under the guns of Metz, whose shelter they were never to leave again except as prisoners of war. On the German side about 200,000 men were engaged; on the French about 140,000. The German losses in killed and wounded amounted to 20,584 men, those of the French to about 13,000, besides 5000 prisoners.

On August 19, the fact that the army of the Rhine had fallen back on the forts surrounding Metz, and was holding positions which could not be carried by assault, was known to Moltke. The original plan of campaign had contemplated that, while the armies advanced to Paris, Metz should be masked by a Landwehr division, which was already approaching. The new situation demanded a reorganisation of the armies, which was at once undertaken. The whole of the first army, and the second, third, ninth and tenth corps of the second army, with the Landwehr division, were formed into an army of investment, 175,000 strong, under Prince Frederick Charles. From the remainder of the second army (the Guard, the fourth and twelfth corps), the army of the Meuse was created, and placed under the Crown Prince of Saxony. Thus, with the third army, 240,000 men were available for the advance on the French capital. The third army and fourth corps had reached the Meuse on August 19, and were there halted to enable the new army to come up. On August 22 a general advance was begun on Châlons, where troops were believed to be collecting.

When the Emperor drove into Châlons from the battlefield of Mars-la-Tour on August 16, he found there the twelfth corps, which had been formed of troops from the Spanish frontier, a division of

marines from the expeditionary force, and some newly formed regiments; also one infantry division, the cavalry and half the artillery of Canrobert's corps which had been unable to get through to Metz, and some Gardes Mobiles from Paris. During the next few days the refugees from Wörth and the fifth corps arrived, while the seventh corps was on its way from Belfort. Macmahon was directed to form an army, to be called the army of Châlons, out of this collection of units. The material was not promising; many of the regular units were in a state of demoralisation, while the Parisian Gardes Mobiles were openly insubordinate, and had to be sent back to the capital. Of the machinery that makes an army an effective weapon of war part was totally lacking, the rest wofully deficient. Yet something had to be done, for the third German army was already across the Meuse, and there was no time for hesitation.

Macmahon was for leading the army back to Paris, where a thirteenth corps was being formed, and where, with the immense resources of all France upon which to draw, he would have more time for organisation. The Emperor agreed; but the Empress and Palikao had still to be reckoned with. A despatch from Bazaine after Mars-la-Tour had reached Paris, in which he announced that, after replenishing his supply columns, he intended to march west. If Macmahon were to fall back, the Paris mob might construe the movement to be an abandonment of the army of the Rhine; and in that event the Empress did not care to face the consequences. Macmahon, in perplexity, proposed a compromise. It was clearly impossible to remain at Châlons with the army incomplete in every detail, while the enemy were fast approaching. So, on the 21st the camp was abandoned in haste; immense accumulations of stores were burnt; and a move was made to Reims. Here the seventh corps joined the army by rail, bringing its strength up to 150,000 men organised in four corps. At Reims Macmahon was in a position to act against the flank of a direct advance on Paris, and could still stretch out a hand to Bazaine, if opportunity offered. The state of the troops which had last arrived confirmed Macmahon in his intention to move on Paris. Orders to this effect were issued, but, on the 22nd, another dubiously worded despatch arrived from Bazaine, giving details of Gravelotte, and announcing his intention to break out towards Châlons, by Montmédy, or if that were not possible, by Sedan. Macmahon inferred that Bazaine was about to start, and reluctantly and with full knowledge of the danger, ordered the fatal march to the Meuse, which was to lead to the downfall of the Empire. If the army moved swiftly and secretly, it might be possible to get round the right of the army of the Meuse before the third army could come up; but the condition of the troops, and of the supply and transport services, upon which the mobility of armies depends even more than upon the marching powers of the men, gave little promise of swiftness, while the want of a numerous caval-

trained to keep prying eyes at a distance warranted small hope of secrecy. In brief, a hastily organised, ill-equipped, and half-demoralised force was attempting the desperate venture of a flank march between the enemy and the Belgian frontier, on the ground that Bazaine might be doing something, and could not, if he were, be left without support.

Fortune at first favoured Macmahon; the German headquarters, well aware of the condition of the army of the Rhine, could not believe that the French would uncover the capital and risk their last field army in a forlorn hope. The lines of march of great armies are not to be lightly altered. Ill-considered changes throw into confusion the immense trains toiling painfully in the rear, and, as many a luckless Frenchman had found, entail hardships no less severe than the loss of a battle. So, not until the evening of August 28, when news from London had confirmed the reports of the cavalry, did Moltke direct a movement northwards to intercept the rash enemy. The army of Châlons had thus gained three days; but already the intendance was breaking down, and in three days the army had only reached the Aisne, barely 25 miles on its way. Still the position was not hopeless. Macmahon expected Bazaine to break out to the north-west, and hoped to join him near Montmédy. To do this he had to cross the Meuse near Stenay or Mouzon; for the Belgian frontier bends to the south near Montmédy, and he would have been cramped for room, had he crossed lower down.

On the evening of August 25, the right of the army of Châlons was some twelve miles nearer Stenay than was the right of the army of the Meuse. The Germans were still uncertain of the enemy's movements, and had to execute a difficult change of direction. The next few days altered the situation decisively. On the 26th an encounter with a strong body of German cavalry on the right flank caused unwarranted alarm; and the 27th, on which day the first German troops occupied Stenay, was spent in moving the rest of the army to the assistance of the seventh corps which was on the right. The events of this day once more convinced Macmahon of the hopelessness of his task, and orders were issued for a retreat. But during the night vigorous protests arrived from Paris, whence Palikao telegraphed, "If you desert Bazaine, there will be a revolution in Paris." Macmahon preferred the probability of defeat and capture, if he advanced, to the certainty of slander and disgrace if he retired. The counter-orders produced more than ordinary confusion, and the army gained little more than ten miles on the 28th, on which day the twelfth Saxon corps held the Meuse at and south of Stenay, while the remaining German corps were fast approaching from the south. Macmahon moved northwards to seek a crossing lower down the river, leaving the fifth corps under de Failly to cover the movement. This corps had a skirmish with the advanced guard of the Saxons on the 29th, yet allowed itself to be surprised next day a few miles further north, near Beaumont.

On the morning of the 30th the head of the third German army had, by splendid marching, come up with the army of the Meuse. The German line stretched from Stenay on the Meuse to Vougières on the Aisne, down which river the eleventh corps and three cavalry divisions were marching to cut off Macmahon, should he try to fall back westwards. Six corps could be concentrated for a battle, a seventh corps, the sixth, was following half a march in rear. Thus the net was already spread, and, as it was drawn together, the French were pressed back on the Meuse. August 31 found their army hemmed into a triangle with sides about four miles in length. The base, with the town of Sedan in its centre, was formed by the Meuse, which was swollen by rains. Lines of hills skirted by streams formed the sides, and furnished natural ramparts strengthened by well-built villages, positions capable of a stubborn defence, but with the cardinal defect that they were everywhere encircled by heights, which afforded unlimited opportunity for the employment of an overwhelming artillery.

Within this triangle many anxious conferences were held. Macmahon was above all desirous of getting the Emperor away to safety; but Napoleon III, sick in body and broken in spirit, a passive spectator of the miseries of his troops, not permitted to return to his capital, whence orders were issued of which he disapproved, and left with nothing but the honour of a great name, preferred to remain and suffer with his men. As to the future, the French Marshal had no very definite idea. The most pressing need was a day's rest for the troops, which were arranged rather with a view to holding off the enemy than to accepting a decisive battle. Macmahon did not grasp the extent of his danger, for he had not learned that lesson in tactics which September 1 was to make clear to the military world. Till then it had always been believed that it was only necessary to mass sufficient force, and to drive it home with determination, to be certain of breaking through any hostile position. In this war breech-loader was meeting breech-loader for the first time, and long-range field artillery was first employed. Few, if any, had perceived the power of resistance which the increase of range, accuracy, and rate of fire had conferred on an attenuated line, or the deadly effect of converging fire whether in attack or defence. Macmahon did not conceive it possible that Bazaine could be held in by a less numerous foe; and, believing the strength of the enemy in front of him to be exaggerated, he considered that he could break through at will, if his adversary were rash enough to attempt to surround him.

During the 31st General de Wimpffen, a *protégé* of Palikao, joined the army to replace de Failly in command of the fifth corps, with a brevet from the Minister appointing him Macmahon's successor in the event of any accident to the Marshal. On the same day a thirteenth French corps, which had been organised at Paris under General Vinoy, and moved by rail to the front, was directed by Macmahon to halt at

Mezières, a clear indication of his intention to retreat on that place. The German plans were simple and consisted in an enveloping movement by two corps against each of the sides of the French triangle, covered from any movement from Mezières by two cavalry divisions, and the Württemberg division. The first Bavarian corps was to attack the village of Bazeilles at the foot of the eastern face, while two corps remained on the left bank opposite Sedan in second line. The Bavarians opened the battle during the afternoon of the 31st, and, resuming it at daylight the next morning, carried the village after a fierce fight by 10 a.m., by which hour the two corps operating against the eastern face had developed their attack, and established a long line of guns on the heights behind them. During the fight at Bazeilles Macmahon was severely wounded, and handed over the command to Ducrot. The latter, impressed with the danger of the situation, ordered a retreat on Mezières; but the movement had scarce begun when de Wimpffen, producing his nomination from his pocket, countermanded it, after a fierce wrangle with Ducrot, and directed the army to break out eastwards towards Montmédy.

While the French generals were quarrelling, the Germans, methodically deploying battery after battery, crowned the heights west, south, and east with a circle of iron, which poured a ceaseless rain of shell into the ever narrowing space in front of the advancing infantry. Overwhelmed by artillery fire, de Wimpffen's efforts on the east were meeting with scant success, when his attention was called to a more pressing danger on the west. Here Douay's corps, attacked by two German corps, was in great peril; and it became necessary to counter-march troops to his assistance across ground swept by the German guns. Still the pressure on the western face was not relieved; and, as a last desperate throw, the cavalry were called up to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Five regiments of cavalry under General Marguerite charged home again and again, riding through the enemy's skirmishers, only to be swept back by the unshaken fire of the supports. Three generals and nearly half of those brave horsemen fell killed or wounded on the field. The splendid and hopeless gallantry of the attempt made it a fitting climax for the death-throes of an empire. Soon afterwards, the eastern and western attacks, uniting near the apex of the triangle, completed the pitiless circle which fenced in the unlucky army of Châlons; and by the Emperor's order the white flag was hoisted over Sedan. Macmahon's force had ceased to exist. No less than 81,000 officers and men, including the Emperor and a Marshal of France, surrendered as prisoners of war; while during the battle 21,000 had been captured, 3000 killed, and 14,000 wounded. The German losses amounted to 8960 men.

While the army of Châlons was struggling into the trap which Moltke had set, Bazaine, lost in the fog of war, uncertain whither Macmahon was moving, or whether he was moving at all, but possessed

with a vague desire to do something, was tapping in half-hearted fashion at the lines which Prince Frederick Charles was daily drawing closer round Metz. After an ineffective demonstration on August 26, it was decided, on August 30, when definite news of Macmahon's march had come through the German lines, to make a serious attempt to break out on the right bank of the Moselle and to move northwards on Thionville. But Bazaine's staff was not equal to the task; columns crossed each other; delays, orders, and counter-orders produced vacillation when decision was imperative; the attack could not be developed till late in the afternoon of August 31. Superior numbers enabled the French to gain some minor successes in the direction of Noisseville during the evening and night; but the dawn of September 1 showed German columns hurrying forward from all points to strengthen the threatened portion of the line of investment; and by midday Bazaine had abandoned the attempt, and retired under cover of the forts.

Down to this time, Bazaine does not appear to have grasped the fact that he was besieged. He still looked upon his troops as a field army, which, kept intact, might, by threatening the German communications, have a decisive influence on the course of the campaign. He had not doubted his power to break through the German lines; he was rather obsessed by the difficulty of maintaining his army without a base when he did break through. He was even more in the dark than Macmahon as to the effect of modern inventions upon tactics. It was a revelation to him that the breech-loader would enable a small body to hold out against greatly superior numbers, while the telegraph, spreading instantly the news of attack, brought at speed to the threatened point reinforcements which, thanks again to the busy brain of the inventor, could carry sufficient sustenance to make them for a time at least independent of the heavy trains which more than all else fetter the movements of armies. Nor were the French Marshals alone in this condition of ignorance; the people of Paris, soon in their turn to be shut in by a thin circle of iron, spoke loudly of treason as the sole explanation of the astounding failure of their leaders, spreading distrust throughout the country, accustomed to draw inspiration from the capital. Indeed, the events of the month of August, 1870, culminating in the stupendous catastrophe of Sedan, had set all Europe agape with wonder. Within one short month the whole of the regular army which a great military empire had sent forth to meet the foe had been dispersed, put *hors de combat*, taken prisoners, or closely invested. Few even among the most thoughtful remembered that the grandsons of the men of Jena were much as their grandfathers had been, that the German was not irresistible, that the Frenchman was still brave, that a Colossus had not sprung fully armed from Moltke's brain—but that the weapon of war, which they saw used to such effect, had been slowly and painfully forged by men of like passions with themselves.

The immediate result of the capture of the Emperor and the destruction of the Imperial Army at Sedan was a bloodless revolution in Paris, on September 4. The Empress and Palikao fled to England; and a Provisional Government of National Defence was formed in Paris under the Presidency of General Trochu, with Jules Favre, Gambetta, Arago, Grévy, and Rochefort as members. Such a Government could not be other than Republican; but an appeal was made to all parties to unite in the defence of the country, while a pledge was given that the nation should have an opportunity of deciding between the claimants to power when the foe was driven from the land. Paris became the natural centre of further resistance; surrounded on two sides by deep rivers, encircled by an inner line of ramparts and an outer one of detached forts, the great city was capable of a stout defence. After Gravelotte, armies of workmen had been employed in strengthening the defences, and stores had been hurried in, to supplement the already large accumulation of supplies; for Paris had been designated as the main base of the armies operating on the eastern frontier. Of regular troops there were the thirteenth corps, which Vinoy had cleverly withdrawn from Mezières, the fourteenth corps, which had just been formed in the capital, and a number of marines, sailors, gendarmes and police—in all about 80,000 men, and in addition 115,000 Gardes Mobiles and 100,000 Gardes Nationales. Heavy guns and ammunition had been brought from the fleet and coast fortresses; and the forts were on the whole well armed.

At the German headquarters there had been no hesitation as to the next step. In France, more than in any country in Europe, the capital represented the country. The capture of Paris would be the best guarantee of a satisfactory treaty of peace. As soon then as arrangements had been made for the disposal of the prisoners of Sedan, and the supply system of the armies, somewhat disorganised by the sudden wheel to the north to intercept Macmahon, had been disentangled, the advance on the capital began. By September 19 the line of investment had been completed with trifling opposition. On this day and the next Jules Favre was engaged in negotiations with Bismarck, to discover what terms the Germans would concede; but, the Provisional Government having decided not to yield a stone of the fortresses or an inch of territory, these ended abruptly, and both sides prepared to continue the war.

In spite of the overwhelming successes already won, the task before the German leaders was full of difficulties. The detachments required for the various sieges, to protect the lines of communication, and to conduct the numerous prisoners back to Germany, the losses in battle, the ravages of sickness, had all greatly reduced the strength of the army. Not more than 147,000 men were at first available to hold an *enceinte* of over fifty miles, and to cover the investment from possible interruption. The capture of Toul and Strassburg at the end of September relieved the strain by setting free the besiegers, and by

opening direct railway communication with Germany; but by the beginning of October it had become evident that the war was entering on a new and, to the Germans, a most unpleasant phase.

Hitherto, the people of the invaded provinces, being for the most part out of touch with the Imperial army, had treated the war as the affair of the soldiers, and, with the object of easing their burdens, met the enemy's demands more than half-way. In the first weeks of the war, the German cavalry patrols found little difficulty in obtaining information; small foraging parties, entering towns and villages, often found that obsequious mayors had anticipated their requisitions. But the defeats of Gravelotte and Sedan and the investment of Paris had stirred France from coast to coast. An appeal issued by the Provisional Government, calling on the whole able-bodied population to cooperate in the defence of their native land, met with a ready response. The cavalry of the armies besieging Metz and Paris found it increasingly difficult to obtain supplies; patrols were attacked by assailants who disappeared as rapidly as they had appeared; the escorting of convoys, which had at first been an almost unnecessary precaution, became a dangerous and arduous duty. The German cavalry, shy of venturing far from support, failed to obtain information, and rumours took its place—rumours of levies in the north about Amiens, in the south about Besançon and Lyons, above all, rumours of preparations on a large scale in the valley of the Loire. Till now the checking of information and the classification of reports had been carried by the German staff almost to the stage of an exact science, for the organisation of the French army was known to the smallest detail. From the capture of a few prisoners wearing a particular button, the whereabouts of the regiment, brigade, and corps to which they belonged could be accurately deduced with the aid of a little corroborative evidence. The strength of the corps in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, even the names of the commanders and staffs, and their idiosyncrasies, were known. But nothing was known about the organisation of the new formations springing up round the beleaguered capital: there were no data to which reports could be referred. The machine-like regularity with which the advance to Paris had been conducted became impossible; blows were struck in the air; the German commanders, still inspired with the desire to meet and defeat the enemy's forces in the field, now discovered that the finding of an army to defeat was their chief difficulty.

Fortunately for them, the immense resources of France had not been organised for war; though the Provisional Government had done much in the short time at its disposal. After the investment of Paris there remained of regular units, outside the besieged fortresses, but twelve battalions of infantry, nine regiments of cavalry, and a single complete battery of artillery. There were, in addition, a large number of depot companies, which had been collected after Gravelotte into *regiments*



*de marche*, of men who had not joined at the outbreak of the war, of untrained or partially trained men, and of men who had escaped from the early battles. Behind these there were the Garde Mobile, scattered throughout France, more than 600,000 strong; some 40,000 *Francs tireurs* or irregulars formed in small bodies under local leaders; and the Garde Nationale, strengthened and vivified by the accession of all able-bodied males not otherwise employed who were willing to strike a blow in defence of their country; of these last, there were not less than 700,000, used chiefly in the defence of their own districts. Of arms there was no lack, and deficiencies could be readily supplied, through the Atlantic and western channel ports, by purchase from abroad. But of trained leaders there were few, and of those supply and transport services, which give life to armies, none.

The Provisional Government had despatched a delegation to Tours to organise resistance in the provinces, and had selected the valley of the Loire as the chief centre of activity; Lille in the north, Rouen in the north-west, Alençon in the west, and Besançon in the south, being other centres of organisation. By the end of September little had been done beyond the partial organisation of a fifteenth corps at Tours, which had been placed under the command of the veteran general, de La Motte Rouge, with vague instructions to do something, and that quickly. He accordingly drew his forces towards Orleans and sent his cavalry, supported by some infantry, northwards through the town towards Paris. On October 5 this body met, and pushed back to Étampes, within thirty miles of the capital, the 4th German cavalry division. The German headquarters staff, already somewhat uneasy at the extent of their commitments, saw in the movement the beginning of a general offensive on the part of the forces known to be assembling in the Loire valley. General von der Tann, with the first Bavarian corps, was accordingly directed to cover the besiegers from the threatened advance; and later, as the French showed no sign of advancing, the 22nd division was added to his force, and he was ordered to advance and occupy Orleans. The fifteenth French corps was anything but ready for the offensive; and, though the men fought bravely on the defensive, they were badly led, so that von der Tann, after some stiff fighting, succeeded in occupying Orleans on October 11.

Meantime, an event destined to have a far-reaching effect on the course of the campaign had taken place. On October 7 Léon Gambetta escaped in a balloon from Paris and reached Tours on October 9. Alone of the members of the Provisional Government, Gambetta saw clearly that Paris was but a small part of France; he alone appreciated the potentialities of the immense resources of the nation as a whole. Aided by de Freycinet, a young civil engineer, he succeeded in inspiring the provinces of France with his own fiery patriotism. Endowed with a genius for organisation and an extraordinary capacity for work, he

created in the short space of six weeks an army of 180,000 men, lacking only the discipline and training which no human power could improvise. So early as October 25, Gambetta, who had replaced de La Motte Rouge by General d'Aurelle de Paladines, agreed with the latter that an advance should be made on Orleans, with the object of capturing that town and forming there an entrenched camp within which an army could be assembled to raise the siege of Paris. For this operation, 120,000 men were already available, while von der Tann, still in Orleans, had not more than 20,000. D'Aurelle de Paladines' advance was delayed by the ominous news that on October 27 Bazaine had capitulated, and that the 200,000 besiegers of Metz were hurrying forward to relieve the pressure on the armies round Paris. Gambetta, however, insisted that the programme agreed upon should be carried out. Accordingly, on November 9, von der Tann was attacked near Coulmiers, a few miles south-west of Orleans, borne back by weight of numbers after a fierce struggle, and compelled to evacuate the city. The recently organised French troops were in no condition to undertake protracted operations, and a proposal to follow up the success by an advance on Paris was abandoned in favour of the original plan. The French troops, therefore, prepared defensive positions north of Orleans.

The activity of General Fiereck, who had collected in the west a force of Gardes Nationales, Gardes Mobiles and Francs tireurs, had already caused the German leaders serious anxiety. Incapable of sustained operations in the field, but admirably handled as guerillas, these troops continuously harassed their enemy, who was never able to discover their strength or their intentions. It was therefore decided, even before d'Aurelle de Paladines advanced, to reinforce von der Tann by a division of cavalry and by one of infantry, and to place the whole under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. When the news of Coulmiers and of the loss of Orleans arrived, there was serious talk of raising the siege; and kits were actually packed in the headquarters staff. It had not been supposed at first that Paris would stand a regular siege; but now, when there were no signs of surrender after six weeks of investment, it became necessary to form and bring up a siege-train from Germany, and to arrange for reinforcements for the attenuated line of circumvallation, against which a sortie in force was daily expected. Efforts were made to check the spread of guerilla warfare, the chief bane of the German leaders, by an organised system of reprisals. Villages and towns were fired without mercy, and even given over to pillage for a stated period, while the leading inhabitants were taken as hostages and shot, when attacks were made by guerillas in their vicinity. By the end of October the strain on the German resources had become very severe, but the capitulation of Metz (October 27) brought a welcome relief. Of the troops thus set free—the first and second armies—the former were directed to move on Rouen and Amiens, and to deal with

the French troops gathering in Normandy and Picardy; the latter, to cover the siege of Paris from the army of the Loire. Immediately after the fall of Strassburg, Werder had pushed through the Vosges towards the Upper Seine, with a view to covering the German communications from the troops which Cr  mer was known to be assembling about Besan  on, assisted by Garibaldi, who had come to the aid of the Republic, and was raising a force of irregulars at D  le. By the end of October Werder had occupied Dijon; and, during the first week of November, a detachment of his force under Tresckow had invested Belfort. With the deployment of the first army and of Werder's corps, the German communications were to some extent covered; and the second army was free to deal with the masses gathering in the Loire valley.

Bazaine's surrender of Metz had come at a most inopportune moment for the organisers of the national resistance to the invader. Its moral effect was second only to that of Sedan, for not only did it neutralise the effect of the recapture of Orleans, but by producing a sense of hopelessness in all but the most valiant, it greatly influenced subsequent operations. Had Bazaine, looking beyond the miseries of his own army, held out for another fortnight, as he might certainly have done, the army besieging Paris would have been most seriously embarrassed. The surrender of Metz delayed d'Aurelle de Paladines, and settled any question of an immediate movement on Paris. By November 14, the ninth corps of Prince Frederick Charles' army had reached Fontainebleau; and the Germans, though there were still many weeks of hard work before them, had passed successfully through the crisis. The solution was, however, by no means clear. Fiereck's operations had convinced the Germans that a French army was forming in the direction of Le Mans, which would threaten the flank of any movement on Orleans. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment was accordingly sent westward in search of this imaginary army; while Prince Frederick Charles, awaiting the arrival of the remainder of his command from Metz and the return of the Grand Duke, adopted a defensive attitude north of the forest of Orleans. By November 21, the third and tenth corps had come up; and the army was disposed on an extended line from the Loing to the main Paris-Orleans road. Preparations were now begun for an advance on Orleans; and, with this object, Prince Frederick Charles drew in the left of his line from the Loing to Beaune la Rolande; but, before he was ready, the enemy had anticipated him.

D'Aurelle de Paladines, distressed by the lack of discipline and training in his newly formed units, and busied in repairing these defects behind his fortified lines, urged, in reply to Gambetta's demands for an advance on Paris, that the second German army might at any moment take the offensive, and that with half-trained troops it would be better to await their onset behind earthworks. When the Germans did not attack, Gambetta insisted that an effort must be made to push

through to the assistance of the capital. Accordingly, on November 28, d'Aurelle de Paladines massed 50,000 men on his right with the object of overwhelming the Germans left at Beaune la Rolande. The tenth German corps about this place did not number more than 9000 and at first was in great danger of defeat. But the training of the French troops did not admit of large concerted movements; columns missed their way and were late, thus allowing time for the inevitable German reinforcements marching to the sound of the guns to relieve their hard-pressed comrades, and drive back the assailants. The French lost in all about 10,000 men; with such desperate valour did the young levies, seeking to atone for their lack of skill, hurl themselves on the enemy. Under the stress of defeat the discipline of the newly formed army broke down; and the French fell back in great confusion. Fortunately for them the Germans, too exhausted to pursue, had not perceived the extent of their success. Undaunted by this repulse, Gambetta, who had heard from Trochu by balloon that the garrison of Paris would make an effort to break out towards Orleans on November 29, directed d'Aurelle de Paladines to try the other flank. Thus, on December 2, the French, advancing with some 80,000 men in the direction of Toury met the detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg coming up to extend Prince Frederick Charles' left, near the villages of Loigny and Poupry. Again the Germans were at first hard pressed; again the French attack, though gallantly delivered, failed owing to want of combination; and again the timely arrival on the field of a German division of the ninth corps turned the scale. The French were everywhere repulsed.

The effect of these two defeats was to break up the organisation of the army of the Loire; the transport and supply arrangements were thrown into complete confusion; and the defeated troops, wearily retreating through snow and slush, suffered terribly. D'Aurelle de Paladines had intended to stand in his lines outside Orleans; but the state of his army made him abandon all idea of organised resistance. After some haphazard but severe fighting north of the forest of Orleans and outside the town, the Germans drove back their opponents and reentered Orleans on the night of December 4. Among the French, General Chanzy, the commander of the sixteenth and seventeenth corps, who had throughout these operations shown marked ability, alone succeeded in maintaining some semblance of organisation in his command, which he rallied at Beaugency south of Orleans.

Meantime the sortie from Paris, which Trochu had announced for November 29, had taken place. Ducrot, the guiding spirit of the defence, had been busy throughout the months of October and November in reconnoitring, under cover of a number of minor enterprises, the circle of investment. He had decided that an attempt to the north of Paris offered most prospect of success, and preparations to carry his proposals

into effect were well advanced, when the news of Coulmiers and the hopes aroused of the approach of the army of the Loire caused Trochu to insist on an immediate effort to break out to the south. The strength of the German position in front of Versailles forbade a sortie on that side; and it was decided to advance from Vincennes across the Marne in the direction of Villiers and Champigny on November 29. The preparations for the movement were however not completed in time; the bridges over the Marne were not ready; and it was necessary to cancel the orders which had already set the troops in motion—a fatal step with half-trained troops enlisted from the critical population of Paris. The attacking columns failed to combine; and the Würtemberg division, upon whom the brunt of the onset fell, fighting stubbornly throughout December 1, and again, after an armistice to bury the dead on December 3, withstood every effort to break through their lines. Ducrot led his men back into Paris on December 4; and the city relapsed into the dull struggle with hunger, broken only by the occasional political *émeutes* stirred up by the extreme Republicans. Northwards of Paris Manteuffel, who had taken Steinmetz' place in command of the first army, had occupied Amiens on November 27, and Rouen on December 5; while to the south Werder, firmly established at Dijon, was more than holding his own against Crémér and Garibaldi. Only at Belfort, where a gallant engineer, Colonel Denfert Rochereau, had trained a garrison of Mobiles and Franc-tireurs round a nucleus of regulars, and by sheer energy and ability was keeping the besiegers in a state of constant anxiety, did the French flag still retain something of its old prestige.

The loss of Orleans (December 4) had created a panic throughout Touraine. The Delegation of the Provisional Government removed the seat of administration to Bordeaux, and was followed by a stream of diplomats, officials, clerks, correspondents, and the majority of those who could afford to leave their homes. Undaunted in the midst of the general depression and confusion, Gambetta and de Freycinet still toiled ceaselessly at the creation of new forces, still elaborated fresh plans of offence. The troops of the German second army, exhausted by their rapid marches from Metz, and by the severe fighting in bitter weather which had led to the recapture of Orleans, were in urgent need of repose. Both Prince Frederick Charles and Moltke believed the army of the Loire to be in a state of dissolution; and the pursuit was entrusted chiefly to cavalry, who however soon discovered that Chanzy was standing stubbornly in front of Beaugency, and that they could make no headway. The weary victors were again compelled to take the field, and for six days were engaged, in frost and snow, with an enemy who doggedly refused to be driven from his position.

The sufferings of the French during these days were appalling. Chanzy resolutely kept his troops bivouacked in the open in alternate snow and mud, foreseeing that his army would inevitably dissolve if he allowed it

to be scattered to seek shelter in the surrounding towns or villages. On December 12, finding the men could endure no more, he began a retreat on Vendôme, where, standing again at bay, he brought his army successfully across the Loir, a tributary which runs west of and parallel to the great Loire, and finally, drew back westwards towards Le Mans. Rarely has a retreat under such adverse conditions been conducted with equal ability. By drawing the enemy upon himself, and stoutly refusing to give way, Chanzy allowed time for the shattered right wing of the army of the Loire, under Bourbaki, to re-form south of Orleans and to take up positions covering the great arsenal at Bourges. The wisdom of the retreat was at once shown by the fact that Prince Frederick Charles, uncertain of the situation to the south, could not venture to uncover the army of investment by following Chanzy to Le Mans, where the latter, reaping the reward of his self-sacrifice and firmness, won the time needed for his worn-out troops to recruit. A truce of exhaustion followed for some weeks in the south-west, Prince Frederick Charles withdrawing the second army to the neighbourhood of Orleans and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment to Chartres.

For a time the centre of interest shifted north, where, after the occupation of Rouen and Amiens by the Germans, the fortress of Arras had become the base of French resistance. There General Faidherbe, who had gained a reputation in north Africa, arrived on December 3, and, completing with great energy the work of his predecessors, had by the middle of December ready for the field an army of 40,000 men, which, as it contained a number of refugees from Sedan and Metz, was superior in discipline to any other of the levies raised by the Provisional Government. After occupying Rouen, General Manteuffel was directed to seize Le Havre. This harbour was of great value to the French, who were importing immense stores of war material; and, to save it, Faidherbe advanced on Amiens. The German garrison was compelled to evacuate the town, and Manteuffel had to give up all thoughts of Havre and to hurry back to meet Faidherbe, who on hearing of his approach took up a position north-east of Amiens on the Hallue stream. Manteuffel advanced to the attack with 25,000 men on December 21, and opened a three days' struggle amid ice and snow, in which Faidherbe held his own, retiring during the night of December 24, only because his ill-equipped troops, forced to bivouac in the open, could no longer endure the cold.

The news of Faidherbe's advance roused fresh hopes in Paris; and preparations were at once begun for the attempt to break out to the north which Ducrot had always counselled. The sortie, which took place on December 21, resolved itself into an attempt to capture the village of Le Bourget, which, if successful, was to be the signal for a general advance through the investing lines. Favoured by fog, the French managed to enter the village, but were never able completely to drive

out the defenders; and, on the arrival of German reinforcements, Trochu broke off the fight before half his troops had been engaged. Indeed, Trochu at this period seems to have considered failure inevitable, and to have undertaken any enterprise rather with a view to pacifying the populace than with any hope of success.

For some time past, loud expressions of impatience had been heard in Germany at the delay in reducing the French capital. Pressure was brought to bear on Moltke to bombard Paris—a step to which he was supposed to be averse from motives of humanity. But Moltke understood better than his critics what the bombardment of a fortified town of the size of the French capital entailed. He knew that it would be useless to begin a cannonade which could not be sustained; and, until the large number of guns, and immense stores of ammunition required had been collected (a difficult operation with congested lines of communication), he turned a deaf ear to those who urged him to begin. At last, when all was ready, the bombardment of the forts began on December 27, 1870, and that of the town on January 5, 1871.

At the beginning of the new year, when it was becoming daily more clear that the powers of endurance of the capital were nearing their limit, the untiring and still hopeful Gambetta had started another great effort to rescue Paris. While yet the halves of the army of the Loire were reeling back from the blows received about Orleans, the left under Chanzy westwards towards Le Mans, the right under Bourbaki south towards Bourges, de Freycinet had conceived the idea of transporting a part of the army of the Loire eastwards. This was to be combined with Crémér's and Garibaldi's troops, and with a new corps whose formation at Lyons was far advanced, in a great movement against the German lines of communication, which should incidentally raise the siege of gallant Belfort; simultaneously Chanzy from the west and Faidherbe from the north were to resume the offensive. The plan, admirable as a war-game manoeuvre where the all-important element of *morale* is of no account, had the defect of demanding a mobility and an organisation such as the army of the Loire did not possess.

After the loss of Orleans, d'Aurelle de Paladines had been removed from his command; and Gambetta had practically assumed the direction of the armies in the provinces. He accepted de Freycinet's above-mentioned proposal, overrode the objections of Chanzy, who, appreciating the situation more correctly, advocated the simpler operation of a combined movement from west and south on the capital, and directed Bourbaki to begin the entrainment of the three corps under his orders eastwards on December 23. But the movements of great masses cannot be improvised. A large proportion of the railway officials brought in for the occasion were unacquainted with the lines they were required to work, with the result that delays were endless. The men, cooped up in narrow carriages for days together in severe cold, suffered torments;

supplies, abundant where they were not required, were not available where they were needed. The first troops did not gain touch with the newly formed corps from Lyons, which had moved forward to Besançon, till January 2; while Bourbaki's third corps, which was left in front of Bourges to cover the movement from prying eyes in the German second army, did not come up till a week later. Werder, warned in time of this massing of 100,000 men against him, evacuated Dijon and concentrated at Vesoul; then, when it became clear that Bourbaki was moving on Belfort, by a brilliant dash against the French flank at Villersexel he further delayed their already hesitating advance. Finally, slipping between them and Belfort, he took up a strong position on the banks of the Lisaine. Here for three days, from January 15 to 17, he withstood all attacks, till Bourbaki was compelled from exhaustion to draw off and begin a disastrous retreat.

At the German headquarters at Versailles, Werder's reports of the concentration in the neighbourhood of Besançon had been regarded as exaggerated. Bourbaki was still believed to be in front of Bourges and to be meditating an advance on Paris; and it was not until January 5, when Werder captured a number of prisoners of Bourbaki's regiments, that Moltke acknowledged his mistake, and immediately set about repairing it. A new army was promptly formed from one of the corps besieging Paris, together with a division from the lines of communication and a division set free by the fall of Mezières, and was placed under Manteuffel, who had hitherto been directing the operations of the first army in the north. Manteuffel moved rapidly southwards and, sweeping down on the flank and rear of Bourbaki's luckless force, hemmed it in against the Swiss frontier. Bourbaki's one chance of keeping open his line of retreat lay in the cooperation of Garibaldi, who with 40,000 men occupied Dijon. But Garibaldi, who had lost the fire of his youth and was in failing health, allowed himself to be neutralised by a single German brigade. Left without succour, cut off from his base, his starving troops exposed to the rigours of winter in the Jura Mountains, Bourbaki had no choice but to cross the frontier, within which on February 2 over 80,000 men were disarmed by the Swiss. Fifteen days later, Colonel Denfert Rochereau marched proudly out of Belfort at the head of the garrison, having stood a siege of 106 days and having surrendered only on the express orders of the French Government.

The events which had led to the issue of these orders may be told in a few words. Towards the end of December Chanzy, who, thanks to Gambetta's energy, had re-equipped and reorganised the two corps with which he had retreated to Le Mans, and had been largely reinforced, was preparing to renew the offensive, and had pushed forward strong detachments with this object. Moltke still believed Bourbaki to be in front of Bourges, and, wishing to deal with the two armies while they were separated, ordered Prince Frederick Charles, on January 1, to march



against Chanzy, who was considered to be the more ready to take the field. With the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment, Prince Frederick Charles disposed of about 60,000 men, as against Chanzy with 150,000. The Germans, advancing on January 5, at once came in contact with French detachments, which were steadily pushed eastwards. In view of the German offensive, Chanzy decided to give up his forward movement, and to occupy a position which he had prepared in front of Le Mans. Prince Frederick Charles attacked him there on January 10; and in a fierce battle, which lasted throughout the two following days, the French were everywhere driven from their entrenchments, suffering a loss of more than 6000 killed and wounded, and 20,000 prisoners.

The removal of Bourbaki's army eastwards, and the defeat of Chanzy, had cleared the country south and west of Paris, and left Faiderbe in the north the only immediate menace to its besiegers. After the battle of the Hallue, Manteuffel had left his eighth corps under Goeben to watch Faiderbe and to besiege the fortress of Peronne east of Amiens, which was a standing danger to his communications, while he proceeded to Rouen, in the neighbourhood of which the Francs tireurs and Mobiles were becoming daily more active. On January 2 Faiderbe, with about 35,000 men, moved against Goeben, who with 15,000 was covering the siege of Peronne, and began an attack on the German position, which was continued the next day. Fighting gallantly and in superior numbers, the French had, by nightfall on January 3, gained a substantial success, and driven the Germans everywhere back on their last positions. But the strain of battle was too much for the raw troops; and when, on January 4, Faiderbe found Goeben still standing in front of him, and his own men in no condition to renew the fight, he drew off, greatly to the relief of the hard-pressed Germans.

Peronne fell on January 9 after Manteuffel had left to take command of the army formed to deal with Bourbaki. His successor, Goeben, as it was no longer necessary to keep troops in advance of Peronne, concentrated the greater part of the first army behind the Somme, an operation which was barely completed, when news arrived that the French were moving eastwards in the direction of St Quentin. Faiderbe had been induced by Gambetta to take this step, with the triple object of threatening the communications of the first army, of reaching out a hand to Bourbaki in his expected march northwards from Besançon, and of aiding a great sortie from the capital, which was in preparation. The manœuvre proposed was indeed an attempt to march round the right flank of the German first army; and Faiderbe, perceiving its danger, had consented to it with reluctance. By January 18 he had assembled his forces about St Quentin; but Goeben had divined his adversary's intention, and, having rapidly collected his army by road and rail, was marching that same day up both banks of the Somme to the attack. On January 19 the Germans advanced upon St Quentin, and, capturing the town, inflicted a decisive defeat upon Faiderbe.

Thus north, south, east, and west, Gambetta's heroic efforts to save the capital had met with disaster; but, ere they had all failed, it had become clear that the limits of endurance had been nearly reached. The Paris mob still believed in itself, however, and clamoured for a *sortie en masse*. Accordingly, Trochu agreed to make a great effort, in which the Garde Nationale, hitherto chiefly employed in manning the ramparts, should take part, rather to convince the populace of the futility of further resistance than with any hope of success. 90,000 men, massed under the guns of Mont Valérien, moved southwards on January 19 against the German lines before Versailles. The attack was delivered in three columns; but, being disjointed, it was foredoomed to failure. Parts of the force by sheer hard fighting forced their way into Saint-Cloud and into the park of Buzenval, where refusing to be dislodged, they maintained themselves until the following day; but the greater part was streaming back to the city before dark. Four days later, Jules Favre arrived at Versailles to open negotiations for the capitulation.

The Provisional Government had at length recognised that any hope of foreign intervention was futile. After the downfall of the Empire, Thiers had undertaken a mission to the Courts of London, St Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence, to invoke the mediation of the Great Powers. The time was ill-chosen. Italy was already engaged in securing Rome, while the attention of England and Austria was fully occupied by the action of Russia, who on September 29 announced that she would no longer be bound by the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. The utmost that Thiers was able to bring back to Paris was a proposal made by England, and supported by the other Powers, that the Provisional Government should negotiate an armistice for the purpose of taking the sense of the French people. One of Bismarck's strongest cards, in his dealings with Favre, was that he had no grounds for supposing the Provisional Government to represent France. He let it be known that he had opened negotiations with Napoleon; and the fear that the Imperial Army under Bazaine would be released, for the purpose of restoring the Empire and enforcing any compact which had been agreed upon, brought Favre to his knees. On January 28 a three weeks' armistice was signed, to enable elections to be held for an Assembly, which was to meet at Bordeaux to decide the question of peace or war. The outer defences of Paris were surrendered; the garrison became prisoners of war; and the city purchased exemption from occupation at the price of £8,000,000. Elsewhere, the troops of both nations were to retain their positions; but the eastern theatre of war was expressly excluded by Bismarck from the terms of the armistice. By a strange blunder Favre omitted to communicate this fact to Bourbaki, and thus rendered his fate doubly sure.

Gambetta absolutely refused to recognise the authority of the Paris Government to act in the name of France, and called loudly for the

continuance of the war; but he found no one to follow him, and he resigned, a disappointed and discredited man. Though at the moment he was stigmatised as a madman, his work was more than justified. It is true that the terms offered by Bismarck after Sedan were not substantially different from those he ultimately accepted, but the second period of the war not only preserved for Frenchmen their self-esteem, but impressed their adversaries with respect for the great resources and power of resistance of the French nation. When, in the years following the Peace of Frankfort, the wonderful recovery of France from her disaster was watched with jealous eyes by the hot-bloods in Germany, the memory of the resistance offered by an unprepared and unorganised people lent weight to the counsels of the prudent. Thirty-five years of peace are Gambetta's best apology for his administration.

The result of the elections proved France to be eager to end the war. Thiers was appointed on February 17 as chief of the executive, and, together with Favre and Picard, was commissioned to conclude peace. The preliminary proposals were signed on February 26, France agreeing to the cession of Alsace, and of German Lorraine with Metz, and to the payment of an indemnity of £200,000,000; but she retained possession of Belfort. These terms were ratified by the Assembly of Bordeaux; and the formal treaty was signed at Frankfort on May 10, 1871. The chief prize of victory had not however been included in the capitulations. On January 18 King William of Prussia had been proclaimed German Emperor in the *Salle des glaces* of Louis XIV's historic palace at Versailles. Thus the work begun in 1866 was completed. The blood shed by north and south side by side on many a victorious field had made of Germany a united nation, which from its birth could proudly claim to be the first military Power of the world.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## RUSSIA AND THE LEVANT AFTER THE 'CRIMEAN WAR.

## (1) RUSSIA AND THE PERIOD OF REFORM.

IF the tradition of the terrors of the system of Nicholas has unduly prejudiced men's minds with regard to his thirty years of resolute repression, it is probable that opinion has been somewhat biassed by the sympathetic figure of the Tsar liberator, so cruelly slain on March 13, 1881, in favour of his twenty-six years of far less stable rule, in which great expectations alternated with great disappointments. A careful examination of historical documents, as they become accessible, will, it is to be feared, somewhat detract from the halo of idealism which has surrounded Alexander, and also diminish the deep sympathy that has been felt with the sacrifices imposed on society and the governing classes during this fateful period. The early life of Alexander, and his activity up till his accession, gave little promise that he would be known as a reformer. He seemed impregnated with the spirit of his father's reactionary *régime*, though to his father's disappointment he showed no love of soldiering, and indeed gave evidence of a heart too soft for the heir to a military despotism. He was, however, no enthusiastic idealist, but a man of limited education, limited experience of affairs, and a cautious spirit. Acquainted through his tutor, Vasili Zhukovsky, with the ideas of German romantic literature, but devoid of the technical knowledge of the social and economic problems with which he had to deal, he was obliged to choose between plans put before him, rather than criticise or initiate. As a result there appeared a vacillation in his policy, and a want of staunch adherence to his counsellors, of which a striking instance was the dismissal of Nicholas Miliutin as soon as the Edict of Emancipation was published. He was fond of his country, and a believer in her destiny, but alike in internal and external policy inclined to take a middle course. For some years he managed to steer between the two extremes. But at home years of labour and anxiety weakened his desire for reform; and, when revolutionary societies

appeared, he gave way to the advisers who advocated repression. Abroad he was sincerely anxious for peace, though jealous of the national honour, and desirous of amending those provisions of the Treaty of Paris which he considered derogatory to Russia. With these objects he twice risked a European War: first in 1863, when the Western Powers threatened interference in the Polish question, and again in 1870, when he repudiated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.

His first great work was the Emancipation of the Serfs. The manifesto issued on his accession to the throne did not contain a word with regard to this question; and the retirement, on August 20, 1855, of Bibikoff, the Minister of the Interior, who was considered a foe of serfdom, quieted the fears of the nobility. The manifesto, issued on March 19, 1856, on the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, spoke of laws equally just for all his subjects. But in the same month the Emperor, in addressing a deputation of the Moscow nobility, said: "There are reports that I desire to proclaim the emancipation of the serfs. That is wrong; but, as a result of these menaces, there have been instances of the peasants disobeying the landowners....I do not say that I am entirely against it (emancipation). We live in such an age that in time it cannot but take place. In this, I think you too agree with me. Consequently, it is better for it to come from above than from below." While the Emperor showed prudence and common sense, and looked with a critical and suspicious eye upon panaceas, society, including all who made any pretensions to enlightenment, was in a state of excitement, one might almost say exaltation. Men seemed to breathe more freely when the death of Nicholas was announced. On all sides were heard cries in favour of liberty; on all sides were heard confessions of past delinquencies, even from high officials; on all sides enthusiasts registered vows to prove themselves worthy of the new era, which it was felt was now dawning on Russia. All alike expected reforms so thorough that Russia would be placed at one bound in the van of civilisation.

The emancipation of the serfs had been long and eloquently advocated by writers like Griboiedoff, Bielinski, Grigorovich and Turgenieff, and earnestly expected by the peasants, who, by repeated revolts during the war, extending over nine governments, in 1854 and 1855, showed their belief that their military service had given them an additional title to freedom, and their intention of obtaining it. But the Emperor proceeded with deliberation. On his coronation in 1856, he suspended recruiting for three years, and granted an amnesty, among others to the Decabrist conspirators. At the end of 1856 he appointed a secret Committee to consider the question of emancipation. It met for the first time on January 3, 1857, and consisted of Prince Orloff, the Finance Minister Brock, Count Adlerberg, Muravieff, Chefkin, Prince Vasili Dolgorukoff, Prince Gagarin, Baron Korff, Count Lanskoi, Count Bludoff and Rostovtseff. Only the last three, with the Secretary Vladimir

Butkoff, were for emancipation; the majority were rather in favour of measures for improving the condition of the peasants. The Emperor was not contented with the progress made, and to expedite matters, appointed the Grand Duke Constantine a member of the Committee. On August 18, 1857, the nobility of three Lithuanian governments presented a petition asking for permission to liberate their serfs, but retain their right to the lands. In reply, the Emperor issued a rescript on November 20, 1857, empowering the nobility of each of the governments named to form a committee to draw up projects "for the amelioration of the condition of the peasants"—a permission which was extended in the same year to the nobility of St Petersburg and Novgorod, and in the following year to Moscow and other governments.

After some intermediate steps, including the appointment of a Principal Committee and a Central Statistical Committee, the question of emancipation became definitely the order of the day; and there were formed on February 17, 1859, two Elaboration Committees under the presidency of Rostovtseff, to work up the materials forwarded by the Local Government Committees. On one of these served Miliutin, with his friend George Samarin; and it is noteworthy that their efforts in favour of the serfs, while supported throughout by the landowners on the Committee, such as Vladimir Cherkasky, were opposed by the bureaucrats. The material so worked up was then presented to a small committee consisting of Lanskoy, Muravieff, Constantine Palen and Rostovtseff, and was finally considered by the Principal Committee, of which the Grand Duke Constantine was now made President. These deliberations occupied the whole of the years 1859 and 1860; and it was only through the personal interference of the Emperor that the scheme was presented to the Council of State in January, 1861. The manifesto of emancipation was completed on February 19, 1861. This measure dealt with the private serfs. By imperial Orders of September 7, 1859 and October 23, 1861, in a similar way, a number of the state serfs, who held an intermediate position between serfdom and freedom, were also partly liberated—a process which in their case was not completed till 1866.

The general result of the Emancipation was, that with the exception of the *dvorovnye*, or serfs personally attached to the nobles, who after two years more service received their freedom, the peasants were not only liberated from their personal dependence on nobles or Crown, but were also formed into a body of landed proprietors. A certain proportion of the land was left to the nobles as their private property; the rest was distributed amongst the peasantry, on condition that they should eventually redeem their lots by paying compensation to the former landowners. The State issued bonds to the latter, representing the amount due from the peasants, which was to be paid within forty-nine years. The redemption was not to begin at once; but the peasants were allowed to enter into an arrangement with their former proprietors, by which they

remained in partial dependence upon them, and paid rent for the use of their lands. The payments were fixed at different rates, according to the locality, and levied in such a way that the rate rose, as the lot of land diminished. In determining the amount of the lot, the State fixed a maximum and minimum, varying in different localities, which generally corresponded to the amount of land allotted to the peasants while serfs. When the amount of land occupied by the peasant exceeded the maximum allowance the landowner might appropriate the surplus; but, when the peasants' lots were below the established minimum, the deficiency was made up out of the estates of the nobles. By voluntary arrangement with the peasants the landowners had the option of giving them at once one-quarter of the maximum as a free gift, and so closing all further relations or mutual claims. Special local provisions were made in the case of serfs belonging to small proprietors.

The former state serfs received very much larger lots than the former private serfs. 10,749,845 private serfs received 92,708,690 acres or on an average 8·62 acres each, while 10,745,738 state serfs received 185,595,295 acres or 17·56 acres each, and 900,486 crown serfs received 10,833,153 acres or 12·03 acres each. The emancipation legislation did not require any alteration to be made in the existing mode of tenure in any locality. Where communal ownership was customary, the land was apportioned to the community as a whole. Communal ownership prevailed in the north, east and south, but in Little Russia, in Poland and the west, individual ownership was general. Where individual ownership prevailed, the land was allotted to individuals. The deeds were in all cases delivered to the village community, which was made responsible for all taxes and redemption payments. This led to an increase in the communal system; for the community was directly interested in seeing that the labour on each piece of land was sufficient to discharge the obligation attaching to it, hence a redistribution of land took place at definite or indefinite periods. Where the pressure of taxation was most severely felt, the partition of the land according to the number of the labourers, and even according to the capacity of the individual, became most precise, so that no member of the community should shirk his share of the burden. If any peasant was left without cattle or means of cultivation, and became hopelessly involved in debt, his land was taken from him and given to someone else. At an early stage, in central and eastern Russia, there arose from this cause a large number of landless peasants. Originally, it was expressly stated in the Emancipation Act, that the peasants should have absolute possession of their lots, after they were redeemed, with power to sell or otherwise dispose of them.

To carry out the emancipation and to determine the area to be given by the proprietor, and the money compensation payable to him, negotiations of a most delicate character were necessary. For this purpose the office of Arbitrator of the Peace was instituted (1861); and, to the

great credit of the nobility, men of position and character were found, who brought infinite patience, tact, and knowledge to their difficult task. So far did they abandon class prejudice, that they were even accused of siding too much with the peasants; and, thanks largely to them, the peaceful revolution was carried out almost without an outbreak. It may be said that the credit of this extraordinary measure, and its successful fulfilment, was due not only to the Emperor, the Grand Duke Constantine, and the Grand Duchess Helena (a Würtemberg princess by birth, who warmly supported him), but also to the nobility, who, in the vast majority of cases, were ready, with unhesitating generosity, to sacrifice a large portion of their cherished hereditary rights. It was due not less to the peasantry, who patiently accepted what they believed to be only a fraction of the benefits due to them.

The result of the emancipation, so far as the landlords were concerned, was wittily summarised by one of the nobles, as reported by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, in the saying: "Before the emancipation we drank champagne, and kept no accounts; since the emancipation we keep accounts, and drink beer!" The direct monetary compensation was probably inadequate. The new dues, to be collected from the peasants, not only fell short of the value of the compulsory labour, now abandoned, but were extremely difficult of collection. When a proprietor was energetic and careful, he became much better off, and in the southern section of the Black Earth zone at any rate the land increased enormously in value; but, when the money obtained under the emancipation scheme was ill employed, the proprietor and his family became bankrupt, and went to swell the educated proletariat of the local town. So far as the peasant was concerned, there is no doubt that his enthusiastic worshippers were disappointed; and within a very short time of the emancipation we find them admitting their disillusionment. The peasant often proved lazy, careless, drunken, and dishonest; and it was very difficult to make him adopt any of the requisite improvements in his primitive methods of cultivating the land. From the peasant's point of view, the money dues and taxes were more burdensome than the old compulsory labour dues; and the old ill-defined rights as to grazing cattle on the landlord's pasture, and obtaining wood from the landlord's forest, and pecuniary help in time of need from the landlord were missed at every step. Everything under the new system had to be bought and paid for. But, slowly and surely, the capable and industrious agricultural peasant saved and bought land and prospered, while the lazy and incompetent lost even the share of land he had, and sank to a misery unknown before. The best proof of the general success of this great measure is that, on the whole, it may be said that for the first twenty years the taxes were paid without great and serious arrears.

After agriculture come industry and commerce. Free labour was on the increase in industrial employment in the period preceding the



emancipation. That event was certain not only to accelerate the tendency, but also to produce a crisis in production. The crisis occurred in the industries most dependent on serf labour, such as the iron industries of the Urals; there in many cases the labourers lost their heads, and simply gave up the work they had such reason to detest, and departed. The production of pig-iron in the Urals fell from 14,513,000 *puds* in 1860, to 10,467,000 in 1862. In the Bogosloff district of the Perm government about 3000 men, being three-quarters of the men workers, either deserted their land, houses, and gardens, or sold them before leaving at a ridiculous price. In one summer, 800 of the best workmen left the Berézoff works, and similar instances might be multiplied. It was the same with the mines. If the factories were not all affected in the same degree, it was because free labour had already made good its footing. The cloth factories suffered most; in 1858 there were 423 cloth factories employing 97,168 workmen, in 1863 there were 365 employing 71,797. In other industries, there was less trouble. The decline in the cotton industry was due not to the emancipation, but to the great diminution in the import of cotton owing to the American Civil War. This decline in cotton led, as a not unnatural result, to a revival of the linen industry.

There was added another of those disturbing factors which make it so difficult to draw economic conclusions on any subject, at any time. At the end of the fifties, a commercial expansion took place in Russia, and an alteration was made in the law relating to public companies, introducing limited liability, which produced a fabulous increase in the number of joint-stock companies. There followed, of course, over-production; then either panic, or complete indifference, on the part of the public, to such undertakings. In 1856, the capital subscribed to limited liability companies amounted to 15 million roubles, in 1857, to 30 million roubles, in 1858, to 51 million roubles, and, in 1859, to 67 million roubles. Another factor in the situation was a movement beginning in 1857 in favour of the prohibition of child labour in factories, and the limitation of the hours of labour of minors. In that year a special Commission on this and cognate subjects was appointed by the Governor-General of St Petersburg, which prepared the project of a law for the prevention of accident, the promotion of sanitary regulations, as well as housing and other reforms which was supported by the St Petersburg employers, but resisted by those of Moscow and elsewhere. The same year saw another Commission appointed in the Ministry of Finance, under the presidency of Stackelberg, to reform the whole of the Russian factory and labour laws; and this Commission was sufficiently enlightened to record its protest against Article 1865 of the Penal Code, which had made a strike a criminal offence. No legislation, however, followed.

The emancipation of the serfs further revolutionised the conditions of the industrial labour market. The first result was a rise in wages; but prices rose still higher, so that real wages fell. The industrial

labourer showed an inclination to return to the land; nevertheless, the productive power of the factories rose to such an extent, owing to the introduction of machinery, that domestic industries declined. Thus an enormous incentive was given to a new development of travelling labour, followed by a fall in the normal rate of wages and a deterioration in the conditions of labour.

An impulse in favour of industry was due to the development of railways. In 1856 Alexander II directed his Committee of Ministers to consider the whole question of railway construction; and, as a result, the railway system was developed, more or less rapidly, under the general control of the Government, although the actual building of the lines was carried out by private companies, and was largely due to men of energy and initiative like von Dervies. During 1856-78 about 600 miles of railroad were annually constructed; and the railways formed a fairly complete network for the European portion of the Empire, extending as far as Orenburg in Asia, and including the Poti-Tiflis line in the Caucasus. The construction of these lines was rendered easier by the lower tariffs of 1859 and 1861, permitting the importation of pig and cast iron either at a very low duty or entirely free. In 1866 the Government ordered that all railway plant should be of Russian manufacture; and in 1869 an import duty was, for the first time, placed on foreign machinery, which led the way to a more stringent protective policy in 1877 and later years. The average value of all exports from 1850 to 1874 was 261,389,000 roubles, and the average value of all imports during the same period was 263,869,000 roubles.

The Finance Ministers of this period were Alexander Kniazhevich 1858-62, and Count Michael Reutern 1862-78. The principal achievement of the former was the establishment, on May 31, 1860, of the Bank of Russia. He left it to his successor to carry out the project which effected the supersession in 1862 of the system of leasing the retail sale of spirits to private persons, by a system of excise. In the first year of the excise system the consumption of spirits in Russia doubled; and the number of cases of open intoxication increased sixfold. The gain to the revenue was by no means proportionate. The income derived from spirits in 1865 was £18,000,000, or only one million more than that obtained in the last year of the farming system. The very low original duty, 4 roubles per *vedro* (2·7056 gallons) was accordingly raised till it reached 10 roubles per *vedro*. The result was a decrease in consumption, and hence a relative but not an absolute falling-off in the revenue. Reutern was one of the Committee on the finance of the emancipation, which succeeded in solving the financial side of that complex question, so as to involve no sacrifice on the part of the public exchequer. During his long tenure of office he showed himself a man of prudence, method, and integrity. He succeeded not only in effecting some economies, and in introducing some order into Russian finance, but also in developing the

national credit by the creation of private banks, thirty-three of which were founded during his administration. He reformed the system of the audit of accounts and at length, in 1872, after a long series of deficits, managed to produce for the first time a surplus. To him must be given in great measure the credit for the development of the railway system.

The emancipation of the serfs was only the first in a series of reforms. It was followed by the institution of a system of local self-government, by reforms in the law Courts, as well as in the military and educational systems.

The introduction, after enquiries which commenced in 1859, of local self-government in the shape of elective local Councils (1864), was all the more popular, because the local committees—formed to consider the question of the emancipation—had been much hurt that no general assembly had been held in St Petersburg, at which they might have aired their views. It was characteristic of Alexander II that the reform was introduced gradually, and that in twelve years—1865-76—it was brought into force only in 34 governments of European Russia, and in the Cossack district of the Don, where it was abolished later (1882). It involved a measure of decentralisation and of liberty, and it embraced in one scheme all classes of the population. At this time, there were on the one side the assemblies of the nobility, under their marshal, with the right of petition to the Crown; on the other hand were the peasant assemblies of the *Mir* (village community), and the *Volost* (canton). The new authority combined both classes, and also the towns, in two new bodies, the District Assembly, and the *Zemstvo* or Provincial Council, the latter being elected by the former. The principal duties laid on the new bodies were, to keep the roads and bridges in proper repair, to provide means of conveyance for the rural police and other officials, to elect the Justices of the Peace, to look after primary education and sanitation, to watch the state of the crops, and take measures against approaching famine. They meet once a year, and elect a bureau or committee, which is a paid body and is responsible for the conduct of affairs. Every three years the deputies are elected in certain proportions by the landed proprietor, the rural communes, and the municipal corporations. It was a remarkable fact, noticeable from the outset, that no trace was found of class hatred, resulting from the emancipation; on the contrary, peasant and noble sat peaceably side by side in the local assemblies, and peasants often chose nobles or priests to represent them. The elections were on the whole satisfactory. At peasant elections, no doubt, the local chief of police and the president of the electoral meeting made their influence felt, and corruption in the shape of drink or actual bribery was not unknown. At the meetings the nobles preponderated by dint of education, if not by dint of numbers; and attendance, being unpaid, was found burdensome by the peasants. A few years later, out of 13,000 deputies elected for 33 governments, there

were 6204 landowners, 5171 peasants, and 1549 representatives of towns. The officials of the Central Government regarded the plan askance from the first, and not only took care that any attempt of the *Zemstva* to combine, or to exercise any political influence, should be frustrated, but also exerted through the veto of the Governor a benumbing effect on the work. That veto could be used if any resolution passed appeared to the Governor to be "contrary to the true interests of the Empire"; which opened a very wide door to reactionary influence.

Another hindrance to an active policy was that of finance—a drawback most acutely felt in the District Assemblies, where the interests of the ratepayer were most active. Of the burden, some three-quarters fell on rural districts, and of this about three-fifths was paid by the peasantry, the imperial taxes taking precedence of the local rates. At first, the revenue did not amount to more than half the expenditure, and the burden rose rapidly; in fact, the total expenditure—originally six million roubles—rose in 1868 to nearly 15 millions, and in 1875 to nearly 28 millions. In 1868 the combined revenues of 30 *Zemstva* were expended in the following percentages:—houses for the police and other imperial officials 4·6 per cent.; quarters for the troops 0·8; means of conveyance for the police and other officials 17·0; special administration for peasant affairs 14·9; Justice of the Peace Courts 13·2; roads and bridges 13·1; sanitary affairs, physicians' hospitals, and the like, 8·3; popular education 5·1; payment of debt and sundries 3·8, and working expenses of *Zemstvo* administration 19·2, per cent.

On the whole the new institution worked well. The ordinary duties were well performed, with but little taint of speculation or jobbery. Reforms were introduced into the hospitals, lunatic asylums, and benevolent institutions; a good deal was done, considering the limited means, for popular education, by founding village schools and a few seminaries for schoolmasters; a new and more equitable system of rating was created; and a plan for mutual fire insurance was carried into effect—an institution of great value in a country where wooden houses are usual, and fires not exceptional. Perhaps too much attention was paid by the new administration to the more attractive work of education and too little to the more prosaic needs of good communications; but, considering the expenditure, and the difficulties of obtaining good administrators for the tiresome detailed work, which was rewarded by none of the decorations or official promotion, such as were given for other public service, and none of the profits realisable in the new world of railways, banks, and joint-stock companies, the wonder is rather that so much good work was done in these early days.

In 1870, the principle of local self-government was extended to the towns. In the time of Nicholas, a project drawn up by Miliutin had been applied to St Petersburg; but now a complete system was introduced, at first tentatively, for St Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa,

which substituted representation of property for representation by class or corporation, and even adopted the advanced idea of women's suffrage.

The reforms of the law Courts were characterised by the same cautious deliberation as marked the other great measures of Alexander II. First, there were references thereto in imperial manifestos; then, the Council of State examined the question from the historical, theoretical, and practical point of view; then, a commission discovered no less than twenty-five radical defects in the existing system; then, the fundamental principles underlying the changes to be made were published in an Imperial Order of September 29, 1862; finally, the new legislation was completed, and received the Emperor's approval on November 20, 1864.

Unlike the other reforms, it was not an original creation, but an adaptation of elements borrowed from the civilised West. This was a disappointment to the Slavophiles and to reformers like Samarin, who feared that the peasant tribunals set up by the Emancipation Act might suffer. But, although not original, judicial reform was planned on a larger scale, with more unity and logic, and was carried out more resolutely, than any of the other reforms of Alexander II. The principles on which it was based were the separation of the judicial from the administrative power; the independence of the magistrates and the tribunals; the equality of all Russian subjects before the law, without distinction of birth or rank; oral procedure; publicity; and, last but not least, the direct participation of the people in the administration of justice, through the institution of the jury, and by the election of the judges.

There were two complete sets of tribunals: on the one hand, for petty cases, where no abstract legal principle was at stake, the Justices of the Peace Courts, the members of which were selected by the new elective District Assemblies, subject to confirmation by the Senate; on the other hand, for the more important cases, the regular tribunals, the ordinary members of which were to be appointed by the Crown through the judges, who submitted lists of suitable candidates. These two sets of tribunals were parallel, and contained each an ordinary Court and a Court of Appeal, with the Senate as the complete and final Court of Appeal above them all. The Justices of the Peace Courts were to be competent for all civil cases in which the sum at stake was not more than 500 roubles, and for all criminal cases in which the fine was not more than 300 roubles. If the sum at stake exceeded 30 roubles, or the fine 15 roubles, there was an appeal to the monthly sessions. The institution of elective Justices of the Peace was introduced gradually, and was not extended, for instance, to the Polish and Lithuanian provinces.

Complete and logical as the reform appears, there were from the first a good many exceptions. There were the peasant tribunals, with the judges elected under the Emancipation Act. There were the commercial Courts instituted by Nicholas for commercial men. There were the ecclesiastical Courts with their medieval jurisdiction, not only over the

clergy, but over the laity also, in such matters as divorce, in which the reforms planned by Alexander II were never carried into effect. Apart from administrative justice, with its totally irregular proceedings and the creation of certain special examining magistrates for criminal cases (1860), which constituted a serious modification of the new system, there were the Courts martial. These played an important part in the troublous times at the end of the reign; but they did not escape the influence of the prevalent zeal for reform. The wholesome light of publicity was introduced, with a system of regimental and District Courts under a supreme Court at St Petersburg. But, though a juridical education was given to the officers who filled judicial posts, the presiding judge remained more like a prosecuting counsel than an impartial authority. In addition to these important exceptions, there was always in the background the Ministry of Justice, which could still exercise pressure. Though judges could not be dismissed, except for the commission of a felony, or a misdemeanour, the threat, whether expressed or implied, of their removal by the Ministry of Justice to a distant disagreeable post, or other methods, were used to subject them to the Executive. There also remained the crying evil—severely felt in every department of official administration—the lack of competent men, and the inadequacy of salaries, which provoked, and in the eyes of contemporary Russian society extenuated, corruption and other such abuses. At the beginning of 1870, in the 32 District Tribunals which then existed, there were 227 judges, of whom 44 had never received a legal education.

The want of a proper *personnel* was even more keenly felt in the composition of the Bar, now called into existence by the new juridical institutions. The profession of advocate, though lucrative, enjoyed but little credit with the public; for few of those who sought this new avenue of work were possessed either of adequate knowledge of the law or of the keen sense of professional honour required by their calling.

Abuses therefore remained both in civil and in criminal cases. Moreover, there seems no doubt that, in some form or other, bodily torture was still exercised. In the peasant Courts there was even an increase of the corporal punishment expressly forbidden by a *ukase* of 1863, to such an extent that, in one government the number of cases in which it was inflicted rose from 5452 in 1866-8, to 10,884 in 1872-4. The worst infractions of the new judicial laws took place from the action of the secret police, the Third Section of the Imperial Chancery, which, at the close of the reign, acted with the same arbitrary disregard of legal forms and principles, as in the worst days of Nicholas. It is perhaps the best tribute to the vitality of the new judicial institutions that they survived the terror and confusion of the Nihilist period.

At the very commencement of the reign, military reforms were introduced; military colonies came to an end; the period of military service was reduced from twenty-five to fifteen years; degrading corporal

punishments were abolished; attention was paid to the education of officers, and the military educational establishments were reformed. In 1862, the Minister of War was instructed to review the whole military system, which suffered, among other defects, from over-centralisation. The first result was the publication, on August 6, 1864, of an order with regard to the formation of military districts, of which ten were founded at once; four more were added on August 6, 1865. In each circle, a special commanding officer was appointed. On January 1, 1874, a new order was issued, under which the whole male population, without distinction, became liable to military service. Six years were to be spent with the colours, nine years in the militia, and in the reserve men were liable for service up to 40 years of age.

The question of national education occupied the attention of the Emperor from the first year of his reign. In 1856, a Committee was appointed to enquire into subjects of instruction and text-books. On June 18, 1863, a general code of regulations for Russian Universities was published, based on the labours of a Committee appointed on the initiative of Alexander Golovin, the Minister of Education, to enquire into the management of educational establishments, and consisting chiefly of Professors of the University of St Petersburg. According to this Code, the Universities received a certain measure of autonomy under the Ministry of Education, the system of instruction being placed in the hands of the different faculties and the Council of the University. Each faculty constituted an independent assembly, consisting of the ordinary and extraordinary Professors, under the presidency of a Dean chosen for three years. The Council consisted of all the ordinary and extraordinary Professors, under the presidency of the Rector, who was chosen by the Council for four years and confirmed by imperial ordinance. The code laid down what was the sphere of independent action of the faculties, and the Council, and those cases, in which the confirmation of the Warden and the Minister was required. The administration of the economic affairs of the University was placed in the hands of the Dean and the Inspector, who was called in only on questions relating to the students, under the presidency of the Rector. A University Court, to deal with the offences of the student, was formed, consisting of three judges, chosen annually by the Council from the Professors. Besides this, the stipends of the Professors, the number of professorial chairs, and the revenues of the Universities were all augmented.

On November 19, 1864, a new code of regulations was published on the subject of secondary schools, which was later amended and supplemented by the code of June 19, 1871. Secondary educational establishments were divided into classical schools, or gymnasia, and modern schools (*Realschulen*), from which the ancient languages were excluded. Popular education was thoroughly revised by a code published on the subject on June 14, 1864. Special attention was paid to

the education of women, in institutions which were grouped under the foundation of the Empress Marie. Similar institutions were founded in 1870, under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Instruction. The higher education of women was provided for by pedagogic instruction, and advanced courses in St Petersburg, Moscow, Kieff, Kazan, and Odessa.

With regard to the Press, the new reign brought the outbreak of journalistic activity, described by Bernard Pares in his *Russia and Reform*. In 1856, the Russian *Causeries* (*Besyeda*) of Alexander Koshelyeff, and Terty Philipoff, and the *Russian Messenger* of Michael Katkoff were founded at Moscow. In 1857, government newspapers were instituted in four towns in Siberia, and eleven Russian specialist magazines, such as the *Engineer's Magazine*, the *Library of Medical Science*, and the *Journal of the Imperial Archaeological Society*. Many new newspapers appeared, which were not only sent to subscribers, but also sold on the streets. Among the papers which became influential were the *Golos* (the *Voice*), founded by Andrew Kraevsky at St Petersburg in 1862, and the *Moscow Gazette*, the editorship of which was taken up by Katkoff on January 1, 1863, and the *Den* (the *Day*) founded by the Slavophil Ivan Aksakoff in October, 1861, which lasted till 1865 and had a circulation of 4000. During the years which elapsed before the new press law, published at last on April 6, 1865, the Censorship acted spasmodically. In 1857, Prince Paul Viazemsky was placed at the head of the Censorship. He drafted a report in 1858 advising that the regulations should be relaxed, but he did not obtain the complete concurrence of the Emperor, and therefore resigned. In 1859, the secret Committee was reestablished to control literature, in harmony with the views of the Government; in 1862, the duties of the Censorship were divided between the Ministries of the Interior and of Public Instruction, preventive duties being assigned to the latter, and punitive duties to the former. It is noteworthy that, when the emancipation was promulgated on March 5, 1861, not a journal in St Petersburg or Moscow had a word of comment on it, and that only on March 7 did the *Moscow Gazette* insert a few sympathetic lines in reviewing a book in an obscure corner of the paper. The chief Russian journal of this period was the *Kolokol* (the *Bell*), founded by Alexander Herten in 1857, and published in London, with its motto, "*Vivos voco, mortuos plango, fulgura frango.*" Although strictly forbidden in Russia, it was to be found everywhere, even in the Emperor's Cabinet. In fact, on one occasion, when an official who had been attacked in the *Kolokol* took the precaution of printing a special number for the Emperor, omitting the incriminating article, means were found to bring an original, unexpurgated copy into the Emperor's hands.

In the matter of the Censorship, as on other great questions, the Emperor vacillated. In February, 1856, on the occasion of the performance of Count Vladimir Sollogub's play, *The Chinovnik* (*The Official*), he expressed himself in favour of outspoken criticism. In 1859, he agreed,



in conversation with Isakoff, that publicity was indispensable; "only," he said, "with us it takes a bad direction." In 1860, Alexander Nikitenko, who had been placed in 1859 at the head of the Committee on the affairs of the Press, wrote. "for literature there has come a very unfavourable epoch; the chief thing is that the Emperor is strongly set against it"; and in 1862: "now we have a thoroughgoing reaction."

The Commission of 1863, which collected information from France, Germany, England and Belgium, preceded the law of 1865. This Act tried to make a transition from the system of preliminary Censorship so strongly opposed by Aksakoff to that of legal punishment, but all the fundamental guarantees were wanting. The punitive powers belonged not to the law Courts, but to the Minister; the accused had no right to be heard; the punishment was not confined to the offender; the offence was not defined by the law; the accuser was the judge. The result was that, after an attempt on the Emperor's life in 1866, terrorism and hysteria prevailed. Journals were suppressed right and left. The public, to which the journals appealed, was as unstable as in the days of Nicholas. In 1863, Herten wrote sympathetically of the insurgent Poles, and the circulation of the *Kolokol* fell from 2500 in 1861 to 500. In 1866, he wrote strongly against Karakozoff's attempt on the Tsar, and alienated Radical sympathy. Katkoff, on the other hand, attained power and influence, by the genuine patriotism of his articles on the Polish question. In 1862, the *Moscow Gazette* had a circulation of 6000. In 1865, its circulation had risen to 12,000, and he was able successfully to withstand the Censor. But he was the exception, and from 1862 to 1868 the Press deteriorated rapidly. Repressive laws were applied to the Press in 1866, 1867, in 1872, and in 1873. Between 1865 and January, 1880, no less than 167 warnings were issued to the Press, and 52 publications were stopped.

The date of the reaction from the reforming spirit which inspired the earlier part of the reign cannot be definitely fixed. In a despotism, even with a clear-sighted, determined, and experienced head, there are always undercurrents. In Russia, from 1855 onwards, there was a whirlpool of undercurrents which make it almost impossible to gauge the force and direction of the stream at any given moment. The causes of the reaction are among the most interesting phenomena which the historian of this period will have to trace, when all the necessary documentary evidence is forthcoming, and when a sufficient length of time has elapsed to make a proper perspective possible. At present only a rough sketch is possible, and one that must reflect the confusion of the time.

First and foremost, there was the thoroughly Russian characteristic, a feeling of profound despair which quickly succeeded confident enthusiasm, as each of the great reforms failed to bring about the complete regeneration of the whole Russian Empire which its advocates had expected. Then there was the character of the sovereign, cautious to the point of

vacillation and always inclined to look back as well as forward. Then there was Russian society with its inherent want of moral purpose and steadfastness, and the continuous internal conflict, due to its being largely composed of men who were both officials and landowners. For thirty years these men had been bound hand and foot and ruled with a rod of iron. Now that freedom had come, they were, with the exception of a small minority, too benumbed in spirit to take advantage of it, and too much aghast at the speed and thoroughness of the transformation the Empire was undergoing, to become accustomed to the new order of things. In the opinion of the enlightened few, the reforms had been too long deferred; a gradual start should have been made at an earlier epoch; now it was too late for half-measures.

It has already been indicated that one great reason of the failure of the reforms was the terrible dearth of competent administrators for ordinary posts. But it is true that previous despotic reigns, by keeping society aloof from politics, had not only prevented the growth of such administrators, but also had turned men's minds to speculative philosophy. This speculative direction was now encouraged by the daily Press, especially in St Petersburg, which showed a total want of moral and political principle in the use of the newly acquired freedom. The wildest socialist and materialist ideas were now openly as well as secretly preached to the Russian youth of both sexes. The Government might have looked to society for some sound element to oppose the new and dangerous movement which culminated in revolutionary Nihilism. But society still regarded the Government as its foe, and neither the defenders nor the opponents of the new institutions had any faith in the courage or sincerity of the Administration. The policy of the Emperor, in entrusting the execution of the reforms to bureaucrats who were hostile to the policy in question, was intended no doubt as a measure of conciliation, but it conciliated no one, and was only regarded as a sign of weakness. Therefore, the enemies of the new reforms openly opposed the Government, while the friends of the new reforms did not support the Government, and the Government, for its part, did not stand by its own friends. The extraordinary result was that the Liberals bitterly attacked anyone who said a word in favour of the Government as a hireling in search of a career, and he received no protection from the imperial Administration.

In these circumstances, Socialism, with its secret organisation, advanced by leaps and bounds. At the very time of the emancipation secret proclamations were being issued advocating the destruction, not only of the whole imperial family, but also of the nobility and the highest official classes. The Universities were seething with disaffection, and the Government did not know what to do with them. Harsh measures were tried, but only increased the trouble. Incendiary fires took place in St Petersburg, which were ascribed to the secret organisation. Investigations showed that the agitation was confined to the educated

proletariate, and was practically the product of the Universities and Technical Schools, such as the Medical Academy and the Agricultural Institute. The Government, which in response to a demand for a scientific and practical, as opposed to a classical, education, had encouraged scientific studies, now discovered, to its astonishment, that there seemed to be some occult connexion between natural science and revolutionary tendencies. The young persons supposed to be preparing for a commercial and industrial career were, it now appeared, devoting their time to planning the reconstruction of society; and, when they wished to put their plans into practice, they naturally came into collision with the police. Exile by deportation increased enormously. From 1853 to 1862 there were 101,230, and from 1863 to 1874 there were 146,380 persons deported to Siberia. In the country the detailed work of the reforms went slowly but surely forward. In the largest towns, and especially in the two capitals, there was an unexampled ferment of excitement. To make matters worse, there arose foreign troubles. First came the Polish insurrection. The Poles proved unable to profit by the benevolent intentions of the Emperor, who had shown himself, in the case of Finland, ready to go far to meet national susceptibilities by granting a distinctive coinage in 1860, and in some other respects.

The Poles, however, were not content with gradual progress. They desired all or nothing, and their ambitions not only involved rebellion against Russian government, but went beyond the Peace of 1815, and claimed for Poland the boundaries of 1772, thus provoking the resentment of Austria and Prussia as well. The economic condition of Poland in 1855 was remarkable. The nobility, as sole proprietors of the land, and entitled to demand forced labour from their peasants, enjoyed a position of great wealth and influence. The peasantry, on the other hand, were, in general, the mere chattels of their masters, with no land of their own, and impoverished by the burden of forced labour. The Agricultural Society founded in 1855 by Count Andrew Zamoiski, with the object of affording a centre for all efforts to ameliorate the condition of the peasants, became, before long, the rallying-point of public spirit. Its aim was nothing less than the settlement of the peasant question, which would have gained immense popularity for the society, but the imperial Government determined to secure for itself any credit that could be gained in this way. By a *ukase* of March, 1861, concessions were granted in the shape of a separate Ministry of Instruction and Public Worship, under Marquis Alexander Vielopolski, who had persuaded the Emperor to adopt a policy of conciliation. Elective Boards were established in every province and district, with the power of representing the local needs to a Council of State sitting at Warsaw. Before these institutions could have a fair trial, there were differences between Vielopolski and Zamoiski, and the Governor-General Prince Michael Gorchakoff suddenly suppressed the Agricultural Society on April 6,

1861. Throughout the year, demonstrations took place, repeatedly checked by the Cossacks, who fired upon the passive crowds. In 1862, the Grand Duke Constantine was appointed Viceroy, with Vielopolski as Vice-President of the Council, and Director of the Civil Administration; but, in spite of reforms, including the reopening of the University of Warsaw, which had been closed since 1832, and the adoption of Polish as the official language, disaffection increased. Repeated attempts were made on the lives of the Viceroy and Vielopolski; the secret national organisation extended its activity; the neighbouring Russian provinces were affected.

At the commencement of 1863, the revolution broke out. The insurgents were unarmed and unorganised, and the insurrection was an act of national despair. It was relentlessly repressed, and every remnant of Polish autonomy was obliterated. The most important consequence of the rebellion, for Poland, was the economic revolution embodied in the law of 1864—the work of Prince Vladimir Cherkasky and Nicholas Miliutin. The rebellion had been carried out by wealthy nobles; the peasants had remained inactive. As a reward for their loyalty, and as a measure of precaution against the power of the nobility, half the land was bestowed as freehold property upon the peasant holders, who were at the same time freed from all obligation to work on the estates of the large proprietors. No change was made in the peasants' undefined right of access to the nobles' forest-land and pastures, as it was the aim of the Government to perpetuate the difference of interest between the two classes and to complete the incorporation of Poland with Russia. To this radical measure, and to the effect of the tariff of 1877, is due the marvellous subsequent development of Polish industry, which has bound Poland and Russia with chains of self-interest likely to prove a serious obstacle to the realisation of Polish hopes of independence.

The most important consequence of the rebellion, for Russia, was an outburst of patriotic feeling, in which Michael Katkoff took the lead, which not only strongly supported the Emperor in his attitude of resistance to the interference of Foreign Powers in Polish affairs, but which set the seal of public approval on the policy of repression followed by Muravieff in Lithuania, by Erast Dlotovsky in Livonia, and by Michael Annenkoff in the south-western governments, and on the policy of Russification in matters both political and religious, henceforth remorselessly applied in European Russia. Yet, in spite of the patriotic enthusiasm of Katkoff, and the renaissance of Pan Slavism, the revolutionary movement grew and prospered in the heart of the Empire; and the new ideas were strengthened, if not by missionary efforts among the people, yet, in considerable measure, by the exile of their advocates to distant parts of the Empire, where they were hitherto unknown. The escape of Michael Bakunin from Siberia, in 1864, marked a new era in the development of militant Nihilism, which was more clearly defined in the programme put forward at the Nihilist Congress at Basel, in 1869.

and received a great impulse from the action of the Paris Commune in 1871. Michael Bakunin preached the destruction of all existing political institutions; Nicholas Chernishevsky grafted on this negative doctrine the views of socialism; Peter Lavroff advocated the necessity of going among the people to enlighten and instruct them. The first-fruits of these efforts were seen in the attempt of Karakozoff on the life of the Tsar in 1866, and the foundation of the special organ the *Narodnoye Dyelo* (the *Cause of the People*), at Geneva, in 1870. Two classes played an unexpected part in the spread of the new doctrines, which included atheism, namely, descendants of priests of the Orthodox Church and persons of Jewish descent—a nationality which enjoyed a far greater measure of toleration under Alexander II than was accorded to them in the preceding or the succeeding reign. Women also were especially conspicuous; and the educated proletariat furnished 99 per cent. of the revolutionaries, whose enthusiasm and audacity present, at the end of this period, a striking contrast not only to the indifference and torpor of society, but also to the moral isolation and indecision of the governing classes.

Through all the changes and commotions in the interior, Russian external policy was unmoved. Prince Alexander Gorchakoff had given the word, "*La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille*"; and *recueillement* was her attitude to Western Europe during 1856–70, except when Prussia required her support. That steady support was granted, on the whole, during the quarrel of Prussia with Austria, and, without qualification, in the transactions leading to the Franco-German War.

But in Central Asia, in the Far East, and in South-Eastern Europe, the attitude of the Government of Alexander II at once maintained Russian prestige, and gratified the national pride and ambition. The question of Central Asia was early brought home by the embassies sent by the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara to congratulate the Emperor on his accession. Musaffar-ed-din, the then Amir of Bokhara, had openly sympathised with the Khokandians in their efforts to retake Fort Perovski. Those efforts were supplemented by the pillage of caravans, which kept the frontier in a ferment. In 1863, Michael Chernaieff, starting from the basin of the Ili, marched southwards against Ali Alta, while Colonel Verevkin, from a base on the Sir Darya, marched eastwards on Hazrat; the two columns then combined, and captured Chimkent. This advance gave alarm to Great Britain, which had long felt apprehension on behalf of India; and Prince Gorchakoff deemed it wise to issue a circular note to the Powers, explaining the policy which was being carried out, and defending the action of Russia on the plea of necessity (1864). This note pointed out the dilemma in which civilised States are placed when in contact with wandering tribes. They find it impossible to live in unity with such neighbours, and must establish a system of control, or see their frontiers a prey to chronic disorder. But, when the frontier tribes are subdued, they in their turn are exposed to the aggression of

more distant tribes; and hence the frontier line must be extended until it come into contact with a regularly organised State, which can maintain order within its borders. Prince Gorchakoff declared that the protection of her own frontier, and not encroachment upon the territory of others, was Russia's object. To the commanders on the spot, however, perpetual advance seemed the only practical policy. Thus, Chernaieff, learning that a strong body of Khokandians were gathered at Tashkent, immediately marched against them without waiting to be attacked. His first attempt at Tashkent (October 2, 1864) failed; but a second, undertaken in direct defiance of the orders of the Tsar, succeeded in reducing the town. In 1865, Turkestan was constituted a frontier district with Tashkent as its capital.

Russia had, by this time, subdued the whole of Eastern Turkestan, and only the Khanates remained to be dealt with. The struggle was immediately renewed. In December, 1865, the Amir of Bokhara assumed the offensive on behalf of the three Khanates, occupied the city of Khozhend, and imprisoned four Russian envoys. General Dmitry Romanovsky, who was sent against him, encountered him at Irgai, where a great battle, reminding one in some respects of Plassey, was fought on May 20, 1866; and Khozhend was taken by the Russians. A *ukase* signed in 1867 placed Turkestan under a Governor-General, whose authority extended over the provinces of Sir Darya and Semirechensk, the latter including all the territory between the lakes of Balkash and Issik-Kul. General Constantine von Kaufmann, who was appointed to establish the Government, began by making overtures of peace to the Amir of Bokhara. No reply was vouchsafed, but the Amir instead massed his troops for an attack on the Russian outposts. Without waiting for this, Kaufmann pushed on to Samarkand, and, after defeating the united Khivan and Bokharan host, received the surrender of the city on May 12, 1868. Leaving a small garrison in the city, he pushed on, with his main force, against the Amir. During his absence, the townspeople introduced reinforcements, and for three days closely besieged the little garrison. This act of treachery was punished by Kaufmann, on his return, by an indiscriminate massacre. The submission of the Amir was complete; and a treaty was signed between Russia and Bokhara on June 18, 1868, the chief articles of which were the cession of the province of Zerafshan to Russia, the payment of a war indemnity, and the right of trading throughout the Khanates to all Russian subjects.

The reduction of Khiva was a corollary to that of Bokhara. In the year following the conquest of Samarkand, Khivan bands penetrated the steppes of the Orenburg government, and urged the Russian Kirghiz to revolt. The troubles, which then arose, continued till 1872, when rumours of an intended expedition reached England, and occasioned so much anxiety that Count Peter Shuvaloff was despatched to London to explain the intentions of Russia. According to his statement, which

was repeated to Parliament by Lord Granville, the sole object of the expedition about to be despatched to Khiva, was to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with impunity. In regard to the suggested desire of the Tsar to annex Khiva, Count Shuvaloff declared that not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been given to prevent it. In March, 1873, an expedition consisting of three Russian columns advanced simultaneously against Khiva. After a short bombardment, and before a final assault was made, the city capitulated, and a treaty of peace was signed, the terms of which were entirely contrary to the declared intentions of Russia, whose representatives subsequently stated that an expression of intention did not amount to a solemn pledge given for all time. The terms included the cession to Russia of the entire territory of Khiva on the right bank of the Oxus together with the delta of the river, the payment of a large indemnity, and the relegation of the Khan to the position of a dependent. In 1875 Kaufmann invaded Khokand, and defeated the Khokandians at Makhran. In 1876 the capital was occupied by a force under Skobelev, and after several engagements, in which the native forces were defeated, Khokand was declared a portion of the Russian empire, under the name of Ferghana, with General Michael Skobelev as its first Governor. Russia was thus in possession of the whole of Eastern Central Asia.

During the alarm caused in England by the conquest of Samarkand, Prince Gorchakoff, in a note of February 24, 1869, instructed the Russian ambassador, Baron Brunnow, to inform Lord Clarendon that the Tsar considered Afghanistan entirely outside the Russian sphere of activity in Asia, and that it had at no time entered his mind to interfere with the independence of that country. In 1872 he agreed with Lord Granville to delimit the Afghan frontier by an imaginary line, running from old Sarakhs to Khoja Saleh on the Oxus, and excluding Russia from the oasis of Pendjeh. On the Chinese frontier, a Mohammadan adventurer, named Jakub Beg, established himself in 1866 as ruler of Kashgar; and his growing power excited the jealousy of the Russians, who created a fortress at Naryn and occupied the district of Kulja in 1870.

In the Far East the favourable results of the Treaty of Aigun (1860) have been already indicated. The course of Russian diplomacy in China and Japan is elsewhere described, but the important transactions with reference to Russian policy in America need some notice. On December 31, 1861, there expired the last charter of the Russian American Company, to which in 1799 the trade and regulation of the Russian possessions in the region now known as Alaska had been confided. Prince Maksutoff was appointed to administer the affairs of the territory. In 1864 authority was granted to an American company to explore the territory with a view to establishing an overland telegraph line. This

led to important investigations in the Yukon district, commenced in 1865 by Robert Kennicott and others. In 1867 negotiations were initiated by the United States with the Russian Government which had no idea of the value of the territory, but was only acquainted with the difficulties and expense of its administration. These negotiations were terminated by the formal sale of the territory for 7,200,000 dollars, on October 18, 1867, to the United States.

On August 25, 1859, the long struggle of Shamil against Russia was concluded by his surrender, and the Eastern Caucasus was pacified. The tribes of the Western Caucasus offered a longer resistance, being supported by the Turks, who secretly supplied arms, by the English, who subscribed money, and by the French, whose ambassador in Constantinople openly took the side of the Tcherkesses. Thanks, however, to the energy and local knowledge of General Nicholas Evdokimoff, good progress was made. Early in 1863 the Grand Duke Michael was named Viceroy of the Caucasus, and in June, 1864, he was able to report that the country was completely subdued. The Caspian became practically a Russian lake in 1869. Since that time no ships flying the Persian flag have been allowed upon it; none but Russian companies may navigate it; and the transport of goods by sea is secured to Russia. The relations of Russia to Persia at this time were based upon a series of treaties between Great Britain and Russia beginning in 1834. The first of these, signed by Lord Palmerston in 1834, affirms the desire of the British Government to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia. This agreement was confirmed in 1838, and again in 1839, by an exchange of notes between Count Charles Robert Nesselrode and Lord Palmerston, when the latter accepted with satisfaction the declaration of the imperial Cabinet that it did not harbour any design hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India, that its own policy with regard to Persia remained unchanged, and was no other than that which the two Powers had in 1834 agreed to adopt. On July 2, 1873, Lord Granville informed the Persian Grand Vizier of the understanding arrived at in 1834, and communicated what had passed to the Russian ambassador, who expressed satisfaction.

In his relations to the Turkish Empire both in Asia and Europe, Alexander II was guided by two principles—his desire to protect the Slav Christians, and his determination to free Russia from the clauses of the Treaty of Paris relating to the Black Sea and Bessarabia, which he considered derogatory to her. Consequently, he took part in the Conference which met at Paris in 1858 and placed the Danubian Principalities under Hospodars, elected by representatives, with a reservation of Turkish suzerainty; and, as elsewhere described, gave his support to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1861, under the name of Roumania. He gave moral assistance to the French Emperor in 1859 in the question of Italian unity, as against Austria; and, had he not been estranged by



the subsequent Sardinian invasion of the Papal States, his joint action with France in regard to Syria in 1860 might have led to a complete understanding between himself and Napoleon with regard to the future of Turkey. In 1863 Alexander joined England and France in recognising Prince William of Denmark as George, King of the Hellenes; and in 1864 he approved of the British surrender of the protectorate of the Ionian Islands, and of their incorporation in the kingdom of Greece. With the appointment of General Nicholas Ignatieff in 1865 as ambassador at Constantinople, a more active policy commenced, which was accentuated by the enthusiasm excited in Russia by the Panslavist Congress, held at Moscow in 1867. In 1866 Russian diplomacy persuaded the Turks to evacuate Belgrade and the Servian fortresses, and in 1869 procured the recognition by the Porte of Milan IV as King of Servia, on the murder of his uncle, Prince Milan Obrenovitch. The action of Alexander was less fortunate in the matter of Crete, when the inhabitants rose against Turkey in 1866. He invited England and France to join him in obtaining the autonomy of that island. England refused, and the proposals of the Powers were negatived by Turkey. Greece intervened with armed force; but Prince Gorchakoff brought about a Conference at Paris in 1869 which imposed neutrality on King George, and left the Cretans to fight their own battle. In 1869 appeared Nicholas Danilevsky's famous book *Russia and Europe*, which contained the gospel of Panslavism and proclaimed the mission of Russia as a civilising power. In Bulgaria the struggle for freedom, which commenced in 1870, received the support of Ignatieff; and the first substantial result was obtained by the establishment of an exarchate independent of the Patriarch at Constantinople in 1872, and the consequent recognition of the freedom of the national Church.

In 1870 the Franco-German War gave Alexander the desired opportunity for the repudiation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, which forbade Russia to construct naval arsenals on the coast of the Black Sea, and closed those waters to all ships of war. This step excited considerable enthusiasm in Russia, and was followed by a Conference of the Treaty Powers in London in 1871. On March 13, 1871, a treaty was executed by the Powers abrogating the clauses of the Treaty of Paris which limited the naval rights of Russia on the Black Sea, but affirming the Sultan's rights to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to warships. On March 18, a convention was signed between Russia and Turkey, declaring that each Power had the right to maintain fleets of any size in the Black Sea.

The following year (1872) saw the termination of the long estrangement of Russia from Austria, and the culmination of the long friendship with the House of Hohenzollern, in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance between the three Emperors, which was for sixteen years to be the main factor in European politics.

## (2) THE BALKAN LANDS.

Through the inopportune intervention of Russia the question of the Holy Places merged into wider issues, and, after occupying the chancelleries of Europe for many months, passed out of the domain of diplomacy to the arbitrament of the sword (July 3, 1853). The story of the Crimean War is told elsewhere; its chief results for Turkey were the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and of the Tsar's claim to a special right of intervention on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Sultan; the closing of the straits to the warships of all nations; and, especially, Turkey's formal admission into the family of European Powers. In return for this concession and for the guarantee of her independence and the integrity of her territory, which looms large in the Treaty of Paris, the *hatt-i-Houmayoun* of 1856, whereby the principles of the *tanzimât* are reaffirmed and amplified, was incorporated in that international Act. The proviso however was made that the signatory Powers could base on this insertion no claim to intervene on behalf of the Christians of Turkey.

It might have been hoped that the fact that three Christian States had just taken the Sultan's side in a great war against another Christian Power would have induced the statesmen and people of Turkey to adopt and endeavour to carry out really effective measures of reform, and to establish the proclaimed equality of all classes of Ottoman subjects otherwise than theoretically and on paper. But the occurrence, not long after the conclusion of the treaty, of several fanatical outbreaks, proved once more how deep-seated were the animosities of the different nationalities. The first of these, which occurred at Jedda in June, 1858, is said to have been due to the ill-considered action of certain European officials in hauling down the Turkish flag which had been hoisted on a vessel purchased by an Ottoman subject, though the formalities of registration had not been completed. Immediately mobs began to assemble in the streets, and a rush was made for the foreign consulates, where the inmates were murdered. The comparatively few Christian residents in the town, mostly Greeks, were then slaughtered: it is to their lasting honour that not one of them accepted the offer made them by the mob of saving their lives by apostasy to Islam. England and France, whose Consuls had been killed, took vigorous action: the chief Turkish officials were held responsible and publicly executed; and the fact that fifty years later the respective embassies are still occasionally busied with claiming from the Turkish treasury the arrears of annuities due to relatives of the murdered Consuls furnishes another example of the proverbial longevity of pensioners. The energy displayed after the event by the two Powers produced a salutary impression on the ultra-fanatical population of Jedda; and nearly forty years elapsed before the next murderous attack on a consular official there.

Disturbances next broke out in 1860 in Syria and the Lebanon, which, if not actually instigated by the local authorities, at least took place with their connivance; it has been alleged that the central Government was acting with the settled purpose of punishing the population for having assisted Mehemet Ali in his designs of conquest. If this incredible story be true, it argues an astonishing lack of foresight on the part of the Porte. For the Syrian troubles were nearly the cause of the permanent occupation of the country by France, who, while loyally cooperating with England in the cause of reform, never lost sight of her own interests. The Turkish ambassador in Paris, the distinguished Ahmed Vefyk Effendi, succeeded in protracting negotiations with Drouyn de Lhuys until Fuad Pasha had arrived in Syria with 20,000 troops, and all danger of French conquest was at an end. A European Commission, in which Lord Dufferin made his first appearance in diplomacy, drew up on June 9, 1861, a Constitution for the Lebanon which, with slight modifications, has worked not unsatisfactorily until the present day. It provides for the nomination, by the representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople, in conjunction with the Porte, of a Christian (hitherto always a Roman Catholic) Governor for the Lebanon, appointed for five years but eligible for reelection.

On June 25, 1861, Abd-ul-Mejid died; he was succeeded by his brother Abd-ul-Aziz, in whose reign Turkey was not destined to enjoy more repose than in that of his predecessor. Soon after Prince Danilo's death in 1860, disturbances in Montenegro called for serious efforts on Turkey's part before they could be suppressed. On May 13, 1858, the Montenegrins had inflicted a crushing defeat on a Turkish expedition at Grahovo. Frontier incidents and an insurrection in the Herzegovina led to a renewal of the war in 1862; the superior armaments and discipline of Omar Pasha's troops overcame the valour of the mountaineers; Cetinje was invested, and on August 31, 1862, the Convention of Scutari was concluded, whereby the Montenegrins were precluded from building forts on the frontier and from importing arms.

Servia, the Principalities, and Crete were successively the scene of disturbances. At last Turkey, exasperated by the assistance openly afforded to the Cretan insurgents by the Hellenic Government, on December 11, 1868, presented an ultimatum. This required within five days compliance with five points, which provided for the cessation of the formation of bands and the equipment of ships in Greece destined for acts of aggression against Turkey. These terms being rejected, a rupture of relations ensued, and Hobart Pasha, a retired British naval officer in command of the Turkish fleet, threatened the Greek coasts with a blockade. European diplomacy intervened, and a Conference of ambassadors met at Paris on January 8, 1869. The scope of the deliberations was limited to the five points comprised in the Turkish ultimatum; and at its sixth sitting on January 28, 1869, the Conference decided

that a declaration should be forwarded to Athens calling on the Hellenic Government to comply with the Turkish demands. Greece, more than usually unprepared for a conflict with Turkey, accepted this declaration on February 6, 1869, and diplomatic relations were resumed; the grant on January 10, 1869, of a Constitution providing Crete with a measure of local self-government calmed for a time the turbulence of the islanders.

Meanwhile, Turkey had taken advantage of the complaisance of the European investor to accumulate an enormous debt in successive loans, the proceeds of which were squandered in unproductive and useless expenditure. By 1865 it had become apparent that the interest on the debt could be met only by contracting fresh liabilities; but the inevitable bankruptcy was staved off for several years. The Sultan was able to count on the prodigality of his vassal, the Viceroy of Egypt, to supplement his resources; besides a large addition to the annual tribute, vast sums were given as *bakshish* by Ismail in order to obtain the increase of his privileges, and, especially, the alteration of the law of succession. The firmans granted on May 27, 1866, and June 8, 1867, conferred on the Viceroy the title of *Khedive* (the equivalent of ruler or lord) and settled the succession on his eldest son. Until then the inheritance had devolved on the oldest male of the family, irrespective of relationship; this is still the rule followed in the House of Osman, being a custom derived from the original nomadic condition of the Turks, when the leadership of a child was obviously out of the question. Abd-ul-Aziz was the more readily inclined to make the change, as he was meditating a similar alteration of the succession to the Ottoman throne in favour of his son Youssouf Izz-ed-din, which, however, owing to adverse public opinion, he was unable to effect.

In 1867, the Sultan, accompanied by his nephew, the present Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, and by his Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, travelled to England and France—the first Ottoman sovereign who had ever undertaken such a journey. Two years later various European rulers and princes visited Constantinople on their way to the opening of the Suez Canal.

The transactions leading to the opening of the Suez Canal, which will be fully described in another volume, need some notice here, however brief. To restore the ancient waterway that led from the Nile to Suez and thence fall on the flank of the Cape route to India was one of Napoleon's dreams in 1798. A generation later, the cutting of the isthmus formed a part of the nobly-planned "Mediterranean system" of international communications devised by Michel Chevalier and popularised by the zeal of his fellow Saint-Simonians; and about that time also some such scheme fascinated Ferdinand de Lesseps, then French consul at Tunis. In 1847 the Saint-Simonian propaganda actually led to the making of a survey.

The accession of Saïd Pasha (1854–63) enabled Lesseps, who was his personal friend, to secure a comprehensive concession in that very year. Supplemented by a second document of January, 1856, it promised to the unborn company land and materials for the maritime canal and the sweet water canal, claims over all the area which the latter would irrigate, generous exemptions from taxes, and the *corvée* labour of the *fellahin*. Later in the year a strong international committee of engineers blessed Lesseps' plan. In 1855 he had opened his long campaign for Turkish recognition and European support, through the Press, public meetings, the chancelleries and the embassies. He won much sympathy; but for three years his plans broke against the wills of two old men—Stratford Canning and Palmerston—who could not believe that this scheme of a retired French diplomatist was other than a continuation of the old struggle between France and Britain for the control of the East. At length, however, in 1858, Lesseps, assured of the benevolent attitude of his own and the Austrian Governments, started his Company without the formal approval of the Porte, and work began in 1859. But for a favourable report from Sir John Hawkshaw, in Saïd's last days, Ismaïl, who succeeded him as Khedive in 1863, might have stopped the work altogether. He withdrew the *corvée* labour, resumed much of the expropriated land, and took over the sweet water canal—giving the Company compensation on a scale fixed by Napoleon III as arbitrator (1866), in which year the Porte gave a belated sanction to the enterprise.

Three years later the canal was opened. Its success was immediate and the bulk of the tonnage that passed through it was British. But, as Englishmen had subscribed very little capital, England was not possessed of influence in proportion to her interests, until Disraeli, by buying Ismaïl's shares in 1876, made the Government which had steadily opposed the canal the greatest of the Company's shareholders.

To return again, after this slight digression to an event which was to influence deeply the future of Turkey, to the mere purely internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. A noteworthy proceeding was the grant of the firman establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate as a separate religious community (March 10, 1870). The Bulgarians had long resented the tyranny of the Greeks in ecclesiastical and educational matters, and towards 1860, under French instigation, had seriously contemplated joining the Church of Rome. Several revolutionary outbreaks, which the Turks strove to characterise as mere acts of brigandage, had occurred; and in 1868 one band, under Hajji Dimitr, had crossed the Danube and had penetrated as far inland as Kezanlik, before encountering serious opposition. Russia, gradually improving her relations with Turkey, took advantage of her growing strength and of the Porte's apprehensions to press for the concession of an independent Church to the Bulgarians, her

fellow-worshippers and fellow-Slavs; and Turkey eventually yielded, in spite of the protestations and warnings of the Oecumenical Patriarch. The Phanar finally fulminated a decree of excommunication against the adherents of the new ecclesiastical denomination, whose only point of divergence from the Orthodox Church lay in the fact that they used in their liturgy the Bulgarian instead of the Greek language. The effect was at first to produce among the Bulgarians a feeling of unbounded loyalty towards the Sultan. But this evanescent sentiment soon gave way to the awakening consciousness of nationality, and the Exarchate Firman of 1870 was the direct forerunner of the Bulgarian insurrections of 1875-6, just as these led in turn to the Russo-Turkish War and the loss of Bulgaria to Turkey.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870, by crippling for a time the power of France, offered to Russia an opportunity of which she was not slow to take advantage. There is indeed little doubt that her neutrality had been conceded at the outbreak of the war on condition that Prussia would allow her, if circumstances permitted, to denounce those clauses of the Treaty of Paris which she found most galling, *i.e.* those which restricted her sovereign rights in the Euxine. Far-sighted statesmen had long foreseen that these restrictions would not be endured by Russia indefinitely, and Lord Palmerston had prophesied that they would last only ten years. When it became clear that France could not move and that England would be left alone to assume the championship of the treaty, the Russian Chancellor, by a note dated October 31, 1870, denounced the articles of the Treaty of Paris which limited Russia's naval forces and armaments in the Black Sea. This action was based on the allegation that infractions of the treaty had already occurred in the modifications of the status of the Principalities, and in the passage of the straits by certain warships, contrary to its provisions. Europe found no satisfactory rejoinder to this application of the theory that one breach of an engagement, if established, justifies another. The British Government was obliged to state that, while treaties in a general way were binding, Russia might have asked for the revision of such of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris as pressed unduly on her, and that in that event Her Majesty's Government would have taken her wishes into consideration. The upshot was that a Conference met in London, and on March 13, 1871, a treaty was signed restoring to both Russia and Turkey the power of possessing unrestricted naval forces in the Black Sea.

The outbreak of the Crimean War was hailed by the anti-Turkish party in Greece as the long-awaited opportunity of freeing their compatriots from the Turkish yoke. Russia's triumph was looked upon as certain, the King and Queen actively supported the policy of aggression, and the Greeks hastened to carry out the armed invasion of Thessaly

and Epirus. Some 6000 men took part in the inroad, which was little more than brigandage and cattle-lifting on an unusually large scale. Turkey's official patience gave way, and all Greek subjects were expelled from the empire; when at last the Turkish troops came up, the invaders offered little resistance. Finally, England and France interfered: on April 22, 1854, England threatened Greece that, if she persisted in squandering her scanty resources in attacking Turkey, it would become necessary to insist on compliance with those clauses of the treaty establishing King Otho on the throne which made the payment of the interest on the guaranteed loan a first charge on the state revenues. In May, 1854, the Piræus was occupied by English and French troops, which remained in occupation until February, 1857. King Otho was required by England and France to give an undertaking that Greece would preserve strict neutrality during the continuance of the war, failing which Athens would be occupied by Anglo-French troops at the cost of the country. By her ill-considered and unsuccessful action Greece thus lost the respect of friends and foes alike, and sacrificed the prestige gained during the war of independence. The continuance of brigandage in particular compromised Greece seriously in the eyes of Europe, and directly resulted in prolonging the foreign occupation of the Piræus.

During the Paris Conference the guaranteeing Powers decided to take measures for the amelioration of Greek affairs: and a commission was sent to enquire into the state of the finances. But the divergence of views between the three Powers prevented any good result. On May 4, 1859, the Commission published its report, in which attention is directed to the manifold shortcomings of the Government in financial matters, and the conclusion is drawn that a sum of 900,000 francs, subject to eventual increase, should be paid annually by Greece towards the interest and sinking-fund of the guaranteed loan; in June, 1860, Greece agreed to these terms, but failed to carry them out.

Meanwhile, the unpopularity of the King and Queen increased daily. The war of 1859 between Austria and Italy brought out strongly the divergence between the Court, which was entirely in favour of Austria, and the people, whose sympathies were naturally with the Italians. Discontent prevailed throughout the army, and the desire to rid the country of the Bavarian domination grew apace. Even the frustration of an attempt to murder the Queen (September 18, 1861) failed to restore popularity to the discredited royal pair. Five months later the garrison of Nauplia openly revolted, and the mutiny was not suppressed for nearly two months. The King endeavoured to gain favour by lending his support to a visionary scheme for the invasion of Turkey in imitation of Garibaldi's successful raid, and by actively fomenting discontent against English rule in the Ionian Islands. But the disaffection of the people was increased by the doubts as to the succession to the throne. The Constitution of 1844 required that King Otho's

successor should be a member of the Orthodox Church, and the absence of a properly qualified heir afforded a powerful argument to the anti-dynastic party. Warnings of impending revolution were unheeded. In October, 1862, when the King and Queen had left for a tour through the country, the revolt of the troops at Vonitsa, near Arta, spread rapidly to the capital. On October 22, 1862, a provisional Government was formed which declared the deposition of King Otho, and announced the forthcoming convocation of a national assembly for the election of his successor and the drawing up of a fresh constitution. King Otho was unable to return to Athens, and on October 24, 1862, he left Greece for ever; five years later he died. His departure was for the guaranteeing Powers a matter for neither surprise nor regret: all recognised the right of the Greek people to expel a sovereign whose mismanagement and incompetence were abundantly proved.

By the treaties and protocols of 1832 it had been provided that no person connected with the reigning families of the three guaranteeing Powers could be chosen to occupy the Greek throne. On the deposition of King Otho England at once proposed to France and Russia to re-affirm this principle, and the Cabinets of Paris and St Petersburg expressed a praiseworthy desire to respect the choice of the people of Greece, so long as any likelihood existed of its falling on a prince of their respective nationalities. But they hastened to comply with the British proposal when it became evident that the Greeks were determined to elect Prince Alfred, afterwards Duke of Edinburgh. On December 4, 1862, the three Powers joined in a formal declaration excluding their princes from the throne of Greece, which was communicated to the provisional Government on December 13, 1862. But when the matter was referred to popular suffrage, out of 241,202 votes cast 230,016 were in favour of Prince Alfred and only 2400 for the Russian candidate, the Duke of Leuchtenberg. England now felt it her duty to show gratitude for the choice of an English prince, even though debarred from accepting the proffered Crown. She accordingly notified the provisional Government that if a suitable person were chosen as King, if the constitutional form of government were preserved, and all attempt at aggression against Turkey were abandoned, the Ionian Islands would be ceded to Greece.

After various personages had refused the vacant throne, the choice eventually fell on Prince William, the second son of King Christian of Denmark, who on March 30, 1863, was unanimously elected as King George I. On June 5, 1863, the Powers entered into a treaty by which they recognised the election; England undertook that the legislature of the Ionian Islands, before the annexation to Greece was effected, should vote a sum of £10,000 annually to the King's Civil List—thus raised to £45,000. Each of the three Powers consented to relinquish in favour of King George an income of £4000—in all £12,000—out of the 900,000 francs which Greece had undertaken to pay annually in respect



of the guaranteed loan. In compliance with these conditions effect was given on May 30, 1864, to the constantly expressed desire of the Ionian legislature; and this State, which by the treaty of 1815 had been placed under British protection, but which had never properly realised the benefits derived by it from an arrangement to which it was not a party, was annexed to Greece on condition that the forts should be dismantled and that perpetual neutrality should be observed. Popular satisfaction found expression at the time in songs not complimentary to the late rulers; but it was not long before many regretted the period when the only public works in the Islands had been carried out. Nor were the islanders slow to appreciate the advantages of the English sovereign as a circulating medium over the unwelcome notes of the National Bank of Greece.

The Provisional Government which managed the affairs of the country until King George's arrival was as incompetent to maintain order as its predecessors. Civil war prevailed at Athens; on July 3, 1863, British, French and Russian troops had to be landed for the protection of the Bank; and on the same day the three Powers threatened a rupture of relations unless tranquillity was restored. Some semblance of order was hereupon established; and King George's arrival on October 30, 1863, found the National Assembly discussing the new Constitution which was to take the place of that of 1844, abrogated by the revolution of 1862. A year later, the new Constitution became law, being ratified on November 28, 1864. Its provisions are of a strongly democratic character, and confer on the people liberties which have been allowed but too frequently to degenerate into licence. One legislative Chamber was established, each member receiving a salary of 2000 drachmae (£80). The Senate created by the Constitution of 1844 had distinguished itself mainly by illegally prolonging its existence and therewith the enjoyment of its emoluments; the National Assembly of 1862 in drafting the Constitution decided to dispense with a second Chamber, more especially as Greece contained no class from which its members could be supplied. But the total suppression of an upper Chamber being considered too democratic a measure, it was agreed to create a Council of State—of from fifteen to twenty members—named for ten years by the King upon the recommendation of the Ministers. The duties of this body were to consist in preparing and revising projects of law; but, in spite of the wishes of the King and his Ministers, it was abolished by a vote of the Chamber on November 19, 1865. The Assembly thus freed itself from the one salutary check on its action; it has since been the tool of demagogues, and subservient to the inordinately sensitive and passionate public opinion, which is so marked a feature of the modern Greek democracy.

The new régime was more successful in establishing discipline in the army and order in the administration than in constitution-making. Its

relations with Turkey were far from cordial: reference has been made already to the rupture over Cretan affairs in 1868-9. Brigandage continued to be the scourge of the country until 1870, when a more than usually conspicuous outrage at Marathon on April 11 of that year induced the Powers to adopt towards Greece so peremptory a tone that efficacious measures were taken, and brigandage disappeared for many years.

During the Russian occupation at the outset of the Crimean War, Russian Governors were appointed to Bucharest and Jassy. When, in 1854, the Russian troops were withdrawn from the Principalities, the Princes returned, accompanying the Austrian army which took the place of the Russians. Prince Stirbey continued to effect reforms, among these being the total emancipation of the gypsies: Prince Ghyka, his colleague in Moldavia, followed a practically identical course of action, and greatly contributed to the eventual union of the Principalities. The two Princes' septennate of office came to a close in 1856, the year of the signature of the Treaty of Paris. By that instrument the portion of Bessarabia bordering on the Danube was incorporated with Moldavia, and a European Commission was instituted for regulating and supervising the navigation of the river; Russian exclusive protection was suppressed, and Turkey undertook to maintain an independent and national administration for the Principalities. It was further agreed that the existing laws should be revised by a special international commission to be convoked at Bucharest, while a "*divan ad hoc*," or Constituent Assembly, was to meet in each of the Principalities to discuss and transmit to the Commission the views of the population as to the definitive organisation of the provinces; the Commission was to draw up its report without delay, and a convention was to be concluded by the Powers and confirmed by a *hatt-i-Sherif* which should in future constitute the organic charter of the provinces, placed henceforth under the collective guarantee of the Powers signatory to the treaty.

These stipulations had been agreed to as a *pis-aller* by England and France, whose representatives at the Paris Conference had proposed the union of the Principalities, a proposal strongly opposed by Austria and Turkey. It was at once obvious that every obstacle would be placed in the way of a free expression of opinion by the population. Turkey appointed in each Principality acting Governors, instead of commissions of lieutenancy, who worked energetically against the union; Austrian intrigue was indefatigable in seeking to pack the Divans and to limit their field of discussion; moreover, England's advocacy of the union soon gave way to a less friendly attitude, through apprehensions that it would be too favourable to Russian interests—a consideration destined to weigh with her representatives at Berlin in the case of Bulgaria some twenty years later. France now took up the question

vigorously; and Napoleon III in an interview at Osborne in August, 1857, sought to induce Queen Victoria to acquiesce in the proposed union. But the fear of facilitating Russian aggrandisement proved too strong; England would only agree to certain internal measures of union; and France was obliged to content herself with the formal satisfaction of the annulling of the improperly conducted elections to the Moldavian Divan, and the holding of fresh elections.

The Divans met in September, 1857; and the Wallachian Divan decided on submitting to the international commission at Bucharest the following *desiderata*: guarantee of autonomy and neutrality for Moldo-Wallachia; union of Wallachia and Moldavia in a single State with one Government; appointment of a Prince belonging to some European dynasty, with hereditary succession; establishment of constitutional representative government, with one Chamber, based on an extensive suffrage. The Moldavian Divan also voted the same four points. Turkey, much disappointed at the result, proceeded to dissolve the two Divans. The ambassadors of the Powers now assembled at Paris in May, 1858, and on August 19, 1858, concluded a convention embodying a constitution proposed by France, which excluded a political and administrative union. None the less it endowed the "United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia," as they were therein styled in an official terminology savouring somewhat of irony, with a large measure of constitutional autonomy and some appearance of internal union: thus Moldavians and Wallachians were declared eligible for any office in either principality. Separate Hospodars (Princes), and separate elective assemblies, were provided for each principality; but a Central Commission common to both was to sit at Fokshani.

The nomination of the two Princes was by the Convention referred to popular suffrage under the superintendence of commissions of lieutenancy, consisting of the three highest officials in each principality. But the Powers had not taken into account the contingency of the choice of both principalities falling on the same person. After many intrigues and much discussion, the Moldavian electoral assembly on January 5, 1859, unanimously elected as Prince of Moldavia, Alexander John Couza, a colonel who had attracted favourable notice by his resignation during the discussions attending the elections to the Moldavian Divan. On January 23, 1859, the Wallachian assembly chose the same candidate, and the "personal" union of the two principalities, so long the subject of opposition, became an accomplished fact. Austria indeed showed signs of an intention to occupy the principalities, but the Italian war claimed all her attention. On September 6, 1859, the Conference of ambassadors sitting at Paris took formal cognisance of Turkey's recognition of Prince Couza's nomination to both principalities, exceptionally and *pro hac vice*; and the first Prince of the United Principalities was left to enter upon his sufficiently arduous task.

It was soon clear that this exceeded his ability: the working of the Constitution was attended with constant difficulties, notwithstanding the modifications successively introduced. By the first of these, the firman of December 6, 1861, the Porte consented to the abolition of the Central Commission and to the establishment of a common Chamber and Ministry; subsequently, in the Convention agreed to at Constantinople on June 28, 1864, provision was made for altering the electoral law and instituting a Senate and a Council of State. By endeavouring to confiscate the ecclesiastical properties, and by enfranchising the peasants, Prince Couza incurred the enmity both of the Church and the boyars. The unwise introduction of a government monopoly of tobacco put the finishing stroke to his unpopularity. On February 23, 1866, he was the victim of the first of those nocturnal palace depositions which have since become the regular methods of revolution in Balkan States: armed conspirators forced their way into his apartments and compelled him to abdicate. A provisional Government was formed and the nation was convoked for the election of a Prince belonging to some foreign reigning House, though this was an infringement of the Constitution of 1858. The people's choice fell on the Count of Flanders, younger brother of the King of the Belgians, but Turkey raised strong objections and began to mass troops along the frontier.

The crisis was ended temporarily by the refusal of the Count of Flanders to accept the dignity offered him; Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was next elected by acclamation on April 20, 1866. The Powers at once protested, and the Conference of ambassadors then sitting in Paris agreed, on April 24, 1866, at the suggestion of the Russian ambassador, to instruct the foreign representatives at Bucharest to declare that the Convention of August 19, 1858, restricted the choice of the assembly to a native, and, moreover, that, if a majority of the Moldavian deputies should declare against the union, such a vote would entail the separation of the two Principalities. On May 11, 1866, the assembly by 118 votes to six abstentions voted the union under Prince Charles; it also decreed the naturalisation of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family, thus hoping to remove the technical objection on the ground of nationality. Russia and Turkey demanded the strict application of the international agreement of September 6, 1859, which stipulated that in the event of any infringement of its provisions an enquiry should be held on the spot by an Ottoman Commissioner and delegates of the Powers. They also suggested coercive measures; but the opposition of England and France defeated the proposal. The Austrian War diverted attention from the question, the Prince was supported by England, France and Prussia; and on October 23, 1866, an imperial firman recognised Prince Charles, with hereditary succession and the right of increasing the army to 30,000 men. A new Constitution had been voted by the Assembly on July 12, 1866, on which day the Prince

took an oath to respect it. This Constitution declared the country to be a single and indivisible State, under the name of Roumania. It provided for a Senate and a Chamber of deputies, and endowed the people with the liberties usually conferred in similar charters, such as equality and the abolition of titles, the freedom of conscience, of the Press, and of public meeting; but it failed to grant to the Jews the privileges of citizenship, and by its radical character accentuated the cleavage between the Conservative and Liberal parties, thereby giving rise from the outset to acute and rancorous political controversies. Finally, it laid down that if the throne should become vacant without a successor being forthcoming the two Chambers should meet to elect a Prince belonging to one of the sovereign dynasties of Europe.

The path of a foreign Prince called to rule a Balkan State is not strewn with roses. In spite of great qualities and an attractive personality, Prince Charles gradually grew unpopular; his marriage on November 15, 1869, with Princess Elizabeth of Wied did little to counteract this feeling. The Roumanians have always been strongly Gallophil; and it was thought that the Prince did not show sufficient gratitude for the constant support which France had given him. The candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne alienated French sympathy from Prince Charles; the consequence was in certain quarters in Roumania a growing hostility towards him, culminating in August, 1870, in an anti-dynastic outbreak at Ploeshti. Moreover the finances had been thrown into disorder by the failure of the German banker Strousberg, to whom large railway concessions had been granted. The Prince now determined to abdicate, and in December, 1870, addressed letters to the sovereigns of Europe explaining that his position had become intolerable. But statesmen of different parties united to urge Prince Charles to reconsider this decision. A journey throughout the principality convinced him that the country was firmly attached to him; and the complete victory gained by the Government at the elections of May 22, 1871, induced him to abandon all idea of abdication.

The relations between Roumania and Turkey had not been untroubled, although Prince Charles had maintained a uniformly correct attitude, rejecting the proposals of Greece to unite against Turkey in 1869, just as he had refused in 1866 to listen to the advances of Hungarian emissaries anxious to take advantage of Austria's embarrassments. The asylum afforded to Bulgarian revolutionaries, and the passage of Bulgarian bands across the Danube, more than once gave occasion for sharp reproof from the Porte, which also protested against the coinage of money by Roumania (March, 1870). Such tension between suzerain and vassal is almost inevitable; Prince Charles deserves credit for not having allowed it to become acute.

During the Crimean War Austria imposed on Servia a strict neutrality from which Prince Alexander Karageorgevitch, who had no special cause for friendship towards Russia, saw no sound reason for departing. But this subservience to Austria was held up by his enemies as a crime; and, when Servia was found to have gained nothing by the Treaty of Paris, the Prince's unpopularity increased rapidly. On December 23, 1858, the Assembly voted his deposition and the recall after nearly twenty years' exile of Milosh Obrenovitch. The few months of Milosh's second reign showed him to have preserved his autocratic ideas unaltered. He presented a bold front to both Turkey and Austria, and one of his last acts was to induce the Assembly to vote a declaration, recognising the hereditary right of the House of Obrenovitch to the throne. On his death on September 26, 1860, his son Michael succeeded him. This prince at once took measures for curtailing the authority of the Senators and for rendering them amenable to the law. He also introduced fiscal reforms and reorganised the army. To Prince Michael is due the final evacuation of Servia by the Turkish garrisons, whose residence was restricted by treaty to the actual fortresses, save at Belgrade where a suburb was assigned to the Turks. In course of time Servians also began to inhabit this suburb, and hence conflicts frequently arose. On June 15, 1862, a more than usually serious riot took place; the fortress of Belgrade, threatened with an attack, replied by a bombardment of the city (June 17, 1862) and matters assumed a serious aspect. Turkish Commissioners were sent to hold an enquiry which in the excited state of the public mind proved abortive. The Powers decided that Turkey's right to garrison the forts, consecrated by treaty, could not be called in question; but it was considered advisable to summon a conference of the ambassadors at Constantinople to devise some compromise which should be acceptable to both Turkey and Servia.

On September 4, 1862, the ambassadors drew up a protocol whereby it was agreed that all Moslems should be withdrawn from Servia save the actual garrisons of Belgrade, Feth Islam, Shabatz, and Semendria, Servia undertaking to compensate the dispossessed Moslem proprietors. Obligated to content himself for the time with this concession, Prince Michael continued to work for the complete evacuation of the fortresses. The war of 1866 left Austria, its chief opponent, disinclined for the possibilities of a campaign on the Save; and, after carefully paving the way by acquiring the good-will of the other Powers, Prince Michael, on October 29, 1866, addressed to the Grand Vizier a letter, dwelling in courteous and temperate language on the uselessness to Turkey of the right of garrison and the great importance which Servia attached to its abandonment. The tone of this communication, and the desirability of conciliating Servia at a time when the Christians of Turkey were in a state of unrest, induced the Porte to give way, and on March 3, 1867, the Grand Vizier informed the Prince that the Sultan was willing to

allow the substitution of Servian for Turkish troops, on condition that the Turkish flag should be hoisted over the forts together with that of Servia. But the adherents of the Karageorgevitch dynasty viewed Prince Michael's successes with unpatriotic dissatisfaction, and on June 10, 1868, he was assassinated while walking in his grounds. A strong attempt was made to proclaim as his successor Peter Karageorgevitch, but the hurriedly summoned National Assembly declared that family to be perpetually excluded from the throne, and conferred the succession to the murdered Prince on his cousin Milan, then aged 14.

The regency appointed during Milan's minority proceeded to elaborate a new and more Liberal Constitution, whereby the Senate or Council of Administration was abolished, and supreme authority was vested in the Prince and the National Assembly. This Constitution, promulgated on July 11, 1869, remained in force until January 3, 1889.

### (3) RUSSIAN LITERATURE.

(1800-1900.)

Russian literature, in the years covered by the present volume, passes through two stages, one of romance and the other of realism. The first stage is indissolubly connected with the names of Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) and Michael Lermontoff (1811-41). Pushkin, though the possessor of a historic Russian name, and brought up in a household characteristic of the old Russian nobility, was of negro blood on his mother's side. Neither in appearance nor genius was he a typical Russian. His poetry is beautiful in form, happy in expression, and adroit in versification, but has neither depth, nor elevation of feeling. His great services to Russian literature consisted in throwing off the yoke of French classicism, purifying the language, creating a literary style, and arousing an intellectual life. His first verses, circulated in manuscript as was then the custom, were entitled *Ruslan* and *Ludmila*, and show the influence of the folk-lore learned from his nurse. His next works, *An Ode to the Knife*, some epigrams on Arakcheieff, and the profane and licentious *Gabrielid*, entailed on him a temporary exile to the southern provinces, where he was inspired by the grandeur of the Caucasian scenery, and where he studied the poems of Byron, whom he calls the master of his thoughts, but whose love of freedom and hatred of hypocrisy he never understood or shared. His most popular work, *Eugene Onyeghin*, is a novel in verse, its hero a dull, selfish profligate, without a vestige of the mysterious charm with which Byron could invest his characters. Pushkin was in fact a sybarite, with a strong admixture of the negro. He was killed in a duel at an early age, at the height of his fame, but, *felix morte sua*, as he had exhausted both his mental and physical powers. One looks in his work in vain for the mysticism and spirit of unrest which characterises the most distinguished

of his successors. His melancholy was not that of the philosopher, but that of the worn-out man of pleasure; his religious sentiment is merely part of the scenery which he uses for dramatic effect. Even his patriotism has no definitely national ring.

Michael Lermontoff, also in part an alien through his Scotch ancestor George Learmonth, was more thoroughly Byronic in his cynical contempt for his age and surroundings, as well as in his rejection of all authority. He rose to fame by some passionate verses on the death of Pushkin, directed against the circle round the throne. His chief poem, *The Demon*, is a story of a fallen angel, exiled from Paradise, who is enamoured of a Georgian princess. The descriptions of the Caucasus—to which, like Pushkin, he was exiled—contain passages of exquisite beauty; and the power with which the evil spirit is represented recalls Milton rather than Byron. The scenes remain graven on the mind, and many of the lines, once read, vibrate on the memory. Lermontoff also wrote a novel, *A Hero of our Time*, giving a most graphic picture of the disenchantment which had come over literary society. His pessimism is not merely the pessimism of despair; it is a militant, almost a spiteful, protest against all that is ignoble in Russian life. All his heroes strive against the stream. Like Pushkin, Lermontoff perished in a duel at an early age.

Vissarion Bielinski (1810-42), the great national critic, marked and encouraged the transition from romance to realism. He pointed out that all that could be said about gloom, disenchantment, ideals, the celestial virgins, the moon, the hatred of the human race, lost youth, treachery, brigands, poniards and poison, had already been said and repeated a thousand times, in the beautiful creations of Pushkin and his imitators. The time for juvenile enthusiasm was over; the time for serious thought had now come. The reading public was not only growing wider; it was becoming more exacting, and no longer either understood or cared for lyric poetry. It became necessary to direct attention wholly to the people, the masses, to depict common men, and not merely those pleasant exceptions from the universal rule, which produced a false idealisation, and bore on them a foreign and romanticist stamp. Bielinski discovered the need of this transition, Gogol accomplished it.

The first works of Nicholas Gogol (1807-52), the great national satirist, the founder of Russian realism, were published at the same time as the last poems of Lermontoff, and, as Bielinski observed, "the reign of the novel began." It has never waned. In Gogol's novels, *The Mantle* and *Dead Souls*, and in his play *The Inspector*, the Russia of Nicholas I found herself confronted with a pitiless mirror, which revealed every wrinkle in a visage seamed by the corruption, brutality, and ignorance of a tyrannical bureaucracy and the nameless miseries of serfdom, hopeless, helpless, and irresponsible in its degradation. It is a picture of unspeakable gloom; and, as the author said, his countrymen looked at



it in terror. He invented types from which, through infinite variety, the works of Russian genius which followed him were to proceed. "We have all come forth," said a successor, "from the mantle of Gogol."

Among these successors three stand out preeminent: Ivan Turgenieff (1818-83), Feodor Dostoievski (1822-81), and Lyof Tolstoi (born 1828). In artistic construction, in the finish and beauty of his work, Turgenieff surpassed his great contemporaries; his knowledge of the human heart is profound, and his greatest successes are attained in depicting the heart of a young, thoroughly honest, and reasoning girl, when she awakes to higher feelings and ideas, and above all when that awakening takes, unconsciously, the form of love. Of this the character of Lisa in *The Nobleman's Nest* is perhaps at once the most touching, and the most typical instance in his work; here the strength and purity of character of an unschooled maid resemble the shadow of a great rock in a weary land, to which all turn for refuge. The heroes are generally like Turgenieff himself, aristocrats—Russian gentlemen who have completed their education abroad, well-bred, well-mannered, well-informed, but fit for nothing except making love, and, even in love, irresolute and destitute of initiative and energy. Sometimes, as in the case of Rudin, they are so incapable of action as even to be guilty of cowardice; or again, though patriots and full of knowledge, honourable feeling, and disinterested eagerness to serve their country, they are ruined by an utter incapacity to face difficulties, by a fatal predisposition to despondency, and by a total lack of saving common sense. But in each novel there is a striking figure—such as that of Bazaroff (the first Nihilist) in *Fathers and Sons*—which marks a stage in the moral and intellectual growth of the country; and in each book, from the *Sportsman's Sketches* onwards, there is a grace, a tenderness, a delicacy of touch and feeling, not to be found in the work of his great rivals.

Dostoievski takes us a step further in our knowledge of Russian pathos and the Russian feeling of *ochaiania*, so inadequately translated by the English word "despair." *Ochaiania* is partly no doubt the result of the long struggle of man with nature which the Russian climate necessitates; but it is also the brand of the Tartar yoke, just as the gospel of suffering which Dostoievski preaches, and his unfathomable depths of compassion, mystic, wild and weird in its manifestations, proclaim the origin of Russian Christianity to be as truly Byzantine as does the church of St Basil at Moscow. That church is not, as Napoleon called it, a mosque, but, for all its labyrinth of strangeness, a church of the true Christ—the Christ of the weak, the down-trodden, and the maimed in mind, body, and spirit. No other work save the *Inferno* of Dante produces on the reader the impression made by *The Poor People* and *Memories of the House of the Dead*; an impression of bitter, helpless, hopeless, endless suffering. Hither, into darkness that can be felt, only one ray of comfort penetrates—the word which the peasant soldier

whispered to the author himself, when in gaol in Siberia, "You are sorely tried. Suffer with patience. Christ also suffered." Nowhere else in modern literature are the feelings of those who, like Russian dissenters from the established religion, not only suffer, but also torture themselves for conscience' sake, so clearly represented. Nowhere is there the same sympathy not only with crime and the criminal—a genuine Russian trait—but also with the insane. It is difficult in Western literature to parallel the horrors of the end of the prisoner Michailoff in *Crime and Punishment*. It is even more difficult for the Western mind to understand many of the characters, their words, and actions. That Sonia, a poor prostitute, should bear her calling like a cross, with resignation and piety; that Raskolnikoff should fall at her feet and worship her, a girl who maintains her parents by her shame; and that, when she lifts him up, he should say "I am not bowing before you, I am prostrating myself before all the suffering of humanity"—these are hard sayings, but they contain the key to Dostoievski's religion. He believes that only by suffering can humanity rise, and that, by suffering and expiation, any and every crime can be redeemed. He has faithfully portrayed his own life, his own struggles, his own exile, his own misery. To the student of psychology and religion he reveals new worlds in these lengthy volumes. They cannot be recommended as either light or pleasant reading; but they are works of genius which set forth a side of human nature never before portrayed with such accuracy and insight, though without a touch of pruriency or a trace of that gloating over human misery, vice, brutality, and crime, which characterises the Russian literature of despair in the hands of lesser writers of the period.

In Tolstoi we have the most complete, and, so far as this period is concerned, the final, manifestation of Russian literary effort. But the labourer's task is not yet over, and it is impossible to appreciate so great a genius till his last word is written; and one of his greatest works, *Resurrection*, is also one of the most recent. An aristocrat by birth and education, a gallant soldier, a sportsman, a man of fashion, a country gentleman, a historian, an economist, a philosopher, a theologian and a mystic—these are many parts to fill, but he has filled them all and in a most striking fashion. Who can forget the entry of Kitty into the ball at Moscow in *Anna Karénina*, or the *salon* of Anna Scherer in *War and Peace*, and the respectful melancholy with which the imperial family was mentioned there? The account of snipe-shooting and the steeplechase at Tsarskoye Selo, in *Anna Karénina*, are masterpieces of their kind; and the description of the author's experiences in Sevastopol is regarded by experts as an authoritative historical document. In *War and Peace* we find, in spite of the Censorship, a complete review of the religious and political problems of the time. This review includes the origin and growth of national consciousness, for the novel is in fact a great national epic, a paean of triumph over the defeat of the French in 1812, in which

the part played by the Russian peasant in the national development and his value as a moral force are made clear. In *Anna Karénina* the everlasting tragedy of unlawful love, which played so large a part in the literature of the nineteenth century, is treated with unparalleled power, judgment, tact, good feeling, and truth. Side by side with the inexorable *descensus Averni* of the adulterers, there is the course of the true and honourable love of Kitty and Levin rising from strength to strength, through all the changes and chances of this mortal life. In the background is the growth of Tolstoi's own religious beliefs. His creed, which is largely though not wholly negative, may be summed up in the following commandments: Be not angry; do not commit adultery; take no oath; use no violence even in self-defence; make no war—a creed which later leads him to call himself an anarchist, and to say that the three things which he hates are autocracy, orthodoxy, and militarism.

But it is not for his political and religious views that he will be read so long as Russian civilisation endures—it is for his marvellous insight into the characters of men and women, and above all for his comprehension of his countrymen. His portraits of emperors, statesmen, generals, noblemen, officials, merchants, and peasants, form a gallery which no historian of this epoch can neglect. Moreover, Tolstoi is one of the few Russians who never writes unless he has something new to say, something which his conscience compels him to utter; he also is one of the few who always know what they want, and whose object in writing is always good. Ever independent in thought and action, all his writings show an independent spirit full of profound ideas and profound convictions. In his own words, the heroine of his story, whom he loves with all his heart, and whom he desires to represent in all her beauty, is Truth. In his novels he never moralises, but the effect of his work is in the highest degree a purification of the passions, by pity and fear. There is no need to prefix to *Anna Karénina* the words "Vengeance is mine, I will repay." At every step in the pitiless analysis of the main characters down to Anna's suicide, no less than in episodes like the death of Levin's brother, we are conscious of a sovran presence, more than mortal, august and awe-inspiring, watching, directing, loving, healing, and above all punishing, with just but unfaltering hand.

In conclusion, if it be thought that too great a space has been devoted to one branch of literature, to the exclusion of other forms of art, it should be remembered that in Russia, during the period under review, the novel took the place of Parliament, Pulpit, and Bar, and also to a great extent of the University and the Press. In Western countries the novel was a pastime for the leisured classes; in Russia it was, to all who could read, as manna in the wilderness. The novelist was the guide, philosopher, and friend of the individual, the poet, priest and prophet of the race. To him his readers looked not only for an answer to all the problems of their daily life below, but also for an ideal of the life of the world to come; and they did not look in vain.

#### (4) NATIONAL INFLUENCES IN BOHEMIAN AND POLISH LITERATURE.

The first notable Čechish national manifesto is to be dated from March, 1792, when three and thirty "Bohemian aborigines" (*i.e.* Bohemians of Slavonic origin) petitioned the Bohemian Diet against the policy of Germanising their compatriots, which had been steadily pursued under Joseph II. Somewhat later, the "nationality" idea was resuscitated by the majority of the Bohemian gentry in the Diet, as a card which might be effectively played in order to preserve their "historical rights," failing the success of the purely political methods adopted hitherto. From 1792 till 1848 its protagonists were, mostly, scholars of middle-class origin acting as tutors in the families of nobles who wished to promote Čechism for personal reasons, but, being incompetent themselves to use their native language with effect, employed the practised pens of scholars for the purpose. The long French War which seemed, at first, to arrest the national movement, ultimately gave it a fresh impetus and a new character that has influenced it profoundly ever since. The Austrian Slavs had followed with wonder and admiration the successes of the Russians against Napoleon. Their racial pride was kindled by the reflexion that Europe owed its deliverance to the one great Slavonic Power. As members of the Slavonic family they claimed a share in the glory of its head. A new ideal, an enthusiasm for the solidarity of the Slavonic races, extinguished, for a time, so far at least as regards the south-western Slavs, the older striving after local autonomy, and "Panslavism" eclipsed patriotism in Bohemia.

It should be remarked, however, that Panslavism was, originally, extra-political, the affair of scholars and students rather than of statesmen. But, from the first, there was a vague, dreamy, affection for a Slavonic policy; and, during the long residence of the Russian "deliverers" at Prague in 1813, a very amicable intercourse began between Russian officers and Čech professors which was kept alive by epistolary correspondence long after the northern visitors had departed. The study of the Russian tongue was now taken up with ardour by Čech scholars; and some enthusiasts, the poet Antonín Puchmajer (1769–1820) for instance, proposed the composition and propagation of a universal Slavonic language whose area was to extend from Prague to Kamschatka. But there was an infinite distance between this intellectual Panslavism and the later political Panslavism, whose fundamental postulate was the union of all the Slavonic races in a single State. The earlier stages of the movement are intimately associated with the names of three eminent Čech writers, Josef Dobrowský (1753–1829), Josef Jungmann (1773–1847), and František Palacký (1798–1876).

Dobrowský was the first critical historian of Bohemia in the modern sense of the term. František Pelcl (1734–1801) before him had done something towards sifting out the truth of the ancient annals; but it was preeminently the merit of Dobrowský that he took his stand immovably on the exclusive authority of incontrovertible documentary evidence. The attempts of later scholars to place nationality above accuracy were offensive to his severely dispassionate judgment; and, when dubious expedients were employed to prop up the crazy claims of Čechism, he protested against it with all the weight of his authority. This was notably the case in his famous exposure of the Hanka frauds.

In 1817 Václav Hanka (1791–1861), a passionate nationalist of wide but superficial scholarship discovered, in a room in the church tower of Königinhof, a parchment containing Čech poems of presumably hoary antiquity. In the following year another document (known as the Grüneberg ms) came to light embracing what purported to be the "Judgments" of the mythical Bohemian Princess Libussa. The younger generation of Čech scholars, all of them enthusiastic nationalists, including the well-known Slovak Paul Josef Šafařík (1795–1861), and the Čech, Václav Svoboda (1791–1849), hailed these discoveries with transport as revealing unimagined palaeographical depths in the Čech language. But Dobrowský, after the most searching examination, pronounced them to be forgeries; and subsequent investigations have confirmed his verdict. It is needless to enter into the details of this fierce and perennial controversy. The Čech language has by this time so firmly established itself in both literature and politics, that its importance or otherwise cannot be materially affected by the ultimate decision reached with regard to these questionable documents.

While Dobrowský laid the foundations of historical science in Bohemia, Josef Jungmann's great merit was the popularising and modernising of the Čech language, partly by means of his famous dictionary (begun in 1810 and published between 1834 and 1839) and partly in the columns of the literary journal *Krok*, financed, in the nationalist interest, by Count Frederick Berchtold. Jungmann's enthusiasm for Panslavism made him comparatively indifferent to purely Čechish aspirations—hence his *opus magnum* is not so much a Bohemian as a Slavonic lexicon. He was a zealous propagandist of the Panslavonic idea. On one occasion, by way of stimulating the youths to learn all the Slavonic languages, he gravely told his pupils at the gymnasium of Leitmeritz that, if they travelled from Leitmeritz to China, they would encounter nothing but Slavonic races. He professed his indifference as to whether Polish or Bohemian ultimately became the official language of the Austrian Slavs, and, while expressing his sympathy with the Poles in 1830, found consolation for their overthrow in the presumption that the spread of Russian influence would tend to promote the cause of Slavdom generally.

The succeeding stadium of the national movement is intimately

associated with the great name of František Palacký, who, in 1827, founded a learned periodical<sup>1</sup> to champion the cause of Čech autonomy against the out-and-out Panslavism of Hanka and other ultras. Palacký was, at first, a moderate man as well as a patriot, and openly preferred the hypercriticism of Dobrowský to the lack of all criticism in Dobrowský's detractors. The most extravagant member of the opposite camp was the Slovak poet and preacher, Jan Kollár (1793–1852), who carried Panslavism to the verge of absurdity. In his *Staroitalia Slavijanska*, Kollár tried to prove that Latin was an old Slavonic tongue corrupted by Greek influences. He attributed the facility with which the Slavs acquire Latin to the fact that it is really their second mother-tongue. He even maintained that the aboriginal inhabitants of Italy were Slavs. Yet, despite the eccentricity of his scholarship, Kollár enjoyed the extraordinary influence which must always belong to a man of genius who is also an ardent patriot. His first volume of verse published under the simple title of *Básně* (*Poems*) in 1821 established his reputation as the first of Bohemian poets. An amplified and rearranged edition appeared in 1824, under the title of *Slávy Dcera* (*The daughter of Sláva*—Sláva was a mythical Čech hero). This famous book, lyrico-epic in form, is, in substance, a pathetic lament of the oppression of the Slavs by their German neighbours. Kollár's critical views are set forth in his *Über die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten der slavischen Nation*, Pest, 1837. Palacký's clear and critical mind naturally rejected these chimeras. His position was strengthened when, in 1831, he was appointed a director of the newly instituted Čech section of the National Bohemian Museum and a member of the society "*Matice Česka*," founded, the same year, by Prince Rudolf Kinsky, for the promotion of Čechish literature. Palacký's principal work was his *History of Bohemia*, in five volumes, which appeared, from 1836 to 1876, in German and Čech simultaneously. He also wrote thirty-six politico-historical monographs, all remarkable for great ability, for an outspoken nationalism, and for a very pronounced Teutonophobia. He differed from his predecessors in being, on the whole, rather a Čech Chauvinist than a Panslavist.

In the early forties, the National Bohemian movement transgressed the domain of literary speculation and became an active political factor in the hands of demagogic agitators and adventurers. External influences, such, for instance, as the large influx of revolutionary Poles into Bohemia after Ostrolenka, and the awakening of national aspirations in the southern Slavs (this latter movement a reaction against the Magyarising policy of the Hungarian Diet), were the chief causes of this metamorphosis. The political history of this movement is recorded

<sup>1</sup> Two originally, one in Čech and the other in German. The latter, however, only lived for a few months.

elsewhere; here, we can only, very briefly, consider the effect upon Bohemian literature.

The views of the Čech nobility were best expressed in Count Leo Thun's pamphlet, *Über den gegenwärtigen Stand der böhmischen Literatur* (1842), which favoured the official adoption of the Čech language, but also postulated mutual forbearance among the various races in the Austrian dominions. Palacký delivered a series of brilliant lectures advocating the federalistic union of all the nationalities with a central authority at Vienna. Two very notable works of this period were the *Naše znovuzrození* (*Our Regeneration*) of Jakub Malý (1811–85) in favour of the old Čech programme of local autonomy and gradual reform, and the *Paměti* (*Memoirs*) of Josef Frič (1829–90) which combined political Radicalism with violent Panslavism. Another stormy petrel was Karel Havlíček (1831–56) who, as editor of the *Národní Noviny*, exercised a determining influence over the masses. His political views were ultra-Čechish, but a brief visit to Russia effectually cured him of Panslavism. In his later days Palacký, while distrustful of Russia, was also opposed to any close union between Austria and Germany. Thus on April 11, 1848, he deprecated the election of Austrian representatives to the Federal Diet. His views were crystallised in the famous phrase, "If the Austrian Imperial State did not exist already, in the interests alike of Europe and humanity, it would have to be invented"; which defines his point of view fairly well. The reaction after the Revolution of 1848 condemned impartially all the conflicting constitutional programmes, and, when a relative freedom of speech was once more permitted after 1860, the political oracles of the Bohemian nation, for some years to come, did little more than flatly contradict each other as they had always done.

The principle of nationality among the Austrian Slavs, at least in its earlier stages, seems a trifle academic to an outsider. Anyhow, it was largely stimulated by linguistic aspirations. With the Poles, on the other hand, it has ever been a political *sine qua non*, the natural condition of things in fact. The cause of this sharp distinction is very simple. An unbridgeable chasm of ages separates the western and southern Slavs from the period of their independent historical existence, whereas Poland survived to the very end of the eighteenth century, nay, almost to the middle of the nineteenth century, if we count the Congressional Kingdom and the Republic of Cracow as genuine if extenuated prolongations of the ancient State. For the same reason Panslavism, as a definite political programme, could never appeal to the sympathies of the Poles. Their ancient and glorious traditions made it impossible for them to regard Russia, their secular antagonist, in the light of a protector. The rehabilitation of Poland, as a leading independent element in the Slavonic world, has always been the aim of the Polish

nationalists. So far, the ambition of the "Reds" and the "Whites" (these terms, though not prevalent till 1863, may conveniently be used to denote the Revolutionaries and the Conservatives) has always been identical. It is only on the question of how to realise this ambition that they are hopelessly divided.

From 1815 to 1849 the "Reds" indisputably held the field and to their ultra individuality, indiscipline, and utter lack of practicability (the three original, and, apparently, ineradicable vices of old Poland) the disasters of the Poles in modern times are mainly attributable. The literary oracle and champion of this party was the historian Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861). His political principles are best expressed in *Considerations on the history of Poland and her people*, written, originally (1844), in French, and subsequently (1855), translated by the author into Polish and German. He rightly insisted that one of the chief causes of the fall of Poland was the aristocratic aloofness of the *szlachta*, or gentry, from the nation at large; but, in attempting to redress the balance, by an indissoluble union between Western democracy and the Polish people, he only submerged Polish patriotism in the flood of a Jacobinism which was inherently antipathetic to mere nationality as falling short of its own ideal—the emancipation of the whole human race. Lelewel was largely responsible for the crazy Polish Revolution of 1831, when the Poles, for the sake of a fantastic idea impossible of realisation, ruined the little congressional kingdom which was the focus of the national aspirations and might, with the exercise of a little tact and patience, have become the nucleus of a gradual agglomeration of the other Polish lands beneath the Russian sceptre into an autonomous Polish State.

An active, frantic, hatred of Russia, natural enough in the circumstances but entirely mischievous from a purely political point of view, was, indeed, the determining cause of all the ill-advised Polish insurrections. This feeling has been largely shared by writers who have little sympathy with the ordinary methods and principles of the "Reds." Thus, Count Izidor Dzieduszycki, in *Der Patriotismus in Polen* (1884), goes so far as to say, "a war with Russia is and must ever be our most ardent desire." As he wrote twenty years after 1863—and is singularly independent of both "Whites" and "Reds"—it is significant that this should be his attitude here.

The Polish Conservative party was dominant from 1849 to 1862, that is to say during the eclipse of the Revolutionaries between the insurrections of 1831 and 1863. Their watchwords were peaceful progress and political compromise. They sought to convince European public opinion, their own rulers included, that Polish patriotism, although imperishable, was by no means synonymous with a predilection for political upheavals. Their chief representative in Russia was Count Andrzej Zamoiski (his views are set forth in *Moje przeprawy* (*My transitions*), 1830-1, first published in 1906), to whom we shall return



presently. A group, difficult to place elsewhere, of more or less philo-Russian authors, is sometimes associated with the Conservatives. Of these we need only mention the poet, Antoni Eduard Odyniec (1804-85), who, in 1858, presented to Alexander II, during his visit to Vilna, a poem in which the Tsar was extolled as a worthy successor of the Jagellos; and the novelist Henryk Rzewuski (1791-1866), the panegyrist of the old Polish aristocracy (in *Pamiętki Seweryna Soplica* and *Listopad*, still the best historical romances in the Polish language) and the opponent à outrance of modern democracy.

Independent of "Reds" and "Whites" alike, and rejecting contemptuously the aspirations of both, there has always existed in Poland, since 1815, a small group of politicians of a peculiar character, hard-headed, dictatorial, bureaucratic patriots, intent on securing, with the direct cooperation of Russia, an irreducible minimum of local autonomy for Poland. This class of men has always been very unpopular; yet their work alone has been fertile in practical result. The first notable representative of this group was František Lubecki, whose statesmanship and financial genius did so much for the economical welfare of the congressional kingdom before 1831; but Lubecki was completely overshadowed in later years by the Marquis Alexander Vielopolski (1803-77).

Vielopolski first came prominently forward in 1846 with his *Lettre d'un gentilhomme polonais au Prince Metternich*. He rebuked the Vienna Cabinet for being responsible for the horrible *jacquerie* in Galicia, when the Ruthenian and Polish peasants massacred and plundered the Polish gentry, and warned Metternich that any repetition of these atrocities would inevitably drive the Polish nation into the arms of the Tsar. Subsequently Vielopolski entered the Russian service, and in May, 1862, was sent to Poland, as Civil Administrator with the portfolios of Education, Justice, and Public Worship, in the train of the enlightened Polonophil Governor, the Grand Duke Constantine Nikolaevich.

There can be no doubt that the Russian Government meant to deal fairly and even generously with the Polish people on this occasion. Vielopolski brought with him from St Petersburg considerable concessions, *e.g.* permission to use the Polish language in schools and public places, permission for Polish students to wear the national uniforms and the national colours, the election of Polish assessors in the tribunals, and of Polish representatives in the town and county councils. In a word, these tentative reforms, in the hands of a Polish administrator of constructive genius and adamant character, were the best obtainable guarantees, in the circumstances, for a more liberal government in the future. They were also, obviously, the first steps in the direction of a fuller measure of local autonomy at a more favourable time.

But such a pacification was by no means to the liking of the "National Central Committee" of the "Reds," which took its orders direct from Paris, and determined to provoke a rupture with Russia

at any cost, and at the first opportunity. They began with a series of outrages. On June 27 an attempt was made to assassinate the Russian General Lüders. Four days later, the Grand Duke Constantine arrived at Warsaw in the uniform of a Polish Uhlan. His attitude was more than conciliatory. He addressed public meetings in Polish, which he spoke fluently. He took care that his Court should be predominantly Polish, and set about repairing the splendid but dilapidated old royal palace in the Belvedere Park, with the view of living in it. The "Reds" responded by firing at him as he was leaving the theatre. Two almost simultaneous attempts were made on the life of Vielopolski. The would-be assassins were seized and promptly executed; but, on the very day after their execution (August 27), the Grand Duke issued a proclamation, in the circumstances pacific enough, and concluding thus: "Poles! place the same confidence in me as I place in you! Let us unite for the same objects, let us labour for the good of Poland! Pray God that he may bless our efforts to bring about a new era of happiness and prosperity for the country we all love so much!"

Bad as the conduct of the "Reds" had been, it is a question whether that of the "Whites" was not more exasperating. If ever there was an occasion when the Polish Conservatives should have rallied, unconditionally, to the side of the Government, it was in the summer of 1862. Unfortunately they failed to grasp the true significance of the situation. They had learnt nothing from the past, they expected too much from the immediate future. A "White" deputation waited indeed upon Vielopolski with an offer of support, but only on condition that the autonomous Constitution of 1815 was reestablished. The dangerousness of such a suggestion is obvious. The war of 1831 had proved to demonstration that Russia would never again consent to the erection of an adjacent independent Poland. The "Whites" ought to have known that, if any substantial concessions were obtainable at all by negotiation, the Conservative party must begin where Vielopolski proposed to begin, at the very bottom of the political ladder. No wonder Vielopolski was angry. No wonder that he repulsed the deputation with even more than his usual roughness. "I neither ask for nor desire assistance from you or from anyone else," he cried. "It is possible to do some good *for* the Poles sometimes, but *through* them never." Failing to move Vielopolski, the "Whites" proceeded to intrigue against him at the grand-ducal Court. Constantine consented to an exchange of views with the Conservative leader, Count Zamoiski, at a private audience; but any hope of an accommodation in this direction was ruined at the outset by the incredible tactlessness of the Count. By this time the "Central Committee of the National Government," working incessantly and secretly, had become more powerful than the responsible Polish Government, and when Vielopolski (in his manifesto of November 6, 1862) attempted to anticipate the "Reds" by calling out as recruits the most refractory

elements of the population, the outbreak of an insurrection became merely a question of time. On January 21, 1863, the "Central Committee" gave the signal for the most senseless, hopeless and heroic rising of modern times. The desperate valour of the insurgents prolonged for some months a struggle which, according to all military calculations, should have been extinguished within a fortnight. It really never had the remotest chance of success. A feeble protest of the Western Powers on behalf of Poland (February 23, 1863) was contemptuously rejected by the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gorchakoff. Thus Poland, in consequence of the criminal recklessness of the "Reds," was plunged back into the slough of despond from which the superhuman efforts of Wielopolski had barely succeeded in extricating her.

Since 1863, the Polish national cause has been skilfully championed in Austrian Poland by the notable group of patriotic publicists who, in 1866, started the famous *Przegląd Polski*, or *Polish Review*, the standard of modern Polish nationalism. This group includes Józef Szujski, the founder of the Cracow school of history; Count Stanislaw Tarnowski, the Brunetière of Poland; Count Ludwik Wodzicki, the descendant of one of Kosciuszko's best generals and himself a volunteer in the rising of 1863; František Smolka, from 1867 to 1881 the most influential Polish member of the *Reichsrath*, his son Stanislas, one of the most prominent of the younger historians of Poland. Their standpoint is, briefly, the pacific regeneration of Poland, but they have learnt from experience not to aim too high. They are averse from all revolutionary expedients; would obtain from Austria, by arrangement, or compromise, the best possible terms; are not unfriendly in their disposition towards Russia; but rightly regard Protestant Germany as an irreconcilable enemy. They have attracted within their orbit the flower of the ability of Young Poland, and are the only Polish political party which seems to possess a consistent and intelligible programme.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.

(1839-70.)

## (1) HOLLAND.

THE Treaty of 1839, which put an end to the period of the *status quo* (1833-9) and finally under the guarantee of the Great Powers established the independence of the kingdom of Belgium, was very welcome to the Dutch people. The obstinacy with which King William I had refused to assent to the conditions of the Twenty-four Articles had imposed heavy burdens upon his subjects. A large army had been kept practically on a war footing since the Revolution of 1830; and the taxes, though continually mounting, had been insufficient to meet the heavy expenditure. The interest on the National Debt, which in 1815 had amounted to 15,000,000 florins, had reached 38,000,000 florins in 1839. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the attachment of the Dutch people to their sovereign, which had led them to place almost autocratic powers in his hands, and for so many years to give him their unanimous support against Belgian discontent in his policy aiming at the unification of the Northern and Southern Netherlands, should have been weakened. The alarming condition of the finances, over which the States General exercised a supervision little more than nominal, aroused widespread distrust; and there arose a powerful Liberal Opposition, which demanded a revision of the Fundamental Law, ministerial responsibility, and public control of the finances. The report also that William wished to conclude a marriage with Countess Henriette d'Oultremont, a Belgian and a Catholic, who had been one of the late Queen's Court ladies, was received with great dissatisfaction. To meet the demands of public opinion, a revision of the Fundamental Law was actually proposed and carried out in 1840; but the changes were of a very limited character, and were far from satisfying the Liberals. The chief modifications were a reduction of the members of the States General, necessitated by the separation from Belgium; a division of the province of Holland into two provinces; a reduction of the Civil List; and the abolition of

the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure. The entire Budget was henceforth to be submitted to the States General every two years for confirmation, and the Colonial balance sheet yearly. This extremely limited measure of constitutional reform, though conceded by the King, was distasteful to him. He became weary of a position which exposed him to so many rebuffs and disappointments in his really honest efforts to promote the welfare and prosperity of his subjects. He accordingly abdicated (1840) and handed over the reins of government to his son. He married the Countess d'Oultremont immediately afterwards; lived in retirement, chiefly on his private property in Silesia; and died at Berlin in 1843.

His successor William II, a soldier of experience and distinction, chivalrous, genial, kind-hearted, was different in temperament and character from his father. At his accession he had to face a situation full of difficulties, especially as regards finance. Though the settlement of all differences with Belgium had removed one of the chief obstacles to retrenchment and reform, the position was still critical. The public debt stood in 1840 at 2200 million florins; and the burden of interest had become unendurable. The State stood upon the verge of bankruptcy. After several ineffectual attempts, this serious problem was successfully taken in hand by the Minister of Finance, Floris Adrian van Hall. He offered the Dutch people the choice between subscribing a so-called "Voluntary Loan" of 127 million florins at 3 per cent., or submitting to an oppressive Income Tax. The money was subscribed (1844), the royal family setting a patriotic example by a joint contribution of 11 million florins. By this loan and by capitalising a large portion of the annual payment due under the Treaty of 1839 from Belgium, van Hall was enabled to clear off the past four years' arrears, and to convert the 5 and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. scrip into 4 per cents. By this means, and by help of the large annual balance of profits which from this time onwards began to flow into the treasury from the East India Colonies, an equilibrium between the public income and expenditure was at length established.

It was hoped that the spirit in which the people had met the call for a voluntary loan would have been requited by a generous response to the general demand for a thorough revision of the Fundamental Law. But the King, though profuse in expressions of gratitude, had no initiative or strength of character. In 1844, nine members of the Liberal party in the Second Chamber, under the leadership of Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, at that time professor of jurisprudence at Leyden, put forward a definite proposal of revision. William having, however, declared himself opposed to it, the proposal was rejected. Another proposal of a less far-reaching character made by Nedermeyer van Rosenthal met with the same fate in 1845. But the spirit of discontent was rising in the land, and was heightened by the distress

caused to the labouring classes by the terrible outbreak of potato disease in the years 1845 to 1847, which deprived the poor of one of their chief means of subsistence, and raised the general cost of provisions. Riots and disturbances had to be quelled by the military in various parts of the country. These troubles were but part of that general reaction against the autocratic principle of government which had been for some years slowly gathering force, and which came to a head in 1848. In that year, the Revolution of February 24 at Paris overthrew Louis-Philippe, and found an echo in nearly every capital of Europe; and William II, alarmed at the spread of the revolutionary spirit, determined to satisfy the popular demands. Finding that certain proposals made by the Ministry (March 8) were deemed inadequate, he took the bold and unconstitutional step of consulting the President of the Second Chamber, Boreel van Hagelanden, as to the wishes of the deputies in the matter of revision. On March 17 he named a States Commission, consisting of five members, four of whom were the recognised Liberal leaders (Thorbecke, Donker-Curtius, Luzac, and de Kempenaar) and the Catholic representative of North Brabant, Lambertus Dominicus Storm, to draw up a scheme of reform; Count Schimmelpenninck formed a new Ministry, but, not finding himself in accord with his colleagues, speedily withdrew. On May 11 a provisional Ministry under Donker-Curtius and de Kempenaar was formed and charged with carrying out the revision. No further obstacles arose; and the new Fundamental Law, after passing both Chambers and receiving the royal assent, was solemnly promulgated on November 3, 1848.

Its chief provisions were as follows. The Crown is hereditary, both in the male and female lines of the House of Orange. The executive power resides with the Sovereign; the legislative with the States General. The King can do no wrong; the Ministers are responsible to the nation for all his acts. The States General consists of a First and a Second Chamber, whose members must be at least 30 years old. The First Chamber—of 39 members—is to be elected by the Provincial States from those most highly assessed for direct taxation; the Second Chamber to have one member for every 45,000 of the population, and to be chosen directly by those electors who pay a certain amount in direct taxation. Annual budgets are to be presented and approved. Freedom of worship and equal protection are assured to all religious denominations. The authority of the States General over colonial affairs is extended. Public primary education is placed universally under state control, though full liberty is conceded to private education. The provincial and communal administrations are to be reformed and regulated, the direct popular vote being here likewise introduced.

The Ministry, charged with the carrying out of the revised Fundamental Law, took steps at once for holding the new elections. On February 13, 1849, the States General were opened in person by the

King. William II had been on principle opposed to a revision of the Constitution in accordance with Liberal ideas; but he was prepared to accept loyally the changes to which he had assented. Unfortunately his country, at this important moment in its constitutional history, was deprived of his experienced guidance. William died suddenly at Tilburg (March 17, 1849). He had married Anna Paulovna, sister of the Tsar Alexander I, and was succeeded by his son, William III. The new King, who was 32 years of age, was speedily called upon to deal with a ministerial crisis. The majority in the newly elected States General were Liberals; and Johan Rudolf Thorbecke formed a Ministry. Thorbecke was a learned jurist, a great orator, a man of varied talents and commanding personality. It was in a large measure owing to his efforts and initiative that the revision of the Fundamental Law had been accomplished, and that a powerful Liberal party had been called into existence; and it was only fitting that the task of applying the principles of the new Constitution to the details of provincial and communal administration should be now committed to his hands. It was indeed fortunate that the country possessed at this crisis of transition a statesman capable of carrying out such important changes in a spirit of moderation. There were at this time in Holland four political parties or groups—the Liberal, the Conservative, the Catholic, and the Anti-revolutionary. For some years after 1849 the Catholics, in their struggle for religious and political equality, supported the Liberals, though diametrically opposed to them on many other points. The Conservatives (strictly so-called) lost touch with the electorate, and gradually ceased to be powerful, being replaced by the Anti-revolutionary party, founded by the well-known historian Gulielmus Groen van Prinsterer. This party placed in the foreground the upholding of the Calvinistic Reformed faith and of the religious principle in the State. The educational policy of the Liberals was at last to sever their alliance with the Catholics, and to lead to a coalition in defence of religious instruction between the Catholic and the Anti-revolutionary parties.

The manifesto of Thorbecke, on taking office in 1849, was comprised in four words, "Wait for our deeds"; and he lost no time in translating them into action. The electoral, provincial, and communal laws, which were successively passed, placed every kind of representation and administration on a thoroughly popular basis (1850–1). It was the aim of Thorbecke to reform the system of finance by removing as many as possible of the indirect imposts, which interfered with the free development of trade and industry, and substituting for them direct taxation. The navigation laws of the Minister of Finance did much to effect this object. All differential dues favouring ships under the Dutch flag were reduced, and the tolls on the Rhine and Yssel on through cargoes were abolished, subject to a registration fee on foreign vessels. The excise on pork and mutton was removed (1852); and other changes in the incidence

of taxation were introduced to lighten the burdens of the poorer classes of the community. The first Ministry of Thorbecke left, however, a more permanent memorial than its legislative activity, by its conversion of the Haarlem lake into an expanse of good pasture land (*polder*). This gigantic undertaking was completed in 1852.

Meanwhile the Minister had contrived to draw upon himself the enmity of the powerful forces of Calvinistic Protestantism. Thorbecke himself favoured the principle of the separation of Church and State, and of non-intervention of the Government in purely religious questions. The Fundamental Law of 1848 had established complete freedom of worship and organisation for all forms of religion, and by abolishing the right of *Placet* (the ratification by the State of papal decrees) had finally removed the last trace of Roman Catholic disabilities. Hitherto there had been no Roman episcopate in the kingdom of the Netherlands. The Pope now determined (1852) to create an archbishopric at Utrecht, with four bishoprics (Breda, Haarlem, Hertogenbosch, Roermond). He made, however, the great mistake of issuing his allocution without previously consulting the Dutch Government, and of laying stress in it upon the importance of counteracting in Holland the errors of the heresy of Calvin. A wave of fierce indignation swept through the Protestant population of the Netherlands, already prejudiced against the Liberal Ministry by a law placing all religious charitable institutions under government supervision. The cry of "Down with the Bishops" recalled the days of Granville and Philip II. A petition, drawn up at Utrecht by Professor Gerrit Jan Mulder and others, obtained 200,000 signatures in a few days. The King's reply on its presentation at Amsterdam was taken by Thorbecke as a call for his resignation. It was offered and accepted; and a new Ministry was formed under the joint leadership of the former mutual opponents, van Hall and Dirk Donker-Curtius. A dissolution followed, and resulted in the return of a majority for the Conservative-Protestant (Anti-revolutionary) over the Liberal-Catholic coalition. Thorbecke himself sought refuge in a Catholic constituency, owing to this sudden turn-over of public opinion, which is known in Dutch history as the "April Movement."

The name of Donker-Curtius was a pledge that the new Ministry, though Conservative, would not be reactionary. A Church Associations Law was passed, laying down that no foreigner could undertake any church office without the King's consent, and forbidding the wearing of a distinctive religious dress outside closed buildings. In accordance with certain Articles of the Fundamental Law of 1848, Acts were passed dealing with Poor Law administration, ministerial responsibility, and the right of public meeting. The Ministry fell in an attempt to deal with the subject of Primary Education. The dispute was whether the State was to give compulsory education in "mixed" schools (*gemengde scholen*), where only the simple truths common to all forms of religious



belief were to be taught; or in denominational schools (*gezindte scholen*), where the religious instruction was to be in complete accordance with the principles of the religious body to which the scholar belonged. It now became, and was for many years to continue, a burning question, dividing the Dutch people into two hostile camps. Van Hall and Donker-Curtius endeavoured (1856) to establish universal "mixed" schools; but the proposal stirred up such a violent agitation in the country that the Ministry gave way to a new one under the presidency of Justinus Jacob Leonard van der Bruggen. The numbers of the Anti-revolutionary party were small; and from the first the existence of the van der Bruggen Ministry was precarious. It contrived, however, to pass in 1857 a Law of Primary Instruction, by which the principle of the "mixed" school, to the great chagrin of Gulielmus Groen van Prinsterer and the upholders of denominational education, was adopted by the State. In the following year van der Bruggen was replaced by Jacob Jan Rochussen, who had recently been Governor-General of the Dutch Indies (1850-6), and whose tenure of office (1858-60) was marked by the abolition of slavery in the East Indies. He was succeeded by van Hall, whose third Ministry had a short life (1860-1). A measure regulating the construction of a system of state railways was the chief fruit of its activity. The Colonies, which had for a series of years been a source of considerable profit to the Dutch treasury, furnished the funds for the carrying out of an undertaking, which promoted the welfare of the country without adding to the National Debt.

Another ephemeral Ministry, under Baron van Heemstra, followed (1861-2); but the "April Movement" had now exhausted its force, and there was once more a Liberal majority in the Second Chamber. Thorbecke again formed a Cabinet, and was actively engaged (1862-6) in developing the material interests of the country, and in removing the restrictions pressing upon trade and industry, which had been interrupted by the change of public opinion in 1853. With this object indirect taxation was superseded to a considerable extent by direct, and the communal dues were abolished. A law for secondary and technical education was passed (1863). Bills were also passed for making a waterway through the Hook of Holland, for the formation of the Canal of Holland, and for the reclaiming of many thousands of acres covered by the Y and the construction of the sea-harbour Ymuiden at the mouth of that river. A dispute about colonial administration led in 1866 to the formation of a Ministry under Francis van de Putte, which only lasted four months. His Bill for enabling the natives of the East India Colonies to become proprietors of the farms which they cultivated (*cultuur-wet*) was defeated by the Conservatives, who were supported on this occasion by Thorbecke and some Liberals.

A Ministry was then formed under the joint leadership of Baron Jacobus Petrus van Zuylen van Nyevelt (Foreign Affairs) and Jacob

Heemskerk (Interior), which had a stormy existence (1866-8). A dissolution gave them a small majority; but serious difficulties arose in 1866 and 1867, after the dissolution of the old Germanic Confederation, concerning Limburg and Luxemburg. As a consequence of the Conference of London (1867), Limburg was entirely severed from all connexion with Germany and became a Dutch province, while Luxemburg, of which King William remained sovereign, was created a neutral State, as is told elsewhere in this chapter. The Chamber, however, resented the part taken by the Foreign Minister in this treaty, and the foreign financial vote was thrown out by 38 votes to 36. A dissolution followed; and the Government, finding themselves in a minority after the general election, resigned. Thorbecke declined office; but, on his advice, the King entrusted the formation of a Cabinet to Pieter Philip van Bosse, which held office till 1870, and which is principally remembered by its law for the abolition of capital punishment. It had not, however, strength to deal with the many difficult questions arising out of the Franco-German War of 1870; and Thorbecke was called upon (1871) to undertake the part of First Minister for the third time. He continued in office until his death in the following year. For more than a quarter of a century, whether in or out of office, he had been the most influential politician and statesman in Holland; and this period of Dutch history has been largely associated with his name.

No account of that period would be complete without some reference to the administrative history of the Dutch East India colonies and of their relations with the mother country. At the close of the Napoleonic wars all the Dutch colonies were in British hands; but in 1815 they were, with exception of the Cape and the Guiana colonies—Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice—restored to Holland. In the East Indies the treaty of 1824 finally settled various disputes between Great Britain and the Netherlands, the Dutch being henceforth supreme in Sumatra, while the British obtained Singapore and the command of the Straits of Malacca. Two formidable and costly wars, however, for some years checked the peaceful and profitable development of the principal Dutch possessions in the Malay archipelago. A serious Javanese rising in Djokjokarta, under Diepo Negoro, was subdued with considerable difficulty after the despatch of a series of expeditions (1825-30). In the uplands of Sumatra the final overthrow in 1833 of the power of a Mohammadan sect, known as the *Padres*, was only effected with the loss of many lives during several years of desultory fighting.

The advent of Johannes van den Bosch as Governor-General (1830-3) was, however, to mark the turn of the tide in the prosperity of the East India colonies. He introduced into Java what was known as the *cultuurstelsel* (cultivation system). By this system the native cultivators, instead of paying to the Government, according to the system introduced

by Governor Raffles in the period of British rule, one-fifth (sometimes two-fifths) of the produce of their rice fields as rent, were compelled to set apart one-fifth of their land or one-fifth of their time (sixty-six days in the year) to grow for the home-market certain prescribed products, such as coffee, sugar, pepper, tea, tobacco. For these products the Government agreed, besides a remission of rent, to pay a certain fixed price. These commodities were shipped to Holland, where they were sold at a large profit; and thus the colonies were made to contribute a large annual sum to the advantage of the taxpayer in the mother country. At first these profits, the disposal of which was under the sole control of the King, were absorbed in the upkeep of large forces on a war footing during the period of the *status quo*. With the accession of William II, as has been already told, the colonial treasure-trove was very helpful to the Minister van Hall in his reorganisation of the national finances, and at later times in the carrying out of costly public works—such as the building of railways and canals, and the reclaiming of the large areas covered by the Haarlem lake and the waters of the Y.

The revision of the Fundamental Law in 1848 brought the colonies under the control of the States General; and required the Government to submit an annual report to the Chambers upon all the Dutch overseas possessions. *Cultuurstelsel* was from the first regarded by the Liberals as, in principle, obnoxious, and their efforts were directed to modifying and relaxing the system of compulsion in the interest of native cultivators. The Conservative party on the other hand were strongly for its retention. After the abolition of slavery in 1860, finally carried out under the Governor-Generalship of Sloet van de Beele (1861-6), and after Francis van de Putte became Colonial Minister in 1863, many reforms took place. In 1864, van de Putte by his *comptabiliteits-wet* made it necessary for the Indian Budget to be annually confirmed by the States General; and an end was put to the Government's cultivation of tea, pepper, tobacco, and various other commodities, while that of sugar was restricted. But the ideas of van de Putte were in advance of those of Thorbecke and of a large section of the Liberal party; and, after his proposals for the abolition of compulsory culture had been rejected in 1866, van de Beele was recalled, and the principles of reform advocated by him received for the time a decided check. In 1870, however, on the return of the Liberals to power, the Colonial Minister passed two laws, one for the determination of the sugar culture in 1890, the other an agrarian law which facilitated the ownership of land by natives; and these were to be followed by a series of administrative Acts lessening the burdens and improving the lot of the Javanese population under the rule of Governor-General James Loudon (1871-5).

## (2) BELGIUM.

The Belgian people submitted to the hard conditions imposed upon them by the will of the Powers in 1839 with feelings of grief and resentment. The forced relinquishment to Holland of portions of Luxemburg and Limburg, which had been treated as Belgian since 1831, and whose populations had become thoroughly Belgian in sentiment, was especially bitter. It was a severe trial; but the sacrifice had to be made. Belgium, though shorn of territory, saddled with a portion of the Dutch debt, and hampered by restrictions on the navigation of the Scheldt, now became an independent State, whose integrity and neutrality were guaranteed by the Powers. The Belgian people were thus henceforth able to pursue their own national destiny under free institutions of their own choosing, unhampered by fears of attack from without. The success of the Belgian Revolution had been chiefly due to the alliance between the Catholic and Liberal parties, and the patriotism with which they had sunk their differences in their common ardour for the national cause. This alliance King Leopold, on entering upon his difficult task in 1831, had done his utmost to maintain, and he had succeeded.

Barthélemi Theodore Theux de Meyland had headed a Coalition Cabinet in 1834; but, in the interval between that date and 1840, the Ministry had been gradually acquiring a more Conservative character. At last, after having successfully administered the affairs of the country through the difficult years of the *status quo*, it was defeated in the Chamber of Deputies, and replaced by a homogeneous, but moderate, Liberal Ministry under Jean Louis Joseph Lebeau (1840). This Ministry had, however, to face a Catholic majority in the Senate; and, as the King would not consent to a dissolution, Lebeau resigned. This event brought Leopold face to face with a somewhat delicate and critical constitutional situation, which was, for the time, surmounted by the formation of a Coalition Cabinet, at the head of which was Jean-Baptiste Nothomb. Nothomb had been prominent in the events of 1830-1, and, though a Conservative, was a man of moderate views. He had the difficult task of conciliating two parties, whose views on many subjects were absolutely opposed. Among the thorny questions with which he had to deal, that relating to public primary education most sharply divided the Conservatives and the Liberals. In 1842, however, the Nothomb Ministry succeeded in passing a law, which failed to give satisfaction to the extreme partisans on either side, whether Catholics or Anti-Clericals, though it effected a settlement approved by all moderate men. This was shown conclusively by the fact that the final vote in the Senate was unanimous, and that in the Chamber there were only three dissentients. The leading principles of the law of September 23, 1842, were the necessary inclusion in the scheme of public

education of religious instruction in a definite faith; the obligatory maintenance of at least one primary school by each commune; the obligatory support of these schools by the State and the province, in the case of the insufficiency of communal resources.

Nothomb's tenure of office was marked by many useful measures; and his own great ability and conspicuous moderation enabled him to remain, until an adverse vote at the elections of June, 1845, led to his resignation. Such a result was not surprising, for Belgium had been passing through a most serious industrial and financial crisis since 1843. The introduction of machinery in England for spinning yarn and weaving linen had crushed one of the chief industries of Flanders and Brabant. The goods made by hand-loomers could not compete in price with those produced by steam. In less than four years the exportation of Belgian linen fell by one-half; and of the 500,000 workpeople dependent on this industry a large proportion were reduced to beggary and starvation. To crown misfortune, the potato disease in 1845 almost destroyed a crop most important to the poorer classes; in 1847 the wheat crop was also a dismal failure. The price of provisions rose alarmingly; the streets and villages were filled with beggars; and only the promptness of the measures taken by the Government prevented disorders breaking out. Fortunately, in the south and east of the country, the coal, iron, cotton and cloth industries continued to flourish; and occupation was found by the State for those who were out of work, by the carrying out at the national charges of various public works of great utility—such as the extension of the railway system in Flanders and elsewhere, the construction of the canal at Turnhout, and of many hundreds of miles of new roads. Steps were also taken for the introduction of the machinery required for the revival of the linen industry; and model workshops and technical schools were set up to give skilled instruction in the latest methods of textile manufacture. Thus a crisis was averted and provision made against its recurrence.

Meanwhile a no less important political crisis had taken place. The system of government by neutral Ministries had always found favour with King Leopold, who had striven to moderate between the two extreme parties, and who was inclined by natural caution towards a policy of compromise. Hence, on Nothomb's resignation, he was averse from placing a purely Liberal Ministry in power. Accordingly, he asked Sylvain van de Weyer, then Belgian envoy in London, to form once more a mixed Cabinet (July, 1845). Van de Weyer was a moderate Liberal, universally respected for valuable services rendered to his country during a long series of years; but he speedily found his position intolerable, and resigned on March 31, 1846. The King was now obliged to turn to Charles Rogier, the acknowledged Liberal leader, who was, however, unwilling to take office without the King's consent to a dissolution. Leopold declined to give it, and called upon Theux to

attempt the task of government at the head of a homogeneous Catholic Ministry, a step which aroused fierce opposition.

A General Congress of the Liberal party, summoned to Brussels on June 14, 1846, was attended by 320 delegates from all parts. The meeting, which was very orderly, drew up an Act of Federation and a programme of reforms; and the party was thoroughly organised and united for the next general election which took place in 1847. A large Liberal majority was returned; and Charles Rogier was invited to form a Ministry. The King, putting aside his prepossessions, never hesitated, as a constitutional monarch, in giving full effect to the unmistakable expression of the popular will; and thus he enabled Belgium to pass unscathed through the period of revolution, which followed the expulsion of his father-in-law, Louis-Philippe, from the throne of France on February 24, 1848. In wellnigh every country of Europe insurrections and risings took place, but the Belgian people remained calm. Satisfied with the liberty they had acquired, and with their progress under the wise and sympathetic rule of the sovereign of their choice, they had confidence in their future. An attempted invasion by a band of French revolutionaries was easily dispersed by a body of Belgian troops (March 30) at Risquons-Tout, near Mouscron. Leopold, whenever he appeared in public, was received with striking demonstrations of the popular good-will.

The Rogier Ministry, the crisis of 1848 overpast, set to work to redeem its pledges by carrying out a scheme of electoral and parliamentary reform. The qualification for the franchise was reduced to 20 florins direct payment to taxes; and by a series of laws this reduction was made applicable to parliamentary, provincial, and communal elections. This change was very favourable to the Liberals, as it doubled the number of urban voters, while that of the rural districts did not increase in anything like the same proportion. The result was manifested in the election which followed; 85 Liberals were returned against 23 Catholics. The Ministry, now secure of an overwhelming majority in the Second Chamber, passed a number of measures of considerable utility both to the commercial and the working classes, among which were the establishment of a National Bank, and of a General Savings and Assurance Bank. Import duties upon comestibles were lowered or abolished; and the credit of the State was used to carry out large public works for the benefit of the suffering and unemployed poor. It was at this time that a heavy blow fell upon the King and the country by the death of Queen Louise-Marie. The daughter of Louis-Philippe, who had been for some time in delicate health, had been greatly afflicted by the misfortunes of her family in 1848. Her health was much shaken, and she expired at Ostend, October 11, 1850. The entire country mourned her loss; for she had endeared herself to all Belgium by her charity, her kindly disposition, and many personal virtues.

The question of education had to be dealt with by the Liberal

Ministry; and aroused party passions once more. Rogier determined to leave the compromise of 1842 with regard to primary education severely alone. A law with regard to higher education was introduced and passed in 1849 without much difficulty; but that which organised secondary education in 1850 met with the bitterest Catholic opposition. In the new schools that were set up, the privileges accorded to denominational religious teaching by the law of 1842 for primary education were not conceded. In 1853 the council of the secondary school at Antwerp surmounted the obstacle by passing a regulation, that the only religion taught within the school should be that professed by the majority of the pupils, *i.e.* the Catholic faith. The necessity of the imposition of new taxes had made the Ministry unpopular; and Rogier found his majority diminished after the elections of 1852. He resigned office in the following year, and de Brouckère formed a Cabinet of Moderates. With a view to gaining Catholic support the new Government caused the Chambers to assent to the universal application to all secondary schools of the "*Regulation of Antwerp.*"

After the elections of 1854 the parties were almost equally balanced; and in March, 1855, de Brouckère made way for a Ministry drawn from the Right Centre, under de Decker. But in 1857 the Liberals gained once more a decisive majority; and Charles Rogier again became head of the Cabinet. He was to remain in power for a long period (1857–70) which was marked by two achievements of considerable importance. The system of *octrois* was abolished by a law introduced by the Minister Walter Frère-Orban (afterwards First Minister) July 19, 1860. To provide for the deficit thus caused, a "communal fund" was created to the support of which a portion of the receipts of the Post Office and of the dues collected at the frontier on sugar, coffee, beer, and vinegar were assigned. The amount thus raised was divided between the various communes in accordance with their just claims. A still more important achievement was the suppression of the Scheldt tolls in 1863. This obnoxious and humiliating burden had greatly hindered the commerce of the country and the development of the port of Antwerp. Its removal was largely brought about by the insistent diplomacy of the King, which at last overcame the obstinate negative interposed by Holland and Great Britain to any proposals to modify the terms of the Treaty of 1839. He succeeded in obtaining the meeting at Brussels of a Conference of the interested Powers, at which it was finally agreed that the river should be freed, in consideration of a sum of 32,276,566 francs to be paid to Holland in compensation by the Powers interested. Of this sum Belgium contributed 12,000,000 francs.

The death of King Leopold, aged 75, December 10, 1865, after a reign of thirty-four years, was felt as a personal loss, throughout the length and breadth of the nation, which he may be said to have created. By his rare sagacity, prudence and political insight, the Saxe-Coburg

prince, chosen amidst countless difficulties and embarrassments to rule the destinies of the new Belgian kingdom, had slowly won for himself the unstinted confidence and respect both of his own subjects and of foreigners. At the time of his death he was spoken of at home as the father of his people, and abroad as the Nestor of Europe. England owes him special gratitude for the valuable advice and assistance which he gave to Queen Victoria during the early years of her reign. He was succeeded by his son Leopold II (born April 9, 1835), who had married (August 22, 1853) Marie Henriette, daughter of the Archduke Joseph of Austria.

The downfall of the Liberal party was brought about by its own divisions. From the beginning it had a moderate wing—the *Doctrinaires*—and a radical wing—the young Liberals or Progressists. The latter party objected to any compromises with the Catholics on religious education, like those of 1842 and 1854. They wished for universal and obligatory secular instruction, and also aimed at lowering the franchise, the more advanced section advocating universal suffrage. The *Doctrinaires*, of whom Rogier was the chosen leader, worked for the centralisation of power in the national Government. Rogier was himself born in France of a French mother; and his political sympathies and principles were those of the French Revolution. The liberty of the historical Belgian provinces and towns had been the immemorial liberty of local immunities, customs, and privileges, and these anomalies were offensive to the French ideas of Charles Rogier, who set himself to work to make the State supreme. Hence his consistent advocacy of universal military service, his carrying out of great public works at the national charges, his desire to place the railways and coal-mines under government control. Many of his measures and proposals were thus distasteful to a portion of his own party, no less than to the Opposition.

The Catholics took up the position of defenders of local and individual freedom against state and governmental interference, and they were helped by the rapid growth of the "Flemish Movement." The separation of Belgium from Holland had no sooner taken place than the newly aroused national spirit began to show itself among the Flemish-speaking part of the people by a revival of interest in their ancestral Teutonic language. There had always been a distinct line of cleavage in the Southern Netherlands between Fleming and Walloon, and a movement set on foot by Jan Frans Willems, Hendrik Conscience, and other writers against the Gallification of the country found a ready response in Flanders and northern Brabant. King William I's attempt to make Dutch the official language had met with universal opposition; but as early as 1840 a demand was put forward for the use of the Flemish tongue (which is closely akin to the Dutch) on equal terms with French in the Legislature, the law Courts, and the army. As the years passed by, the movement gathered ever increasing numbers of adherents, and the demand was repeated with growing insistence. It



was steadily opposed by Charles Rogier, a devoted admirer of all things French, and by the Liberal party, which found its chief support in the Walloon provinces. The *Flamingants*, as they were called, were especially numerous in those parts of Belgium where Catholicism had maintained its firmest hold; and the Clerical party, already sure of the votes of the peasantry, was able by their expressed sympathy with the movement to secure the adhesion of the working classes in the large Flemish towns. The defection of Antwerp and Ghent from the Liberal cause in 1870 was largely due to this cause. The elections in that year rendered possible a coalition of the Clerical party with the malcontent progressives, which led to the defeat of the Ministry and the accession to power of a Catholic Cabinet, at the head of which was Baron d'Anethan.

### (3) THE LUXEMBURG QUESTION.

Luxemburg had been erected by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 into a grand duchy and declared hereditary in the male line of the House of Nassau, in exchange for the ancestral domains of that House in Germany,—Dietz, Siegen, Hadamar and Dillenburg. The new grand duchy was thus attached to the Netherlands by a personal union, but remained a member of the Germanic Confederation, and its capital, as a federal fortress, had a Prussian garrison. William I however treated Luxemburg as if it were an integral portion of his kingdom, extended to it the Dutch Constitution of 1815, and administered it through Dutch officials. That dissatisfaction was felt at the Grand Duke's autocratic rule was conclusively shown in 1830. The Belgian uprising against Holland spread to Luxemburg, and the whole province revolted, with the exception of the capital, which was garrisoned by foreign troops. During the period of the *status quo* (1831–9) no active steps were taken to interfere with accomplished facts. Luxemburg was regarded at Brussels as a Belgian province, and became in fact thoroughly Belgian in sentiment. In 1839 however the sudden determination of King William I to agree to the 24 Articles of 1831, which he had so long refused to sign, completely changed the situation. The Conference of London decided that Belgium should retain the part of Luxemburg contiguous to her frontiers, but should cede to the King of Holland a part of the duchy of Limburg in compensation. The remainder of Luxemburg was once more declared to be the hereditary possession of the House of Nassau, and forms the present grand duchy.

William II endeavoured to conciliate the good-will of his Luxemburg subjects by giving to them a separate administration, and by promising them a Constitution after the Belgian model. The revolutionary outbreaks of 1848 followed by the death of the King caused, however, a delay in the carrying out of this project. William III, shortly after his accession, appointed his brother, Prince Henry of the Netherlands, his

representative in Luxemburg, with full grand-ducal powers. From 1850 to 1879 the Prince continued to fill this responsible post with singular discretion and ability; and under his wise administration the little State quickly became prosperous and contented, and was the model of an unambitious and peaceful community. In 1856 a parliamentary Constitution was granted to the Luxemburgers in the name of the Grand Duke. It established a Council of State nominated by the sovereign, and a House of Representatives elected directly by the people, though it fixed a somewhat high property qualification for the franchise. Its powers were limited, and the right of initiative remained in the hands of the sovereign. This was not a very liberal concession, but it appears to have worked fairly well, and to have aroused no active dissatisfaction.

Luxemburg remained a portion of the Germanic Confederation, and the capital was still garrisoned by Prussian troops until 1866, when the dissolution of the Confederation took place, and created a new situation. As Luxemburg was one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon III objected to its remaining in Prussian hands, and entered into negotiations with King William III for the purchase of the grand duchy by France. Prussia, on being consulted by the King of Holland, protested; and finally a conference of the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers met in London, May, 1867, to consider the question of the future of Luxemburg. The issue of their deliberations was a treaty, which declared the grand duchy to be a sovereign and independent, but neutral, State, under the guarantee of the Powers. The fortress was accordingly evacuated by the Prussians, and the fortifications were demolished five years later. The connexion between Luxemburg and Holland was henceforth purely dynastic. The destiny of the Luxemburgers being thus settled by the concert of Europe, the Grand Duke proceeded to revise the Constitution in a liberal direction (1868). The sovereign still retained very extensive powers; but all laws required the assent of the representatives of the people. The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 exposed the treaty of neutrality to a severe strain, as at different times a breach of it was obviously in the interest of either belligerent. William III however announced his intention of rigorously enforcing the treaty, and, despite the difficulties of the position, succeeded in doing so.

#### (4) LITERATURE IN THE NETHERLANDS.

(1800-70.)

Literature in the Netherlands had a great revival in the nineteenth century. In the early decades the name of the versatile and prolific Willem Bilderdijk (1756-1831) occupies the first place and overshadows those of all his contemporaries. His power was undoubted, his command of language extraordinary; but, although he excelled in every kind of

verse, he did not attain the highest rank as a poet. But as a fiery Orangist and Calvinist—as one holding strong opinions, which he expressed with force and felicity—he exercised during half a century a kind of spell over the minds and imaginations of his countrymen, and his influence is still far from extinct. Among his contemporaries may be mentioned Jan Frederik Holmers (1767-1813), Rhijnvis Feith (1753-1824), Johannes Kinker (1764-1845), Antoni Staring (1767-1840) and Cornelis Loots (1754-1834)—all of them writers of verse of considerable merit. Four other poets of this time survived to the second half of the century: Hendrik Tollens (1780-1856), Adrianus Bogaers (1795-1870), Petrus Augustus de Genestet (1830-61) and Isaac da Costa (1798-1860), and so belong to this period. Tollens has been styled “the People’s Poet” of the nineteenth century. He took as his theme for a series of lyrical romances, different heroic episodes of the national history, and wrote in addition a great number of popular songs and ballads. He possessed a real poetical gift, full at once of fire and sweetness. The genius of da Costa was of a loftier type. He was of Jewish descent, an avowed disciple of Bilderdyk; but he far surpassed his master in sounding the depths of passion and tenderness.

The writing of Dutch prose has been carefully cultivated since the end of the eighteenth century, and has attained a high standard of excellence. It is inferior to that of no European tongue in vocabulary, flexibility, clearness and strength. The pioneers were Bilderdyk, and Johannes Henricus van der Palm (1763-1840). One of the most voluminous writers of the middle of the century was Jacobus van Lennep (1802-68), who wrote many historical novels upon various episodes of the national history. Of more permanent value was his great critical edition in twelve volumes of Vondel’s works. The romances of Madame Bosboom Toussaint, like those of van Lennep, belonged to the school of Scott; but her literary quality and the truth of her representation of past times was greater. Two other writers of varied gifts were Nicolaes Beets and “Multatuli” (E. Douwes Dekker). The masterpiece of Beets was a series of humorous sketches of Dutch life entitled *Camera Obscura*, that of “Multatuli,” a novel *Max Havelaar*. In the fields of history, science, theology and criticism, Holland has been rich in a succession of able and cultured writers, whose number and intellectual activity is very remarkable, when the smallness of the population from which they spring and which they address is considered.

In Belgium the most striking literary characteristic was the rise and spread of the Flemish Movement, of which Jan Frans Willems (1793-1835) has been called the “father.” His writings were chiefly philological. The poet of the movement was Karel Ledeganck (1805-47); but the popular romances of Hendrik Conscience (1812-85) were perhaps still more potent in furthering the propaganda, and in raising up a powerful force in politics.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

## SCANDINAVIA.

(1815-70.)

## (1) SWEDEN AND NORWAY.

THE year 1815 has been termed the honeymoon of the House of Bernadotte and the Swedish nation. Although the devotion of his adopted countrymen soon lost its first exuberance, the personality and policy of Bernadotte continued to dominate Sweden until his death in 1844. Charles XIII, though aged and infirm, survived, indeed, until 1818; but both he and his queen were the willing vassals of their adopted son, whose irresistible fascination subdued even the dethroned and exiled Gustavus. Nothing more reveals the character of Bernadotte than the ascendancy which he rapidly acquired and long continued to command among a people whose language he could not speak. Elected with the expectation that he would bestow upon Sweden far greater riches than he possessed, that he would propitiate Napoleon and reconquer Finland, he did none of these things, and yet became supreme. He had the greatness to perceive the true path for Sweden in the nineteenth century and to guide her into it, although in so doing he abandoned the traditions of her history and of his own. A soldier and a man of the Revolution, called upon to rule a nation whose victories, but few generations earlier, had dazzled Europe, he made peaceful progress his aim and interpreted strictly the provision of the Swedish Constitution that, in spite of the existence of Diet and Council, "the King shall rule the realm." After his advent and through his exertions, therefore, the true history of Sweden changes its character. It becomes a record in which statistics count for more than campaigns, and economic and social progress is of greater moment than political. If in modern times "the patriotism of the Swede has but one ambition—to prove equal to the intellectual demands of the age and to be among the leaders in the field of progress"—the Swedish career of Bernadotte has proved its abiding worth.

Bernadotte, who became Charles XIV in 1818, owed his commanding position in 1815 partly to what he was and partly to what he had already done for Sweden. His adopted father, Charles XIII, gladly acquiesced in a state of things in which both Swedish policy and its execution came from his heir. Such was the influence which the

munificence, the personal charm, the warlike renown, and the commanding greatness of Bernadotte procured for him in Sweden, that, on the morrow of her dismemberment by Alexander, he had leagued her with Russia against France, her secular ally. It was he who had won Norway, and who had dictated the terms, without parallel save in the case of Russia and Finland, on which the Union was accomplished. He had already made the Swedish army formidable and had conquered peace almost without bloodshed. An unrivalled athlete, a skilled tragedian, and a born king, his public appearances were always splendid. He had a royal presence, a royal memory, and a charm which made men devoted to him in an hour, and kept them true to him in spite of his volcanic upbraidings. No appeal to his benevolence passed unheeded, and nothing pleased him better than to hear that his people called him Father. By impulse and by training a benevolent despot, he displayed many of the virtues of that type of ruler while he took pains to avoid its defects. In his case, unlike that of George I, inability to speak the language of his adopted country tended to make government more absolute, for in French the councillors were no match for the eloquent King. Yet Constitutional forms were on the whole observed. He recognised his tendency to suspicion, took pains to curb his temper, and tried to give due weight to the opinion of a Council which he often despised, and which the Form of Government of 1809 in no way bound him to follow.

Though impatient of contradiction, he loved men of character, and did not seek to fill his Council with mere creatures of his own. To his heir, whom he took pains to educate, he always showed an affection which in a lesser man the difference between their political views might well have quenched. In some respects, however, Bernadotte exhibited a weakness which went far to determine the domestic history of Sweden during his reign. Appreciating the power of money, with which he was wont to combat opposition, he wrongly believed himself a great financier. "There may be three hundred better soldiers than myself in Sweden," he once declared in Council; "but there cannot be a better financier, for I have long made a special study of high finance." When exhorted on his death-bed to talk of religion, he preferred to discuss the East Gotland Private Bank, of which his confessor was a director. His private economy was conducted with the minute care native in the *bourgeoisie* of France. Each month he rigorously inspected the accounts of his household and paid his tradesmen by instalments. The speculative investments which he made for his own sake, and for that of the nation, were innumerable. The great bargain by which he undertook to pay the external debt of the nation in return for a perpetual annuity of 200,000 dollars deserves special mention. But, although some of his economic principles were less antiquated than the parochial ideas of industrial and commercial policy which still survived in Sweden, his theories of currency and exchange produced nothing but disaster, though

the extent to which they received application was fortunately limited. Despite his constant munificence, moreover, he became suspected of enriching himself at the expense of the State. He was, indeed, the first Swedish king who distinguished between his private and public purse, and it was doubtless difficult to effect a complete severance between the financial policy of the King and of the Crown. Yet towards the end of his reign he was able to show that he had laid out many millions for the national good, and he died probably no richer than when he came to Sweden.

He was also prone to a distrust of public opinion, natural perhaps in a Frenchman of the Revolution who filled the throne from which the third and the fourth Gustavus had been dispossessed by violence, and who ruled two foreign races. Fearless alike of armies and assassins, he dreaded factions, newspapers, and mobs. His suspicions, worked upon by the unscrupulous for their own advantage, caused him to institute a system of spies and secret police, to prosecute writers, to confiscate journals, and to resort to bribery and chicanery in the futile hope of paralysing an opposition which he did not understand. Even in his last hours his dread of opinion at home and abroad did not leave him. By his command the bulletins of his doctors were translated into French, submitted to him for alteration, retranslated into Swedish, and revised by one of his intimates before being published to the world. His reputation for avarice and suspicion gave to Swedish Liberalism a growing bitterness against the King, which marred his reign more and more, until it culminated in the Diet of 1840.

Sweden in 1815, though full of hope, stood in urgent need of wise rule. Suchtelen, the Russian Minister in Stockholm, had lately declared that the political character of the Swedes resembled that of the Poles, and that Sweden was on the verge of dissolution. Her economic condition, never flourishing, appeared at its worst in the years which followed the great war. The herrings had deserted her western coast, and her harvest had failed. Such was the lack of currency that some districts were compelled to resort to barter, while a mass of depreciated notes ruined foreign trade. The Bank tried to keep a mixed currency in circulation by cashing notes to the value of less than one dollar for each applicant daily. This device brought a crowd of commissionaires, sailors, and other disorderlies, to fight for places at the bank counter, so that they might get drunk for a day on part of the difference between the value of the notes in metal and in paper. Soon cash payments were abandoned; and a long series of operations was necessary before the national credit could be restored. At the same time, while luxury was rampant among the upper classes, the towns were filled with bankrupts and throughout the country peasants were protesting against the ruin of the land.

The Diet of 1815 called upon the Government to interfere; and in

1817 those, who used wine, coffee, tea, silk, gilded furniture, mahogany or other foreign wood, playing-cards and other similar luxuries, were subjected to personal taxes designed to inculcate better domestic economy. Soon the import of porter and many other articles was forbidden. These measures gave rise to smuggling, and this to friction with the Danes. At the same time, to encourage a popular Swedish industry, the right of distilling brandy was conceded to all householders. The Jews in Sweden owed their continuance there only to the King, who evaded the demand of the Diet for their expulsion.

Sweden and Norway were now engaged in hastily cementing the insecure foundations of their new Union. From the first, however, the nature of the body politic was disputed. According to Bernadotte, Norway had been acquired by the Swedish dynasty rather than by the Swedish nation, and owed her novel freedom to himself. The Swedes and the statesmen of Europe, on the other hand, believed that Sweden had gained compensation for Finland and Pomerania by the extension of her frontiers to the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The Norwegians, however, loathed and dreaded close union with neighbours almost thrice as numerous as themselves. Conscious of a national character distinct from that of the Danes or the Swedes, they regarded the elevation of their country from a vassal to a constitutional State merely as a step towards the independence which, under Prince Christian, it had for a moment enjoyed. A small party, indeed, headed by Count Hermann Wedel-Jarlsberg, shared the hopes for the future of the "brother-nations' welfare" which inspired Bernadotte and the mass of the Swedish people; but to the Norwegians as a whole Sweden remained the national enemy of nearly three centuries' standing.

Early in August, 1815, by a breach of the Swedish rules regarding the due notice, discussion, and enactment of legislation, the *Rikssakt* for determining the constitutional relations between Sweden and Norway became law. It provided that Norway should be a free and independent, indivisible and inalienable (*oafhändeligt*) kingdom, united with Sweden under one King. The constitutional position of the King as King of Norway was to conform in the main to the Norwegian fundamental law of 1814; while as King of Sweden his powers were exercised in accordance with the Swedish fundamental laws of 1809-10. It was now provided that the Norwegian Premier (*Statsminister*) and two other members of the Norwegian Council of State were always to remain with him during his residence in Sweden. By a corresponding rule, the interests of Sweden were protected during his residence in Norway. In either case, the affairs common to both countries were to be transacted in a combined Council of State, formed by the Council of State of the country in which the King might be, together with three representatives of the other. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish consuls were also to serve for Norway; and a war-flag in which the blue

and gold of Sweden greatly predominated was to be that of the united realms. Both countries were to contribute to the common defence in proportion to their population. While none save a Crown Prince or his eldest son could act as Viceroy in Norway, the office of Lord-Lieutenant (*stathållare*) in that country might be filled by a Swede.

Charles XIV hoped that in time, under the favouring influence of common kinship, geographical neighbourhood, and a skilful dynasty, the union of Norway with Sweden would become as close and as mutually beneficial as the union of Scotland with England. He himself strove to carry out the spirit of the *Riksakt*, construed in the sense of a moderate Norwegian nationalist, and to further the interests of Norway in trade, industry, military preparation, and intellectual training. Even in old age he spent months in Norway; and, when neither King nor Crown Prince could undertake the journey, he spared no effort to find a Lord-Lieutenant acceptable to the Norwegian people. Norwegian nationalism, however, defied all such endeavours. Charles himself, who was not a Swede, received in Christiania and Trondhjem marks of personal respect and even gratitude such as he could by no means always command in Stockholm. His son enjoyed an almost dangerous popularity. The Lord-Lieutenancy, on the other hand, suggested that Norway was less than the equal of Sweden. This office robbed all who filled it of their pleasure in life, so that after 1829 it could no longer be safely committed to a Swede. From 1824 onwards, May 17, the day on which, in 1814, Prince Christian had dared to accept the Crown of independent Norway, was celebrated as a national festival, in spite of all the efforts of the Government to prevent it. The *Storting*, or Norwegian Parliament, in which the peasants gained more and more the upper hand, steadfastly refused to grant to the King an absolute veto over its measures, and abolished the relics of noble and hereditary privilege, in direct opposition to his wish. In the region of foreign affairs, Norway proved a burden to Sweden rather than a source of strength. The land, however, advanced in economic and political organisation. The Bank of Norway owes its existence to the labours of Wedel-Jarlsberg in 1816; and in 1837 communal self-government was established with a thoroughness hardly excelled in Europe.

Although destined to be monarch of two realms, Bernadotte never forgot that of all the Frenchmen whom Revolution had made royal, he alone had escaped overthrow. So long as the heirs of the dethroned Gustavus IV survived, he could not feel secure. In Sweden he prepared for his accession as for a *coup d'état*, and he watched with the utmost anxiety for repudiation by Europe. The result suggested, however, that there was little to fear. Louis XVIII reminded the French Legitimists that some one must begin a royal line, and that Pepin and Charlemagne had been upstarts. Alexander, notwithstanding the strained relations to be presently described, eagerly welcomed the new dynasty. The rest



of Europe followed Russia and France; and the favour shown to the Crown Prince Oscar at the Congress of Verona proved that the Gustavian party might well abandon hope. Prior to the deposition of Charles X of France, however, the Bernadotte dynasty remained in a somewhat anomalous position. While its natural allies were the constitutional Governments of the West, the prime necessity of its policy lay in a good understanding with the Tsar. Full acceptance of the Union by the Norwegians, moreover, constituted the dearest aim of Charles XIV; and with regard to Norway England and Russia held views irreconcilable with one another, while the members of the Holy Alliance conceived themselves entitled to regulate the affairs of the smaller States. A Scandinavian monarch who desired peace but who was determined to uphold the honour of his nation therefore found his task by no means light. For Charles XIV it was complicated, as was soon proved, by the ancient and abiding hostility of Denmark.

The sixth article of the Treaty of Kiel had provided that Norway should be charged with a share of the Danish debt "in proportion to its population and resources." This provision gave rise to a controversy which illustrated the new relation between the three Scandinavian kingdoms, the attitude of the Great Powers towards them, and the statecraft of Bernadotte. The question might well be raised, Was the Treaty of Kiel still in force? It had been made between Denmark and Sweden for the cession to one of territories subject to the other. But, before Sweden could be said to have entered into possession of those territories, they had asserted their independence—and this, as Sweden not unwarrantably alleged, with the connivance of the Danish King. That independence they had not laid down; and Sweden might argue that, if any debt was due at all, it was due from Norway, who had incurred it on her separation from Denmark, and had subsequently joined Sweden of her own free will. The natural rejoinder must be that Denmark had carried out the treaty by renouncing Norway, and that the concession of sovereignty by Sweden to Norway did not exempt the former from paying the price of that renunciation. The matter was further complicated, both by the fact that the payment of this debt formed part of the general settlement of Europe, and that the Great Powers were not disposed to allow their arrangements to be frustrated, and also by the straitened circumstances and mutual jealousies of all three nations concerned.

In these circumstances the course of Bernadotte was clear. Something must be paid; the debtor must be Norway; Denmark must receive as little as possible; and the matter must be settled by the Scandinavian Powers alone. In November, 1814, he persuaded the *Storting* to admit the principle that Norway must pay a portion of the Danish debt, and to entrust the negotiations to her King. Next year, to the disgust of Denmark, who protested that her treaty was with Sweden, Norwegian commissioners appeared in Copenhagen. A long wrangle ensued.

Denmark claimed 7,000,000 dollars, while Norway responded with counter-demands for the restoration of Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands, and for a share in the Sound Dues. The Powers, Russia in particular, were constantly appealed to by Denmark; while Bernadotte consistently maintained that negotiations were proceeding, that a constitutional monarch could not dictate to the *Storting*, and that, as no Power had guaranteed the Treaty of Kiel, none had a right to interfere.

The hardihood of such conduct was unmistakable. In December, 1817, the ambassadors of Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain represented to the Tsar that it was advisable for the Allies to compel the Court of Stockholm to fulfil its engagements. Although Alexander bore with great patience the rebuffs of Bernadotte, and most cordially recognised him as King, the danger to Sweden was growing greater throughout the year 1818. On November 15, three identical notes were despatched by the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Prince Regent and Louis XVIII followed suit. These notes concluded a personal appeal to Charles XIV by stating in the phrase of Metternich that "it was not for him to disappoint their expectation." In his reply the indignant King lamented the abyss of misfortune into which the lesser States would be plunged, if force were suffered to take the place of the Law of Nations. He affronted the Tsar and massed 15,000 Swedes and Norwegians in Scania, but secured the mediation of England and concluded a treaty in September, 1819, by which Norway undertook to pay 3,000,000 dollars in the course of ten years. A noteworthy feature of the negotiations had been that Norway had attempted to throw part of the burden upon Sweden. She only accepted the treaty under great pressure in 1821. Sweden, on the other hand, had so far accepted liability as to offer to Denmark certain assets of doubtful value in order to facilitate a settlement.

During the remainder of the reign, the chief problems of foreign policy arose out of the relations of Sweden and Norway with Russia; and Charles derived great profit from his friendship with the Tsar. No transaction better illustrated the character both of the King's policy and of his relations with his Ministers and Diet than the affair of the Swedish ships, which has become a leading case in the Law of Neutrality. Always desirous of securing funds for the navy and the secret service, Charles welcomed a suggestion for the sale of old warships to Colombia, then in revolt against Spain. Two ships thus changed hands, being sold nominally to a firm of Swedish Jews and by them to an English house, while their armament reached Colombia by a circuitous route. Everyone concerned was bribed, though indirectly; and soon a similar bargain was made with Mexico. This time, however, the secret was not kept, and Spain, supported by the three despotic Powers, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, interfered. The flimsy fictions which disguised the breach of law were swept away; and the demand of Charles XIV that Russia or Spain

should compensate Sweden for her loss was treated with contempt. The King tried to carry matters with a high hand; but Russia practically threatened war. At great financial sacrifice, therefore, the bargain was cancelled; and, for several years, the Government had to manœuvre desperately to prevent the Opposition from exposing the whole affair.

In 1826, thanks to the distraction of Nicholas I by the Eastern Question, another danger of collision with Russia was averted. After long negotiations a treaty was then signed in St Petersburg, which provided for the partition between Norway and Russia of the districts in Finmark which had been hitherto occupied in common by the subjects of both Powers. Thenceforward, Charles XIV's growing distrust of Liberal ideas drew him nearer to the Tsar. Their relations received clear illustration in 1838, when Nicholas delighted his brother monarch by a surprise visit. At that moment, however, the streets of Stockholm were filled by dangerous mobs, demonstrating in favour of the journalist Crusenstolpe, who lay under trial for slandering the Crown.

To the domestic progress of Sweden, the greatest contribution of Charles XIV was peace. Yet, in establishing the national credit, in improving agriculture and other existing sources of wealth, in facilitating and applying new inventions, in furthering education, and in seeking for the best commercial policy, he and his Ministers deserved well of their country. Under their leadership, Sweden drew freely upon England for ideas and for the instruments of progress. William Chalmers had bequeathed an industrial college to Göteborg (Gothenburg), where James Keiller established a great factory. Edward Nonnen taught agriculture and Samuel Owen mechanics to all Sweden, while Thomas Telford played a great part in the construction of the Göta canal. English cattle, English sects, the English system of smelting and English notions of unfettered industry and commerce entered Sweden together.

At the same time, the Government and the nation did much to solve their problems without foreign aid. The mass of depreciated paper-money, which had frustrated all attempts to create an exchange favourable to Sweden, was absorbed in consequence of a decision of the Diet in 1830. By calling down the paper-dollar to three-eighths of its face-value in silver, the nation secured enduring relief at the cost of a momentary humiliation. The Bank was compelled to keep an adequate reserve in metal; and private joint-stock banks, with a limited right to issue notes, now began to arise. This, the final restoration of Swedish credit, was due rather to Provost Schwerin and Baron Nordin than to the King. The simultaneous improvement of the old sources of national wealth, on the other hand, owed much to his direct endeavour. He purchased estates, and by gifts and exhortations encouraged individuals and public bodies to further agriculture and industry. The establishment of agricultural schools helped on the emancipation of Sweden from the system under which much of the land was tilled by the

villagers in common with an antiquated rotation of crops. New areas were laid under cultivation; and local societies were founded for the promotion of agriculture by discussions, exhibitions, and prizes. The result was seen in 1830, when Sweden took rank as a grain-exporting country. A decade had sufficed to double the yearly production of wheat and almost to double that of rye. The extraction and smelting of iron-ore and the manufacture of machinery also underwent a notable development; and here again the lead was taken by the King. Communications likewise owed much to himself and his reign. The famous Göta canal, connecting Stockholm and Göteborg, which was constructed in great measure by the army and subsidised by the nation, is but the most conspicuous among many improvements in communication by land and water. The invention of gas and the application of steam power to navigation rendered industry on a great scale possible in a land where almost every town lies near navigable water, and where daylight is most unequally distributed through the year.

These measures, though they prepared the way for a period of rapid material progress, did not, however, preserve the Government from attack. To the standing disquietude of the King, the political and economic discontent in Sweden gave birth to an Opposition inspired by that of England and encouraged by the progress of Liberalism in France. In spite of all that Government could do to propitiate the leaders and to influence the elections and procedure, the Opposition grew until it held the upper hand in 1840. Its leaders, among whom Provost Schwerin and Baron Anckarsvärd were most conspicuous in the Diet, and Hierta and Crusenstolpe in the Press, were in some cases influenced by spite rather than by patriotism. They drew increasing strength, however, from the fact that in 1809 Sweden had made herself by law a constitutional State and that her sovereign was an autocrat at heart. The critics in the *Aftonblad* and in the Diet found a broad mark for their arrows in the autocratic administration of the finances, the incapacity or subservience of many of the Ministers, the lavish distribution of pensions and places, and a censorship of the Press so injudicious and so ineffective that, after the censor had done his worst with each of the preceding series, a twenty-seventh *Aftonblad* could appear. With the peasants the cry for the reduction of the army was always popular; and in the King's later years—the period of the so-called Bed-Chamber rule—every Estate found cause for discontent in the influence exercised by Count Magnus Brahe and other courtiers less noble and devoted than he.

The Swedish Diet was, however, too clumsy a machine for rapid progress even when it acted in harmony with the Government. In 1838, by reason of a popular outbreak against the imprisonment of Crusenstolpe, Stockholm was for a short time under martial law. The last Diet of the reign, which met in 1840-1, was dominated by the Opposition, which in talent and influence proved superior to the

supporters of the timid and undistinguished Government. Such was its bitterness that the aged poet Tegnér declared his fear that the Swedes would themselves annihilate their ancient freedom, which had defied every assault from without. The Diet brought some of the Ministers to trial, while compelling the King to accept others and to reorganise the administration under seven departments, each with a responsible chief. Other reforms, particularly that of the national representation, were advanced a stage; and, by refusing to vote money which had been borrowed for the diplomatic service, the Estates left the King and Crown Prince to pay nearly 776,000 dollars out of their private fortunes. Such violence, however, recoiled upon the malcontents themselves. Instead of procuring the King's abdication, they found their own power broken. The nation, if not the Diet, listened to the royal exhortation to "understand their Government," and to remember what it had done for Sweden. Charles could point to "freedom maintained, riches won, canals opened, rivers made navigable, new roads and harbours constructed, fortresses rising, an army of more than 100,000 young men and veterans, a coast defence of nearly 250 gun-boats and yawls, new ships of the line and frigates, agriculture improved every year, the product of many important manufactures doubled, the whole external debt and the greater part of the internal paid off, the income of the Bank considerably increased, the customs revenue almost trebled, a population approaching that of Sweden and Finland together before Finland was lost." During his few remaining years a comprehensive law for elementary education was added to the long list of benefits conferred upon Sweden in a period of peace, which was without precedent in her history, and in which the lines of her future policy and progress were clearly traced. Early in 1844, Charles XIV died, at the age of eighty-one.

Among the most memorable features of his reign are movements which it was not in the power of the Government to initiate. The springs of religious feeling flowed afresh in the heart of the people; and "readers," despite the law, made their way through the scattered homesteads of the north. From 1830 onwards a determined effort was made to check the drunkenness which was threatening to destroy the nation. Ten years earlier popular thrift had given rise to savings-banks. At the same time Sweden was striving to attain in science and in literature the national greatness which could no longer be hers by means of war. The chemist Berzelius almost takes rank beside Linnaeus, her greatest savant. Ling was not only a poet of merit, but a man of practical insight, who strove to train a new generation on a plan which founded modern gymnastics. The Romantic Movement in literature gave rise to a Scandinavian school of writers and historians, among whom Tegnér and Geijer, the Swedish Macaulay, were the most eminent. The names of Tegnér and Geijer, indeed, are inseparably linked with each other and with what is best in modern Swedish literature. Both were

famous bards, Liberals, educationalists and men of religion. Both derived inspiration from the ancient history of the North. Tegnér, drawing fire from Greece and Scandinavia alike, won a high place in the world of poetry. His *Frithiof's Saga* has been translated into eleven languages. But he was a national poet above all else, and so great was his influence that he modified the diction of the people. Geijer's profound and versatile genius made its greatest mark on the history of his own land, which he may be said to have transformed by writings equally admirable for philosophical depth and lucidity of exposition. Newspapers—some subsidised by the King, others by members of the Opposition—flourished in great numbers, and the political and social aspirations of the time found expression in a mass of pamphlets. These signs of life, together with the new prospect of an educated peasantry, promised well for the intellectual future of the nation.

The advent of Oscar I, a cultured philanthropist (1844-59), filled the Liberals with expectation. The new King, however, though he called new men to office and convoked the Estates, soon added another name to the long roll of princes who have been bolder reformers before than after their accession. After the Revolution of 1848, which roused an echo in the streets of Stockholm, he ceased to be a political progressive; and his rule, as a whole, formed a prolongation of that of his father in hands less powerful either to guide or to obstruct the political and social forces of the nation. Fortunately for Sweden, a strong foreign policy was at this time not indispensable. In Norway, Oscar I reaped a harvest of good-will due to the sympathy for Norwegian aspirations which he showed both as Viceroy and as King. Powerfully attracted by the Scandinavianism which at this time won many adherents in the three kingdoms, he declared that the Eider was the natural frontier of the north, and drew closer to Denmark both during and after her war with Schleswig-Holstein. In 1857, a treaty with Denmark abolished the Sound Dues, and thus relieved Sweden, with other countries, from a vexatious impost.

With Russia relations became strained. In 1851 the Tsar attempted to secure rights over the Norwegian coast of the Varanger Fiord, and avenged his failure by closing his dominions to the Norwegian Lapps. Soon afterwards the Crimean War put to the test the alliance with the Tsar into which Bernadotte had entered in 1812, but which could never commend itself to a free nation from which Finland had been torn. At first neutral, Oscar concluded in 1855 the so-called Treaty of November with the Western Powers. By this compact England and France gave a guarantee of help to Sweden and Norway, in case their refusal to grant territory or privileges to Russia should provoke her attack.

From the domestic policy of Oscar I, Sweden derived more unquestionable advantages. Although the movement for the reform of the Diet was frustrated by the King, his reign forms a period of advance towards

social and economic freedom. From 1844 onwards the Diet met at intervals of three years instead of five. The power to confiscate newspapers was given up, together with the power to compel attendance at church. Prisoners were no longer flogged or herded in common gaols. The first legislative step was taken in a campaign which has converted the most drunken country in Europe into the classic land of the temperance movement. In 1854, thanks to the crusade begun by Canon Peter Wieselgren of Göteborg and Dr Magnus Huss, the production of brandy was changed from a domestic industry into one that could be taxed and controlled in factories. At the same time communications were improved by the introduction of the electric telegraph, and the first cautious advances were made towards a system of state railways. The coinage was again reformed, the decimal and metric system introduced, and the modern system of postage established. Further, under the guidance of the Finance Minister, Gripenstedt, the work initiated under Charles XIV for the establishment of freedom of trade and industry was carried on. In 1846, the gild system was done away with, and within twenty years every man stood free to follow in town or country whatever calling he might choose. In 1853–4, the Diet consented to reduce the customs, and to permit many exports and imports hitherto forbidden. In 1857, free trade was definitely and consciously established.

During this period agriculture continued to improve; and industry and commerce advanced by leaps and bounds. In twenty years, 1840–60, Swedish manufactures trebled in value, while the sum total of exports and imports rose in almost equal degree. The progress of a decade equalled that of the preceding century; and Sweden could prepare to assume a debt of 110,000,000 dollars for the construction of her five trunk railway-lines. Norway was enjoying a similar material development; and for a time political agitation ceased. In 1854 the birthday of the Union—November 4—was actually made the occasion of public rejoicing in Christiania.

Charles XV, who began to rule in 1857 and to reign in 1859, applied to the government of modern Sweden the test of a weak King. The first Bernadotte King born on Scandinavian soil, he has been styled “half a viking of the north and half a knight of southern France.” Young, quixotic, an artist, and popular even to legend, he lacked the discernment, the pertinacity, and the industry necessary for political success. From his father he differed as widely as Oscar from Charles XIV. The Ministers found it almost impossible to induce Oscar I to sanction a sentence of death, or Charles XV to show mercy. He began his Regency with a complete and arbitrary change of ministry, and always remained conservative at heart. Yet, thanks to sage councillors and to the accumulated force of the nation, his reign became the time of harvest for the reforms which had long been germinating.

Much of the achievement of the reign was due to the exceptional political ability of Baron Louis de Geer, a penniless cadet of a well-known family founded by the rich merchant who came from Holland to serve the great Gustavus. A young man almost without political experience or ambition when called to office as Minister of Justice (1858), de Geer made his mark by advising the King to refuse to allow Norway to abolish the Lord-Lieutenancy without consulting Sweden (1860). He then set himself to make the Government harmonious, solid, and responsive to public opinion, which was deeply stirred by problems of railway construction, volunteering, and Reform. By the force of high character and sound judgment he won for himself and his colleagues the complete confidence of the nation, and a commanding influence over Charles XV. Many reforms, conceived and promulgated in the spirit of moderation, now came into effect. In 1862 the communes received responsible self-government. The Church was provided with a novel representative system in the shape of quinquennial meetings of clergy and laity combined. The criminal law was rendered milder. Freedom of religion, of industry, and commerce became wider.

Above all, the long struggle for a reform of the Diet was brought to a peaceful issue. The need for some change in a legislature, which was little better than the simultaneous session of four exclusive corporations, had become more clear, as the growth of new classes of society, the increased occasion for fresh laws, and the weakening of the barriers between class and class, demonstrated that Sweden was developing into a modern State. Drawing inspiration from England and from Norway, the Liberals had for many years demanded a bicameral system and a wide franchise. Two of the Estates, the burghers and peasants, expected to gain in power by a more direct representation of the people; and the King was induced to abandon the active hostility to change which his father and grandfather had shown. But the spirit of privilege, which filled the nobles and higher clergy, long defied the arguments of the Ministry, although they were supported by deputations and petitions from the people and by an almost unanimous Press. At last, however, in December, 1865, Reform was accepted. The new Diet was to meet for four months every year as well as when specially summoned by the King. It consisted of two Chambers chosen without regard to birth or calling. The First Chamber comprised members, aged at least 35 years and possessing landed estates or taxed incomes of 4000 crowns, elected for nine years by communal councils and unpaid. In the Second Chamber, whose members received a small salary, deputies were chosen directly or indirectly by the country districts and by the towns, according to population. They must be electors domiciled in their constituencies, of at least 25 years of age, and qualified by property or income according to a standard which was fixed somewhat too high to include the mass of the people. Under certain circumstances the Chambers might vote together,



and Ministers who were not members might address them. The remainder of the reign of Charles XV (1859-72) sufficed to show that power was passing from the King and Ministers into the hands of the Diet, and that within the Diet the agricultural interest formed the strongest force.

Thanks chiefly to de Geer and his colleagues Gripenstedt and Carlson, Charles XV had thus won renown as a reformer. In the domain of foreign affairs, however, the aspirations of both King and nation were frustrated. Overjoyed at the downfall of Russia in the Crimean War, Charles and many of his people had dreamed that Sweden might yet play a great part in the politics of Europe. A sense of their own freedom inspired outspoken sympathy with the insurgent Italians and Poles; while Panscandinavian sentiment and the encouragement of Napoleon III impelled the King to promise support to Denmark against the German Confederation. The sequel was deeply humiliating. Failing the alliance of one of the Great Powers, de Geer, Gripenstedt, and the Norwegian Minister, Sibbern, vetoed an adventure for which their two realms were not equipped and for which the people felt no general enthusiasm. By rashly issuing the Constitution of November, 1863, Denmark gave excuse to her foes to advance and to her friends, among whom Sweden stood foremost, to retreat. Expressions of sympathy, a few hundred volunteers, and a demonstration of defensive armaments formed the meagre contribution of Sweden and Norway to the losing side in the war of 1864.

Charles XV, though beloved in Norway and crowned at a moment when the tide seemed to be running towards true "brotherhood," failed to draw closer the bonds of Scandinavian union. His refusal in 1860, at the bidding of the Swedes, to confirm the abolition of the Lord-Lieutenancy by the *Storting* provoked in the Norwegians, whose growing national literature is characterised below, a determination to resist all proposals for the revision of the *Rikssakt* in a Unionist spirit. Although the downfall of the Danes in 1864 emphasised the need of Scandinavian defence and even caused the jubilee of the Union to be celebrated with enthusiasm, the *Storting* of 1871 rejected revision by a majority of more than five to one. The original defects and obscurities in the contract between the two nations were thus perpetuated, while the weaker grew every year more capable of standing alone. The triumph of the Young Norse party, which was anti-Swedish, in Norway, and the victories of Prussia, then the foe of Scandinavia, in Europe, came at a time when the Swedes were unable to solve the question of national defence. They were emigrating in tens of thousands to the New World; but abundant harvests and the industrial stimulus—due to the Franco-German War and peace—had brightened the horizon, when Charles XV died in September, 1872.

## (2) DENMARK.

Denmark, like Sweden, emerged from the chaos of the Napoleonic wars a mangled and poverty-stricken State. The minute duchy of Lauenburg could compensate neither King nor nation for the loss of Norway and of the fleet, the devastation of Copenhagen, and the ruin of the finances. In spite of a national bankruptcy, Denmark owed more than ten years' revenue at the conclusion of peace; and it was long before her annual income could be made to balance her expenditure. In the following twenty years the debt rose from 240,000,000 to 260,000,000 crowns. During this period the limit of practicable taxation was passed, while the price of corn fell heavily; and of industrial and commercial enterprise Denmark showed little sign. Her administration was almost of necessity corrupt. In Copenhagen, for five years, bankruptcies occurred at the rate of one per week, while in 1840 the population of the capital was only one-fifth greater than in 1801.

Despite all misfortunes, however, until the death of Frederick VI in 1839, his dominions, both Danish and German, enjoyed a period which seemed harmonious and even happy by contrast with the succeeding generation. Norway had indeed been lost, but the King still reigned in Schleswig and in Holstein. The Norwegians had been turbulent neighbours rather than brethren. Frederick returned from the Congress of Vienna to be welcomed as the saviour of the nation, and to rule as the most benevolent of despots. For more than thirty years he had been at the head of the State, associated first with the emancipation of the peasants, and in later days with national sufferings, in which his share had been the greatest. Now, out of respect for him, the Danes were content for a time with a measure of real liberty and tranquil progress which, though small in comparison with what came later, surpassed that of their German neighbours at that time. A new religious enthusiasm moreover animated great sections of the people, while the upper classes showed in many ways that they were inspired by sentiments of humanity. The poor and the afflicted were cared for as never before; prison-reform began; the rights of the Jews were enlarged; savings-banks were established; education became compulsory; and English methods of instruction were introduced. Liberal ideas therefore began to ripen in a not unkindly air.

Much of the quiet progress which Denmark made in the later years of Frederick VI must be attributed to the efforts of private persons rather than to those of the King. Frederick VI, indeed, remained first and foremost a soldier. He lacked political imagination, and was by no means fond of contact with intellects superior to his own. His humanity and common-sense, however, secured to his subjects not only a continued enjoyment of the liberties which the Crown had already granted, but also, though by slow degrees, their enlargement. In the darkest days

of European reaction, the Press, in the Kingdom though not in the Duchies, continued to enjoy considerable freedom. Thus the famous *Kieler Blätter*, when proscribed by the German Confederation in Holstein, found a refuge north of the Eider. In a small State, at peace within itself and more free than its Continental neighbours, art and letters flourished. Copenhagen was fertile in academic and literary achievement; and Oehlenschläger beheld Grundtvig dedicate the studio which a rich noble had built for Thorwaldsen.

In the sphere of politics also liberty found some place. While other rulers broke their promises to their people, Frederick, who had promised nothing, granted to his Danish and German subjects a measure of Constitutional government. At the close of the war he announced his intention of admitting the Privy Council to a regular share in public business, yielding thereby something of his autocratic rule. In 1816 a commission was appointed to consider the grant of a Constitution to Holstein. In 1818 a national bank, independent of the Government, was established. In 1831 and 1834, "to knit closer the bonds which unite the royal house to the people," Frederick created four provincial Diets, for the islands, Jutland, Schleswig and Holstein respectively, whose functions should be to deliberate and advise upon questions of legislature and finance. Provision was made for the election to these bodies of a fixed number of burgesses, landowners and peasants, while a few landowners, professors and clergy were to be nominated by the King.

These measures, however, though creditable to an aged autocrat, could not satisfy the constitutional aspirations which grew up during a quarter of a century of peace—a period renowned for the rise of Liberalism and Nationalism throughout the Western world. The expulsion of Charles X from France in 1830 stimulated the desire of the Danes for a national representative system. In the following year, Uwe Jens Lornsen, a young Schleswig official, in a pamphlet which started the German national movement of Schleswig-Holstein, gave clear utterance to the demand of the Germans in the Duchies that their union with the Kingdom should be merely dynastic. Lornsen was thrown into prison; but in Frederick's last years, when men expected that a Liberal would succeed to the throne in the shape of Prince Christian, Nationalism expressed itself boldly. Even the Danish minority in northern Schleswig began to show that it was not a negligible factor in the State. At the same time Panscandinavian ideas, which drew inspiration from the long past history of the North, found vent in a meeting between Danish and Swedish students, the first of a remarkable series which continued at intervals for more than twenty years. When to the new hostility of the Germans in the Duchies towards the Danes was added the new friendliness of the Swedes, the political future of Scandinavia became indeed uncertain. At the same time the probability that no male heir would be born to Frederick, Prince Christian's only son, rendered

dubious the question of the eventual succession to the dominions of Frederick VI. Christian VIII, who succeeded his uncle in 1839, thus found himself confronted with a complex problem which no statesman then living could have solved. The element of greatest difficulty lay in Schleswig-Holstein. Simultaneously with the grant of Diets, these Duchies had received a common administration and a common tribunal, which emphasised the distinction between them and Denmark proper. In many respects indeed they formed a single corporation. From the Kongeaa to the Elbe and the Trave, the upper classes were Germans or Germanised Danes, conscious of a unity unsevered by the Eider and accentuated by the existence of Jutland on their flank. In the Diets, the law Courts, the schools and the churches, the sole language was German. That Schleswig and Holstein were inseparable had been admitted by the Treaty of Ribe in 1460; and the Danish elements of the population had been so far Germanised that only a remnant in northern Schleswig retained the speech and consciousness of their race. The governmental union with Denmark was threatened, moreover, by differences in the law of succession. In Holstein at least the succession could not be said to pass, as in Denmark, through females, while the Germans asserted that in Schleswig the same objection held good.

The Danes, on the other hand, regarded the Eider as the historic boundary of their State. Their monarch had annexed Schleswig in 1713; and his title had been recognised throughout a long series of European pacts. While many Danes felt a certain indifference with regard to the future of Holstein, the nation was resolved that Schleswig must be retained. Yet even the Danes of Schleswig belonged to the duchy rather than to the kingdom; while, to complete the confusion of the situation, Holstein was a member of the German Confederation and Schleswig was not.

Such was the burden which weighed down Christian VIII. The new King, though energetic, cultured, and enlightened, won little appreciation from his people. Liberal opinions, for which in earlier days he had been excluded first from the Council, and afterwards for a time from the country, he now disavowed. Always susceptible to external influences, he had learned from the Tsar, Metternich and many other rulers whom he visited in 1838, to regard a centralised representative system as dangerous to monarchy. But, although he abjured political change and did not shrink from imprisoning Orla Lehmann, when that brilliant demagogue indicted autocracy, his reforms proved him at least to be a conscientious ruler. During his short reign (1839-48), he effected great and beneficial changes in all departments of the administration, and developed communal self-government in town and country alike. He set the finances in order, published the national accounts, revised the Sound Dues, sold the unprofitable colonies, bought up the exemptions of his German nobles from customs dues, and paid off

debt at the rate of 3,000,000 crowns a year. Stimulated by the visit of Elizabeth Fry, he furthered the reform of prisons, the abolition of the slave-trade, and the toleration of the Baptists. Crimes began to be punished more wisely, and flogging in the army was abolished. Iceland received a Constitution. Communications by road and railway were rapidly developed, and the peasants were thereby helped to take part in public life. Thanks to the King's labours, Denmark became sufficiently rich and well-organised as to be able to endure not long afterwards a three years' war on land.

In dealing with the great problem of knitting his dominions into a firm whole and passing it on to a determinate successor, however, Christian VIII was less successful. The antipathy between his Danish and German subjects increased in intensity. During the session of the Schleswig Estates in November, 1842, a member advanced the unprecedented claim to speak and to be reported in Danish. This challenge to the German majority began a struggle which raged until 1864. The King, by a patent of March, 1844, conceded the use of Danish in exceptional cases but not as an inalienable right, and thereby satisfied neither side. Henceforward the majority of the Danes, who desired to make the Eider the frontier of a unified State, gladly countenanced the coercion of the Germans in Schleswig; while the Germans of the Duchies, supported by the public opinion of the German Confederation, showed themselves equally harsh towards the Danes. Christian's attempt to provide for the future added bitterness to the strife. His open letter of July 8, 1846, declared that the succession established by the *Kongelov*, the autocratic fundamental law of Denmark, undoubtedly held good for Schleswig and Lauenburg, but that concerning parts of Holstein the question was uncertain. This implicit endorsement of the views of the Eider-Danes found its almost inevitable consequence in the war of 1848.

The concluding months of the King's life were passed in endeavours to combat the growing spirit of separatism in the Duchies by means of a Constitution in which the whole monarchy should share. This work was taken up in a spirit of filial piety by Frederick VII, who ascended the throne in January, 1848, and who was to be the last unquestioned heir to kingdom and duchies alike. In him the Danes found a monarch, whose indolent kindness and real sympathy with his people won him the affection of every class, while the society and influence of his low-born wife made him constitutional rather than absolutist at heart. With indiscriminating obedience to the letter of his father's commands, he called to his councils Karl Moltke, a strong and perfectly loyal statesman, but dangerously inclined to emphasise the claim of the Duchies to form a single body politic. Under his influence, the Crown prepared to establish for the whole of its dominions a Diet, which should assemble annually in Copenhagen or in Gottorp. Such a "whole-State" policy,

involving as it did the equality of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein, ran counter to every hope of the Eider-Danes. Both sections of Frederick's subjects protested, demanding respectively that Schleswig should enter the Kingdom of Denmark and the German Confederation. The Danes gained the ear of the King, who complied with their national demand for greater freedom of the Press, and challenged the Duchies by establishing a Danish Nationalist Ministry in power. Amid the general excitement produced by the Revolution of 1848, Denmark found herself involved in the first Schleswig-Holstein War.

The course of the three years' struggle is traced elsewhere. Its influence upon the remainder of Frederick's reign (to 1863) was deep and manifold. The victories at Bau, Fridericia and Idstedt, and, in general, their successful defiance of Germany, inspired the Danes with a national self-confidence, which was soon to prove disastrous. The problem of the Duchies had not been solved by fighting. The partition of Schleswig on the basis of language which England suggested had been rejected; and Danes and Germans hated one another more fiercely than before the war. The pause in their armed strife, moreover, had been purchased largely by Danish pledges with regard to the future government of the Duchies, which had given to foreign Powers a precedent and a pretext for future interference. Above all, the King's surrender to the Danish Nationalists had produced the Constitution of 1849, by which the monarchy finally abandoned its claims to autocracy north of the Kongeaa. With little or no struggle and sacrifice, Denmark proper had become a limited hereditary monarchy, in which the King shared legislative power with a Diet elected by the people. Responsible Ministers appeared, each at the head of a department of State; and, without the signature of one of them, the royal ordinances were thenceforward to be invalid. In composition and mode of election the two Chambers, the *Folksting* and *Landsting*, closely resembled the Swedish Chambers of 1866 described above. Freedom of religion, of the Press, of public meeting and of industrial career were granted; and all privilege was abolished. In this Fundamental Law Schleswig found no place. Early in 1852 it was removed from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, under which it had hitherto been associated with Holstein. For some years, Moltke governed the Duchies in the spirit of pure autocracy, while during 1852-4 the hopes of the Eider-Danes were flouted by the sway of a Ministry which depended largely on foreign support and governed without special regard to Danish nationalism. From 1854 onwards, however, a series of measures aimed at making Schleswig Danish by force; and the way was thus prepared for the remonstrances and demands of the German Powers, which eventually precipitated the war of 1864.

The position of Denmark, both national and international, was at the same time complicated by the question of succession. After the nephew of Christian VIII had ceded to his sister Louise his rights under

the *Kongelov*, and the dynastic claim of the Duke of Augustenburg in the Duchies had been bought off, a settlement seemed to have been reached by the Treaty of London of 1852. This was signed by the Five Great Powers and Sweden and Norway, which all severally undertook, in the interests of the peace of Europe, to recognise the eventual succession of Christian of Glücksburg, and his heirs male by Princess Louise, to "all the lands which are now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark." Offensive as this arrangement could not but be to the Eider-Danes, they were not strong enough to oppose it in the Diet; and it became law in 1853. Next year, the Government followed up their success by promulgating a Constitution common to all the King's dominions. By this a Council, whose powers were closely limited, was established of whose fifty members twenty were nominees of the Crown. The Diet rose in defence of the Fundamental Law, and in October, 1855, reaped the reward of its efforts in the shape of a Council enlarged in numbers and in powers. In 1856, however, the German Great Powers stepped in to denounce a Constitution granted in violation of the agreements which Denmark had made with them in 1852. For years the quarrel went on at intervals, Denmark yielding slowly, the Germans claiming more and more, the tide of Eider-Danish and Panscandinavian enthusiasm rising, and, to all appearance, the European situation changing in Denmark's favour. At last in March, 1863, the Government, headed since 1857 by Hall, announced a separate legislature and army for Holstein and Lauenburg, to be followed by a common constitution for Denmark and Schleswig. The German Confederation continued to threaten military action against Denmark, while the Germans of Schleswig made constitutional government impossible. On November 13 the Council accepted by forty votes against sixteen the common Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig which had been foreshadowed in March. The nation was thereby pledged to the policy of "Denmark to the Eider," just at the moment when the death of Frederick VII prevented it from rallying round an uncontested throne. Within a year, as is narrated elsewhere, his successor, Christian IX, had been compelled by German arms to renounce Schleswig-Holstein for ever, and to accept the frontier of the Kongeaa.

With the loss of the Duchies, Denmark ceased to need the political institutions of a *de facto* federal State. What body, or bodies, had power to establish a Constitution was now, however, a disputable question. It was not until after a heated conflict and a new election of the Diet that the Agricultural party made their will so far prevail that, in July, 1866, a new edition of the Fundamental Law of 1849 received the royal signature. This for the most part confirmed the Constitution granted by Frederick VII, but contained modifications designed to secure more permanent and substantial elements in the *Landsting*. Of its sixty-six members, twelve were now to be appointed by the King for life, and the

others indirectly elected by voters possessing an income of 2000 crowns. The fact that a Ministry supported by the *Landsting* felt itself entitled to govern in defiance of the popular will, as represented in the *Folksting*, lent importance to the Constitution of 1866 and led to political conflict in Denmark during many years.

### (3) DANO-NORWEGIAN LITERATURE.

(1815-65.)

The nineteenth century had opened for Denmark with less internal disturbance than for most of the countries of Europe. But, in 1807, she also was drawn into the whirl of the Napoleonic crisis, and her political and social conditions underwent a succession of disasters. The devastation of Copenhagen by fire, the capture of the Danish fleet, the forcible separation from her ancient dependency, Norway, culminated in a national bankruptcy that plunged a large part of her population into severe poverty. But while these calamities wounded the vanity and sapped the comforts of the people, the intellectual life of Denmark had never blazed so high, or with a flame so clear or so pure from foreign influence as it did immediately after these terrible calamities.

In the course of the eighteenth century, Danish literature had brought forth many admirable specimens, particularly in lyric and dramatic poetry. In Holberg it had produced a great comic playwright, in Johannes Ewald an exquisite lyrist and the first pioneer of Scandinavian neo-romanticism. The veteran of Danish literature, as the century closed, was Jens Immanuel Baggesen (1764-1826), satirist, rhetorician, lyrist, and almost a great writer. But Baggesen was a Germaniser, and the new writers, who rose in violent opposition to Baggesen in the opening years of the new century, were in their own way Germanisers too. Their ideas were those which the Norwegian philosopher, Henrik Steffens (1773-1845) had brought back from Germany. The earliest of the great lyrists of the new age, Adolph Wilhelm Schack-Staffeldt (1769-1826), clothed in an extraordinary beauty of form thoughts and types which were borrowed directly from his romantic German contemporaries.

But the veteran Baggesen, who had sometimes written in German, and who had been deeply tinged with the colour of earlier German descriptive and didactic poetry, in his latest period—partly in pique at the successes of the new poets, no doubt, but partly also in response to the dictates of his own sound judgment—went back to the original Danish characteristics and strongly opposed all exotic influences. It is interesting to note that his strongest utterance in this direction dates precisely from 1814, the year of the separation from Norway. Baggesen, who possessed the limpid common-sense of the eighteenth century,



ridiculed the mysticism and the opacity of the romantic Danish imitators of Novalis. He did not spare even what he considered Germanising tendencies in Oehlenschläger, whom he had greeted with so splendid a gesture, as more than the inheritor of his own renown, as the Aladdin who had discovered and had relighted the sacred lamp of poesy in Denmark.

When the period we are discussing began, Adam Gottlob Oehlenschläger (1779–1850) was unquestionably the greatest figure in the living poetry of the North. It was the pride and joy of the Danes in the darkest hour of their political humiliation that they possessed a poet of surpassing greatness, a poet who, as it seemed to them, could hold his own with Goethe, with Alfieri, with Byron. In 1805 the new writer, already celebrated, had poured out of his golden horn a cluster of works, epic, dramatic, descriptive, lyrical, which placed him, at once, far above any preceding Danish writer in each of these kinds. Oehlenschläger called his imagination a fairy ring; he had but to turn it on his finger, and it brought him all he asked for. Then followed the majestic series of his saga-dramas, with which he stirred to its depths the patriotic sentiments of his wounded country. Never had his verse sounded with a louder, more passionate harmony than in the collection called *Helge*, printed in the unhappy year 1814.

If in the poetry of Oehlenschläger there remained to the last a slight touch of Germanism, an echo of the romantic ideas he had listened to in his youth from the impassioned lips of Steffens, in Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783–1872) these have wholly disappeared, and every word and every thought is redolent of Danish soil. As a poet, as a priest, as a teacher, as a politician, all through his long and violent life Grundtvig fought for the national principle; in him the sentiment of the independence of Denmark found its raciest exponent. In his incessant publicity, in his character as a tireless intellectual Berserker, he contrasted with the subdued and pathetic Steen Steensen Blicher (1782–1848), whose voice seemed scarcely louder than that of the wind blowing over his native heaths in Jutland. But Blicher also did a great work, by means of his incomparable peasant stories, in building up an independent form of literature, owing all its character to Danish elements.

It was by poetry mainly that the revival of Danish letters was illustrated; but in Bernhard Severin Ingemann (1789–1862) Denmark produced her first great novelist. His historical romances, started, no doubt, by the example of the *Waverley Novels*, enjoyed an extraordinary popularity. Ingemann was followed by innumerable imitators; but the real birth of Danish prose fiction was not yet. Drama, as has often been the case in the history of literature, awakened first. Before 1815 several playwrights had attempted to follow in the steps of Holberg by composing comedies on themes of a purely local character, but these homely dramatists had to fight against the overweening popularity of German

models, and particularly of Kotzebue. Foersom's admirable, and still classic, translation of Shakespeare, began to be printed in 1819, and prepared the way for better things. Then, in the fulness of time, appeared Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791-1860), a man not merely of lively and exquisite fancy, but equipped, as perhaps no other Dane was then equipped, with the culture of Europe. In 1825 Heiberg brought to Copenhagen from Paris the form of the *vaudeville*, but clothed it with robes of delightful wit and fancy, combining an ironical observation of local manners with a delicate sense of poetry. It would be difficult to exaggerate what Heiberg did, as poet, playwright, journalist and critic, to extend and modernise Danish taste, lifting it to a level with its neighbours, while preserving its essential independence.

The poets who immediately followed Oehlenschläger were somewhat eclipsed by the splendour and fulness of his output. But the lamp of Aladdin flickered and declined some time before the poet's bodily powers decayed, and there was found room for a new generation to assert itself. Of these there stand out five who deserve mention among the most eminent writers of the century; they are, in the order of their birth, Ludvig Adolph Böttcher (1793-1874), Christian Winther (1796-1876), Henrik Hertz (1798-1870), Hans Christian Andersen (1805-75), and Frederik Paludan-Müller (1809-76). These are the poets who represent at its height the poetical genius of Denmark in the central years of the nineteenth century. Böttcher and Winther were lyrists, Andersen the world-famous fabulist, while Hertz and Paludan-Müller excelled in almost all branches of the art of poetry. It was Hertz who put his stamp on the romantic drama of the country, and he has the distinction of having influenced Ibsen more directly than any other writer. Paludan-Müller, doubtless the most accomplished poetical artist that Denmark has produced, summed up the tradition of his day, very much as Tennyson was doing in England and Victor Hugo in France. In 1870 all these five poets were still alive, and at the height of their influence, though they had almost ceased to write.

In prose there should first be mentioned the great philologist Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787-1832), who insisted, more emphatically than any man before him, on the relationship between the language and manners of the ancient Scandinavian races and those of their living successors. He was followed, in his admirable work, by Petersen and Madvig. A glory of Danish science was Hans Christian Oersted (1777-1851), the inventor of electro-magnetism, and an excellent author. But perhaps the most important prose-writer of this period was the philosopher Søren Aaby Kierkegaard (1813-55), whose value was scarcely recognised in his own day, as he threaded the streets of Copenhagen in meditation, but who has slowly risen, since his death, to be one of the principal stars in the Danish firmament. His chief contribution to philosophy bears the title *Either—Or*. With these

exceptions, however, the glories of Danish literature during this period were mainly poetical. Here Denmark could compete on equal terms with any literature in Europe. But the revival of her prose, in which the personal genius of Georg Brandes has had a large share, belongs to the generation after 1870.

The intellectual condition of Norway, for a long time after the separation, was far less satisfactory than that of Denmark. Hitherto the writings of Norwegians had, in consequence of the identity of the language, been merged in Danish literature; and, although a large number of the leading writers of the eighteenth century, such as Holberg, Tullin, Fasting, Wessel, and Jonas Rein, had been Norwegians by birth, they no more formed a Norwegian literature than Swift and Berkeley formed an Irish literature. After 1814, the authors of Norway continued for some years to follow exactly in the steps of their Danish brethren, but with a great poverty of invention and under humiliating conditions. The immediate result of the separation was to impoverish all forms of intellectual life in Norway; and even the boasted expansion of the University of Christiania, which had been founded in 1811, did little at first to enrich the State. The jealous spirit in which the Norwegian politicians protected the vindicated independence of their country was in itself highly unfavourable to any international movement in the directions of literature, art, and science; while Norwegians were indignantly excluded from all participation in the intellectual successes of Denmark.

The official histories of Norwegian literature present to us the names of three patriotic poets who rose into local eminence at the moment of the separation. These are Konrad Nicolai Schwach (1793-1860), Henrik Anker Bjerregaard (1792-1842), and Mauritz Christopher Hansen (1794-1842). It is impossible for a foreign critic to regard these writers of political songs and occasional festival pieces with the indulgence given them in Norway, where, indeed, though they are still honoured as ancestors they are no longer read for pleasure. To compare these poets with their immediate Danish contemporaries is to throw a cruel light on the poverty of Norway. But there were two children in the nursery at the beginning of Norwegian independence who were destined to win for themselves a permanent position. Henrik Wergeland (1808-45) was the champion of Norwegian independence and the inspired darling of the people. By the critics of Copenhagen he was uniformly treated with neglect and ridicule, and he has, even to this day, received no cordial consideration from Danish writers. Treated in Norway as if he were King David and Victor Hugo rolled into one, and in Denmark as a raw poetaster, Wergeland exemplifies the difference of taste which at that time divided the countries. Without refinement, ignorant of all æsthetic art, Wergeland could but scandalise the delicate Danish critics; filled to the lips with a rough kind of lyric fire, pouring forth his odes, epics,

pantomimes, and hymns, all to the glory of Norway, he could but gratify a national susceptibility. Those who now judge his work with impartiality may see beneath his extravagance of form and turbidity of phrase a genuine poetical passion.

Under the infliction of so much noisy verse, Johan Sebastian Welhaven (1807-73) long preserved an angry silence. But in 1834 he broke out with *Norway's Twilight*, a polemical poem in sonnets, which provoked a huge sensation. In the course of this diatribe, the young satirist exposed all the faults which disgraced the weltering confusion of Norwegian ideas, and in particular the chaotic literary taste of his fellow-citizens. The national vanity and the emphatic redundancy of the poets was pitilessly scourged in these brilliant sonnets, from the publication of which the literary history of Norway really takes its starting-point. Welhaven quitted satire, and published many volumes of original poetry, full of elegance and charm, but in *Norway's Twilight* he had performed his life's work. He was accompanied by Andreas Munch (1811-84), whom it was long the pride of the Norwegians to pit against Tennyson, Geibel and Paludan-Müller. He had something in common with each of these great writers, but it was reduced into timid and commonplace terms; his success was even less permanent than that of Wergeland and Welhaven. This school of Norwegian writers rose to its zenith about the year 1845, after which there was a gentle decline until the opposition set in of the group to which Ibsen and Björnson belonged.

As in Denmark, so in Norway, the period was preeminently a poetical one. But there grew up a sense of the value of the ancient monuments of tradition and legend, and this took literary form in the folk-lore of Peter Christian Asbjørnsen (1812-85) and Jörgen Moe (1813-82), whose popular stories, written in collaboration, began to appear in 1841; these were continued and expanded for thirty years, forming at last a monument of national Norwegian prose, and a well into which future writers have dipped the buckets of their imagination. The best prose work done by Norwegians in these years was of an antiquarian character. Much is forgotten; but the philology of Ivar Aasen (1813-96), the popular songs collected by Magnus Brostrup Landstad (1802-80), the collection of dialects by Sophus Bugge (born 1833), the researches into Norwegian history of Rudolf Keyser (1803-64), and Peter Andreas Munch (1810-63) deserve remembrance.

From a European point of view, however, the interest in Norwegian literature begins with the coming of Ibsen and Björnson, the only authors whom Norway has contributed to the class which enjoys a universal publicity. Neither of these illustrious writers properly belongs to the period of which we are here recording the productions. Ibsen had passed through a long apprenticeship to Danish forms, and particularly to the romantic tragedies of Hertz. His full originality

was only asserted towards the closing years of this epoch. Björnson, whose *Arne* dates back to 1858, had, indeed, already enriched the literature of his country by a number of pathetic and romantic short stories of peasant life, far exceeding in beauty and skill anything performed in Norwegian prose before. But the Björnson we have known since, in the larger flights of his genius, was still unrecognised and hardly guessed at. He leaned slightly towards a movement which Ibsen always repudiated, the *maalstræv* or effort after the formation of a national language. Of this movement, the peasant poet, Aasmund Vinje (1818-70) was the protagonist, but he received little definite encouragement at the time, although at a later date the *maal* or patois was strenuously cultivated. Nor were the supremacy of Danish taste and the irksome provinciality of intellectual life in Norway successfully overcome until a date subsequent to that with which we here close.

In a general survey, we are struck by the difference between the classical development of a literature long nourished on tradition and cultivated upon conservative lines, and the rough emergence of one forced by political conditions to depend upon its own resources. Although these two literatures were composed in identically the same language, their differences and discords are far more noticeable than their similarity. There is a certain parallel in the relations between the literatures of Great Britain and the United States between the Revolution and 1800. The imitativeness and crudity of the early Norwegian writers bear a close resemblance to the jejune qualities of what Americans call the Colonial Period. It took Norway half a century of liberty to free herself from the servitude of style.

## CHAPTER XXV.

## ROME AND THE VATICAN COUNCIL.

(1846-70.)

ON June 17, 1846, Giovanni Mastai-Ferretti, Bishop of Imola, was proclaimed Pope under the name of Pius IX. The election, as generally happens, was the result of a compromise; the "Gregorians" would have preferred the late Secretary of State, Lambruschini; the reformers, Micara or Gizzi. Mastai was understood to have Liberal leanings, and to have been out of sympathy with his predecessor's policy. But his Liberalism, in no sense religious or theological, was matter of temperament rather than of principle, and dictated largely by circumstances. The system of repression, inaugurated under Pius VII by Pacca, and adopted unreservedly by the last three Popes, had broken down. Metternich himself had remonstrated against the medieval administration of Gregory XVI, which discredited absolutism; and, whatever his personal views or feelings, the new Pope could not but make efforts in the direction of reform. That his changes brought upon him the ill-will of the Legitimist Governments was the result less of his Liberalism, which was but slight, than of the unreality of the European situation and, in particular, of the contradiction involved in the notion of a Pope-King.

The character of Pius IX has been variously estimated. It passed through more than one phase; and, while retaining certain leading qualities throughout, it was wanting in consistency. The abrupt change in his policy after 1848 gave the impression that Pius IX was a Liberal before, and a reactionary after, that date. It may be doubted whether he was ever by conviction either the one or the other. He had the obstinacy of a weak man; and the epileptic tendency which he never wholly lost was the key to his personality. His original aim was self-contradictory: the papal theocracy and the modern State were incompatibles; their union was the most impossible of dreams. A man of sentiment rather than of fact, he moved in a world of signs and wonders: his credulity was abnormal, and his piety, sincere as it was, stood in no relation to the mind or facts of his time. He magnified his office; and, regarding opposition to his will as the unpardonable

sin, viewed great political and ecclesiastical questions from a personal standpoint. At the Vatican Council he canvassed energetically for the definition of Infallibility; he pleaded, menaced, cajoled. He met the loss of the temporal power on occasion with dignity, oftener with querulous invective. Italian as he was at heart, at times the patriotic instinct asserted itself; but, since he was an ecclesiastic by profession and prejudice, the class interest more commonly subordinated the man to the priest. He was unequal to his times and to his office. As a simple priest, he would have left a happier record; his was not the stuff of which leaders of men are made.

At his accession the government of the Papal States was, with the possible exception of the kingdom of Naples, the worst in Italy. Every public department was in disorder. The finances were desperate; taxation was heavy and unequal; trade was limited to small industries; manufactures did not exist. The higher posts in the administration were open only to the clergy; the police, whose number was out of all proportion to the population, were employed mainly for political purposes; smuggling and brigandage were rife. Railways were forbidden—*chemin de fer chemin d'enfer*, ran the saying; education was nominal and difficult of access; the mental and moral life of the people was deliberately stunted. The reforms instituted by Pius IX were inconsiderable; some of them, indeed, had been urged on the papal Government in vain by the Powers since 1815. But the temper of the time was sanguine; the reforms excited enthusiasm more by what they were understood to promise than by what they performed.

The legend of a liberty-loving Pope was diffused throughout Italy and Europe by the issue of an extensive political amnesty (July 16, 1846), by the establishment of a Council of State (April 21, 1847), and finally (March 14, 1848) by the grant of a Constitution. Slight however, and hedged in by limitations, as the concessions were, the very word Constitution was enough to alarm Austria and to encourage the rising tide of Italian Liberalism. The *Giovine Italia* found an echo in other camps than that of Mazzini and the Republicans; the presence of the Austrians in the peninsula was universally resented; the ideas of national independence and unity were in the air, and among the Neo-Guelphs of the school of Gioberti they took the shape of a confederation of the Italian States under the presidency of the Pope.

Such aspirations were calculated to fire the susceptible imagination of Pius IX: at first protesting and reluctant, he was swept away by the tide. From the balcony of the Quirinal he solemnly blessed Italy, now no longer a geographical expression but a nation; he saw himself in fancy the idol of the populace and the over-lord of kings. But, when it came to action, he drew back. No reliance could be placed on his varying moods and resolutions; he said and unsaid. When the flame of revolution kindled in Upper Italy, his troops marched to the defence

of the frontier; but he wavered as to further measures, and could not make up his mind either to take part in or to withdraw from the war. His justification, had he been prepared to plead it, was the impossibility of reconciling his spiritual claims with his temporal sovereignty. The question indeed admitted only one solution; for which neither Europe nor the Church was yet ripe. In despair he called Gioberti and Rosmini, the two wisest men in the Church, to his councils; but other and less scrupulous advisers were in the ascendant. The sport of contending factions and forces, he leaned—as pressure was brought to bear upon him—now to this, now to that side. The people, ignorant and untrained in the duties of citizenship, got out of hand; and the murder of the Minister Rossi, a doctrinaire Liberal, closed the first chapter of the pontificate. On November 25, 1848, the Pope fled from Rome, now a prey to anarchy, to the Neapolitan fortress of Gaeta.

Here his vacillation ceased; henceforward he stood for the lost cause of European reaction. It was at this time that he fell permanently under the influence of Antonelli. Never were two men less alike; but the famous secretary, at once resourceful and supple, succeeded in making himself necessary to his master, whose foibles he could flatter and to whose prejudices he could condescend. His loyalty has been questioned, but not disproved. He had little fixed conviction; he had been absolutist under Gregory XVI, Liberal during the first years of Pius IX. But he was neither a visionary nor a fanatic; he relied on diplomacy, not on force, and persistently opposed Merode's grotesque war policy. Pius IX had worse advisers than Antonelli. Corrupt and unprincipled, he was driven into ambiguous alliances and doubtful paths; but, substantially, his policy was in accordance with the traditions of Roman diplomacy, which is astute rather than farsighted; and he may well have believed that, in the circumstances, it was the safest that could be pursued. The religious fervour of the Pope was foreign to him; his mind was set on more material objects—the maintenance of the *status quo* in Rome, and generally in Italy. This was not, as matters turned out, in accordance with the historical development of events. But, at the time, it did not necessarily appear either visionary or mischievous; wiser men than Pius IX might have believed in it; better men than Antonelli might have regarded it as a desirable end.

Generous as were the enthusiasms of 1848, they were premature and, in their original shape, impracticable: Mazzini and Garibaldi had to be supplemented by Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. Hence a plausible if inadequate explanation of the revolutionary movement, which ascribed it to the aspirations of a comparatively small middle class and the agitation of demagogues, and declared the masses to be indifferent to political change. The disturbances were less significant than they appeared, and might be treated as episodes; the framework of society was as solid as before. The adoption of this view might perhaps have led to definite



results, had the Italian Governments been patriotic or progressive. But, excepting that of Piedmont, they were neither. The politico-religious influence of Rome was brought to bear on the better disposed Princes; Leopold of Tuscany was induced by the Pope, who feared the contagion of constitutional government, to revoke the Fundamental Statute of 1848. Under similar pressure he revived the medieval law forbidding Jews to practise medicine; treated the reading and distribution of the Bible as a penal offence; and prohibited the reprinting of the works of the great eighteenth-century scholar Muratori. Benedict XIV had guaranteed Muratori's orthodoxy; but the critical temper, admitted, within limits, in the eighteenth century, could not be tolerated under Pius IX.

In the Papal States, things were almost as bad as they had been in the time of Gregory XVI. Irritated by the clemency of the French to his revolted subjects, Pius IX leaned on Austrian protection, and wished to transfer the seat of government to Loreto, and live under the shadow of the Holy House which, tradition said, had been miraculously transported from Nazareth, by way of Dalmatia, to that sanctuary. He was persuaded, however, to abandon this fantastic design; and reentered his capital, April 12, 1850, where, supported (except for a brief interval) by French bayonets, he reigned for twenty years. Laymen were again excluded from office; the electoral bodies were not even convened; in 1851, the number of political prisoners reached 8800; the *vendetta pretina* was in full swing.

Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, wishing at all costs to keep foreign troops out of Italy, had offered his intervention between the Pope and the Romans; but Pius, embittered and distrustful, refused his offer. Italy never forgot or forgave him. The despatch of the French expeditionary force under Oudinot, sowing, as it did, lasting seeds of discord between France and Italy, was a disastrous step on the part of the Second Republic; Napoleon III in later years spoke of the occupation of Rome as the great mistake of his reign. But it must be remembered that, both at the time and subsequently, French diplomacy did its best to induce the Pope to make reforms; and that the military intervention of the Prince President barred the way to action on the part of the more reactionary Powers. He was the dupe at once of circumstances and of a diplomacy more astute than his own. Pius IX accepted everything, and conceded nothing; and, while lavishing effusive gratitude upon Austria, Spain, and Naples for the part taken by them in his restoration, treated his French preservers with marked coldness. Their position was a false one, but escape was difficult, and after the *Coup d'état* impossible. The Emperor dared not openly quarrel with the French Clericals; and the Pope was master of the situation. Hence, however, arose a standing danger to the French empire; its Achilles' heel was Rome. The Vatican pursued its advantage to the utmost; and its assistance was valuable to

the new dynasty. Forgetful alike of the crime of December 2 and of the interest of his Legitimist allies, the Pope was the first European sovereign to congratulate Napoleon, and contemplated officiating in person at his coronation. It was the policy of the Emperor, on the other hand, to pose as the friend of the clergy and of religion; and in his changed circumstances his zeal for constitutional government cooled.

The civil and religious claims of the Papacy, in their most extreme form, were championed by a powerful section of French Catholics, whose influence dominated what had once been the Gallican Church. Contrary to the intention of Napoleon I, the Concordat of 1801 had made the French clergy more dependent than ever upon Rome. The suppression of the historical hierarchy, if justified by the circumstances of the case, was the greatest stretch of jurisdiction on which a Pope had ever ventured. The abrogation of the old canon law made the priests, now for the most part mere *desservants*, defenceless against the Bishops, and the Bishops equally so against Rome. Deprived of the privileges and possessions enjoyed under the monarchy, they were unable to hold their own with the Pope, as their predecessors, when need was, had done; rather they looked to him as their protector against the violence of the Revolution and the encroachments of the civil power.

The brilliant politico-ecclesiastical theorising of de Maistre supplied a systematic framework to the practical requirements of the situation, and influenced not only religious enthusiasts, but thinkers like Comte and statesmen like Guizot, to whom the maintenance of order seemed the first social need. This, for de Maistre, was fundamental; and the Papacy was its embodiment. For him, a dialectician of the first rank, history was non-existent: he viewed the supremacy and infallibility of the Pope as political necessities rather than as religious or theological truths. The Church stood for order; and this order must not be an idea—de Maistre detested ideas—but a concrete force, present, available, energising; Rome was the Church, and the Church was Rome. Starting from different premisses and with a different end in view, Lamennais reached the same conclusions. The timorous and ineffectual Gallicanism of the Restoration repelled him; Ultramontanism represented all that was living in the Church. With entire conviction, remorseless logic, and the command of every art of popular journalism, Louis Veuillot pushed these principles home; and his organ, the *Univers*, became a power in France, and even in Rome, greater than that of the hierarchy. The Vatican itself affected at times to disavow the utterances of its too impetuous advocate; bishops quailed under his vitriolic pen. No paradox dismayed, no consequences deterred him; he pressed premisses granted, half-heartedly enough, by his opponents, to their most extreme conclusions; he identified the Papacy with a party, and the Church with a sect. If France to-day is broken up into two conflicting factions, if the public peace is disturbed, if the interests of religion and society are

imperilled by the struggle between two rival ideas of civilisation, two incompatible interpretations of life and experience, the seeds of the discord were sown by the insolent tyranny of the religious journalism "*sans mission et sans pudeur*," as Montalembert described it, of which the *Univers* was the representative, and Pius IX the patron.

Politically Austria had been the mainstay of the Papacy, but Metternich was no Ultramontane; among clergy and laity alike the traditions of the antipapal policy of Joseph II still lingered; and the concessions with regard to marriage, education, and the censorship of the Press, made by the State to the Church in the Concordat of 1855, excited no little discontent. Similar Concordats were concluded with Würtemberg and Baden. The motives at work were not wholly religious; Francis Joseph wished to use the papal authority as a means for drawing together the various States of his heterogeneous empire. But Rome had the best of the bargain; not only did she obtain the important advantage mentioned, but she was enabled to play off Austria against Piedmont, whose home and foreign policy inspired her with increasing disquietude. In Piedmont the Siccardi laws had abolished the immunity of the clergy from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals, which Victor Emmanuel I had restored; in 1855 Rattazzi dealt drastically with the religious Orders and their property; while it became more and more evident that the King and his advisers aimed at the independence and unity of Italy, and ultimately at the possession of Rome.

In Prussia, Frederick William IV had inaugurated a conciliatory policy towards the Church, whose influence in the Rhine Provinces was great. The Constitution of 1848 secured to the different confessions, reformed and unreformed, a greater freedom than they had hitherto possessed; and the Romantic movement in literature and art had helped towards a more sympathetic understanding of Catholicism. But, for Pius IX and his Court, Prussia remained a heretical Power, the hereditary enemy of the Catholic House of Habsburg. The alliance between William I and Victor Emmanuel, and the subsequent Austro-Prussian War of 1866, accentuated this attitude; and, but for a significant hint given him by Napoleon III, the Pope would have declared himself on the Austrian side. The result of the campaign reacted politically on the fortunes of German Catholicism. Protestantism became preponderant in Germany as a whole; while in Austria a reform agitation was set on foot, which led to the establishment of constitutional government, in 1867, and in the following year to the abolition of the unpopular Concordat of 1855. Josephism was not dead; stimulated by national sentiment and by the Munich school of scientific history, it was to be superseded by the tendencies associated with the name of Döllinger, and finally by the movement known to-day as *Los von Rom*.

In Spain, a disputed succession called for the most characteristic qualities of Roman diplomacy. Theory was with the Carlists, fact with

the successful Cristinos; and Rome, while pledged to the theory, accepted the fact by recognising Isabella as Queen. Whichever branch of the Bourbons reigned, papal interests seemed secure. The Spanish Concordat of 1851, anticipating the lines of the Austrian of 1855, was a triumph for the Papacy, into whose hand the Revolution had played unconsciously by the weakening of local authority in Church and State. From none of the old monarchies could such terms have been obtained. The devotion of the young Queen to the Holy See was exemplary; the Liberalism of her Ministers shadowy. Spanish troops helped to reimpose the papal rule in the revolted provinces; on the Roman question the Cabinet of Madrid acted with Austria and Naples rather than France.

The phases through which this question passed, the various attitudes adopted towards it by Napoleon III according to the exigencies of policy, and the untiring efforts of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour to bring about the only possible solution, have been described elsewhere. No French statesman wished to see a powerful Italy. Two strong neighbours, Germany and England, were enough; it was the policy of France to keep the peoples south of the Alps divided and weak. But the Emperor's personal sympathies at length induced him to cooperate actively with Victor Emmanuel. In 1859 the Romagna, in 1860 Umbria and the Marches, Naples and Sicily, were annexed to the kingdom of Italy. By September of the latter year nothing but the "Patrimony of St Peter"—the territory immediately round Rome—remained subject to the papal Government. The excommunications launched in 1860 against the violators of papal territory lent a touch of the incongruous to the struggle; it became evident that the knot must be cut, if it could not be untied. Antonelli was less resolute or more politic than Pius IX; in 1861 negotiations were on the verge of conclusion which, while retaining a nominal sovereignty for the Pope—and securing certain material advantages to the Cardinal and his family—would have made over the administration of Rome and the States of the Church to the Italian King. Other influences intervened; and the Minister, quick to see how things were going, passed over into the extremist camp. He would never, he declared, come to terms with the robbers; and his desperate throw of the dice was translated in northern Europe into the language of vehement religious sentiment. Dupanloup's rhetorical appeals, and John Henry Newman's famous sermon, *The Pope and the Revolution*, showed how strong a feeling was roused even among the more moderate Catholics. The obstinate resistance of the Vatican did not seem hopeless to those who recalled the past without perceiving that it furnished no parallel to the present. They saw that before now Popes had lost and regained their dominions; they did not see that, for good or evil, a new era had set in.

In England one result of the Oxford Movement had been a considerable number of secessions to Rome. A section of the Established

Church, it seemed, was gravitating towards Catholicism; the most sanguine expectations were entertained by the enemies of the Reformation at home and abroad. These expectations were destined to disappointment. The movement was part of the wave of reaction which passed over Europe early in the century. That genuine religious feeling entered into this reaction is unquestionable; but other causes—the interests of the governing and commercial classes, professional pietism, and the ignorance of the masses, whose influence in the community was on the increase—combined to further it. Building on the foundation laid in Germany in the preceding century by Spener and Francke, it took the shape of Romanticism on the Continent: in England, modified by the Puritanism which had left so deep a mark on the national character, it appeared first as Evangelicalism; then, in an effort to return to medieval precedent, to the teaching and practice of the Pre-Reformation Church. Its partial success was due to the failure of the Liberalism of the time to appeal to the imagination of the people. The enthusiasm of the French Revolution had long been extinguished; and, though the zeal of the Parliamentary Reformers of 1832, the Utilitarians, the Free Traders, and the like, was sincere, and their measures were popular, their temper was uninspiring; there was a certain aridity and provincialism about the men and their ideas. This the Tractarians saw; what they did not see was the promise of the future. Their movement was, to a large extent, retrograde and temporary. On the higher levels of thought there was no reaction; the shadow on the dial did not go back. But a considerable amount of English religion was diverted from the main channel of European thought; the old unity between the nation and the Church was broken up. The opposition between the lay and the clerical mind, familiar in Catholic countries, became naturalised in England. It was an evil importation: increase of religious observance was dearly bought at the price of interior contradiction and exterior strife.

The characteristic features of Tractarianism were summed up in its protagonist, John Henry Newman. An acute dialectician, his critical faculty moved in a narrow field; but within the limits of that field it was remorseless. No weak point in his opponent's armour escaped him: he questioned, suggested, pleaded; he used irony, satire, pathos, with supreme art. As a writer of English prose he stands with Burke; he played on human nature with a master touch. His excessive subtlety, which was moral as well as intellectual, left an impression of disingenuousness: to get at his meaning it was necessary to decipher and unravel, to read behind the letter and between the lines. His knowledge, even judged by the standards of his time, was inadequate, and would not stand comparison with that of Thirlwall or Milman. German research, contemporary science, the actual movement of life—all this was a closed book to him; the world of his experience, if a decorous and an academic, was a thin and restricted, world. The logic of his position

eventually led him to Rome (1845); and not a few of the rank and file followed the seceding leader. Pusey and Keble remained; their followers captured the historical High Church party, and secured, first toleration, then preponderance, in the Church. In his later years Newman, distrusted from the first by Pius IX, displayed Liberalising tendencies. A Liberal, indeed, he never was; but the temper of actual, as opposed to ideal, Catholicism jarred on his susceptibilities, and his horizon widened with age. It is a paradox of history that the man who more than any other revived the medieval spirit in the Church of England came to be hailed as the precursor of modernist, or Liberal, Catholicism. Whatever may be the future of the latter movement, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the former: the sturdy Protestantism of England was in little danger from the solicitations either of Oxford or of Rome.

The High Church propaganda made little immediate impression on the general sense of the people; and the seceders, though not a few were men of character and distinction, were in no way representative; they had simply fallen out of the current of national life, which ran in another direction, and pursued its course unchanged. A more important factor in English Catholicism was the influx of Irish immigrants after the famine year, 1847. This made an increased ecclesiastical organisation at once possible and necessary. The establishment of the new Catholic hierarchy in England (1851) might have passed unnoticed, had it been less strongly emphasised by the progress of Tractarianism in the national Church and by the zeal of Roman Catholic converts, who saw in it the prelude to the conversion of England. A matter of internal policy, it was followed by no marked increase either of number or of activity. The leakage from the Catholic body more than balanced the conversions; and its new machinery was out of proportion to its real consequence. Historically an interesting survival, Catholicism in England was rather a religious and social than an intellectual or political force. In Ireland, on the other hand, it is an effective and energising power, the expression of a vigorous national life. Nor is this so only, or even chiefly, in Ireland itself. Where the Irish race goes, the Church goes with it; the flourishing and democratic Catholicism of the British colonies and of the United States is Irish in origin and spirit; the exile from Ireland is the missionary of Rome.

The harsh measures of Russia against the Catholic Poles had produced chronic Polish disaffection—partly the cause and partly the effect of these severities—which broke out in 1863 into an open rebellion, connived at, it was believed at St Petersburg, if not instigated by Rome. In 1866 these disagreements ended, to the credit of Pius IX, in open rupture; and the Russian representative at the Vatican was withdrawn.

The theological aspirations of the pontificate had been more successful than the political. What was gained in intension had indeed been lost

in extension; but the centralisation, or acute Romanising, of ecclesiastical life contemplated had been in great measure attained. It was no longer safe to express the Febronian or Pistoian principles so commonly held, even in high places, in the eighteenth century; Gallicanism and nationalism in religion were crushed out. A series of condemnations directed against such writers as the canonist Nuytz, the Italian patriots Gioberti and Ventura, the philosophers Baltzer, Frohschammer and Ubaghs, and finally against the historical school of Munich, warned thought off the territory of religion and its ill-defined *Hinterland*. Local usages were suppressed; Italian beliefs and devotions introduced into the Cisalpine countries; from the shape of an arch to the cut of a vestment, conformity to the practice of Rome was enforced. But under the surface of uniformity the ground was shifting; a conflict between the Church and the historical conscience of Europe was preparing, in which the latter, defeated for the moment, retired to sharpen its weapons and to plan a more dangerous and more radical assault. The phases of this conflict, so closely associated with Pius IX, must now be discussed.

While Antonelli was scheming for the Temporal Power, the Pope was preparing a series of dogmatic pronouncements, which opened in 1854 with the definition of the Immaculate Conception, and, after the Encyclical *Quanta Cura* with the annexed *Syllabus* (1864), closed, for the time at least, with the promulgation of Papal Infallibility in 1870. To appreciate the attitude of the Church to the historical, theological, and political issues involved in these pronouncements, it is necessary to bear in mind certain fundamental assumptions of Catholicism. The philosophy of Catholicism is clearly defined, and has been carried to its furthest conclusions by the logic of speculative thinkers as acute as any that the world has seen. It starts from a sharp Dualism taken over from the late Greek philosophy, and in particular from Neo-Platonism; a hard and fast line is drawn between God and creation, mind and matter, the Church and the world. The notions of immanence and evolution are absent; the two forces confront each other, and are separate and opposed. From this position the reasoning is rigorous: the one is to rule, the other to be ruled; short of unquestioned supremacy, there can be neither peace nor truce between the two. Hence, on the one side, the ascetic, on the other, the theocratic idea. Not only the teaching of the Church, but her ministers, her privileges, her possessions are covered by a Divine sanction. To touch the latter is sacrilege; to subject the clergy to secular tribunals, to resist or question their jurisdiction in mixed subject-matter, such as education, marriage, the censorship of the Press, and the like, to interfere with religious Orders or corporations, to invade papal or ecclesiastical territory, is to resist God.

On the abstract notion of the Church an enormous superstructure was erected. Being a society, it could not be other than a "perfect" society, independent of and superior to the State, entitled to hold

property, to enact laws, to coerce its subjects not only by spiritual but by temporal penalties, which the civil power could be invoked to execute under pain of censure. Criticism was unknown; it was assumed that the existing teaching and practice were invariable, and of Apostolic origin; the theory of development associated with the name of John Henry Newman is tolerated rather than sanctioned—as an expedient to solve a not readily admitted difficulty. Finally, the Scholastic doctrine of the reason was no less *à priori* than that of Rousseau. Its competence to deal with either transcendental or historical subject-matter was taken for granted. From vague, uncertain, and often erroneous premisses an exact logic deduced the most startling conclusions; and, as the former were admitted without question, the latter were held to be beyond doubt.

The Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, that is her exemption from the stain not only of actual but of original sin, was an opinion of the schools held by the Scotists and denied by the Thomists. Later, it was enthusiastically championed by the Jesuits; some of whom forged documentary evidence in its favour, known from the place of its origin as the tablets and parchments of Granada. The fraud was discovered, and denounced by Urban VIII and Innocent XI. Not, however, till it had done its work. The scaffolding was removed, but the belief had advanced from the position of a disputed opinion to that of a doctrine which it was unlawful to criticise. It chimed in with the popular devotion to Mary; to question it seemed to be wanting in reverence and affection for the Mother of God. The allegorical method of interpretation found scriptural proof in such passages as *Proverbs* viii. 22, and *Ezekiel* xlv. 2; nor were arguments claiming to be based on reason wanting. The Baptist had been sanctified before birth; Mary, being greater than he, must have been sanctified still earlier, *i.e.* in her conception; and the dogmatic temper, not satisfied with freedom to hold and teach this belief, insisted on its being imposed on the Church under anathema.

The proof from tradition was difficult to establish; but the papal theologians were equal to the emergency. The general witness of the living Church, they argued, was an infallible proof that the truth to which it bore witness was contained in tradition; and this independently of any historical evidence. Were this not so, they urged—and it was difficult to refute them—not a little of the received teaching of the Church would be open to dispute. In Germany the Catholic faculties of Munich and Tübingen hesitated to endorse Perrone's theory. But Rome was strong, and her opponents were inconsistent. Tied by previous admissions both as to the privileges of the Virgin and as to the papal authority, they held false ground. Given the premisses, which they admitted, or at least were not free to deny, Rome had the best of the argument. The dogma was defined, on December 8, 1854, by the Pope on his sole and personal authority; the remonstrances of certain of the Bishops against their relegation to the part of spectators were brushed



away. In this definition the dogma of 1870 was contained. The ground was cut away by anticipation from subsequent demur; the promulgation of Papal Infallibility was now only a question of time. The opportune apparitions and miracles at Lourdes, which took place shortly afterwards, were taken as a confirmation of the new dogma: "I am the Immaculate Conception," were the words said to have been addressed by the Virgin to Bernadette Soubirous.

Quick to see where the enemy could be attacked with its own weapons, the Vatican was alive to the influence of the Press. What is called *la bonne presse* is a feature of modern Catholicism; and what the *Univers* was in France the *Unità Cattolica* was in Italy; Veillot and Margotti had throughout the approval and backing of Rome. It was thought, however, that the Holy See should possess a distinctive organ; and the return of Pius IX from Gaeta saw the birth of the Jesuit *Civiltà Cattolica*, in which the ablest members of the Society were to meet the modern spirit, and combat the Reformation and the Revolution in all their forms. The connexion between the Vatican and this publication was semi-official; its utterances, when most inspired, were tentative, and could be disavowed. But it claimed with reason to be the faithful echo of the Papacy; and, in a brief of February 12, 1866, Pius IX declared that it had been expressly entrusted with the defence of religion and of the authority of the Holy See. So close a connexion between the Pope and a particular religious Order was without precedent, and would have been impossible had not the older Orders fallen into insignificance, and the influence of the episcopate become a shadow of its former self. But the centripetal tendency in the Church was in the ascendant, and the Jesuits knew how to turn it to their advantage; a *connubium*, to use Döllinger's phrase, was concluded between the Society and Rome.

So early as 1851, a sweeping condemnation of the errors of modern society and modern thought had been contemplated. It was proposed to associate this with the definition of the Immaculate Conception; but, though its preparation began early in the pontificate of Pius IX, it was not until 1864 that the famous Syllabus appeared. Its publication was an answer to two important events—one in the political world, the Convention of September, 1864, by which Napoleon undertook to withdraw his troops from Rome, on Italy engaging not to attack or suffer an attack on what was left of the Pope's dominions; the other in the religious, the Catholic congress of Malines. In the former, denounced as it was by the Italian patriots, the instinct of Rome discerned the beginning of the end as regarded the Temporal Power: in the latter, signs of radical differences in the Catholic camp became manifest; Montalembert definitely threw over the theocratic idea, and declared for Cavour's policy, "a free Church in a free State" (*libera chiesa in libero stato*).

Political events had gone fast—Piedmont's annexations in the years 1859–60 have already been described. The Jesuits themselves were divided.

Passaglia and Curci counselled a change of front towards Italy. But the Pope, under the influence of less prudent counsellors, was obdurate. Modern society, with its Constitutions, its extended suffrage, its parliaments, its freedom of worship and of the Press, had been fatal to privilege, ecclesiastical as well as civil; he saw, and he was right in seeing, that it stood for an idea of civilisation other than that of the Church. The gulf between the two cannot be bridged. In ordinary times and on ordinary occasions moderation and good sense bring about a *modus vivendi*. Men are not always consistent; they refrain from drawing inconvenient conclusions from premisses to which they assent, or believe themselves to assent. But the essential divergence remains; and, when circumstances bring it to light, an alternative is forced upon many who are unwilling and unprepared to face it. They have come to the parting of the ways; they must go back or forward. Pius IX deliberately forced such an alternative on the Catholic world. What did he hope to gain by this? To many, perhaps to most, it seemed that, looking from the windows of the Vatican at the world, he saw it out of focus. He did not know that he was speaking to living men in a dead language; he believed in the possibility of their return, if not by reflexion, by a miracle, to the standards and beliefs of a past that had gone beyond recall.

The Encyclical *Quanta Cura* was a declaration of war against modern ideas, liberties, and institutions. The annexed *Syllabus* particularised its pronouncements. This famous document was negative in form; and it has been questioned whether, from the condemnation of the various propositions which it enumerates, the affirmation of their contradictories is to be inferred. The question is technical; the intention of the Pope is beyond doubt. The Jesuit Schrader, who had drafted the *Syllabus*, transposed its negative statements into their corresponding affirmatives; its drift must be judged by the action, both historical and contemporary, of the Holy See. Its censures were not new, but taken from previous Encyclicals, Allocutions, and Apostolic letters; what was new was the emphasis, the reiteration, the more authoritative accent. Theologians of repute did not hesitate to describe it as infallible; and it was hoped in influential quarters that its doctrines would be imposed by the Vatican Council as of faith. Prominent among the errors condemned was that of those who deny the Church's right to employ force, that is to inflict civil and criminal penalties. A practical comment on this was the beatification, a few years later, of the Inquisitor Peter Arbués and other officials of the Holy Office; thus the practice as well as the principle of the Inquisition was approved. That Popes have exceeded their power, and encroached on the rights of Princes; that the immunities of the Church and the clergy have their origin in civil law; that the pretensions of the Papacy helped to bring about the separation of the Eastern from the Western Church; that it is no longer expedient that Catholicism should be the only religion of the State to the exclusion of all others;

that freedom of worship should be granted to foreigners resident in Catholic countries; that the Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile himself with progress, liberalism, and modern civilisation—such, with others of the same sort, are the propositions condemned.

It was urged that, if these censures were to hold, history as commonly read must be rewritten, and that the legal code of every European nation must be revised. The plea that they refer to an abstract and non-existent state of things can scarcely be taken seriously: the Pope must be assumed to know the significance of words and to mean what he says. The motive of the Syllabus was practical; the absolutism in the Church, which is the essence of Ultramontaniam, is incompatible with freedom in the State. Rome at least has never endorsed the special pleading to which not a few of her advocates have condescended. She has been consistent throughout, reducing her principles to practice where, and in so far as, it was possible to do so, at most tolerating their violation under protest, waiting, and at the same time working, for more propitious times. Leo XII pronounced against the French, Gregory XVI against the Belgian, Constitution. In Italy, as has been said, Pius IX brought pressure to bear on the several Governments to prevent the introduction of representative institutions; the Austrian Constitution of 1867 was anathematised as “abominable” and “unspeakable”; the Pope proclaimed it null and void by his apostolical authority, and bade its authors, with all those who presumed to propose, accept, approve or execute its provisions, remember the spiritual penalties incurred *ipso facto* by the violation of the rights of the Church.

On December 8, 1864, the Encyclical and the Syllabus were published. Great was the triumph in the Ultramontane, great the consternation in the Liberal, camp. Dupanloup, a zealous champion of the Temporal Power, but theologically a Moderate, explained, qualified, minimised. He toned down the most startling points of the papal pronouncement, endeavouring to show that it meant considerably less than it appeared to mean, and conveyed, in the technical language of theology, truths to which, translated into popular terminology, few would refuse assent. His opponents called his pamphlet “Anti-Syllabus”; Veuillot roundly stigmatised its publication as a crime. In England a similar difference of opinion manifested itself. Newman insisted that it was a technical document only to be interpreted by experts, and spoke pointedly of the malaria that hung about the base of the Rock of Peter. Manning and William George Ward were for its natural and literal sense; it was for the Pope to explain the theologians, not the theologians the Pope. In the political world the sense of insecurity was general. Nothing, it must be admitted, took place to justify the apprehensions excited; it was forgotten that the average man is at little pains to reconcile theory and practice. A later theory maintained that such utterances of the Holy See, though dogmatic in form, are disciplinary rather than dogmatic in

character, and call for submission rather than for interior assent. They express the temporary opinion of the governing body, and are to a great extent matters of policy; in time they will be tacitly, if not avowedly, withdrawn. This theory gives a correct account of what in many cases actually happens; but its value is historical, not theological. The pronouncement remains, as a weapon in reserve, in the hands of Rome; and it is difficult to reconcile this explanation either with the terms of the documents or with an intelligible view of the authority either of Pope or Church.

Despite the efforts made to suppress or disguise them, differences of opinion, which might easily become formidable, were to be found among Catholics. The growth of the school of scientific historians in Germany caused special disquietude. So long ago as 1832, Lamennais had noted among the Bavarian clergy a certain Protestant spirit, which would have led, he thought, to a breach with the Papacy, had not its ideas already gone far beyond mere Protestantism. Of this school Döllinger was the most eminent living representative. Its spirit, methods and conclusions were diametrically opposed to those of the dominant Ultramontanism. The perspective of current theology altered under its criticism; much that had been taken for fact was seen to be fiction, and the facts that remained unshaken appeared in a new light. Meanwhile, Ultramontanism was preparing to make a desperate bid for power. The Emperor Napoleon, whose troops, withdrawn in 1866, had a year later regarrisoned Rome in consequence of an alleged breach of the September Convention by Italy, was now in high favour at the Vatican. Sadowa was to be avenged on Prussia by France, which, after a short and victorious campaign, was to lead Europe, confirm the Pope in the possession of his dominions, and champion the Catholic interest throughout the world. German science was to be crushed as effectually as German military power: with Napoleon III, as a new Pepin, the golden age was to return. The result of the Franco-German War of 1870 upset these calculations; the material force on which they had reckoned was on the German side. But the other half of the programme was carried out by the definition at the Vatican Council of the Infallibility of the Pope.

The name, and in its modern sense the idea, of Infallibility was foreign to the primitive Church. In the first days, believers spoke as they were moved by the Spirit, whose power attested the genuineness of their utterances. As time went on, the *charisma Veritatis* was held to reside rather in the office-bearers, and, after the rise of the monarchical episcopate, in the bishop than in the subordinate members of the community; he alone possessed the unquestioned right of voting at the Councils whose decisions were taken as the voice of the Church. Usage tends to harden into ritual, and opinion into dogma; the prophetic or spiritual speech, originally free and elastic, was embodied in fixed formulas; and the predominant position early acquired by the Roman Church

caused a peculiar weight to be attached to her decisions both in matters of discipline and of faith. The infallibility of the Roman Bishop stood in close connexion with his supremacy; from the notion of a Court of final appeal in the matter of doctrine to that of the inerrancy of this Court the transition is easy. Nor, in this connexion, can we overlook the series of fabrications, interpolations, and forgeries beginning in the sixth century with the *Liber Pontificalis* and continued, with the decretals of the pseudo-Isidore and Gratian, to the end of the Middle Ages. The one bearing most directly on Papal Infallibility was the catena of spurious quotations from Greek Fathers and Councils, which had been composed in the thirteenth century by a Latin theologian, probably a Dominican who had lived long in the East. This catena deceived St Thomas Aquinas, who unsuspectingly embodied it in his theology; from which it passed without question into the dogmatic system of the Schoolmen, Cajetan and Melchior Canus taking it over on his authority—an event the importance of which can scarcely be exaggerated.

Early in his pontificate the idea of holding a General Council had occurred to Pius IX; and by 1864 it had taken definite shape. The ostensible reasons were to make an effective demonstration on the part of the Church; to condemn modern errors; to deal with the status of the religious Orders, and the relation of canon to civil law. But Infallibility was in the air; and the ground was carefully prepared for its proclamation. Three great gatherings of Bishops at Rome preceded the Council—that of 1854, at which the Immaculate Conception was defined; that of 1862, at which the Japanese martyrs were canonised; and that of 1867 for the centenary of St Peter. Provincial Councils, inspired by Rome, were held in various countries, which with singular unanimity pronounced for the dogma. It was desired to define the teaching of the Syllabus, as against modern society and its liberties; the temporal power, as against the Revolution; and the Infallibility of the Pope, as against Gallicanism and German science. To this programme the Jesuit *Civiltà* added the Assumption, or bodily translation into heaven, of the Virgin. Only one of these four points was carried. As a formula, the Syllabus of 1864 is dormant; for the time being, the temporal power is in the background; the Assumption has not, so far, become an article of faith. But the definition of Infallibility included all, and more than all, the rest in its plenitude, subjecting as it did the content of faith to the discretion of the Pope.

The Council was summoned for December 8, 1869. The Catholic sovereigns were not, as at Trent, invited to send ambassadors; the State had become neutral in matters of religion, and Catholics as such stood outside it. The Catholic Church is so large and so powerful a body that statesmen view with suspicion any tendency on the part of its rulers to adopt an attitude of opposition to the manifest temper of the age or to civil society. On the other hand, they are unwilling to

interfere in technical controversies which concern them only indirectly, or to risk a conflict in which experience shows victory and defeat to be equally disastrous. In this case the latter consideration prevailed. Prince Hohenlohe, then Bavarian Foreign Minister, urged diplomatic intervention. But Prussia, Austria, and France declined to move in the matter; to protest, Bismarck replied, was always a thankless task, and one to be undertaken only when those who make the protest have power to enforce it. The mistake was recognised when it was too late to repair it. Had the influence of the Governments been brought to bear upon Rome and the Bishops in 1869, the *Kulturkampf* might have been avoided; and in that case the Central or Clerical party, that great disturbing force in German politics, would have been unknown.

Meanwhile it rained pamphlets. The most important of these were the famous articles contributed to the *Allgemeine Zeitung* by Döllinger (published in book-form under the title of *The Pope and the Council*, by Janus). Their object was to show that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility was unknown to antiquity, in contradiction with history, and based on the forgeries and misconceptions above-mentioned. Whatever may be thought of their conclusions, their facts, even after Hergenröther's *Anti-Janus*, the only serious answer attempted, remained almost beyond dispute. The key to the difference of opinion was that the two parties looked at the question from fundamentally different standpoints. To the one, Papal Infallibility was a self-evident theological conclusion; to the other, it was a statement in palpable contradiction with historical fact. The dispute therefore resolved itself into one concerning the relation of theology to history, and involved controversies unforeseen, far-reaching, and even now unsolved. The position of the Munich theologians was not always consistent. While refusing to consider the Papacy and the Church as convertible terms, they admitted that the former rested on Divine appointment. "The Church from the first was founded upon it; and the Head of the Church ordained its type in the person of Peter." This admission was their weak point. To the rising critical school in and outside Germany it seemed unwarranted; while the Ultramontanes, stronger in logic than in history, argued that the notions of Supremacy and Infallibility were contained in that of Primacy, and, being necessary to make it effective, had been realised more and more clearly in the Church's consciousness as time went on. The forgeries, which they could no longer deny, had but stereotyped existing usage; and the plausible moral argument that, at least till the sixteenth century, every considerable reform of the Church had been associated with an advance of the authority of Rome, was on their side.

The German Bishops put forth a reassuring but non-committal pastoral; the most influential prelates in Europe were avowedly inopportunist; a few, like Hefele and Darboy, had the courage of their opinions, and declared openly that the opinion which it was proposed

to raise to the rank of a dogma was untrue. Meanwhile, at Rome, preparations were being made for the meeting and procedure of the Council. These arrangements were made independently of the Bishops. The Pope's right of presidency was made to cover a carefully conceived scheme of direction by which every possible obstacle was placed in the way of the minority, whose learning, independence, and political influence were greatly feared. The matters to be discussed were kept secret, the Bull of Indiction confining itself to generalities; and the theologians employed in the preliminary work were rigorously bound to silence. These theologians were divided into a Directive Congregation and six commissions, of which that on dogma was the most important. The members of these bodies were selected with a view to the results desired. When the subjects for discussion and the form of procedure had been fixed by the Congregation, the reporters proceeded to work upon their several drafts, which, to the number of 51, after approval by the special commission to which they were submitted, were laid before the Council—as "*schemata*," *de Ecclesia*, *de disciplina*, and the like. No criticism of these prearranged dispositions was tolerated.

Even after the Council had met, the presidents of the five Congregations which it was called upon to elect were nominated by the Pope. On these bodies the minority was scantily, if at all, represented; their members were chosen from official lists by a disciplined majority voting as one man. In the general Congregations the nominal liberty of speech was so hampered that the freedom of the Bishops was practically confined to their vote; and the episcopal oath, by which every Bishop on his consecration swears not only to maintain but constantly to increase the rights of the Pope, was held *in terrorem* over the weak; the moral and material power at the disposal of the Curia—and it was great—was used to the full. A rigorous censorship was exercised on their meetings; they could not print even their speeches or memoranda; books sent to them through the post were confiscated; meetings of over fifteen, or at the most twenty, Bishops were forbidden. The papal Government felt bound, it was urged, to hinder the diffusion of error, and could not tolerate attacks on the Holy See. So much for the freedom of the Council. As to its representative character, the Italian Bishops, owing to the multitude of sees in the peninsula, swamped their northern colleagues. Further, many of the Bishops from a distance were brought to and maintained at Rome at the expense of the Pope—a fact which they were not allowed to forget; many, again, were merely titular Bishops, without sees and unrepresentative; come what might, the majority for the definition—and a majority was held to be sufficient—was secure.

In February a new order of procedure, imposed like the former, by the Pope, still further restrained the little freedom of speech originally tolerated. A hundred Bishops protested. To shorten the debates by legitimate means was one thing; to suppress discussion, and introduce,

contrary to all precedent, the closure and voting by majorities another. But protest and remonstrance were in vain; the Curia was resolved to carry things through, if necessary, with a high hand. The position of the minority Bishops was difficult in the extreme. It seemed strong at first sight; they were men of greater distinction, personal as well as official, than their opponents; they had on their side the good-will of their Governments and the general sympathy of the educated classes in every country. But, as had been the case with those who had opposed the definition of 1854, if history was with them, logic was on the other side. If Rome was what she had been made by the current Catholic teaching, which they admitted or were theologically bound to admit, the proposed dogma necessarily followed. Again, whatever weight they might carry as individuals, they had neither cohesion nor discipline as a party. Personally unacquainted with one another, differing in nationality, temper, and standpoint, they were unable to work together effectually. Some were timid and half-hearted, others open to the influences which the Curia had at its disposal and used with dexterity. Above all, the majority had the control of the ecclesiastical machine, whose pressure was as calculated as it was persistent, and the active support of the Pope. Pius IX, endowed as a man with no very commanding qualities, had, as the representative of a cause, become the object of a more than Byzantine cultus. With this many of the leading inopportunists had identified themselves; and they were consequently bound hand and foot by chains of their own making. "*Amas me?*" (*John* xxi. 16) was the question put by Pius IX to Ketteler of Mainz: it was difficult to give it any answer but one; and the answer covered the vote.

The minority could reckon originally on from 150 to 200 votes out of some 700. This fact made the proposed carrying of the dogma by acclamation impossible; had it been attempted at least 100 Bishops would have left the Council. Here, however, their influence stopped short. Remonstrances against the rules of procedure were ignored or overruled; the proposals for decentralisation and reform of discipline, with which not a few even of the majority associated themselves, were shelved. Outside the Council the opposition gradually became more pronounced. The learned Oratorian Gratry denounced the dominant "*école d'erreur et de mensonge*"; Montalembert even spoke of the "idol of the Vatican"; Newman stigmatised the party identified with the *Univers* and the *Civiltà* as "an aggressive insolent faction," and declared that, if it was God's will that the Pope's infallibility should be decreed, then it was God's will to throw back "the times and moments" of that triumph which he had destined for his kingdom. In January, Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, complained to his Emperor of the Council's want of freedom and suggested that the Governments should assist the hard-pressed minority. Daru in France and Beust in Austria were inclined to regret, and if possible to repair, their previous inaction.



It was too late. The *Schema de Ecclesia*, asserting the Pope's immediate and ordinary jurisdiction over all the Churches, a jurisdiction to which "pastors and faithful alike of whatever dignity were bound to submit themselves, not only in matters of faith and morals, but in questions affecting the government and discipline of the Church"—and what would not this cover?—was already in circulation; and Antonelli, while he endeavoured to reassure the Governments as to its practical results, refused to withdraw it. In the last section of this dogmatic Constitution the Infallibility of the Pope was proclaimed. It was "a dogma divinely revealed that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in the exercise of his office as pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, is by the Divine assistance promised to him in the person of St Peter possessed of that Infallibility wherewith the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are unalterable of themselves and not by reason of the consent of the Church."

The anti-infallibilists resisted, but more and more feebly. The noose was gradually tightened; the inevitableness of the end grew more apparent day by day. Eighty Bishops protested against the closure; finally, overborne by numbers, they agreed to refrain from speaking, 88 voting against the whole scheme concerning the Primacy. At the last moment the Pope wavered. But he had gone too far to stop; his personal inclinations and the pressure of the majority overcame his fears. Faced by the final issue, the minority capitulated. Twenty only were prepared to vote *Non Placet* at the Public Session; it was agreed that, out of reverence for the Pope, they should absent themselves and leave Rome without voting. Their conduct was not heroic. The weakness of the position had translated itself into weakness of moral fibre; it was difficult even for sympathisers to feel enthusiasm for men who, so circumstanced, could act in such a way. The definition was voted, on July 18, by 535 Bishops. The actual proportion between the parties was as five to one; though, if the votes were weighed, either as to their representative or moral value, the proportion would have been greatly altered.

The submission of the dissentients was a matter of time. Some, no doubt, recognised the voice of the Holy Spirit in the decision of the majority. Till it was given, they were justified in their opposition; now opposition and doubt were at an end. Others, like Hefele, avowed themselves unable to endure the consequences of continued resistance—suspension, excommunication, and the like: unity meant more to them than truth. Most, it is probable, felt that, while a formula could be explained away, or might become obsolete, an act of schism was definite and irreparable; of two evils they chose the least. Again, while some at least, who had taken part in it, found it impossible to accept the Council as either free or valid, the dogma, as defined, fell short of that for which

the extreme party had contended. It left important questions open—it did not decide what papal pronouncements are *ex cathedra*, or, more far-reaching still, what is “that Infallibility wherewith the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed.” Again, as Gratry pointed out, the Infallibility of the decree was official, not personal; it was not ascribed to inspiration; it was limited to definitions given *ex cathedra*, and touching faith and morals. It was by such reasonings as these that theologians, somewhat half-heartedly, reconciled themselves to what had taken place. To the world, even the Catholic world at large, the quarrel was one of the sacristy: the professionalising of religion, or at least of theology, had been fatal to its life and actuality, and had removed it at once from the cognisance and interest of the average man.

The Old Catholic Schism in Germany and Switzerland was on a small scale, and its adherents were rather respectable than representative. It went at once too far and not far enough. The Tridentine position, which it professed to take up, is unthinkable without the Papacy, and contained, implicitly and after the manner of a theological conclusion, the dogma against which Old Catholicism was a protest. A half-way house, it offered no real halting-place; those who occupied it did not see how much stood, or fell, with Rome. Döllinger, while in sympathy, did not identify himself with them. After his excommunication (April, 1871), while steadfast in his loyalty to his historical conclusions, he submitted externally to the censures which an authority legitimate, from his standpoint, though acting unjustly, had inflicted.

The weapon placed in the hands of the Curia has not hitherto been used in the manner feared by some and hoped for by others. So far, no further definitions have been made, and no indisputably infallible pronouncements put forth by the Holy See. It has taught rather, *as if* it were infallible, than infallibly; though its dogmatic utterances have been more frequent than before. Those who so energetically promoted the definition had more than this in view. It was not worth while to venture so much to gain so little; what they dreamed of was a tribunal which should speak frequently and unmistakably, counteracting Rationalism and Liberalism at every turn. It has been suggested on the other hand by sanguine observers that in the hands of a strong Pope the Infallibility dogma might heal the wounds which it had inflicted, and be the means of freeing the Church from the burden of the past. It is difficult to conceive so complete a reversal of policy, and the signs of the times point in the opposite direction. The intension of Catholicism increases, if not as rapidly as some would wish; but it increases inversely with its extension. In so far as the Vatican Council aimed at the centralisation and concentration of the Church, it succeeded. But the world is the material on which the Church works and in which it realises itself; and the Council broadened the gulf, already wide and threatening, between the Church and the world.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

(1815-69.)

THE foundations of an empire resting upon justice and the good of the people had been truly laid by Lord Hastings' predecessors in the office of Governor-General of Bengal. But, despite the activity of Lord Wellesley, slow progress had been made in the work of building. It was not until November 14, 1834, that the title of Governor-General of India was adopted by Bentinck, while the imperial style of Viceroy was first accorded to Lord Canning in November, 1858. Nevertheless, from 1815 onwards the work of expansion and consolidation proceeded without interruption. For forty years the stir of war rang through the pages of Indian history. The battleground shifted from Bombay and central India to Burma; campaigns followed the course of Alexander's victories in the Punjab and Sind, embraced Afghanistan and Persia, and took the Sepoy army across the seas to Canton. Each Governor-General, as he left the shores of England, flattered himself that the era of peace and material progress was about to dawn; and more than one, although he had seen his hopes frustrated, was induced to disband a part of his victorious army in the confident assurance that at last the end of warlike operations was reached. Finally, the Company's troops, having no foreign foe to face, rebelled against their own employers, and the fabric of British rule so laboriously raised was shaken to its very foundations.

Two circumstances invested the year 1816 with special significance. The Directors of the Company were able to breathe more freely when the question of the abrogation of their Charter was deferred by the House of Commons for another seventeen years, and since their Governor-General on the spot was Francis Rawdon, first Marquis of Hastings, a man full of initiative and strength. In June of the same year a change of ministry brought to the Board of Control George Canning, who realised the futility of pious resolutions in arresting the brutal excesses of the Pindaris. In September, 1815, the Secret Committee under the orders of that Board had scouted the idea of a general league against those "human jackals," as they were termed. Precisely a year later they told Hastings that their orders were not "intended to restrain your Lordship in the exercise of your judgment and discretion, when actual war upon our territories might be commenced by a body of marauders,

and when the lives and properties of British subjects might call for efficient protection."

Thus liberated from the shackles imposed upon him, Hastings made his preparations for the last Maratha War, one of the most confusing of all the tangled transactions of Indian history. Its immediate object was the suppression of the Pindaris, those lawless gangs of Pathan or Rohilla origin, who were the children of the disorderly times on which they battered, and whose chief patrons were the rulers of native States. Chitu, or Situ, a Jat sold as a slave in time of famine, called his followers the Sindhia levy; and many of his brother leaders adopted the orange standard of the Peshwa and the Raja of Berar. Imam Baksh and his allies, dubbing themselves the Holkar host, hoisted the striped flag of that chief. Karim Khan had risen to power in the service of Bhopal. Amir Khan, founder of the Tonk State, was himself a leader of Pindaris, holding territories under Indore. Would the ruling chiefs join hands with the British in suppressing these freebooters, who had followed the Maratha hosts to the stricken field of Panipat in 1761 and since then had helped their leaders to acquire dominions of their own? This was the problem that had to be solved; and, if Hastings anticipated that the chiefs of western and central India would rather become his foes than his allies, he honestly gave them the choice. But there was no time for hesitation. The latest irruption of the Pindaris into the northern districts of Madras in March, 1816, was of so destructive a character that it could not be allowed to be repeated. Their stay in that part of the Company's dominions lasted for only eleven days and a half; but in that time they plundered 339 villages, killed 182, wounded 505, and tortured 3603 persons. They spared neither sex nor age; they violated the living and profaned the dead.

Fortune gave Hastings the first move. The ambitious designs of the head of the regency at Nagpur, Apa Sahib, led that wily Maratha to strengthen his position by concluding, May 27, 1816, a treaty of alliance with the British against the Pindaris or other enemies of the Company. This undertaking, if only it were kept, would close the passes of Berar to the invaders. Events on the extreme west of the area of disturbances were equally favourable. Baji Rao, Peshwa of Poona, had imprudently shielded his Minister, Trimbakji Danglia, who had caused the death of the Gaekwar's accredited Minister, Gangadhar Shastri, on July 14, 1815. Mountstuart Elphinstone, the British Agent, at last secured Danglia's imprisonment at Thana. Escaping from his confinement Danglia had spread disorder throughout the districts near Poona, his master declining to act against him. Elphinstone was firm, and, on June 13, 1817, compelled Baji Rao, the Peshwa, to sign a treaty, which bound him to suppress the disorders created by Danglia, placed several forts in the hands of the British, and transferred to them territories for the maintenance of troops.

With these two positions secured in Berar and Poona, Hastings lost no time in offering to Sindhia the choice of war or peace. Crossing the Jamna in October, 1817, he advanced towards Gwalior, whose ruler, Daulat Rao Sindhia, observing the movements of Sir Thomas Hislop's army and other supporting columns, was compelled on November 5, 1817, to accept a treaty of cooperation, and admit the right of the Company to conclude treaties with the Rajput States. Accordingly Karauli, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Bhopal, Jaipur, and other States were brought into the political system of the Company. Amir Khan also was guaranteed the territories he held under the Raja of Holkar, on condition of disbanding his free-booter levies. While these events were taking place in central India, the Peshwa determined to strike for himself. He attacked the residency at Poona, and watched his army of 30,000 men prepare for battle on the field of Kirki. There they were attacked by Colonel Burr with a brigade of 1200 men and ignominiously defeated, November 5, 1817. When General Lionel Smith arrived on the scene, Poona was captured, and the Peshwa had fled. At Koregaon a small detachment of 900 men under Captain Francis Staunton, January 1, 1818, held their own, inflicting heavy loss on the Peshwa's force of 25,000 men. At Ashta Baji Rao was surprised, and Gokla, his ablest general, killed; so that nothing was left for him but to seek an asylum in one of the Maratha States with which he had been in correspondence.

But the rashness of the Raja of Berar, and the indecision of Holkar's troops, had already closed this last door of escape. The Raja, in defiance of his recent treaty, was massing his force near the residency at Nagpur, under the shadow of the Sitabaldi hills. The Resident, Richard Jenkins, called in a detachment of 1200 men who, gallantly led by Colonel Scott, wore down the repeated attacks of 12,000 cavalry and 8000 infantry, including 3500 Arabs. The engagement (November 25-6, 1817) lasted eighteen hours, and cost the British 365 in killed and wounded. The army of Berar was crushed a few days later by General John Doveton; the Raja was deposed, and the Nagpur State rendered powerless.

Meanwhile the forces of the Minor Maharaja of Indore determined upon advancing towards Poona in support of the Peshwa. Sir John Malcolm in vain protested; and a collision between them and the British took place at Mehidpur, December 21, 1817. The British casualties were 775; but the affair was decisive. Holkar signed away forts and territories to the Company by the Treaty of Maundsaur, January 6, 1818. The Pindaris, now deprived of their supports in the native States, were roughly handled wherever met. Karim Khan's band was routed by Major Richard Clarke, January 13, with a loss of 1000 killed. Chitu, leader of the Sindhia levy, was driven into the forests and there devoured by a tiger. Other leaders surrendered, and their followers dispersed. The Peshwa of Poona, reduced to the last extremity, accepted the terms offered by Malcolm, resigned his sovereign powers, and eventually

retired to Bithur, where he adopted a son, Dhondev Pant, afterwards known as the Nana Sahib. His territories went to build up the presidency of Bombay; and the local Government, copying the example set them, lost no time in making treaties with the neighbouring States of Kutch, Kolhapur, and Baroda, and even with the Amirs of Sind and the Arab tribes of the Persian Gulf.

In March, 1818, Hastings was able to break up his army and devote himself to administrative reforms. He managed his finances with great ability, bequeathing a substantial surplus to his successor, encouraged education, and improved the tone of the public services. Notwithstanding the exhaustive despatches in which he justified his policy, the Directors, while making him a grant of £60,000, repeated their regrets at the extension of their territories. A more serious difference between him and his masters arose out of the loans granted, with his permission, by William Palmer and Company to the Nizam of Haidarabad. The Court of Directors, while satisfied as to his integrity, were suspicious of his motives, and ungracious in their language. Hastings tendered his resignation, and left India in January, 1823, having finally by his treaties broken down the ring-fence within which the home authorities had vainly endeavoured to confine him. All the native States outside the Punjab were now parts of the political system, and from Singapur to the Persian Gulf British interests were permanently secured.

Lord Amherst had hardly taken his seat, August 1, 1823, when his hopes of a peaceful administration received a shock from a new quarter. Bagyidaw, King of Ava, had conquered Assam, and vainly demanded the surrender of its Raja, now under British protection. This, however, was not the only cause of dispute. His troops had attacked a small British fort on the island of Shapuri, at the mouth of the Naaf, near Chittagong, and levied tolls on British boats entering the river. A small military detachment was ordered to occupy Shapuri; and Bagyidaw replied by sending his famous general, Bandula, to take command of his troops in Arakan. Kachar, a protected State, was also invaded. Amherst had no option but to declare war upon Burma. But, before the expedition was fully organised, a mixed British force was defeated and driven back at Ramu, causing a panic in Bengal. The war which now ensued exposed many weaknesses in the Company's military system. The Bengal sepoy, ready enough to march overland, was unwilling to break caste by crossing the "black water," as he termed the sea. The successes gained in the Maratha War had raised the Company's prestige, but rumour magnified the difficulties and disasters in Burma; and a rebellious relative of the Raja of Bhartpur, trusting in the strength of his impregnable fortress, did not hesitate to defy the victors of Mehidpur and Sitabaldi.

Defective preparations had also much to answer for. Two attempts to move troops through Kachar into Ava, and to reach the Irrawaddy from Chittagong through Arakan, proved expensive and disastrous failures.

Colonel Thomas Shulldham, unable to transport the first of these columns through forests and over mountains, withdrew the wreck of it; while the notorious Arakan fever decimated and rendered powerless the troops sent from Chittagong. The main army, consisting chiefly of Madras troops—men less scrupulous about caste—with the support of naval forces, reached Rangoon in May, under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell. The enemy's stockades were soon carried. But further progress was stayed by the drenching monsoon, by the lack of fresh food supplies, by want of accommodation for the troops, by insufficient hospital arrangements, and by the putrid condition of the stores sent from Calcutta. What the Burmese forces failed to accomplish, fever and dysentery quickly effected.

When the monsoon was over, the British, having meanwhile taken Martaban and secured Tenasserim, advanced against the stockades near Kyaikhalo, but were foiled in their attacks; and, emboldened by these events, Bandula moved down with 40,000 ill-armed troops to expel the invaders from Rangoon, December, 1824. In this enterprise he failed, and, after suffering heavy losses, he withdrew to an old Talaing fort strongly garrisoned and defended by guns and stockades at Danubyu, 60 miles from Rangoon. General Willoughby Cotton, with his division, was the first to reach the fort by river; but his attacks were repulsed in March, 1825, with heavy losses. Archibald Campbell, proceeding with his division by land, turned south to the rescue, beating off successive attacks of the Burmese; and in the assault on April 2, the death of Bandula by a shell scattered his army and gave the position to the British. Prome was occupied in April, and its stores of rice enabled the force to remain there for the rainy season; while the Burmese army was established at Myedè.

In August, the King of Ava professed his readiness to consider proposals for peace, but indignantly refused to surrender Arakan and other coast districts, which the British had occupied, or to pay any indemnity. War was therefore resumed in November, and, after four days' fighting, the Burmese position at Nat-padi, a cliff facing the river, was captured, Myedè being entered in December. The new year, 1826, opened with further successes gained at Matun, and again Bagyidaw sent a British prisoner with his agents to negotiate a peace. This, however, was but a feint. For, learning that Campbell's effective force was reduced to some 1300 men, he persuaded himself that one of his generals at the head of 15,000 troops could overwhelm them in a pitched battle without recourse being had to stockades. Sir Archibald easily scattered the Burmese at Pagan, and pushed on to Yandabu, only 45 miles from Ava. Here on February 24, 1826, he received the treaty wrung from the King, and the war was at an end. The British gained the provinces of Assam, Arakan, and the coast of Tenasserim, the payment of an indemnity, with possession of Rangoon until the payment was received, commercial facilities, and the right to maintain a British Resident at Ava. But

the war cost more than five millions sterling and the lives of thousands of soldiers, and caused troubles in India to which attention must now be called.

As has been told, the Bengal sepoy had the utmost abhorrence to crossing the sea; and, on being summoned for service with the column proceeding overland to Arakan, the 47th Native Infantry not unnaturally asked for assistance in furnishing itself with transport. But the authorities, annoyed at these religious scruples, were in no mood to grant the men's demands. When, then, in November, 1824, the greater part of the regiment refused to fall in on parade at Barrackpur, they were ruthlessly mowed down by European artillery and cut up by cavalry. The incident left an ineffaceable impression upon the whole army, which bore fruit when the Company had to undertake oversea expeditions at a later date. The disturbances which led to the capture of the Fort of Bhartpur were hardly less unfortunate. The Minor Raja of that Jat State had been imprisoned by his cousin, Durjan Sal, and Sir David Ochterlony, the chief political officer, promptly called on the Jats to support their lawful sovereign, at the same time summoning a British force to cooperate. Amherst, preoccupied with Burma, shrank from the risk of failure in the heart of India, remembering that the famous fortress had defied the assaults of Lake in 1805, and that numerous free-lances were easily to be collected from neighbouring States. Ochterlony was therefore ordered to suspend his preparations—an act of weakness which only increased the disorder. The gravity of the situation was however perceived by Sir Charles Metcalfe, who warned the Governor-General that Upper India would again be in a blaze, unless public peace were restored. Lord Combermere, who had become Commander-in-chief in October, 1825, was therefore authorised to collect an army of 20,000 men, with which he commenced the siege of the fort in December. The solid walls of clay, five miles in circumference, resisted the impact of shot and shell; and it was not until a mine charged with 10,000 pounds of powder had exploded on January 18, 1826, that the fort was captured. The immense treasure found in it was appropriated as prize money, and Durjan Sal became a state prisoner. This success, combined with the conclusion of the Burmese War, restored confidence in the Company's power, and enabled the Government to raise loans to meet the heavy debt incurred in obtaining these results.

Lord William Bentinck became Governor-General at Fort William in 1828, and left India in March, 1835. During these seven years of comparative peace he acted up to the principle, recorded at the foot of his statue in Calcutta, that "the end of government is the welfare of the governed." He converted the deficit of a million sterling (a *crore* of rupees) into a surplus of the same amount, improved and rendered secure internal communications by land and water, and opened the way for the overland route by despatching the first steamer, the *Hugh Lindsay*, that ever made the passage from Bombay to Suez. The credit, however,



which history has exclusively attached to his name for the suppression of *Sati* must be shared by the Marquis Wellesley, who in 1802 prohibited by Regulation the practice of exposing children to be devoured by sharks or drowned in the Ganges, and who also instituted an enquiry into the prevalence of *Sati*. The public conscience was shocked by the discovery that between April 15 and October 15, 1804, no less than 116 widows had been burnt alive within thirty miles of Calcutta. But Bentinck had the courage to stop the practice in British India in 1829, and to qualify the doctrine of toleration by declaring that all classes would "be secure in the observance of their religious usages, so long as that system can be adhered to without violation of the paramount dictates of justice and humanity." In another direction he prepared the path for Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1843 abolishing property in slaves, for by a Regulation of 1832 he rendered illegal the removal of slaves for traffic from one British district to another; and he vigorously prosecuted the war upon Thags and Dacoits, so that his successor was able without difficulty to enact that any one proved to have belonged to such gangs should be imprisoned for life. In education also it was Bentinck who really settled the long controversy in favour of the advocates of instruction in English and the vernaculars, and paved the way for the abolition of Persian (accomplished in 1837) as the language of the Courts.

While India reaped the victories of peace under Bentinck, she could not avoid further acquisitions of territory, although the wars of Hastings had been condemned for bringing about a similar result. Kachar, saved from the clutches of the Burmese and recognised as a native State under its own Raja, Govind Chandra, was in 1830 left without a head, its ruler, who perished by assassination, being heirless. The State was claimed by one of his officers, a rebel against his rule; but Bentinck rejected his claim and annexed the State under the "doctrine of lapse"—a doctrine which gained such notoriety in Dalhousie's time. To the south of India, in the highlands of Coorg, another principle, which afterwards became famous, was laid down as a justification for annexation—the intention "to secure to the inhabitants the blessings of a just and equitable government." One of its Rajas after another had asserted, by more brutal methods than his predecessors, "the right divine of kings to govern wrong." Among them Virarajendra Wodiyar, agent of his own orders, delighted in executing not only his subjects but his nearest relatives. To the remonstrances of the Governor-General he sent insulting answers, while imprisoning his envoy. Bentinck retorted by annexing the State (May 7, 1834) in compliance with the unanimous wish of its inhabitants. The same policy induced him to interfere in Mysore, whose Maharaja was left in possession of nominal sovereignty while the administration was conducted by British officers; and in Oudh the King was warned that, if he did not reform his government, the country would be taken over by the Company.

Bentinck was compelled by ill-health to quit India before he had completed his programme of reforms. This was unfortunate, because the new Charter Act of 1833 brought to a close the commercial business of the Company and emphasised their position as rulers of an Indian empire in trust for the Crown. The whole administration as well as the legislation of the country was then placed in the hands of the Governor-General in Council, and authority was given to create a third Presidency of Agra. Before his retirement Bentinck assumed the statutory title of Governor-General of India, November 14, 1834, thus marking the progress of consolidation since Warren Hastings in 1774 became the first Governor-General of Fort William. Lord Heytesbury was appointed his successor; but, before he could sail, the accession of Lord Melbourne to office caused George Eden, afterwards Lord Auckland, to be sent out in his stead.

Whatever plans Auckland had formed for the expansion of Indian trade and the material development of the country were soon shattered by the fatal decision at which the Board of Control arrived in their fear of Russian aggression. When at last they perceived their error, Auckland had not the courage to cast adrift the counsel of William Macnaghten and to withdraw from the enterprise on which he had embarked. The war with Afghanistan dragged in its train the annexation of Sind, the Sikh wars, and the inclusion of Baluchistan in the protectorate of India. It is necessary therefore to review briefly the events which brought these several States into such close relation with each other.

Ahmad Shah Abdali, whose invasions of India and capture of Delhi left northern India strewn with the wreckage of the Moghul empire, belonged to the Sadozai branch of the Abdalis, whose name he changed to the Duranis. Crowned at Kandahar in 1747, he bequeathed to his successors unquestioned dominion over Sind, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and the Punjab, as well as Afghanistan. His descendant, Shah Shuja, was reigning at Kabul in 1809, when Lord Minto, alarmed at the designs attributed to Persia and France, sent Mountstuart Elphinstone to conclude an alliance with him, while at the same time Metcalfe cleared away a difficulty by fixing with Ranjit Sing the Satlaj as the boundary of the Sikh kingdom. Shortly afterwards Shah Shuja was ousted from the throne by his brother Mahmud, who committed the fatal error of blinding and putting to death the Barakzai Minister, Fateh Khan, by whose aid he had himself obtained the Crown. This outrage exasperated the Barakzai section of the Duranis, and they ousted Mahmud, dividing the Afghan provinces between themselves. Dost Mohammad secured Ghazni and Kabul; but Herat remained in the possession of the Sadozai Kamran, son of Mahmud. The Indian provinces which Ahmad Shah had conquered rapidly fell away from Afghanistan; the Sind Amirs withheld their tribute and asserted their independence; while Ranjit Sing established his authority over Lahore, and, in 1833, having relieved Shah

Shuja of the famous Koh-i-nur diamond, offered to support him in an attempt to recover Kabul. Shah Shuja thus encouraged marched through Sind and occupied Kandahar, but was driven back into India by Dost Mohammad. The latter followed up his success by proclaiming a *jehad* against the Sikhs. With a large army he invaded Peshawar; but the intrigues of Ranjit broke up his followers, and he retired home, leaving the wily Sikh master of his possessions in the Punjab.

Persia next sought profit out of the distractions of her neighbours. Encouraged by Russia, the King besieged Herat in November, 1837; but it chanced that a young officer of the Company's service, Eldred Pottinger, found shelter within its walls, and his sound advice and indomitable courage enabled the garrison to hold the fortress against the attack of 40,000 Persian troops, directed by Russian officers, for a period of ten months. Before, however, the siege was raised, the Persians and their Russian allies had entered into negotiations with Dost Mohammad, trusting in his hostility towards the Sadozai ruler of Herat. The Dost was the more disposed to favour their proposals because he had been greatly disappointed by the failure of his attempts to secure from Captain Alexander Burnes, whom Lord Auckland had sent on a "commercial" mission to him, a promise of support against the Sikhs.

Such was the position of affairs on the Indian frontier when the British Cabinet were considering how they could checkmate the designs of Russia in Asia. They regarded the Afghans no less than the Persians as already won over by that Power, and turned to Ranjit as a means of redressing the balance. They therefore approved of Auckland's proposals for restoring Shah Shuja to his throne and maintaining Herat as a separate principality independent alike of Persia and Afghanistan. By these means it was hoped to establish a buffer State in the latter country and to confirm the Sikhs in their rule over Kashmir and Peshawar, at the same time relieving the Amirs in Sind of Afghan supremacy and tribute. A tripartite treaty between the Governor-General, Ranjit Sing, and Shah Shuja, on these lines, was signed at Simla July 25, 1838.

The failure of the Russian and Persian attack upon Herat did not arrest the prosecution of this risky policy. A British column left Ferozpur in December, 1838, and marched towards Sind, while troops from Bombay under John Keane were landed at Karachi. The Sind Amirs were required to give assistance to an army which was advancing to free them from dependency on Afghanistan. From the start to its tragic finish, the expedition met with difficulties that might have been foreseen, and left behind in its course a bad moral effect, which was only effaced by the shedding of more blood. Deficient in transport and means of subsistence, the British troops forced their way by dogged perseverance through the deserts of Sind and the inhospitable Bolan Pass. Kandahar surrendered without a blow, and Shah Shuja was crowned there May 8, 1839. Ghazni was brilliantly taken by storm, and in August Shah Shuja

made his triumphal entry into Kabul where, however, he was coldly received by its inhabitants.

Dost Mohammad fled north, and, eventually giving himself up, was sent to India. With the entry into Kabul Auckland might have rested content, and thus have avoided the terrible sequel. He was anxious however to restore to his ally a settled government, and it never occurred to him that it was a more difficult task to get out of Kabul than to enter it. After a few months insurrections broke out, headed by the son of Dost Mohammad; the army was dispirited by the hardships it had undergone, and in deference to the Shah's wishes it abstained from securing the commanding position of the Bala Hissar. An incurable optimism took possession of the authorities, military and civil. The internal administration was conducted by British officers, who came into collision with the Afghan populace; and Major D'Arcy Todd, who had been sent to Herat as Agent, found the Minister, Yar Mohammad, actively engaged in intrigues with Persia. The cost of maintaining troops at Kabul pressed heavily on the finances; and the reduction of the liberal allowance to the local chiefs increased the unpopularity of the British occupation.

In the state of feeling thus created, the murder of Burnes and his brother by a party of Ghilzais was the spark that fired the gunpowder so carefully laid on all sides. Consultations with the Shah, and the hesitation of General William Elphinstone, who would neither relieve Burnes nor send aid from the cantonment to the detachment besieged in the fort, encouraged a general rising against the foreign invaders. General William Nott, summoned to Kabul, was unable to obtain transport for more than a small detachment, which soon retraced its steps; while Robert Sale, weighing the cost resolutely, retired to Jalalabad, which he hastened to strengthen for the inevitable attack. The British at Kabul were left to shift for themselves; and a pitiful succession of blunders led up to the final disaster. The commissariat fort was captured by the Afghans, Elphinstone making no effort to rescue the provisions on which the cantonment depended. The citadel might have been secured by John Shelton as a place of refuge; but he preferred to waste time in quarrelling with Elphinstone. On November 23, 1841, the British were defeated in action on the Behmaru hills; and demoralisation succeeded to hunger. Every endeavour to obtain supplies for some 15,000 men was frustrated by Akbar Khan, one of Dost Mohammad's sons; and on December 11 Macnaghten, seeing nothing but starvation before them, gave hostages, promised to evacuate Kandahar, Ghazni, and Jalalabad, and to leave Kabul in three days, in return for provisions to be furnished on payment of their value. These terms were violated; Macnaghten was assassinated; and, after the retreat had begun, Lady Macnaghten and ten other ladies, with fifteen children, were rescued from certain death only by accepting shelter in Akbar Khan's camp. Elphinstone and Shelton were given up as additional hostages; and the hostile Ghilzais

wreaked their vengeance on the rest in the passes covered with snow. One solitary survivor, Dr William Brydon, reached Jalalabad, wounded and exhausted, on January 13, 1842.

Auckland's first step on receiving news of the disaster was to give General Nott at Kandahar authority to act upon his own judgment "to secure the paramount object of the safety of his troops and to uphold at the same time the honour of British arms." He also directed Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-chief, to push forward a strong division under George Pollock to the Peshawar frontier. Hearing, however, of the doubtful attitude of the Sikh Government and of Nicolls' misgivings as to any renewal of the contest, he impressed upon Pollock the necessity of concentration. It is true that he half-heartedly referred to the release of the British captives; but he added that the "Governor-General in Council does not contemplate any great effort in the present season for the reoccupation of Afghanistan."

Ellenborough, on his way out to relieve Auckland, learnt the gloomy news as he entered the Madras roads, February 21, 1842. His mind was full of the expedition to China, which had occupied the attention of Palmerston's Government before he left England; and, when he heard of the discontent of the troops at Haidarabad, the numerous desertions reported from the Punjab, and the rumours of trouble in Sind and Burma, his heart failed him. In March, he wrote to Nicolls that "in war reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops." Meanwhile Nott, unable to move for lack of transport, anxiously awaited the arrival of General Richard England with reliefs from Sind. But on March 28 England fell back from Hakalzai to Pishin with a loss of 27 killed and 71 wounded, while the garrison at Ghazni capitulated on March 1, and Kandahar narrowly escaped capture. Ellenborough ordered Nott to withdraw to Sakhar, and Pollock to concentrate on the Indian side of the Khaibar at the earliest practicable period. He was so sure of his own judgment that he even made the following boast to the Duke of Wellington on May 17; "I stand alone and have to contend against the whole monstrous body of political agents. I have acted altogether in all I have done upon my own judgment."

Neither his colleagues in Calcutta, from whom he had separated himself, nor his generals in the field, were prepared to acquiesce in Ellenborough's humiliating orders. When Pollock reached Jalalabad, he found that Sale, reduced to almost his last half-rations, had not merely repaired the injury caused to his defences by earthquake, but in a pitched battle had soundly thrashed 6000 Afghans under the walls of the citadel. The "illustrious garrison" had in fact relieved itself. To Ellenborough, however, this success, and the murder of Shah Shuja, made no difference. So he at once told Pollock, who forcibly pointed out the danger of retiring, and finally demonstrated the impossibility of doing so without carriage. From Kandahar came the same story. Nott, whom England

had at last joined with 2500 men and 3000 camels from Sind, withdrew the garrison from Kelat-i-Ghilzai because he had "no option" save to carry out definite orders. But, with only 52 casualties in his own force, he succeeded in inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy, 12,000 in number, outside Kandahar; and he too declared that he could not safely withdraw until he had collected supplies. And now, while Pollock with 15,000 men, including his sick, at Jalalabad, and Nott with 10,000 at Kandahar, held fast, public indignation asserted itself. Ellenborough therefore reluctantly wrote to Nott, July 4, that he left to his discretion "the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country"; and Pollock was at first authorised to make his strength felt before abandoning his position, and finally to cooperate with the Kandahar force if it marched by Kabul.

Nott naturally selected the way by Ghazni and Kabul as the route he would follow, after despatching England to Sakhar with a part of his troops. Sir Charles Napier was summoned with reinforcements from Bombay to take command of all the forces in Sind, which with England's contingent numbered 10,000 men; and a reserve army was organised on the Punjab frontier. It now became a race for Kabul between Nott and Pollock. The former started in August, defeating an Afghan force of 12,000 in the same month, took Ghazni after heavy fighting, September 6, thereby releasing 327 sepoys from captivity, and arrived, September 17, within five miles of Kabul, to find that Pollock's troops had occupied the Bala Hissar on the previous day. Both armies fought several actions; but the signal defeat which Pollock inflicted upon Akbar Khan's army of 16,000 men at Tizin, September 13, was decisive, and opened the door to Kabul. The European prisoners, with the exception of General Elphinstone, who had died in captivity, and one other, numbering 105 persons, were rescued on September 21, and before Christmas Day both Pollock and Nott, not without some fighting, had crossed the Satlaj, the latter bearing the so-called gates of Somnath in triumph to India. England, with the rest of the troops from Kandahar, had reported his arrival at Dadar in October.

Ellenborough, having first ordered his generals to retire, and then thrown upon them the heavy responsibility of advancing upon Kabul, could not restrain his extravagant joy at the successes which they had achieved. He met Pollock on December 18 at the banks of the Satlaj and loaded the troops with medals and honours. The resonant periods of his "prancing" proclamations struck a false note and offended the public ear; and, when he bade the princes of India rejoice that "the insult of 800 years is at last avenged" by the restoration of the (spurious) gates of Somnath, he only provoked a contemptuous smile. The Mohammadans were offended at the desecration of a tomb; the Hindu princes knew that, even if Mahmud, the Mohammadan invader of India, had carried away any gates from Somnath to Ghazni in 1024, they were

not made of Deodar nor carved with a Mohammadan pattern. A spirit of triumphant insolence took possession of him, as he thought of the 30,000 effective troops gathered at Ferozpur at the close of 1842, and reflected upon the successful issue of the war with China. But grave exception was taken in England to the destruction of the bazaar and two mosques at Kabul and to the unnecessary losses which the armies had incurred in their retreat. Moreover events in Sind alarmed the home authorities eager for settled peace, and even called forth a warning from Ellenborough's friend the Duke of Wellington, who urged a policy of conciliation rather than of menaces.

The conquest of Sind was not merely a sequence but a consequence of the Afghan War. Commercial intercourse with that province had been established by the Company in 1758, and more particularly with the Haidarabad Mirs of the Talpur family than with those of the two other branches, Mirpur and Khairpur. But, when the tripartite treaty was concluded with the Sikhs and Shah Shuja, the temporary occupation of Shikarpur became a matter of necessity. The Amirs were by that engagement to be relieved from the dominion of Afghanistan; and the sum claimed by the Afghans was to be fixed by the British, who in turn were to pay Ranjit Sing a *solutum* of 15 lakhs out of it. As the price of this freedom, the Amirs engaged to allow the temporary occupation of Shikarpur and the passage of troops and supplies through their country. The Khairpur family entered readily into these arrangements; but the Haidarabad Amirs objected to the payment of any tributary arrears to Shah Shuja and to the intrusion of the British into their dominions. In fact, a military force under Brigadier Thomas Valiant on its way to Afghanistan from Bombay was opposed at Karachi in 1839, with the result that the fort and town had to be taken. Eventually, the Amirs agreed to the terms imposed on them which fixed their share of the tribute. But they failed either to pay the money or to surrender the lands demanded in lieu of it; and, when the news of the Kabul disaster reached Sind, insolence was added to refusal. Moreover, they disputed the right of navigation on the Indus and the commercial tariff which the Government of India regarded as already secured to them by existing treaty.

Such was the position when Charles Napier took command of the forces in Sind and Baluchistan in August, 1842. Strengthened as he was by the vindication of British honour at Kabul, Napier was in no mood to be trifled with; and, in February, 1843, the Amirs, learning that a force was advancing and had blown up the fortress of Imam Ghar, agreed to accept the terms of a new treaty dictated to them. Those terms included the cession of territories to the British and to their allies the Nawab of Bahawalpur and the Mir Sobdar Khan, as well as the surrender of the privilege of coining money, and a free passage to the Company's troops through Sind. That Napier's conscience was pricked by the enterprise entrusted to him may perhaps be inferred from the humorous message by

which he announced his success—"peccavi"; but it is also clear from his diaries and letters. "My present position," he wrote on January 16, 1843, "is not to my liking; we had no right to come here, and are tarred with the Afghan brush"; and on the following day he admitted that the enemy were incapable of real opposition.

The incidents of Indian history, however, constantly repeat themselves; and, as at Kirki and Sitabaldi the Peshwa and the Raja of Berar had put themselves in the wrong, so now at Haidarabad the ink upon the treaty was hardly dry when the Sindis treacherously attacked James Outram in the Residency. There he defended himself against 8000 men until his ammunition was exhausted, and then fell back upon Napier's force at Matari. Outram was still disposed to treat with the Amirs; but Napier was anxious to fight his first battle as generalissimo, and with 2800 men and 12 guns he inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy of 22,000 men at Miani, losing 300 and killing or wounding 5000 (February 17). The Amirs themselves surrendered, but their followers maintained an attitude of hostility, till they received a second defeat at Dabo, six miles from Haidarabad, March 24. The whole of Sind, with the exception of the Khairpur territories, which were continued to Mir Ali Murad, was annexed; and the Amirs, after being deported, were eventually allowed to return to Haidarabad on pensions. The justification pleaded for these proceedings was "the welfare of the inhabitants of the country," and the treachery and misrule of the Amirs. Napier persuaded himself that the act was morally defensible; but, although there is no doubt that the people were delivered from a bad government and the risk of Afghan and Sikh invasions, the treatment of the Amirs was harsh. The necessity of securing a free passage for troops and commerce between Bombay and the Punjab as a mere act of self-defence is the best excuse that can be made for Ellenborough's policy.

His actions in Gwalior rested upon firmer grounds of principle and statesmanship. While the Amirs in Sind were gathering together their forces for the conflict at Miani, a revolution was in progress at Gwalior, which, in view of the growing insolence of the Sikhs, demanded the utmost attention. The young Raja Jankoji died without issue, and his child widow, with the permission of the Governor-General, at once adopted a son. Ellenborough recognised Mama Sahib, uncle of the late Maharaja, as regent in preference to Dada Khasji, the Minister favoured by the widow and the Court, and concentrated a large force on the frontier to support his authority. The troops of the State had not forgotten the lesson taught to them in the Maratha War, when they had been isolated by the dispositions of Hastings' army while they hesitated to strike a blow for the Peshwa. On the other hand, they had not experienced for themselves the futility of resistance, as Holkar's army had at Mehidpur, and they lent too willing an ear to exaggerated tales of British weakness in Afghanistan. They fancied themselves



masters of the situation, and, when the regent was dismissed from office, and the British Resident withdrew from the capital, where Dada had won over most of the army and taken control of affairs, matters could only end in an open conflict.

In December, 1843, Ellenborough proceeded to Agra; and, fearing that the Sikhs would declare war before Gwalior affairs were settled, he warned the Maharani that the time had come for active interference in the interests both of the Company and of the protected State of Gwalior. The Dada was thereupon sent to the frontier town of Dholpur, and a deputation was despatched to the Governor-General to ask for a conference before the British force should cross the Chambal. But the interview fixed for December 26 fell through; and Sir Hugh Gough, with some 6400 troops, advanced to Maharajpur, while General John Grey proceeded from a direction south-east of Gwalior to Punniar, with a view to cooperation with the Commander-in-chief's force. The enemy, however, numbering 25,000 men, prevented the two wings from uniting. Part of them, taking advantage of a delay in the arrival of the four 8-inch howitzers, fell upon Gough's troops before they were fully prepared, and an obstinate struggle ensued in which, though losing 106 killed and 684 wounded, Gough gained the day. On the same day, December 29, Grey too won a victory at Punniar, with a loss of 217 killed and wounded.

These successes achieved in a campaign of two days put an end to further resistance. The two wings of the army joined forces at Gwalior, January 4, 1844, and on the 13th the Maharaja accepted the treaty dictated to him. By this he agreed to reduce his armed forces to 9000 men with 32 guns, leaving his fort in the hands of a contingent of 10,000 men under British officers, but retaining his independence. Peace and order, thus established, continued until 1857, when the contingent joined the mutineers at Cawnpore, and Tantia Topi, one of its Brahman officers, raised the standard of revolt in central India.

Ellenborough was now able to turn his attention to the critical state of affairs at Lahore. Since the death of Ranjit Sing, June 27, 1839, the Khalsa army of 82,000 well-drilled soldiers under the guidance of a military committee had taken part in a series of revolutions at that capital. Dhulip Sing being an infant, Janda Khaur, supported by her paramour Lal Sing, was now regent. The recall of Ellenborough by the Court of Directors in June, 1844, and the succession of Sir Henry Hardinge, did not interrupt the policy being pursued of gradually increasing the British forces round about Amballa so as to prepare for eventualities without alarming the Sikhs. Gough was thus able to count upon 32,000 men to protect Ferozpur and the Company's possessions, when suddenly, on November 17, 1845, the Sikh Committee resolved on war, and the Lahore Government dared not say them nay. The Khalsa, under Tej Sing, crossed the border, and to their invasion Hardinge replied by a proclamation annexing all Sikh territories on the left bank of the Satlaj.

The validity of this paper victory was at once put to the test of war. Part of the Sikh forces remained round Firozpur, watching the British garrison; while another part, under Lal Sing, moved on to Firozshahr and entrenched itself in a formidable position of an oblong shape. But the Sikhs were not content with playing a waiting game. They also sent out a force of 12,000 men with 22 guns to Mudki, to bar the way of Gough and Hardinge now approaching with a force of 11,000 men. On December 18 Gough came into contact with the enemy late in the afternoon and at once attacked them, losing 215 killed, including the gallant Sale, with 657 wounded. If the honours of the short fight rested with the British, the fruits of victory were snatched from them by the falling of darkness and by their fatigue after a long march.

The Sikhs made good their retreat to the shelter of their entrenchments at Firozshahr; Gough, when his men had rested, followed them thither. On reaching that place, December 21, he would again have hurled himself upon the Sikhs; but Hardinge, who had placed his services at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief as second in command, interfered as Governor-General and insisted upon waiting for John Littler to come up. The British forces, together 17,000 strong, were unable to effect a junction and take up their positions before 3 p.m. Littler's division, though weary after a long march, were allowed no rest, and he was repulsed and compelled to fall back. Everywhere the Sikhs took advantage of their splendid position; but by nightfall the entrenchment was pierced, and Sir Harry Smith held the village in its centre. Darkness and the confusion caused by constant explosions of magazines obliged Gough to draw back his men, who for many hours were unable to move or light a fire without exposing themselves to the enemy's artillery. At length the "night of horrors" began to give way to dawn; and the British troops, spent though they were by hunger and want of rest, once more advanced, driving the enemy out of their retrenchment. At that moment Tej Sing arrived with 25,000 fresh Sikhs, and it seemed as if victory must be turned into disaster. But, though the ammunition for the guns was exhausted, and men from sheer fatigue were dropping from the ranks, the combat was stubbornly upheld; and the Sikhs, losing heart at the capture of their entrenched camp, made no serious effort to retrieve the day. The victory, known as Firozshahr, thus won cost the British 694 killed, while 1721 were wounded.

The Sikh army, however, soon discovered that there was no cause for despair. Awaiting reinforcements from Lahore, it detached 8000 men to attack Ludiana and break Gough's communications with British India. Sir Harry Smith was therefore despatched to relieve Godby, thus assailed, and to frustrate the threatened interruption. Having carried out this duty, Smith, at the head of 12,000 men, won a brilliant victory over the Sikhs in the battle of Aliwal, January 28, 1846, though with a loss of 580 killed and wounded. He then rejoined the main army at Sobraon,

where the enemy had entrenched themselves in a strong position, resting upon the Satlaj and connected by a bridge of boats with their heavy batteries on the other side of the river. Here Gough, with 15,000 men, gave battle to the Sikhs numbering some 35,000 with 70 guns. Again his ammunition ran out; and the position had to be carried by the bayonet. Nicholas Penny's brigade on the right failed to push home its advance, while Walter Gilbert's attack on the centre was twice hurled back. But eventually a complete victory was gained. The Sikhs were driven pell-mell into the river, and sixty-seven of their seventy guns were captured. The British losses on this day, February 10, were 320 killed and 2063 wounded.

Diplomacy now stepped in; and, their overtures for peace being accepted, the Sikh Government escaped the full chastisement they had merited. By a treaty signed March 9, 1846, and by subsequent arrangements, the Lahore State was preserved from annexation. Its sovereignty over Kashmir was transferred to Golarb Sing on payment of a *crore* of rupees; while the Sikh possessions in the Jalandar Doab and Hazara were annexed and the Lahore army reduced to 32,000 men. Henry Lawrence, soon to be temporarily succeeded by his brother John, now took up his appointment as British Resident to guide the Council of Regency in the administration, a force of 9000 British troops, to be paid by the Durbar, being quartered at Lahore. Believing that by these measures the Sikh kingdom would become an orderly member of the British protectorate, Hardinge now proceeded to effect economies, reducing the Company's army by 50,000 men, breaking up his transport, and devoting the remaining months of his term of office to financial reforms. So sanguine indeed was he of peaceful times that, though the Resident soon had to complain that his advice was disregarded, and later to report designs upon his life, the Governor-General turned a deaf ear to these warnings and assured Lord Dalhousie, who relieved him on January 12, 1848, that all was quiet.

On April 18 these pleasant dreams were dissipated by the treacherous murder of two British officers, William Anderson and Vans Agnew, sent by the Council of Regency to relieve Mulraj, Governor of Multan, of a trust which he had abused. With great gallantry, Herbert Edwardes raised troops and inflicted losses upon the rebels at Kineyri and Sadusain; but it was soon perceived that Multan would not be recovered without serious effort. Moreover, as Dalhousie foresaw, there was imminent danger that the whole Sikh nation, secretly encouraged by the Council of Regency, would rise in arms. The general sentiment of India was therefore in favour of the immediate despatch of all available troops to the assistance of Edwardes at Multan. But the Governor-General resolutely adhered to his plan of preparing for extensive operations after the rainy season, concentrating his forces in the meanwhile. The regiments reduced by Hardinge were brought up to their former strength; troops were moved forward to advanced positions on the frontier; and transport and supplies

collected for a winter campaign. For the present, the State authorities at Lahore were urged to punish a rebellion against their own Government; and Sher Sing was therefore despatched to Multan with the forces under their command, while later on Frederick Currie, the Resident, acting upon his own responsibility, directed William Sampson Whish with the British troops lent to the Sikh Government to advance to the relief of Edwardes. Whish accordingly commenced operations against the fort in September. But, at his first reverse, Sher Sing threw off the mask and joined the rebels. The British general, thus forced to raise the siege, could only await reinforcements from Bombay. On their arrival in December, he resumed operations, carried the city by assault, and opened fire upon the citadel, which surrendered on January 22, 1849.

Long before this Sher Sing had withdrawn his forces from Multan and, expecting to be joined by Chatar Sing with the Sikh troops from Peshawar, returned towards Lahore to meet the army now assembled under Gough. On November 22, 1848, Gough, without waiting for the completion of his arrangements, directed Colin Campbell and Charles Cureton to drive Sher Sing out of Ramnagar. The British lost 26 killed, and 59 wounded, the enemy, who suffered but little, withdrawing into the Jechna Doab. Gough, confined by his instructions to operations on the Chenab, now despatched Thackwell to cross the river higher up and attack the Sikhs. Owing, however, to mistakes and misunderstandings, Thackwell missed his chance; and the only result of the battle of Sadulapur, December 3, 1848, was the orderly retreat of the Sikhs to Chilianwala, five miles from the Jhelum. Thither Gough pursued them with a force of 13,000 men and 60 guns, intending to engage the enemy, 40,000 strong, before Chatar Sing's troops could join them. The armies met on the afternoon of January 13, 1849; and, as the position had not been fully reconnoitred, a scene of the utmost confusion ensued, almost each regiment fighting a battle of its own. If Sobraon was described as the "night of horrors," Chilianwala is known as the "day of blunders." The immediate sequel too after each of these actions was much the same. The guns, taken at the bayonet by Campbell's and Gilbert's divisions, were recaptured by the Sikhs during the night; the killed, 697 in number, were left on the field, while 1641 wounded men lay out in the bitter cold. Pursuit was impossible on the morrow; and British guns and standards remained in the hands of the enemy who occupied a position of their own choosing close by at Rasul, and presently offered battle to Gough, which his instructions forbade him to accept.

For Dalhousie, on hearing the result of the battle, issued explicit orders that no further offensive action should be taken until General Whish, with his troops from Multan, could join Gough. The Sikhs had now been reinforced by Chatar Sing's arrival from Peshawar and by a cavalry contingent of Afghans sent down by Dost Mohammad,

raising their numbers to some 40,000 men. When the two armies finally met, February 21, 1849, at Gujarat, Gough could place 20,000 in the field; and on this occasion his plans were deliberately formed and carried out. Walter Gilbert was also prepared with a suitable force to pursue the enemy. The battle began in the morning, free play was allowed to the artillery before the infantry were launched upon the positions taken up in the villages; and by 1 p.m. the enemy were in full retreat, a decisive victory being gained at the cost of 96 killed and about 700 wounded. On March 12 the Sikhs surrendered at discretion to Gilbert at Rawal Pindi, and the Afghan contingent fled ignominiously through the tribal passes, to report their discomfiture to the Amir Dost Mohammad. Dalhousie, rejecting the advice of the Lawrences, and without awaiting instructions from home, forced the young Maharaja to sign a treaty, and at once annexed the Punjab. Its affairs he placed in the hands of three Commissioners, of whom two were the brothers Lawrence; in addition he entirely reorganised the whole administration, civil and military, visiting the newly acquired territories and settling every question on the spot.

Peace being now reestablished throughout the country, the Governor-General hoped to devote his entire attention to internal reforms, but in this congenial task he was interrupted towards the close of 1851 by insults which the King of Ava offered to the British flag at Rangoon. Commodore Lambert was sent to demand redress; but his emissary met with nothing but insolence, and finally a cannonade, from a stockade on the banks of the Irrawady, was opened upon H.M.S. *Fox*. War with Burma was thus rendered inevitable, and Dalhousie determined to avoid the mistakes that had marred the conduct of the campaign in 1824. Conferring frequently with General Henry Godwin, the commander of the expedition, he made minute provision for the comfort and health of the troops to be sent from Bengal and Madras. At the same time, he kept the door open for negotiation, being resolved to avoid an appeal to the sword, if this could be with honour, and to confine operations to the district of Prome. The King remaining stubborn, Martaban, Rangoon, and Bassein were taken in April, 1852, and terms of peace offered, preparations being at the same time made for a renewal of the contest in September. These terms, which involved the cession of Pegu, were treated with contempt, in consequence of which hostilities were hereupon renewed. Prome was taken in October, while in the following month the enemy were defeated and driven out of Pegu. With these successes Dalhousie was satisfied, and since the King refused to sign any treaty, the annexation of the province of Pegu was proclaimed, December 20, 1852. Subsequent attempts were made to secure a treaty of cession, a Burmese embassy being received at Calcutta in 1854, and a British mission being sent to Ava. But the Burmese monarch, while prepared to accept an accomplished fact, was not ready to sanction it by negotiation.

With the exception of necessary but unprofitable conflicts with the

Mohmands, Hasanzais, and other uncivilised tribes on the new frontier of the Punjab, Dalhousie was able to avoid further military operations. But his conduct of foreign affairs was hardly less operative than his wars had been in adding to the Company's domain and in linking together its scattered portions. His treaty with the Nizam for a perpetual cession of Berar removed a source of dangerous friction with Haidarabad regarding payments due for the military contingent, while it opened a direct line of communications between Nagpur and Bombay. The “rule of lapse,” recognised by the Court of Directors in Bentinck's time and applied by Auckland to Mandavi and Kolaba, enabled him to go further in the direction of consolidation. He boldly declared that the Government “is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate States by the failure of all heirs of every description whatever, or from the failure of heirs natural, when the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of Government being given to the ceremony of adoption according to Hindu law. The Government is bound on such occasions to act with the purest integrity and the most scrupulous good faith.” But he made it clear that in addition to these limitations, he would only, as a general principle, apply the rule of lapse to those Hindu principalities which had been created or revived by British authority, and, in very exceptional cases, to other Hindu sovereignties tributary and subordinate to the paramount Power. Under this general rule Satara, Jaitpur, and Jhansi, created by Hastings in 1819, Sambalpur established in 1820, and Nagpur, revived by Amherst's agreement in 1826, were annexed by Dalhousie on failure of issue to their recognised rulers.

The annexation of Oudh rested upon different grounds; and Dalhousie, who would have preferred to retain a titular sovereign while administering the province in his behalf, merely carried out the orders he received on the eve of his retirement. All parties were agreed on two points: first, that “the King,” for to that dignity the Nawab Wazir had been raised in 1819, was bound by his treaty of 1801 to govern properly, and, secondly, that intolerable misgovernment prevailed in the land, as the reports of William Sleeman and James Outram showed. But the Directors feared that, if the consent of the King were asked and refused, it would then be necessary to tolerate a further period of misrule, until the patience of his subjects was exhausted and revolution followed—a cruel process for which they would not take the responsibility. They therefore preferred to adopt more stringent measures. The King was offered the alternative of surrendering administrative powers to the British by treaty, or of being forcibly deprived of them. As he refused to sign away his powers, Oudh was annexed in 1856, minute instructions being laid down for respecting the rights of the landed proprietors, conciliating the people, and pensioning the servants and retainers of the deposed sovereign. It was

Dalhousie's further intention to dismantle all forts, disarm the people, and station adequate British garrisons in the province. Unfortunately, his term of office expired before he could complete his arrangements, and his successor, Lord Canning, did not at once put them in force.

Exclusive of the value of Oudh, Dalhousie had added three millions sterling to the Company's revenues; and his last year's budget showed a surplus of two and a half millions. Yet this was only a small part of the great work he accomplished. He entirely reorganised the internal administration of India, and many of his reforms lasted throughout the century. He swept away cumbrous boards, placing responsible officers at the head of several military departments and those of the public works and gaols. He laid the foundations for the survey and forest departments; and, if in completing the Ganges canal he finished a work begun by others, the telegraphs, railways, and postal system were his own creation. He detached the Government of Bengal from the charge of the overworked Governor-General; and to him was due the erection of the Punjab to a Lieutenant-Governorship, to which John Lawrence was appointed after the Mutiny. Annual administrative reports had their origin in his orders, and effective steps were taken by him to secure the departmental training of civil servants. Although the Government of India continued to be the sole legislature for all India, it was Dalhousie's doing that representatives of the local Governments were summoned to its deliberations, while at his instance the status of the legal member was raised to that of the other members. In the matter of education he laid down the lines of a department of public instruction and initiated more practical measures than any of his predecessors had devised. Yet, in spite of his wars and his vigorous internal policy, the public credit stood so high that he was able to save £300,000 a year by the conversion of the 5 per cent. loans to others at 4 per cent. Above all, he set a splendid example of untiring devotion to duty, and with a wise foresight selected for responsible posts the men who afterwards steered the ship of state through the dangerous seas of the Mutiny.

His successor Lord Canning, who relieved him on February 29, 1856, passed an enactment permitting the remarriage of widows, which Dalhousie had introduced. He also carried a step further the friendly arrangements commenced with the Amir of Kabul, one effect of which was to secure the correct and friendly attitude of Dost Mohammad during the Mutiny. In March, 1855, a treaty with the Amir, drafted by Dalhousie, and successfully negotiated by Herbert Edwardes, had been signed by John Lawrence. It was based on the principle of "letting bygones be bygones," and matters were so arranged that Dost Mohammad made the first overtures. If we had grievously wronged the Dost in the Afghan War, the latest provocation had come from him, since he sent an Afghan contingent to aid the Sikhs at Gujarat. Dalhousie therefore contented himself with a bare treaty of mutual

“forget and forgive.” But Canning had a new situation to deal with. Persia, in violation of her understanding with us, had attacked and taken Herat, adding to this injury insults to the British agent. War was therefore declared by the British Government and Outram was sent with a force to Bushire. This brought the Persians to their senses, and peace was restored by the Treaty of Paris, on March 4, 1857. But before that conclusion was reached, a subsidy was granted to the Amir of Kabul, and a fresh treaty of alliance was executed on January 26, 1857.

The events narrated were now rapidly leading up to a catastrophe expected neither by the statesmen responsible for them nor by the impartial onlooker. The constant wars in which the Company had engaged required a large mercenary army; and in 1857 the native troops, 311,038, outnumbered the British, 39,500, by nearly eight to one. Of the former, 137,580 belonged to the Bengal army, and were mainly recruited in Oudh, where, as servants of the Company, they enjoyed the privilege, denied by the King to his own servants, of prompt and fair trial in the native Courts, a privilege that since the annexation no longer differentiated them from their fellow-countrymen. The Sepoys had moreover learnt their own importance, observing that special allowances had been given for services beyond the Indus, and that their agitation had wrung from Sir Charles Napier a more liberal compensation for dearness of provisions. They were keenly awake to the numerical weakness of the Company's forces, especially after the heavy losses sustained in Gough's campaigns; and they did not forget that British prestige had suffered grievously from the Afghan disaster. Nor were they blind to the fact that between the Company's European regiments and those of the Queen's army there were jealousies and disagreements, that the two served different masters under different conditions, and that the latter were liable at any moment to be recalled from India, thus weakening the proportion of European soldiers, already too small.

To the exaggerated idea of their own value were added offences against their religious sensibilities. Wars with Burma, China, and Persia, involved crossing the “black sea,” and thus losing caste, and now came Canning's General Order, July, 1856, constraining every future recruit to “serve beyond sea whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them.” Evil counsellors outside their ranks warned them that a systematic attack was being made upon their faith, that the Government was turning the world upside down, opening the schools to children of all castes, abolishing *Sati* and slavery, making Brahman and Sudra amenable to the same laws, and, with its telegraphs, railways and hospitals, practising magic arts and sorcery. The East, which had hitherto bowed low before the West “in patient deep disdain,” now resented the inexorable march of civilisation; and a spirit of unrest was abroad. At this moment the Enfield rifle was being substituted for the Brown Bess; and it was reported that the cartridges, smeared



with the fat of sacred cows and the lard of polluted pigs, were to be bitten by Hindu and Mohammadan alike. The ferment caused by this rumour spread from Dum Dum to Barrackpur, and so on to Mirat, where the spark burst into a flame.

In May, 1857, India was startled by the news that, on Sunday the 10th, the 20th Native Infantry and the 3rd Light Cavalry, having mutinied at Mirat, had gone off to Delhi, captured its magazine, and been joined by the regiments there. At many military stations British men and women were being murdered, and fugitives endured terrible sufferings in the attempt to reach a place of safety. Before the month was out, all eyes were turned to Delhi, Cawnpore, and Lucknow, to which places nearly the whole of the mutinous Bengal army had betaken itself.

George Anson, the Commander-in-chief, at once ordered such forces as he could collect at Amballa, to join the British troops at Mirat in an advance upon Delhi. Dying of cholera on the road he was succeeded by Henry Barnard, who, defeating the rebels at Badli Sarai, June 8, gained his footing on the famous ridge at Delhi. But Barnard also died of cholera, July 5; and Thomas Reed, who took his place, was compelled by illness to give place to Archdale Wilson on the 17th. Despite these adverse circumstances, the British force of 4500 effective men—for such reliefs and additions as it received served only to repair the waste of war and disease—stubbornly maintained its position in the presence of 30,000 to 50,000 mutineers, until August 14, when the gallant John Nicholson brought an additional 1600 infantry, a battery of artillery, and 200 cavalry, which, with the siege-guns received a month later, rendered an assault possible.

While the small force of Europeans and loyal Gurkhas, exposed to the burning sun, was improving its defences on the ridge, repelling assaults by day and night, at all times under a deluge of shot and shell from the fortified walls of Delhi, that city received fresh streams of rebels, as the tide of revolt overflowed Bareilly, Jalandar, Nasirabad, Jhansi, and other stations. The arrival of new bodies of mutineers was frequently the signal for a general attack. In two of these, fought on July 9 and 14, the British lost 408 killed and wounded out of a force then numbering 5367 men. Disease, especially cholera and sun-stroke, daily carried off their victims. When the rains came, things were no better. On September 6, there were 2800 in hospital; and, even with the arrival of all their reinforcements, the "Delhi army" could only parade 4720 infantry—of whom 1960 were Europeans—for the four columns finally told off for the assault and their reserves. These figures did not include the Jind and Kashmir contingents.

With the coming of the siege-guns the batteries were at once advanced. Over the crumbling ruins of the Kashmir gate, blown in by Duncan Home and Philip Salkeld on September 14, Colonel Campbell led his men, and Nicholson formed up his troops within the walls. Near the

Lahore gate the heroic Nicholson was mortally wounded; other columns were checked; and by nightfall the British had secured but a foothold within the city, with a loss of 66 officers and 1104 men killed and wounded. In the following days, for all the stubborn resistance of the sepoys, ground was gained step by step; the magazine was taken on the 16th; and on the 21st General Wilson occupied the imperial palace. The King was taken prisoner, and the three princes were captured and shot by William Raikes Hodson the next afternoon. Then not a moment was lost in detaching a force of 1000 British and 2000 native troops to proceed to Cawnpore. On the way they relieved Agra, fought several engagements, destroyed forts, and arrived at their destination before the end of October.

Human imagination has never conceived a scene more heartrending in its details than that witnessed at Cawnpore, when news arrived of the mutinies at Mirat and Delhi. Sir Hugh Wheeler, with but 50 European artillerymen at his back, though aware of disaffection in the four native regiments under his command, dared not attempt disarmament. Nothing remained but to prepare for the defence of 330 women and children, although by so doing he betrayed his suspicions. The Nana Sahib, concealing his bitter resentment at Dalhousie's denial to him of the life pension paid to his adoptive father, Baji Rao, the last Peshwa of Poona, offered his Maratha troops to guard the treasury. On May 21 the women and children took refuge in the rough entrenchment which Wheeler had improvised. A fortnight later the native regiments mutinied; Nana Sahib treacherously seized the magazine; and the investment began. Wheeler had now 240 European soldiers, with six guns, to protect 870 non-combatants. For twenty-two days the defenders, with a row of loaded muskets by their sides, replied day and night to the attack of 4000 rebels well supplied with guns and ammunition. The women and children burrowed in holes to escape the bullets or the fall of crumbling masonry. Several of both sexes died from sunstroke or thirst; others were burnt to death in the hospital set on fire by red-hot shells; and many fell in attempts to procure water. But the remainder bravely held the enemy at bay, surrendering only on the sworn guarantee of the Nana that boats and provisions should be supplied for their departure by the Ganges. On June 27, those still alive, for the most part wounded and fever-stricken, were embarking on the boats when a murderous fire was opened upon them. The survivors were dragged ashore, the men being shot or hacked to pieces before the eyes of their wives and children, while the latter, numbering some 150, were taken back to Cawnpore. Here, with other women and children captured in the attempt to escape from neighbouring stations, they were butchered and mutilated, their bodies being thrown into a well, only just before Henry Havelock, having defeated the Nana's forces, arrived to the relief.

Nothing was now left but for that general to proceed in all haste

to Lucknow. Oudh, so recently annexed, was administered by Henry Lawrence. At the capital were 16,000 native troops, besides many soldiers and retainers of the ex-King and of the nobles, waiting for the signal of revolt, while the British portion of the garrison comprised only 700 men, including 60 gunners. As the tide of mutiny rose, the human driftwood of refugees from various quarters floated down to Lucknow, and Lawrence prepared the residency for the struggle so surely imminent. On June 30 he moved out to Chinhat, to meet 6500 rebels, coming mostly from Faizabad. His native gunners deserted, and, incurring heavy losses, he barely effected his retreat to the residency, where 927 men of British extraction, including civilians and aged pensioners, with 765 natives, composed his garrison. Two days later he was mortally wounded; and John Inglis took command. By the middle of September his garrison had been reduced to 1179, many being sick and wounded, and disease had carried off nine women and fifty-three children. The relief column under Havelock, whom James Outram generously declined to supersede, could only reinforce the besieged by 2000 men, and the besieged had to renew their heroic defence without even an addition to their food supplies. Outram, who took command directly the relief was accomplished, was so closely invested that he could not communicate with the detachment left at the Alambagh, though that ridge was only four miles distant. To the constant fire of grape-shot and the trials of climate were now added reduced rations. At length, the arrival at Cawnpore of the Delhi column, and of the troops pushed up from Calcutta, enabled the new Commander-in-chief, Colin Campbell, to take command of the second relief force. Yet, when his reinforcements, including William Peel's naval brigade, assembled on November 16 for the final advance through the city, his force numbered only 3500 infantry and 400 cavalry, to whom were opposed 30,000 mutineers holding formidable positions behind walls and canals.

Every step through the streets and gardens of Lucknow was contested, 2000 bodies of rebels being afterwards removed from the Sikandar Bagh alone. But the residency was reached, and in the silence of the night, November 22, its 2000 helpless prisoners and wounded soldiers were withdrawn to Cawnpore, and thence to Allahabad. Outram was left with 4000 men at the Alambagh, where Havelock was buried in the hour of victory; and Colin Campbell returned to Cawnpore to deal with the rebels in his rear and then organise a force for the capture of Lucknow.

The British, hitherto compelled to act on the defensive, were now free to advance so far as their limited transport would permit. While Outram watched Lucknow, Nana Sahib's troops, swollen by the Gwalior contingent, were driven out of Cawnpore; other mutinous bodies were defeated at Fatehgarh; and an army for the occupation of Oudh was assembled by the end of February, 1858. A Nipalese force took part

in the operations against Lucknow, then held by some 60,000 sepoys and 50,000 irregular Oudh troops and protected by a formidable line of defences. Outram advanced on the other side of the Gumti and cooperated with Colin Campbell's attack on the front of the position. On March 21 the city was captured, and gradually the whole province was recovered. A campaign in Rohilkhand followed. Meanwhile, in central India Sir Hugh Rose, starting from Mhow, demolished several forts, defeated the rebels before Jhansi, took that city by storm in March, and under a burning sun routed a large force at Kalpi. On hearing that Tantia Topi had occupied Gwalior, he recaptured that city and fort in June, and then, broken down in health, handed over his command to Robert Napier. After his defeat, Tantia Topi maintained for ten months a reduced body of adherents, who outstripped the movements of several British columns, until at last he was betrayed and captured (April, 1859). About the same time, the force cooperating with Jung Bahadur against some 10,000 sepoys and the followers of the Nana Sahib and the Begam of Oudh was joined by troops under Hope Grant, who dispersed the enemy. Organised resistance was at an end, the Nana Sahib disappearing for ever in the inhospitable jungles of Nipal. Votes of thanks were passed by both Houses of Parliament, and on May 1, 1859, services of thanksgiving were held throughout the kingdom.

Lord Canning had no time to congratulate himself on the suppression of the Sepoy Rebellion when he was called upon to deal with a white mutiny. The Company's European soldiers bitterly resented the effect of the Act of Parliament by which, on the transfer of the government of India to the Crown, they were driven like sheep into the fold of the British army. Eventually they were given the option of discharge, of which nearly 10,000 took advantage. The reorganisation of the whole military system of India was thus necessitated; but was not completed until much later.

The more congenial task of restoring the civil administration and regaining the confidence of the ruling chiefs was accomplished by Canning, who had exerted himself from the outset to assuage the bitter feelings of revenge which events had excited. Wholesale executions, the blowing of rebels from guns, and the extermination of entire bands of fighting men without quarter asked or given, might have been justified by considerations of public safety. But panic, and the cry of blood for blood had desolated villages and emptied cities of their inhabitants, and it was necessary to put a stop to excessive measures of repression. On November 1, 1858, the Governor-General, then appointed the first Viceroy in token of the direct responsibility assumed by the Crown, announced the terms of the Queen's Proclamation in great state at Allahabad. The gracious message lost none of its force by being delivered while the clash of arms was yet being heard in central India and on the frontiers of Nipal. Her Majesty accepted all treaties and engagements made by

the Company with the native princes and promised to respect their rights, dignity, and honour. In an impressive passage, inserted by her own special desire, the Queen acknowledged with gratitude the solace of religion, and declared that all her Indian subjects should be protected in the exercise of their religious observances. A principle already enunciated in the Charter Act of 1833 was reinforced, and all, of every race or creed, were to be admitted as far as possible to those offices in her service for which they might be qualified. The Viceroy's proclamation of amnesty was confirmed, and the royal clemency extended to all rebels save those convicted of taking a direct part in the murder of British subjects. The aim of the Queen's government was to be that which had so frequently been announced by the Company, the benefit of all her subjects resident in India—"In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward."

Canning opened a new chapter in the history of British relations with the chiefs by issuing to them *Sanads* (Charters) of adoption and succession, ensuring the continuance of native rule. The terror of annexation under the "rule of lapse" was finally removed, while fresh emphasis was laid on the duty of loyalty to the Crown, and a new responsibility placed upon their shoulders. Fifty years had passed since the policy of non-intervention had given way under Hastings to one of subordinate isolation, each State entrusting the whole control of its external affairs to the paramount British power. Now, a more active career of cooperation and partnership in an imperial system was offered to the Queen's allies. Hitherto, it had been enough to define their duties to the Company for the common defence, and to take entire charge of their external relations. For the rest, within their own territories the chiefs had for the most part governed as they pleased, until the people of Coorg or Oudh had cried out for annexation, or a failure of heirs had enabled Dalhousie to substitute British for native rule in the interests of the people. But now Canning confirmed the intention of the suzerain Power to perpetuate native rule, if the chiefs remained loyal and true to their engagements. Henceforth, therefore, friendly advice and timely interference must be exercised to correct gross abuses of power, to maintain peaceful successions, and to place the continuance of native rule upon the only sure foundations of peace and order, law and justice. It might even be necessary to depose an unworthy ruler, or for a time to govern on his behalf; but, if the State was to be preserved from annexation, its ruler must prove himself a worthy member of the imperial system.

Upon British India the transfer of government to the Crown produced no immediate or substantial change. New masters were installed at home, but no new powers were conferred upon them. A principal Secretary of State aided by a Council of India, at first composed of fifteen members, gathered into his hands all powers previously exercised either by the Board of Control through its faithful

servants, the "Secret Committee," or by the Courts of Directors and of Proprietors. The Secretary of State was given the power of overruling his Council in most matters; while in others, such as appropriations of revenue, he required a majority of their votes, and he could on his own responsibility give orders regarding foreign affairs and other "secret" matters with which the "Secret Committee" used to deal. An independent audit of the accounts was provided, and the control of Parliament secured over military operations outside India; while annual reports upon the moral and material progress of every province were to be laid before that body. All existing laws, treaties, and orders were to remain in force, and generally the Statute was an enabling and continuing Act, rather than one which created a new order of things.

The Mutiny had not merely ousted British authority from certain districts, it had also suspended everywhere the introduction of reforms contemplated by the last Charter Act and commenced by Dalhousie. The Indian Civil Service was already being recruited by public competition, Haileybury College having been closed in 1857; but the rule of seniority prevailed, and civil offices were reserved in each presidency for civil servants appropriated to it. An Act of Parliament (1861), validated appointments made in disregard of these provisions, swept away numerous restrictions, and threw open a large number of offices to persons not being members of the Covenanted Civil Service. By another Act of the same year the High Courts of Judicature in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were established. But the most important of the changes in the civil government effected by Lord Canning was that which the Indian Council's Act enabled him to carry out. A fifth member was added to the Governor-General's Executive Council, which for purposes of legislation was reinforced by additional members who might be twelve in number. The legislative authority of the Government of India was clearly defined both in respect to Parliament, and in regard to the Councils of Madras and Bombay, to which were restored powers of legislation taken from them in 1833. Power was given to establish legislative councils in Bengal, the North-West Provinces, and the Punjab. The Act was amended and extended in 1869; but its introduction so soon after the Mutiny was worthy of a strong and progressive Government. Simultaneously, progress was made in the codification of Indian law; when, for the first time, were reaped the fruits of Macaulay's labours on the Indian Law Commission established in 1833. The Civil Procedure Code of 1859, the Indian Penal Code of 1860, and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, were primarily devised for the guidance of untrained judges and magistrates; but they have proved to be instruments of education and civilisation spreading broadcast among the people of India Western ideas of right and wrong.

Before Canning left India "in prosperity and peace," he had reassured the Talukdars and other classes in Oudh, and had, with the aid of

James Wilson and Samuel Laing, restored the financial equilibrium. The year 1860-1 closed a long series of deficits with one of four millions; but in the following year the drastic remedy of reducing expenditure by five millions enabled Lord Canning to make both ends meet, and even to relieve the Indian taxpayer of the license tax. Fortunately, the country could look forward to a period of tranquillity, and, with the exception of small operations on the frontiers, including Bhutan, and the Abyssinian War, the army could pile arms while the process of military reorganisation ran its course. Lord Elgin, who relieved his predecessor on March 12, 1862, had declared his intention of practising self-denial and of walking "in paths traced out by others" before he shaped his own course. That time never arrived; for he died of heart disease at Dharmasala (November 20, 1863). Without delay, at the call of duty, John Lawrence left England, and took over the office of Governor-General, January 12, 1864, which he held till 1869.

The complicated task of reorganising the Indian military system could not have fallen into better hands, strengthened as they were by the experience of his colleague Mansfield, Commander-in-chief, and Norman, his Military Secretary. The difficulties were perplexing. The Mutiny and its suppression had extinguished the native army of Bengal, and left a legacy of confusion owing to the enlistment of irregular regiments under varying conditions. Parliament had transferred to the service of the Crown all the European forces of the Company, naval and military, and India could no longer recruit Europeans for her service. But, while the naval forces ceased to exist in 1863, the officers and soldiers of the late Company, whether artillery, infantry or cavalry, had to be accommodated in a new military system, often as much against their own wishes as those of the Queen's service. It was decided that the artillery should be almost wholly European, that of the Company being amalgamated with the Royal Artillery, while the proportion of Europeans to natives in infantry and cavalry was fixed at one to two in the Bengal army, and one to three in Madras and Bombay. The creation of a local European force being disallowed, the necessary regiments were to be lent from home and paid for by Indian revenues. The native army was reconstructed in Bengal, and reorganised elsewhere, the officers being supplied from a staff corps in which they gained a step in rank according to length of service.

Despite financial difficulties, and the painful experience of famine gained in Orissa, 1865, the reorganisation of the army proceeded without a call to arms. Operations were indeed required in Bhutan, whither Ashley Eden was sent on a mission at the end of 1863. The Tongsa Penlop extorted from him under duress an engagement which Lawrence repudiated; and, before peaceful relations were restored, the Bengal Duars, or passes into Bhutan, were annexed as a punishment. More serious and expensive were the operations in Abyssinia, where the Emperor Theodore,

enraged at receiving no reply to his letter to the Queen, committed to prison Consul Cameron and other Europeans, and finally sent the envoy Rassam to join them. Robert Napier was entrusted with the command of an expedition of 16,000 men to Annesley Bay; whence a force, after crossing the mountainous tracts, finally stormed Magdala, May, 1868. The captives were recovered; Theodore killed himself; and, despite the protests of Lawrence, Indian revenues were charged with the cost of troops employed in a war with which India had no direct concern.

Looking back at the course of Indian history from 1815 to 1869, one is struck by the growth of centripetal tendencies and the closer connexion established between London and Calcutta. When Lord Hastings proposed a "general league" for the defence of British India against the Pindaris, he was rebuked. His successors threw the aegis of British protection over every native State, extending their treaties even to Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and Arabia, and in later days despatched an Indian force to Malta and to Peking. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the three armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were watertight compartments of the military system. In 1869 they were parts of one organic whole, for the sepoys were enlisted for general service even oversea, and the European troops were merely lent by the Crown. The royal navy had also undertaken the defence of Indian waters. A Viceroy, aided by an enlarged Council, controlled and overshadowed the local Governments to a degree which no Governor-General of India, and still less a Governor-General of Bengal, had ever contemplated. With this increased centralisation of authority in India, improved communications gave to the home authorities ampler means for enforcing their imperial ideas. No sooner had the East and West been linked together, than the Governments of India found themselves compelled to watch two currents of opinion and try to satisfy two opposite ideals. The Mutiny had not quickened any national desire for social reform in India, and the country at once relapsed into the immemorial conditions produced by the thralldom of caste, by religious animosities, and by the strange credulity of the masses. It desired from its alien Christian rulers nothing beyond justice and order; but with the satisfaction of these demands Western opinion was no longer content, as it had been in 1816, for it now began to press for the introduction of reforms and political institutions borrowed from Europe. The transfer of government to the Crown—with its necessary consequence of parliamentary control—was therefore an epoch in Indian history. It directed new influences and currents of thought upon the rulers of India, and it has placed them in the difficult position of serving two masters, endeavouring to reconcile the impatience of Englishmen at Westminster with the halting steps of Indian progress.



## CHAPTER XXVII.

## GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES.

## (1) THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY.

(1840-70.)

DURING this period England, by the adoption of a new policy, and by endowing some of her colonies with self-government, produced a system of imperial relations unknown to previous history, which has had the effect of making the British Empire unlike any other political organisation in the world. In its internal aspect the British Empire may be viewed as comprising a most varied series of political communities, ranging from States under absolute despotism to colonial democracies with the most extensive self-government; from this point of view the structure has little trace of imperial unity and every mark of local variety. But externally, as regards other nations, the aspect was different, at any rate till 1870; till that date the Empire was united, and presented a single and unbroken front for all purposes of defence, for foreign policy, and, to a very large extent, even for trade. In the first case, it was an empire in solution; in the second, an empire in actuality. This dual aspect of the British Empire must never be forgotten; politically it is a hybrid, an eclectic, an antinomy; for it combines the opposite traits, unites the contradictory systems, and reconciles the conflicting principles of Liberty and Empire.

The causes of the growth of this particular form of empire must be sought in the ideas of the generation with which we deal, in the clash of different systems of political thought and practice, and in their reconciliation by means of that English spirit of moderation and compromise which is nowhere more characteristically displayed than in the solution of this most complex of political problems.

Paradoxically enough, the result of the American Revolution, though it taught England not to impose internal taxation on her colonies, tended, in all other respects, not to a relaxation but to a tightening of control from the centre. The American colonies had denied the authority of Parliament on the ground that they held charters not from Parliament but from the Crown; to prevent such pretensions in future,

subsequent colonial charters (like the Canada Constitutional Act of 1791) were granted not by Order in Council but by Statute, making the control of Parliament unassailable and supreme. In general, relations with the colonies grew closer, and the control of their internal politics was more rigid, though, indeed, the wiser statesmen, such as Canning, recognised that these powers were of the *arcana* of the constitution, and should only be used sparingly. None the less, his policy with reference to the slave-owning colonies in 1823, and the abolition of colonial slavery by the second Earl Grey's Ministry in 1833, were remarkable, and indeed unprecedented, instances of interference in the internal affairs of colonies by Parliament. As to the question of military defence, the Napoleonic struggle compelled the Home Government to recognise its obligations in a manner unknown to the days before 1783, when colonials themselves had often undertaken to raise and maintain large forces, not only for their own protection, but even for purposes of aggression. As some compensation for the increase of military burdens, and reminiscent again of American difficulties, the Home Government demanded and maintained a control of colonial trade and commerce more rigid than of old. Thus the American revolt and the Napoleonic struggle had tightened the mother country's control of the colonies, alike from the political, the economic, and the military, point of view. It will be found that the measures taken to relax this control in these three directions synchronise roughly with the revolution in the political system of the mother country effected by the Reform Bill (1832), with the revolution in its commercial system initiated by the repeal of the Navigation Laws (1825) and culminating in the abolition of the Corn Laws (1846), and with the revolution in its military system produced by the Crimean War (1854-6).

The relaxation of the centralised system of control over the internal politics of a colony was first and most obviously necessitated in Canada. The general Canadian policy of Lord Durham and his successors is elsewhere described; it is essential here to mention the change effected by him in the relations between colony and mother country. In this respect he found a system of rigid control by the parent State, and left one which contained the germ of all future imperial relations towards colonies with representative governments. In Upper and Lower Canada, owing to the proximity of the United States, to the presence of a French population in one province, and to the outbreak of rebellions in both (1837-8), the Governors were likely to preach and to practise the doctrine of imperial control in its extreme form. Sir Francis Bond Head, Governor of Upper Canada (1836-8), even went so far as to declare that the Governor of a colony possessing a two-chamber system, must, as the sole representative of imperial power, be endowed with an authority which should be ultimately decisive and supreme in everything. To a statesman of the type of Lord Durham, surveying the problem alike

from a wider and more thoughtful standpoint, this doctrine of "unitarian responsibility" was untenable. The exercise of practical absolutism on the part of the Governor was obviously condemned by that official's inability to understand and to settle all local questions on their merits. But the interference of the local Governor was not the only or the worst evil resulting from the existing colonial system, for a system of rigid control meant centralisation, and centralisation sometimes meant the reference of even the smallest administrative matters to the Colonial Office. In many respects the colonies were governed from the other side of the Atlantic by a Power unable to understand their local needs, and unable to act with the promptitude, so needful for the development of a young country, in settling the numerous and complicated problems of colonial administration. Thousands of miles of intervening sea rendered speedy communication or intelligent centralised control alike impossible. In addition to these inevitable defects in the colonial system, as then constituted, there existed others more remediable. Between 1827 and 1839 there had been eleven Secretaries for the Colonies and for War, and all continuity of policy had hence disappeared. All these defects were clear to Lord Durham—who was one of the first English statesmen to realise the paramount importance of conciliating the local prejudices of the colonists. That the local interests of the colonists were as important, and demanded as much safeguarding, as the imperial interests of the mother country, was a fundamental principle with Lord Durham.

In elaborating his scheme for reconciling the two interests it is curious that Durham does not seem to have drawn inspiration from previous colonial history, or to have wished to revert to the old colonial system of semi-independence prevalent in the New England States in the early eighteenth century. The example of this independence was frequently quoted in England as a model for colonial policy in the forties and fifties, but apparently did not impress Durham, whose Report bears witness to other ideas and influences. He was certainly much imbued with Whig traditions of liberty, and he specifically states that he desired to see the counterpart and model of the institutions of 1688 applied to each colony. But he had also accepted the larger and more humanitarian interpretation given to Whig ideas by Fox, and was probably influenced by that statesman's famous utterance on the question of Canadian government in 1791 that "the only method of retaining distant colonies with advantage was to enable them to govern themselves." But Durham was not only a Whig, imbued with the Foxite tradition of generous confidence and trust in liberty. He had been one of the many Whigs who had studied the more logical, more unsympathetic, but more practical creed of the Radical Utilitarian Bentham, with whom he was on intimate terms. Bentham's famous pamphlet, *Emancipate your Colonies* (1789), had indeed laid down that colonies should be abandoned as profitless and extravagant; but in extreme old

age Bentham abandoned this view. This conversion was probably known to Lord Durham; at any rate, he was quite aware of Bentham's famous contention that the colonies were chiefly of use as providing posts and patronage for our corrupt governors at home. When a deaf and dumb peer governed Barbados; when a public official in England drew a salary for being secretary to the Council of Jamaica, in which island he had never set foot; when there was something more than satire in Disraeli's assertion—that younger sons were at times "saved from destruction by the friendly interposition that sends you in an official capacity to the marsupial sympathies of Sydney or Swan River"—this charge could not be put contemptuously aside. As a parliamentary reformer and as a member of a Ministry which had abolished many useless sinecures and pensions in England, Lord Durham had had experiences of measures for destroying corruption. The remedy for abuses of this sort, and for restoring harmony between colony and mother country was, he believed, to establish an identity of interest between governors and governed. If the public, as represented in the colonial legislature, could control the colonial executive, and therefore the colonial patronage, it would be to their interest to abolish useless and corrupt posts. If the public in England, as represented in the Reform Parliament and controlling the Reform Ministry, had done this, why should not a similar system be applied to Canada? This doctrine of establishing identity of interest between governors and governed is derived directly from Bentham; and, together with the generous ideas of liberty and self-government derived from Fox, seems to have lain at the root of Durham's peculiar system for regulating future colonial relations with the mother country.

In his famous Report on Canada—presented to the English Parliament on February 11, 1839—Durham advocated the establishment of a working identity of will and interest between governors and their executive council on the one hand, and the popular assembly on the other. Upper and Lower Canada were in future to form a single province, with a single legislature, consisting of a legislative council (or Upper Chamber) and a popular assembly. But he recommended that the new relations between the Lower House of the Legislature and the Governor and his executive should be wholly different from those previously obtaining in North America. Not only Upper and Lower Canada, but Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, all possessed representative government: that is to say, in each case the colony was ruled by two chambers (legislative council and popular assembly with partial or complete financial control), and, in each case, the Governor chose his own executive council independently of them. The consequence had been to produce relations between executive and legislature that were not only everywhere inharmonious, but were everywhere threatening to the authority of the Governor, and thus, indirectly, to the imperial connexion. The reason was that

patronage had been wholly controlled by the Governor, in his own interests, who gave posts to exclusive and corrupt minorities, to "family compacts," to hereditary office-mongers. No attempt had been made to adjust the control of policy or patronage, or the choice of executive Ministers, to the views of the Lower, or popular, Chamber. The consequence had everywhere been disunion, and in the two Canadas had resulted in actual rebellion. The only way to restore harmony and avert separation of interests was to make the control of the popular Chamber over the executive real and effective; with certain limitations and reservations, the executive should be made responsible to the parliamentary majority of the Lower House as in England; in a word, representative should be succeeded by responsible government. In this way the interests of the executive council, of the majority of the popular assembly, and of the people at large, would be bound up with maintaining the existing form of government. Durham pointed out that the value of the control exercised by the Home Government in the patronage or internal affairs of the colonies with representative institutions was, in itself, trifling and not comparable to the dangers and irritations which it provoked. At the same time, he drew a strict line between internal and imperial affairs, defining the latter as matters concerned with external trade, with defence and with diplomacy. Durham pledged himself that the adoption of his system of responsible government and of his view of the mutual obligations and privileges of mother country and colony would lead not to separation but to unity. Never was a promise more strikingly fulfilled, or confidence more signally justified.

For the time Durham's doctrine of "responsible government" was strangely advanced; and the marvel is, not that its acceptance was grudging and imperfect, but that it found any acceptance at all. In 1840 Wellington was still advocating the Tory view that "local responsible government (in a colony) and the sovereignty of Great Britain were completely incompatible." On January 16, 1838, Lord John Russell, then leader of the Whig Ministry in the Commons, declared that "if the Executive were to be named by the popular assembly of a colony, he could not conceive what was to become of the orders of the Imperial Government and the Colonial Governor." Early in 1839 he was still holding the same views, and it is still something of a mystery how he and the rest of the Cabinet were converted to the views expressed in his despatches to Lord Sydenham (Durham's successor in Canada) on September 7 and 15, and October 14, 1839. In the first place, Lord John, now Secretary for the Colonies and for War, made it quite clear that abuses of patronage, in so far as they emanated from Governor or Home Government, in representatively governed colonies, must cease. "Responsible government" was a vague term and one liable to misinterpretation, but "Durham's practical views of colonial government" might be adopted in Canada. The executive was to conform to public opinion

and endeavour to be in harmony with the popular assembly; at the same time cases were conceivable where the imperial Government might have to interfere in internal matters in a colony; and in all imperial matters—concerning “the honour of the Crown and the unity of the Empire”—the Governor must take orders, not from the local legislature but from the Home Government. These instructions do not seem entirely in harmony with Durham’s views—they were, in fact, perhaps intentionally ambiguous; in any case, the disturbed state of the country did not allow his successor, Lord Sydenham, to realise them to the full. That opportunity first came under Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, who was Governor from 1843 to 1845, and who tactlessly at once raised the questions which Durham had hoped to settle for ever. A quarrel between him and his executive council over a question of patronage led to their retirement (1843). As they were supported by a majority of the Assembly, the identity of interest between “governors and governed” was dissolved. Metcalfe formed another Ministry and, by a timely dissolution of the Lower House (1844), secured a majority in a new assembly. Unfortunately for him, he had earned the permanent hostility of one great party in the State, had dissociated the personal views and authority of the Governor from those of his council, and had thus directed the whole fury of parliamentary opposition not only against the Governor, but against the imperial connexion which he represented. Not perhaps unnaturally, the same difficulties confronted Lord Falkland, the Lieutenant-Governor in Nova Scotia in 1846. Though the ambiguities of Lord John’s instructions to Sydenham had justified both Metcalfe and Falkland, it was clear, from the irritation aroused in both colonies, that actions such as theirs might seriously endanger the imperial connexion.

In 1846 Lord John Russell became Prime Minister, and the third Earl Grey, a man of comprehensive intellect and Liberal views, had the Colonies entrusted to his care. He quickly grasped the situation, saw that the pursuit of a personal policy by the Governor strained colonial loyalty, and resolved, from henceforth, to shroud the individuality of the Governor behind that of his Ministers. His instructions to the new Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, Sir John Harvey, (November 3, 1846) interpret “responsible government” to mean that a change must take place in the position of the Governor. He is to be transformed from a benevolent autocrat into a presentable likeness of a constitutional king. Transfer of power from one party to another in the colony was to be made to appear as the result of the wishes of the people themselves; the executive council was not to be changed arbitrarily, but only when it was perfectly clear that they did not enjoy the confidence of the legislature. The Governor was not to identify himself with any particular party, and was, in general, to act the part of mediator or moderator between extremes. The power to forbid certain acts of the

colonial executive in matters of high imperial interest was indeed recognised, but it was to be exerted "sparingly," and only on matters of "very grave concern."

The general spirit of these instructions was carefully inculcated on Lord Elgin, before he left England to assume the government of Canada in January, 1847. How wisely he executed them, how carefully he divested his governorship of all traces of personal policy, and avoided opposition to his executive or to the dominant party in the Assembly, is told elsewhere. In the matter of the Indemnity Bill of 1849, he sided with the dominant party—an action which was very unpopular in the mother country. He refused to make use of his power of veto, although the slightest deviation from strict justice might have enabled him to interpret the question as one of imperial concern. At the same time, though Lord Elgin conformed to the will of the majority of the Assembly in a way unknown to past colonial history, it must be admitted that his actual influence was more dominant and direct than that of the modern colonial Governor. Under the direction of Earl Grey, colonial Governors, in Canada and elsewhere, took advantage of their position to induce their advisers to institute most valuable reforms, such as the creation of municipal institutions and of extensive local government, the promotion of systems of education, and also—which was perhaps even more important—the institution of a permanent civil service and the consequent destruction of the immediate possibility of the corruption of political life through an extensive spoils system. But, even in these cases, the reforms were secured by the exertion of unofficial influence. There can be little doubt that, from the point of view of political control of the self-governing colonies, Grey and Elgin together realised to the full, and for the first time, the inner meaning of Durham's contention that the establishment of identity of interest between governors and governed was the true means of reconciling local responsibility in the colonies with imperial unity.

The course that was pursued by Earl Grey in Canada was systematically imitated elsewhere. Colonies, such as the Cape of Good Hope, under almost autocratic Governors with Councils, or colonies, such as Nova Scotia, with representative governments, were gradually prepared for full responsible government in the Canadian sense. The preliminary stage of probation was sometimes rather long, and, alike in Australia and New Zealand, the Home Government committed some serious errors and drew on itself rather unmerited opprobrium. The main principle, in these and in other colonial constitutions of the period, appears to have been to train imperfectly developed colonies for full responsible government, by giving them various forms of transitional government during a period of probation. In principle the idea was sound enough; but it obviously gave opportunity to misrepresentation, as well as to a good deal of vexatious or unnecessary interference by the Home

Government. It is not, however, fair to criticise Earl Grey's colonial policy on the lines of the contemporary accusation that he desired to interfere with the purely local administration of colonies. The instances adduced to support the charge were drawn from colonies in a transitional stage of development, not from those which, like Canada, were in full enjoyment of responsible government. In the fourteen years between 1846 and 1860 five colonies in British North America and six in Australasia received responsible government—and the movement towards it had, in all cases, been greatly aided, and in some expressly sanctioned, by the policy of Earl Grey. It is true indeed that he declared that a departure from rules of strict justice towards a class or individuals might compel imperial interference in the local affairs of a self-governing colony. But his hearty approval of Elgin's action in the matter of the Indemnity Laws shows within what extremely narrow limits this interference was to be confined. Further, the complete abrogation by the imperial Government, during the fifties and sixties, of rights of control over the State (or Crown) lands and over the land policy of self-governing colonies not only made it clear that the Home Government was determined to deal generously with them, but set the final seal upon its policy of entrusting local affairs to the local governments. In only one respect—with regard to native races who might be ill-treated by the laws or administration of a colony—was the interference of the Home Government continuous. But, though England's enthusiasm for the abolition of the slave-trade rendered this intervention for a time inevitable, it gradually ceased towards the end of the period. Earl Grey interfered on behalf of the negroes in a colony with representative government like Jamaica, and in his Constitution Act for New Zealand (1852) he separated the natives from colonial control and placed them directly under the Crown. The singular lack of success, which had already befallen the imperial interference in native affairs in South Africa, attended it also in New Zealand and induced the repeal of this provision in 1864. About the same time such rights of interference, on behalf of the natives, were tacitly dropped in other colonies with responsible government. These rights were, however, seldom specifically withdrawn; and, as late as 1885, Bechuanaland (which, on its acquisition, might naturally have been annexed to Cape Colony) was directly controlled by the Crown. The privilege of royal veto on local acts of colonial legislatures was never abrogated during this period, and might conceivably have been used for specific acts relating to natives, after the general principle of direct imperial control had been withdrawn. It was applied also in cases which involved international affairs, as in 1877, when a Queensland measure—imposing a special fee on Chinese gold-miners—was disallowed on the ground "that exceptional legislation, calculated to exclude from any part of Her Majesty's dominions the subjects of a State at peace with Her Majesty, is highly objectionable."



The limits of the political control to be exercised by the mother country had thus been decided by the fulfilment of Durham's ideas ; but in the question of her economic control the eventual solution was in direct contradiction to his view. The control of the external trade of the colonies, which had played so important a part in the American revolt, had been even more jealously reserved by the Home Government after 1783. In 1819 Goulburn, speaking for the Ministry, declared that the colonies received full compensation for any hardship which this system might inflict, in the military protection afforded them by the mother country. Under Huskisson and Canning the repeal of the most important of the Navigation Laws (1825), and the establishment of differential dues in favour of the colonies and against foreign countries, and of a relation intended to be of mutual benefit and obligation between the mother country and the colonies, breathed a more enlightened spirit. But commercial policy towards the colonies vacillated in subsequent years ; and Lord John Russell, on January 16, 1838, reasserted most rigidly the doctrine of Goulburn and the right of the mother country "to compel a colony to receive [her] produce, and a right to restrict that colony in its commerce with other nations." Durham expressly supported this view, and the principle was freely admitted by John Howe, the Nova Scotia publicist and statesman, then one of the strongest champions of responsible government for the colonies in its most extended sense. The dangers likely to result from such control of colonial commerce by the mother country were not as yet apparent to responsible statesmen, and the commercial independence of the colonies was established in deference to the dictates not of a political, but of an economic, philosophy.

In 1843 a circular from Lord Stanley prohibited the imposition of differential dues by one colony against another ; and, in repealing the Corn Laws in 1846, Peel abolished the differential dues in favour of the colonies, and placed colonial and foreign corn on precisely the same footing. The principle, of which this measure was the most important example, was carried to its logical outcome by Earl Grey, Secretary for the Colonies and for War (1846-52), an ardent Free Trader. Measures were carried for the alteration of the duties on coffee, sugar, and timber, and for the complete repeal of the Navigation Laws (1846-9) : which last measure threw open the colonial coasting trade and severed the last link in the old commercial system. The sudden cessation of all differential dues or preferences to the colonies temporarily disorganised their trade, and inflicted considerable immediate losses on Canada and the sugar colonies. Their assemblies resented the loss most keenly and expressed open regret for the fall of the old system. Had their political self-consciousness been more developed, their sense of nationality<sup>1</sup> more mature, the imperial connexion would probably have been seriously endangered.

<sup>1</sup> The following Memorandum from the Executive Council of Canada to Lord Elgin (May 12, 1848) reveals how little the idea of nationality was realised by the

For the moment the tumult subsided. Power was given to the colonial legislatures to abolish differential dues, and strong pressure was used by the Home Government to induce them to do so. The Constitutional Act of Australia in 1850 contained provisions forbidding the imposition of all differential dues whatsoever between different colonies, or between colonies and mother country—provisions which were modified in 1873, but which, in a less rigid form, continued to testify to Earl Grey's ideas of colonial policy till their repeal in 1895. In the case of New Brunswick, which instituted a bounty on hemp, Lord Grey, finding that he could not prevail by advice or persuasion, ratified the specific measure in question, but declared that in future all similar measures imposing differential dues would be vetoed. He was not prepared to "abdicate the power or duty of regulating the commercial policy of the whole empire."

Earl Grey carried his points with several other colonies, and thus imposed upon the empire a general policy of obligatory Free Trade. The new economic system was, on the whole, an improvement on the old, but there lurked in it a considerable element of danger, inasmuch as it was perfectly possible to conceive of cases in which a given colony might think itself injured by such a policy, and might regard its commercial interests as different from those of the mother country. It could not be expected that colonial assemblies would always submit, as the Canadian legislature had submitted in 1846, to the mother country in this matter; and the raising of such a question was particularly dangerous because the Home Government's interference with the tariff of a colony might be construed into indirect interference with the assemblies' rights of internal taxation. But, as the adoption of the commercial principles of Free Trade had opened up this dangerous dispute, so it was to be closed by the wider political principles which it brought with it.

The old Benthamite contention of the worthlessness of the colonies began to revive, and some Free Traders argued that, if the colonies were no longer valuable for their commercial advantages to the mother country, they might as well be abandoned. One result of this view was to produce a decline of interest in the colonies, and an unduly low estimate of their importance. This, no doubt, had the effect of inducing Earl Grey's successors to abandon his system of enforcing a uniform commercial policy on the empire. When Canada imposed a tariff of distinctly protective character in 1859, the Duke of Newcastle, then Colonial Secretary, contented himself with ineffectual remonstrance. In reply the Canadian Finance Minister, Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt, vigorously denied the right of the imperial Government to interfere in the adjust-

colonies before 1870. It refers to the Welland Canal and other public works—"as a series of undertakings which would do honour to the enterprise and industry of a nation, it was hoped for the colony" etc.

ment of their tariffs, on the ground that they were matters of internal concern. Of this action Lord Grey expressed strong disapproval; but his protest was not generally upheld, and from this time forward the fiscal independence of self-governing colonies was definitively acknowledged and all attempts at authoritative interference by the Home Government ceased. Henceforward, however, the principle that the Home Government had a right to be treated as the most favoured nation in all commercial treaties which the colonies might make, has always been upheld.

The limit of the political and commercial control to be exercised by the mother country had now been settled—there remained that of military control; and on the solution of this problem, as of the two others, was based the new conception of imperial policy as a whole. Though the Colonies contributed something towards their military defence, the imperial Government bore the greatest part of the expense, and men like Cobden, Roebuck, Molesworth, Gladstone, and Lowe bewailed the enormous and increasing burdens entailed by these costly establishments. It was pointed out, with great force, that, wherever representative governments prevailed, the colonies had reduced imperial expenses and raised local militias, and that self-defence was the corollary of self-government. Such a policy, it was contended, far from dissolving would actually strengthen the imperial bond, and weighty strategic arguments backed these political and economic contentions, when the Crimean War compelled the revision of England's system of military defence. The numerous commissions on colonial expenditure and defence which sat between 1848 and 1862 united in recognising that the empire as a whole was best defended, not by a diffusion of force in many isolated spots, but by concentration at a few strategic centres.

The decision to reduce or withdraw a large number of colonial garrisons was accordingly carried out in the years 1862-70; military establishments were only retained in such places as the necessities of the empire as a whole might require. Although the supreme direction of military policy was retained by the Home Government, the new arrangement increased the responsibility without diminishing the loyalty of the colonies. Similarly, the right of the imperial Government to appoint Governors to each colony, and to control all international and diplomatic relations, was not seriously questioned during this period, though there were signs that, in the latter respect, ideas were changing.

In reviewing the whole question of imperial policy towards the colonies during 1840-70 it is well to enquire how far the prospect of separation between Great Britain and her dependencies was really an object of practical political discussion. Colonial opinion, so far as it can be gathered, though often resenting interference from Downing Street, was nearly always sensible of the enormous advantages of the imperial connexion. In England, as late as 1850, Lord John Russell declared that,

though he believed that England gained by her colonial connexion, there might come a time when such advantage would cease and their independence become necessary. But no one was more resolute than Lord John in maintaining the imperial connexion at the existing time, and for so long as it would reasonably last. Such seems also to have been the attitude of Sir James Graham, though he opposed expansion, and thought colonies only of advantage as commercial or military centres. One responsible statesman in 1852 certainly used expressions which suggested that the colonies were useless encumbrances; another as late as 1867 advocated the policy of giving them self-government, with a view to preparing them for complete independence. Yet the necessity and possibility of retaining the colonies by a wise policy of conciliation and liberality was urged by statesmen so different in view, calibre, and predilections, as Grey, Durham, Molesworth, Charles Buller, Gibbon Wakefield, Lowe, and Gladstone. The way in which this view affected all parties, though in different ways, is best illustrated in the evolution of the political opinions of Gladstone. In his early days, as representative of the high Tories, he advocated retention of the colonies even at the cost of sacrifices to the mother country, on the ground that they were "an integral part of the empire"; later, under the influence of the ideas of Liberalism and Free Trade, he advocated the extension of the largest powers of self-government to the colonies, on the ground that liberty of self-government would in reality produce unity of imperial interest. It was indeed, perhaps, not altogether an accident that the first principles of colonial self-government were enunciated by Bentham, who began by proposing to abandon the political control of the mother country; that they were advocated by Durham, who proposed to retain complete economic sovereignty, and put into practice by Grey and Newcastle, one of whom supported obligatory Free Trade, while the other stood for complete fiscal independence. The resultant compromise of principle and ideal was not heroic, was not logical, was hardly even intelligible; none the less, it has proved eminently practicable in its results. Moreover, the immediate results of the new policy were striking. British North America as a whole was infinitely more prosperous and more loyal to the mother country in 1870 than in 1840.

Sir George Cornewall Lewis, a Whig statesman of eminently judicial mind, in composing, in 1841, an academic treatise *on the Government of Dependencies* could not conceive how the sovereignty of the mother country could be reconciled with the self-government of the dependency. There can be little doubt that his deduction was correct, and that, in theory, the problem was insoluble. The mother country has never disavowed her supremacy and remains legally sovereign throughout the empire, but the political or *de facto* sovereignty has passed, in the case of self-governing colonies, to the legislature or people of the colony itself. This new conception of the position and relations of Great

Britain and her colonies could hardly have developed save by judicious compromises of principle between the warring interests and parties. The Tory idea of retention at all costs, the Whig idea of political liberty but of commercial control, the Free Trade idea of commercial freedom, all mingled together. The Tory abandoned the theory that local responsibility and imperial unity were incompatible; the Whig abandoned commercial control; the Free Traders, like Sir William Molesworth, who believed in the possibility of retention, abstained from pushing their ideas to their extreme limit and allowing the colonies to appoint their own Governors, without reference to the mother country.

In conclusion, it is important to note that the question was not finally settled on purely economic grounds, on the lines of profit and loss, as has sometimes been asserted. The two men who—at the most critical period—realised the difficulties and set themselves to solve them, were both inspired by idealism. Grey, regarding the matter from its imperial aspect, declared that, though he did believe England gained both morally and materially by retention of the colonies, yet the colonies gained so much from her that the necessity of retaining them was a matter of duty and obligation. Elgin, looking to the more purely colonial aspect, saw the future possibility of a union from which both parties might derive benefit. Though the practical measures were undertaken by these two men, it is well not to forget the statesman, to whose influence and ideas they owed so much. And perhaps Durham himself, had he been praised for the originality of his ideas, might have replied that not he but Bentham and Fox—names not usually associated with imperial unity—were the real inspirers of his famous Report, and the true legislators for generations yet unborn.

## (2) THE FEDERATION OF CANADA.

Lord Durham's Report—which has been justly termed the most valuable document in the English language on the subject of colonial policy—marks the line of cleavage in the treatment of Canada. It was written with the help of facts and statistics which Buller, Wakefield, Turton, and other able lieutenants accumulated, but its constructive aspects and its conclusions were the work of the great statesman who died, baffled and discredited, in 1840. It came as a revelation of the actual condition of the country to the public men of England, and it overthrew the autocratic traditions and high-handed procedure of the Colonial Office at the beginning of the Victorian era. It vindicated the only just principle of authority, and laid the foundation of responsible government. It took a large and generous view of England's responsibilities, and, beyond everything else, it was inspired with the passion of patriotism. Durham's successor, Lord Sydenham, built wisely and well during his unhappily short career in Canada on the foundations of his great

predecessor; and the Act of Union, which became law in 1840, was itself a vindication of Durham's policy, as well as a substantial measure of justice to Canada. It provided for the union of Upper and Lower Canada, with one legislative council and one legislative assembly. The former was to consist of not less than twenty members nominated by the Crown, and the second of eighty-four representatives—forty-two from each province—elected by popular suffrage. It was the beginning of a new epoch, the concession of the right of the people, though with limitations, to control their own affairs. The new machinery of government did not always run easily. The old order had changed; but old traditions died hard. Durham and Sydenham were exceptional men; they laid down great principles, they had broad ideas of statesmanship, they had generosity and moral vision. They were followed by men of less political sagacity; it would be unjust to say of less sincerity. Sir Charles Bagot during his short-lived tenure of power, from 1842 to 1843, in spite of antecedents scarcely reassuring, acted consistently on the principle that the majority, without respect of race, had the right to rule under the new Constitution. He was succeeded by Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe in 1843 (created Lord Metcalfe in 1845), and the latter by the Earl of Cathcart in 1846. Neither of them was a conspicuous success, nor showed any real grasp of the political situation. Metcalfe, though personally popular, was too much inclined to insist on his own prerogative and was thus brought into conflict with the representative assembly. Cathcart was a stiff old soldier, who was appointed when a war with the United States seemed imminent, and was recalled when the cloud vanished.

Lord Elgin, who succeeded in 1847, was Durham's son-in-law, and came to Canada impressed with the magnitude of the task over which his wife's father had broken his heart. The charming personality of Lady Elgin, who as a girl had been in Canada with her father, the knowledge common to all classes of the community that Durham had been unjustly treated, gave Elgin an opportunity which he amply redeemed. He was himself an open-minded, capable, far-seeing statesman, who knew well how to take occasion by the hand; and his career in the colony is one of the brightest chapters in her annals. Elgin was not possessed of the genius or the personal magnetism of Durham; but he was not so high-handed, or so impulsive, and he proved himself to be the best ruler that Canada had known since Durham quitted her shores. He set himself with quiet determination to develop the resources of the country, to settle old grievances, to bring about that condition of public affairs without which any real and substantial progress was impossible. His policy in Canada was, in the best sense of the term, enlightened. He settled the Clergy Reserves question, which had long been a bone of contention. He allayed the jealousy of Upper Canada against the sister province on the old question of the disloyalty of the French Canadians

at the period of the Rebellion, and succeeded in passing a Bill of Indemnification. His wise attitude did much to discredit the dangerous movement in Canada for annexation to the United States. Imperial nominees had previously filled the chief places in the Civil Service, but under Lord Elgin a great change in this respect was made possible by the absolute control over the Civil List conceded to the Canadian Government in 1847. One of the most useful achievements of his administration was the Seigneurial Tenure Act of 1854, which abolished one of the chief grievances in Lower Canada by liberating the land from a complicated survival of feudalism imported from France under the *ancien régime*. Elgin came to Canada in 1847 with the reputation of a just man; he left it in 1854 with that of a popular and sagacious ruler. He took a bold and independent course, and during his tenure of power nothing was more sharply criticised than his announcement, in 1849, of the Royal assent to the measure entitled: "An Act to provide for the indemnification of parties in Lower Canada whose properties were destroyed during the Rebellion in 1837–8." Many prominent politicians in Upper Canada, both of the Conservative and Reform parties, raised the cry of "No pay to rebels"; and some of them went so far as to urge annexation to the United States if such a subsidy was granted. Lord Elgin had the courage to stand firm. He took his stand on the fact that the measure had passed both Houses by large majorities, and he refused to make a distinction, in this respect, between Upper and Lower Canada, or, by reserving the measure to throw on the imperial Government a responsibility, which he justly claimed, "ought to rest with the Governor-General of Canada." By his courageous action at this crisis Lord Elgin won the sympathies of the French Canadians, and effectually prevented Lower Canada from falling, for the second time, into the mischievous hands of Papineau. Elgin strengthened the links which bound the colony to the mother country; and, besides settling the knotty problem of land tenure in Lower Canada, he helped to repeal the Navigation Laws, and thus gave a stimulus to the shipping and trade of the colony. In 1854, the year in which Lord Elgin relinquished his authority, a reciprocity treaty was concluded between Canada and the United States, which determined the commercial relations of the two countries until 1866. The reciprocity treaty was the crowning achievement of Lord Elgin's administration, and his own share in bringing it about was so great that it deserves to be recorded. This measure was of the utmost commercial importance not merely to Upper and Lower Canada, but to all the maritime provinces.

Lord Elgin was succeeded by Sir Edmund Head, who remained Governor-General until 1861, when Lord Monck became his successor; the latter resigned office in 1868, but not before the great scheme of Confederation had become an accomplished fact. Canada under Sir Edmund Head continued to make substantial progress both in a political

and in a material sense, and, despite sharp conflicts of opinion, the Constitution was settled on an elective basis. The colony became alive to the principle that the privileges and burdens of freedom were inseparable. The first volunteer force was organised, and the Royal Canadian regiment was added to the British army, while, during the crisis of the War in the Crimea, the colony showed practical sympathy with the English nation by sending through the legislature not merely congratulations on military victories, but substantial help for the relief of the widows and orphans of soldiers who had fallen in the struggle. The Act of Union (1840) had decreed that the Upper House or Legislative Council should be nominated by the Crown; but, as will be seen, it was determined in 1867 that the members of this responsible body should be chosen by the vote of the electors of the whole colony. It is a curious fact that in 1864 the Quebec Conference, composed of thirty-three leading representatives of every shade of political thought in Canada and the maritime provinces, unanimously resolved that the Upper House or Senate should be appointed by the Crown. One important question was settled by a direct appeal to the Queen. The expansion of the colony made a new seat of government not merely desirable but imperative. Five cities were competitors for the honour, and the Queen selected Bytown, then an obscure place, the Ottawa of to-day. There the Legislative buildings were erected and the government offices concentrated. Ottawa, known in early days as "Westminster in the wilderness," is now a flourishing city, and the wisdom of the selection of such a site has been fully justified. Canada, at that time, had no connexion by rail with the maritime provinces and was, during half the year, dependent upon the United States for communication with England. Trade was paralysed and credit ruined. Lord Monck was confronted by a political situation which might have spelt disaster to a less capable man. Parties were so closely divided that neither side could obtain a working majority. Three dissolutions occurred in two years, and good government became impossible. Lord Monck acted at this juncture with strict impartiality; he interpreted the duties of his position in a constitutional spirit, and was neither to be flattered nor coerced into partisanship. The result was that a coalition took place between men like Cartier, Macdonald, and Taché, who represented the Conservative party, and Brown, McDougall, and Mowat, typical leaders of public opinion in Upper Canada. The coalition Government took office in 1864, committed to the policy of a federal union of all the colonies, or, if that could not be accomplished, of Upper and Lower Canada. The movement towards closer union had already taken definite shape in the maritime provinces, before the coalition Government in Canada had come into power, pledged to this very policy. Before the alliance of the two political parties in Canada, Dr (afterwards Sir Charles) Tupper, then Prime Minister of Nova Scotia, organised a conference of public men in that province with responsible



representatives from New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island to consider the desirability of legislative union. In advocating this policy, Tupper expressed the hope that the movement, which was thus begun, would lead eventually to a confederation of the whole of British North America. It was felt by men of all parties that the state of perpetual Ministerial crisis, chronic discord, and sectional jealousies must cease, if Canada was to prove worthy of the splendid opportunities presented by an ever expanding territory, and the steady growth, not merely of the population, but of the resources and public spirit of the country.

The final phase in the movement toward Confederation began in 1864, both in Upper and Lower Canada and in the maritime provinces. In June of that year a Committee of the Legislative Assembly appointed to consider the administration of public affairs reported in favour of "changes in the direction of a federal system," applied either to Canada alone or to the whole of the British North American provinces. In September, 1864, the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island sent delegates, who assembled at Charlottetown to devise measures for a legislative union of the three provinces. As soon as the new coalition Government heard of the conference at Charlottetown, the admirable decision was made to send a delegation of which the principal members were Macdonald, Brown, Cartier, McGill, and Galt, to bring before the Assembly the much greater question of the union of all the provinces. The delegates of the Canadian Government were cordially received at the Charlottetown Conference, and, after a full discussion of a federal union of all the British North American provinces, it was decided to hold a Conference at Quebec to advance this end under the sanction of the imperial Government. The desire for union by this time was widespread. The Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island were quick to recognise that union spelt strength, whilst the British of Ontario and the French of Quebec were not less eager to secure political autonomy and the power to settle local controversies originating in conflicting laws, customs, traditions, and religion. After an interval of six weeks, which was full of political activity throughout British North America, thirty-three delegates representing all parts of the country met at Quebec on October 10, 1864, with full authority to thresh out the matter. The Quebec Convention sat in private for eighteen days, and the outcome of the discussion of the thirty-three public men who composed it—they represented all shades of opinion—was an elaborate document of seventy-two resolutions which was subsequently submitted to the imperial Government, and became the foundation of the Act of Union. Despite a good deal of opposition to some of its decisions both in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, especially those which related to finance, the Quebec Convention of October, 1864, nevertheless marked a new departure in the annals of Canada.

Confederation was now clearly in view. The Canadian Legislature

in the summer of 1865 adopted addresses to the Queen, in which were detailed proposals for the great constitutional reform on which the heart of the majority of the people of Canada was clearly set. This was followed by a Conference in London (December, 1866) of delegates from Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, but not from Prince Edward Island. The Quebec resolutions, especially those which related to finance, were modified to meet the objections raised in the maritime provinces, but no other substantial change in the original scheme was adopted. To the last, those who wished, for various reasons, to keep Canada dis-united, some of whom were Republicans at heart, and in favour not of a union of the provinces but of annexation by the United States, made their voice heard. The "people's delegates"—for so those who opposed the Union styled themselves—came to London in the wake of the responsible representatives of Canada, and did their best to make mischief. The Earl of Carnarvon, an enlightened and far-seeing statesman, was happily at that time Colonial Secretary; and, so soon as the final details had been settled by the London Conference, he introduced the historic measure, founded on the resolutions of the Quebec Convention, to the House of Lords on February 17, 1867. It was called an "Act for the Union and Government of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick; and for purposes connected therewith." It passed rapidly through both Houses of Parliament, received the Queen's assent on March 29 as the British North America Act, 1867, and came into force on July 1, as the law of the Dominion of Canada. It was at first proposed, at the suggestion of Sir John Alexander Macdonald, to call the United Provinces the Kingdom of Canada. But this was overruled by the Earl of Derby, on the ground that such a title might ruffle the political sensibilities—which at that time were in a somewhat exasperated condition, both towards England and Canada—of the United States. The British North America Act, 1867, thus brought about a federal union between the old Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and at the same time made provision for the ultimate inclusion into the newly constituted Dominion of Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, British Columbia, Rupert's Land, and the great, and at that period ill-defined, territories of the North-West.

Since Confederation brought about a new era in Canada, the constitutional changes which it effected require to be broadly indicated. The basis of the new Constitution was the control of the general affairs of the country by the Dominion Parliament now called into existence. There were, however, two exceptions to this rule. One was the paramount authority of the Crown, as represented by the Governor-General, and the control of all naval and military forces by the Crown. The other was the authority given, within strictly defined limits, to the provincial legislatures for the management and sale of public lands within their area; for the regulation of railways, public works, charitable

and municipal institutions; for the administration of justice; and, though with a proviso for the protection of religious minorities, for the advancement of education. The provincial legislatures were also given the power to make laws concerning agriculture and immigration within their own area, but with the express stipulation that no measures of this kind were to conflict with the enactments of the Canadian Parliament. The Provinces, in short, were made subject to the Federal Government rather than to imperial authority. No Province, in other words, could make laws which imperilled the general interests of the Dominion as interpreted by the Canadian Parliament. If any Province exceeded the lawful bounds of its own jurisdiction, or asserted a principle or preferred a claim imperilling the interests of any other portion of the Dominion, or those of the Confederation as a whole, the Court of appeal was not the imperial Parliament, but the Governor-General acting in concert with a Dominion Ministry. It remains to state what in reality is more important, the outlines of the scheme of confederation. The broad principles of the Act of 1867 provided the framework of a Constitution avowedly based on that of the United Kingdom, liberally interpreted in the light of modern conditions and local requirements. The task of government, under the supreme authority of the Crown, was delegated to the Governor-General, the newly constituted Privy Council of Canada, the Cabinet, the Senate, and the House of Commons. The Governor-General holds office for five years, and is vested with executive powers. He represents the authority of the Crown, subject to the advice of the Cabinet. With him rests the appointment of the Governors of the provinces and the judges of the supreme Courts. No Act of the Dominion Parliament can become law without his assent, and he alone can disallow the sentence of a Court of justice. He has the virtual command of all the military and naval forces of the Dominion, and acts, in concert with a Cabinet of responsible Ministers, in all matters relating to the general administration. The Cabinet consists of members of the Privy Council selected from either the Senate or the House of Commons. The Premier sits in either Chamber, and allots the various departments of Government to his colleagues.

The Senate consists of members appointed for life, nominated by the Crown, or in reality by the Governor-General in Council. They must be British subjects, and live within the province for which they are elected, and they must possess private means. They constitute—their number is at present 83—the nearest approach in Canada to the House of Lords. The House of Commons is elected for a maximum period of five years by a popular vote under a uniform franchise for the whole Dominion except the North-West Territories. It consists at the present time of 214 members. Both senators and members of the House of Commons receive salaries and travelling expenses, but unless illness is proved deductions are made *pro rata* in the case of absentees.

Measures of any kind can be introduced in either Chamber, except proposals in regard to finance which must originate in the Commons, to which Chamber no senator is eligible. All questions which affect the Dominion collectively are determined by the Federal Parliament at Ottawa. It settles all matters of public debt and property, taxation, customs and excise, currency, banking laws, the postal service, the military and naval defence of the country, navigation, fishing rights, criminal law, patents and copyright, marriage and divorce, questions of naturalisation of the aliens, Indian reserves, the taking of the census, and in a word all laws which touch and control the general life of the community. The apprehension was expressed, even by responsible statesmen, when the terms of confederation were under discussion in the imperial Parliament, that the British North America Act of 1867 was an attempt to reconcile conflicting ideals. It was deemed hazardous to link monarchical institutions to so bold an adoption of federal principles. If the Constitution of Canada represents a compromise between the authority of the Crown and the supremacy of democratic liberty, the new departure has admittedly worked well. Provincial jealousies have dwindled to vanishing point; racial antipathies no longer imperil the prosperity of the Dominion; religious animosities have lost their mischievous power in a new atmosphere of common justice and toleration. Canada, as the direct outcome of Confederation, has grown strong, prosperous, energetic. The unhappy divisions which prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and which darkened with actual revolt and bloodshed the dawn of the Victorian era, are now only a memory. The links which bind the Dominion to Great Britain may on paper seem slight, but they are resistless. Imperial federation has still great tasks to accomplish within our widely scattered Imperial domains, but its success in Canada may be accepted as the pledge of its triumph elsewhere. Canada is a nation within the Empire, and in Kipling's phrase is "daughter in her mother's house, and mistress in her own." The ruling idea of Confederation and the principle, which has made it in an ever broadening sense successful, was the concession to the Dominion as a whole of the right of self-government, and the preservation at the same time to each province of a sufficient measure of local independence. In one important respect, apart from the paramount authority of the Crown in Canada, the new Constitution of the Dominion differed from that of the American Commonwealth. In the United States new problems, which at the time were unforeseen, but which afterwards arose, were left not to the Federal Government but to the sovereign States of the Union. Exactly the opposite course was pursued in Canada, where all undelegated authority was left to the Federal Government. This, perhaps inevitably, led in earlier years to friction between the Dominion Parliament and the provincial legislatures, with the result that the former sometimes claimed the right to intervene and at other times refused to do so, acting in both

instances on the principle of the general good of the whole community. Happily, almost every possible conflict of authority between the Federal and provincial Governments has been determined either by friendly compromise or judicial decision.

One great result of Confederation apart from material advantages—these were many, instant, and sprang up in every direction—was the evolution of, a common sentiment, to which all things were possible. After Confederation Canada saw its own destiny, in Lord Strathcona's phrase, as "first of the new nations within the Empire," and out of this grew loyal devotion to the Crown, a new sense of citizenship, and with it the gradual adoption of a Canadian policy sympathetic with Imperial ideals, yet exempt from the old racial jealousy and the bitterness of a house divided against itself. Confederation did not settle by a stroke of the pen all the difficulties of Canada; but it made a settlement of them possible by the creation of a new political atmosphere, and gave fresh and almost unbounded possibilities of both moral and material progress, and loyalty to a new system of government which the people of the Dominion, with few exceptions, realise to be at once conservative and progressive. Confederation placed the basis of representation on population—a notable advance on the hard-and-fast system of 1841, which gave the same number of representatives to both Upper and Lower Canada. Then, the balance of the population was with the French; in the next decade, the flowing tide of emigration shifted the numerical advantage from Quebec to Ontario, and with every year which passed until Confederation was accomplished the disparity increased. This question of inequality in the representation between the two Provinces was one of the moving causes of the Quebec Convention of 1864, which led, as we have seen, to the epoch-making measure of 1867.

The statesmen who brought Confederation about were representatives of both races and all parties and classes in Canada. In the course of four decades, the "Fathers of the Confederation," as they were called, have all passed away with one distinguished exception, Sir Charles Tupper. His services to the Dominion, not only at that juncture, but during a long term of strenuous official life in which he has filled many responsible offices, including that of High Commissioner and Prime Minister, have made him, like Lord Strathcona—whose chief activities have been thrown into the development of the trade and railway resources of the country—one of the historic figures of the Dominion. Amongst others who remodelled the political institutions of Canada and led the movement which transformed a number of isolated, jealous, and feeble colonies into a commonwealth, destined within comparatively few years to expand by a natural and inevitable process from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was George Brown. He was a Toronto journalist of Scottish birth and Presbyterian convictions, who rose by force of character and capacity to the forefront of public life. He was a man who made

enemies as well as friends, but who never found any to question either his integrity, his love of civil and religious liberty, or his devotion to his adopted country. His services to Confederation can scarcely be exaggerated, and his tragic death in 1880, when he was killed by the cowardly bullet of an assassin, was regarded throughout the Dominion as a public calamity. A very different type of Canadian statesman was Sir George Étienne Cartier, a typical French Canadian, in his youth a disciple of Papineau, and one who had borne arms in the short-lived rebellion of 1837, but afterwards a powerful and able defender of the supremacy of the Crown. Always loyal to his own race, Cartier, who acted as Premier of Lower Canada (1858-62), was a man of chivalrous and ardent temperament, and was one of the first at a time of warring interests to see the necessity of compromise and conciliation in a country of different races and conflicting ideals. Sir Charles Tupper has always declared that, but for Cartier's patriotic devotion in the face of great difficulties and dangers, the great project of Confederation could probably never have been accomplished. Sir John Alexander Macdonald was the great man of the movement—it is impossible to speak of Galt, McDougall, D'Arcy McGee, Taché, Langevin, Chandler, and Tilley. Macdonald was born in Scotland, but was taken as a child of five to Canada, and no man served her with more passionate devotion. Like Cartier, in later years his political colleague and close friend, he carried a musket in 1837, though on the opposite side. He entered public life in 1844, and it was then that he uttered words which were the keynote of his whole career: "I need scarcely state my firm belief that the prosperity of Canada depends upon its permanent connexion with the mother country, and I shall resist to the utmost any attempt—from whatever quarter it may come—which may tend to weaken that union." It may be said of him with perfect truth that he held Canada for the Crown against enemies within and without the Dominion. He was a man of fascinating personality, an incisive speaker, a keen tactician, and a statesman of wide and enlightened views. For nearly forty years he laboured, through good and evil report, to advance the prosperity of Canada, and to make it in the most vital and abiding sense an ever growing and influential part of the Empire.

Here it becomes necessary to state in outline the fortunes of the newly constituted Dominion up to 1870. Self-government was now a reality. Lord Monck, under whom Confederation had become an accomplished fact, retained the post of Governor-General until 1868, and was succeeded by Sir John Young, afterwards Lord Lisgar, who held office until 1872. The first Federal Premier was Sir John Alexander Macdonald, and his Government represented a coalition of Liberal and Conservative statesmen pledged to make the development of the resources of the country the chief object of their policy. The growth of Confederation, though its full story is elsewhere told, may here, perhaps,

be briefly stated. The Hudson Bay Territory was ceded to Canada by the imperial Government on the payment of a subsidy to this great trading corporation, May 12, 1870, and out of it the province of Manitoba and the North-West Territories were created. Part of the North-West Territories were afterwards divided into the provisional districts, Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Athabasca. In 1895 the vast outlying territory to the north and west was divided into the four districts of Ungava, Franklin, Mackenzie, and Yukon. Meanwhile, on July 20, 1871, British Columbia with Vancouver Island, and on July 1, 1873, Prince Edward Island, entered the Confederation. The whole of British North America, with the solitary exception of Newfoundland—the most ancient English colony—is therefore now within the limits of the Dominion.

Newfoundland refused to join the Confederation in 1867, and to this day the oldest of the colonies remains self-excluded. The existing form of government (established 1855) consists of a Governor appointed by the Crown, an executive council of seven members, a legislative council of fifteen members appointed by the Crown, and a House of Assembly of thirty-six members elected by popular vote. Manhood suffrage obtains, subject to two years' previous residence. Between 1840 and 1870 the wealth of the colony consisted almost exclusively in the fisheries. But, even before 1870, a considerable area of land was brought under cultivation; the timber trade was developed, and the mineral resources, chiefly coal, copper, and iron, hitherto regarded as a negligible quantity, began to render the colony prosperous in a more marked degree. Considerable friction arose in Newfoundland at this period over fishing disputes with the French, due in part to a vague clause in the Treaty of Versailles, 1783, and in part to the proximity of the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon. Fishing disputes were not peculiar to Newfoundland. Canada had her own difficulties in that respect with the United States, especially after the abrogation by that country of the Reciprocity Treaty (1866). The relations of Canada with her powerful neighbour were at that time distinctly strained, and the situation was complicated by the *Alabama* claims, and the belief which was common in the United States that Canada as well as England had sympathised with the Confederates in the Civil War. The Treaty of Washington (signed May 8, 1871) settled the Fisheries Question for the next twelve years. It accorded the Americans the right of navigation, not merely in the waters of the St Lawrence, but in the canals of the Dominion on equal terms with British subjects, subject to the right of the Dominion Government to levy tolls or other charges. The free passage of goods in bond through either country, and Canada's right to free navigation of the rivers of Alaska, formed other provisions of the treaty.

Questions of boundary arose all through the period under review

between Canada and the United States. In 1842 large concessions were made to American demands, with the result that the State of Maine now projects into the provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec. In 1846 the Oregon boundary question was settled by the adoption by Great Britain of the 49° to the Pacific coast; but, unfortunately, San Juan, an island in the channel between Vancouver and the mainland, termed because of its strategic position, the "Cronstadt of the Pacific," remained debatable territory. The matter was submitted to the arbitration of the German Emperor, William I, who gave a decision in favour of the United States (1872).

But Canada, while protecting her rights alike by sea and land, was also developing her internal resources on a broad scale. Confederation rendered possible the construction of railways from end to end of the new Dominion—a practical embodiment of the new community of interest. In 1867 there were scarcely more than two thousand miles of railway throughout the whole Dominion. Thirty years later nearly seventeen thousand had been constructed, and of the capital required for such splendid progress no less than four millions were contributed by the Dominion and provincial Governments. When in 1869-70 the Hudson's Bay territory was transferred to the Dominion and divided into the province of Manitoba and the four provisional districts of the North-West, trouble arose with Louis Riel, who incited the half-breeds to armed opposition in the Red River rebellion (1870). The revolt was suppressed by an armed force commanded by Colonel (now Viscount) Wolseley; and the natives were first intimidated and then conciliated. The Dominion Government subsequently allotted an extensive area, alike in Manitoba and the North-West, for the exclusive occupation of the natives—an act of conciliation which has borne excellent fruit in the settlement of the country.

Since Confederation, Canada has acted on the principle laid down in the British Parliament in 1862, that all colonies exercising the right of self-government ought to provide for their own internal order and security, and assist in any emergency which might arise in regard to their external defence. Questions of fiscal policy have been determined in Canada in the main by her geographical position and her trade relations. The bulk of her commerce has always been with Great Britain and the United States, though it found other markets in the West Indies and in Europe between 1840 and 1870. The difficulty in Canada in these earlier years arose from the fact that Great Britain stood pledged to Free Trade, whilst the United States adopted Protection. As long as the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States existed—until 1866—Canada found an abundant market across her borders; when that measure was abrogated her trade was crippled, and, in the period of commercial depression which followed, the way was prepared for the adoption of a protective policy in 1878. The progress of education



falls in the main outside the sphere of this chapter. High schools and collegiate institutes existed, in response to the demand for secondary education, in all cities and towns; while each province provided normal and model schools for the training of teachers. The requirements of culture, both literary and scientific, were met by the older seats of learning, such as the universities of Laval, McGill, Kingston, and Toronto, all of which made great strides in the period between 1840 and 1870. Since then they have grown in wealth, efficiency, and influence, while new foundations have been created in other parts of the Dominion, to follow the Western march of civilisation and the ever widening growth of the Dominion.

### (3) THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA.

(1815-70.)

The British occupation of South Africa began in 1806, when Cape Town surrendered to General Baird; but it was not until 1814 that the London Convention was signed. By this instrument the Dutch formally surrendered their claims to Cape Colony and certain other of their former possessions, on payment of an indemnity of six millions sterling. Although the history of the Cape as a British Colony dates, therefore, from 1814, many of the most important factors in shaping the history of this part of our colonial empire were already at work before that year. At first the English conquerors made little change in the method of government. The division of the country into five districts—the Cape, Stellenbosch, Swellendam, Uitenhage, and Graaf-Reinet—was retained, with the local administration by *landrosts* and the quasi-military organisation under the *veldt cornets* of the sub-districts. The population was small and scattered, except at Cape Town. The slave population consisted of Malays, introduced from the East Indies by the Dutch, and of a number of negroes from Madagascar, Mozambique, and the West Coast. The slaves numbered, in all, about 30,000, the free native population being estimated at 1,700,000—1,800,000, and the whites 26,000.

An important epoch in South African history is marked by the beginning of the missionary movement, which had before been impossible. The Dutch not only sought to prohibit among whites all forms of religious worship, save that of Protestant communions akin to their own, but were inclined to disapprove of attempts to convert the natives. Religious toleration and missionary zeal began to take effect soon after the British occupation, with the result that an enquiry was officially instituted into the conduct of the white settlers towards the natives (1811). Considerable bitterness was fostered, and throughout this whole period we find the continuance of this unfortunate dispute—the colonists aggrieved at the attitude and accusations of the missionaries, who, in their turn,

championed the cause of the native with a zeal which sometimes made them unfair to the white man.

The long series of Kaffir wars, which began in 1779 and were renewed at intervals throughout the following century, deeply influenced the attitude of the white settlers, particularly of the isolated *backveldt* Boers, towards the native. These "wars" always began with an unexpected attack upon lonely farms and the murder of all who were taken unawares. The colonists fought side by side with the troops sent by the British Government, and frequently bore the brunt of the battle; but they were seldom consulted as to the after settlement. The growing strength of the party at home, who, in the French phrase, were "friends of the black man," made it increasingly difficult for the agents of the Government to keep a straight line between justice and weakness. The Boer farmers were ignorant and inarticulate; the missionaries, particularly the rich and powerful London Missionary Society, had the ear of the public in England—and these unevenly matched opponents struggled to dominate the native policy of the Government, with the result that it was vacillating and unsatisfactory. The notorious affair of Schlachter's Nek, which happened in 1815, had its origin in this unfortunate state of things. A farmer named Frederick Bezuidenhout refused to obey a summons issued by the District Court, at the instance of one of his Hottentots. In the attempt made to arrest him by the Government, Frederick Bezuidenhout was killed. Of the thirty or forty men who took up arms to avenge him, his brother Jan was killed, but the majority surrendered; and five of the leaders were hanged under exceptionally painful circumstances. The episode has assumed in Boer annals an heroic aspect to which it is not entitled. No incident in South African history has been made more use of, or has been more distorted, than the affair of Schlachter's Nek; but the unbiassed historian cannot fail to see that the Cape Government was bound to assert its authority sternly, in order to check the lawless spirit of the frontier Boers, who had always been averse from recognising a superior authority, even when the Government at the Cape was of their own race. It should, however, be remembered that the British Government was assisted in its suppression of the revolt by many of the Boers themselves, and that it was the treatment of the rebels after the suppression of the rising which excited, and has continued to excite, intensity of feeling.

British emigration to Cape Colony began in 1819; and in the next two years about five thousand people were brought out. The number does not seem large nowadays; but at that time it represented a great effort, since the size of ships available and the time occupied by the voyage made emigration slow and difficult work. The Home Government paid fares, and gave free land to each head of a family, almost all the newcomers being located in the same district, on the eastern frontier between the Fish and Bushman rivers. After considerable weeding out,

and many trials and troubles, the English colony took root and prospered exceedingly; and to-day their descendants make the eastern province of Cape Colony distinctively English, and in physique and morale show some of the finest developments of the British type.

In 1825, an Executive Council was formed to assist the Governor of the Colony, who had hitherto enjoyed almost despotic authority. Soon after this, Lord Charles Somerset, who had held office for twelve years, resigned, in order to escape impeachment on a variety of counts charging him with autocratic action. The reports of a Commission, which had been collecting data on the government of all the British settlements, were presented in 1826. Partly as the result of this enquiry, modifications were made at the Cape. English was declared, and remained till 1882, the sole official and school language, although only a small number of the Dutch—who formed six-sevenths of the total population—had facilities for learning that tongue. There is not very much trace of unwillingness to adopt the English language at this period, for it was the avenue to promotion and prosperity; but the facilities for learning it were so scanty that Dutch, or rather the *Taal*, remained the true mother-tongue of the Cape Boers.

The same period saw the promulgation of an ordinance (1828) ensuring to the Hottentots equality at law with Europeans. This measure, so just and merciful from our present standpoint, seemed revolutionary to the Boer of that time. It certainly had the effect of removing from the native the restraints of ancient custom, while the provisions for securing his obedience were lacking, and before there had been time to teach him respect for the new authority. Discontent as to this measure was still seething, when the news came (1833) that the imperial Parliament had passed a measure for the abolition of slavery. The quondam slaves were to serve a short period of apprenticeship before acquiring full freedom, and, in 1835, the sum of £1,250,000 was allotted to compensate the Cape slave-owners. This sum was quite inadequate, in view of the scarcity of labour in the Cape and the extent to which the farmers depended on their slaves. It was still further reduced by being payable in London, so that farmers sold their claims to speculators and got very little in exchange. Many were entirely ruined, especially as the emancipated slaves often refused to work for their former masters for wages, so that harvests were lost and cattle died from lack of tending.

Of course this stage was not reached immediately; but other circumstances combined to make these few years notable and unfortunate alike. A great irruption of Kaffirs into the newly formed eastern province, where the settlers were just becoming prosperous, was only repelled after twelve months' hard fighting (1834–5). For Sir Benjamin D'Urban, sent to carry out the Abolition, this Kaffir war (the sixth) was his first experience. He drove the invaders beyond the Keiskama river and formed a new province, called Queen Adelaide, in which he located the

Fingo tribes who had placed themselves under British protection. His action was viewed with disfavour at home, owing to the representations of the well-known missionary John Philip. His arrangements were cancelled; the Kaffirs were restored to their land in close proximity to the colonial homesteads; and D'Urban himself was eventually recalled. Both English and Dutch settlers united in indignation against the Home Government, which declared that the Kaffirs were quite right in resorting to force, and that justice was on the side of the conquered and not of the conquerors.

An immediate result was the determination of many Boer farmers to leave the colony, and as a large portion of the *hinterland* (including what is now the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal and Natal) was almost depopulated by the savage wars of extermination waged by the Zulus, the farmers hoped to secure for themselves a new country far away from missionary interference or British domination. In all the history of pioneering there is nothing more remarkable than the Boer *treks*. They were carried out by a people ignorant of the country to which they were going, who plodded with incredible patience and daring over a trackless land infested with wild beasts and savages. Women and children took part in these marches, sharing the dangers and fatigues and the frightful isolation. The mere extent of the country covered by these slow-moving columns, in which the household goods were packed on the creaking ox-waggons and the able-bodied members of the party went on foot, is almost incredible. The food provided at the start could not last long, and beyond the possibility of occasionally getting mealies from the natives, the only resource was the meat and game shot by the wayside. In these *treks* the Boers lost many of the distinctive characteristics and customs of their race. The women, divorced from house-keeping, lost their house-pride and sense of cleanliness, as well as the traditions of cookery. The children grew up illiterate, though hardy and daring; the elder people lost all sense of citizenship and broke away somewhat from the ties of church membership. Widely scattered homesteads and the growth of a sturdy local self-government had already tended to substitute for the Teutonic tradition of conformity to established law a love of individual liberty. This tendency was promoted and increased by the *treks*, and it continues to be a striking feature of Boer character.

The first *trek* took place in 1836, and was made by two parties, numbering about fifty each. After reaching Zoutpansberg they separated, one of the peculiarities of the Boer *trekkers* being that, even in the isolation of the African wilds, they were jealous of each other. While one band (with the exception of two children) was massacred by the Matabele, the other reached Delagoa Bay, and, after being reduced to twenty-five by fever, was finally transported to Natal. Natal already had a small population of English, who, at the outset of their career,

had christened their country Victoria and their chief town D'Urban. They had, however, vainly petitioned to be recognised as a British colony. This incident, and the fact that the Cape Colonial Courts were authorised by an Act—not passed in the imperial Parliament till as late as August, 1836—to deal with offences committed by his Majesty's subjects south of latitude 25° (that is, just north of Delagoa Bay, where Portuguese influence began), must be remembered in connexion with the Boer attempt to escape British jurisdiction. The Colonial Government, however, was not very sure of its ground, and refused for some years to recognise the existence of the new communities. During 1836–40 the Boer *treks* went on steadily, the total number taking part in them being estimated at 10,000. One of the first of the enemies encountered was the Matabele nation, an offshoot of the Zulus and formidable in fight. Eventually, they were driven across the Limpopo, and the Boer leader Potgieter proclaimed all the territory south of that river forfeit to the emigrants, and concluded treaties with the Bechuana and Basuto tribes dispossessed by the Matabele. Another party of Boers, under Pieter Retief, made their way across the Drakenberg to Natal, where (as we have seen) a small English settlement already existed. Retief and many of his followers were treacherously murdered by the Zulus under Dingan (February 6, 1838); Andries Hendrik Potgieter and Andries Willem Jacobus Pretorius came to assist their kinsfolk to avenge this crime, and with a small force defeated Dingan near the Blood river and slew 3000 Zulus. This event is celebrated in "Dingan's Day" (December 16), still kept as a holiday by the Boers. They then dethroned Dingan and founded what they called the Republic of Natalia, with the town of Pietermaritzburg as its capital. Their leader was Pretorius; for, on account of disagreements, Potgieter and his friends had retired to the Transvaal, where they seceded and set up a rival government at Potchefstroom. The word "government" is rather a misnomer, for the emigrant farmers were each a law unto themselves, and it was not until some years later that pressure from without organised them into any semblance of a State.

Although the Home Government had previously shown no readiness to accept Victoria as a colony, there was no desire to lose the port or to see a Boer republic established on the coast. Accordingly a small force was sent to take possession, and was besieged in Port Natal by the Boers (1842), receiving relief only after twenty-six days' severe suffering. A memorable incident was the ride of Richard King to fetch help from Cape Colony. He covered the distance to Grahamstown in nine days, fording deep rivers and crossing hundreds of miles of savage country inhabited by hostile tribes. Natal was declared a British colony in May, 1843, the Drakenberg being subsequently taken as the frontier. Immediately afterwards a number of the Boers left Natal and formed settlements in what are now the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.

The Home Government was not conciliatory; and in 1847 the Boer leader Andries Willem Jacobus Pretorius (a man of fine character and ability) arrived to lay the grievances of his countrymen before the Governor at Cape Town. He was denied an audience, with the result that many other valuable farmers were lost to Natal, and their places filled with natives. In 1853 Natal was at length recognised as a separate colony; up to that date she had been managed, or mismanaged, from Cape Town.

Meanwhile the efforts of the missionaries at the Cape, who desired to form a chain of protected native States round the colony, had been successful in securing conventions with the Basutos and the Griquas. The latter were a half-caste tribe, descended from Boer men and Hottentot women, who had formed Christianised communities north of the Orange river as early as 1812. Their chief, Waterboer, settled in what is now part of the Orange River Colony and entered into treaties with the Cape Government (by which he was subsidised and provided with muskets) to form a protective frontier against the natives. Another community of similar origin, under Adam Kok, was established at a considerably later date, east of Waterboer's territory and near a mission station of the London Society called Philippopolis. By recognising the independence of Kok, and by fixing his boundaries to coincide with those of Waterboer on the west and those of the powerful and able Basuto chief Moshesh on the east, a barrier of protected States was spread across the north of the colony from the Kalahari desert. This was completed by a treaty with the Pondo chief Faku, whose territory was fixed between the Umzimkulu and Umtata rivers, the Drakenberg and the sea.

The arrival, in 1848, of Sir Harry Smith as Governor of the Cape initiated some changes in policy, both as regards the natives and Boers. He was a man of energy and resource, familiar and popular with the Boers. He attempted to turn the tide of emigration from Natal, but, failing in this project, declared the whole of the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers British territory, and named it the Orange River Sovereignty (February 3, 1848). To accomplish this, he was obliged to do away with the so-called Treaty States of Griqualand and Basutoland, a proceeding acceptable to some of the white settlers, who resented the overlordship of a half-caste or a native chief. But it was resented by the Boers who had emigrated to escape British rule. Their resistance finally culminated in the battle of Boomplatz (August 29, 1848), when Pretorius and his followers were defeated and obliged to recross the Vaal river. A British residency, with a small garrison, was established at Bloemfontein.

The Orange River Sovereignty (although settled by a good class of farmers, both Dutch and British) was handicapped by the penny-wise, pound-foolish policy of the Home Government, which expected it to be self-supporting and self-defending from the first. The latter responsibility was especially heavy in view of the proximity of the Basutos under Moshesh. Discontent was met with indifference; and at last,

after the Basutos had gained an advantage over an expedition led by Major Warden at Viervoet (June 30, 1851), the Home Government decided to abandon the Orange River Sovereignty. This was the opportunity of Pretorius, who was waiting beyond the Vaal for just such a contingency. The Cape had recently passed through two crises which did not increase her popularity with the British Government. The first was caused by a strenuous refusal to receive convicts. The ship in which they were sent out was successfully boycotted and at length ordered to proceed to Tasmania. The second crisis was the eighth Kaffir war (1850 to 1853), which proved the most costly of the series. There was at this time a republican party in the Orange River Sovereignty; the British taxpayer was represented as resenting the expenses of that far-off and useless colony, and the temper of the Home Government was in favour of avoiding responsibility at all costs. Pretorius offered to mediate with the disaffected Dutch in the colony and obtained the reversion of the sentence of outlawry passed on him. Shortly after, the long-sought-for recognition of an independent State beyond the Vaal was granted in the Sand River Convention (signed January 17, 1852). The country south of the Vaal was formally abandoned by England in 1853; and, on February 23, 1854, a convention was signed at Bloemfontein, which transferred the government to representatives chosen by the inhabitants. Thus the Orange Free State came into being. Great but useless efforts were made by the missionary parties and British settlers to avert this; the Crimean War absorbed too much of the attention of the Home Government to leave any for the complaints of a handful of missionaries and farmers.

In 1852, the energetic, hot-headed soldier Sir Harry Smith was recalled, and eventually succeeded by a real statesman in the person of Sir George Grey (1854–9). Cape Colony had just made a step forward in her constitutional history by the creation of a representative Parliament of two elective Chambers, a Legislative Council and a House of Assembly (1853). Members were elected by a franchise conferred on all British subjects over twenty-one years of age, with a low property qualification and without distinction of race or colour. The qualification was slightly raised later, and an educational test added (1892); but the franchise remains the most liberal in South Africa. The Governor, who was nominated by the Crown, appointed the executive officials, notably the Governor's Council, members of which did not resign on defeat of their measures in Legislative Council or Assembly. Sir George Grey did much to promote the welfare of the colony, and was far ahead of his time in proposing a scheme of federation for all the South African States, which probably would have been supported by the infant Boer republics, had it received approval in England. The readiness of the Boers, especially in the Free State, to listen to such a proposal was undoubtedly due to their unexpected difficulties in managing their own

affairs. The Orangia burghers waged perpetual war with the Basutos, over whom they did not begin to get the upper hand till 1864. As for the Transvaal, it was for many years in a condition of chaos. There were, at least, four separate republics in different districts, Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Potchefstroom, and Utrecht—a fact afterwards commemorated in the *Vierkleur* (flag of four colours) which became the national flag of the Transvaal. It was not till 1857 that the *Grondwet*, or Constitution, was drawn up at Potchefstroom as an attempt at organisation, and in 1858 was accepted by Zoutpansberg. Its principal points were the abjuration of slavery (already stipulated in the Sand River Convention), and the restriction of all the rights of citizenship to the white inhabitants alone. The territory was open to all strangers who obeyed the laws; every able-bodied male was subject to be called out on *commando*; suffrage was granted to every burgher of twenty-one, but not to natives, bastards, or members of any Church save the Dutch Reformed Church. No churches of any save the State religion might be built. The President was elected for five years, and was assisted by an Executive Council of four, and by the *Raad*, a representative body of twelve members. In 1860 this Constitution was accepted by the previously united republics of Lydenburg and Utrecht, and the Transvaal Republic was fairly launched, with Marthinus Wessel Pretorius as its first President (1857-60). Civil war again intervened, but in 1864 Pretorius was accepted by all as the legal President, while Stephen John Paul Kruger, who, as a small boy, had shared in the "Great Trek" of 1836, became commandant-general. The question of revenue was a pressing one in the new Republic, since its citizens disliked nothing so much as paying taxes, and indeed had forgotten the use of money, and used cattle and crops for barter during their wanderings. Even to-day the *backveldt* Boer is chary of any transaction which means parting with cash. In addition the vast territory north of the Vaal was very sparsely settled, and many strangers from all parts of Africa and Europe flocked to this free and lawless country, which became a veritable Alsatia.

No sketch of South African history, however brief, would be complete without some account of the part played by the Dutch Reformed Church and its synods. Among the earliest acts of the Dutch in South Africa was the formation of presbyteries, and round the Church organisation their whole social and political life was built up. When the "Great Trek" was carried out, the emigrant farmers took with them their Bible, their Church forms, and a sense of allegiance to their mother Church and the Cape Synod. For twelve years they had no regular places of worship and only the occasional ministrations of a Natal minister. When their communities began to form and settle, however, the Cape sent missionaries to visit them—only to find that, while holding firmly to the faith founded on the Confession of Dort and adopted by the Dutch Reformed Church, they were not inclined to any form of



dependence on the Cape. In the conflicts that ensued between the various Boer communities, the question of dependence on the Cape Synod was frequently debated, but eventually the Transvaal and Orange Free State established their own synods, in communion with, though independent of, the Cape. At the same time a secession took place from the orthodox body, owing to the influence of a minister of a dissenting sect in Holland. He drew away a number of Boers, including Paul Kruger, and founded the "*Gereformeerde*" or "*Dopper*" ("Roundhead") Church, which had a great influence on the future course of Transvaal politics. Its distinguishing feature was a narrow nationalism, opposed to the wider ideas of an Africander nation which was already dawning, and a bigoted opposition to most of the tendencies of modern civilisation. Its ministers were drawn from the dissenting colleges—not the great State colleges of Holland; and their influence was that of narrow, bigoted, and often ignorant men opposed to any movement which would take their people into a world of wider experience and opportunities. The Cape Colony seminaries about this period began to supply ministers for the orthodox Churches of the Transvaal; and both they and their brothers in the colony (mostly recruited from Holland) were concerned to preserve that Dutch nationality on which the supremacy of their Church depended. This tendency did not become plainly visible until the sixties, when the gradual strengthening of the Government at Cape Town, under representative institutions, led to the beginning of state-regulated education. The management of schools and selection of teachers (hitherto the prerogative of local committees and therefore of local *predikants*) was then partly assumed by the Superintendent of Education. In no country, not even in Ireland, has the influence of the Church been so prominent. The *predikants* have always taken a leading part in politics as well as in education, and their influence has almost invariably been on the side of Dutch rather than that of a broad South African nationalism.

In this sketch of the position of the Church we have slightly anticipated the march of events, especially in the Cape, which we left in its first stage of self-government. An extraordinary occurrence in 1857 destroyed many of the Kosas, a tribe lodged in the territory between the Keiskama and the Kei—the abandoned province of Queen Adelaide, which had been reabsorbed as a separate province under military rule, under the title of British Kaffraria. Sir George Grey did all he could to further the progress of the natives, and among other institutions encouraged the foundation of Lovedale—the Free Church educational mission which was to become the nucleus of the native college of South Africa. The Kosas, however, were the victims of their own superstitions. Certain prophets—probably with the ulterior motive of forcing the natives to attack the English—promised them the return of their national heroes, if they destroyed all their cattle and crops; in

consequence, the natives deliberately deprived themselves of the means of subsistence, and died of starvation in thousands. Some of the gaps thus created were filled by settlers on a military tenure, taken from the Anglo-German legion disbanded after the Crimean War; but more permanent settlements were made by German and Swiss peasants. The peculiar conditions of farming in South Africa and the jealousy between the eastern and western provinces, with their respective English and Dutch complexions, retarded the economic prosperity of the colony for a time; but two great sources of prosperity for South Africa were at length revealed, in 1869-70, by the discovery of diamonds at Dutoitspan and Bulfontein, and by the establishment of ostrich farming.

In 1866, the long struggle between the Free State and the Basutos seemed about to end in favour of the former, when Moshesh appealed for protection to Great Britain. His request was granted, and the protests of the burghers were met by the Treaty of Aliwal North (February 12, 1869), by which a strip of territory lying to the west of the Caledon was incorporated in the Free State. This district, known as the "Conquered territory," has some of the best farming land in South Africa. The Free State resented the intervention of Britain, although, by the definite relations now established, the Basutos were henceforth kept in check by Great Britain. In 1871 Basutoland was formally annexed to Cape Colony and was governed henceforward under a system resembling that in certain protected Indian native States. The native chiefs enjoy considerable discretionary powers, but are under the tutelage of British Residents and subject to the direct administration of the High Commissioner.

The same year which saw the annexation of Basutoland to Cape Colony witnessed the sensational find of diamonds at Old De Beers and Colesberg Kopje, and the rush of miners to the spot which led to the foundation of Kimberley. In a few months the population on the small area of diamond fields increased to 10,000, and a question arose as to the ownership of the territory, which was claimed by the Griqua chief, Waterboer, and by the Free State. A Court of arbitration presided over by Lieutenant-Governor Keate of Natal, decided in favour of Waterboer, who at once offered both land and people to Queen Victoria. The dispute was not settled till 1876, when the Free State accepted a compensation of £90,000. The enormous impetus given to the development of South Africa by the discovery of diamonds brought about a change of attitude on the part of the Home Government. At the same time the influx of miners, not only to the diamond mines but to the Transvaal (where gold had been found in 1867 at the Tati and in 1871 at Zoutpansberg), led to internal changes which Boer conservatism was powerless to resist. This was especially true with regard to the beginnings of urban life, which could only have otherwise developed very slowly among a people so essentially pastoral in their habits.

Meanwhile, the colony of Natal, which received a representative

system in 1856, was chiefly occupied with the serious question of the control of the numerous natives surrounding her tiny handful of white inhabitants. Between 1848 and 1851 some four to five thousand English emigrants arrived; but not all remained. The disadvantages of dwelling in a country so largely occupied by the black man were obvious, and after the British occupation great numbers of natives took refuge in Natal, where they multiplied exceedingly. In 1848, occurred a serious native outbreak, which was put down by the colonists with promptitude, but (so far as can be judged from our knowledge of the circumstances) without undue severity. Their action was, however, censured in England, owing to the representations of the Aborigines Protection Society and Bishop Colenso, and the Governor was in consequence recalled. The impossibility of obtaining adequate labour, even with the teeming black population, for the cultivation of sugar, cotton, and other tropical produce, led to the importation of coolies, on contract from India, many of whom settled. A regular stream of Indian settlers followed, so that Natal has now three distinct races, of which the white is the least numerous.

The year 1872, which marks the beginning of responsible government in the original colony of South Africa, found her in the first flush of the diamond fever. She was already face to face with the two most serious questions in her development—how to work the black population into a social and political scheme which would secure them justice and liberty, while leaving the reins of government in white hands; and how to reconcile the conflicting interests of town and country, which coincide so closely with the racial division between Briton and Boer. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 inevitably made a great difference to the Cape, which ceased to be the halfway house between Europe and India. It was only by a development of her *hinterland* that the colony could hope to make up for what she had lost. Thrown upon her own resources she would have had a hard fight for existence as a pastoral and agricultural country, since she has to contend with conditions far less favourable than those, for instance, of the Australasian colonies. But the rapid upspringing of mining communities gave an impetus; and their organisation into great industries, on a more permanent basis than that of most mining enterprises, has entirely modified the economic position of Cape Colony by supplying the much needed industrial element. In 1871 there came, also, to South Africa the man who was to play so great a part in controlling its destinies—Cecil John Rhodes.

The year which saw Cape Colony embark on a fresh stage of its career in more senses than one, found the Orange Free State settling down to a period of peace and prosperity. The republic across the Vaal was just losing its President Pretorius (1871), who was succeeded by a Cape colonist, the Reverend Thomas François Burgers. The emigrant farmers had hardly as yet coalesced into a genuine State; but President Burgers, who was a man of education, intended to give them a more

civilised form of government. They were still at war with native tribes, in the north and north-east particularly, and also endeavouring by treaties and concessions to obtain that foothold in Bechuanaland which would have cut the British colonists off from possible expansion northwards. Already, the necessity of an outlet to the sea had caused Pretorius to make an effort to secure Delagoa Bay—an attempt which was foiled by the action of Great Britain and Portugal. But the action eventually led (1869) to a commercial treaty between Portugal and the Transvaal, which was afterwards to be of great importance to the latter.

In conclusion, the period which ends with the grant of responsible government to the Cape had seen the modification of the views of the Home Government on the native question; and, from this time forward, an increasing tendency to entrust the native policy to South African hands becomes evident.

#### (4) THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALASIA.

(1815-70.)

The history of Australasia during 1815-71 falls into four periods—one in which new penal establishments were founded in the interests of free settlement; one in which free settlement extinguished the convict system; and one of conflict, and one of harmony, between the Home and the colonial Governments. In New South Wales these periods coincided with the rule of autocratic Governors, nominee Councils, representative Councils, and responsible Ministers, respectively.

In 1815 the first judge of the Supreme Civil Court of New South Wales had just arrived from England, while two magistrates acted as jury; but criminal justice was still administered by a Judge-Advocate and six officers. In 1819, in consequence of appointments by Governor Macquarie of ex-convict magistrates and of protests received by the Home Government, John Thomas Bigge proceeded to Australia on a commission of enquiry. By an Act based on his Reports (1822-3) the first nominee Legislative Council and the first criminal judge and attorney-general were appointed (1824). Questions of fact were to be decided in the Criminal Court by seven officers or magistrates; in the Civil Court by two assessors or a jury; and at Quarter Sessions (until 1828) by a jury. Similar privileges were accorded to Van Diemen's Land, which was separated from New South Wales in 1825. By an Act of 1828 the Governor was deprived of power to suspend the Constitution; and control over the application of the proceeds of taxation was entrusted to the Council. These political changes were the result of physical and economic growth.

Before 1816, Australian farmers lived like Indian ryots, in equal dread of plenty and dearth. Surplus corn could not be sold or even used until

distillation was allowed (1822); and, but for India and the Cape, dearth would have spelt death. In 1816—a year of scarcity—relief came not only from India but from Van Diemen's Land, which was thenceforth the supplementary granary of New South Wales; and the last fears of famine were dispelled. Scarcity of corn and credit led in 1811 to large payments by the State being made in rum or rum monopolies; but Lord Liverpool sent a consignment of dollars from India, which arrived in 1813. In 1817 the Bank of New South Wales was incorporated; and, although its cash reserve in 1821 consisted only of £4462 in dollars, its operations relieved urban colonists from recourse to consumable substitutes for coin.

In 1815 a road to Bathurst was opened over the dividing range which Lawson, Wentworth, Blaxland and Evans had crossed for the first time in 1813. Next, a road was built south-west to the vicinity of Goulburn on the crest of the same range, along a route discovered by Hume in 1814. Then, a way from Sydney to its only mainland sub-settlement at Newcastle was discovered (1820), and here too a road was built. These roads stimulated settlement, and advanced the frontiers of Sydney district 100 miles in three directions. Lastly, Oxley, after vainly exploring the Lachlan and Macquarie 300 miles out west, crossed Liverpool Plains to Port Macquarie, whence he returned to Newcastle by land. His discoveries bore fruit both on Liverpool Plains and at Port Macquarie.

Bigge advocated the use of bad convicts as pioneers, who were to work in gangs as far away as possible from the main army of civilisation, and the dispersion of the better convicts amongst settlers as assigned labourers. Accordingly, convict gangs were moved on from Newcastle to Port Macquarie (1820) and Brisbane (1824), which had been discovered in 1823. Nor were those retreats secure from intrusion. Cunningham crossed the great range from Newcastle, passed through Liverpool Plains and New England to Darling Downs (1827), and discovered an easy route thence to Brisbane (1828). At the same time the Australian Agricultural Company, which had been incorporated in England for the purpose of buying, cultivating, and eventually reselling land (1824), began farming on a gigantic scale on Liverpool Plains and north of Newcastle, so that Port Macquarie was enveloped on its south and west; and the same fate overtook Brisbane, when the Darling Downs were occupied in 1840. Convict gangs were being crowded out of eastern Australia. Accident provided other refuges for the displaced in the south-west, and north; but these refuges were only temporary. In 1824–5, Hume travelled south-west from Goulburn, over 400 miles of untrodden wastes, to Port Phillip, which his companion mistook for Western Port. In 1826 a convict settlement was established at Western Port, and also at Albany (Western Australia), Melville Island, and Raffles Bay (Northern Territory), in order to prevent annexation by a French squadron, which arrived in Australia on a voyage of discovery in that year. The first settlement was abandoned in 1827,

and the rest in 1829, on the return of the squadron to France. In 1826, Norfolk Island was reopened as a convict establishment.

A similar process went on in Van Diemen's Land, but without promoting settlement. In 1818 the south-east of the island, excepting Tasman's Peninsula, and its centre, from Launceston to Hobart, were occupied. In 1825 detached tracts of land in the north-west were occupied by a Corporation similar to the Australian Agricultural Company and styled "The Van Diemen's Land Company." During the twenties escaped prisoners from Macquarie Harbour, which was in the wild west, and assigned servants from other parts, turned bushrangers; they plundered the settlers, and attacked the blacks, making the island what was facetiously called a "vandemonium." Then the blacks attacked the settlers, but were vanquished and deported to Flinders Island (1829-35), where they finally died out (1876). Shortly after 1829, the convicts of Macquarie Harbour were removed to Tasman's Peninsula, where they were more safe though equally useless.

We have now reached the second period. Before 1824 Australian colonies were essentially penal settlements. The free, who ever since 1805 and 1824 outnumbered the bond in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land respectively, consisted mainly of ex-convicts and the children of the bond. The making of history was due to a mere handful of ex-officers in the old New South Wales corps, like McArthur, Lawson and Bell; of officials, like Marsden, Evans, Oxley, and Cunningham; of colonial-born sons of officials, like Hume and Wentworth; and of capitalists introduced by McArthur, like Blaxland. After Waterloo the dread of over-population filled men's minds; successive Parliamentary Reports preached, and the two land companies practised, emigration; and, in the middle twenties, a few hundred persons emigrated annually to Australia. Some effect was produced; rural land changed hands for 5s. an acre; the Government sold land competitively (1826), and divided the settled districts of New South Wales into nineteen counties, in which upset prices were put upon land (1826-9).

Several events now occurred which transferred Australian destinies from freedmen to free men and made the convict system an anachronism. In Western Australia French explorers paid marked attention to the Swan River (1823), which was accordingly resurveyed (1827); and an appeal was made by the English colonial authorities to private enterprise to found the first free Australian colony (1828). Grants of land were offered to capitalists who exported labourers or stock at their own cost, or who applied capital to the soil. This appeal to self-interest, unaided by privileges, monopolies, joint-stock companies, or the promise of state support, was successful—a success unique in English history. Captain Stirling, R.N., was appointed the first Governor of Western Australia; Perth became its capital, and Fremantle and Albany its ports; and nearly 4000 immigrants arrived (1829-31). Much capital was lost, and the

colony relied during this period on small annual grants in aid by the Home authorities. The success, though genuine, was dearly bought. In 1831, an Order in Council was issued by Lord Goderich, that land should be sold by auction at not less than 5s. an acre, and that the proceeds of sale should constitute a fund for the importation of immigrants by Government; and in 1835 bounties became payable out of the fund to employers who imported working men or women at their own expense. In 1839-40 the upset price was raised to 12s. and £1 an acre, and the latter price was confirmed by an English Act (1842). Assisted immigration transformed New South Wales; thus in 1832 its population was 53,524; and in the next ten years 70,081 immigrants arrived, six-sevenths of whom were assisted.

In 1828-30 Captain Sturt rounded off Oxley's discoveries by tracing the Lachlan and Macquarie into the Darling, the Darling into the Murray, and the Murray into Encounter Bay. On receipt of this news the National Colonisation Society, formed in England in 1830, started a South Australian Association, to promote settlement by free people on the shores of Spencer's Gulf (1833). By their efforts an Act was passed incorporating South Australian Commissioners with power to sell land between 132° and 141° east long., and south of 26° south lat. at a fixed price of 12s. or more an acre, the proceeds to be devoted to immigration (1834). In 1836 a cultivating land-jobbing joint-stock company, called the South Australian Company, raised £200,000, bought land-orders from the Commissioners, and equipped the first fleet, which sailed to Kangaroo Island, Captain Hindmarsh, R.N., the Governor, following in December. Early in 1837 Adelaide was selected as the capital. The settlers fell into difficulties; under his successor, Colonel Gawler, and when Major (afterwards Sir George) Grey arrived as Governor (1841) there was a deficit of £300,000; and bankruptcy and pauperism prevailed.

Major Sir Thomas Mitchell's explorations of 1835-6 covered much the same ground as those of Captain Sturt, except that, instead of following the Murray down-stream, he descended on Portland Bay, whence he travelled across what is now Victoria to Albury. He found one Tasmanian squatter at Portland Bay, and two or three more had just reached the site of Melbourne. Mitchell's praises of the new country sent many thousands of immigrants overland from Sydney, and oversea from Van Diemen's Land, and Melbourne was founded by Sir Richard Bourke, the Governor of New South Wales (1837). Such was the inflow of immigrants that in 1841 the white inhabitants numbered 11,700. The new country was governed from Sydney, although it had a Superintendent at Melbourne, and its accounts were kept separately.

Lastly, a new free colony was founded in New Zealand. Whalers and sealers from Sydney had been in the habit of paying prolonged visits to New Zealand ever since 1792; Maori, as the natives call themselves, used to serve on board fishing vessels; a thousand nondescript

vagabond Englishmen, mostly from Australia, haunted Foveaux Straits, Cook's Straits, and the Bay of Islands. Since Marsden established his mission at the Bay of Islands (1814), the Maori had been rapidly embracing Christianity. In 1833, Busby arrived in Kororarika in the Bay of Islands as Resident, subject to the Governor of New South Wales, in order to advise this mixed multitude; and, in 1835, he organised a league of tribes as a bulwark against French encroachment. In 1835 de Thiery, who had purchased land at Hokianga, boasted at Tahiti of his sovereignty over New Zealand and the Marquesas; from 1837 to 1840, a French fleet patrolled the Pacific and annexed Tahiti and the Marquesas, in order to protect French missions; in 1838, a French mission was established at Hokianga, and Langlois bought Banks' Peninsula on behalf of a French Company, in which Louis-Philippe was a shareholder. The danger was therefore not visionary. It led, too, to the formation of a New Zealand Association (1837) modelled on the South Australian Association, and of a New Zealand Company modelled on the South Australian Company. This Company sold 100,000 acres of unbought Maori lands, and in 1839 despatched Colonel William Wakefield, who bought on its behalf the sites of Wellington, Nelson, Taranaki, and other lands.

A few weeks after Wakefield's departure the Government sent out Captain Hobson, R.N., who with missionary aid concluded the Treaty of Waitangi (February 6, 1840), under which every prominent chief ceded his sovereignty to the Queen on condition of the title of the chiefs and tribes to their lands and wastes being recognised, the Crown reserving preemptive rights over these lands and wastes. One of Hobson's first acts as Governor was to send Captain Stanley, R.N., to Banks' Peninsula, who on his arrival took possession four or five days before the arrival of a French frigate with Langlois' colonists. In 1841 Hobson shifted his capital from Kororarika to Auckland, the site of which was bought from the Maori and resold to settlers. Then, the Crown waived its preemptive rights over native lands in favour of the New Zealand Company, proportionately to the immigrants and capital they introduced; and a Commissioner was appointed to settle the land claims of Colonel Wakefield's purchasers and settlers, some thousands of whom had already arrived. The award, published in 1845, caused discontent among the representatives of the New Zealand Company, none of whom had realised the almost Hindu complexity of Maori land tenures. While the claims to the valley of the Wairau were still *sub judice*, Captain Arthur Wakefield, R.N., a brother of Colonel Wakefield, took fifty colonists to arrest a chief named Te Rauparaha for obstructing his surveyor; a skirmish ensued; the natives, more numerous but worse armed, won the day, and killed Captain Wakefield with eighteen of his followers (1843). Captain Robert Fitzroy, R.N., who was then Governor, thought the colonists in the wrong, and abstained from action. He failed, too, to quell the disorders known as Heke's Rebellion,



which culminated in the burning of Kororarika. In grappling with the economic crisis which affected Australasia he issued "debentures," which were disallowed, waived the preemptive rights of the Crown over Maori lands for a penny an acre, and abolished customs duties. He was recalled in 1845 and succeeded by Sir George Grey.

These events produced two effects; the large expenditure first causing an inevitable reaction, during which trade, credit, and prices collapsed; in Adelaide and Auckland inconvertible paper-money was current, and in Sydney inconvertible legal tender notes were advocated by the Council (1843). Secondly, the English propagandists of emigration, including Archbishop Whately and Dr Arnold, enhanced the attractions of free colonies by depicting convict colonies in the darkest colours. In 1837-8 a Parliamentary Committee was appointed, took evidence, and recommended the abolition of transportation. Accordingly, the transportation of convicts to New South Wales ceased in 1840; penal establishments were removed to Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island; and Brisbane, which was now purged, was sold to settlers (1842). The same Committee secured the abolition of the practice of assigning convicts, who had been invaluable as shepherds. Wool was the staple export of Australia; shepherds were scarce, and the interests of sheepmasters began to conflict with those of the rest of the community. Town was opposed to country.

The disappearance of convicts was accompanied by English Acts instituting in New South Wales trial by jury in criminal cases (1839) and a quinquennial Legislative Council with 36 members, two-thirds of whom were elected by voters with a property franchise (1840). The Act of 1840 also authorised the Queen by charter to sever from New South Wales territory north of 26° lat., and the Governor to establish elective district Councils by proclamation. In 1842 the South Australian Commissioners were abolished; and South Australia became a Crown colony with a nominee Legislative Council like Van Diemen's Land and New Zealand.

During the third period the Legislative Council of New South Wales was acutely conscious that the only matters in which it was interested, namely, the trade, the lands, and the peopling of Australia, were matters over which it had no control. Wrongly attributing the distress of 1840 to the English Orders in Council and the Act raising the price of Crown lands (1842), it demanded their repeal. An English Act (1846), and Order in Council (1847), divided the country into settled, intermediate and unsettled districts, and converted squatting licenses into leases for one, eight, and fourteen years respectively, with preemptive rights for the squatters, except in settled districts. This measure occasioned still greater ferment, urban politicians exclaiming that squatters were being endowed, rural politicians that squatters were being robbed.

With regard to convicts the Home authorities made mistakes, the extent of which was exaggerated. Squatters wanted stockmen; and exiles or comparatively venial criminals, pardoned on condition of not

returning home, were sent out in answer to rural petitions to supply the void. In 1848, in pursuance of a resolution of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, ticket-of-leave men were sent out as well as exiles, but without the free people for whom the Council stipulated. The omission aroused stormy protests in Sydney and Melbourne. Van Diemen's Land, which was overloaded with convicts, organised an Anti-Transportation League with federal branches in eastern Australia (1850), and transportation to New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land finally ceased in 1851 and 1853 respectively. Meanwhile Western Australia, the first free Australian colony, petitioned for convicts (1849), which it received during 1850-68. During that time this colony remained outside the main stream of Australasian history socially, politically, and economically.

Stagnation in Western Australia and extensive and intensive development in eastern Australia contributed to these results. In 1844-5 Leichhardt travelled through unknown country from Darling Downs to Port Essington (Northern Territory), which was at that time occupied by marines as a port of call (1838-50); Mitchell explored the headwaters of the Maranoa and Warrego, thus completing the exploration of the Darling-Murray river system, and Sturt's (1844) and Kennedy's explorations (1845) made the Barcoo or Cooper's Creek river system known. These expeditions created Queensland. Hitherto, Brisbane had been an appendage of Sydney; it now began to be the capital of the country on its north and west. Three fruitless expeditions followed these discoveries. Eyre travelled along the Great Bight from Adelaide to Albany; Leichhardt started to cross from Darling Downs to the west coast; and Kennedy went overland to Cape York. The last two journeys ended disastrously (1848), and the fate of Leichhardt and his numerous retinue is shrouded in mystery. Purchase did for New Zealand what exploration did for Australia. During his first period of rule (1845-53) Sir George Grey, after subduing Heke, Te Rauparaha, and their associates, by physical and moral force, bought almost all South Island, the east coast district of North Island from Wellington to Napier, and some scattered coastal plots north-west of Wellington. Roads were built connecting Wellington with the newly purchased lands on its north-east and north-west. The greater part of South Island was uninhabited, and was bought for less than 1s. a square mile.

In Australia adversity was followed by prosperity. During Sir George Grey's government (1841-5) wheat fields, copper mines, and a gift of about £200,000 by the Home authorities made South Australia solvent and prosperous. The recovery of New South Wales was equally rapid, owing partly to the thrift of Sir George Gipps, partly to the revival of its neighbours, but chiefly to the discovery of gold. Hargraves of Sydney, who had been a gold-digger in California (1849), discovered gold near Bathurst, and informed the Governor, Sir Charles Fitzroy, who opened the first Australian goldfield in May, 1851. Further discoveries were made; and

before 1852 goldfields were opened in Victoria at Ballarat and Bendigo. The wild rush from Port Phillip to the diggings, fifty or a hundred miles away, threatened to disorganise every industry; but the disturbance was only temporary. In five years Victoria exported £39,000,000, and New South Wales £7,000,000 in gold, without diminishing their normal exports, except in 1852-3. The effect on population was unparalleled. If we may anticipate the colonial boundaries which were subsequently adopted, the figures of population for the years 1850-1 and 1855-6, in each respective case, were as follows: New South Wales 187,000, 253,000; Victoria 77,000, 364,000; South Australia 64,000, 97,000; Tasmania, 69,000, 70,000. The New Zealand figures were in 1851, 27,000, in 1856, 46,000; those of Queensland were in 1850-1, 9000, in 1856, 17,000. The increased population was due to a vast spontaneous immigration, not from the sister colonies, but from the mother country. Spontaneous immigration, which before 1851 had been almost limited to capitalists, became for the first time a force in Australian history.

Great constitutional changes accompanied these revolutions in the nature, number, distribution, and pursuits of the population. In 1845, the New Zealand Company asked to be made proprietors of a province, which was to consist of South Island and the neighbourhood of Wellington, and was to be regarded as a colony won by occupation, while the rest of North Island was to be regarded as a colony won by cession. Their request was refused; but, in December, 1846, Earl Grey, then Secretary for the Colonies, divided New Zealand into these two provinces, and tentatively suggested a scheme for their federal government. Objections were taken to indirect election, which was a feature in the scheme, and to subsidiary provisions which threatened the confiscation of native waste lands; accordingly, the scheme was suspended for five years by an English Act (1848). During the suspension, Sir George Grey created a nominee Council for the southern province, and with Earl Grey discussed and devised the ultimately adopted scheme. In the meantime, the New Zealand Company sold Otago to an "Association of lay members of the Free Church of Scotland," and Canterbury Plains to a body of English Churchmen incorporated as the "Canterbury Association" (1848). Shortly afterwards it expired. As discussion proceeded, the two provinces swelled to six, and were named Auckland, New Plymouth, Wellington, Nelson, Canterbury, and Otago. Each province was to have an elected Superintendent and Council, with power to legislate on various matters, subject to the assent of the Governor. Intercolonial matters such as those concerned with the system of government, with the authority of the supreme Court of Law, with customs, currency, posts and the like, were reserved to the General Assembly of the Colony. The latter was to consist of the Governor, and of two Houses, the Legislative Council being nominated for life, and the House of Representatives being elected on a property franchise. Elections were to be direct. As before, the

Governor was to be autocratic in buying native lands and in dealing with the natives, but no means were provided for making his autocracy effective. This arrangement was embodied in an English Act (1852), and came into force after Sir George Grey's departure (1854).

In Australia, as in New Zealand, the necessity for division provided the opportunity for reform. In response to demands for the separation of Victoria from New South Wales, Earl Grey proposed (1847) to give to the district Councils, created by the Act of 1842, the election of the representative chamber of each colony; to endow each colony with a bicameral Constitution, and to federate Australia under a Governor-General and a central legislature. Western Australia was excluded until it should become self-supporting. Indirect election, and the fact that the district Councils of 1842 had never taken root, were obvious objections to the scheme, which was accordingly withdrawn.

In 1848 Earl Grey's scheme was revised by the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, which advised the creation of a federal "House of Delegates" from the colonial legislatures, and the grant to the latter of Constitutions, modelled on that of New South Wales, but with power to prepare plans for responsible government (1849). This advice was embodied in the necessary English Act (1850); and the new Constitutions for Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania—the new name adopted by Van Diemen's Land—came into force in 1851. All these colonies adopted responsible institutions with power to change their Constitution, with control over Crown lands and the proceeds of sale thereof, and with power to impose customs duties, unless differential. These arrangements were modified in 1873, but it would appear that, until 1895 no Australian colony could have granted a preference to the United Kingdom. In all these schemes the Upper House was longer lived and composed of fewer members than the Lower House. In New South Wales members of the Upper House were nominated for life, elsewhere they were elected on a high property franchise from large electoral stricts, or, as in South Australia, from one electorate co-extensive with the colony. Federation was ignored. Imperial Acts sanctioned these arrangements (1855), which came into operation in 1856. One result of the Crimean War was that the Departments of War and the Colonies were separated, and a Secretary of State for the Colonies alone appointed (1854).

During the fourth period constitutional, agrarian, and mining legislation in the different Australasian colonies advanced on parallel lines. South Australia, from the first, adopted triennial Parliaments; manhood suffrage for the Assembly, and a sexennial elective Council. In a few years all her sister colonies conformed to the South Australian type, New South Wales alone retaining her nominee Council. Again, South Australia secured free trade in land by the enactment in 1858 of Sir Robert Torrens' system of registering titles to land; and the other

Australasian colonies promptly followed her example. Everywhere the ready-money sales by auction, and the immigration funds established in 1831 and 1842, were swept away, and unimproved rural land was opened to "free selection"—a process which meant different things in different colonies, but the essence of which was to reestablish non-competitive conditional purchases of limited rural holdings with deferred payments, and to bring less settled districts more into line with those that were wholly settled.

Victorian gold attracted Chinamen; disorders took place; and a £10 entrance fee was imposed, first in Victoria (1855), then in adjacent colonies. Still graver disorders arose at Ballarat (1854). Tactless searches for unlicensed gold-diggers, and the unpunished murder of a drunken digger provoked riots, and in one case arson. A Commission was appointed, with the avowed purpose of superseding the licenses, and the murderer was duly tried and condemned. But the rioters were not pacified. They hoisted a rebel flag, drilled, built a fort, and hustled the soldiers and police. On December 3, 1854, the soldiers stormed the Eureka Stockade, as the fort was called, losing seventeen, but inflicting a loss of twice that number. Twelve prisoners were tried for high treason and acquitted. Lalor, the ringleader, who was wounded in the assault, was not tried, and afterwards became Speaker of the Victorian Assembly. The system of issuing monthly licenses to gold-diggers was abolished.

The colonies vied with one another, not only in legislation but in exploration. This chiefly concerned Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia. Sir Augustus Gregory crossed from the Western Australian border to Carpentaria, followed a variant of Leichhardt's route to Brisbane, and then went by the Barcoo and Cooper's Creek to Adelaide (1855-6). In 1859, Queensland, whose squatters were just reaching the Burdekin and Barcoo, was severed from New South Wales, and received a Constitution like that of its parent colony. In 1860, Burke and Wills headed a Victorian expedition from Cooper's Creek to the Gulf of Carpentaria, and perished on their return at Cooper's Creek. Numerous search parties traversed Carpentaria, and the Georgina and Diamantina districts, which were occupied shortly afterwards. In 1862, Stuart crossed the continent from Adelaide to Adelaide River and back; then, Northern Territory, or the territory north of 26° lat., was added to South Australia, Port Darwin was founded, and a telegraph wire was constructed along Stuart's arid track to connect it with an English cable at Port Darwin (1872). Stations were occupied along the wire, but at long intervals. In 1870 Sir John Forrest traced out a telegraph route from Albany to Adelaide, which proved to be Eyre's route reversed.

In the same year representative institutions were introduced into Western Australia, which now reentered the general political life of the continent. Its connexion with convicts had already ceased. The

population of Australasia in 1871 was as follows: Victoria, 731,528; New South Wales, 503,981; South Australia, 185,626; Queensland, 120,104; Tasmania, 101,785; Western Australia, 25,353; New Zealand, 256,393.

The progress of New Zealand thus disclosed was due partly to the energy of the provinces, which were now ten in number, Hawke's Bay having been severed from Wellington, Westland and Marlborough from Nelson, and Southland from Otago; partly to gold discoveries, chiefly in Westland and Otago, and partly to the agricultural riches of Canterbury. South Island developed like Victoria, though on a smaller scale. Meanwhile, so much of North Island as lay south of Auckland and north of a line drawn from the mouth of the Whanganui to Napier, underwent experiences unlike any to which Australian colonists were exposed.

Owing to the construction put upon the property franchise, the Maori had no vote, and their dealings with Europeans were still regulated by the Governor, whose responsibility was personal. Sir George Grey's personal influence over the Maori was immense; that of his successor, Sir Thomas Gore Browne, was *nil*. Moreover, Governor Browne saw things through the eyes of a "native department," controlled by the colonial Ministers. So the Maori tried to work out their own salvation; and three allied tribes, which inhabited the Waikato district, banded themselves together, one of the three chiefs calling himself King. No conflict resulted from this empty assumption. But at Taranaki, the capital of New Plymouth, the ideas and interests of colonists and Maori were diametrically opposed. The awards of 1845 seriously cramped Taranaki; the most influential chiefs opposed further sales of their tribelands; and Sir Edward Stafford's Ministry passed Bills for partitioning tribelands, which the Home authorities disallowed. About this time Parris, a sub-commissioner for the purchase by the Crown of Maori lands, purchased from Taylor, a member of the Ngati-Awa, the "Waitara block" on the left bank of the Waitara, near Taranaki (1859). Taylor was repudiated by William King, the most important chief of the Ngati-Awa, who occupied the block. Parris was justified by his departmental superior, Sir Donald MacLean, and by the colonial Ministry, although the claim of an individual and relatively unimportant tribesman to sell tribelands would not now be seriously entertained. Governor Browne, without further enquiry, summoned his Executive Council, and with their approval issued orders; whereupon King's tribesmen and their local allies were attacked and driven off the Waitara block (1860). Technically the Governor was alone responsible, but the Executive Council of Ministers, one of whom gave orders directly to Parris, shared the blame. On the other side, Te Rewi, one of the three principal chiefs of the "King-State," though hitherto hostile to William King, sent warriors to his aid. An armed truce ensued, King's local allies occupying Tataraimaka block—which was admittedly English—English soldiers occupying Waitara block.

In 1861 Sir George Grey succeeded Sir Thomas Gore Browne as

Governor, accepted the inevitable, and devolved responsibility for native policy on the colonial Government (November, 1861)—an arrangement which the Duke of Newcastle ratified (August, 1862), and which the colony finally accepted (December, 1863). Persuasion having failed, Sir George Grey in 1863 reoccupied Tataraimaka bloodlessly, but by force, and urged on his reluctant Ministers the restitution of the Waitara block. Before this was effected the local Maori, instigated by Te Rewi, renewed the war. Te Rewi was to blame, but it is difficult to answer the criticism of the Duke of Newcastle, that "it would have been better if the reoccupation of Tataraimaka and the abandonment of Waitara had been effected at the same time." Owing to Te Rewi's aggression the "King-State" was invaded and conquered, and large tracts near Auckland were confiscated, subject to reserves for natives (1863-4). In 1865 war still smouldered in New Plymouth, where the hostile Maori adopted "Hau-Hauism," an unholy blend between Christianity and tenets which in some cases led to cannibalism. Accordingly a similar policy of confiscation was applied between Taranaki and Whanganui, and a through road was designed. General Cameron, who commanded the troops, denounced this policy, prosecuted the war languidly, and amongst other things refused to attack a fortified position at Weraroa which he declared it impossible to carry. Accordingly, Grey, in Cameron's absence, at the head of a few colonials and some friendly Maori took the impossible position by storm. Thenceforth the war was conducted by colonials and friendly Maori, who, out of disgust for Hau-Hau practices, flocked to the English side. A "Native Rights Act" (September 26, 1865) declared, for the first time, that Maori were natural-born subjects of the Queen; the institution of a native Land Court guaranteed the Maori against the repetition of the blunder of the Waitara block; and the removal of the capital to Wellington assured northerners of help from their southern compatriots.

Although the war dragged on until 1872, the last campaign which could be strictly so called occurred in 1870, when colonial and Maori troops marched across the centre of the island from Whanganui to East Cape. Eleven tribes, few of which had ever fought on the same side before, fought during this campaign under the English banner. The tribes were at last united. Only the "King-State" and some wild mountaineers near East Cape preserved for a time an attitude of unfriendly isolation. Special Maori representation for both Houses of the Assembly was accorded in 1867 and 1871 respectively. The significance of the war, from a Maori point of view, was the union of the two races. Its significance, from an English point of view, was threefold. First, the Treaty of Waitangi made New Zealand a colony by cession; but large parts, especially in South Island, were undistinguishable from colonies acquired by occupation, and now a coastal fringe in North Island was acquired by conquest. Secondly, by the transfer of native control to

the colonial government (1863), responsible institutions were carried to their logical conclusion. Thirdly, as a corollary to this extension of autonomy, Lord Granville withdrew the last imperial troops from New Zealand (October, 1869; March 25, 1870), as well as from Australia. These events assimilated New Zealand to its Australian sister colonies in every important respect, except in its possession of provincial governments, which were not abolished till 1875.

Periodic meetings of the Ministers of different Australasian colonies, and the introduction of Melanesian labourers into the cotton and sugar plantations of Queensland occurred during the sixties, and initiated movements which ended respectively, in the annexation of some islands of the Pacific from 1874 onwards, and in the federation of Australia (1900).



## CHAPTER XXVIII.

## THE FAR EAST.

(1815-71.)

## (1) CHINA AND HER INTERCOURSE WITH WESTERN POWERS.

THE period treated in this section was occupied by a conflict of the acutest character between an ancient civilisation that had become stagnant, and another of much later origin, but of far greater vigour, which had overtaken and outstripped its rival. The Chinese had invented the art of printing from engraved wooden blocks in the sixth century; it was not till the middle of the fifteenth that Europeans discovered the use of movable types—and this fact is typical. Again, the Chinese have never got beyond the use of complicated written characters similar to the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and have neither invented nor adapted an alphabet. These instances will suffice to mark the far-reaching difference between them and Occidental nations.

It will be convenient to divide the period into three portions:—

From 1815 to 1842, the Western Power which carried on the conflict being mainly Great Britain; from 1843 to 1860, when France and the United States began to cooperate with her; from 1860 to 1871, when these and other Powers, including Russia, maintained diplomatic establishments at the Chinese capital, Peking.

Until the middle of the sixteenth century, China had scarcely heard of the existence of Western nations. From time immemorial she had been a centre of enlightenment to the countries in her immediate vicinity—to Corea, Japan, Annam, Siam, Burma and Thibet, most of which recognised her superiority in power and wisdom, and were content with the relation of vassal to suzerain. To use the Chinese expression, “all men under heaven” owed allegiance to the Emperor of China. Other nations came to her to do homage and buy her valuable productions; but of these nations she had no need. That any other sovereign should claim equality with the Emperor was inconceivable. China was the only land of culture, and, in the words of an imperial edict of 1818, “the Empire, in ruling and restraining the barbarians beyond its boundaries, gives to them always fixed rules and regulations. Upon those who are obedient it lavishes its rich favours; but to the rebellious and disobedient it displays its terrors.” “If the barbarians are contumelious, they should be chastised; if brought under subjection, they should be tolerated.” The

Chinese Hong (Guild) merchants were appointed "for the continual instruction and guidance of the barbarians, and to repress their pride and profligacy." The King of England is in official documents constantly described as having been "reverentially submissive," and he is said to have "repeatedly presented tribute." On the occasion of Lord Amherst's embassy to Peking in 1816, it was demanded of him that he should perform the ceremony of thrice kneeling and nine times bowing the head to the ground before the Chinese Emperor; and, because he declined to pay higher marks of respect than he would to his own sovereign, he was dismissed in disgrace without being accorded an audience. In 1857 the American *chargé d'affaires* writes to the High Commissioner at Canton that the fountain of all difficulties between China and foreign nations is the unwillingness of China to acknowledge England, France, America and other great nations of the West as her equals. Even so late as 1870 we find that the Chinese officials, in addressing their own sovereign, continually spoke of the foreign diplomatic representatives as if they were not only the subjects of the Emperor of China, but even the subordinates of the Chinese officials. The treatment to which the foreign merchants and the English officials were subjected corresponded to this haughty language.

These pretensions were not supported by any real military power or capacity. The Chinese were peace-loving, industrious, and imbued with the mercantile spirit. They despised the career of the soldier, and were lacking in the tradition of exploits achieved by warriors against the foreign foe. The Tartars, who had conquered the country in the seventeenth century, had contented themselves with placing garrisons in the principal cities, where the descendants of warlike ancestors soon lost all love of fighting. Their arms, consisting of swords, spears, cannon and matchlocks, were greatly inferior to those possessed by Europeans, and in the art of navigation they were equally at a disadvantage. The rank and file were not wanting in physical courage; but the officers were ignorant of the art of war, incompetent and unfit to lead, so that, when armed conflict arose, the Chinese forces were incapable of effective resistance. They were either put to the rout with the greatest ease, or if they resisted were slain in numbers out of all proportion to the losses of their assailants.

Now, the Englishmen who went to Canton from India belonged to a race that had just emerged triumphantly from a great war in Europe; and they were accustomed to domineer over Asiatics. Ready to resent insults by the application of physical force, they had no fear of an unarmed crowd; and, from their history and traditions, they were not disposed to submit to the exercise over them by their own officials of any authority which was not based upon legal enactments. If such a community could but enlist the sympathy of their own Government in respect to the treatment under which they chafed, the result would

probably be the use of force to redress their wrongs and to obtain for them greater commercial privileges; and the superiority of the British military power promised an easy victory. The task was rendered easier by the want of cohesion among the provinces of China. The Manchu conquerors had thought it more prudent to leave to them a large measure of local autonomy, so long as they paid their quotas for the maintenance of the Court. Particularism was the keynote of both civil and military administration, and the natives of different provinces hardly knew that they had a common country. The troubles that arose in the south did not affect the central or northern parts of the country. If the Governor-General of Canton got into difficulties with the English, if his forts were captured, his war-junks destroyed, and the city itself forced to pay a heavy ransom as the price of being spared an assault, his immediate neighbour, the Governor-General of Fuhkien, did not regard it as his duty to render assistance, or even to abstain from friendly relations with the English, and Cantonese willingly enrolled themselves to carry the scaling ladders for the English troops, which took by assault the forts at the mouth of the river that was the highway to Peking.

In passing judgment upon the decisions taken by Western Governments, and by their agents in the Far East, it should be borne in mind that the usual time required for a report from China to arrive in Europe and for instructions to reach the officers on the spot, was at least ten months, up to 1846; after which date the voyage one way was reduced to about fifty days, and in 1853 to about forty-four. Even after 1864, when telegraphic communication had been partially established, the news of the massacre of Tientsin in July, 1870, took thirty-five days to reach Europe. Governments were therefore much less able than in more modern days to control the proceedings of their agents, while agents, being often obliged to take momentous action, acquired a habit of deciding for themselves rather than await instructions. Although the telegraphic wire is capable of being misused, as a rule it is an instrument that prevents war.

The English trade to China was a monopoly of the East India Company, which traded thither in its own ships. The Company was represented at Canton, the only port open to commerce, by a select committee of supercargoes, who resided ordinarily at Macao, proceeding annually to Canton for the tea season. They were not permitted to bring their wives with them to Canton, to enter the walled city, or to roam about the country. So long as they submitted peacefully to these restrictions they were fairly well treated; but difficulties frequently arose out of affrays between the Chinese people and the foreign sailors, as the Chinese authorities always demanded the surrender of the foreigner who had killed or wounded a Chinese subject. The rule of a life for a life was applied strictly, without any of the mitigations recognised by the Chinese penal code, whether the homicide was

committed accidentally or in self-defence, but there was no interference in commercial disputes where both the parties were foreigners. Besides the Company's ships, other vessels owned in India, known as "country ships," were allowed to engage in the Indian trade, and a certain number of private merchants were also tolerated. As the time drew near for the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1834, the agitation for the abolition of its monopoly of the China trade, fostered by the private traders, and by the merchants of Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield, became too strong to be resisted. It was shown that the annual profits of the Company from the China trade from 1815 to 1829 had averaged over a million sterling. The British Government had been led to believe by reports received from Canton, that the Chinese Government itself desired a change, and that it would welcome the transfer of the control of the trade exercised by the Select Committee to a Superintendent of Trade appointed by the British Government. This was a grievous misunderstanding, which was not discovered until Lord Napier arrived in China and demanded to be received by the Governor-General of Canton on a footing of equality, as the official representative of England.

It is necessary to bear in mind that at this moment the Foreign Secretary was Lord Palmerston, whose presence, either at the Foreign Office or in some other influential position in the Ministry, will be found to cover all the occasions during 1830-65 on which a strong coercive policy in support of British trade was adopted towards the Chinese Government. When the Chinese authorities first heard of the expected abolition of the East India Company's monopoly, they informed the Select Committee that someone must be appointed to take its place; but they had never contemplated the substitution of an official personage, claiming to represent the British Government, for a trading company's commercial agent. The Viceroy accordingly refused to hold any communication with Napier, and threatened to stop the trade unless he withdrew to Macao. Perceiving that the support of a military force alone would enable him to maintain his position, Napier proceeded to Macao. The climate of Canton and his intense application to business had brought on a fever, aggravated by the annoyances and insults to which he was subjected by petty Chinese officials on his passage down. His condition rapidly grew worse, and, a fortnight after he had reached the friendly shelter of the Portuguese colony, death put an end to his troubles on October 11, 1834.

During his stay at Canton Napier urgently recommended to Lord Palmerston the despatch of a small British force with three or four ships of war, which, he judged, would suffice to overcome any opposition, and that possession should be taken of the island of Hongkong. But his letters reached England after Lord Grey's Government had fallen, and came into the hands of the Duke of Wellington, who replied curtly on February 2, 1835, in the tone which the Directors of the Company

had always adopted towards similar representations from the Select Committee, that the King's intention was to establish commercial intercourse, not by force, but by measures of conciliation.

The Superintendency remained at Macao, in accordance with the policy outlined in a memorandum signed by the Duke of Wellington during his short tenure of the Foreign Office in 1835. Unfortunately, no notice was taken of the fact that the authority of the East India Company's representatives had been destroyed, and that the Chinese had not recognised that of the Chief Superintendent of Trade in its place. Hence no control existed over the proceedings of British subjects either ashore or afloat, and to this fact are to be traced the international difficulties that culminated in the war of 1839-42.

Elliot, a naval officer who had been sent out to hold the subordinate office of Master Attendant, on being placed in charge of the Superintendency at the end of 1836, came to the conclusion that it would be better to endeavour to reopen communications with the Chinese authorities; and he even consented to use the obnoxious word "petition" in addressing them, notwithstanding very precise instructions to the contrary, and thus led the Chinese authorities to infer that he possessed the same powers as the old Select Committee.

Besides this vital question, which Elliot had thus raised, of the conditions of carrying on official communications with the Chinese authorities, there was another relating to the Chinese claim to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in cases of homicide. Thirdly, there were the accumulated debts of the Hong merchants, amounting to some £600,000, and finally the question of suppressing the traffic in opium.

As this last is a matter in regard to which strong condemnation of the course pursued by the British and Indian Governments has been freely expressed by foreigners as well as by many Englishmen, it is necessary to state the main facts of the case. Opium was imported to and grown in China on a small scale from early times. The import trade was at first in the hands of the Portuguese and Dutch. Opium smoking was introduced at the end of the seventeenth century, but was prohibited in 1729, though the drug continued to be admitted as a medicine. From the end of the eighteenth century it was totally prohibited. Before 1773 the importation never exceeded 200 chests. The East India Company then assumed the monopoly of the internal trade in Bengal opium, keeping up the price by hindering the export of Malwa opium through the ports on the west coast. In 1830 the restrictions on the cultivation of the poppy in British territory were removed. From 1787 to 1830 the average quantity sold for export was about 4000 chests. It continued to expand, till in 1836-9 the average was 30,000 chests. In 1820 the Canton authorities stopped the smuggling that went on at the anchorage of Whampoa, and the receiving ships betook themselves to the island of Lintin, whence the opium was

transported by Chinese smugglers, with the connivance of the local officials. The edicts put forth from time to time remained without effect. The danger of the situation was pointed out to Palmerston in 1836, but he held that this was a Chinese affair. An expectation that the importation would be legalised was disappointed, for the Court remained adverse. In 1837 Elliot was ordered by the Chinese to send away the receiving ships, and his reply that he had not the requisite powers was regarded as an evasion; but he eventually expelled the British smuggling boats from the river, and informed the Governor-General that he was at liberty to seize them. In January, 1839, the Chinese Government acted on this intimation, and Commissioner Lin, sent from Peking for the express purpose, ordered the merchants to deliver to him the opium in their possession. To enforce this, he blockaded the factories and cut off all supplies. Elliot then took the courageous step of calling on them to hand it over to him "for the service of the British Government," and a quantity, valued officially at over £1,250,000, was surrendered. The British Government, having previously disclaimed all responsibility, refused to be bound by Elliot's undertaking, but, looking to the violence that had been employed, and to the previous connivance of the authorities, held that the Chinese Government must provide compensation.

The confiscation at Canton gave an impulse to the trade on the coast; but no serious attempt was made for its repression. To avoid the risk of armed conflicts between the Chinese preventive service and British smugglers, Palmerston suggested that it would be wiser to legalise the importation, and to convert the drug into a source of revenue. Similar instructions were given to Pottinger when he was sent out in 1841; and, at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Nanking, he presented a memorandum to this effect. The Chinese replied that no representations could be made to the Emperor on the subject. Repeated efforts were made, up to 1847, to induce them to yield on this point, but without success. In 1858, however, in the negotiations at Shanghai as to the tariff which was to be appended to the Treaty of Tientsin, the question was revived. The Chinese plenipotentiaries accepted the proposal to admit opium, subject to a duty, which, after some discussion, was fixed at 30 *taels* (£10) a chest, and the agreement was embodied in a separate customs "rule regarding certain commodities heretofore contraband." From 1845 until 1857 the importation grew continually larger, and in 1869 it attained the quantity of 78,210 chests. All this time, the production in China increased with corresponding rapidity. The extent to which the habit had spread may be inferred from comparing these figures with those of 1773.

In 1869, during negotiations for the revision of the Treaty of Tientsin, the Chinese Ministers made a further attempt to obtain the cooperation of England in suppressing the trade. They were told that, even if England allowed opium to be treated as contraband, China was in no

position to prevent its being smuggled, and that, if India ceased to grow it, other tropical countries could, and would, produce it without limit. The subject was then dropped.

To return to the general narrative of events. After the surrender of the opium Elliot proceeded to Hongkong (not yet a British possession), whither he was followed by the British merchants. Negotiations took place, which finally broke down, and the Chinese provincial authorities issued what was practically a declaration of war. Elliot's despatches of May, 1839, relating what had happened, together with a memorial from the leading firms trading to Canton, reached England in September, 1839. The Cabinet came to the conclusion that steps must be taken to place future relations with China on a definite and secure footing. With this object, they decided to send out a small naval and military force, to blockade the Canton and Peiho rivers, and to seize Chusan or some other island as a rendezvous for the expedition, and ultimately as a permanent base for the commercial establishments. The demands which Elliot and his cousin the Admiral were to present at the Peiho included satisfaction for the insult offered to the British Crown in the person of its representative, payment for the opium extorted as the price of the lives of British subjects arbitrarily confined at Canton, payment of the debts of the Hong merchants, and a share of the cost of the expedition. A letter was also addressed by Palmerston to the Minister of the Chinese Emperor setting forth the grounds of complaint—particularly the conduct of the Chinese Government in allowing the opium trade to go on for a long series of years, and then suddenly attacking the British subjects implicated, instead of punishing the officials who had connived at it—and formally enumerating the British demands. As satisfaction for the insult to their agent, the British Government were willing to accept the cession of one or more islands from which trade could be carried on with the ports of China, or, if the Chinese Government preferred it, the conclusion of a commercial treaty. China would be free to fix her own customs tariff and to confiscate any goods prohibited by her laws. British subjects charged with offences were to be tried by a British Court according to their own laws. Great Britain declared that she did not desire to obtain any privileges of trade which would not be equally extended to the subjects of every other nation.

The Government were vigorously attacked by the Opposition, on the ground of their neglect to furnish to their agent powers and instructions to cope with the growing evils connected with the contraband traffic in opium, and secured a majority of only nine—a result which did not affect their determination to adopt energetic measures. The above-mentioned expedition reached China in the course of the summer of 1840, and occupied Chusan; the plenipotentiaries proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, but found it impracticable to force acceptance of the demands of the British Government with the inadequate force at their disposal.

Fruitless negotiations were opened in the south with the Chinese Commissioner Keshen. Elliot, however, occupied the outer forts on the Canton river, and compelled the Chinese Commissioner to come to an agreement. The terms of this arrangement being disapproved by both Governments, Elliot was summarily recalled and superseded by Pottinger. Instructions were also sent out to reoccupy Chusan, surrendered in consideration of Elliot's abortive agreement. But, before Pottinger could reach the scene, negotiations had proceeded, and a draft treaty had been agreed to in February, 1841. Orders, however, came down from Peking to renew hostilities; the remaining defences of Canton were carried in less than a fortnight; and eventually the heights above the city were occupied, a ransom of six million dollars being exacted, besides £80,000 as compensation for the burning of the Spanish ship *Biscaino* and the losses of British merchants by the destruction of the factories, which had followed on their departure. Trade was resumed at Canton, and continued throughout the subsequent operations.

No time was lost in despatching the reinforcements which events had shown to be necessary, and Pottinger arrived in China in August, 1841, bearing instructions practically identical with those addressed to his predecessor. Amoy was captured on August 26; Chusan was reoccupied, in spite of its huge defences, on October 1; and on October 10 the naval and military forces appeared before Chinhai, which was speedily taken by assault. Ningpo fell on October 13; but further operations were postponed till the following spring. On their resumption in March, 1842, Tzechi, about ten miles inland from Ningpo, was captured; Chapu on May 18; Woosung on June 16; and Shanghai three days later. The force then proceeded up the Yangtze river, and assaulted Chinkiang on July 20, anchoring finally off Nanking on August 21. Negotiations were begun without loss of time, and a treaty, called after that city, was signed on August 29. It contained the greater portion of the articles of a draft which had been sent out to Elliot and his fellow-plenipotentiary two years before. Hongkong, which had been proclaimed British territory by Elliot on the strength of a verbal promise given to him by Keshen, was now formally ceded to the British Crown. A war indemnity was agreed to of twelve million dollars, from which were to be deducted any sums received for the ransom of towns and cities in China subsequent to August 1, 1841. This did not include the six million dollars paid as a ransom for Canton in the previous May. Additional articles provided for the release of all British subjects then in Chinese hands; for an amnesty to all Chinese subjects who had had intercourse with British officers or had entered the British service; for the promulgation of a fair tariff of import and export duties; for correspondence between British and Chinese officials on a footing of equality; and for the retention of Chusan and the island of Kulangsu at Amoy, until the articles of the treaty, including the arrangements for opening the ports of Canton, Amoy,



Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, should be carried out. This treaty was supplemented, on June 26, 1843, by an agreement that the transit duties to be levied on British goods should not exceed the existing rates, which were assumed to be on a moderate scale. A further treaty signed at Hu-mên-chai in the Canton river, on October 8 of the same year, comprised general regulations for the conduct of trade, among which were a very important provision reserving to the British Crown the punishment of British subjects committing crimes and offences in China, a most-favoured-nation clause, an article conceding the right to station a cruiser at each of the ports, and one providing that small coasters of British nationality, such as schooners, cutters, *lorchas*, and the like, should carry a sailing letter or register issued by the Chief Superintendent of Trade.

The first American ship arrived at Canton in 1784; and two years later a merchant was appointed Consul; but the Chinese Government refused to recognise his official status. When Commissioner Lin blockaded the foreign factories in 1839, and refused permission to any one to depart until the opium was surrendered, the Americans were subjected to the same treatment as the English. Their share in the opium trade had been insignificant, and they were able to remain at Canton after the English had withdrawn and to carry on the trade of the port, until it was blockaded in June, 1840. When the news of Pottinger's treaty was received, the President sent a message to Congress, recommending an appropriation to meet the cost of sending a Commissioner to China. The House of Representatives reported in favour of the proposal and justified the recent action of England by observing that the war had originated in the refusal of the Chinese Government to receive Ministers appointed by the British sovereign, and in the rejection and expulsion with insult and indignity of Lord Napier; that a series of similar outrages inflicted on other British diplomatic officers, followed by the seizure and destruction of several shiploads of opium belonging to British subjects, had finally kindled the war, the origin of which had erroneously been attributed to this last incident alone; and that the object of Great Britain had been to compel the imperial despot to treat with the sovereign of another empire, not less powerful, upon terms of perfect equality and reciprocity. This American vindication of British policy is remarkable. The choice of the President finally fell upon Caleb Cushing, who proved himself a highly capable diplomatist. His instructions left him a wide discretion, fully justified by the event. Notice was given beforehand of the mission; but, when Cushing arrived at Macao, in February, 1844, he found that no one had been appointed to treat with him. By a judicious use of firm yet courteous language he finally prevailed on the Court to despatch to Macao as plenipotentiary the same high official who had negotiated with Pottinger; and he was able, on July 3, to sign a treaty of friendship and commerce. This speedy conclusion was promoted by the desire of the Chinese plenipotentiary

to get the American negotiations out of the way before the arrival of the French mission, whose advent was daily expected. Cushing's Treaty was, in many particulars, an improvement on the Treaty of Nanking. The articles providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States as to crimes committed by its citizens, and in civil cases in which no Chinese subject was concerned, and for most-favoured-nation treatment, were more clearly drawn. Provision was also made for the transmission of communications between the United States Government and the Court of Peking through the highest provincial authorities in the region of the five ports, and for the permanence of the tariff until the American Government should consent to its revision. Opium was declared to be contraband, and United States citizens trading in it were made liable to be dealt with by the Chinese Government, without being entitled to the protection of their own Government. Lastly, by notes exchanged between Cushing and the Chinese plenipotentiary, it was agreed that, if the Ministers of other Western Powers were admitted to Peking, the United States envoy would also be received there.

England had borne the burden and heat of the day in opening the ports to the commerce of the world, and had thus incurred the enmity of the Chinese Government and people. It was not difficult for other Powers to enter the gate she had forced open, and, by contrasting their own moderation with her annexation of Chinese territory and her exaction of a large money indemnity, to obtain further concessions. England in her turn participated in the benefits secured by the United States.

France was not far behind in taking advantage of the Treaty of Nanking. She had already in 1842 despatched a diplomatic mission to observe and report on the proceedings of the British expedition, and she now appointed Lagrené, an experienced diplomatist, to negotiate a treaty of commerce. The British Government, it was admitted, had ensured that the concessions obtained for itself should be granted to all Europeans; but a French treaty was nevertheless regarded as a necessity. Lagrené arrived in China in August, 1844, escorted by a powerful squadron, and two months later signed a commercial treaty based on that of the United States. French commerce in China was of insignificant amount, and the efforts of the envoy were chiefly devoted towards securing a virtual protectorate over the Roman Catholic converts. Roman Catholic missions had been founded two and a half centuries earlier. After establishing confidential relations by representing China's need of an ally, he persuaded the Chinese negotiator to memorialise the Emperor in favour of the native Christians. Lagrené wrote to his Government that this episode was destined to establish French policy in China on a firm and immovable basis. The Chinese negotiator's memorial was approved by an imperial rescript, and the French representative was recognised to possess the right of intervening

to protect the religious liberty of Roman Catholic converts. Guizot, in 1847, declared to the Chamber that France had resumed the protectorate which she had been compelled to abandon during the previous half-century. The rescript was followed in February, 1846, by an imperial decree ordering the restitution of the properties belonging to the religious communities founded in the seventeenth century, provided that they had not been converted into pagan temples or private dwellings. Thus was inaugurated a policy which was destined, in the future, to have far-reaching effects upon the relations of China with Western Powers.

Protestant missions in China date only from 1807, when the Englishman Robert Morrison landed at Canton; American missionaries first arrived in 1830. Lord Elgin, on proceeding to China in 1857, was instructed to obtain protection for missionaries travelling in the interior of the country; and it was added that the British Government would gladly see in any treaty with China a renunciation by the Chinese Government of any interference with Chinese converts to Christianity. After the capture of Canton by the allied British and French forces Elgin informed the Chinese Government that the persecution of native Christians in various parts of the Empire was one of the matters on which he was empowered to treat; and, when the plenipotentiaries of England, France, Russia and the United States reached Tientsin in 1858, after the capture of the Taku forts, it was known that a toleration clause would be inserted in the treaties which China would be required to sign. Thus it came about that in the Russian Treaty, the first to be signed, this provision found a place, and that the treaties signed successively with the United States, Great Britain, and France contained articles of a similar tenor.

Obviously these toleration clauses, which were renewed in all subsequent treaties with European States, gave to any Power that chose to exercise it a protectorate over the native Christians belonging to its own section of the Church. Neither Russia, nor the United States, nor England, cherished any such ambition. France had obtained an undefined right of intervention on behalf of native Christians in 1844, and looked to establishing her influence on that basis. The amplified toleration article in her Treaty of 1858, besides stipulating in favour of native converts for complete security for their persons and property, and the free practice of their religious rites, further provided for the protection of missionaries proceeding into the interior under passport, for the abrogation of everything that had previously been written, proclaimed, or published against Christianity by order of the Government, and that no obstacle should be placed by the Chinese authorities in the way of any Chinese subject who might desire to embrace Christianity. In the Peking Convention of 1860 the edict of 1846 was inserted, without the limiting clause. Baron Gros, who negotiated it, considered that the undertaking to restore to the French Minister, for the benefit of

the native Christian communities, all the churches, cemeteries, and other properties confiscated throughout China during the persecutions was a complete set-off to the conversion, in favour of England, of the perpetual lease of the tiny peninsula of Kowloon into ownership. Not until some time after was it discovered that a clause, not to be found in the French, had been inserted in the Chinese, text, which permitted French missionaries to rent or purchase land in all the provinces and to erect buildings thereon at pleasure. To avoid disputes as to the true meaning of this Article, it was agreed in 1865 that such lands should be registered in the name of the local native church, and not in that of the missionaries. The important fact is that, while the remaining cathedral in Peking and the sites of three others that had been destroyed were readily handed over to the French authorities, pressure had to be applied in other localities to obtain the execution of the Article. Another cause of trouble was the claim of converts to be exempted from contributing to the cost of national ceremonies of a religious character, while their priests sought to protect them against the cupidity and injustice of the mandarins. Buddhists and Confucian *literati* were equally hostile to those who treated the popular superstitions with contempt. The great influx of Roman Catholic missionaries after 1858, and their increased pretensions, provoked the alarm of the Chinese Government. A few years later popular disturbances began to break out in various parts of the country, and accusations were made that native Christians exercised magic arts on young children, that they extracted their eyes and even their souls for use in compounding medicines. No belief of this kind was too gross for uneducated Chinese to swallow. A special ground of complaint was that converts were compelled to destroy their ancestral tablets; and, in a country where ancestor-worship is of the greatest importance, such an accusation was certain to cause disturbance. Here and there, a missionary was beaten or murdered, or a native Christian establishment pillaged and destroyed. In 1869, the Government complained that Christianity, as preached in China, became an attack on all native institutions, and showed itself subversive of the established relations of rulers and people. They were puzzled to comprehend the interest which the French Government took in the missions, and its claim, asserted with so much warmth, to exercise a protectorate over the converts. They consoled themselves with the hope that France herself might ere long be so embroiled in Europe as to have little leisure or power to dictate the law to a country so far distant as China. This was a remarkable anticipation of the events of the following year.

The Roman Catholic Missions included founding hospitals, and it was alleged that children were kidnapped by dishonest Chinese for sale to these institutions. In May, 1870, rumours of this kind were current at Nanking, but the Viceroy arranged for a public inspection of the buildings, and the rumours were at once dissipated. In June, the same

stories gained credence at Tientsin. Before measures could be taken to allay the popular excitement the mob rose, and, led by malicious persons, destroyed the French missionary buildings and murdered ten Sisters of Mercy, the French Consul, and several other Frenchmen, besides a party of Russians supposed to be French. The Chinese officials, as usual on such occasions, lacked the courage and the means for quelling the mob. The news reached Europe six days after the declaration of war between France and Prussia; and the events which followed rendered it impossible for the French Government to insist on adequate reparation. Not until four months had elapsed was the French *chargé d'affaires* able to announce that a settlement had been arrived at. Sixteen of the rioters were condemned to death and twenty-one to banishment, as were two of the leading local officials; a high functionary was sent to France to present an apology from the Chinese Government; and a sum of about £80,000 was paid as an indemnity for the lives that had been taken and for the buildings that had been destroyed.

Already a year before the Tientsin massacre the Chinese Government had complained officially of the manner in which the propaganda of the missionaries was carried on, and suggested that regulations should be framed to control the conduct of converts and non-converts towards each other, and for placing the missionaries under the control of the Chinese authorities. Early in 1871, they returned to the subject with a definite set of proposals. The language of this document showed that it was aimed at the Roman Catholic Missions, which it compared to an infinite number of independent rival States in the heart of another State. The Protestant Powers replied that the abuses complained of did not concern them; while the French Government rejected the whole of the proposals as inadmissible. The result of the step taken by China was thus what is known in diplomacy as a *fin de non-recevoir*.

After the conclusion of the treaties of 1842, 1843, and 1844 the relations of foreigners at the newly opened ports were generally of a peaceful character; but at Canton attacks on the factories, assaults and even murders of foreigners occurred repeatedly. The officials and populace had been too long accustomed to treat foreigners with contempt, and they united in refusing to allow them to enter the walls of the city. On the surface this appeared to be after all a matter of no vital importance; but it was in reality the sign and symbol of the unsatisfactory relations between China and the Maritime Powers. In 1847, two serious instances of maltreatment of British officers and seamen, for which no redress could be had, led to vigorous action on the part of Davis, the Governor of Hongkong. In thirty-six hours all the forts defending Canton were successfully carried; but, even then, all that he could feel it safe to require was an undertaking that the gates should be opened in two years' time. After the stipulated period had elapsed, the Chinese refused to carry out their promise. An emphatic warning, addressed to them by Palmerston,

regarding the consequences which might ensue from their disregard of treaty engagements, was treated with contempt. In 1854 matters began to assume a serious aspect. Bowring was appointed Governor of Hongkong, while Yeh had recently become imperial Commissioner at Canton. Instructions came out from home to raise the question again; but Yeh turned a deaf ear to all the representations made to him, although these were supported by the French and American representatives. Bowring, the United States Commissioner, and the French Secretary of Legation proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, where they held a fruitless conference with a delegate sent down from the Court, who absolutely refused to discuss the detailed proposals put forward by England and America for the revision of the treaties, including the right of diplomatic representation at Peking. The conclusion to which their representatives came was that no improvement was to be looked for unless a stronger policy were adopted. France and America, however, were not disposed to depart from their previous cautious policy. But Palmerston was resolved to take advantage of the first occasion to coerce the Chinese into relations of a normal character; though, for the moment, the Crimean War stood in the way of sending out to China the necessary naval forces.

In the summer of 1856 a remarkable Englishman was sent to act as Consul at Canton. Parkes was only twenty-eight years of age, but he had already served fourteen years in China, spoke the language fluently, was able, active, and resolute, and knew the mind of Palmerston on Chinese matters. The seizure of the crew of the British lorcha "*Arrow*" as she lay off the city of Canton offered the opportunity. Yeh at first refused to apologise or to surrender the men, and the original question in dispute became merged in a demand to open the gates of the city. Reprisals on a small scale having produced no effect, Parkes' recommendation that possession should be taken of some of the forts between Whampoa and Canton was acted upon. A few days later the city wall was breached, and a force of marines effected an entrance. As Yeh still refused to give way, the Bogue forts were captured. The French, having no trade to protect, hauled down their consulate flag, the American merchants were withdrawn, and finally the foreign factories were destroyed by an incendiary fire in December. It was now judged impracticable to carry on operations until reinforcements should arrive. The French and American agents, while adopting a neutral attitude, informed Yeh that they considered him to be entirely in the wrong. The American was perhaps more inclined to take the British side than his Government thought desirable.

The British Government had fully approved the proceedings of their agents, but Cobden brought forward a condemnatory motion in the House of Commons. He was supported by a coalition of Peelites and Tories, with whom spoke and voted Lord John Russell. The result was a defeat for the Cabinet, but Palmerston appealed to the country, and remained in power with a triumphant majority. In pursuance of

plans already mapped out, Lord Elgin was appointed High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, while arrangements were made for the despatch of reinforcements. France, having a quarrel of her own with China, arising out of the murder of a French missionary, was ready to join in measures of coercion, not only for the settlement of the Canton question, but also for the extension of commerce and the abatement of Chinese pretensions to superiority. Baron Gros was appointed her plenipotentiary. The United States Government had the same grounds of complaint, but was unwilling to resort to force; its peaceful cooperation was nevertheless accepted by England and France.

It was not until nearly the close of 1857 that the plenipotentiaries were all assembled at Hongkong. In the meantime Russia had offered to join in negotiations for a new treaty, and had sent out Count Putiatin, who had met with a rebuff in trying to reach Peking, first by way of Kiachta and then from the mouth of the Peiho. He too was instructed to abstain from warlike measures, but was informed that, whenever the allies went north, they would be pleased to be accompanied by the Russian flag. Whatever was to be accomplished depended on the military exertions of the allies. In August the British Admiral had established a blockade of Canton, and his blockading force was now strengthened by the accession of the French squadron. Yeh having refused to surrender, the city was taken by assault after a very slight resistance (December 28-9, 1857) and Yeh himself was captured, and deported to Calcutta, where he died. The Governor was replaced in office, and was assisted by a joint commission consisting of Parkes and two military men. (Canton was not restored to the Chinese Government until October 21, 1861.)

Identical notes were now addressed by the four envoys, inviting the Chinese Government to send a duly accredited plenipotentiary to Shanghai by the end of March. It was intimated that, in the event of a refusal, other measures would be taken. The Russian Envoy's note, of course, did not hint at hostilities, but mentioned "frontier questions" that required settlement. The reply of the Chinese Government—faithful to their policy of keeping the foreigner at a distance—was a refusal to discuss business anywhere but at Canton. The fact that the British and French plenipotentiaries were supported by sufficient forces to be employed as occasion arose, while their American and Russian colleagues could not resort to coercion, induced the Chinese to offer to settle questions specially interesting to the latter, in return for their good offices. They professed themselves ready to concede all the American demands, except diplomatic representation at Peking, to concede the opening of the rivers to commerce and the payment of compensation for the losses at Canton. This intrigue was defeated by the straightforwardness of Reed and the firmness of Elgin and Gros. No properly accredited plenipotentiaries having been produced to them, the allies captured the

Taku forts, and the four plenipotentiaries ascended the river to Tientsin, where satisfactory treaties were signed in June, 1858.

Among the proposals of the four Powers the most obnoxious to the Chinese Court was the establishment at Peking of resident diplomatic agents. The firmness of Elgin carried the day, and the British treaty provided that the agent of Great Britain might reside permanently at the capital, or visit it occasionally, at the option of his Government. The principle was affirmed less positively in the other three Treaties. Certain documents found in an official building at Canton, which Elgin had communicated to the American Envoy, who characterised them as painful revelations of the mendacious and treacherous habits of the high officials of China, convinced him that, if American interests were worth protecting, such protection could only be secured by direct representation at the capital, and that the contents of these papers justified the coercive policy of the allies.

Nevertheless Elgin himself conceived doubts as to whether it might not be well to give way on this point. He recommended to his Government that, provided the British ambassador were properly received at Peking when he went there to exchange the ratifications, he should not fix his residence at the capital, but only visit it occasionally. This suggestion was approved, and the Chinese Commissioners were so informed in March, 1859. The words "properly received" signified a ceremonial in accordance with the forms of respect paid to Western sovereigns. The Chinese were determined that, unless envoys submitted to Chinese ceremonial, they should not be admitted to Court at all. Accordingly, they proceeded to rearm the Taku forts and when the Ministers of England, France and America, Bruce, Bourboulon, and Ward, presented themselves there in June, intending to journey to the capital and exchange the ratifications, they were directed to land at Pehtang instead. In the Russian Treaty Taku was expressly mentioned as the point from which the Russian Envoy might proceed to Peking. The English Admiral endeavoured to force a passage and was repulsed with loss. The American Envoy accepted the alternative offered, travelled under circumstances of some indignity to Peking, and there found that no audience of the Emperor would be accorded, unless on Chinese terms. He refused and retired to Pehtang, where the ratifications were hastily exchanged as he was about to reembark.

The Russian Minister had preceded the American to Peking, by way of Kiachta, and had exchanged the ratifications of the Russian treaty. Consequently Russia and the United States had no further motive for cooperation with the allies. It is only necessary here to note that the delimitation of the Russo-Chinese boundary, which was to be effected by Commissioners appointed on both sides to carry out the Ninth Article of the treaty, was rejected by the Chinese Emperor on the ground that it conceded to Russia territory properly belonging to China; and a



settlement of the question was deferred until two years later, as will be seen.

The British Government approved of the course which Bruce had pursued, and informed him that preparations were being made for the despatch of forces, which in conjunction with those of the Emperor of the French, would support him in the execution of the instructions about to be addressed to him. The Chinese Court, on their side, did not conceive themselves to be at war with the allies, and relations at the open ports continued on a normal footing. It was hoped at first by the British Government that, when the Chinese learnt the demands of England and the extent of her preparations, an understanding might be arranged without further bloodshed. But the discourteous treatment to which the United States Minister had been subjected in return for his conciliatory attitude, convinced both the English and the French Government that their demands must be supported by a force strong enough to overcome any resistance which might be anticipated. To make it easier for the Chinese Emperor to yield, if the ultimatum was not delivered by the two Ministers who had been repulsed from Taku in the previous year, the two Powers reappointed Elgin and Gros, but left it to Bruce and Bourboulon to present the demands. These were an ample apology; ratifications of the Treaties to be exchanged at Peking without delay, the envoys proceeding to Tientsin in a man-of-war of their nationality and being conveyed thence to Peking with due honour; that full effect should be given to the provisions of the said treaties, including prompt payment of the indemnities stipulated therein; that the British Government reserved to themselves exclusively the right of deciding whether their legation should be established at Peking; while an indemnity to meet the cost of sending additional forces to China was to be demanded, and an answer was required within 30 days. The demands having been met by a flat refusal, communicated through the Chinese Commissioner for the five ports, the first step taken was the peaceable occupation of Chusan. The allied Commanders-in-chief moved northwards, and concentrated the ships of war and transports at Talienwan Bay towards the end of June, 1860. A landing was effected at Pehtang, August 1; three weeks later the whole of the Taku forts were captured, and Tientsin occupied on August 25. Negotiations were opened; but, as the Chinese Commissioners had not adequate powers, the allies continued their advance on Peking. As they approached the city, the Court became seriously alarmed, and offered to accord all their demands, if they would consent to stop short of the capital. The spot where the allied forces were to encamp had been already agreed upon; but it was found to be occupied by a Chinese force. An engagement ensued, in which the Chinese were defeated, and retreated on Peking, taking with them some thirty-seven English and French prisoners whom they had captured, in spite of the flags of truce they carried. Among these

were Parkes and Loch. The Chinese treated their victims with odious brutality, from the effects of which two-thirds of them died in captivity. Notwithstanding the refusal of the Chinese to give them up, unless peace was made and the territory evacuated, the allies continued their march. After another severe defeat the Chinese armies took to flight, and the allies encamped before Peking. The French were the first to reach the Summer Palace, which they pillaged and set on fire. Later, when it became known that it had been the theatre of the tortures inflicted on the unfortunate prisoners, Lord Elgin insisted on completing the work of destruction as a penalty upon the Chinese Court, for having permitted, if it had not actually ordered, the barbarous treatment of the prisoners who had been taken by treachery. Of complicity it cannot be acquitted, seeing that, two days after their seizure, an imperial edict was issued offering money rewards for the heads of "barbarians."

Prince Kung, a brother of the Emperor, who had already been appointed a plenipotentiary, after some resistance agreed to exchange the ratifications of the Treaties of 1858 in Peking itself, and to sign an additional convention, by which China undertook to open Tientsin to trade, and to pay to each of the allies an indemnity of 2½ millions sterling. Of the cession to England of the peninsula opposite Hongkong and of the undertaking given to France for the restitution of the ancient Roman Catholic religious properties mention has already been made. Another article provided for the occupation of certain points in Chinese territory pending payment of the indemnity. The presentation to the Emperor of their credentials by the two ambassadors had to be abandoned, because the Chinese officials still obstinately insisted on an audience being accompanied by the *Ko-t'ou*.

The Russian Envoy, who had followed the march of the allies, and had done everything in his power to render himself acceptable to the two ambassadors, and to act the part of a conciliator, was rewarded within a week of the withdrawal of the allies by the signature of a treaty of delimitation, by which the territory lying between the Ussuri River and the Gulf of Tartary was ceded to Russia, together with the grant of commercial privileges in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.

The legations of the three Powers were permanently established at Peking during the course of 1861, and that of the United States in 1862. Treaties were negotiated with other Powers—with Prussia on behalf of the Zollverein in 1861; with Portugal in 1862 (though a difference of opinion regarding the territorial status of Macao prevented the eventual ratification of this Treaty), with Denmark and Holland in 1863, Spain in 1864, Belgium in 1865, and Italy in 1866.

On the establishment of the legations at Peking a new policy was inaugurated towards China. Instead of leaving disputes with local officials to be settled on the spot by force of arms, it was thought by the British and French Governments that the better way would be to treat

the Court as if it were a central Government, able to give orders throughout the territory under its control, and to see them executed.

It was not for the purpose of carrying on with China political relations such as exist among Western States that the Powers had insisted on the residence of their diplomatic agents at the capital, but, with the exception of Russia, for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of their countrymen engaged in commerce and proselytism. To enable them to carry out this policy with success it was necessary that the central Government should be strong enough to make its authority felt throughout the country; and two things were recognised as indispensable: first, that the "Taiping" rebellion should be suppressed, and, secondly, that for the old system of redressing grievances by putting pressure on the provincial officials should be substituted that of diplomatic representations.

For some years past the richest provinces of China had been ruthlessly ravaged by rebels, who had proved incapable of establishing any settled form of government. Their leader was a native of Kwangsi, named Hung Siu-tsuen; he had imbibed some notions of Christianity from an American missionary at Canton, and had established on this basis a new sect of his own. In 1850, being joined by some fellow-provincials, he allied himself with the anti-dynastic secret society known as the Triads, and thus gave to the movement a political character. In 1851 these people broke out into open rebellion under Hung, who proclaimed himself "Emperor of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace" (*Tai Ping*), and from this time onwards they were spoken of by foreigners as "Taipings." Advancing northward, they laid siege to more than one important provincial city without success; but, in January, 1853, Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow fell into their hands. Moving down the Yangtze, they captured Kiu-kiang and Nganking, finally establishing themselves in March at Nanking, the ancient capital of China. From this point they despatched expeditions to the north, and penetrated as far as the neighbourhood of Tientsin. After six months, fruitlessly consumed in attempts to make good their conquests in the north, they were driven back south in the ensuing spring, and by March, 1855, they were confined to the neighbourhood of the river.

Many foreigners, influenced by the belief that they had adopted Christianity, approved of their efforts to overthrow the Manchu dynasty; supposing that, if they succeeded, their attitude would be more friendly than that of the Peking Government. But visits paid to Nanking in 1853 by the Governor of Hongkong and the French Minister showed that the Taipings were not disposed to abate a whit of the lofty pretensions put forward by the imperial Court in their relations with foreigners, and the opinion formed by foreign officials was adverse to the expectation that they would eventually establish their rule over the whole country. As time went on, it became more and more evident that their only policy consisted in plundering the cities they had captured, and in devastating

the regions through which they passed. Towards the end of 1859, they were besieged by the imperial forces in their most important strongholds; but the Anglo-French expedition in 1860 gave the movement a new lease of life. The siege of Nanking was raised; and the rich and important city of Suchow fell into their hands. As their near approach to Shanghai endangered that important centre of foreign commerce, the British and French Ministers publicly announced that they would defend the Chinese city and foreign settlement. About the same time a patriotic Chinese merchant engaged the services of an American named Ward, who began operations with a small body of Europeans and Manila-men, and afterwards raised a force of disciplined Chinese with the object of driving the rebels out of the province of Kiangsu. The rebels attacked Shanghai in August, 1860, and again in January, 1862, but were repulsed on both occasions by the allied troops. From this time onwards, the interest of both the English and the French Governments was actively enlisted for the expulsion of the Taipings from the neighbourhood of the open ports, and their troops frequently acted as auxiliaries to Ward's disciplined Chinese. On one of these expeditions the French admiral lost his life. Ward was killed in action in September, 1862, and was succeeded by Burgevine, who later, quarrelling with the Governor of the province, went over to the rebels. The French had already organised a Chinese contingent under naval officers; and the British Government now allowed several of its officers to undertake the leadership of what had been Ward's force. Among these officers the most distinguished was the well-known Colonel Charles Gordon. His operations were so successful that by May, 1864, Nanking was almost the only place left to the Taipings. With the capture of this city in July of that year by the imperial General Tseng Kuotsuan the rebellion came to an end. The effective assistance rendered to the imperial Government by the allies was an important factor in the suppression of this disorder, which had ravaged the richest provinces of the country for over twelve years.

The aim of the Western Powers had been to place their relations with China upon a normal footing; and, when the residence of their representatives at the capital was finally conceded, they at once turned their attention to this question. Consuls and naval officers had been accustomed to regard themselves as authorised to exact redress for local abuses by the employment of force. Such a practice defeated the endeavours of the diplomatists to compel the imperial Government to recognise its responsibility for the acts of the provincial officials. The policy adopted aimed at strengthening the central Government as the best means of restoring tranquillity, and at securing the observance of the treaties without resorting to force. In earlier days the "gunboat policy" was the best that could be resorted to, in view of the length of time required for the exchange of communications with the home Governments, and of the uncompromising temper of the Chinese Court, which refused

to have any direct dealings with Western Powers. Peace had not been of long duration at any intermediate stage between the abolition of the East India Company's supercargoes at Canton, who regulated a trading monopoly, and the establishment at Peking of foreign Ministers, who watched over a trade open to all the world. In July, 1862, the newly appointed American Minister Burlingame took up his residence at Peking and joined the other three Ministers in substituting diplomatic action for the more popular and showy appeal to force. Owing to the peculiar constitution of the government, which left a large measure of autonomy to the provinces, such a policy could not be expected to be immediately successful; and great forbearance had to be exercised by the foreign Ministers, whose task was rendered more arduous by the dilatoriness of the Chinese and the impatience of the mercantile communities at the ports. From time to time consular officers of different nations, in conjunction with naval officers, continued to act on their own initiative in claiming redress from the local authorities. It became necessary to remind them that they could not be allowed to determine for themselves what reparation or redress was due for wrongs committed, or by what means it should be exacted—whether by blockade, by reprisal, by landing armed parties, or by acts of even more hostile character, since obviously no Government could delegate to its servants in foreign countries the power of involving their own country in war.

Towards the end of 1867, when Burlingame was on the point of giving up his post at Peking, the Chinese Government induced him to undertake a mission to the Treaty Powers, with the object of disabusing them of an impression believed to be very general, that the Chinese Court had entered upon a retrograde policy, and to deprecate any intention, on the part of the Powers, of urging China to adopt precipitately any new progressive policy which might affect her independence—such as, for instance, the grant of concessions to construct railways, which would place the internal communications of the country under foreign control. He successfully negotiated a treaty at Washington in which the principle of non-intervention in Chinese domestic affairs was recognised. In England also the mission met with a cordial reception; and Clarendon wrote to Burlingame that the British Government preferred appealing rather to the central Government than to local authorities for the redress of wrongs done to British subjects. He reminded him, at the same time, that it was the duty of the central Government to assume, and to be prepared to exercise, supreme authority over provincial Governments. It was agreed, however, by Burlingame that force might be resorted to for the protection of life and property in immediate peril.

Burlingame's views, which the British Government confirmed, did not meet with ready acquiescence either from merchants or diplomatists. In default of a central Government with adequate power, the only effectual means of preventing war was, in their opinion, to make the

local authorities feel a personal responsibility for their own acts. For some years the general disregard of the treaties by the Chinese authorities at the ports, and the unsatisfactory tone of the Government towards foreigners generally, had been the subject of complaint. A large majority of the leading Chinese were hostile to foreigners, and in the redress of grievances the Government seemed to have adopted the maxim of Philip II, "Time and I are a match for any two." It was observed that a diplomatic instrument had no binding power with the rulers of China when they could evade its stipulations with impunity, or when they believed that the force that imposed them was no longer available. The answer returned from England was that the British Government looked to the Chinese Government, and to it alone, for the wrongs of any kind done to British subjects under any circumstances. They held the Government at Peking alone responsible for the carrying out of treaties, and looked to it to enforce their full observance on the provincial authorities. This shows the policy of the Western Powers, and proves that they hoped by pressure at the centre to modify the age-long Constitution of the Chinese State, so as to compel the substitution for the practical autonomy of the provinces of an intelligent and centralised administration. To expect this result, however, was to underestimate the force of resistance to innovation which permeates a body politic of so hoary an antiquity as that of China; and experienced observers were not wanting who came to the conclusion that the policy of forcing direct diplomatic relations on the Court of Peking had proved a grievous mistake.

## (2) JAPAN.

After the expulsion of the Spaniards and Portuguese in 1638, Japan was closed to all foreign intercourse except with the Dutch and Chinese traders, who were confined within a limited space at Nagasaki. Japanese subjects were forbidden to travel or trade abroad. The commerce with the Dutch, which had at first been free, was converted into a government monopoly, and subjected to constantly increasing restrictions till it seemed scarcely worth continuing. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the English, French, Russians and Danes had in turn endeavoured to establish friendly relations, but without success. In 1842 it was ordered that, if foreign vessels were driven by stress of weather on the coasts of Japan, or were in want of provisions, fuel, or water, such articles might be supplied to them, and they might be allowed to depart in peace. Two years later the King of Holland counselled the Tycoon to mitigate the strictness of the law against foreigners. The reply was that no deviation from the ancient law of Japan regarding foreign relations could be permitted.

In consequence of the development of the whale fishery in the

northern Pacific, American seamen were from time to time cast away on the coasts of Japan, where they received harsh treatment. The desirability of coming to a direct agreement with the Japanese Government in regard to whalers putting into Japanese ports, and for the establishment of a coaling depot for the line of steamers which it was proposed to run between California and China, induced the American Government in 1851 to send out instructions to Commodore Aulick, together with a letter from President Fillmore to the "Emperor" of Japan. These instructions were repeated in November, 1852, to his successor, Commodore Perry, who was ordered to proceed to Japan with his whole available force; and if he found persuasion unavailable, was to threaten that chastisement would be resorted to in case American seamen were hereafter cruelly treated. Perry reached Uraga, at the entrance to the Bay of Yedo, with a squadron of four ships, on July 8, 1853.

The material and mental civilisation of Japan had been derived from China, either directly or through Corea. The writings of Chinese moral philosophers and historians were the main objects of study, and classical Chinese was the favourite vehicle of literary composition. Buddhism, in the form in which it had been early imported into China, became the dominant religion, and almost entirely absorbed the temples formerly dedicated to the gods of the country. The early constitution of the government had been framed on a Chinese model, and the penal legislation of the T'ang dynasty had been adopted in its entirety. Alongside of classical Chinese there had continued to exist an indigenous poetical and romantic literature which remained unaffected by Chinese influences, and a revival of interest in it had been promoted by a small band of scholars from the end of the seventeenth century.

The nation was classified, as in China, into scholars, agriculturists, artisans and tradesmen, with this difference that the word scholar was applied, not to a learned and pacific class, but to the noble or military order of *Samurai*. The moral code was based on the Chinese doctrine of the Five Social Relations, but dwelt mainly on the duties of loyalty to the prince and obedience to parents. This loyalty was due, not to the sovereign, but to the feudal chief, and the popular literature was full of shining examples of this virtue. From China, too, had been adopted the view that all Western nations were barbarians, whom it was right and proper to exterminate, and the isolation in which the Japanese people had lived for two centuries or more had intensified this feeling. Christianity was stigmatised as a "pernicious doctrine," and was believed to be associated with the practice of sorcery. The Japanese point of honour was that of the *Samurai*, ready to sacrifice his life for his lord and to die by his own hand rather than suffer any imputation of disloyalty; the mercantile point of honour, strict fulfilment of engagements even where they involve pecuniary loss, was unknown. It was the

*Samurai* class that formed the backbone of the nation, and inspired all its ideals.

Towards the end of the twelfth century the administration was usurped by the military class, on whose chief was conferred the title of *Sei-i-tai-shō-gun*, or Barbarian-quelling-Generalissimo. Civil wars in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries only served to strengthen a polity in which the legitimate sovereign was relegated to a merely nominal position as head of the State and fountain of honour, while the *Shōgun* was recognised as the *de facto* ruler in both internal affairs and external relations.

The power of the latest dynasty of *Shōguns*, that of the Tokugawa family, was established by Iyeyasu after the fall of Ōsaka in 1615, and consolidated by his grandson Iyemitsu, who succeeded in 1623. He compelled the *daimiōs* to pass alternate years at Yedo, and to leave their families there when they went down to their fiefs, by this means maintaining a strict control over their actions. Yedo was the real capital of the country, which was partitioned amongst the Tokugawa family and the *daimiōs* or feudal lords, who numbered some 268, broadly divided into *fudai*, creations of Iyeyasu, and *tozama*, feudal lords of earlier date. At the head of the *daimiōs* ranked the *Go-san-ke* or Three Families, as they were called, or Princes of Owari, Kishiu and Mito, descended from the third, fourth and fifth surviving sons of Iyeyasu. In case of a failure in the direct line of *Shōguns*, an heir could be chosen from either of the first two. It was held that Mito could not succeed, but he was regarded as peculiarly the supporter and adviser of the *Shōgun*. In 1716 the seventh *Shōgun* having died while yet a child, Yoshimuné, Prince of Kishiu, was brought in as his successor. Two of his sons and a grandson became the founders of the *Go-san-kiō* or Three Nobles, Tayasu, Hitotsubashi and Shimidzu, who were also capable of succeeding; in fact, the eleventh *Shōgun*, Iyenari, was adopted from the second of these houses. With these must be classed the other descendants of Iyeyasu, some fourteen in number, who bore his family crest, of whom the most important were Echizen and Aidzu. Next in order came the *Koku-shi daimiōs*, nobles whose territories comprised one or more of the 68 provinces into which the country was divided, and their cadets, most of whom traced their lineage back to a period anterior to the victories of Iyeyasu. Amongst them the more prominent in political affairs were Satsuma, Chōshiu, Tosa and Hizen, in the south and west. A member of the Daté family of Sendai, best known by the name of his castle-town, Uwajima, must also be mentioned. In the list of great *daimiōs* was included Ii Kamon no Kami, belonging to one of the four families from which a President of the Council could be taken, and hereditary protector of the Mikado's person. Lastly came the *fudai daimiōs*, creations of Iyeyasu, the minor *tozama* or nobles of a time preceding Iyeyasu's rise to power, and the *hatamoto* or gentry of



lesser wealth and importance. These nobles were subject, as was the *Shōgun* himself, to a strict ceremonial etiquette, which rendered them almost prisoners in the hands of their retainers, forming a compact body usually designated as a "clan." Of the latter, the higher in rank held office as clan-councillors by hereditary right. The effect of this etiquette in the course of time was a curious degeneracy and aloofness from public affairs. The feudal chiefs gave themselves up to pleasure, lived a life of artificial seclusion, and allowed their retainers to think and act for them. If, during the period of storm and stress which preceded the revolution of 1868, some of them were distinguished for political ability, it was mainly because they had been younger sons, who had received an ordinary education.

The *Shōgun*, or (to call him by the title first adopted at the beginning of the eighteenth century in correspondence with Corea) the Tycoon, was usually termed Emperor by Europeans and Americans. His administration was formed from his own vassals, the great territorial nobles taking no share in it whatever. The notion that the 18 greater *daimiōs* constituted a Council of the Empire is altogether erroneous. They were not consulted on public affairs until after 1858.

Entirely in the background, exercising no governmental authority, secluded in his palace and never seen by any of the common people, was the Mikado. A sort of phantom Court surrounded him, bearing administrative titles belonging to the period when he was *de facto* as well as *de jure* ruler. Intermarriage with the leading *daimiō* families was not uncommon. The *Daijō-daijin*, a title in later times combined with that of *Kwambaku*, or first Minister, was assisted by the *Sa-daijin*, *Udai-jin*, *Nai-daijin* and *Dainagon*. They were descended from the most illustrious families of the Empire, in comparison with whom the *daimiōs* were mere *novi homines*; but their incomes were on a meagre scale. Even the Mikado himself received but a very limited revenue. From the time of Yoritomo downwards, the military chieftain who was able to obtain possession of the Mikado's person virtually ruled the country. It was therefore a principal object of the Tycoon to keep a strict watch over the Court and its surroundings. The garrison of Kiōto was under the command of the *Shoshidai*, who may conveniently be called the Tycoon's Resident, and the civil governor was also a Tokugawa vassal. None of the feudal lords was permitted to have a permanent residence at Kiōto, nor to communicate directly with the Court, their immediate and acknowledged superior being the Tycoon, who might almost be styled their sovereign.

Two things were requisite in order that this system should be maintained: first, that the Mikado should be contented with the way in which the country was governed and his own dignity and safety provided for; secondly, that, if a difference of opinion arose between the Court and the Tycoon's Government, the latter should be strong enough to make

its will predominate. So long as the country was closed to the entrance of ideas from the outer world and peace was maintained at home, this dual system, which had lasted for six and a half centuries, was likely to remain undisturbed; but the moral fibre of the Tycoon's Government had degenerated, and it only needed the arrival of the American squadron under Perry in 1853 to start a movement which, in the short space of fifteen years, brought it to the ground; while the necessity of replacing the particularism of the feudal system by a centralised government deriving its authority from the principle of legitimacy was gradually forced upon the minds of all thinking men.

At the head of the Tycoon's administration was the Council of State, popularly called *Gorōjiū*, composed of five or six of his greater vassals, not necessarily endowed with political ability, so that the substance of power passed into the hands of subordinates. Next in official importance was a Second Council, called *Waka-doshiyori*, also composed of *fudai daimiōs*. The Exchequer, the Tycoon's harem, and the ordnance were managed by the *Rusui-toshiyori*. There were no written laws, either civil or criminal, but manuscript records of cases were in existence which furnished precedents for decisions delivered by the judicial officers. Two *Jisha-bugyō* tried cases affecting the Buddhist and Shintō temples, and others brought up from distant provinces. Two *Machi-bugyō* presided over the administration of the city of Yedo, and tried cases arising among the common people. To the same number of *Kanjō-bugyō* were referred agricultural cases, and they also had charge of the posting system on the main lines of communication. Cases in which *daimiōs*, the gentry and ordinary *Samurai* were concerned, came before the *Ō-metsuke*, of whom there were four. The *Metsuke* were similar officers of lower rank. The foregoing classes of officials were on duty during alternate months. They held general meetings on nine days in the month to hear appeals, and also to advise on matters of state policy which were referred to them. During the later years of the Tyconate it was commonly said that the confidential secretaries governed the country. In the territories of the *daimiōs* the same transfer of real authority had come about, and the revolution of 1868 was mainly brought to pass by *Samurai* of undistinguished birth, who had gained the confidence of the few Court nobles and feudal lords whose understanding had survived the soporific effect of the conditions under which they had been educated. Another factor in the situation was that the retainers of the Tycoon, residing either at Yedo, a city of over a million of inhabitants, or in small country towns, had mostly lost the fighting qualities that had won the victories of Iyeyasu, while those of the *daimiōs*, living for the most part a simple country life away from the pleasures of the metropolis, retained the warlike vigour and hardihood of their forefathers.

At the request of the United States Government, the head of the

Dutch factory at Nagasaki had given notice to the Tycoon's officials in the previous autumn that the American expedition would shortly arrive. When the news of Perry's sudden appearance at Uraga reached the capital, considerable perturbation nevertheless ensued. The alarm was caused by the fear lest, in the event of hostilities breaking out, communications by sea should be interrupted, and the population of Yedo be deprived of the supplies of rice from other parts of the country upon which they depended for their subsistence. Nariaki, the ex-Prince of Mito, who had been forced to abdicate in 1844 for having destroyed the Buddhist monasteries in his province and confiscated their bells to cast cannon, and for other measures of reform, initiated with the object of reviving the military spirit of his clan, which were disapproved of by the conservative members of the Council, was invited to come forth from his retirement and aid the Government with his counsels. To add to the confusion, the Tycoon was so sick that it was found impossible to take any decision, except that the President's letter should be received, and the envoy be told to come back next year for an answer. To have induced the Government of Japan to receive with some ceremony a letter addressed to the Tycoon was already a success. When it was represented to Perry that his proposals were of such a weighty character as to necessitate reference to the Mikado and the feudal chiefs, he answered that he would return in the ensuing spring with a larger force, when he trusted to obtain a favourable response to his overtures.

The suggestion that the Mikado and feudal lords must first be consulted was an unfortunate one for the Tycoon. No such obligation existed, and it had been merely put forward as an excuse for delay. For two and a half centuries the Tycoon had exercised an authority in domestic and foreign affairs, which had never been disputed by a single powerful *daimiō*. It was the Tycoon who had closed the country to foreign commerce, not the Mikado; nor were the *daimiōs* consulted on the occasion. The pretext was, however, again made use of when the Russian Admiral, Putiatin, arrived shortly afterwards at Nagasaki and delivered a note from Count Nesselrode proposing to fix the boundary between the two empires, and to open a couple of ports to Russian trade. Resort was had to procrastination; and it was not till January, 1854, that an answer was handed to Putiatin, to the effect that the boundary would have to be carefully examined with the aid of documents and maps; the weighty questions raised in the Russian Chancellor's note must be reported to Kiōto, and discussed with the nobles and great officers of State. This would take from three to five years, and the result would be communicated in due course. Putiatin, after replying that, if she desired to avoid disaster, Japan would do well to enter into commercial and friendly relations with foreign countries, took his leave for the present.

It was impossible to conceal the substance of the reply given to the

Americans, and shortly after Perry's departure copies of the correspondence were circulated among the high officers of State and the principal feudal lords. In the course of the autumn their replies came in. Nearly all were opposed to any alteration in the old law that foreign intercourse was limited to trade with the Dutch and Chinese; but the impossibility, for the present, of resisting the forces of which the United States could dispose was generally recognised. It was suggested that a friendly answer should be given, and hopes be held out of the demands being granted in a year or two; during that time the naval and military defences of the country could be completed, when the refusal to negotiate could be made absolute. A different note was struck by Ii Kamon no Kami, who was in favour of returning to the system that had prevailed before in the seventeenth century the country was closed, and the Japanese people interdicted from trading abroad. He advised that the old prohibition against the building of sea-going ships should be repealed, and that Dutch masters and sailors should be engaged to instruct the Japanese in the art of navigation. Then they would be able to sail the ocean in their own ships and see what other countries were like with their own eyes, instead of depending upon the reports of the Dutch. The knowledge and experience thus gained would better enable them to ensure the safety of the nation than the present system of sitting at home with closed doors.

The head of the Ministry, in resuming the memorials and the discussions that had taken place, declared the inadequacy of the national defences to be recognised on all hands; consequently, when the Americans returned, they should be put off with a dilatory reply. Orders were issued that Perry should not be permitted to pass Uraga, and officials were sent thither to detain him. They were reckoning on a mistaken view of his character. Perry called at Uraga on February 13, 1854, accompanied by six ships, with which he moved up towards Yokohama in spite of all remonstrance. Five commissioners, of whom two were the governors of Uraga, were appointed to treat with him. After some three weeks' negotiation, he exchanged with the Japanese plenipotentiaries on March 31 an agreement providing for the opening of the ports of Shimoda and Hakodaté to American ships for the supply of coal, wood, water and provisions, for the protection of shipwrecked mariners and their property, for a limited exchange of products, for the appointment of a consul to reside at Shimoda after the lapse of eighteen months, provided either of the two Governments deemed it necessary, and for the exchange of ratifications within eighteen months from the date of signature. After examining the local conditions at the two ports, he agreed at Shimoda upon a set of port regulations to be observed by Americans, and on June 18 he sailed thence by way of the Loochoos for Hongkong.

In May the Tycoon's Government let it be publicly known that

concessions had been made, under pressure of necessity, owing to the present incompleteness of the national defences. It was supposed that a short interval would suffice for perfecting the arrangements for resisting further demands. The real reason which induced the Government to make concessions to the American Commodore was the emptiness of the treasury, a fact which, however, was unknown to all but a few of the higher officials, so that they were universally blamed for their weakness in giving way. It was unfortunate that they adopted this shuffling policy, which it cannot be doubted contributed to their eventual downfall, and caused their foreign relations to assume a troubled aspect from the beginning.

The outbreak of the Crimean War rendering it desirable to prevent Russian ships of war and their prizes from making use of Japanese ports to the disadvantage of England and France, the British Admiral on the China station proceeded early in September, 1854, to enquire what were the views and intentions of the Japanese Government in regard to the war vessels of belligerents. The Tycoon's Ministers held that it would be more prudent to ignore the question, as the exclusion of belligerent vessels from their ports might involve them in disputes with Powers towards whom they entertained no unfriendly feelings; but they were willing to concede to Great Britain permission for passing vessels to obtain provisions, wood and water, and to effect repairs at Nagasaki and Hakodaté, and also, if necessary, at Shimoda. The Admiral accordingly experienced no difficulty in concluding a convention embodying these terms, with the addition of a most-favoured-nation clause, which was signed at Nagasaki on October 14.

About the same time Putiatin, after calling at Ōsaka, arrived at Shimoda. Here his ship was damaged on December 23 by a tidal wave, and foundered at sea as she was being towed round to Toda Bay for repairs. He then resumed negotiations on the lines originally proposed by him at Nagasaki. The Japanese Government declined to discuss the boundary question, or to grant any concessions beyond those contained in Perry's treaty. A convention was accordingly signed at Shimoda on February 7, 1855. Putiatin succeeded in getting away in May on board a ship which he had built with materials supplied to him by the Japanese authorities.

Copies of the American, English and Russian Treaties were forwarded to Kiōto for the information of the Mikado, who on February 13, 1855, caused an expression of his complete satisfaction with the manner in which the negotiations had been carried on to be conveyed through the *Kwambaku*, his chief Minister, to the Tycoon's Government. Hakodaté, which had hitherto formed part of the domain of the feudal lord of Matsumae, was constituted government territory, a grant of other lands being promised by way of compensation. The narrative here naturally falls into two parts, namely the action of foreign Powers and the

internal political condition which resulted. It will be found more convenient to treat them alternately than to adhere closely to the chronological order of events.

Townsend Harris, the American Consul-General appointed to reside at Shimoda, arrived there with his interpreter Heusken on August 21, 1856. He found the officials extremely obstructive. Orders had in fact been given to hinder, by every possible means, the growth of an intimacy between Japanese subjects and foreigners, lest the former should be led to embrace Christianity. In spite, however, of the general unwillingness to hold intercourse with foreign nations, the current was setting strongly in the direction of its development. In November, 1855, a convention had been concluded with the Dutch permitting them to own their settlement at Nagasaki; and the ratifications were exchanged in October, 1856. A month later Captain Possiette brought to Nagasaki the ratifications of the Russian Treaty. In April of the same year orders were given to discontinue the odious practice of enforcing the *fumi-ye* or trampling on the emblems of the Christian religion, and in October, 1857, this was made the subject of a treaty stipulation with Holland; but at the same time the Japanese commissioners declared that it was forbidden to teach Christianity (then regarded in Japan as a "pernicious doctrine"), or to import books, pictures and images relating to Christianity or any other foreign religion. In the autumn of 1856 the governors of Nagasaki reported that Sir John Bowring was about to visit that port for the purpose of concluding a fresh treaty, doubtless for the promotion of commerce, and the *Metsuké* (law officers) advised that it would be politic to make voluntary concessions with a good grace rather than to yield to pressure. To meet the emergency, Hotta, one of the Council of State, was placed in charge of foreign affairs, with a staff of officials to study commercial questions. Harris in March, 1857, communicated to the officials at Shimoda part of a letter from the Secretary of State, to the effect that, if Japan sought to evade the Treaty, the President would ask Congress for authority to employ such arguments as they would be unable to resist. He had at an early date after his arrival applied to be allowed to visit Yedo in order to present the President's letter to the Tycoon, and his persistent refusal to deliver it to anyone but "the Emperor" finally won the day. The Council of State had regarded the vigorous action of the British naval forces against Canton in the later months of 1856 as an omen of what might befall Japan if they did not change their attitude towards foreign countries, while Harris lost no opportunity of intimating that it would be wise to accept his proposals if they desired to avoid subsequent difficulties with Russia, France and England. His observations evidently made a great impression on them. In September, 1857, the Government decided to reverse their policy, and to invite him to Yedo for an audience of the Tycoon. This was made known to him without delay, and he

arranged with the governors of Shimoda that the ceremonial of presentation to the Tycoon should be the same as in the Courts of Europe. For form's sake a suggestion was put forward, but immediately abandoned, that he should prostrate himself and touch the floor with his forehead.

At this moment the most influential members of the Council of State were Hotta and Matsudaira. The Tycoon Iyesada was entirely in their hands. Owari enjoyed no consideration, and Kishiu was a mere boy. Nariaki of Mito was looked up to as a leader by half Japan. The *daimiōs* of Tsuyama, Echizen, Akashi, Kaga, Inshiu and Awa were connected with the Tycoon by family ties. The other great *daimiōs* were guided by Nariaki. Satsuma and Hizen early perceived that political changes were imminent, but were more deferential than Chōshiu, Higo and Tosa, who were wont to express their views with a good deal of freedom. The *daimiōs* sprung from the same blood as the Tycoon and the great *fudai*, such as Aidzu, Kuwana, Ii and Himeji, and those who had been members of the Council, were the main props of the Government. The lesser *daimiōs* did not count.

Harris arrived at Yedo, November 30, where he was received with the greatest civility, and commissioners were appointed to treat with him. His audience of the Tycoon passed off satisfactorily on December 7, and on the 12th he had a conference with Hotta, at which he enlarged on the changed situation caused by the introduction of steam propulsion. Japan would be obliged, he pointed out, to abandon her policy of seclusion. Foreign nations would send fleets to demand the opening of the country, and the terms demanded by them would not be so moderate as those asked by a simple diplomatist with no force at his back. He illustrated this thesis from the case of China in the war of 1839 and the war then in progress. The chief concessions required were, the residence of foreign Ministers at Yedo, freedom for foreign merchants to buy and sell without official interference, and the opening of more ports. A treaty that satisfied America would be accepted by the other Powers. These arguments proved convincing, and on February 18, 1858, the terms of the treaty were settled. In order to give time to obtain the consent of the Mikado and the *daimiōs*, it was agreed that the final signature should be postponed for sixty days, and Hotta proceeded to Kiōto for this purpose, while Harris went down to Shimoda. He was back in Yedo on April 17. Hotta was still away at Kiōto, endeavouring to gain over the Mikado, and he did not return till June 1. He told Harris on the 5th that the Mikado's consent was still withheld, but he undertook that the treaty should eventually be signed as it stood. Harris reproached him with having represented the Tycoon to be the treaty-making power, whereas it was now clear that the real authority resided at Kiōto; and he hinted at proceeding thither himself to pursue the negotiations. Hotta assured him that the Tycoon and his Council were fully resolved to carry the treaty into effect, but

they required time to bring the *daimiōs* to reason, and asked for a further postponement until September 4. The Council offering to give him a written pledge to sign on that date, he agreed to the delay, only stipulating for an undertaking not to conclude a treaty with any other Power until thirty days after the signature of his own. The letter was accordingly written, and dated June 12. Harris retired to Shimoda; but on July 23 an American man-of-war brought him the news of the conclusion of the English and French Treaties with 'China, and of the impending visit of the English and French plenipotentiaries. He at once proceeded to Kanagawa, whence he despatched a letter to Hotta with the tidings. Since June 4, Ii Kamon no Kami, whose broad-minded policy has already been referred to, had been at the head of the Tycoon's Government. He promptly sent down the treaty commissioners to discuss the situation. Harris urged the importance of signing without a moment's delay, because the English and French, having vanquished the Chinese, and forced on them the signature of a treaty almost at the gates of Peking, would assemble their fleets and proceed to Japan to insist on the opening of the ports. He feared that Japan would find it difficult to satisfy the demands of two great Powers flushed with their recent victories. If the Council would sign his treaty he could usefully intervene on their behalf. Returning to Yedo, the commissioners reported the conversation. Ii argued that the administration of public affairs having been entrusted to the Tycoon, the delegation to him of the Mikado's powers must be held to include that of deciding in a case of emergency. The Tycoon gave his consent, and the commissioners were instructed to append their signatures, which was done on July 29.

This Treaty, which served as a model for those subsequently concluded with Holland (August 18), Russia (August 19), Great Britain (August 26) and France (October 9), conceded diplomatic and consular privileges, and undertook to open, in addition to Shimoda and Hakodaté, the following ports at the respective dates: Kanagawa (Yokohama) and Nagasaki (July 4, 1859), Hiōgo (January 1, 1863), Niigata or some other port on the west coast (January 1, 1860), and the cities of Yedo and Ōsaka (January 1, 1862 and January 1, 1863). The importation of opium was prohibited; the persons and property of United States citizens in Japan were placed under the jurisdiction of United States consular Courts; the free exercise of their religion and the right of erecting places of worship were granted to them; and a tariff of import and export duties was annexed. Foreign coin was to circulate in Japan at its intrinsic value, weight for weight. Ratifications were to be exchanged at Washington on or before July 4, 1859, in accordance with a suggestion made by the Japanese themselves, and either party was to be entitled to demand a revision after July 4, 1872, on giving a year's notice. The Treaty also contained an article providing that the President,



if requested by the Japanese Government, would act as friendly mediator between Japan and any foreign Power.

Nariaki had been called into council in 1853 on the occasion of Perry's first visit. In 1855, besides being appointed to advise on the coast defences and military reforms, he was invited to take a share in the general administration. He found, however, that the obstructiveness of the permanent officials impeded his efforts, and in 1856 he ceased to attend at the castle. On hearing of the resolution that had been taken to invite Harris to Yedo he threw up his appointments and sent a secret memorial to the Mikado, reviewing the course of events during the past five years, and accusing the Tycoon's officials of weakness and want of foresight. The manner in which Europeans had spread over the whole globe, annexing one country after another, made it clear to him that their offers to enter into friendly relations with Japan were merely a cover for their sinister designs. He prayed the Mikado to arrive at a decision without delay, and to send stringent orders to Yedo that things must not be allowed to go on in this fashion. He was convinced that the Mikado did not approve of the conduct of the Tycoon's officials. If it were otherwise, then the humiliation of Japan would become patent to the whole world, and her loss of honour and dignity would by succeeding generations be laid to the charge of the Tycoon's Government.

From this moment Nariaki worked persistently against the Tycoon at Kiôto, where he maintained an agent in constant communication with the leading nobles of the Court. His own sympathies were no doubt influenced by the fact that his wife was a daughter of Arisugawa, one of the Princes of the Blood. She had borne to him the son who in 1844 had succeeded him in the headship of the clan, and also the son who, having been adopted to be head of the Hitotsubashi House, was now being put forward as a candidate for adoption as heir to the childless Tycoon. Two of his younger sisters were married to Nijô and Takadzukasa, Court nobles of the highest rank.

Hotta and his colleagues of the Council had, however, definitely adopted the policy recommended by Ii in 1853. Harris' proposals for a treaty had been communicated to the *daimiôs*, who were informed that the changed world situation necessitated the conclusion of treaties with foreign nations. If the country were not united in the face of the emergency, grave danger would result, and they were invited to express their opinions as to the best course to pursue. Nariaki replied by a violent tirade, suggesting that Hotta and his colleague Matsudaira ought to disembowel themselves, and that Harris' head ought to be cut off. Inshiu took the same line as his father Nariaki; but Echizen and Awa pronounced themselves in favour of the government policy. Satsuma also advocated opening the country. The general opinion seemed to have become less hostile to the cultivation of relations with foreign countries; but nearly all of the *daimiôs* recommended that the question

should be referred to the Mikado for his decision. The Mikado thereupon declared his desire that care should be taken not to admit foreign diplomatists or traders to the vicinity of Kiōto, and that mixed residence must be prohibited. A first attempt to procure the Mikado's approval of the negotiations with Harris having proved fruitless, owing to the uncompromising attitude of the Court, it became necessary to use greater pressure, and Hotta proceeded to Kiōto in March, 1858, together with one of the commissioners who had negotiated with Harris. He took with him a copy of the draft treaty, and laid it before the Mikado accompanied by a statement of the reasons for asking his sanction. If it were refused, the internal condition of the country would give rise to grave apprehension, and cause domestic and foreign war to break out simultaneously. It will be remembered that the Council of State had pledged themselves in writing to Harris to sign within sixty days.

This declaration caused further animated discussion at the Palace. Various Court nobles memorialised the throne in an adverse sense. Feudal retainers flocked to Kiōto, and unanimously condemned the treaty. In consequence of this the independent clansmen were forbidden by the Tycoon to enter the city.

The reply of the Mikado did not amount to a direct refusal, but it reiterated the necessity of keeping foreigners away from the neighbourhood of Kiōto, and again declared that the *daimiōs* ought to be requested to put their opinion in writing. Hotta rejoined that it was absolutely necessary to grant to foreigners such terms as they were willing to accept. The Treaty provided effectually against any sort of future dispute arising. It was of course impossible to foresee every possible contingency, but the danger of the Powers banding together against Japan was imminent. A hurried message from Yedo reached him in the middle of April reminding him that Harris was shortly expected there, and that the Treaty had to be signed on the 18th. The Council said they would not sign without the Mikado's sanction, and they enclosed the draft of a letter which they proposed should be addressed to Harris deferring signature until Hotta's return. On receipt of this news Hotta again addressed the Court, urging a prompt reply, as Harris had become very pressing and the English fleet was expected. He added a copy of a letter in which the Council acknowledged the Mikado's orders to consult the *daimiōs*, and said that the Tycoon recognised the justice of the Mikado's apprehensions in regard to public opinion, but that he would guarantee him against having any reason to feel personal anxiety. The only reply he elicited was a repetition of the previous order. Hotta thereupon replied that the negotiations with Harris having been concluded, it was necessary to give effect to them. The Mikado must give a definite answer at once, if he desired to avoid dangerous complications.

The Court replied that the Mikado's resolution was unchanged.

Nothing beyond the Treaty with Perry could be conceded. If the Americans resorted to force, the Tycoon must do his best, and the Mikado would wish to be informed what measures of defence were adopted. He would not sanction the new Treaty until the opinions of the *daimiōs* had been submitted for his consideration.

Finding that he made no impression, Hotta at last gave up trying to persuade the Court, and left for Yedo. Three days after his return Ii was appointed by the Tycoon *Tairō*, or President of the Council, an office not ordinarily filled up, and it was decided to ask Harris for further delay. At the same time the *daimiōs* actually present in Yedo were sent for to the castle, and in the presence of the Tycoon a written order was delivered to them reciting the Mikado's commands. It stated that the Mikado did not believe there would be war, but that this result would depend upon the action taken by the Tycoon, who was of opinion that the only course to adopt was that already laid before the Mikado. A further expression of their views was required of them, which they were to furnish without delay.

Matters were complicated at this juncture by the urgent need of finally deciding upon the adoption of an heir to the Tycoon, who had been married for some years and had had no children. The question had been pending for several years. Some favoured the choice of the young Prince of Kishiu, who was only twelve years of age, but being cousin-german to the Tycoon was the nearest in blood. Many leading officials, including Hotta, as well as the *daimiōs* of Owari, Echizen, Satsuma, Tosa, Sendai, Awa and Uwajima and the Tycoon's own wife preferred Nariaki's son, Hitotsubashi, who was twenty years of age, and known to possess exceptional ability. The Tycoon had made up his mind in favour of his cousin. Moreover he disliked the character of Nariaki, who was likely to arrogate to himself an inconveniently great share in the counsels of the Government, if his son were adopted as heir. While this question was still being debated, the necessity presented itself of immediately signing the treaty with Harris. Nariaki, on hearing of Harris' arrival at Kanagawa, protested violently against the conclusion of the treaty without waiting for sanction from the Mikado, as a disloyal and impious act, certain to encounter general reprobation. If they had, however, actually signed the treaty, either Ii, or one of his colleagues on the Council, ought to proceed to Kiōto at once and take the Mikado's pleasure in the matter. He also declared his absolute opposition to the chief provisions of the Treaty. Ii replied that when the *daimiōs* had been consulted, not one of them had given his voice for war, but that they had simply urged the imperative necessity of taking precautions for the future, which had been done. The Council then informed the Court at Kiōto of the momentous step they had felt compelled to take. The Tycoon had been unwilling to sign without the Mikado's sanction; but the danger of postponement was too great to be risked. Similar

information was given to all the *daimiōs*, who were called on to state their opinions without reserve as to the next steps to be taken.

On August 4 the ceremony of installing the young Prince of Kishiu as the Tycoon's heir took place. The partisans of Hitotsubashi, nevertheless, still hoped to upset the decision. However, a week later orders were issued confining Nariaki to his house; Hitotsubashi was forbidden to attend at the castle; Owari and Echizen were forced to retire into private life, in consequence of their opposition to Ii's foreign policy; while Tosa and Uwajima were subjected to the same penalty for having addressed the Court directly with regard to the Hitotsubashi candidature, and Hotta was dismissed from the Council. On August 10, the Tycoon received in person the congratulations of the *daimiōs* on his choice of an heir; but that night he was suddenly taken ill, and expired on the 14th, after giving orders for the penalties just mentioned. To add to the confusion, a decree arrived from the Mikado, commanding the presence of either Ii or a member of the Council at Kiōto. In this the hand of Nariaki is evident. On the 12th the British and Russian squadrons arrived with the respective plenipotentiaries. Ii was therefore justified in replying to the Court that state affairs of pressing importance required his presence at Yedo; but he promised that Manabé, newly appointed a member of the Council, should be sent up instead. As the latter could not start during the early days of mourning for the late Tycoon, a long letter, drafted by Ii, was sent to the *Kwambaku* (the Mikado's chief Minister), defending the course pursued by the Yedo Government.

It is necessary to explain in a few words the situation at Kiōto. When Hotta went there to get sanction to the Harris treaty he was greatly helped by Kujō, the *Kwambaku*, and his retainer Shimada Sakon, the latter deriving his inspiration from Nagano Shuzen, a retainer of Ii. On the other side were the friends of Nariaki and his party, namely Takadzukasa and his son, Konoyé and Sanjō, all four of them nobles of the highest rank, with whom sided most of the Court nobles, thorough-going advocates of the seclusion policy. It was these personages who defeated Hotta's mission. To procure the Mikado's orders in their favour was, for either party, a matter of first-rate importance, and as these had to be transmitted through the *Kwambaku*, the side he favoured must win the day. A contest thus arose about the occupancy of that office, and Ii's opponents exerted every effort to get rid of Kujō. It was his support that had enabled Ii to procure the Mikado's approval to the young Prince of Kishiu being adopted, in spite of Nariaki's influence, and this success had exasperated the other party. The news of the Treaty having been signed gave them a powerful handle against Ii. Nariaki, after being worsted at Yedo, now employed all his influence at Kiōto on behalf of Takadzukasa and his friends, who in turn endeavoured to set him on his feet again by procuring direct orders to him from the Mikado. One

day, when Kujô happened to be absent from Court, the Takadzukasa party drafted a letter stating that the Mikado was not satisfied with the Tycoon's hasty signature of the treaty. It was a rebellious and discourteous proceeding on the part of the Ministers, which could not fail to cause a breach between Kiôto and Yedo: the Mikado required, therefore, that all the *daimiôs* should be summoned to give their advice on the critical situation that had arisen. Instructions were at the same time forwarded to the Prince of Mito (Nariaki's son), as the senior *daimiô*, to communicate to the others the wishes of the Mikado. This document came into the hands of the Prince, though obviously intended for his father, and instead of acting on the instructions, he showed them to the Council. He had, however, already sent off his reply, promising to act for the best, but this fact he was careful not to disclose. The Council decided therefore to reply briefly to the Court letter, defending what had been done, and to leave it to Manabé, on his arrival at Kiôto, to offer a fuller exposition of their policy. Meanwhile, clansmen of Satsuma (among them Saigô Kichinosuké, afterwards a celebrated political leader), Chôshiu, Echizen, and Mito had assembled at Kiôto to support the opposition against the Tycoon's Government. The Tycoon's Resident and the civil governor of the city had kept a watchful eye on their doings, and sent information to meet Manabé on his journey which showed the necessity of adopting vigorous measures, for traces of a conspiracy to get rid of the young Tycoon and supplant him by Hitotsubashi had been discovered. On hearing of Manabé's having started from Yedo, the pro-Mito Court nobles put sufficient pressure on Kujô to make him resign; but he refused to recognise the resignation on the ground that by constitutional practice a *Kwambaku* could not be appointed or dismissed without the Tycoon's concurrence, and instructed Manabé to act accordingly. The latter reached Kiôto on October 23, and the arrest of the plotters followed. This vigorous step greatly weakened the Nariaki influence. Kujô agreed to remain in office, and measures were taken against the hostile Court nobles, though in such a leisurely manner that six months more elapsed before they found it necessary to resign their offices.

Manabé told the Court that the Yedo Government did not really desire to cultivate relations with foreign countries. The change in the world situation had necessitated the conclusion of treaties, but the Government would watch for an opportunity and use every effort to get rid of foreigners so soon as adequate armaments, in the way of ships and guns, were completed. At present the necessary funds were lacking. Foreigners would come to Japan solely in pursuit of gain; and, if things could be so arranged as to prevent their making any profit out of the trade, they would soon withdraw of their own accord. To rescind the treaties on the morrow of their signature would unite all the Powers against Japan, and in the unprepared state of the country it was not to

be thought of. Kujō told the Tycoon's Resident that what the Mikado was most anxious to prevent was a promise to open Ōsaka to foreign trade. He wished foreigners at other places to be placed under the same restrictions in regard to residence and moving about the country as the Chinese and Dutch had always been subjected to at Nagasaki, lest the Japanese people should become friendly to them and be infected by the "pernicious doctrine." It is clear that Manabé had undertaken that all foreigners should be expelled from the country within a few years. The result was the issue of an imperial edict on February 3, 1859, declaring that the Mikado, while unwilling that relations of friendship and commerce with "barbarians" should be established even temporarily, was satisfied for the moment with the resolution adopted by the Tycoon, with the concurrence of the President of the Council and other officials, namely, to keep "the barbarians" at a distance, and eventually to reestablish the good old law of seclusion. Harmony had thus been attained between the Mikado and the Tycoon, and it was confidently hoped that satisfactory plans would speedily be formed for closing the country again. The Mikado understood the unavoidable difficulties that had presented themselves, and would for the present await the result of the Tycoon's deliberations. This important edict was regarded as a victory for Ii; and it was followed by the resignations of Takadzukasa and his son, of Konoyé and Sanjō, which took effect in May.

Manabé had returned to Yedo in the middle of April. The arrested plotters had been despatched thither for trial, and the qualified assent of the Mikado to the treaties might have seemed to have secured the position of the Tycoon. This was, however, only in appearance. The prisoners had not yet been convicted, and the Mito clan was still in possession of the special order from the Mikado. What Manabé had obtained was not his sanction to the Treaties, but merely a postponement of the closing of the country. The Court had abandoned no principle. The Tycoon remained under the obligation to close the ports, sooner or later, to commerce, and yet the course of events was adverse to his carrying out his undertaking. He had contracted it in January; nevertheless he had not only to open the three ports in July to several nations, but also to send an embassy to the United States to exchange the ratifications of the treaty. The language held to the Court and the course pursued towards foreigners became daily more divergent. That collisions with foreign Powers should ensue became inevitable, because the majority of the ruling classes of the country was anti-foreign, who learnt nothing from the few whose eyes were opened by their intercourse with such men as Commodore Perry and Count Putiatin, or their visit to Washington. Ii having failed to obtain the Mikado's unreserved consent, was now driven to attempting to crush the Mito influence by severe sentences on political offenders, and by bringing about a marriage between the Tycoon and a younger sister of the Mikado. The decree in

which the Mikado affirmed his hope that the foreigners would eventually be driven out was not made public, and those whom it most concerned were left in entire ignorance of its existence.

The new treaties came into force on July 1, 1859. Kanagawa, or rather Yokohama, a village on the opposite side of the bay, was opened to trade, while the English, American and French diplomatic representatives took up their residence at Yedo. From the outset every sort of obstacle was thrown in the way of trade by the Japanese authorities. Difficulties occurred in connexion with the currency, owing to the unwise clause in the treaties providing for the circulation of foreign gold and silver coin in Japan weight for weight. The ratio of gold to silver was much lower than in the West, and the gold coin was rapidly exported. Prices of produce rose, and all classes complained that living was now much dearer than before. Less than two months after the opening of the port of Yokohama a Russian naval officer and a seaman were hacked to pieces in the dark by men of the *Samurai* class. In November the Chinese servant of a foreign merchant was the victim of a murderous assault. In January, 1860, the native linguist of the English legation at Yedo was murdered, and in February two Dutch merchant captains were cut to pieces in the streets of Yokohama. No redress was obtained in any of these cases; but every measure that ingenuity could suggest was taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, especially by instituting a rigid system of passes for *Samurai* visiting Yokohama, and by the erection of guard-houses on the approaches to the town. The Tycoon's Government had weakened their own hands by allowing the Mikado and the *daimiōs* to believe that it was their intention to expel foreigners from the shores of Japan as soon as they considered the country to be sufficiently prepared, and the impediments placed in the way of trade were part of the ambiguous policy they had adopted.

In order to maintain the prestige of the Tycoon they exerted themselves to obtain from the Mikado a censure on the Court nobles dismissed for the share they had taken in transmitting orders direct to Mito, and thus fomenting disagreement between the Mikado and the Tycoon, while at the same time, in the name of the latter, they disgraced Nariaki, and ordered him into confinement at the capital of the clan. His son was confined to his own house, and Hitotsubashi was forced to retire into private life; sentences varying from capital punishment to exile were pronounced on some fifty of the men of lower degree who had been arrested at Kiōto and sent for trial to Yedo; and the officials who had worked for the adoption of Hitotsubashi were deprived of office and lands. The source of all the Tycoon's troubles being the Mito clan and its intrigues with the Court, Ii now came to the conclusion that it must be forced to give up the document containing the private orders received from the Mikado. Through Kujō he obtained the necessary sanction to the demand being made; but obstinate resistance was offered

by the Mito clansmen, some twenty of whom resolved to remove the traitorous President of the Council who had betrayed his country to the barbarian, insulted their prince, and persecuted even to the death upright and patriotic *Samurai*. On March 24, 1860, as he was proceeding to the castle, the band attacked his train, murdered him and carried off his head in triumph. Thus the most strenuous advocate of an enlightened foreign policy disappeared from the scene, to be followed to the grave six months later by his inveterate enemy, Nariaki. From this time onwards dissensions among the clansmen, some of whom supported the Tycoon, while others vindicated the rights of the Mikado, prevented Mito from exercising any influence over the current of national politics.

In September, 1860, a Prussian mission under Count Eulenburg arrived at Yedo to conclude a treaty of commerce. It can well be imagined that this proposal to negotiate was in the highest degree unwelcome to the Tycoon's Government, which had already become involved in serious difficulties in consequence of the Treaties of 1858. The Prussian diplomatist was, however, not to be denied; and, finally, the Government consented early in December to appoint commissioners, with the result that a treaty was signed on January 24, 1861. From this all mention of the opening of other ports or places besides Yokohama, Hakodaté and Nagasaki was excluded. Niigata, or some other port on the west coast, was to have been opened on January 1, 1860, but no steps were taken on either side to carry out this stipulation. Of more importance were the treaty provisions that the city of Yedo should be opened for residence and trade on January 1, 1862, and the city of Ōsaka with the port of Hiōgo, January 1, 1863. It was necessary for the Tycoon's Government, in order to fulfil the undertaking given by Manabé to the Court, to obtain from the Treaty Powers their consent to a postponement, and already in the summer of 1860 they had approached the foreign representatives on this subject. The latter, who had experienced in their own persons the dangers of residence in Yedo, were not unwilling to recommend this course to their Governments. Eventually, it was decided by the Council to send a mission to Europe to negotiate. It started in February, 1862, and returned home in January, 1863, after visiting all the Powers in turn, except the United States, with its object accomplished. In return for the concession obtained, the envoys undertook to recommend to their Government that all restrictions on trade complained of by foreign merchants should be removed, and also that, in accordance with a suggestion thrown out in 1861 by the Tycoon's Ministers, Tsushima should be opened to commerce as a measure of protection against Russian aggression.

Just before the negotiations for the Prussian Treaty were concluded, Heusken, the Secretary of the United States legation, was murdered as he was riding home one night from the Prussian envoy's lodgings. The English, French, and Netherlands representatives decided



to remove their establishments temporarily to Yokohama or Kanagawa, until the Japanese Government should give guarantees for the safety of the legations, while the American Minister preferred to remain in Yedo, where, as he maintained, perfect safety could be enjoyed, so long as foreigners observed the precautions recommended by the Tycoon's Ministers. It was he who had obtained the conclusion of the first treaty that accorded the right of diplomatic residence in Yedo. To him, therefore, it would have been humiliating to admit that he had made a mistake in insisting on this point during the negotiations. He reported to Washington that he looked on Heusken's murder as the result of his own imprudence in going through the streets at night, though escorted by the mounted *Samurai* detailed by the Government for his protection.

The Council were greatly disquieted by this withdrawal of the three diplomatists, but procured their return in March, 1861, by engaging to provide effectually for the protection of the legations. The measures that the Council had engaged to take were put to a rude test on the night of July 5, when a band of fourteen Mito clansmen attacked the residence of the British Minister. The Japanese guard, consisting of clansmen furnished by the feudal chief of Kōriyama and from retainers of the Tycoon, engaged the assailants after they had penetrated to the Minister's apartments and wounded two of his staff. It was discovered afterwards that the plan had been formed more than a year before, some of the confederates having visited the building in the disguise of curio dealers, and made themselves acquainted with the interior arrangements. Hearing that the British Minister had returned on July 3 from a journey in the interior, they proceeded to carry out their design. The motive was merely blind hatred of the foreigner, and, as in the case of other murderous attacks, the act was not the result of provocation received. In order to ensure better protection in the future, the Government undertook that residences should be built for the foreign Ministers in some defensible locality. The place finally selected was Goten-yama, an elevated piece of ground commanding the bay, which for generations had been a pleasure resort of the inhabitants of the capital. Buildings were accordingly commenced, but had not been completed, when they were burnt to the ground early in 1863 by incendiaries from Chōshiu. The choice had been very unpopular, and the clansmen had especially resented it as dedicating to the service of the foreigner an important strategic position. Harris and his successor Pruyn continued to live at Yedo till, on the night of May 24, 1863, the American legation was destroyed by fire. For some time previous Pruyn had been urged by the Council to leave the capital, for the residence there of diplomatists was one of the treaty stipulations most objected to by the Mikado's party; and he reluctantly came to the conclusion that the destruction of his residence was an act of incendiarism for which the ultimate responsibility must rest on the Tycoon's Government.

Russia had, as narrated in a previous section of this chapter, acquired from China an enormous territory stretching from the mouth of the Amur river down to the northern boundary of Corea. It contained no warm-water port, and the idea was conceived that the Japanese island of Tsushima, lying in the Corean channel, would serve as a convenient additional naval station. Accordingly, in March, 1861, the corvette *Possadnick*, commander Barileff, was despatched thither with orders to form an establishment on shore. When the news of his proceedings reached Yedo, the Government sent down officials to enquire what were his intentions. They could obtain no information, except that his ship was in need of repairs, which appeared to them suspicious, as she had come straight from Nagasaki, where, had she required any, they could easily have been executed. The commander explained that his real object was to forestall the English, who had designs on the island and had asked the Tycoon's Government to give them land there for a naval station. This was false. Injunctions were left with the *daimiō* to avoid a breach of peaceful relations, and the officials returned to report to their superiors. The Russian consul at Hakodaté was then appealed to, who replied that he knew nothing of the matter, but would enquire of the Commodore. It turned out afterwards that he himself had been the channel through which the Commodore had received his instructions. The Japanese Government then turned for help to the British Minister and Admiral. The diplomatist advised their addressing a complaint to the Russian Government, which they accordingly did on September 27. The Admiral proceeded to Tsushima, where he arrived on August 27, and found a very complete naval depot in existence, including a hospital and workshops, with the Russian flag flying on the hill above. On his addressing a letter to the Russian officer, asking whether his orders admitted of his leaving the island if he received a request to that effect from the Japanese authorities, and whether he had orders to create a permanent establishment there, he received a polite but evasive answer. Sir James Hope thereupon proceeded to Olga Bay on September 5 in search of the Commodore, but not finding him there, he left a letter, enquiring whether it was his intention to retain permanently the establishment begun by the *Possadnick*, and if otherwise, when would it be removed. He added that until he received instructions from his own Government, it would be his duty not to recognise any establishment formed on Japanese territory not sanctioned by treaty, whether by Russia or any other Power, and that he would make his intention known to the Japanese authorities. In reply the Commodore informed him that, even before the receipt of his letter, orders had been sent to Commander Barileff to withdraw. When the official reports reached England, Lord Russell instructed the ambassador at St Petersburg to make representations to the Russian Government. Prince Gorchakoff treated the matter as one of no importance, and complained of the tone

of the Admiral's letter to Barileff, but said that the island had been abandoned. The dates seem to suggest that the relinquishment of this attempt to establish a naval station midway in the channel between Corea and Japan was not altogether spontaneous. In the unprepared state of Japan at that period the Russians might have acquired a position on the island from which they could not afterwards have easily been dislodged.

In November, 1861, on the occasion of the intended marriage between the Mikado's sister and the young Tycoon, orders came down from Kiôto to proclaim a general amnesty in favour of all those who, in the belief that they were serving their country, had committed political offences for which they had suffered capital punishment, exile, imprisonment or domiciliary arrest. This was virtually a command to censure retrospectively the whole policy of Ii, the late President of the Council. Since his assassination, the chief direction of affairs had passed into the hands of Kuzé and Andô. It was the latter who had sanctioned the treaty negotiations with Eulenburg, at a moment when the Tycoon was morally pledged to cancel those already concluded. A reprimand addressed by him to the actual negotiator Hori, one of the Commissioners for Foreign Affairs, had driven the latter to take his own life, and a party of Hori's retainers attempted on February 14, 1862, to assassinate Andô in the precincts of the castle. He escaped with a severe wound, but did not reappear in public life.

A few days later an edict was received from Kiôto, inveighing against the increasing audacity of "the barbarians," and recalling that the result of previous communications with Yedo had been to fix upon a term of between seven and ten years for severing relations with foreign countries. The Mikado had agreed to a short delay, in order to give time for the completion of military preparations. As evidence of the harmony which now prevailed, so necessary for the successful "quelling of the barbarians," the Mikado had allowed his sister to espouse the Tycoon, and the whole country must unite in seizing the occasion for manifesting the glory of Japan. After Nariaki disappeared from the scene, his mantle had fallen on Shimadzu Saburô, a younger brother of the late, and father of the present, Prince of Satsuma, who now appeared at Kiôto. A complete change speedily came over the field of politics. Kuzé and Andô were disgraced. Shungaku, the ex-Prince of Echizen, and the feudal chief of Aidzu were summoned to the Tycoon's councils, while at Kiôto the Court nobles who had been disgraced at the instance of Ii were restored to favour. The *Kwambaku* Kujô was sent about his business and replaced by Konoyé, who belonged, as will be remembered, to the party formerly headed by Nariaki. In order to secure the Tycoon's hold over the person of the Mikado, Aidzu was shortly afterwards appointed Military Governor of Kiôto. It was a good choice, for the Aidzu clansmen were the most formidable warriors in Japan, except those of Satsuma.

To bring pressure to bear on the Tycoon a Court noble named Ōhara was despatched early in June to Yedo, with Shimadzu Saburō as his escort, bearing instructions to offer to the Tycoon the choice of three alternatives: the first, that the Tycoon should come up to Kiōto with all the *daimiōs* to consult with the Court nobles as to the government of the country and the "expulsion of the barbarians"; the second, to copy the system bequeathed by Hideyoshi to his son, and appoint five of the greater *daimiōs* whose territories lay on the coast to be chief Ministers (*tairō*); or the third, to appoint Hitotsubashi assistant to the Tycoon and Shungaku sole chief Minister. The Council finally consented to accept part of the first and the whole of the third alternative. Notice was given that the Tycoon would proceed to Kiōto "in order to come to a complete understanding with the Mikado, and to give expression to his sincere sentiments and intentions, thus laying the foundations of a complete accord and enabling the military prestige of Japan to be developed until she became the most powerful nation in the world; the Tycoon therefore called on all the *daimiōs* to aid him with their advice in the introduction of the necessary administrative reforms, that finally he might bring tranquillity to the imperial bosom and confer prosperity on the people." This proclamation was followed on August 1 by the appointments of Hitotsubashi as Guardian to the Tycoon and of Shungaku as President of the Council.

The Tycoon's Government had capitulated.

As Shimadzu Saburō was returning to Kiōto in September, 1862, he met on the high road near Yokohama a party of four British subjects, one of whom (Richardson) was killed, and two severely wounded, by men forming part of his retinue. This incident had important and far-reaching consequences. In the spring of 1863 the British Government demanded a formal apology for a murderous attack having been permitted on British subjects on a high road open to them by treaty, with the payment of a sum of £100,000 as a penalty for this offence, and a further sum of £10,000 as compensation to the families of two sentries who had been murdered by one of the Japanese guards at the British legation at Yedo on the night of June 26, 1862. From the Prince of Satsuma the *chargé d'affaires* was instructed to claim the trial and execution of the chief perpetrators of the murderous assault, and the payment of £25,000 by way of compensation to the relatives of the murdered man and to his companions. The Tycoon's Government, which was being pressed by the Court to "expel the barbarians," would have refused compliance, but eventually gave way when an ultimatum, backed by a strong naval force, was presented. They paid the money and offered a written expression of regret. They intimated their readiness to pay the indemnity on behalf of the Prince of Satsuma, but declared themselves unable to arrest and punish the murderers, thus admitting that they had no power in the territories of a great *daimiō*.

The British squadron under Admiral Küper, with the chargé d'affaires on board, consequently proceeded to Kagoshima in the month of August to present the demands directly to the Prince. The Satsuma authorities attempted to justify the slaying of Richardson on the ground that he and his party had obstructed the passage of Shimadzu Saburō's train. They held that, if anyone were to blame, it was the Yedo Government for not inserting in the treaty a statement of the Japanese rule of the road. They declared their inability to find the individuals implicated, and declined to pay compensation until the question of responsibility was settled. The Admiral thereupon seized some steamers belonging to the Prince, and on the batteries opening fire, engaged them during a furious storm. Many guns were dismounted and half the town was burnt, besides a factory and a gun-foundry, the loss on the British side being 2 officers and 10 men killed and 51 wounded. On the following day the squadron quitted the bay, throwing shells as it passed into what was believed to be the Prince's palace. The report addressed to the Tycoon on behalf of the Prince briefly stated that the seizure of the steamers had rendered it necessary to open fire and drive off the attacking force. The engagement could hardly be claimed as a victory by either side, but in November, 1863, envoys from Satsuma presented themselves to the British chargé d'affaires, expressing the desire of their Prince to come to terms, by undertaking to search for the guilty parties and offering to pay the sum demanded. This proposal was accepted, and the Tycoon's Government provided the money. From this time forward a friendly feeling grew up between the clan and the British legation, which was largely facilitated by the business relations existing between Satsuma and a leading British firm at Nagasaki. In the spring of the following year, however, Shimadzu Saburō was sent for to the palace of the Mikado, who expressed his satisfaction at the zeal displayed by the Satsuma clan in the repulse of the British squadron, and conferred gifts on him and his son the reigning Prince. It is highly probable that the arrangement made with the chargé d'affaires had been concealed from the Prince's knowledge by the retainers who professed to speak on his behalf.

To go back, however, to the previous year—the political situation developed rapidly after the mission of Ōhara, who on his return to Kiōto was rewarded for the success he had obtained. The Court nobles were informed of the Mikado's satisfaction with the Tycoon's evident desire to amend his conduct and to respect the wishes of the sovereign, who would wait awhile to see the result. About the same time, notice was given at Yedo to the *daimiōs* that they might send their families home, and that the rules for their own attendance there would be greatly modified, so as to allow in future of their residing more continuously in their territories and attending to the interests of their people. One and all thereupon quitted Yedo, as it proved, for ever; and most of the great *daimiōs*, such as Inshiu, Chikuzen, Geishiu, Kurumé, Awa,

Kumamoto, Satsuma, Chōshiu and Tosa, from this time onwards established themselves at Kiōto, thus openly transferring to the Mikado the allegiance they had formerly paid to the Tycoon.

Finally, it was decided at Yedo that the Tycoon should start for Kiōto in the ensuing March. Hitotsubashi and Shungaku preceded the Tycoon to Kiōto. In response to an urgent message from the palace they, in conjunction with Aidzu and the ex-Prince of Tosa, imprudently undertook that when the Tycoon arrived he would fix the date when "expulsion of the barbarians" should begin. This would be some time in the month between May 18 and June 15, 1863; but, in order to provide beforehand a sufficient reason for shortening his stay, they reminded the Court that they had previously stipulated for an interval of twenty days between his return to Yedo and the commencement of operations. To the general body of officials at Yedo, who were only too conscious that the Tycoon was undertaking the impossible, it seemed that the impatience of the Court was unreasonable, and that the Tycoon ought not to be made to promise precipitately what was beyond his power to perform. They counselled the adoption of stringent measures against all those who were trying to force on him an enterprise that would not only bring about his ruin, but also leave a lasting stain on the character of Japan in the eyes of foreign nations. But the time had gone by for resistance, and their political chiefs lacked the moral courage to tell the Court that the task was hopeless. On the last day of March the start was made. The original intention was that the stay at Kiōto should not exceed ten days, but the Court, having got the Tycoon there, determined to keep him as long as possible. At first, the Mikado was induced to declare that he left the performance of the functions of *Shōgun* entirely in his hands; yet at the same time he announced the possibility of his taking the field himself in person. Mito was sent down to Yedo to hasten preparations for war. The only way of escape for the Tycoon was to agree on a date for commencing negotiations, by which was meant an intimation to foreigners that they must depart. June 24 was accordingly chosen. Notice was given to all the *daimiōs* to defend their coasts from foreign attack, and Hitotsubashi was despatched to Yedo to see that the Mikado's orders were executed. Before his arrival, however, notes had been addressed on the appointed day to the Ministers of England, France and the United States, stating that orders had come from the Tycoon at Kiōto to close the ports and banish all foreigners. At the same time the Council gave them verbal assurances that nothing would be done to give effect to this intimation. Trade would go on as usual, and troops would be sent to support the Tycoon against his enemies. As a matter of course the foreign representatives replied by a protest against this attempt to set the treaties aside, and declared they would take such steps as seemed fitting to protect the interests of their respective countries.

Troops were accordingly embarked on board two British steamers chartered by the Council and brought as far as Ōsaka, to the unbounded indignation of the Court. Ogasawara, who commanded them, was denounced on all sides as a traitor to the Mikado, and was glad to escape back to Yedo. Hitotsubashi, moreover, had sent up a memorial asking to be relieved from his charge, on the ground that he could not find a single member of the Yedo Government willing to assist in its execution. Assurances on behalf of the Tycoon that he would carry out the Mikado's orders so far as practicable having been given by the Ministers in his suite, he was allowed to go down to Ōsaka, whence they promptly brought him home to Yedo by steamer. Ogasawara had to be dismissed from office for his temerity in planning a rescue.

The Straits of Shimonoseki, on the northern side of which lay the Chōshiu territory, were habitually used by foreign vessels navigating between Yokohama and Nagasaki. Powerful batteries had been constructed in readiness for the day when "expulsion" was to begin. It so happened that a passing American steamer anchored there on June 24, 1863, and she was at once fired on. On July 8 and 11 a French despatch-boat and a Dutch man-of-war received similar treatment. An American man-of-war was promptly sent to retaliate. She engaged the batteries on July 16, and sank a steamer and a brig belonging to the Prince. Four days later the French Admiral attacked the batteries, and landing a party of 250 men, spiked the guns and destroyed the ammunition. The Straits remained closed until September, 1864, when a joint expedition of the four Powers, including Great Britain, attacked Shimonoseki, captured the batteries and removed the guns. It should be mentioned that, previous to the despatch of the allied squadrons, a ship had been sent down to convey to Chōshiu two young clansmen (one of whom was the present Prince Itō) who had just returned from England, in order to present to their lord remonstrances on the part of the foreign representatives, and endeavour to induce him to abandon further hostilities. The answer of the clan was that the Prince had been merely carrying out the orders of the Mikado and Tycoon, and that he could not open the Straits without their sanction, which he would endeavour to obtain if a delay of three months were conceded to him. The failure of this attempt at negotiation convinced the diplomatists that measures of coercion were unavoidable. The result of the operations was an undertaking on the part of Chōshiu not to re-arm the batteries, to allow free passage to foreign vessels, to furnish them with such supplies as they might need, and to pay an indemnity for the expenses of the expedition together with a sum as ransom for the town of Shimonoseki. Eventually, the Tycoon's Government undertook the payment of this indemnity, the amount of which was fixed at \$3,000,000. Each of the three Powers whose vessels had been molested received \$142,000 as

compensation, the balance being divided equally among the four, although the force contributed by each was far from being equal. As in the case of Kagoshima in 1863, this passage of arms was followed by the establishment of entirely amicable relations with the Prince and his retainers.

No sooner had the Tycoon been conveyed safely back to Yedo than a memorial signed by him was addressed to the Mikado, representing that, in the opinion of Mito and Hitotsubashi, with whom he had been directed to consult, the present moment was an unfavourable one for carrying out the exclusion policy. To attempt it would be merely playing into the hands of the "barbarians." So soon as order was introduced into the internal administration and harmony of opinion established, the necessary steps should be taken. He suggested that the fixing of a date should be left entirely to his discretion.

It will be noticed that the authors of this document entirely ignored the fact that June 24, 1863, had already been agreed upon by their colleagues who had accompanied the Tycoon to Kiōto. The reply which came back praised the Tycoon for having, by coming to Court, revived an excellent practice that had remained in abeyance for over two centuries, and thus placed the relations of sovereign and vassal on a proper footing. A rebuke was added for his not keeping the Mikado constantly informed of his doings, above all for having gone to Yedo *in a steamer*, and for his unsatisfactory language in regard to breaking off foreign relations; he deserved to be called to account for his conduct, but out of gracious consideration, proceedings against him would be delayed—haughty language to which the Tokugawa *Shōguns* had not been accustomed.

A sudden and unexpected change now came about in the Mikado's counsels, due to the rash proceedings of the Chōshiu chief. By his unprovoked attacks on American, French and Dutch ships he had brought on himself the direct hostility of foreign Powers, and had been ingloriously worsted. He had violated a constitutional rule by anticipating instructions from the Tycoon. He had not parleyed before opening fire. To the Tycoon's Government the discomfiture of Chōshiu was very welcome, and strengthened their position. Prince Nakagawa, the Mikado's principal adviser, became convinced that the anti-foreign policy of violence was impracticable, and those who had been foremost in urging it fell into disgrace. Sanjō and certain other Court nobles were forbidden to appear at Court, and the Chōshiu men were ordered to surrender the guard of the palace gate that had been in their charge. Easy credence was given to the accusation that they were plotting to carry off the Mikado and force him to declare war against the foreigners. Chōshiu, being called on to explain his action in firing on foreign ships and in sending armed men across the strait into the territory of Kokura, replied that to the order to break off relations on June 24 his retainers



had given its natural interpretation. They had supposed that any barleyings that might be contemplated would have taken place previously, and that hostilities were to be immediate. The Kokura clan had weakened the effect of Chōshiu's efforts by withholding their assistance, and surely to send men to expostulate with them was in no way irregular.

There were not wanting sympathisers with Chōshiu. Awa, Inshiu, Uyesugi and Bizen urged that the Tycoon should be called on to explain the delay in closing the port of Yokohama, which the Minister Itakura and his colleagues had promised should by this time be accomplished. On the other hand the Echizen clan frankly gave it as their opinion that both the Mikado and Tycoon were pursuing an erroneous policy. The maritime "barbarians" had become enlightened, and friendly intercourse between nations was the rule. For Japan to remain isolated was impracticable. The policy of closing the country and "expelling the barbarians" had no foundation in reason. To break off relations with the Five Powers without just grounds would amount to a breach of faith. The "pernicious doctrine" so much talked about was quite different from the "*Kirishitan*" of former times, and as far as they could hear no harm need be anticipated from its adoption. Commerce would enrich Japan, as it had enriched other countries. Until the Court changed its line of action it would not be visited either by the reigning *daimiō* or by Shungaku.

The upshot was that the Chōshiu clansmen were forbidden to remain in Kiōto, and they accordingly departed in a body, carrying off with them Sanjō and six other Court nobles, who were allied with them politically. Sanjō will be heard of afterwards.

At first the Tycoon's Ministers hoped to induce the foreign representatives to consent to Yokohama being closed, on condition of Ogasawara's Note of June 24 being withdrawn. Finding that they had produced no impression, the Council wrote on November 12 announcing that they had changed their policy, and requested that Ogasawara's Note might be returned. To keep up appearances, they circulated a notification that full powers having been given to the Tycoon to arrange for closing the ports, and negotiations having begun, the clansmen must abstain from all acts of violence. The Mikado was also informed that negotiations had begun, and he announced reluctantly that he would await the result.

On October 14 a French naval officer, Lieutenant Camus, had been cut to pieces as he was riding in the neighbourhood of Yokohama. An apology and compensation for this murder was promised; and, as the foreign representatives had peremptorily refused to entertain the proposal to close the ports, it was decided to despatch a mission to France and England, to arrange the Camus affair and at the same time to negotiate with the two Governments, whom the Council expected to find

more yielding than the diplomatists on the spot. The reception they met with in Paris did not encourage the envoys to pursue their journey further, and they returned in August, 1864, with a convention by which they undertook that the Tycoon would reopen the Straits of Shimonosēki within three months. This convention the Government were easily persuaded not to ratify, as they recognised the impossibility of putting it into execution.

His most formidable antagonist having been obliged to withdraw from Kiōto, it was thought safe for the Tycoon to proceed thither again in February, 1864, accompanied by four out of the seven members of which the Council of State now consisted. He was preceded by Hitotsubashi in January. Chōshiu still had friends there, who exerted their efforts to obtain leave for himself and his son to come up and explain their conduct in the previous summer, but without success. The result of the negotiations between the Court and the Tycoon's supporters was that Aidzu, Shungaku of Echizen, the ex-Princes of Uwajima and Tosa, and Shimadzu Saburō were designated as personages enjoying the Mikado's confidence and therefore suitable counsellors for the Tycoon. An undertaking was given that the Tycoon and all the *daimiōs*, on succeeding to their fiefs, should proceed to Kiōto to receive investiture from the Mikado, and that various marks of respect hitherto withheld should be paid to him and to the members of the imperial house. In return for these concessions, the Mikado again committed the government of the country to the Tycoon, and left the punishment of Chōshiu and the seven fugitive Court nobles to his discretion. He was at the same time ordered to carry out the closing of Yokohama to foreign trade with due expedition. As soon as these terms were settled the Tycoon started for Yedo, where he arrived on June 23.

The Chōshiu clan, who were indisposed to admit that their conduct was in any way worthy of blame, refused to remain under the imputation of disloyalty, and early in August a band of some 400 warriors, headed by Fukubara, a leading clan-councillor, arrived at Fushimi. They disobeyed the Court's orders to return home at once, and protested that their only desire was to manifest the loyalty of their princes, and to remove traitorous advisers from the Mikado's side. Two other bands under Kunishi and Masuda followed, raising the total number to 900. The Tycoon's party put forth a proclamation, commenting on their threatening attitude, and announcing that the Mikado had decreed their chastisement. On the 20th of the month hostilities broke out. The Chōshiu men attacked the palace from three sides, but were repulsed after a bloody fight by the clansmen of Aidzu, Kuwana, Echizen, Hikoné, Ōgaki, and Satsuma and the Tycoon's troops under Hitotsubashi. They were pursued in their retreat; some twenty of the fugitives committed suicide rather than surrender, and the rest dispersed in the direction of their home.

Five days later, a decree was issued from the palace denouncing the criminal act of Chōshiu, and ordering the Tycoon to march against the clan. This was proclaimed throughout the country, and the *daimiōs* of the west and south were called on to furnish contingents. The ex-Prince of Owari was named commander-in-chief, and Echizen second in command. Further edicts deprived the two Princes of their titles and rank, and forbade the transport of rice and arms to their territories. In November the Commander-in-chief arrived at Hiroshima at the head of the attacking force, and received the submission of the Chōshiu Princes. They undertook to execute the three leaders of the attack on the palace and to surrender the fugitive Court nobles, while they themselves would retire to a monastery and await the sentence that might be pronounced on them. The heads of Fukubara, Kunishi and Masuda having been produced and satisfactory evidence of contrition furnished by the Princes, Owari gave orders to withdraw the troops.

It only remained, therefore, to decide what should be done with the two Princes. That the Tycoon inspired the resolution taken on this occasion is scarcely probable, and it can only be supposed that his supporters had become infatuated, for they not only commanded that the Prince of Chōshiu and his son should be brought prisoners to Yedo, but also ordered Uwajima to send troops into the territory to assume their custody. They also conceived the untimely resolution of reenacting the old law, abrogated in 1862, which required the *daimiōs* to leave their families in Yedo, and to reside there themselves every alternate year. These measures provoked not only a protest from some of the leading *daimiōs*, but also a severe rebuke from the Mikado, who called on the Tycoon to forthwith proceed to Kiōto and settle with him what steps should be taken to restore domestic and foreign peace to the country. Meanwhile disturbances had broken out in Chōshiu, where those of the clan who resented the decapitation of the three clan-councillors, rose under the leadership of Takasugi and Yamagata, worsted their opponents, and carried off the two Princes to the inland fortress of Yamaguchi.

On these events becoming known at Yedo the Tycoon's advisers resolved on a second expedition. To reiterated orders to proceed to Kiōto no attention was paid; but at last they found that delay was no longer practicable, and finally consented that he should leave Yedo in June, 1865. It was at first intended to reappoint the ex-Prince of Owari to the chief command, but his principal retainers were unwilling to see him placed again in that invidious position, and Kishiu was appointed in his stead. Higo was to lead the van, but, loyal though his house had always been to the Tycoon and his ancestors, he was very unwilling to take part in the operations. Inshiu, a brother of Mito by blood, remonstrated against the vagueness of the expression "dangerous schemes" used as the justification for renewed coercion, and warned the Tycoon against the defeat and loss of prestige which he foresaw would be the result. Echizen likewise protested, while Satsuma flatly refused

to send a contingent. To make matters worse, the treasury was depleted, and resort became necessary to the unpopular measure of calling upon the Buddhist monasteries and townspeople of Yedo for contributions towards the expense of the contemplated operations. f

The Tycoon reached Kiōto on July 16, and had an audience the same day. The Mikado put before him three equally unpalatable alternatives, each of which was contrived so as to reserve to the Court the ultimate decision in Chōshiu's case; and it was not till November that a reply was given. The Tycoon stated that he had summoned the cadets of the house of Chōshiu to appear before him at Ōsaka, but they showed no signs of an intention to obey, and under the circumstances it was difficult to treat the clan with leniency; on the contrary, everything pointed to the necessity of an advance in force.

Another complication had arisen from the attitude of the foreign representatives. So far back as 1858 Harris had twitted the Tycoon's Ministers with their apparent inability to conclude a treaty without the Mikado's permission. Nevertheless the Treaties were signed by the Tycoon as the high contracting party on the part of Japan, and to hide this assumption, while he was termed "His Majesty" in the various texts drawn up in foreign languages, in the corresponding Japanese version these words were either omitted altogether or rendered by a term of which the only possible equivalent in English is "His Highness," a title borne also by the *Kwambaku*. When real diplomatic relations were opened at Yedo the foreign representatives were not long in finding out that the Tycoon was not the Emperor of Japan, and that the Mikado was much more than the supposed "Spiritual Emperor" of the early writers. This impression deepened as time went on. The Tycoon's Ministers were forced to admit that they were unable to interfere in the administration of the great fiefs, and that their inability to carry out the treaties was due to the Mikado having refused his sanction. The necessity of obtaining the ratification of the true sovereign was forced upon the notice of Western Governments; but until after the naval expeditions to Kagoshima and Shimonoseki and the gradual assemblage of ships and troops in the Japan seas, the opportunity of pressing the point did not present itself. In the summer of 1865 Sir Harry Parkes arrived in Japan as British Minister, and, as soon as he had leisure to take up this question, urged it upon the attention of his colleagues. Accordingly, a powerful combined squadron proceeded to Hiōgo early in November, carrying the British, French and Netherlands Ministers and the United States chargé d'affaires, with the object of compelling the attention of the Tycoon to the matter. In addition to demanding the Mikado's ratification of the Treaties they offered to remit two-thirds of the Shimonoseki indemnity in return for the immediate opening of Ōsaka and Hiōgo and the revision of the customs tariff on a basis of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*.

The appearance of foreign ships of war in the bay of Ōsaka on such an errand caused a profound sensation at the Court. The Tycoon was persuaded by his Ministers to ask the Mikado's leave to recommence negotiations with respect to the treaties frankly and sincerely. Simultaneously he offered to resign his office in favour of Hitotsubashi and retire into private life. To increase the pressure on the Court it was given out that he would leave at once for Yedo. Evidently such a step would have placed the Court in a very difficult position. A similarly worded memorial from Hitotsubashi, Aidzu, Kuwana, and the Minister Ogasawara reinforced the Tycoon's arguments. On the night of November 21 representatives of fifteen leading clans were summoned to the palace, to offer their advice to the Mikado. A large majority proved to be in favour of the treaties being sanctioned. Accordingly, on the following day the wished-for decree came forth, worded as follows: "Imperial consent is given to treaties, and you will therefore make suitable arrangements." To this was added a rider, stating that there were several stipulations in the existing treaties which did not harmonise with the Mikado's views. A report must be made on these points after careful examination, and when the clans had discussed it, he would give his decision. The question of opening Hiōgo must be dropped.

In communicating the Mikado's consent to the foreign representatives the Tycoon's Ministers entirely suppressed the rider, thus leaving them under the impression that the treaties had been sanctioned as they stood. In regard to the opening of Hiōgo they simply said that they were unable to discuss it at the moment. They would continue to pay the instalments of the indemnity, and instructions should be sent to Yedo to negotiate the amendment of the tariff.

This interruption having been disposed of, the Tycoon reluctantly consented to remain in office, with Hitotsubashi as his principal adviser, and he was left free to deal with the Chōshiu question as he judged expedient. Early in January, 1866, a sort of trial of Chōshiu took place at Hiroshima; that is to say, three law officers put a series of questions to two clan-councillors, who returned not very frank replies. Finally, a declaration was put in on behalf of the two Princes, expressing complete submissiveness and readiness to accept whatever terms might be imposed. The leaders of the Chōshiu drilled troops, who had also been examined, spoke out more boldly, and expressed their confidence that the two Princes would be acquitted, on the ground that they had unwaveringly obeyed the orders both of the Mikado and the Tycoon.

This was too much for the patience of the Council, who felt they were being trifled with. In March they presented a report bearing the names of Hitotsubashi, Aidzu and two of themselves, acquitting the Princes indeed of treasonable intentions towards the Mikado, but censuring them for their lax exercise of authority over the clansmen. In consideration of the loyal conduct of the Chōshiu family in past times

they recommended as a lenient sentence that 100,000 *koku* of lands should be confiscated (say two-sevenths of the Chōshiu territory), that the two Princes should be condemned to seclusion for life, the headship being continued in a descendant, while the families of Fukubara, Kunishi and Masuda should be attainted. This was approved by the Court on the same day, with the significant recommendation that care should be taken to avoid popular commotion. In the eyes of the feudal lords the sentence appeared preposterous, as indeed it was, since the Tokugawa power was altogether insufficient for its enforcement. The whole population of the two provinces declared their intention of resisting, and, so soon as they were ready to take the field, the Chōshiu troops invaded the adjoining provinces, where they occupied positions from which the Tycoon's army proved unable to eject them. Kishiu had already protested against the unnecessary severity of the sentence, while Satsuma had refused to march on the ground that there was no justification for an appeal to arms. The Government was at its wits' end for money, and tried to raise funds from the officials, from the city of Ōsaka, and the towns of Hiōgo and Nishinomiya. The Tycoon's forces suffered repeated defeats at the hands of their better drilled and disciplined adversaries.

At the end of September the Tycoon died most opportunely, and Hitotsubashi was appointed to succeed as head of the Tokugawa family. Hereupon the Court commanded a cessation of hostilities and the retirement of the Chōshiu troops from the territories they had seized. Chōshiu affected to disbelieve that this was the genuine order of the Mikado, and declined to evacuate, on the ground that there was no guarantee that the war would not be renewed immediately after the mourning for the Tycoon was over. On February 3, 1867, the Mikado died also, and was succeeded by the present Emperor, then only fifteen years of age. This event was followed by an order from the palace to disband the troops on both sides in consequence of the national mourning, which was submissively notified by the new Tycoon to all whom it might concern.

The opening of the port of Hiōgo and of the cities of Yedo and Ōsaka had in 1862 been deferred with the consent of the Treaty Powers until January 1, 1868, and there was no prospect of a further delay being accorded. The new Tycoon, anxious to cultivate friendly relations with the foreign representatives, invited them to visit him at Ōsaka in the month of April, when he received them in public and private audience, and entertained them at his own table in accordance with Western etiquette. During their stay arrangements were discussed for the settlement of foreign merchants at those three places, and on April 9, 1867, the Tycoon memorialised in reference to the opening of Hiōgo. He confessed that in 1865 the order of the late Mikado to abandon this treaty stipulation had not been communicated to the foreign representatives

by his predecessor, for fear of the complications which might have ensued. To have insisted on modifying the treaties in this respect would have amounted to a breach of faith, and was impracticable. As the treaties had been sanctioned in general terms, nothing had been said on this subject at the time. Then the Chōshiu question and the death of his predecessor had caused the question to drop out of sight, but the foreign representatives were constantly arguing that it should be disposed of, as the stipulated date was fast approaching. He was convinced that the only safe course to pursue was to carry out the treaties faithfully. Any other policy would interfere with the most urgent need of the moment, namely, that Japan should acquire the ships and arms in which foreigners at present possessed the superiority, and develop the resources of the nation. He enlarged on the value of international treaties as guaranteeing the weak against oppression by the strong, and declared that in the present state of the globe it was no longer practicable to maintain a policy of seclusion.

The reply was that it was impossible, out of respect to the late Mikado's memory and in view of opinions expressed by the various clans, to sanction the execution of the Treaties in regard to Hiōgo. In a further memorial of April 26 the Tycoon returned to the charge, and begged for a reconsideration of this matter, which he regarded as of the most vital importance to the interests and safety of the country. The foreign Ministers, confident in the Tycoon's promise to them that the Treaties should be carried out, quitted Ōsaka about May 20, but the Mikado's consent was not given until nearly a month later. There were at this moment in Kiōto representatives of Echizen, Geishiu, Tosa, and Uwajima, who, on being consulted, confirmed the Tycoon's representations. On June 26 an imperial decree was issued annulling the orders of two years before to revise the treaties and to refrain from opening Hiōgo. Another decree of the same date, quoting the opinion of all the clans represented at Kiōto, and especially of the four just named, the Tycoon concurring, ordered a lenient settlement of the Chōshiu case. Two days later the four clans memorialised, accusing the Tycoon's Government of having mismanaged the affairs of the nation for years past, and especially in undertaking a second expedition against Chōshiu; which was revolting to public opinion. The Chōshiu question was the more urgent of the two which pressed for solution, and now was the occasion for the Yedo Administration to show that it was disposed to return into the right path. In another memorial of the same date they demanded the restoration of rank and title to the two Chōshiu Princes, considering this to be of greater urgency than arrangements for the opening of Hiōgo.

It had long been obvious to every observer, foreign as well as Japanese, that the existence of the Tycoonate was an anachronism. Only a governing power accepted by the whole nation could fitly

represent it in international relations, and bring the latter into conformity with the rules of intercourse observed among the independent sovereign States of the West. Expression was given to these views by the ex-Prince of Tosa in October, in a weighty document addressed to the Tycoon, pointing out that the want of accord between the Mikado, Tycoon, Court nobles and *daimiōs* exposed the nation to danger from without. He declared it necessary to set aside the dual polity that had been tolerated in the past and restore the ancient form of government directly by the Mikado. To this was annexed a short sketch of a new Constitution, in which the anti-foreign policy was definitely discarded. Under these circumstances the Tycoon came to the conclusion that the course pointed out by Tosa was the only way of extricating the nation from a position full of peril, and, in a manifesto to the *daimiōs* on November 8 declaring that the whole governmental power, as exercised by his predecessors, must be restored to the sovereign, he announced that he had relinquished his functions. His resignation was at once accepted ; but he was directed to remain responsible for the general direction of affairs until the *daimiōs*, who would be summoned to discuss future arrangements, could arrive at Kiōto ; in the meantime their retainers would represent them for all necessary purposes. The Satsuma, Tosa, and Geishiu clansmen at the capital warmly approved the Tycoon's surrender of power. Many of his own retainers were, however, deeply incensed at the step he had taken, and he experienced much difficulty in persuading them to acquiesce in his renunciation of a position from which their own share of political importance was derived.

Manifestly the institution of the Tycoonate afforded no protection against foreign attacks ; it was powerless to impose its will on any important *daimiō*, and its influence at the Mikado's Court had almost completely faded away. Its inability to carry out the Treaties and to protect the lives of foreigners, its want of frankness, and its narrow-minded endeavours to prevent intercourse between the retainers of feudal lords and the foreigners resident at the ports had deprived it of the sympathy which its misfortunes might otherwise have merited.

Suddenly, on January 3, 1868, an order was issued from the Court dismissing Aidzu from the guardianship of the palace gates, and substituting the clans of Satsuma, Tosa, Geishiu, Owari and Echizen. The offices of *Shōgun* (Tycoon) and *Kwambaku* were abolished, and three grades of high office were created, to which various Court nobles, feudal lords and clansmen were appointed. No servant or supporter of the late Tycoon had a place in this new list of functionaries. Another decree declared that the government of the country had been resumed by the Mikado, whom henceforth we must speak of as the Emperor. This decree added that the *daimiōs* must combine their efforts to place Japan at the head of all the nations of the earth. The provisional Government was formed with Prince Arisugawa at its head, two more imperial



Princes, two Court nobles and the five feudal lords whose men held the palace gates, as councillors, five Court nobles (of whom Iwakura was one) and three *Samurai* from each of the five clans as assistant-councillors. The real power lay with these last fifteen. A further decree restored the Princes of Chōshiu to their former rank and titles, and granted permission to the clan to reenter Kiōto. On this a large body of their troops, which had been held in readiness, at once entered the capital. The outlawed Court nobles who had fled in 1863 were also allowed to return. A close alliance had existed between Satsuma and Chōshiu since the end of 1866, and the events which speedily followed were directed and controlled by the leaders of these two clans.

On January 6 the ex-*Shōgun* addressed a memorial to the Court, protesting against the changes made on the 3rd without consulting him, and announcing his intention of continuing the provisional direction of affairs, in accordance with the Mikado's previous commands. He then withdrew to Ōsaka, accompanied by his own drilled troops and the clansmen of Aidzu and Kuwana, giving out that he took this step in order to avoid an armed conflict in the immediate vicinity of the palace. At a reception of the foreign representatives, who had assembled there in December to watch the development of the situation, he informed them that he did not recognise the validity of the measures recently taken in the name of the young Emperor. He would abstain from the use of force to vindicate his rights, and would demand of his opponents that they should ask for the opinion of a general council. In the meantime he would conduct foreign affairs as before.

These prudent resolutions were eventually overborne by his own military retainers and by the clans of Aidzu and Kuwana. Echizen and Owari came down to Ōsaka to attempt an arrangement. They proposed that he should give up a considerable portion of his hereditary revenues to the Mikado, and enter the Government as a councillor on a footing of equality with Satsuma and the other great *daimiōs* already appointed; and they offered to guarantee a friendly reception, if he came up to Kiōto with only a small retinue. Unfortunately for the success of these pacific overtures, a conflict had already occurred at Yedo between the forces of the ex-Tycoon and the Satsuma men. The Satsuma palace had been attacked and destroyed, and the clansmen either slain or forced to fly. A manifesto was immediately published against Satsuma, now regarded as the ringleader of the opposition, if not the sole enemy, with whom he had to contend, and on January 26 the ex-Tycoon started for Kiōto with all his available force. About half-way thither he encountered the troops of Satsuma and Chōshiu, was completely defeated after four days' fighting, and had to retreat on Ōsaka, whence he returned precipitately to Yedo by sea. A message was at the same time delivered to the foreign representatives that, as the Tycoon could no longer protect them, they must provide for their own safety and that of their country-

men at Ōsaka and Hiōgo. This was not difficult for them, as the English, French and American ships of war were in port at the latter place. In consequence of some passing Bizen troops having fired on foreigners, it became necessary temporarily to occupy Kōbē, where the merchants were located; but on February 8 a Court noble arrived from Kiōto, bearing a declaration under the Emperor's sign-manual announcing the constitutional changes that had taken place, and recognising the binding character of the treaties. Satisfactory assurances that foreigners would be protected in future from similar acts of aggression having been given by the envoy, the foreign representatives at once requested the naval commanders to withdraw their men. Neutrality notifications were issued by the Ministers, of which one important consequence was that an iron-clad ram, purchased in the United States by the Tycoon's agents, which arrived shortly afterwards, was not delivered until the Civil War was over, when it passed into the hands of the imperial Government. Unfortunately, the anti-foreign feeling among the clansmen, which had been encouraged for so many years, still continued to manifest itself from time to time, and on March 8 the crew of a French man-of-war's launch were massacred by a party of Tosa soldiers at Sakai. Both in this and in the Kōbē case the new Government was able to afford complete redress, and the incidents failed to disturb the relations between it and foreign Powers.

The transfer of authority at Nagasaki, Hiōgo and Ōsaka was effected without further fighting, and by the middle of February the western half of the country as far as Lake Suwa had acknowledged the authority of the Emperor. A proclamation was put forth declaring the ex-Tycoon and the *daimiōs* in immediate attendance on him, among whom were Aidzu, Kuwana and members of his Council, to be in a state of rebellion, and an imperial Prince was appointed commander-in-chief of the clansmen who now set out for Yedo along the two main roads from Kiōto. Towards the end of March the vanguard crossed the passes into the plain of Yedo. A month later the ex-Tycoon made his submission. The transfer of the city of Yedo, as well as of the port of Yokohama, was carried out without disturbance early in May.

The Aidzu clan had retired to their own country among the mountains north of Yedo, where they maintained a vigorous defensive for some months. Sendai, Nambu, Yonézawa, and Shōnai entered into an alliance with them, more out of a spirit of opposition to the southern and western clans than from devotion to the Tokugawa cause. To them flocked numbers of men from other northern districts and not a few Tokugawa retainers who were unwilling to accept without a struggle the downfall of their chief. In Yedo itself a body of the latter, with the assistance of Aidzu and other clansmen, seized upon the mausoleum of the Tokugawa *Shōguns* at Uyeno, but a vigorous attack made on them by the Imperialist troops drove them to flight. After long-continued fighting in Echigo the imperial authority was established in that

province also. The armies of the Emperor were now free to close in upon the capital of Aidzu, which after a heroic defence surrendered on November 6, and all resistance on the mainland terminated.

When the castle of Yedo was handed over on May 2, the ex-Tycoon's fleet, consisting of six vessels mounting 83 guns, was to have been surrendered, but Admiral Enomoto and his friends refused to comply with the terms of the capitulation, and the Imperialists lacked sufficient naval force to compel delivery. They continued to lie off the city, affording an asylum to opponents of the Imperial party, till early in October, when they suddenly disappeared from their anchorage, leaving behind them a manifesto in which they denounced the proceedings of the confederated clans, and declared their intention of fighting, if need be, to confer peace on the country. After calling in Sendai Bay, where they obtained some recruits, at the beginning of December they took possession of the island of Yezo, where they proceeded to set up a republic based on what was styled universal suffrage, though the franchise was limited to *Samurai*. They remained unmolested till the following April, when an Imperialist squadron proceeded in their pursuit. It included the iron-clad ram which had now been handed over. Operations began towards the end of May, and were terminated a month later by the surrender of the rebel leaders to the overwhelming force that had been brought against them. The civil war was thus concluded with the complete triumph of the Imperialists. It remains only to sketch the constitutional changes resulting from the assumption of power by the legitimate sovereign.

One of the first acts of the victors in the conflict had been to set up a provisional Government consisting of a Council of State composed of Court nobles, feudal lords and clansmen. Seven other executive departments were shortly afterwards added, namely, Shintō worship (which was restored to the position of a state religion), Home, Foreign Affairs, War, Finance, Justice and Legislation. To the department of Foreign Affairs were attached Itō and Inouyé, the two Chōshiu *Samurai* who in 1864 had endeavoured to dissuade their Princes from pursuing a hostile policy, and their advice proved of the greatest utility to the inexperienced heads of the Office. The rest of the staff were *Samurai* who had entertained friendly relations with foreigners. In June the further step was taken of promulgating a Constitution, in which the principle of subdividing the authority of the State into legislature, executive and judiciary was recognised. At the head of the Council of State were to be two Chief Ministers, and each department was to be presided over by a Minister and vice-Minister assisted by secretaries. Local government was divided into cities, clans and imperial territories, or prefectures, formed out of the former domain of the Tokugawa *Shōguns* and the imperial estates. For the moment the organisation of the clans was not attempted, but cities and prefectures were to be placed under Governors and Collectors

of Revenue respectively. This Constitution was merely tentative, and many modifications were made in subsequent years, as the necessity made itself felt, before the system of local government was definitively settled.

The intention of the Emperor to respect the Treaties had already been announced, and a memorial on the subject soon afterwards followed, signed by the heads of six influential clans, Echizen, Tosa, Chōshiu, Satsuma, Geishiu and Kumamoto. It dwelt on the supreme importance of placing foreign relations on a proper footing, of renouncing the idea of "expelling the barbarians," and of receiving the foreign Ministers at Court in accordance with the etiquette generally observed among nations. A government notification declared that these suggestions were accepted, and the diplomatic representatives of the Six Powers were invited to Kiōto to have an audience of the Emperor. Three accepted, the English, French and Dutch Ministers, who were received by the Emperor towards the end of March, 1868. It was not to be expected that this sudden change in the attitude of the Court towards foreigners and radical departure from the old tradition of the unapproachableness of the Emperor, would escape adverse criticisms, and perhaps something worse, at the hands of the ultra-conservatives. A murderous attack was made by a couple of fanatics on the English Minister and his suite as they were proceeding to Court on March 23, when seven men of his mounted escort were severely wounded. Two Japanese civilians, Gotō and Nakai, who were riding with the Minister, leapt from their horses and despatched one of the assailants, Nakai being wounded in the *mêlée*. The other was captured, and was afterwards decapitated, while three accomplices were condemned to perpetual exile in a distant island. The audience took place three days later, and was marked by great cordiality. In April the Emperor broke through the old rule of strict seclusion by moving down to Ōsaka, whither he had been advised by Ōkubo, a leading Satsuma statesman, to transfer the capital. During his sojourn here he gave audience to the British Minister, who was the first foreign representative to present his credentials to the sovereign.

On several occasions fear had been expressed lest a renewal of foreign intercourse with Western nations might be followed by the reintroduction of the Christian religion which, as it was held, had caused unnumbered woes in the seventeenth century. Throughout the Empire, in every hamlet and in every ward of a town or city, tables of the law denounced Christianity as a "pernicious doctrine," and offered rewards for the discovery of priests, lay-brothers and native catechists. At Nagasaki, which had been founded as a settlement of the Roman Catholic missionaries in the sixteenth century, the whole population was forced annually to trample on the emblems of Christianity. The article of Harris' Treaty authorising the erection of places of worship at the open ports had been regarded as especially obnoxious, and it was feared that

if the people mixed intimately with foreigners they would become infected with foreign religious doctrines. It was believed for a long time that Christianity among the people had been completely stamped out, by the severe measures of repression employed. The Roman Catholic missionaries having built a church at Nagasaki, people from the vicinity began towards the end of 1865 to resort to it in such numbers as to attract the attention of the authorities. It was found that some thousands of the peasantry in neighbouring villages had all along practised Christian rites in secret. They arrested all they could lay hands on, and endeavoured to compel their recantation. Finding this impossible, they resolved to banish them to different parts of the empire, in the expectation that this treatment would induce them to renounce their belief. Protests were offered against the proceeding by the foreign consuls and Ministers, but only a temporary relaxation of the measure was conceded. Things were in this position when the revolution of 1868 occurred. Among other steps taken to show that the authority of the Emperor had replaced that of the *Shōgun*, the old tablets were taken down and others substituted, but these still contained the mention of Christianity as a pernicious doctrine. The foreign Ministers renewed their remonstrances. It is true that the Treaties gave no right of intervention, such as that resulting from the toleration clauses of the Treaties imposed on China in 1858; but the argument that it was an unfriendly act thus to stigmatise the religion professed by the States with which the Emperor's Government proposed to maintain friendly relations was irrefutable. The representations of the foreign diplomatists produced some slight effect; but a Government which was based on the theory of the Emperor's descent from the gods of Japan, and had placed the department of the Shintō religion on an equality with the Council of State, could not afford to be tolerant if it was to secure popular support. The decree of banishment was carried into effect; but in most of the localities to which the Christians were transported they were treated with humanity. That they were not put to death, or treated as criminals, but only as misguided people who required to be led into the right path by a certain measure of severity, is a fact indicative of a far more tolerant spirit than that which had actuated the Government of the Tokugawa *Shōguns*. We must not anticipate events further than by stating that in 1873 the offensive tablets were removed and the exiles allowed to return to their homes, and that, from the year mentioned, toleration, even if not legally enacted, became the actual practice of the *régime* which had taken for its designation *Meiji*, or Enlightened Government.

The proposal to transfer the capital to Ōsaka was not adopted; but in September, 1868, it was decided that the Emperor should pay a visit to Yedo, which was to be erected into an eastern metropolis, the name being changed to Tōkiō, which has that signification. The coronation

of the youthful sovereign having taken place on October 12, he left Kiōto on November 4, and travelling by slow stages reached Tōkiō on the 26th. Here he remained till January 20, 1869.

Tōkiō and Niigata were opened to trade on January 1, thus completing the list specified in Harris' Treaty of 1858, and on January 5 the Emperor received the whole diplomatic body in audience. During the same month a general council of loyal *daimiōs* voted unanimously the sentences to be passed on Aidzu and the heads of other clans, twenty-five in number, whose resistance had prolonged the civil war. All but two of the heads were forced to retire in favour of a relation, the domains of Aidzu and another were forfeited, and eighteen other *daimiōs* suffered a diminution of revenues, accompanied by a transfer to less desirable territory.

So far, however, the Emperor had been dependent on the material assistance contributed by the clans which had overthrown the Tycoonate in his name, and it was evident that further changes were necessary to place his Government on a solid basis. The first step in the direction of attributing the substance as well as the form of power to the Emperor was taken by the clansmen of Satsuma, Chōshiu, Tosa, and Hizen, who in March, 1869, induced their respective chiefs to sign a memorial in which they placed their territories and retainers at his disposal. It was decided that for the present the feudal lords should return to their territories, of which they took the title of governor. The administration of the clans was remodelled so as to bring it into harmony with that of the imperial cities and territories.

Early in 1868 a representative assembly had been planned, in order to give effect to the oath, taken by the Emperor on assuming the reins of government, that the practice of discussion and debate should be universally adopted, and all measures be decided by public argument. A year, however, elapsed before the Parliament thus outlined held its first sitting. Its most important achievement was its approval of a proposal that the feudal lords should surrender their fiefs to the Emperor. Several years had to elapse before the time became ripe for carrying into effect what had always been the intention of the leaders of the revolution of 1868, namely, the creation of workable parliamentary institutions.

After the fall of Aidzu in November, 1868, the greater part of the western troops which had fought on the Imperialist side returned to their native provinces, and the Government was in a great measure left to depend on prestige for procuring obedience to its orders. The Emperor had returned to Kiōto in February, 1869, but came back in May to Tōkiō, where he was joined in November by the Empress, and the eastern capital became thenceforth the permanent residence of the Court.

The Satsuma men were by no means satisfied with the share of influence which they possessed in the Cabinet. At its head were Sanjō

and Iwakura, former Court nobles, who may be said to have represented the Chōshiu and Satsuma influence respectively, and out of six councillors one only, Ōkubo, belonged to the Satsuma clan, the other seats being occupied by two Chōshiu, two Hizen and one Tosa man. Particularism was still powerful in the clans of Satsuma, Chōshiu and Tosa, but especially in the first of these, where Saigō, whose tendencies were strongly conservative, enjoyed vast popularity. The future of the unification of Japan looked gloomy. That more definite material support must be obtained was patent, and it was decided to address a strong appeal to the loyalty of those who had contributed most to the victory of Imperialism. Early in January, 1871, Iwakura and Ōkubo proceeded to Kagoshima, bearing a letter from the Emperor to Shimadzu Saburō, in which the old statesman was adjured to come forward as the chief bulwark of the throne. Saigō was induced to consent that a large contingent of Satsuma troops should be permanently stationed at Tōkiō, and to join the central administration in person. In the meantime Kido had gone down to Chōshiu, where he was joined by Ōkubo, and they prevailed on the two Princes to follow the example of Satsuma. From Chōshiu they went round to Tosa, where an agreement was arrived at with the local clan leaders to join in the proposed arrangements. The Princes of Satsuma and Chōshiu were to live in Tōkiō, where the ex-Prince of Tosa had already taken up his residence. Iwakura on his way back obtained the adherence of the important clans of Owari and Hikōné. The total force thus placed at the immediate disposal of the Government consisted of nine battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry and six batteries of artillery.

It was time that the central authority received an accession of strength, for serious disturbances had arisen in Bungo and Shinshiu, which required to be suppressed with vigour. The inherent strength of the monarchical principle was such that it eventually triumphed over all its difficulties, though it was unable to wean the discontented *Samurai* from the practice of political assassination.

That the political unity and development of the national power could only be attained by the complete abolition of feudality had long been admitted by the most enlightened of Japanese statesmen, and at the beginning of 1871 the conversion of the clan domains into imperial territories was openly proposed in a memorial presented in the name of the Prince of Awa. To this Chōshiu gave cordial approval in the same public manner, as did also Inshiu, who pointed out the economy in expenditure that would be secured by the amalgamation of several smaller clans under a single administration. A newspaper was established under official patronage, in which such papers as those just mentioned were published, and by disseminating these ideas throughout the country prepared the way for their acceptance. Some of the smaller clans were converted into imperial territories on their own application. On August 11 the

existing Cabinet was dismissed, with the exception of Sanjō, who retained the post of *Udaijin*, and Saigō and Kido took office as Councillors of State. Ōkubo became Minister of Finance, Ōkuma of Hizen was reappointed Councillor, and Itagaki of Tosa was added to the number, so that the list of councillors now contained one name from each of the four leading clans. Iwakura became Minister for Foreign Affairs and Gotō Minister of Public Works. The Shintō religion, which had been the province of an office ranking with the Council of State, was relegated to a department. Ōki of Hizen, and Itō, Inouyé and Yamagata of Chōshiu were retained as vice-Ministers. Thus the reconstructed Cabinet comprised all the leading minds of the country, and was in reality a strong Government. A few days later the hereditary Governor of Chikuzen was dismissed, in consequence of an extensive forgery of government paper-money by the clansmen, and his place was filled by an imperial Prince. On the 29th the final step was taken by the promulgation of an imperial edict, abolishing the clans and converting them into prefectures. The hereditary Governors were deposed from office, and ordered to take up their permanent residence at Tōkiō, together with their wives and families, thus reducing them to a position of even greater dependence on the Government than in the most palmy days of the Tycoonate. For the moment their places were left unfilled, the local administration being entrusted to the councillors of the late clans.

With this event the history of the period may fittingly be brought to a close. In the comparatively short space of thirteen years, dating from Harris' Treaty, a political revolution, which was at the same time a restoration, had been accomplished, to which no parallel can be found in the history of any country—a revolution which would have been impossible but for the veneration that attached to the name of the sovereign whose genealogy extended backwards beyond the dawn of history.

The power and prestige of the Tokugawa *Shōguns* had already begun to decay before the appearance of Western Powers on the scene. The natural consequence would have been an attempt to displace them in favour of one of the more vigorous families, whose clansmen, living a country life, had not been subjected to the enervating influences of the capital. This would have led to a repetition of the devastating civil wars which had marked the close of previous dynasties of *Shōguns*. The pressure from without exercised by foreign relations hastened the event, and by demonstrating the community of interests between the clans, gave to it a different complexion. From the moment that the Tycoon, whose legal status was that of a subject, entered into treaties with the sovereigns and heads of Western States, his authority became more difficult to uphold; and his downfall in 1868 was but the logical consequence of an essentially false position.





*Note.* In many of the following Bibliographies it has been found impossible to distinguish between contemporary and secondary authorities, and, even where the distinction is made, many of the secondary works often partake of the nature of contemporary authorities.

## CHAPTERS I, XI AND XII.

### GREAT BRITAIN, 1841-68.

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[See also *Bibliographies to Chapters XXV, XXVI, XXVII.*]



## CHAPTERS II AND V.

## FRANCE, FROM 1840 TO 1852.

## I. CONTEMPORARY SOURCES.

## A. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, ETC.

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[See also *Bibliographies to Chapters X, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XXI.*]

## CHAPTERS III, VI, VII, AND XV.

### (1) GERMANY AND THE AUSTRIAN MONARCHY. (1840 TO 1862.)

(See also *Bibliography to Chapter XVI*; as to *Schleswig-Holstein* see also *Bibl. to Chapter XXIV*; for relations with Italy cf. *Bibl. to Chapters IV and XIV*, and for those with the Church of Rome *Bibl. to Chapter XXV*.)

#### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND GENERAL INFORMATION.

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Among collective biographical works the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (Leipzig, 1875 etc.) will of course be found preeminently useful; and it may be convenient to mention here, among the more important articles contained in it referring to the period covered by these chapters, especially those on Arnim-Boytzenburg, Count Adolf Heinrich, by C. Rössler; Arnim, Baron H. A. von, by K. Wippermann; Beckerath, H. von, by W. Oncken; Blum, R., by Eelking; Bruck, Baron K. L. von, by von Sommaruga; Bunsen, C. K. J. Baron von, by R. Pauli; Christian, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, by K. Lorentzen; Dahlmann, F. C. D., by A. Springer; Droste-Vischering, C. A., Abp. of Trier, by L. Ennen; Ernest Augustus, King of Hanover, by F. Frensdorff; Fischer, H., by K. Wippermann; Ficquelmont, Count C. L. F., by Felgel; Frederick William I, Elector of Hesse, by K. Wippermann; Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, by L. Ranke; Geissel, Cardinal J. von, by L. Ennen; Gerlach, Ludwig von, by K. Wippermann; Gervinus, G. G., by A. Thorbecke; Hansemann, D. J. L., by F. Bamberg; Hassenpflug, H. D., by K. Wippermann; Hergenbahn, A. H., by K. Wippermann; Jacoby, J. J., by K. Wippermann; John, Archduke of Austria, by A. Schlossar; Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, F., by Sommaruga; Louis I, King of Bavaria, by T. Heigel; Marx, Karl, by G. Gross; Maximilian II, King of Bavaria, by T. Heigel; Mittermaier, K. J. A., by Marquardsen; Metternich, Prince Clemens, by P. Bailleu; Peucker, General E. von, by K. Wippermann; Pfordten, Baron L. K. H. v. d., by K. Wippermann; Rabenhorst, B. von, by "P."; Radowitz, J. von, by R. von Liliencron; Rodbertus, J. K., by M. Wirth; Schlick, Count F. H., by "S. C. H."; Haynau, F. W. K. E. von, by K. Wippermann; Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu, by von Zeissberg; Sophia, Archduchess of Austria, by C. Wolfsgrüber; Stephen Victor, Archduke of Austria, Palatine of Hungary, by Schlitter; Stüve, J. K. B., by G. Stüve; Vincke, Georg von, by H. von Petersdorff; Wagener, H., by H. von Petersdorff; Waldeck, B., by A. Stern; Welcker, K. T., by von Weech; William I, Emperor (sections 1-4), by E. Marcks; William I, King of Württemberg, by E. Schneider; Willisen, General K. W. von, by B. Poten; Windisch-Grätz, A. C. F., Prinz von, by "L. W."; Wrangel, Count F. von, by H. Poten; Ernest II, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, by M. Berbig; Gager, H. von, by G. Kaufmann; Harkort, F. W., by O. Schell; Kleist-Retzow, H. von, by H. von Petersdorff.

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## CHAPTERS IV, XIV, AND XIX, 1 AND 2.

## ITALY, 1846-70.

## I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.

No comprehensive bibliography of recent Italian history exists. For the epoch of the Risorgimento, we have nothing beyond a Library Catalogue. The partial bibliographies contained in sundry histories of the period, only indicate the documents, etc., from which the information in the text was derived. Bolton King's *History of Italian Unity* has a good specimen of a systematic bibliography of this kind.

Much general assistance is supplied by :

1. Occasional bibliographies on special subjects in the *Rivista Storica Italiana* edited by Costanzo Rinaudo from 1884 onwards.

2. *Annuario Bibliografico della Storia d' Italia*, published for the quarterly *Studi Storici* edited by Amedeo Crivellucci. Pisa, 1902-3.

3. A general bibliography of the history of the Risorgimento, now in preparation by Mr H. Nelson Gay, whose library at Rome is the richest known in the literature of this subject.

The catalogues of Museums of the Italian Revival will be found very useful for consultation, not to speak of smaller collections elsewhere; amid much that is worthless there are many interesting relics, rare publications, and important documents. These museums exist, or are in course of formation, in Turin, Milan, Venice, Vicenza, Bologna, Ferrara, Forli, Modena, Reggio, Florence, Perugia, Macerata, Palermo, etc. The Royal Palace at Turin also possesses a museum, a library, and an archive room devoted specially to the Risorgimento. Among the most important and most scientifically arranged of these Catalogues are :

The Illustrated Catalogue of books, documents, and objects exhibited by the Provinces of Emilia and Romagna in the Temple of the Italian Revival (Provincial Exhibition of Bologna, 1888); by R. Belluzzi and V. Fiorini.

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The Catalogue of works bearing on the History of the Italian Revival, compiled by Ernesto Masi. Rome. (Forzani and Co.) 1907. Printed for private circulation only.

A Catalogue—intended rather for general culture—is now being compiled for the Andrea Ponti Historical Library, branches of which have been established in Ravenna and other Italian towns by the Countess Maria Pasolini, née Ponti.

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## CHAPTERS IX. 1 AND XXII. 1, 3, 4.

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## CHAPTERS X AND XVII.

## NAPOLEON III. THE LIBERAL EMPIRE.

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The several collections specified by Charles Schmidt in his note (Vol. ix., p. 787 of this History) on the manuscript material available for the history of the First Empire would also serve for the Second, but for the fact that the latter period is too recent to admit, in all cases, of the inspection of documents. A definite rule of the Archives Nationales allows the inspection of those documents only which date back at least 50 years. C. Schmidt, *Les Sources de l'Histoire de France depuis 1789, aux Archives Nationales* (Paris, 1907), is a complete guide to the various collections of documents, and to the method of consulting them. For the period of the Second Empire Series BB<sup>30</sup> is the most important. It contains the documents which relate to the "mixed commissions" (bound volumes or indexed registers), BB<sup>30</sup>/398 and following numbers; and especially the political reports of the *procureurs généraux* (BB<sup>30</sup>/367-390) arranged by districts. Rouher as Minister of Justice, by a circular dated November 24, 1849, requested the *procureurs généraux* to furnish, on the first of each month, "reports containing a reasoned estimate of the moral and political condition of the departments...as well as short accounts of such political events as had happened." By a circular of January 31, 1853, these reports were to be furnished at half-yearly intervals only. The series in each department is nearly complete, except that there is in almost all cases a gap between December 1851 and February 1852. Drawn up as they were with the help of the *procureur* of each *arrondissement*, they furnish valuable information, especially for the period during which they were issued month by month, concerning the activity of the political parties and the modifications undergone by them, and also on economic subjects (harvests, famines, industrial prosperity), and the moral condition of the people. On the subject of these documents see an interesting communication by Seignobos to the Société d'histoire moderne in Bulletin, 6th year, No. 49, June, 1907.

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(b) *Legitimist.*

La Gazette de France; L'Union.

(c) *Orleanist.*

Journal des Débats; Revue des Deux Mondes.

(d) *Independent (democratic or liberal).*

La Presse; Le Courrier du Dimanche (from 1857); L'Opinion Nationale (from September 1, 1859); La Liberté (from July 16, 1865); Le Figaro (from November 16, 1866).

(e) *Moderate Republican.*

Le Siècle; Le Charivari; Le Temps (from April 25, 1861); L'Avenir National (from January 10, 1865); L'Électeur, afterwards l'Électeur Libre (January 25, 1868—March 31, 1871); La Cloche (August 15, 1868—December 21, 1872).

(f) *Republican, Radical, and Socialist.*

La Lanterne (May 30—October 17, 1868); Le Réveil (July 2, 1868—January 22, 1871); Le Rappel (from May 4, 1869); La Marseillaise (December 19, 1869—July 25, 1870); La Phare de la Loire (published at Nantes); La Gironde (published at Bordeaux).

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## CHAPTER XIII.

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- [See also *Bibliographies to Chapters I, XI, XII; XV 2; XVIII; XXV D; XXVII.*]

## CHAPTER XVI.

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## CHAPTER XXI.

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Almost all the available original documents dealing with the campaign have been catalogued, and the greater part are stored in the Military History Section of the Great General Staff at Berlin, and in the Historical Section of the Staff of the Army at Paris. Access to these documents (on which the official histories of the War are largely based) can only be obtained through diplomatic channels, and is granted very sparingly.

The German Great General Staff has, in its official history, and in a number of monographs on phases of the campaign, published the gist of the greater part of the documents in its charge, and the French Staff is now in process of doing the same. In either case the documents published have, as is natural, been carefully selected, and the point of view presented is the official one.

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## CHAPTER XXIII.

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(1840-70.)

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## SCANDINAVIA, 1815-70.

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## INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN. (1815-69.)

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## CHAPTER XXVII.

## GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES.

(1815-70.)

## (1) HOME POLICY TOWARDS THE COLONIES.

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\* United States Senate Executive Documents, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States; Foreign Relations of United States Senate. (See also (1) China above.)

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(See also under (1) III above.)

## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF

## LEADING EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.

- 1740 France secures treaty right to custody of Holy Places near Jerusalem.
- 1779 First Kaffir War of Dutch settlers in South Africa.
- 1791 Constitutional Act for Canada.
- 1792 March. First Čechish national manifesto in Austria.
- 1798 Establishment of the Helvetian Republic.  
Bentham's *Emancipate your Colonies*.
- 1799 Russo-American Company formed to trade in Alaska.
- 1803 Napoleon's Act of Mediation reorganises Switzerland.
- 1809 Grand Duchy of Finland finally annexed to Russia.  
"Form of Government" or Constitution in Sweden.
- 1814 Oehlenschläger's *Helge*.  
Restoration of the Order of Jesuits.  
Fundamental Law or Constitution of Norway.  
Norway united with Sweden.
- 1815 June. Germanic Confederation constituted.  
August 7. Federal Pact of Zurich.  
November 20. Act of Mediation guarantees Swiss independence.  
*Rikssakt* determines relations of Sweden and Norway.  
Schlachter's Nek (Cape Colony).
- 1816 Bank of Norway founded.  
March. Raid of Pindaris into British province of Madras.
- 1816-23 Marquis of Hastings Governor-General of Bengal.
- 1817 Bank of New South Wales incorporated.  
The Porte grants autonomy to Servia.  
Oct.-Dec. Successful British campaigns in India.
- 1818 Charles XIV (Bernadotte) King of Norway and Sweden.  
National Bank of Denmark founded.  
Extensive British annexations of territory in India.
- 1819 Count Joseph de Maistre's *Du Pape*.
- 1819-21 5000 British immigrants settle in South Africa.
- 1819-23 Bigge's commission of enquiry and Act of Government for Australia.
- 1820 Mill's *Essay on Government*.
- 1821-44 Brock Finance Minister of Russia.
- 1823 July 14. Swiss *Conclusum* refuses right of asylum to foreign refugees.
- 1823-6 First Burmese War.
- 1824 Jan Kollár's *Slávy Dcera*.
- 1825-6 Revision of Navigation Laws in England by Huskisson.
- 1826 February 14. British Treaty with King of Ava—annexation of Annam, etc.  
English settlements in West and North Australia.  
First railway opened between Stockton and Darlington.
- 1827 Keble's *Christian Year*.  
April 14. Capodistrias President of Greece.

- 1828 Corn Law in England adopts Sliding Scale principle.  
Rigorous Press censorship introduced in Russia.  
Russian Treaty with Persia.  
Hottentots and Whites placed on an equality in Cape Colony.
- 1828-35 Lord William Bentinck Governor-General of Bengal.
- 1829 Treaty of Adrianople gives Caucasus to Russia.
- 1830 Victor Hugo's *Hernani*.  
November. Milosh Obrenovitch recognised as hereditary Prince of Servia.
- 1830-1 Disturbances in Switzerland. Democratic reform of Cantonal Constitutions.
- 1830-3 *Cultuurstelsel* introduced in Dutch Indies.  
Beginnings of French colonisation in Algeria.
- 1830-44 *Zollverein* extended to all important German States except Austria.
- 1831 September. Russians enter Warsaw, end of constitutional Poland.  
October 9. Assassination of Capodistrias.
- 1831-2 *Règlement* or Constitution proclaimed in Moldavia and Wallachia.
- 1832 March 17. *Siebnernkonkordat* of Swiss Liberal Cantons.  
November 14. Six Swiss Catholic Cantons found League of Sarnen.  
European recognition of Kingdom of Greece.  
Issue of *Svod* or Code of Laws in Russia.
- 1832-42 70,000 immigrants in New South Wales.
- 1833 February. King Otho lands in Greece.  
July 14. Keble's sermon *National Apostasy* begins the "Oxford Movement."  
New Charter Act for East India Company.  
Abolition of Slavery in British Colonies.
- 1834 Welhaven's *Norway's Twilight*.
- 1834-5 Sixth Kaffir War.
- 1836-9 Elliot's mission to China.
- 1836-40 Great Trek in South Africa: 10,000 Boers leave British territory.
- 1837 Communal self-government established in Norway.  
New Zealand Association formed.  
June. Separation of England and Hanover.
- 1837-8 Rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada.
- 1838 English Chartists publish the "Charter."  
Earl of Durham Governor-General of Canada.  
December 16. Boers defeat Zulu King Dingan in Natal.  
" 24. Prince Milosh of Servia delegates his powers to a Council.
- 1838-9 First Afghan War.
- 1839 Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's *Les Idées Napoléoniennes*.  
February 11. Lord Durham's Report on Canada.  
April. Final recognition of independence of Belgium.  
November 3. Sultan Abd-ul-Mejid issues the *Tanzimât*.  
Religious persecution in Russia and forcible conversion of Uniates.  
French conquests in Algeria.  
Beginnings of state control of education in England.
- 1840 Schneckenburger's *Die Wacht am Rhein*.  
Accession of Frederick William IV of Prussia.  
Act of Union unites Upper and Lower Canada.  
Transportation to New South Wales reduced.
- 1841 Sir George Cornewall Lewis' *Government of Dependencies*.  
February. Newman's *Tract No. 90*.  
" Nassau Senior's *Report on Condition of Hand Loom Weavers*.  
August. Sir Robert Peel Prime Minister of England.
- 1841-2 Relaxation of Press censorship in Prussia.  
Laws ameliorating condition of serfs passed in Russia.

- 1842 January. Destruction of British army in Afghanistan.  
 February 7. Guizot's Railway Scheme in France carried.  
 July 13. Death of Duke of Orleans. Regency Act in France.  
 August 29. Treaty of Nanking. British annexation of Hongkong.  
 September 21. British armies under Pollock and Nott enter Cabul.  
 October 15. *The Nation* (organ of "Young Ireland") appears.  
 November. Treaty of the Hague between Holland and Belgium.  
 The Amur Darya brought under Russian influence.
- 1842-3 Free Kirk secession from Established Church in Scotland.  
 War between England and Natal Boers.
- 1842-5 Peel revives Income Tax and systematises English tariff.
- 1843 Carlyle's *Past and Present*.  
 Ruskin's *Modern Painters*, vol. i.  
 Gioberti's *Primato*.  
 February. British annexation of Sind.  
 May. British annexation of Natal.  
 Imposition of differential dues between British Colonies prohibited.  
 Commercial treaties between England and China.  
 Sept.-Oct. Agitation for Repeal. Arrest of O'Connell.
- 1844 Lelewel's *Considerations on the History of Poland*.  
 March 30. King Otho assents to new Greek Constitution.  
 May. Narváez' oligarchic amendment of Spanish Constitution of 1837.  
 Graham's Factory Act in England.  
 "Bandiera" incident in Italy.  
 United States and France conclude commercial treaties with China.  
 Nicholas I discusses Eastern Question with Lord Aberdeen.
- 1844-5 Peel's Bank Charter Act.
- 1845 Gioberti's *Prolegomeni al Primato*.  
 Maynooth Grant.  
 Customs union between Moldavia and Wallachia.  
 October. Potato Famine in Ireland.  
 December. Peel resigns, but returns to office pledged to carry Free Trade.  
 Newman leaves the English for the Roman Catholic Church.
- 1845-6 First Sikh War.
- 1845-53 Sir George Grey Governor of New Zealand.
- 1846 January. Massimo d'Azeglio's *I Casi di Romagna*.  
 Liberal Ministry in Baden.  
 June 14. Great Liberal meeting at Brussels demands Reform.  
 „ 26. Abrogation of Duties on Corn Bill passed in England (colonial and foreign Corn placed on same footing).  
 „ 29. Peel resigns. Russell Prime Minister. Grey Colonial Secretary.  
 „ Oregon boundary dispute between United States and England settled.  
 „ The aims of the Swiss Sonderbund made public.  
 July 16. Pius IX publishes his Amnesty.  
 September 17. Germanic Confederation reserves rights in Schleswig-Holstein.  
 October 10. French marriages of Queen Isabel of Spain and her sister.  
 Revolution of peasants in Galicia.
- 1846-7 Continued distress in Ireland and great emigrations to America.  
 Acute distress in Holland and Belgium.
- 1846-9 Final Repeal of Navigation Acts in England.
- 1847 Gioberti's *Gesuita Moderno*.  
 Settembrini's *Protesta del popolo delle due Sicilie*.  
 Lamartine's *Histoire des Girondins*.



- 1847 February 3. Frederick William IV summons the Combined Diets in Prussia.  
 „ „ “Lolamontane” riots in Bavaria (till February, 1848).  
 March 10. Pius IX appoints an Advisory Council.  
 April 4. Pacifico incident at Athens.  
 May. Political disturbances in Württemberg.  
 „ „ Banquet at Maçon to Lamartine.  
 July 17. Austrian troops occupy Ferrara.  
 „ 20. The Swiss Federal Diet decrees dissolution of the Sonderbund.  
 October 10. Meeting of German Liberals at Heppenheim.  
 November 4-25. Swiss Federal troops defeat the army of the Sonderbund.  
 Nicholai Muravieff Governor-General of Eastern Siberia.
- 1847-54 Lord Elgin Governor-General of Canada.
- 1848 Massimo d’Azeglio’s *Lutti della Lombardia*.  
 Macaulay’s *History of England*, vol. i.  
 January 12-27. Successful insurrection in Palermo.  
 „ 20. Death of Christian VIII of Denmark, accession of Frederick VII.  
 Draft Constitution for uniting Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark.  
 February 3. Sir Harry Smith establishes Orange River Sovereignty.  
 „ 10. Pius IX’s allocution, beginning “God bless Italy!”  
 „ 17. Promulgation of *Statuto* by Grand Duke of Tuscany.  
 „ 22. Disturbances in France about the Political Banquets.  
 „ „ Austria proclaims martial law in Lombardo-Venetia.  
 „ 23. Guizot announces his resignation to the French Chamber.  
 „ „ Erection of barricades and riots in Paris.  
 „ 24. Louis-Philippe abdicates. The Republic proclaimed. Provisional Government of Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin.  
 „ 27. National Workshops in Paris.
- March 1. Grand Duke of Baden grants reforms.  
 „ „ Appeal of Frankfort Diet to German nation.  
 „ 5. Heidelberg Liberal committee demands *Vorparlament*.  
 „ „ Charles Albert of Sardinia and Piedmont promulgates *Statuto* (Constitution).  
 „ 6. Lewis I summons meeting of the Bavarian Estates.  
 „ 7. Lamartine’s circular to the Powers defines the attitude of the French Republic in foreign policy.  
 „ 10. Pius IX appoints a Liberal Ministry in Rome.  
 „ 12-3. Vienna rises in successful insurrection.  
 „ 13-5. Riots and disturbance in Berlin.  
 „ 14. Resignation and flight of Metternich from Austria.  
 „ „ Pius IX grants a Constitution to the Papal States.  
 „ 15. Imperial Manifesto grants Constitution to Austrian dominions.  
 „ „ Address from Hungarian Parliament demanding responsible Ministry conveyed to Vienna by the Palatine (Archduke Stephen).  
 „ „ “The People’s Charter” granted by the Palatine’s Council at Budapest.  
 „ 16. Demonstration of 100,000 workmen in Paris.  
 „ „ Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, appoints a Liberal Ministry.  
 „ „ Estates of Baden summoned by the Grand Duke.  
 „ 17. Emperor Ferdinand concedes demands of Palatine. Count Batthyány chosen President of the Ministry, which, under influence of Kossuth, carries “March and April Laws.”  
 „ „ William II of Holland appoints a Commission to reform Constitution.

- 1848 March 18. Frederick William IV of Prussia summons Combined Diets, and abolishes Censorship of the Press. Insurrection in Berlin.
- „ 18-22. *Cinque Giornate* in Milan, which the Austrians evacuate.
- „ 19. Troops withdrawn from Berlin, Liberal Ministry appointed.
- „ 20. Lewis I of Bavaria abdicates in favour of Maximilian II, Liberal *régime* begins.
- „ „ Ernest Augustus of Hanover appoints a Liberal Ministry.
- „ 22. Frederick William IV of Prussia retires to Potsdam.
- „ „ Manin expels the Austrians from Venice and proclaims Republic.
- „ „ Charles Albert of Piedmont declares war on Austria.
- „ 30. Belgian troops disperse French revolutionaries at Risquons-Tout.
- „ 31. *Vorparlament* meets at Frankfort.
- April 1. Publication of new Press laws arouses great opposition in Vienna.
- „ 2. Meeting of Combined Diet in Prussia.
- „ 8. General Durando induces Papal troops to declare for cooperation with Charles Albert; the Pope ratifies his action.
- „ „ Deputation of Serb Nationalists to Hungarian Parliament.
- „ 9. Danish troops suppress insurrection in Schleswig-Holstein.
- „ 10. Failure of O'Connor's great Chartist demonstration in London.
- „ 11. Hungarian Parliament dissolved (reassembles July 2).
- „ 12. Germanic Diet acknowledges Provisional Government in Schleswig-Holstein.
- „ 21. Austria declines to submit unconditionally to the Frankfort National Assembly.
- „ 25. Austrian Constitution published by Emperor Ferdinand.
- „ „ "Dahlmann's Constitution" laid before Germanic Diet.
- „ 25-6. Count Stadion suppresses rising in Galicia.
- „ 26. Extraordinary Diet of Mecklenburg-Schwerin declares equality of electoral rights.
- „ 29. Pius IX's Encyclical declares against the War.
- May 2. Prussians under Wrangel take Fridericia from the Danes.
- „ 5. Convention of Bardo. Polish revolutionists at Posen agree to surrender to Prussians.
- „ 7-17. Risings in Spain. Narváez dismisses Bulwer (British ambassador).
- „ 13. First meeting of Frankfort National Assembly.
- „ „ Count Hoyos dissolves Central Political Committee at Vienna.
- „ 15. Mob demonstration in favour of Poland in Constituent Assembly at Paris dispersed by the National Guard.
- „ „ Riots at Naples. End of Constitutional *régime*.
- „ „ Meeting at Agram demands Constitutional Rights of Croatia.
- „ 17. Emperor Ferdinand I flies from Vienna to Innsbruck.
- „ 22. Prussian Constituent Assembly meets.
- „ 30. Victory of Piedmontese over Austrians at Goito.
- June. Slav Congress opens in Prague.
- „ 10. Radetzky recaptures Vicenza.
- „ 13-7. Fighting in Prague. Victory of Windischgrätz.
- „ 14. Prince Bibesco of Wallachia, forced to accept a Revolutionary Constitution, resigns and quits country.
- „ 21. National Workshops abolished by decree of French Government.
- „ 23-6. Sanguinary riots in Paris. French Government appoints Cavaignac Dictator, who restores order.
- „ 29. Archduke John of Austria chosen *Reichsverweser* at Frankfort.
- July 8. Appointment of ultra-Liberal Ministry at Vienna.
- „ 9. Jellačić supported by Diet of Croatia.

- 1848 July 11. Repression begins in France. Government decrees restrict liberty of Press and right of public meeting.  
 „ „ Hungarian Parliament votes for war against Croatia.  
 „ „ *Reichsverweser* enters Frankfort and appoints responsible Ministry.  
 „ 22. *Reichstag* of the Austrian dominions meets at Vienna.  
 „ 25. Radetzky defeats the Piedmontese at Custoza.  
 „ 27. Union of Piedmont, Parma, Modena, and Venice declared.  
 August 6. Radetzky recaptures Milan.  
 „ 12. Emperor Ferdinand I returns to Schönbrunn.  
 „ 22. He revokes the extraordinary powers of Palatine of Hungary.  
 „ 26. Truce of Malmoe between Prussia and Denmark.  
 „ 29. Battle of Boomplatz. Sir Harry Smith defeats Boers.  
 September 4. Jellačić reinstated *Ban* of Croatia.  
 „ 7. Land law in favour of peasants passes Austrian *Reichstag*.  
 „ 12. Swiss Diet adopts Constitution increasing the Federal Power.  
 „ 16. The Frankfort Assembly ratifies Truce of Malmoe.  
 „ 17. Jellačić invades Hungary from Croatia.  
 „ 18-9. Murder of Auerswald and Lichnowsky at Frankfort.  
 „ 28. Budapest mob murder Lamberg, appointed Commander-in-chief in Hungary by Austrian Government.  
 „ 29-Oct. 7. Jellačić driven back towards Croatia.  
 October 3. Austrian Government declares war on Hungary.  
 „ 6-7. Second Vienna Revolution.  
 „ 17. Flight of the Emperor Ferdinand to Olmütz.  
 „ 22. Austrian *Reichstag* summoned to meet at Kremsier.  
 „ 26. Bombardment of Vienna by Windischgrätz.  
 „ 30. Jellačić repulses a Hungarian force attempting to relieve Vienna.  
 November 1. Arrests begin in Vienna. Schwarzenberg Ministry appointed.  
 „ „ Reactionary Prussian Ministry under Count Brandenburg.  
 „ 8. New Fundamental Law accepted by William II of Holland.  
 „ 9. Execution of Robert Blum.  
 „ 18. Assassination of Rossi. Flight of Pius IX to Gaeta.  
 December 2. Abdication of Emperor Ferdinand I of Austria in favour of Francis Joseph I [made public December 20].  
 „ 5. Prussian Assembly dissolved, and a Prussian Constitution promulgated by royal edict.  
 „ 18. Gagern becomes head of the *Reichsministerium*.  
 Sixty-four outbreaks of serfs in Russia during this year.  
 Portuguese occupy Angola.  
 1848-56 Lord Dalhousie Governor-General of India.  
 1849 January 5. Windischgrätz occupies Budapest.  
 „ 6. Hungarian troops under Görgei declare their adhesion to King Ferdinand's Constitution and to monarchy.  
 „ 23. Frederick William IV negotiates with Frankfort Assembly.  
 February 6. He confirms new Prussian Constitution.  
 „ 7-9. Pius IX appeals to the Powers. Republic proclaimed at Rome.  
 „ 21. Battle of Gujarat, Dalhousie annexes Punjab.  
 March. Thorbecke forms a Ministry in Holland pledged to extensive reforms.  
 „ 4-7. Schwarzenberg publishes a Constitution by imperial edict, and dissolves Austrian *Reichstag*.  
 „ 19. Hungarian Declaration of Independence. Kossuth "responsible Governor-President."

- 1849 March 23. Radetzky defeats Charles Albert of Piedmont at Novara.  
 „ 28. Frankfort Assembly suspend relations with Austria, and elect the King of Prussia German Emperor.  
 April 4. Twenty-eight German States accept Frankfort resolutions.  
 „ 11. Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany, restored to power by *plébiscite*.  
 „ 14. Hungarian Republic, and deposition of Francis Joseph, proclaimed.  
 „ 28. Saxon Lower Chamber dissolved.  
 „ 30. Garibaldi repulses Oudinot and a French force from Rome.  
 May 1. Convention of Balta Liman between Turkey and Russia arranges for suppression of revolution in Moldavia and Wallachia.  
 „ 3. Bombardment of Budapest begins.  
 „ 5. Fall of Palermo and end of Sicilian Revolution.  
 „ 7. Prussian troops suppress insurrection in Saxony.  
 „ 13. Insurrection in Baden.  
 „ 18. Kossuth issues Hungarian protest against Russian interference.  
 „ 21. Görgei recaptures Budapest.  
 „ „ Interview of Francis Joseph I and Nicholas I at Warsaw.  
 „ 25. National Assembly migrates from Frankfort to Stuttgart.  
 „ „ Austrians enter Florence.  
 „ 26. *Dreikönigsbündniss* (Prussia, Saxony, Hanover) concluded.  
 „ 30. Present electoral law of three grades introduced into Prussia.  
 May-June. Fall of Brescia. Haynau's reign of terror.  
 June 6. Kossuth reenters Budapest and prorogues Hungarian Parliament.  
 „ 6-16. National Assembly at Stuttgart sets up Regency of Empire and deposes *Reichsverweser*.  
 „ 25-30. Prussian troops suppress insurrection in Baden.  
 „ 30. Garibaldi evacuates Rome.  
 July 3. Görgei repulses Haynau from Acs.  
 „ 15. White terror in Rome.  
 „ 18. Austrians recapture Budapest.  
 „ 31. Bem and Hungarians defeated at Segesvár.  
 August 9. Haynau defeats southern Hungarian army at Temesvár.  
 „ 11-13. Kossuth hands over his powers to Görgei, who negotiates the surrender of Hungarian troops at Világos.  
 „ 24. Negotiations for surrender of Venice begin.  
 „ 27. Manin goes into exile, Austrian triumph in Italy.  
 October 5. Council of Prussia's "Union" votes for a National Assembly. Saxony and Hanover practically withdraw from the "Union."  
 „ 6. Thirteen Hungarian generals executed at Araù.  
 „ Execution of 114 civilians in Hungary, including Louis Batthyány.  
 Muravieff Amurski builds fort of Petropavlovsk in Kamschatka.  
 1850 Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood edit *The Germ*.  
 January 9. Piedmontese Parliament approves the peace with Austria.  
 February. Siccardi Laws in Piedmont.  
 „ 22. Hanover formally secedes from the "Union."  
 March 15. Falloux' Education Act.  
 June 9. Political clubs and public meetings forbidden in France.  
 July. Recall of Haynau from Hungary.  
 „ 2. Peace signed between Denmark and Prussia.  
 September. Dissolution of Diet in Hesse-Cassel on refusal to vote Budget.  
 „ 12. Revival of the old Germanic Diet.  
 Oct. 11-Nov. 6. Troops sent by Bavaria and Prussia to Hesse-Cassel.  
 November 15. End of the "Union."  
 „ 29. Olmütz Punctuation.

- 1850 December 23. Dresden Conferences open.  
Bruck's uniform tariff between Hungary and Austria.  
Constitutional Act of Australia.
- 1850-1 Louis Napoleon renews French claim to custody of the Holy Places.  
Thorbecke democratises local and provincial government of Holland.
- 1850-64 "Taiping" Rebellion in China.
- 1851 Gioberti's *Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*.  
April. *Reichsrath*, or Imperial Council of State, established in Austria.  
" Revolution of Saldanha in Portugal, *Acto Adicional*.  
May 16. Old Germanic Confederation completely restored.  
" Secret alliance of Austria and Prussia.  
June 13. Close of "Don Pacifico" incident.  
July 19-Aug. 10. French Legislative Assembly rejects project for constitutional revision, and is prorogued.  
August. Kossuth leaves Turkey, and goes to England and America.  
October. Spanish Concordat with Pope.  
December 1-8. *Coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon. Assembly dissolved.  
" 13. Schwarzenberg abolishes Austrian Constitution.  
" 21. Louis Napoleon empowered (by *plébiscite*) to draw up new French Constitution.  
Submarine telegraph laid between Dover and Calais.  
Great Exhibition in London.  
Abrogation of equal electoral rights in Mecklenburg-Schwerin.
- 1851-2 Restoration of Catholic hierarchy in England and Holland.
- 1851-8 Muravieff's campaigns in the Amur district.
- 1852 Montalembert's *Des intérêts Catholiques au XIX<sup>me</sup> siècle*.  
January 17. Sand River Convention grants independence to Transvaal.  
Jan.-Feb. French Constitution promulgated (Jan. 14) by Louis Napoleon, followed by period of severe repression and proscription.  
Jan. 28-May 10. Frederick VII of Denmark reoccupies Schleswig-Holstein.  
April. "April Movement" in Holland.  
May 6. Grand Duke abolishes the Constitution of Tuscany.  
November 2-21. *Senatusconsultum* proclaims Louis Napoleon hereditary Emperor of the French, which is ratified by *plébiscite*.  
" 4. Cavour becomes Prime Minister of Piedmont.  
December 7. "Mantuan Trials," ending in execution of Enrico Tazzoli and other conspirators.  
" 10. *Crédit foncier* of France established.  
Constitution Act for New Zealand.  
Second Burmese War, and British annexation of Pegu (Dec. 20).  
Draining of Lake of Haarlem by Dutch Government.
- 1853 Settlement of Clergy Reserves Question, Canada.  
Transportation of convicts to Australia finally abandoned.  
Gladstone's first Budget.  
January. Nicholas I reopens the Eastern Question to Sir Hamilton Seymour.  
" 20. Defeat of Turks. Montenegrin independence acknowledged.  
May 22. Prince Menshikoff withdraws from Constantinople.  
July 8. Commodore Perry and an American squadron visit Yedo.  
October. Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia retire to Vienna.  
" Sultan demands that Russia shall evacuate Moldo-Wallachia.  
November 30. Russian fleet destroys Turkish squadron at Sinope.
- 1854 February 23. Convention of Bloemfontein. British recognise independence of Orange Free State.  
April. Crimean War begins.

- 1854 July. Revolution in Spain, Ministry of Espartero.  
 September 20. Franco-British forces defeat Russians at the Alma and advance on Sevastopol.  
 October 25. Allies victorious at Balaklava, and (Nov. 5) at Inkerman.  
 \*December 8. Proclamation of dogma of "Immaculate Conception."  
 Elgin's Reciprocity Treaty between Canada and the United States.
- 1854-5 Beginnings of gold-rush in Australia.
- 1854-6 Abolition of slavery in various Portuguese settlements.  
 De Lesseps secures concessions from Saïd Pasha for Suez Canal.
- 1854-7 Piræus occupied by Franco-British troops.
- 1854-8 Treaties provide for opening of Japanese Ports and establishment of diplomatic relations with European Powers.
- 1854-9 Sir George Grey Governor of Cape Colony.
- 1855 January. Resignation of Aberdeen. Palmerston Premier.  
 „ 25. Piedmont joins France and England against Russia.  
 March. Peace conference between Russia and Allies opened at Vienna.  
 April 28. New military law in France.  
 August 16. Piedmontese win the victory of Chernaya over the Russians.  
 „ 18. Austrian Concordat with Rome (revoked 1867).  
 September. French capture Malakhoff redoubt at Sevastopol.
- 1855-60 Bruck Minister of Finance for Austria.
- 1856 March 6. Treaty of Paris ends Crimean War.  
 British annexation of Oudh.  
 Constitution granted to Luxemburg.
- 1857 February 20. Parliament condemns Palmerston's Chinese policy. (A dissolution gives him a large majority.)  
 May 10. Outbreak of Indian Mutiny at Mirat.  
 „ 26. Napoleon negotiates Treaty of Peace between Switzerland and King of Prussia, who abandons all claims to Neuchâtel.  
 June 9. Bank of France given special privileges.  
 „ 27. Nana Sahib's massacre at Cawnpore.  
 August. Garibaldi founds the "National Society."  
 „ Moltke becomes head of Prussian General Staff.  
 September 14-21. Delhi taken by assault.  
 November 22. Final relief of Lucknow.  
 December 28-9. Occupation of Canton by a Franco-British force.  
 Portuguese settle a white colony at Mozambique.  
 Denmark abolishes Sound Dues.  
*Gronowet* or Constitution of Potchefstroom.
- 1858 Széchenyi's *Survey of the anonymous Retrospect*.  
 January 14. Orsini attempts to assassinate Napoleon III.  
 March 21. British capture Lucknow.  
 July 21-2. Conference of Cavour and Napoleon III at Plombières.  
 November 1. Lord Canning first Viceroy of India, amnesty issued.  
 Treaty of Aigun. China surrenders left bank of Amur to Russia.  
 Jews enabled to sit in the English Parliament.
- 1859 Darwin's *Origin of Species*.  
 Meredith's *Ordeal of Richard Feverel*.  
 January 10. Treaty between France and Piedmont.  
 „ Moldavia and Wallachia form personal union under Couza.  
 April 19. France and Piedmont declare war against Austria.  
 June 24. Victory of Napoleon III at Solferino.  
 July 8. Armistice of Villafranca.  
 Aug.-Sept. Tuscany and the Duchies declare for union with Piedmont.

- 1859 December 22. La Guéronnière's pamphlet, *The Pope and the Congress*.  
Roon appointed War Minister by the Regent the Prince of Prussia.  
Juárez President of Mexico.  
Rise of Volunteer movement in England.
- 1859-61 Issue of Indian Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, and Penal Code.
- 1860 January. Cobden's Commercial Treaty with France.  
March. Union of Tuscany and the Emilia with Piedmont.  
" 24. Treaty of Turin cedes Nice and Savoy to Napoleon III.  
May 11-27. Garibaldi and the "Thousand" land in Sicily and take Palermo.  
" 31. Formation of National Bank of Russia.  
August 22-September 7. Garibaldi lands on Italian mainland, and enters Naples.  
October 12. Garibaldi's victory at the Voltorno.  
" 13. Victor Emmanuel II invades the Kingdom of Naples.  
" 20. "The October Charter" proposed for Hungary.  
" 21-2. Naples and Sicily declare for union with Piedmont.  
" 25. Meeting of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel at Caianello.  
November 4. The Marches and Umbria declare for union with Piedmont.  
" 24. Decrees permit free discussion to French Assemblies.  
Slavery abolished in Dutch East Indies.
- 1861 February 13. Fall of Gaeta.  
" 19. Manifesto proclaims emancipation of Russian Serfs.  
March. Russia grants concessions to Poland.  
" 17. The Kingdom of Italy proclaimed by the first Italian Parliament.  
October 31. France, England, and Spain unite to collect debts from Mexico.  
December. Settlement of "Trent" affair between England and United States.  
" 14. Death of Albert, Prince Consort of England.
- 1862 July. Confederate privateer *Alabama* leaves the Mersey.  
August 29. Garibaldi defeated and captured at Aspromonte.  
September. Bismarck becomes President of the Prussian Ministry.  
October 22. Provisional Government in Greece deposes King Otho.  
Swedish communes receive self-government.
- 1863 January 21. Revolution in Poland begins.  
June. French enter Mexico.  
" 5. Prince William of Denmark recognised as George, King of Greece.  
November. Death of Frederick VII of Denmark. Schleswig-Holstein declares for Duke of Augustenburg.  
Opening of the Scheldt to Belgian commerce.
- 1863-72 Maori Wars.
- 1864 February 1. Austro-Prussian forces occupy Schleswig-Holstein.  
May 25. Law passed permitting the rights of combination in France.  
August. Dispute as to Schleswig-Holstein begins between Austria and Prussia.  
October 10. Convention meets at Quebec to discuss Federation.  
September 15. Napoleon III's convention with Victor Emmanuel promises evacuation of Rome.  
November 20. Reform of Russian Law Courts.  
December 8. Papal Encyclical and Syllabus published.  
Peasants freed from serfdom and made landowners in Poland.  
Elective local Councils introduced into Russia.  
Signature of Geneva Convention.
- 1865 February. Deák's pamphlet anticipates the *Ausgleich*.  
December 10. Death of Leopold I of Belgium.  
Sir Harry Parkes British Minister in Japan.
- 1866 Atlantic Cable successfully laid.

- 1866 February. Habeas Corpus Act suspended in Ireland.  
 April 3. Italy and Prussia sign treaty of offensive and defensive alliance.  
 „ 20. Prince Charles of Hohenzollern elected Prince of Roumania.  
 May 6. Italy refuses to abandon Prussia in return for cession of Venetia.  
 „ 20. Battle of Irgai. Romanovsky takes Khozhend.  
 June 24. Italians defeated by Austrians at Custoza.  
 July 3. Prussian victory over Austrians at Königgrätz (Sadowa).  
 „ 12. New Constitution for Roumania voted by its Assembly.  
 „ 20. Austrian naval victory over Italians off Lissa.  
 „ 23. Mob-disturbance in Hyde Park, London.  
 August 12. Treaty of Prague between Prussia and Austria.  
 October 3. Treaty of Vienna between Italy and Austria.  
 „ 22. *Plébiscite* in Venetia declares for union with Italy.  
 December. Rome evacuated by French garrisons. (Reoccupied 1867.)  
 „ Conference in London as to Federation of Canada.  
 1866-7 *Referendum* and Initiative adopted by many Swiss Cantons.  
 1866-8 Last Ministry of Narváez in Spain.  
 1867 D'Azeglio's *I Miei Ricordi*.  
 February. Disraeli's Reform of the Franchise Bill.  
 March. French evacuate Mexico.  
 „ 3. Withdrawal of Turkish garrisons from Servia.  
 „ 29. British North America Act.  
 May. Conference in London and treaty for neutralisation of Luxemburg.  
 „ Execution of Emperor Maximilian by Juárez in Mexico.  
 October 18. Russia sells Alaska to United States.  
 November 3. De Faily and the French repulse Garibaldi from Mentana.  
 „ 8. Mikado resumes full governmental power in Japan.  
 Rattazzi confiscates church property in Italy.  
 Russia annexes Turkestan.  
*Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary.  
 Croatia granted Home Rule.  
 Formation of North German Confederation.  
 1868 May 11. Liberty of Press cancelled in France.  
 September. Prim's revolution in Spain. Deposition of Queen Isabel.  
 Church rates abolished in England.  
 Russia annexes Bokhara.  
 1868-9 Civil War in Japan. Triumph of the Mikado.  
 1869 Danilevsky's *Russia and Europe*.  
 February 6. Greece obliged to accept Turkish ultimatum.  
 December 28. Ollivier Ministry takes office in France.  
 Suez Canal opened.  
 Commercial Treaty between Portugal and the Transvaal.  
 1869-70 Hudson's Bay Territory transferred to the Dominion.  
 Louis Riel's Red River Rebellion in Canada.  
 Discovery of diamonds at Dutoitspan and Bultfontein.  
 Imperial garrisons withdrawn from New Zealand and Australia.  
 Meeting of Oecumenical Council at Rome.  
 1870 March 23. Constitutional Government established in France.  
 April 23. French *plébiscite* approves of Liberal reforms since 1860.  
 July 2. Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern's candidature to Spanish crown announced.  
 „ 12-5. Negotiations between France and Prussia as to this candidature.  
 „ 19. War declared by France against Prussia.  
 „ „ Dogma of Papal Infallibility voted.



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- 1870 August 3-6. Battles of Weissenburg and Wörth.  
 „ 6. Battle of Spicheren.  
 „ 16. Battles of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour.  
 „ 18. Battle of Gravelotte.  
 „ 31-Sept. 1. Battle of Sedan.  
 September 3-4. Revolution and Proclamation of Republic in Paris.  
 „ 19. Investment of Paris begins.  
 „ 20. Italian army enters Rome.  
 October 2. *Plébiscite* at Rome declares for union with Italy.  
 „ 27. Germans take Metz.  
 November 9. French recapture Orleans.  
 „ 26. Amadeo, Duke of Aosta, accepts throne of Spain.  
 „ 28-Dec. 4. Germans recapture Orleans.  
 December 30. Death of Prim.
- 1871 January 18. King of Prussia proclaimed Emperor of Germany in Versailles.  
 „ 20-8. Last sortie from Paris fails. Armistice signed by Bismarck and Favre.  
 February 2. Bourbaki's troops disarmed in Switzerland.  
 „ 17. French Assembly at Bordeaux declares for a Republican Government, and (March 1) ratifies the Prussian terms of peace.  
 March 13. London conference abrogates Black Sea clauses of Treaty of Paris.  
 „ 18. Disputes between Commune and Versailles Assembly begin.  
 „ Disturbances in the French provinces.  
 April 10-May 28. Hostilities at Paris between Commune and Versailles Assembly. Order restored after great slaughter. Numerous arrests and sentences.  
 August 31. New Constitution of France (Rivet-Vitet Law) proclaimed. Basutoland annexed to Cape Colony.
- 1872 Responsible Government given to Cape Colony.  
 1873 March. Russia annexes Khiva.  
 1874 April 19. New Federal Constitution for Switzerland becomes law.  
 1877 Carducci's *Odi Barbare*.

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